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Legal idealism of pre-Qin Confucians: tracing the ideas of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi

  • Lijue Song

    Lijue Song (b. 1982), PhD, is a professor at the School of Foreign Studies of East China University of Political Science and Law. Her current research interests include the interdisciplinary study of law and language. Her publications include “A study on the translation of the Chinese civil code” (2022), “The fourth generation of human rights in the digital era ” (2022), “Legal thought in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties” (2021), and “A corpus-based study on formulaic sequences in the digital era” (2021).

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    and Xiaohong Ma

    Xiaohong Ma (b. 1954), PhD, is a professor at Renmin University of China Law School. Her current research interests include legal history and legal culture. Her publications include “Li and punishment: The historical connection of law” (2004), “The structure and logic of basic concepts of China’s traditional law” (2003), and Legal thought of traditional China (2004).

Published/Copyright: March 31, 2025
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Abstract

The evolution of Confucian legal thought, encompassing the contributions of not only Confucius but also Mencius and Xunzi, holds relevance to China’s contemporary rule of law. These philosophical developments have shaped the foundational principles that underpin China’s legal system today. The emphasis on benevolence, rituals, self-cultivation, and moral education resonates with the importance placed on fairness, justice, and social order in China’s legal framework. Furthermore, the recognition of human nature’s innate goodness aligns with the emphasis on protecting individual rights and promoting harmonious societal relationships. By acknowledging the academic history of Confucian legal thought, China’s rule of law can be seen as a product of both traditional wisdom and contemporary legal developments, blending ancient principles with modern legal concepts to ensure a just and harmonious society.

1 The characteristics of pre-Qin Confucian legal thought

Ru-jia (the Confucian School) is China’s most influential system of thought, being born in the Spring and Autumn period and growing into a leading school in the Warring States period. The school of thought was rejected by Emperor Qin Shihuang, who outlawed and burned most of its classics. That was the hardest time for the school before it was rehabilitated in the Han dynasty and became the mainstream thought of imperial China for centuries, until the end of the last imperial dynasty of Qing, even though many scholars professed that pre-Qin Confucian thought was the basis of their philosophy. Several new strands of Confucian thought (known as neo-Confucianism) have been established since Han claimed that they had origins in pre-Qin Confucian thought and were the descendants of Confucius, despite differing markedly from the original Confucians. The original Confucians, underpinned by the belief that humans were born good, promoted an idealistic society in which the goodness of human nature could be brought out through educational transformation (jiaohua). The optimistic idealist perspective of the pre-Qin Confucians stood in contrast to the neo-Confucians, who instead, after incorporating other pre-Qin schools of thought into their own systems of thought, believed that human nature could be either good or evil. The neo-Confucians were devoted largely to the concerns of realpolitik.[1]

The reason why we consider pre-Qin Confucian legalism to be like what we call legal idealism today is that the founder of the school, Confucius, and his well-known follower Mencius both had faith in the goodness of human nature. It is quite surprising that they still attempted to promote the goodness of human nature and the possibility of restoring it while living in a time of great chaos in which wars broke out frequently as vassal states battled one another for control of the territory. During this period, the social and moral order was in upheaval, as subordinates dared to kill their rulers and sons killed their fathers. With faith in the goodness of human nature, Confucius and Mencius were determined to make education available to the masses, a right that only the noble class were entitled to in the former three dynasties. The famous phrase “youjiao wulei” (there should be no class distinction in education) was an expression of Confucius’ idealistic world view. Confucius and Mencius were optimistic about the future even though they were pessimistic about the present. They longed for a great utopian society with a legal system that emphasized teaching and moral guidance rather than punishment as instruments for the governance of people. In the Confucian philosophy, not only could the law reward the good and punish the evil, but it was also tasked with the mission of promoting the goodness of human nature. This is one of the most prominent characteristics of Confucianism and also of Chinese legal thought.

