Empty Voting: A European Perspective
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Carl Clottens
After analyzing the causes and dangers of “empty voting”, i.e. the decoupling of voting rights and economic rights (risk) in listed companies, this article discusses measures to address the current lack of transparency as well as other more far-reaching measures to prevent abuses. This article focuses on a number of EU directives and regulations in the fields of company and financial law which have been adopted or amended recently or which are currently being prepared or reviewed. The main finding is that, so far, the European Commission has focused its attention largely on the problem of hidden ownership (through cash-settled derivatives) – which is the mirror image of empty voting – but, wrongly, not on empty voting itself. A number of avenues for regulation, and their respective costs and benefits, are explored. In addition, relevant national developments for Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US are considered.
© 2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Directors’ Versus Shareholders’ Primacy in U.S. Corporations Through the Eyes of History: Is Directors’ Power “Inherent”?
- Empty Voting: A European Perspective
- Perspectives on Group Corporate Governance and European Company Law
- Rendering (Once More) the Financial Assistance Regime More Flexible
- The Hidden Voyage of a Dying Italian Company, from the Mediterranean Sea to Albion
Articles in the same Issue
- Directors’ Versus Shareholders’ Primacy in U.S. Corporations Through the Eyes of History: Is Directors’ Power “Inherent”?
- Empty Voting: A European Perspective
- Perspectives on Group Corporate Governance and European Company Law
- Rendering (Once More) the Financial Assistance Regime More Flexible
- The Hidden Voyage of a Dying Italian Company, from the Mediterranean Sea to Albion