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Schelling und der Selbstrepräsentationalismus über phänomenales Bewusstsein

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Published/Copyright: December 11, 2015

Abstract

This paper explores Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness in the System of Transcendental Idealism. It is shown that Schelling’s description and explanation of phenomenal consciousness is in accord with contemporary self-representationalist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, it is argued that Schelling develops a self-representationalist approach of phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, it is demonstrated on the basis of Schelling’s account that analytic self-representationalism fails to completely explain phenomenal consciousness. Finally, however, a fundamental critique of Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Thus the central theses of the paper are, on the one hand, that Schelling is of systematic importance for contemporary debates, on the other hand, that his account is not convincing.

Online erschienen: 2015-12-11
Erschienen im Druck: 2015-12-1

© 2015 Akademie Verlag GmbH, Markgrafenstr. 12-14, 10969 Berlin.

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