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Negation in Modern Greek revisited: selecting between two speaker-based accounts

Abstract: This study holds that negation phenomena in a natural language involve much more than mere logical entailments in some individual's epistemic model. The unique characteristics of negation, i.e., the persistent diachronic renewal of negative particles cross-linguistically, as well as the prevalent synchronic reinforcement of these particles through emphatic mechanisms, demand an analysis that casts the *expressive* speaker, not her epistemic model, in the leading role. Opting for a comprehensive account of negation in Modern Greek, the present analysis highlights this subjective involvement of the individual and suggests that it is the *thinking* and – more important – the *feeling* speaker that directs the distribution of Modern Greek negators.

Keywords: affectivity; expressivity; negative polarity items; (non)veridicality; square of opposition; subjunctive

> Reason is of its very essence egotistical. In many matters it acts the fly on the wheel.
> Charles Sanders Peirce[1]

1 Introduction

Veloudis (1982) was a first attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of negation in Modern Greek. Many relevant notions have enriched the literature since then, including Negative Polarity Items, Jespersen's cycle and Meillet's spiral, minimizers-maximizers-generalizers, pragmatic scalarity, metalinguistic negation,[2] Square of

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1 *The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898.* Lecture I: Philosophy and the conduct of life. In Ketner (1992: 111).

2 Notably, this variety was argued for in Veloudis (1982: 334–379), independently of Ducrot (1972), under the description 'contradictory negation'.

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Opposition, (non-)veridicality/antiveridicality, speaker's expressivity, etc. However, an overall description and understanding of Modern Greek negation encompassing these new inputs is still missing. The present paper intends to fill this gap. It maintains that such a comprehensive treatment is feasible *on condition that the leading role is given to the expressive speaker*.

In the wake of the analysis in Veloudis (1982), two approaches to negation phenomena, an analogical (Veloudis 1986 et seq.) and a digital one (Giannakidou 1993 et seq.), sprung up and unfolded along the lines of the notions above. Since then, a body of literature has developed that advocates the one or the other approach. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, there has not been any attempt to enter into a real debate with respect to these two divergent approaches. The present paper takes on this challenge. And this is not its only novelty: for the first time the overall function of Modern Greek negators is broken down according to the speaker's interaction with her world, her addressee, and the current text.

The prevailing approach to negation phenomena in Modern Greek in the last twenty-five years has been based on the notion of (non)veridicality. According to its proponents, (non)veridicality is a property of propositional operators:

 (i) A propositional operator *F* is veridical iff *Fp* entails that *p* is true in some individual's epistemic model; otherwise, *F* is nonveridical.
(ii) A nonveridical operator *F* is antiveridical iff *Fp* entails that *not p* is true in some individual's epistemic model.

(See, for example, Giannakidou 1998, 1999, 2009, 2011; Giannakidou and Mari 2021). Commenting on this digital[3] characterization, Chatzopoulou (2012: 27–28) notes:

> A veridical operator entails the truth of *p* in all worlds in the model, while a nonveridical operator expresses uncertainty: there are some worlds *w* where *p* is true, and some worlds *w'* where it is not. Within the class of nonveridical operators is the class of antiveridical ones, among which is negation; antiveridical operators entail the falsity of *p*. In other words, veridical operators reflect the speaker's certainty and commitment to the truth of the proposition which is uttered, whereas nonveridical operators reflect uncertainty and lack of commitment.

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3 For a more technical definition of the relativized (non)veridicality, see Giannakidou (1998):

In a context c = <cg(c), W(c), M, s, h, w_0, f, …>

i. A propositional operator *Op* is *veridical* iff it holds that: $[[Op \ p]]_c = 1 \rightarrow [[p]] = 1$ in some epistemic model M(x) ∈ c; otherwise *Op* is nonveridical.

ii. A nonveridical operator *Op* is *antiveridical* iff it holds that: $[[Op \ p]]c = 1 \rightarrow [[p]] = 0$ in some epistemic model M(x) ∈ c.

(where cg(c) and W(c) stand for the informational parameters of c, i.e., the *common ground* and the *context set*, respectively, whereas s, h, w_0 and *f* stand for the Kaplanian parameters of c, i.e., the speaker, the hearer, the world in which the utterance takes place and a function assigning values to variables, respectively). See Giannakidou (1998: 25, 31, 112).

In my view, this alethic anchoring is far from sufficient; negation phenomena are much more than mere logical entailments "in some individual's epistemic model". The unique characteristics of negation, i.e., the persistent diachronic renewal of negative particles cross-linguistically depending on these particles' synchronic reinforcement through emphatic mechanisms (the so-called Jespersen's cycle; see Jespersen 1917), ask for an analogical account that casts the *expressive speaker*, not her epistemic model, in the leading role. The present study puts on stage this subjective involvement of the individual: it is the *thinking* and – more important – the *feeling* speaker that pulls the strings of the use of the Modern Greek negators; or, to put it differently, it is how the speaker uses negators that feature her as a thinking and feeling subject.

Modern Greek employs two verbal negative particles, *δέ(ν)/dé(n)* and *μή(ν)/mí(n),*[4] and two non-verbal negative particles, *όχι/óhi* (*óxi* in Veloudis' [1982] transliteration) and *μή/mí.*[5] Regarding the verbal affiliation of the first pair, it has been well known since Veloudis (1982: 1–22) that *dé(n)* occurs with the indicative mood, never with the subjunctive, whereas the latter's typical negator is *mí(n)*, never *dé(n)* (see also Joseph and Philippaki-Warburton 1987; Veloudis and Philppaki-Warburton 1984, to mention earlier studies). (Non)veridicality attempts to account for these unexceptional preferences in terms of logical entailment/presupposition. To refer to two recent examples, Chatzopoulou argues that "the distribution of the Modern Greek NEG1 [*dé(n)*] and NEG2 [*mí(n)*] immediately falls from the (non)veridicality theory of polarity: the Modern Greek NEG2 is itself a polarity item that is licensed exclusively in nonveridical contexts" (2019: 34).[6] Similarly, Giannakidou and Mari maintain that the subjunctive is "the mood of nonveridicality and uncertainty" (2021: 66). They argue, in particular, that "the subjunctive mood depends on the nonveridical epistemic presupposition of a lexical entry" and that its use "is an indication of lack of knowledge":

> *Subjunctive as epistemic uncertainty*
> For a proposition *p* and an individual anchor *i* (where *i* is the speaker or a propositional attitude subject):
> SUBJUNCTIVE (*p*) entails that *i* does not know *p* to be true.
> The above is the broadest generalization for the subjunctive given what we have discussed so far—and it can account for all uses of subjunctive to be discussed in this book, including cases of autonomous subjunctive in main clauses. (Giannakidou and Mari 2021: 182).

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4 Their final *-n* may be omitted, depending on the phonological characteristics of the first segment of the following word. For more details, see Veloudis (1982: 2–3), among others.

5 For the theoretical recognition of this fourth particle, see Veloudis (1982: 1–5).

6 Note that Chatzopoulou's NEG2 encompasses not only the negative but also the affective occurrences of *mí(n)*. See Subsection 3.2 below.

(Non)veridicality, however, even as a rule of distribution, cannot closely track the relevant data, as discussed below. For example (see Subsection 3.1.3), *Mána ke na mín agapái to pedí tis!* 'What a mother! She doesn't even love her own child!' and its indicative counterpart, *Mána ken dén agapái to pedí tis!* 'A mother who does not love her own child!' do not differ regarding the truth of the proposition expressed: that the mother in question does not love her child is equally true in both, despite the presence of *mí(n)* + subjunctive in the first example, and the concomitant expectations of the proponents of (non)veridicality. What escapes their attention here, and in general, is the role of an emotionally involved speaker: crucially, the speaker is not simply a bearer of epistemic (truth-) values; she is also, and above all, a sensitive bearer of ethical values and personal emotions (condemnation, fear, hate, agony, worry, etc.) that are far from being separate from her utterances.

Seriously considering this point, I argue for a more inclusive and, hopefully, deeper account of negation in Modern Greek. The discussion benefits from a richer version of Langacker's (1991: 243) elaborated epistemic model depicted in Figure 1. As Langacker (1991: 242) explains, the essential notion in his model is that certain situations (or states of affairs) are accepted by a particular conceptualizer, C, as being real (i.e. *known reality*), whereas others are not (*unknown reality*). The present study adds to this notion by maintaining that C's (non)acceptance of a situation occurs on an epistemic *and emotive* basis: briefly, the conceptualizer-speaker not only knows, but also feels. It is in light of this modification that the Langackerian distinction 'known/unknown reality' is applied in the sections to follow.

