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Autonomy in Transactions

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Published/Copyright: July 6, 2021
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Abstract

The article presents a ‘critique from within’ of Peter Benson’s book ‘Justice in Transactions’, while sharing its premise that a theory of contract has to be liberal one. It identifies three problems with Benson’s answer to the question of how the relation between freedom and equality in contract law should be understood. It criticizes Benson’s Hegelian metaphysics and claims that a principle of mutual recognition and respect between juridical persons does not require that contracts only allow the alienation and appropriation of different things of the quantitatively same value. It demonstrates that Rawls’s idea of a ‘division of labor’ within principles of justice is more plausible than Benson’s reformulated account, which loses sight of the premise that a liberal theory of contract must locate the normative foundations of ‘contract’ in individual rights, and, in addition, is at odds with Rawls’s project in ‘Political Liberalism’ and its concept of public justification.


Corresponding author: Thomas Gutmann, Professor, Civil Law, Philosophy of Law and Medical Law, University of Muenster, Münster, Germany, E-mail:

Published Online: 2021-07-06
Published in Print: 2021-06-25

© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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