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Ideen und Sprache

  • Alexander Becker EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 13, 2017

Abstract

Plato’s „Theory of Ideas“ is usually taken to be based upon the claim that ideas exist. In this paper, a different reading is suggested, namely, that the theory of ideas is centered around a distinction between two ways of speaking about ideas. One kind of statement corresponds to the singular predications of contemporary logic, the other kind is aimed at definitions expressing an identity. Since these two kinds of statements employ different kinds of predicative tie, no „reification“ of ideas is involved, which causes most of the problems around the „theory of ideas“. In order to argue for such a reading, two texts by Plato are examined more closely. The Laches serves as an example of how the two kinds of statements are introduced and distinguished in Platonic dialogues. The final argument for the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo (99d–107d) is famous for its claim that ideas are causes. An interpretation is suggested which shows that this claim, too, is best understood if seen as depending on a particular way of speaking about ideas.

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Published Online: 2017-12-13
Published in Print: 2017-12-20

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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