More analytically, Section 2 deals with the speaker as an epistemic-expressive subject (internal cylinder of the elaborated epistemic model, typical negators *dé(n)*, *óhi*). In particular, Subsections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 cover the speaker's interaction with

Figure 1: Langacker's *Elaborated Epistemic Model* (Figure 6.2a in Langacker [1991: 244]).

her world, her addressee, and the text, respectively. Subsection 2.4 concludes the discussion by examining the applicability of the proposed analysis to what has been known as the Square of Opposition. Section 3 discusses the speaker as a feeling subject (external cylinder of the model, negators *mí(n)*, *mi*). In particular, Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 examine the interaction of the speaker's emotional self with the negative and affective aspects of *mí(n)*, respectively. Subsection 3.3 is devoted to a brief consideration of the fourth negator, *mí*. Finally, in Section 4, the virtues of an analogical speaker-based analysis of negation are advocated.

2 The speaker as a thinking subject: *dé(n)* and *óhi*

In this section I discuss how the negators of the internal cylinder, namely *dén* and *óhi*, attend the speaker's interaction with her world, her addressee, and the current text. This tripartite interaction forms a comprehensive, and novel, way of regarding *dén* and *óhi*'s activity, revealing aspects of negation that cannot be accounted for in terms of logical entailments in some individual's epistemic model.

2.1 Speaker's interaction with the world

According to Givón (1979: 107), negative utterances do not appear from nowhere:

> Negative assertions are used in language in contexts where the corresponding affirmative has been mentioned, deemed likely, or where the speaker assumes that the hearer – erroneously – holds to a belief in the truth of that affirmative.

This opinion is also held by Foolen (1991: 219):

> In a way, descriptive negation also has a contextual or discourse aspect, insofar as the use of a negative sentence always presupposes more or less strongly the contextual relevance of the positive counterpart. Saying *The sun isn't shining today* suggests that I or the addressee had the expectation or wish, or did not exclude the possibility, that the sun would shine today.

Similarly, Langacker (1991: 132) suggests that

> something *is not* only in response to some evocation (perhaps implicit) of the positive situation (e.g. I would hardly announce *We're not having pizza for supper* unless there were some expectation that we were). In the terminology of cognitive grammar, NEG is conceptually dependent, for it makes salient (though schematic) internal reference to the situation whose existence it denies.

Against this background, consider the following examples, assuming that their "*is not*" is actually "in response to some evocation (perhaps implicit) of the positive situation" (DPD stands for Holton et al.'s [1997] 'dependent'[7]):

(1) a. *Dén*   *érhete*   /   *erhótan*   /   *írthe*
           not   come.PRS.3SG / come.PST.IPFV.3SG / come.PST.PFV.3SG
           o   *Yánis.*
           ART.NOM Yannis
           'Yannis isn't coming/wasn't coming/didn't come.'
  b. *Dén*   *tha*   *érthi*   *o*   *Yánis.*
           not   FUT   come.DPD.3SG ART.NOM   Yannis
           'Yannis will not come.'
  c. *An* *dén* *érthi*   *o*   *Yánis,* *dén* *tha*
           if   not   come.DPD.3SG ART.NOM Yannis not   FUT
           lipithó.
           be_sorry.DPD.1SG
   'If Yannis does not come, I will not be sorry.'

(1a) belongs to the last instantiation (i.e. *érhete*) or to earlier instantiations of the known reality (*írthe*, *erhótan*). What can we say of (1b–c), though, which apparently belong to instantiations subsequent to the last instantiation of present reality? Evidently, Langacker's elaborated epistemic model (see Figure 1) is not much help in this instance. How can we explain the occurrence of *dén* on the right of the last instantiation of reality, i.e. in the domain of 'non-reality'?

    Langacker's dynamic evolutionary model, tailored to the future-time epistemic uses of *will*, provides the basis for a cogent explanation. See Figure 2. Reality, Langacker (1991: 276) comments,[8]

> never holds still. It relentlessly evolves through time, "growing" toward the future as each instantiation of present reality gives rise to the next […] This evolution exhibits *a kind of organic continuity*: successive instantiations of reality cannot represent totally distinct and unrelated conceptions. Instead, one instantiation bequeaths most of its organization to its successor, which diverges from it only in limited ways, and only as permitted by the world's structure (emphasis mine).

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7 The term refers to the perfective non-past forms that cannot occur independently of either the future/irrealis marker *tha* 'will/would' or the subjunctive markers *na* 'to' and *as* 'let's', whether they are physically present or not. See fn. 10 below.

8 He is having in mind "reality overall, not just known reality" (1991: 276, fn. 20).

Figure 2: The dynamic evolutionary model (Figure 6.8 in Langacker [1991: 277]).

In this light, the employment of negator *dén* + *tha*[9] (the future indicative) in (1b–c) comes as no surprise. The established reality lends veridicality to the future reality, as "one instantiation bequeaths most of its organization to its successor", and this is reflected in the grammar: *dén* + (future) indicative, instead of *mín* + subjunctive.

Perhaps the protasis in (1c) deserves special mention in this connection: its conditional *an* 'if' typically reflects speaker uncertainty, whereas the choice of negator and mood, i.e. *dé(n)* and future indicative,[10] conveys speaker certainty, in the sense of the previous paragraph. This apparent inconsistency can easily be resolved if we assign the dominant role to the speaker, not to logical entailment. As independently maintained in Nikiforidou and Katis (2000), the conditional marker *an* is neutral, compared with its rival conditional *na*, which reveals the speaker's personal interest and emotional involvement (see Subsection 3.2 below). As is to be expected, therefore, *an* functions as an "objective" 'if' of the Projected Reality, whereas *na* functions as a subjective 'if' of the Potential Reality, as depicted in Figure 2.

On the other hand, (1b–c) mean business for the (non)veridicality approach. To deal with cases such as (1b), as well as with the apodosis in (1c), Chatzopoulou (2019: 73) maintains that "the potential veridicality contribution that can be assigned to NEG1

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9 Note that, after Meillet (1912), this particle is commonly considered as the grammaticalized outcome of the ancient syntagm *θέλω* ('will, want, wish') *ἵνα* ('in order to, to').

10 *An* is a host of *tha* 'will' here, otherwise the presence of the imperfective non-past form *érthi* is inexplicable (see Veloudis and Philppaki-Warburton 1984; Veloudis 2017c). The full version of the protasis at hand would actually be *An dén tha érthi o Yánis* (= if not FUT come ART Yanis). For the pragmatic functions of such richer constructions, see Nikiforidou and Torres-Cacoullos (2010).

[*dé(n)*] in the future tense comes from the notion of assertion, which indicates speaker commitment and is thus veridical"; or, in syntactic terms, that NEG1 being "an unmarked negator in terms of nonveridicality" can, in these cases, be formally "represented as being in the scope of an assert-operator ASSERT(p), while the indication of future tense is below the negator. As a result, NEG1 with future indicative is not in the scope of a nonveridical operator" (2019: 73, fn. 12). But where does this "notion of assertion" come from? Is it also involved in cases like (1a), where the "unmarked" *dé(n)* is unexceptionally veridical? To the extent that such questions are not anticipated, the assert-operator ASSERT turns out to be a lot like an *ad hoc* mechanism. An analysis of (1b–c) inspired by Langacker's 'dynamic evolutionary model', as above, explains much more naturally what it is that makes *dé(n)* welcome in references to the future.

An equally questionable syntactic solution is suggested regarding the protasis of conditionals such as (1c). Chatzopoulou (2019: 166) argues that the "unmarked" negator NEG1 is the only possibility left in Modern Greek, as the – marked in terms of nonveridicality – NEG2 [*mí(n)*], typical negator in the protasis of conditionals up to the late Medieval stage,

> became an element that correlates to the C position, in contributing illocutionary force (as in the case of prohibition, interrogation, and introducing *verba timendi* complements). The conditional protasis does not offer such a position for NEG2. The C position in conditionals is filled by the ἄν/an/ or the εἰ/i/ conditional particles that now compete with NEG2 and are in complementary contribution.

