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Der neue Spinozismus und das Verhältnis von deskriptiver und revisionärer Metaphysik

  • Ursula Renz EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: September 12, 2015

Abstract

Relying on the assumption that Spinoza makes a double use of the principle of sufficient reason, Michael Della Rocca has defended a reconstruction of Spinoza’s approach as a metaphysical outlook according to which all particulars vanish in the only and one divine substance. This implies nothing less than a radical attempt to suggest a new and completely revisionary form of metaphysics. After a short discussion of Strawson’s distinction between revisionary and descriptive metaphysics and an exposition of the basic principles of Della Rocca’s interpretation, I critically assess his attack of the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy. After discussing the extent to which the first book of Spinoza’s Ethics is appropriately described as a revisionary project, I conclude with an argument for the necessity of both descriptive and revisionary elements in metaphysics.

Online erschienen: 2015-9-12
Erschienen im Druck: 2015-9-1

© 2015 Akademie Verlag GmbH, Markgrafenstr. 12-14, 10969 Berlin.

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