(See also Chatzopoulou 2013: 28–37). Things are more complicated, however. First, *dé(n)*'s ancient predecessor *u:(k)*, οὐ(κ) started replacing *mí(n)*'s ancient predecessor, *me:*, μή, not after the Medieval stage, but as far back as the time of Christ, cf. *τί οὖν βαπτίζεις, εἰ σὺ οὐκ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς οὔτε Ἠλίας οὔτε ὁ προφήτης;* 'why then do you baptize if you are not the Messiah or Elijah or the Prophet?'(John 1:25). Second, οὐ(κ) may take the place of μή in Attic Greek conditionals introduced with *εἰ*, provided that the verb in the apodosis has emotional meaning: *μὴ θαυμάσῃς, εἰ πολλὰ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐ πρέπει σοι* 'you should not be puzzled if you do not deserve much of what has been said' (Isocr. 11D). Third, oblique questions introduced with *εἰ* employ either οὐ(κ) or μή, depending on the negator of the corresponding direct question: compare *ἐνετέλλετο […] εἰρωτᾶν, εἰ οὔ τι ἐπαισχύνεται* 'ordered […] to ask him if he is not ashamed' (Herod. I, 90), with *οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δικαίου μὴ ἀξιοῖ πλέον ἔχειν μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου* 'I am not asking you that, but merely if a just person would not have neither the determination nor the will to do this against another just person, but he would against an unjust person' (in which

case the direct question would have been *μὴ ἀξιοῖ μηδὲ βούλεται;*) (Plat. Pol. 349B).[11] Fourth, *mí(n)*'s ancient predecessor, *μή*, has been contributing illocutionary force (prohibition, interrogation, etc.) since the time of Homer – a fact that nevertheless did not preclude its cooccurrence with conditional *εἰ* for centuries; cf. *μή μ' ἐρέθιζε* 'don't irritate me' (Il. A. 33), *δέδοικα μή σε παρείπῃ* 'I'm afraid that he might fool you' (Il. A. 555). Fifth, as examples such as *Mána ke na mín agapái to pedí tis!* 'What a mother! She doesn't even love her own child!' in Section 1 reveal, *mí(n)* cannot unquestionably be considered "marked" in terms of nonveridicality; despite the presence of *mí(n)* + subjunctive, *Mána ke na mín agapái to pedí tis!* does not differ in truth from its counterpart with *dén* + indicative, *Mána ke dén agapái to pedí tis!* 'A mother who does not love her own child!'. (What really is happening here was hinted at in Section 1 and is more analytically explained in Subsection 3.1.3.)

To end this excursion to (non)veridicality, what is more problematic is the alleged unmarkedness of *dén.* There is ample evidence to support the conclusion that *dé(n)* is not less marked than *mí(n).*

2.2 Speaker's interaction with the addressee

If the examples in the preceding subsection feature the speaker in interaction with the world, the examples in the present subsection highlight her interaction with the addressee. The discussion, below, draws heavily on Veloudis (2017a, 2017b and the references therein).

Consider the utterances in (2):

(2) a. *Dén   írthe   KÁN   /   kanÉNAS   /   TÍPOTE   /*
        not   come.PST.PFV.3SG   EVEN   /   anyONE   /   anyTHING   /
        to paraMIKRÓ   /   POTÉ   /   kathÓLU.
        the SLIGHTEST   /   EVER   /   AT_ALL
        'S/he didn't EVEN come/No ONE [MASC] came/NoTHING came/
        Not even the SLIGHTEST thing came/S/he NEVER came/S/he didn't come AT
        ALL.'

  b. <u>*Dén*</u>   *érhese?.* [The extra punctuation marks will be explained below]
        not   come.PRS.2SG
        'Don't you come?'

  b′. *Dén*   <u>*érhese!?*</u>
        not   come.PRS.2SG
        'You are not coming!?'

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    c.   *Ke   pjós   dén   írthe/erhótan?!*
        and who not   come.PST.PFV/come.IPFV.3SG
        'Everybody came!'

(2a), the only example of 'asymmetric negation' (Miestamo 2007; van der Auwera and Krasnoukhova 2018) in Section 2, displays a constellation of emphatic Negative Polarity Items (NPIs): the minimizers *KÁN*, *kanÉNAS*, *to paraMIKRÓ*, the generalizers *TÍPOTE*, *POTÉ*, and the maximizer *kathÓLU*. What is the contribution of these emphatic NPIs to the meaning of the utterance? Why do we need them in the first place, given that (2a)'s symmetrical counterpart *Dén írthe* 'S/he didn't come' is also available? Such questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without resorting to the speaker's interaction with her addressee. All one needs to do to bring this out is (i) to place a randomly selected version of (2a) in what would be considered its natural context, and (ii) to take into account the etymological origin of its grammaticalized NPI. Consider, for instance, *Dén írthe KÁN*:

    A: – *Parémine méhri télus sto sinédrio?* 'Did he stay until the end of the convention?'

    B: – *Dén írthe KÁN.* 'He didn't EVEN come.'

As Veloudis (1996, 1998, 2003, 2017a, 2022) points out, *KÁN* 'even if' comes from the conflation of an intensifying *KE* 'and' with the conditional *ÁN* 'if': *KÁN* is an emphatic, not to say emblematic, concessive NPI. In what way does the concession it expresses benefit the negative reaction of Speaker B? The latter, not being content with a simple *No, he didn't*, chooses a circular, estranging path, involving both 'pragmatic scalarity' and 'logical processing'; crucially, on the part of the addressee, as he is essentially invited to participate in a logical 'game' (cf. Ahern and Clark's [2017] 'signaling games').

    More analytically, *KÁN* carries out a specific function: as a kind of meta-message, it signals the following theatrical strategy of Speaker B: *Even if I do you the favor to check, evaluate, count, mind, bother (to consider), etc.*[12] *the least, most elementary, most rudimentary, etc. condition regarding his staying until the end of the convention (i.e. the fact that he came to the convention), I can assure you this: he did not come* (see Veloudis [2022] and the references therein).

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12 Interestingly, as pointed out in Veloudis (2017a: 131, fn. 11), the verbs on which this conversational generosity relies are in fact the 'verbs of indifference' *care*, *matter*, *mind*, *bother*, etc., that Hoeksema (1994: 275) has – independently and inexplicably – associated with negative polarity. Indeed, following the strategy above, the speaker displays indifference regarding her greater exposure to falsification.

Veloudis' analysis does not end here, however; it goes even deeper. Counting on the current context, he explains, Speaker B subtly furnishes her addressee with all he needs to conclude, deductively, 'no, he didn't (stay until the end of the convention)':

> If he stayed until the end of the convention, he came to the venue (where this convention was taking place), at least.

> He did not come.

> Therefore, he did not stay until the end of the convention.

(*modus tollens*). It is obvious what this rhetorical strategy amounts to: the negative reaction of speaker B *Dén írthe KÁN* 'He didn't EVEN come' induces a logical, not simply contingent, truth; crucially, with the involvement of the addressee.

The scalar background of this upgrade should not pass unnoticed. As Israel (2001: 325) more generally points out regarding NPIs and Positive Polarity Items (PPIs):

> The need to modulate one's utterances to achieve particular rhetorical effects is a basic feature of linguistic interaction. The conceptual structure of scalar reasoning turns out to be particularly useful in this respect. By carefully manipulating scalar inferences a speaker can modulate the rhetorical strength of her utterances. The use and distribution of polarity items thus turns out to be the grammatical reflex of a much more general cognitive phenomenon.

There is a whole host of minimizers, maximizers, and generalizers (see Veloudis 2017a) that allow these "rhetorical effects" to emerge. Minimizers, for example, are not a small stock of items; even verbs such as 'come' in the logical sequence above may function as minimizers.

Utterances such as (2a) have been widely discussed in the (non)veridicality literature. With a poor outcome, however: (non)veridicality can tell us no more than that NPIs such as *KÁN*, *kanÉNAS*, etc., are licensed only in the environment of an antiveridical operator such as *dén*. This, however, comes nowhere near to what the preceding paragraphs reveal.

Turning now to (2b), _Dén érhese?_., and (2b'), _Dén érhese!?_, a negative 'queclarative' and a negative 'whimperative,' to recall Sadock's (1970, 1971) long-forgotten terms, are employed for the expression of rhetorical assertions and kind requests,[13] respectively. Both terms differ from the homomorphic negative question *Dén érhese?* 'Aren't you coming?' only in the disposition of stress and the intonational contour (the underlining and the symbols '?.' or '?!', adopted here in line with Veloudis [2017b], are intended to

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13 It is well known from the relevant literature that, unlike in English, present indicative constructions in Modern Greek constitute a "conventional" (Sifianou 1992: 215) or even "characteristic" (Canakis 2007: 263) and "fairly prototypical" (Vassilaki 2017: 116) tool of positive or negative off-record politeness strategies.

represent, respectively, heavier stress and the half-rising intonation contour). What is it, then, that renders formally interrogative utterances suitable, if not indispensable, for the crosslinguistic expression of rhetorical assertions or of kind requests, whose "essential import resides in facets of the speaker-hearer interaction," to put it in Langacker's (2008: 475) terms? This question, raised in Veloudis (2017b), was not left without an answer. Assuming that 'eliciting a yes/no answer on the part of the addressee' is the plain "story" of polar questions, he suggests that

> queclaratives and whimperatives are two adjacent semantic categories which in fact recount this plain story: a yes/no-*like* response on the part of the addressee is actually at issue in both cases, as queclaratives call for the addressee's *agreement/disagreement* with respect to what is being emphatically stated, whilst whimperatives call for the addressee's *compliance*, allowing at the same time his *non-compliance*, with respect to what is being kindly requested. (Veloudis 2017b: 120)

What this amounts to is obvious: according to Veloudis (2017b), negative queclaratives and whimperatives such as (2b) and (2b') function as figurative products of the source category 'yes/no question'. In particular, (2b), heavily based on the encyclopedic knowledge the speaker shares (or assumes she shares) with her addressee, becomes a short-circuited yes/no question, "homonymous" with its yes-answer only, "so that it can figuratively stand for it" (Veloudis 2017b: 123). On the other hand, (2b'), seriously considering the addressee's negative 'face', invites him to see a request, actually a Face Threatening Act, "*as* a question that allows for a quick, as well as foreseen, exit" (Veloudis 2017b: 124).

Two conventional expressions, namely *dén mu lés?!* 'tell me!' (lit. 'you are not telling me') and *mí(n) mu pís?!* 'tell me more!' (lit. 'don't tell me'), should be mentioned in this connection. What makes these expressions distinct, in addition to their specific intonational contour, is their more or less metalinguistic character. The expression *dé(n) mu lés!?* functions as a prelude to, or is embedded in, or even at the end of, questions in Modern Greek, coercing the addressee to answer the speaker – an interesting, if not curious, variety of "on-record off-recordness," to use Brown and Levinson's (1987: 212) term. Its twin expression, *mí(n) mu pís!?*, on the other hand, pushes the speaker toward saying more, rather than silencing her. Undoubtedly, *dén mu lés?!* and *mí(n) mu pís?!*, as well as queclaratives and whimperatives such as (2b) and (2b'), pose a serious challenge to the (non)veridicality approach, assuming that its adherents were ever willing to look at this section of the relevant data.

This point applies also to utterances such as (2c), *Ke pjós dén írthe/erhótan*?!,[14] because they deepen the speaker-addressee interaction. To begin with, such

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14 '*Ke* wh-word *dé(n)* X' is a highly productive construction: cf. *Ke pjón den rótise?!* '(s)he asked everyone,' *Ke pú den épsaksan?!* 'they looked everywhere,' *Ke póte den ítan lojikós o Yánis?!* 'Yannis has been always reasonable,' *Ke tí den idame ekí?!* 'We saw everything there,' and so on.

utterances point basically to the upper value of a pragmatic scale that the speaker shares (or considers shared) with her addressee. Hence, the 'even' aura of these utterances. (2c), for example, implies 'even the most unexpected visitor came,' which is equivalent to 'everyone (in the scale) came'. It is no exaggeration to state that the construction at hand functions as a rhetorical maximizer. At the same time, if its negator *dén* is omitted, the rhetorical character is retained but, crucially, the relevant scale is reversed. *Ke pjós írthe?*. lit. 'and who came?', for instance, implies 'not even the most expected visitor came', which is equivalent to 'nobody came'. (In the same line, the examples in fn. 14 become minimizers, provided their negator is omitted: *Ke pjón rótise?*. 'He didn't ask anybody', *Ke pú épsaksan?*. 'They looked nowhere', *Ke póte ítan lojikós o Yánis?*. 'Yannis has never been reasonable', *Ke tí ídame ekí?*. 'We saw absolutely nothing there', and so on.) Obviously, this behavior subsumes these utterances under the phenomenon of 'scale reversing' (Fauconnier 1975a, 1975b, 1979, 1980). *Ke pjós dén írthe?!* and its counterpart *Ke pjós írthe?!* function as rhetorical ways of eliciting what Fauconnier described as 'quantificational readings' of superlatives, grammatical, cf. *the most difficult*, *the simplest*, etc., and pragmatic, cf. *Einstein*, *Onassis*, etc.

2.3 Speaker's interaction with the text

'Metalinguistic' negation[15] is a "by no means marginal or inconsequential in communication" phenomenon (Horn 1989: 373), the clear characterization of which is pending (see Foolen 1991). In this subsection, the term 'metalinguistic' applies to the use of negation in utterances in which the speaker "may contradict what has just been said by another, [s]he may contradict some assumption or implication of what has been said or done by another, or [s]he may contradict [her]self" (Liberman and Sag 1974: 421). The brief presentation of this phenomenon, below, draws heavily on Veloudis (1982, 1986, 2019).

Contrast the negative utterances in (3a) and (3a′):

(3) a. *Mu   édikse   mja   paljá   polithróna.   Dén   íhe*
         to_me   point.PST.3SG   an   old   armchair   not   have.PST.3SG
         éna   pódi   ke   me   rótise   an   boró   na
         a   leg   and   me   ask.PST.3SG if   can.PRS.1SG SBJV
         ti   diorthóso.
         it   fix.DPD.1SG
         'He pointed at an old armchair. It lacked one leg, and he asked me if I could'
         fix it.

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15 Since Ducrot (1972). See Horn (1985, 1989), Veloudis (1986). See also fn. 2.

a′. A: – *I*   *paljá*   *psáthini*   *polithróna*   *íhe*   *éna*
                 the   old   wicker   armchair   have.PST.3SG   a
                 pódi.
                 leg
                 'The old wicker armchair had a leg.'
      B: – *Dén*   *íhe*   *éna*   *pódi.*   *Ítan*   *kremastí.*[16]
                 not   have.PST.3SG   one   leg   was   swinging
                 'It was not lacking a leg. It was a swinging one.'

Apparently, (3a)'s 'ordinary' *dén* differs in function from its 'contradiction' twin in (3a′) (adopting Karttunen and Peters' 1979 terminology; see also Veloudis 1982). Unlike (3a)'s "informative" (Veloudis 1986: 207–8) *dén* (: *dén íhe éna pódi* '[it is the case that] it lacked a leg'), *dén* in (3a′) is relatively uninformative as it exercises a rejecting, even erasing, action. Speaker B employs this metalinguistic aspect of *dé(n)* "to put things in order: a wrong conversational entry is wiped out leaving room to what the speaker considers as the right entry" (Veloudis 2019: 72; 1986: 207–8). That is, before passing on to her own contribution (i.e. *ítan kremastí* '[it] was a swinging one'), Speaker B quotes Speaker A's contribution just to delete it from the context (*dén "íhe éna pódi"*).[17] To recall Horn's (1989: 397) eloquent depiction of metalinguistic negation, A's contribution *is* in B's response *but not of it*. This action is figuratively reflected in the 'rise in pitch' that characterizes Speaker B's negative utterance. Since Bolinger (1965), it is widely acknowledged that a rise in pitch, his so-called 'accent B,' indicates incompleteness. See Veloudis (1982: 362–7) for the employment of this 'marked' pitch contour in Modern Greek context-bound denials.

Note that, as a rule, metalinguistic and ordinary negators do not differ in form across different languages. This is quite natural, provided that we espouse Langacker's conjecture that "negation is *absence from a space*", e.g. from present reality (1991: 133 and fn. 14; emphasis mine). Metalinguistic negation, as outlined in the preceding paragraph, can be understood as *absence from a conversational space*.

Apparently, then, we are dealing with two sides of the same coin, as this is also testified by the second negator of the internal cylinder. Similar to *dé(n)*, the non-verbal negator *óhi* also has both an ordinary and a metalinguistic function;[18] cf. (3bB), (3b′) and (3cB), (3c′), respectively, below (adapted from Veloudis [1982], examples [36a′], [41a] and [57]):

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16 (3a–a′) are adapted from Veloudis (1982: 270), examples (24) and (23), respectively.
17 Anything can be true except that the armchair in question stands on one foot. For an extensive discussion of these 'coping denials', see Veloudis (1982: 256–386).
18 For an extensive discussion of *óhi*, in comparison with *mí*, see Veloudis (1982: 26–82). For the etymology of *óhi*, see Landsman (1988–1989: 25–26) and Joseph (2001).

(3)   b.   A: – *Épjasan*   *ti*   *María ke*   *to*   *Yáni.*
                 arrest.PST.PFV.3PL   ART.ACC Maria and   ART.ACC Yanni
                 'They arrested Maria and Yannis.'

           B: – *Óhi*   *to*   *Yáni.*
                 not   ART.ACC   Yanni
                 'No, not Yannis.' [= 'They didn't arrest Yannis.']

      b′.   *Épjasan*   *ti*   *María, alá/ke óhi to*   *Yáni!*
             arrest.PST.PFV.3PL ART.ACC Maria   but/and not ART.ACC Yanni
             An   *íne*   *ðinato!*
             if   is   possible
             'They arrested Maria but not Yannis! I'll be damned!'

      c.   A: – *Épjasan*   *to*   *Yáni.*
                 arrest.PST.PFV.3PL   ART.ACC   Yanni
                 'They arrested Yannis.'

           B: – *Épjasan*   *ti*   *MARIA, óhi to*   *Yáni.*
                 arrest.PST.PFV.3PL   ART.ACC Maria   not   ART.ACC   Yanni
                 'They arrested Maria, not Yannis. (You are wrong!)'

      c′.   *´Irthan*   *óhi líjes forés.*
             come.PST.PFV.3PL   not   few   times
             'They came quite a few times.'

Óhi to Yáni in (3b) is the elliptic version of the sentence negation *Dén épjasan to Yáni* 'They didn't arrest Yannis'. The same holds for *alá/ke óhi to Yáni* in (3b′), which can be considered a verbose version of (3b.B).

On the other hand, (3c) exemplifies a corrective function of *óhi*: it acts as an a posteriori eraser of the wrong information (*óhi* ~~to Yáni~~); see Veloudis (1982: 339–44, Appendix) for this context-bound, erasing function of *óhi* – 'metalinguistic', according to the later terminology (Horn 1985; Veloudis 1986). Giannakidou (1998: 50) rediscovered the metalinguistic function of *óhi*; however, she does not at all mention the metalinguistic function of *dén*. To the best of my knowledge, metalinguistic negation has not been a subject of attention in the (non)veridicality literature.

Finally, (3c′) presents an interesting case of constituent negation. As pointed out in Veloudis (2019), the speaker appears to distance herself from her own characterization of the visitors' comings: according to her alethic calculations, *líjes* sounds too strong and should be toned down. As with metalinguistic negation, the negated material is again *a priori* available, only this time not as a quotation of someone else's saying: both *líjes* and its negation belong to the same person, i.e. the speaker. A contradiction, in all appearances! What rescues her is 'litotes', a figure of speech known for a long time: the speaker exploits the correcting action of her *óhi* to leave

room rhetorically for negotiation of what her *líjes* is expressing in rather absolute terms. For the similarities, and dissimilarities, between metalinguistic negation and litotes, see Veloudis (2019).

2.4 Summary

It is well known in the relevant literature that a peculiar asymmetry characterizes the negative side of the Square of Opposition. See Figure 3. According to Horn (2012: 419), "[i]n many, probably most, languages, neither of the negative positions (E or O) is lexicalized. But the generalization remains sound: A, I, and often E values may lexicalize, O values may not". The O values, in other words, resist univerbation (cf. *nall), in contrast to the E values (cf. *none*). Veloudis (2019) argues that this mysterious and, as it turns out, universal restriction is not inexplicable once we admit that it is the expressive speaker's interaction with her addressee that drives this – otherwise logical – structure.

Our discussion in the preceding three subsections revealed that Modern Greek belongs to the languages that lexicalize A, I, and E values; and, more importantly, that it falls nicely under the rubric of Veloudis' (2019) speaker-based conception of the square. This fact allows one to consider the examples so far discussed from a different, more general, perspective. Indeed, (apart from the interrogative in form [2b], [2b′], and [2c], of course) they echo the right-side corners, *E* and *O*. Specifically, as Veloudis (2019: 68) remarks, the *E*-corner (i.e. *no*, *none*, *nothing*, etc.), contradictory to the *I*- corner (*some*, *someone*, *somewhere*, etc.), hosts the crosslinguistic reinforcement of negation through the engagement of – the open class of – minimizers (*no*, *no one*, *nowhere*, etc.), on both a synchronic and a diachronic basis. Following the Jespersenian history of Modern Greek *dé(n)*, this negator is the remnant of *u:dén*, *οὐδέν*, i.e., of the intensified form of the ancient indicative negator (<*οὐ* 'not' + *δέ*

Figure 3: The square of opposition (see Veloudis [2019] and the references therein).

[INTENSIFIER] + *ĕn* 'one') meaning 'not even one'.[19] This fact obviously suggests that not only (2a) but also (3a), (3b.B), (3b'), and the examples in (1) above are reflections of the E-corner.

On the other hand, the *O-* corner (*not all*, *not every*, etc.), contradictory to the *A*-corner (*all*, *every*, etc.), is the habitat of the counteractive function of negation. As Veloudis (2019: 72) puts it,

> due to its contradictoriness, O-corner's *not* suggests that everything is true but what falls within its scope, i.e., but the inhabitant of the A-corner. This is in fact what makes this corner's negation special: it carries out an essentially correcting function, which however leaves us halfway: we know what is to be modified, rejected, revised, disallowed, etc., but not what its appropriate replacement is. In my view, it is this correcting function that makes O-corner's – but not E-corner's – *not* an ideal candidate for rhetorical devices like litotes, as well as for the expression of metalinguistic negation [...].

This means that the O-corner is the base of the operations of the metalinguistic and litotic 'not', hosting examples like our (3a'B), (3c.B) and (3c').

Evidently, there is no place for the other two negators, *mí(n)* and *mí*, in the Square of Opposition. The next section considers why this is the case.

3 The speaker as a feeling subject: *mí(n)* and *mí*

It is time to follow the speaker to the external cylinder of Figure 1. Free from the epistemic bondage of her reality, she can now express her emotional self: to wish, to prohibit, to admit, to disapprove, to want, to exhort, to anguish, to wonder, to threaten. The subjunctive mood is the typical mechanism that allows us to meet this epistemically unchained, feeling speaker in the flesh. What is most impressive is that *na* 'to' and *as* 'let's', the two subjunctive particles,[20] are particularly revealing in this respect. On the one hand, *na* (<ancient *ína*, *ína* 'in order to, to'), in contrast to its

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19 In line with Veloudis (2017a: 121, fn. 4), it can be maintained that the loss of *oὐδέν*'s first syllable of the negator *oὐ-*should not be ascribed to the dynamic stress on the last syllable, *-δέν*. The substitution of the latter, in fact, of an intensifier-minimizer, for *oὐδέν* should be regarded instead as a case of PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, analogous to that which led to the substitution of the intensifier-minimizer *pas* (PART) for *ne … pas* (WHOLE) in French. In both cases, the concurrent intensifier-minimizer provided assurance that the intensified negator was really "there"; thus *oὐ-* and *ne* ended up being rather redundant, and finally their physical presence became unnecessary. In that stage, the intensifier-minimizer turned into an inherent negative particle.
20 Following the general drift towards analyticity, the synthetic subjunctive of Ancient Greek has become analytic in Modern Greek: concessive *as* 'let's' (in independent sentences only) and degenerated deictic *na* 'to' (Christidis 1985; Christidis and Nikiforidou 1994; Veloudis 2001) are its markers. The physical presence of this degenerated deictic *na* is not always necessary. See Subsection 3.1.2.

stressed twin *ná* 'lo, here is', denotes distance from the speaker's reality (see the discussion in Veloudis [2001, 2017c]) and "involves the epistemic issue of (non) reality" (Nikiforidou 2004: 94). On the other hand, *as* (<ancient *áfes, ἄφες* the imperative of *ἀφίημι* 'to let, to allow') expresses the speaker's request to her addressee to go beyond the borders of their epistemic reality. (Regarding the analysis of the synthetic ancient subjunctive, Modern Greek seems to have closely followed the antithesis internal/external cylinder of Figure 1, providing independent evidence for the Langackerian relevant distinction between known and unknown reality.).

With respect to negation, Modern Greek is particularly generous. According to Janda and Joseph (1999: 345), the speaker has at her disposal a 'morphological constellation' of at least 10 *mí(n)-mí*'s,[21] which "[o]n a formal level, all share the common phonological 'core' of an initial sequence [mi], thus characterizable as// #mi//. On a functional level, *all share a semantic core relating to negation* […]" (emphasis mine). Obviously, *mí(n), μή(ν)*, comes from the ancient negator *me:, μή*. It owes its final *-n* to analogical alignment with its counterpart negator *dé(n)* of indicatives, in which the final *-n* is etymologically justified. "Still", Janda and Joseph (1999: 347) note, "the analogy that changed μή to μη(ν) was only a quasi-generalization, given that it did not extend to all instances of μή and thus led to some divisions within the overall set of realizations of μή". See Section 1 and fn. 5 above.

Below, I examine *mí(n)* as a negative particle (Subsection 3.1) and as an 'affective', degenerated negative particle (Subsection 3.2); the consideration of the *n*-less negative *mí* (Subsection 3.3) concludes the discussion.

3.1 Negative *mí(n)*

According to Liddell and Scott (1996), the ancient *μή, me:* displays subjectivity, compared with its objective rival *οὐ, u:*; moreover, it is "used in cases where the Negation depends on some previous Condition, either expressed or implied" (*A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon* [1889: 442]). The functions of *me:*'s modern descendant, *mí(n) μή(ν)*, are quite similar. The subsections, below, display (albeit non-exhaustively) a spectrum of the speaker's emotional involvement with something "either expressed or implied" (see the quotation above). More specifically, they deal with the feeling speaker's interaction with the world (3.1.1), with the addressee (3.1.2), and with the text (3.1.3) – a tripartite interaction, again, as in the case of the thinking speaker, Section 2.

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21 Willmott (2003: 313) reduces their number to five.

3.1.1 Speaker's interaction with the world

A speaker may be forbidding/concurring, as in (4a), conceding/shrugging/wishing, as in (4b), censuring, as in (4c), dismaying, as in (4d), or displeased, as in (4e):

(4)   a.   *Na/As   mín   érhete   o   Yánis.*
          SBJV   not   come.PRS.3SG   ART.NOM   Yannis
          'Yannis is not to/may not be coming [anymore]'

     b.   *Na/As   mín   erhótan   o   Yánis.*[22]
          SBJV   not   come.PST.IPFV.3SG   ART.NOM   Yannis
          'Yannis shouldn't have come/I'd rather wish Yannis wasn't coming.'

     c.   *Sigá   (na)   mi   fovithó!*[23]
          slow   SBJV   not   be_intimidated.DPD.1SG
          'As if I were to be intimidated!'

     d.   *Na   mín   érthi   KÁN   /   kanÉNAS   /   POTÉ   /   etc.*
          SBJV   not   come.DPD.3SG   EVEN   /   anyONE   /   EVER   /   etc.
          'S/he is not to EVEN come/No ONE is to come/S/he is NEVER to come.'

     e.   *Pistévo   na   mín   érχete.*
          believe.PRS.1SG   SBJV   not   come.PRS.3SG
          'I reckon s/he is hopefully (not) coming.'

It is interesting to compare (4e)[24] with its epistemic counterpart (4e'):

(4)   e'. *Pistévo   oti   dén   érhete.*
          believe.PRS.1SG   that   not   come.PRS.3SG
          'I believe that (s)he/it is (not) coming.'

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22 Uttered while Yannis is already there, and the aggressive/indifferent speaker is aware of that.
23 A chant that prevailed in Greece during litigation, and the subsequent conviction for criminal conspiracy, of the far-right political party Golden Dawn. Crucially, *Sigá (na) mí(n) ((dé[n])) X!* is a highly productive construction in Modern Greek. For more examples and relevant discussion, see Alexiou (2005: 71) and the references therein.
24 Surprisingly, examples such as this escape the (non)veridicality account. Regarding its recent manifestation:

> [P]istevo, nomizo, onirevome […] *strictly select indicative.* The Greek doxastics are therefore lexically specified as selecting complements marked indicative by *oti.* Mood selection is therefore in this case like case selection, e.g. accusative or dative, for the direct object of the verb in a language that assigns case. And just like with case, *mood alternations are not possible.* (Giannakidou and Mari 2021: 162–163; emphasis mine)

On the other hand, a Google search delivered 31, 810, 000 and 23, 800, 000 results for *pistévo na* and *pistévo óti*, respectively.

The speaker is emotionally involved in the former but not in the latter. The same holds as far as their negative versions are concerned:

(4)   f.   *Dén   pistévo   na   mín (dén) érhete.*
           not   believe.PRS.1SG SBJV not (not) come.PRS.3SG
           'I cannot believe that s/he is not coming.'

and

(4)   f'. *Dén   pistévo   oti   dén   érhete.*
           not   believe.PRS.1SG that not   come.PRS.3SG
           'I do not believe that s/he is not coming.'

The possibility of a 'pleonastic' *dén* in the – otherwise hostile – environment of the subjunctive in (4f) should not pass unnoticed: *dé(n)*'s sole mission in this use is to strengthen the involvement of the speaker.[25]

   It is even more interesting to note that although all the unstressed examples in (4) are aligned with respect to the speaker's involvement, they are not necessarily aligned regarding the truth. In particular, (4b), when referring to the past, and (4c) are both veridical, compared with the nonveridical (4a), (4d), (4e), and (4f). Of course, this conflicts with the function that the (non)veridicality approach assigns to the subjunctive (e.g., see the relevant quotation from Giannakidou and Mari in Section 2, above).

   Now, let us consider the example below (borrowed from the *Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek 1998*):

(5)   *Na   mín   ékane   tóso   krío, tha*
       SBJV   not   do.PST.IPFV.3SG so_much   cold IRR
       sinéhiza   ti   vólta   mu.
       continue.PST.IPFV.1SG   the   walk   my
       'I would have hoped that it wasn't that cold, so that I could continue my walk.'

Na mín implies that the speaker wishes it were not so cold. The corresponding conditional with *an dén*, on the other hand, lacks this aspect:

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25 The apparent inconsistency is instantly removed if we consider (4) as a laconic version of *Dén pistévo na mín (tíhi ke) dén érhete.* Note that the construction *mín tíhi ke (dén) X* is quite common in independent clauses, cf. *Mín tíhi ke dén érthis* 'Don't even think of not coming', *Mín tíhi ke dé dehtún* 'They shouldn't even think of not accepting', *Mín tíhi ke pís óhi* 'Don't even think of saying no', etc., indicating a really demanding speaker. According to Theodoropoulou (2001: 254), *mín tíhi ke* envisages the small likelihood of the non-fulfilment of the wish, and, in that sense, fortifies the meaning of the complement. For a thorough examination of pleonastic *dé(n),* see Alexiou (2005: 77–112) and the references therein.

(5′) *An   dén   ékane   tóso   krío,   tha   sinéhiza*
      if   not   do.PST.IPFV.3SG so_much   cold   IRR   continue.PST.IPFV.1SG
      ti   vólta   mu.
      the   walk   my
      'If it weren't that cold, I would continue my walk.'

Contrary to what the adherents of (non)veridicality would expect, the protasis in (5) is as veridical and evidential as the protasis in (5′). They differ only in that the latter does not display the affectivity that characterizes the former. As Nikiforidou and Katis (2000) convincingly argue, *na* deictically anchors the antecedent to the speaker, leading to an implicature of personal involvement.

3.1.2 Speaker's interaction with the addressee

Unlike Ancient Greek, Modern Greek does not allow for true negative imperatives (see, among others, Chatzopoulou 2012: 91–2, 244–29, 2019: 34, 159–62; Holton et al. 1997: 206, 420; Veloudis 1982: 14–7). In Modern Greek, as in Spanish, the subjunctive, being more indirect than the imperative, is employed to soften the respective prohibition (e.g., see van der Auwera & Krasnoukhova 2018: 107).[26]

The examples in (6), below, provide a glimpse into the interaction of an involved speaker with her addressee:

(6) a. *(Na)   mí(n)   mu   pís!*
         SBJV   not   to_me   tell.DPD.2SG
         'Don't tell me!'
     b. *Mí(n)   mu   pís!?*
         not   to_me   say.DPD.2SG
         'You don't say!?'
     c. *(Na)   mín   ksehnáme   pos   o   Yánis   íne*
         SBJV   not   forget.PRS.1 PL that   ART.NOM Yannis   be.PRS.1SG
         akóma   ekí.[27]
         still   there
         'Let's not forget that Yannis is still there.'

In cases of immediacy, *na* may be absent, assigning to *mí(n)* the role of the index of subjunctive. The *na*-less version of (6a), then, typically concerns the very moment of its utterance. The second person is the ideal condition, of course, as it readily fulfills the prerequisite of simultaneity. This factor explains why *na* is unacceptable in (6b),

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26 For a syntactic explanation concerning the unavailability of true negative imperatives in Modern Greek, see Chatzopoulou (2013: 13–4) and the references therein.
27 (6c) is cited without *(Na)* in Janda and Joseph (1999: 344, ex. 4d.ii).

in which the speaker pretends she wants her hearer to stop talking at that very moment despite wanting to know more (see Subsection 2.2). On the other hand, the first-person plural in the *na*-less version of (6c), *Mín ksehnáme pos o Yánis íne akóma ekí*, is not a counterexample, despite appearances. What the speaker wants to say is *mín ksehnás* 'you don't forget'. The second-person singular, however, if preferred, would constitute a possible Face-Threatening Act in this case, for obvious reasons. The speaker, "empathizing" with her addressee, goes halves with him as a courtesy.

3.1.3 Speaker's interaction with the text

The involved speaker may direct or even edit reality by building on language resources, specifically on the typical function of the subjunctive mood and the negator *mí(n)*. In (7), for example,

(7)　*Mín　antéhontas　álo,　　ton　parátise.*
　　　not　standing　　anymore　him　dump.PST.PFV.3SG
　　　'Not being able to stand him anymore, s/he dumped him.'

the speaker essentially acts as a film director. She does not simply report an impassive abandonment. She *stages* it to (subjectively) illuminate it: according to her assessment, it is truly an abandonment-due-to-the-abandonee-being-in-a-huff. In general, *mí(n)* + uninflected non-finite verb form[28] is a highly productive construction that allows the speaker to dramatize: by setting an event in a framework of her own appraisal, she colors this event's construal accordingly.

Now consider the emotional reactions in (8):

(8)　a.　*Mána　(ke)　na　min　agapái　　to　pedí　tis!*
　　　　　mother　(and)　SBJV　not　love.PRS.3SG　the　child　her
　　　　　Good God! A mother who doesn't even love her own child!'
　　b.　*Taksitzís　(ke)　na　mín　kséri　　ti*
　　　　　taxi_driver　(and)　SBJV　not　know.PRS.3SG　the
　　　　　Mitropoleos![29]
　　　　　Mitropoleos
　　　　　'A taxi driver and he didn't know Mitropoleos Street; good God!'

---

28 A 'gerund', according to Veloudis' (1982: 23–5) characterization (cf. also Giannakidou 2012; Holton et al. 1997; Tsimpli 2000, among others), an 'active participle', according to Janda and Joseph's (1999) terminology (cf. also Tsokoglou and Klidi 2017; Tzartzanos 1963, among others).
29 A well-known road in Athens.

c. *Ke   o   Yánis   na   mí   théli   na*
   and   ART.NOM   Yannis   SBJV   not   want.PRS.3SG   SBJV
   páme   parathérisi!   Álo   páli   ke   túto!
   go.PRS.1 PL   holiday   other   again   and   that
   'Yannis not wanting to go on summer holiday! How strange!''

The speaker apparently denounces the unloving mother in (8a) and the incompetent taxi driver in (8b), defending the respective social norms: mothers must love their children (the opposite is unthinkable) and taxi drivers should know (at least) the main roads. Similarly, (8c) goads the speaker's emotional response because the situation described is atypical. Crucially, *X (ke) na mí(n) Y!* is a productive construction with a veridical function: the mother did not love her child in (8a), the taxi driver did not know how to get to Mitropoleos Street in (8b), and Yannis did not want to go on summer holiday in (8c).

Apparently, (8) displays a scandalous marriage of the speaker's reality with the subjunctive, the emblematic mood of the unknown to the speaker. This marriage is, nevertheless, blessed by the expressivity of an involved speaker: by modifying her description so that otherwise real situations are accommodated in situations she rebukes, the speaker essentially sanitizes her reality. This figurative function of the subjunctive is inexplicably missing from the (non)veridicality literature.

The same therapeutic modification is carried out by the so-called 'narrative *na*'. This subjunctive marker is commonly used with the imperfective non-past "in narratives in order to give *dramatic effect* to the description of a progressive or iterative action in the past" (Mackridge 1987: 284–5; emphasis mine); cf. the following examples:

(8) d. *O   kósmos   na   hánete,   ke   i   María*
       the   world   SBJV   fall_apart.PRS.3SG   and   ART.NOM   Maria
       na   mí   sikóni   MÁTI   apó   to   vivlío!
       SBJV   not   take.PRS.3SG   EYE   from   the   book
       'No matter if the world was falling apart around her, Maria wouldn't take her eyes off the book.'

   e. *Ama   t'   ákuse   i   María,   na   KLÉI,*
      when   it   heard   ART.NOM   Maria   SBJV   CRY.PRS.3SG
      na   FONÁZI,   na   TRAVÁI   ta   maliá   tis.[30]
      SBJV   SHOUT.PRS.3SG   SBJV   TEAR.PRS.3SG   the   hair   her
      'As soon as Maria heard about it, she began to cry, to shout, to tear her hair out.'

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30 Example (8e), in transliteration from Tzartzanos (1963: 193), is cited and translated by Mackridge (1987: 285).

The narrative *na* directly challenges Giannakidou and Mari's (2021: 317) conviction that the subjunctive mood prohibits proposition *p*'s admission to the common ground – what they call the subjunctive's 'nonveridical anchoring':

> The subjunctive mood is a prohibition: do not add *p*. Given that […] main clause subjunctives are either non-assertions or possibility statements, we can generalize that in all cases the subjunctive mood is an instruction not to add *p* to the common ground.

(8d–e)'s counterevidence is determinant: their subjunctives undoubtedly feed the common ground with new, rather unwelcome, inputs and, indeed, in a way that figuratively denotes speaker disapproval.

Are there, in fact, claims to truth in the realm of subjunctive, that is, in the cylinder of the unknown reality (Figure 1), as the examples in (8a–e) indicate? The inconsistency is instantly raised once the feeling speaker is considered. As said above, the speaker, based on her knowledge of the typical function of the subjunctive, makes use of this mood in order to expel, expressively, more or less unacceptable states of affairs from the internal cylinder (in which they belong) to the external cylinder (unknown reality), just to reveal figuratively that she does not want to know about them: they should not have taken place in reality. How does the speaker achieve this? Simply, by modifying her description of these affairs so that the subjunctive mood takes the place of the indicative.

More generally, it seems that truth tends to venture into the external cylinder in cases of deviation from – what the speaker considers – a norm. Cf. the examples in (9):

(9) a. *Anagástike   na   mín   akoluthísi.*
         be_forced.PST.PFV.3SG   SBJV not   follow.DPD.3SG
         'S/he was forced not to follow.'

     b. *Katáfera   na   mín   ipokípso.*
         manage.PST.PFV.1SG   SBJV not   relent.DPD.1SG
         'I managed not to relent.'

     c. *Hriástike   na   mín   pjó   neró   ja   24   óres.*
         need.PST.3SG   SBJV not   drink.DPD.1SG   water   for   24   hours
         'I had to stay without water for 24 hours.'

In (9a), one was normally expected to follow someone somewhere but was forced not to. In (9b) and (9c), the speaker, exceeding her limits, did not finally relent and did not drink water for 24 hours, respectively. In a sense, then, the situations described in (9) are deemed abnormal, and as such are figuratively expelled from the internal cylinder of the speaker's reality.

It is worth noting in this connection that, to account for the puzzling choice of subjunctive in veridical MANAGE sentences such as (9b), Giannakidou and Mari (2021: 263–264) argue that MANAGE has a presupposition of (nonveridical) TRY, and thus, "it is of mixed veridicality, *even if it entails p*" (their emphasis). The subjunctive, they explain, "is sensitive to what the sentence presupposes, not what it asserts". This obviously means (i) that Giannakidou and Mari should suggest new, TRY-like presuppositions for (9a) and (9c), and for sentences exemplifying 'mixed veridicality' in general; and, moreover, (ii) that one is ready to admit the rather awkward suggestion that what is presupposed, and not what is asserted, is driving the selection of mood. (Giannakidou and Mari's 'presupposition' should not be confused with underlying abnormality: the feeling speaker's subjective evaluations regarding a norm have nothing to do with nonveridicality.)

3.2 Affective *mí(n)*

The preceding subsections did not exhaust the spectrum of a speaker's personal involvement regarding "some Condition, either expressed or implied", to recall the quotation from A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon (1879) in Section 3.1 above. The present subsection develops this personal involvement further, reflecting to a large extent the functions of ancient *me.*

The questions below display an emotional speaker; she is genuinely worrying (10a), she is anything but indifferent (10b), she rhetorically paves the way for her dramatic announcement (10c):[31]

(10) a. *(Na)*   *min*   *tu*   *sinévi*   *káti*   *kakó?*
          SBJV   not   to_him happen.PST.PFV.3SG something bad
          'Do you think something bad happened to him?'

    b. *(Na)*   *min*   *tú*   *'tihe*   *to*   *lahío?*
          SBJV   not   to_him happen.PST.PFV.3SG the   lottery
          'Did he win the lottery or something?'

---

31 (10c) is an excerpt from a well known folk poem, the second line of the stanza below:

  – Ahós varís akújete, polá tufékia péftun.
  Mína se gámo ríhnonte mína se harokópi?
  – Midé se gámo ríhnonte midé se harokópi:
  i Déspo káni pólemo me nífes ke me 'gónia.
  '– Heavy gunfire is being heard.
  Are the shots fired in a wedding or in a revelry?
  – They are neither fired in a wedding nor in a revelry:
  Despo is fighting along with her daughters in law and her grandchildren.'

c. *Mína*   *se*   *gámo*   *ríhnonte*
    not+SBJV   in   wedding   [shots]_are_fired.PRS.3PL
    mína   *se*   *harokópi?*
    not+SBJV   in   revelry
    'Are the shots being fired in a wedding or in a revelry?'

Crucially, *mí(n)* has not entirely abandoned its original negativity in this new role (i.e., as a head of questions), with or without *na*: what the speaker refers to is essentially either meant for rejection, as in (10a) and (10c),[32] or considered as rather impossible, as in (10b). More specifically, (10a) would never express something that the speaker wishes; hence, the unacceptability of (10a′), below:

(10   a′. ?? *(Na)*   *Mín*   *tu*   *sinévi*   *káti*   *kaló?*
                SBJV   not   to_him   happen.PST.3SG   something   good
                'Do you think something good happened to him?'

Similarly, in the (rhetorical) speaker's view, (10c) deserves nothing but a negative answer. In general, in folk poetry, *na mí(n)* occurs in reverse order, *mína* 'lest', to form rhetorical questions intended for negative answers;[33] crucially, for negative answers introduced with *midé* (<ancient *μηδέ*), which in this case acts as a veridical operator.

The examples in (11), on the other hand, imply negative emotions experienced by a stressed subject:

(11)   a. *Fováme*   *(na)*   *min*   *érthi.*
            fear.PRS.1SG   SBJV   not   come.DPD.3SG
            'I fear s/he might come.'
        b. *Fováme*   *(na)*   *mi*   *dén*   *érthi.*
            fear.PRS.1SG   SBJV   not   not   come.DPD.3SG
            'I fear s/he may not come.'
        c. *Fováme*   *(na)*   *mi*   *dehtó*   *to*   *dóro.*
            fear.PRS.1SG   SBJV   not   accept.DPD.1SG   the   gift
            'I fear that at the end I will be compelled to accept the gift.'
        d. *Fováme*   *(na)*   *mi*   *dé*   *dehtó*   *to*   *dóro.*
            fear.PRS.1SG   SBJV   not   not   accept.DPD.1SG   the   gift
            'I fear that I will refuse to accept the gift.'

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32 See in this connection Liddell and Scott's (1996: 1123) general characterization of *μή*: "*μή* rejects, οὐ denies".

33 The same holds in the case of the ancient me:, μή; cf. the relevant entry in Liddell and Scott (1996: 1124): "μή [occurs] in direct questions with indicative, where a negative answer is anticipated."

([11a–c] are adapted from Veloudis [1982: 12–4]). According to Liddell and Scott (1996: 1124), *me:* occurs "after verbs of fear or apprehension (μή οὐ)". Modern Greek *mí(n)*, "a virtual rather than an explicit negative" (Landsman 1988–1989: 28), obviously continues this transition of its ancestor, with or without the companion of *na.* In (11a) and (11b), as commented on by Veloudis (1982), the speaker expresses her concerns about somebody coming and not coming, respectively, as she wishes neither to happen. The same holds as far as (11c) and (11d) are concerned: again, the speaker expresses her concerns about accepting and not accepting a gift, respectively, as she wishes for neither to happen. There is one interesting difference, however: as Veloudis (1982: 14) remarks, the *na mí* version of (11c) is liable to a second reading because the subject of the main verb is identical to the subject of the complement. Thus, (11c) is ambiguous between the readings 'I fear that at the end I will be compelled to accept the gift' (affective *mi(n)*) and 'I am afraid not to accept the gift' (negative *mi(n)*). In the first reading (heavy stress on *déhtó*), the speaker appears to have a deep, unstated desire to accept the gift, whereas in the second reading (heavy stress on *fováme* and on *mí*), she feels obliged to accept an unwanted gift (see Veloudis 1982: 14, fn.1). This ambiguity is removed when *na* is absent, hosted in the unstressed, affective *mi*. On the other hand, (11d) is unambiguous, for *mi* is liable to only one reading: it is unavoidably affective (otherwise, *dehtó* would be negated twice).

Arguably, direct questions and verbs of fear have something in common: a positive or a negative answer may equally follow the former, whereas reality may or may not finally put flesh on the bones of the fear expressed. Therefore, we can legitimately suppose that this indeterminacy (actually, the speaker's uncertainty) has possibly left its trace on uses such as those above, turning *mi(n)* into a degenerated negator. What, however, caused *mi(n)* to be inserted into such contexts in the first place? In the background of uses such as those in (10) and (11), lies something that the speaker disapproves of, finds difficult to foresee, or even wishes to block out. 'Let *nothing* bad happened to him!' is, for instance, what the speaker feels when asking (10a), and an *un*wanted arrival is what she anguishes over in (11a). For a parallel explanation, see Alexiou (2005: 63–5) and Theodoropoulou (2001: 254).

Similarly we could account for the use of *mi(n)* (i) in rhetorical questions like *Na mi milúsa?.* 'shouldn't I speak? = What was I supposed to do, keep my mouth shut? Of course, I didn't!' (the speaker pretends she responds to an interlocutor's claim she should have kept her mouth shut) and (ii) in subordinate clauses introduced by verbs other than verbs of fear like *Éhete to nu sas mi sas ksefíji* 'Be careful so he does not slip away' (two of the relevant examples cited in the *Dictionary of Standard Modern Greek* 1998). For a more general discussion on the function of *mí(n)* in rhetorical questions, see Alexiou (2005).

3.3 Negative *mí*

Mí is extensively discussed as a distinct negative particle of Modern Greek in Veloudis (1982: 4–83): it is considered a fourth negator that does not share the morphosyntactic and phonological characteristics of *mí(n)* and "should not be confused with the forms of the latter that lack (under certain conditions) their final/ n/" (1982: 4). We can roughly think of *mi* as *óhi*'s counterpart in the external cylinder: it occurs in elliptical utterances counting on the context, linguistic and otherwise. Thus, in uttering (12a–b), below, the speaker discourages her addressee from – or asks him to stop – doing something she does not approve, whereas the common exclamation in (12c), "an elliptical expression of disapproval, suggesting, 'may I never live to see worse than this'" (Mackridge 1987: 244), is a comment on what the annoyed speaker has just heard or seen:

(12)   a.   *Mí!*
           no
           'No, stop!'
     b.   *Mí*   *to*   *Yani!*
           not   ART.ACC   Yanis
           'No, stop, don't do this to Yannis!'
     c.   *Mí*   *hirótera!*
           not   worse
           'May I never live to see worse than this!'

Mí may also act as a negator of adjectives, adjectival participles, or even nouns of mainly verbal origin such as *apódosi* (<*apodído* 'attribute, ascribe'), *katáthesi* (<*katathéto* 'deposit, testify'), *aksiopíisi* (<*aksiopió* 'make good use of') etc.[34] Crucially, only as a negator of adjectives is this *mí* interchangeable with *óhi* (maybe because adjectives display an enduring quality, indicating the established reality of the internal cylinder, which is the typical locus of *óhi*'s activity):

(13)   a.   *Pantréftike*   *énan*   *mí/óhi*   *gnostó*   *ithopió.*
           marry.PST.PFV.3SG   INDF.ACC   not   famous   actor
           'She married some obscure actor.'
     b.   *Apagorévete*   *i*   *ísodos*   *stus*   *mí/*óhi*   *éhontes*   *ergasía.*[35]
           is_forbidden   the   entry   to_the   not   having   work
           'No entry – authorized personnel only.'

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34 For example, *to mí timóni 'the non-steering-wheel,' *i mí vivliothíki 'the non-library,' *o mí drómos 'the non-road,' all taken from Veloudis (1982: 74), would be absolutely unacceptable. See Veloudis (1982: 63–79).

35 This is a common sign on construction sites.

c.   *I   mí/*óhi   aksiopíisi   ton   póron   íne   eglimatikí.*
     the   not   utilization   of_the   resources   is   criminal
     'The non-valorization of the resources is criminal.'

Note that all examples in (13) radiate the speaker's disapproval/frustration to some degree. For instance, in (13a), borrowed from Veloudis (1982: 43, ex. [47c]), she appears to imply that it would have been better if the subject had married a famous actor.

4 Epilogue

The relativized notion of (non)veridicality has an important advantage over the non-relativized: it is not allergic to the presence of the speaker. However, it is still a notion one would not select if one wanted to provide a comprehensive account of negation, as shown above. In reality, (non)veridicality continues to divide the phenomenon of negation into two parts: the one that (allegedly) fits its predictions and the one that does not, without paying attention to the fact that data belonging to the latter part may possibly contradict its tenets. As shown above, there are common uses of Modern Greek negators (especially of the subjunctive negator *mí(n)*) that are inexplicable and unexpected in the framework of (non)veridicality – a digital approach based precisely on logical truth in a speaker's epistemic model. Cf. examples (2b), (2b′), (2c), (3a′B), (4a), (4d–f), (5), (8a–c), (8c–d), as well as the common use of the veridical *na mí(n)* in rhetorical questions.

On the other hand, the unique characteristics of negation, namely, the prevalent synchronic reinforcement of negative particles through minimizers, maximizers or generalizers, and their concomitant, cyclical diachronic renewal cross-linguistically, call for an analogical account that casts the expressive, not the logical speaker in the leading role. Crucially, there is no parallel to the so-called 'Jespersen's cycle' for any other linguistic item.

The present study proposed a comprehensive, novel approach to Modern Greek negation. It maintained that Modern Greek negators reflect an epistemic-expressive (*dén, óhi*) and a feeling-emotional (*mí(n), mí*) speaker in interaction with her world, her addressee, and the text. However, the discussion was not exhaustive; it did not touch upon the advantageous field of idiomatic uses such as *káthe álo* 'not at all', *ne, kalá!* 'no!' (lit. 'yes, right'),[36] *sigá [mín pésis]!* 'no!' (lit. 'slow [not to fall]'; cf. example [4c] and fn. 23 in Subsection 3.1.1), or even *dzífos* 'nothing, zero', *skatá* 'not' (lit.

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36 Greek speakers observe in jest that double affirmation makes a negation (reversing propositional logic's law of double negation).

'feces'), cf. *skatá ton agapái* 's/he does not love him' – "advantageous" because they display an ironic, huffy, disappointed, etc., speaker. Moreover, nothing was mentioned regarding the correlative conjunctions *úte X úte Y* and *mite X mite Y* 'neither … nor …,' descendants of the ancient *οὔτε* (<*οὐ* 'not' + *τε* 'and') and *μήτε* (<*μή* + *τε*), respectively. Succinct discussions of these conjunctions can be found in Giannakidou (2007) and Veloudis (2022).

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