Another characteristic of Confucianism is that it tilted toward belief in a natural heaven rather than in a heaven as personified powers of nature. For Confucius and Mencius, Heaven could be either natural or personified. Unlike the Duke of Zhou, they emphasized the fulfillment of human life while largely ignoring discussion of Heaven and deified beings. Jilu, a disciple of Confucius, once asked him questions about ghosts and spirits, to which Confucius responded, “while you cannot serve men, how can you serve ghosts and spirits?” Jilu continued to ask: “Then what is death all about?” Confucius answered: “You haven’t even figured out what life is all about, why bother with death?” The answer reflected the fact that Confucius remained neutral regarding things that he did not know (Ames and Rosemont 2022: 213).

On the other hand, not being completely free from the influence of the theocracy, Confucius and Mencius suggested that people revere ghosts and spirits but meanwhile keep them at a distance. This is why Mozi criticized the Confucians for contradictory statements, because they denied the existence of Heaven and deified beings on the one hand but emphasized the importance of sacrificial rites to them on the other. Yet it was the logic reasoning of ghosts and spirits at a distance that kept the law in ancient China separate from the control of gods and deified beings. In essence, this was a tolerance of different religions. Meanwhile, this reasoning also turned ancient China into the most civilized society, unrivaled by any other ancient civilization. On this Youlan Feng commented: “In dealing with the dead, if we treat them as if they were entirely dead, that would show lack of affection and should not be done; or, if we treat them as if they were entirely alive, that would show lack of wisdom and should not be done” (Feng 2001: 319).

The pre-Qin Confucians were concerned more with humans and their life than with Heaven. They questioned whether the law under Heaven could punish the evil and reward the good, and whether it could protect the well-being of humans. It is this “people-oriented” ideology that embodies what we call legal idealism today.

Furthermore, the pre-Qin Confucians, resting on their belief in the goodness of human nature, did not debate on the forms of law. Unlike the Legalists, they did not study the content of law or the use of language in law; nor did they focus on how laws were made and implemented. They did not equate laws with punishments and did not require that punishments should be proportionate to the gravity of the crime. Instead, they studied the principles of law, the effects of law on society, and the moral values of law. In his publication On the History of the Development of Legal Theory in China, Liang Qichao concluded that the Confucians adhered to the school of “natural law,” as natural law constitutes one of the foundational concepts in Confucian philosophy (The Editorial Board of the Encyclopedia of China 1984: 180).[2]

It is tempting to equate Confucian thought with the Western concept of natural law, as the moral ethics (of the legal system) promoted by the Confucians roughly align with the philosophy of natural law theorists:

They tend to maintain that law-making is a purposive activity that must satisfy certain moral requirements in order for it to have laws as its outcome. Secondly, they tend to maintain that the question of the existence of laws cannot be completely separated from the question of their moral obligatoriness or moral quality. Thus, natural law theorists adopt, or come close to adopting, a moral-deontic position. (Golding 1974: 101)

Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to equate Confucianism with the natural law school, for Confucianism is part of Chinese culture, with distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from Western schools of jurisprudence. Though it may share similar views with some Western legal theories, it has its roots in Chinese culture and aims at solving problems unique to this culture. The pre-Qin Confucians formed their thinking on topics such as ritual propriety, moral principles, and admirable qualities of men (particularly of kings) by studying the former three dynasties (especially the Western Zhou dynasty). They believed there was a regular pattern in the history of the three dynasties: all their rites and laws emphasized the importance of loyalty toward the ruler, filial piety toward parents, women’s chastity, and moral obligations. All of these virtues express the spirit of the Chinese civilization. In other words, the most important thing for a nation was to cultivate a great culture, and making sure that this culture could be passed down for generations was fundamental to the prosperity of the nation. This can be seen as cultural pride. In terms of law, the Confucians valued the spirit of it more than the institution of law itself, as the former reflected the spirit of the people within a culture. This is why today many scholars also consider Confucianism as the historical school of jurisprudence.

The spirit of law was much valued by the pre-Qin Confucians, who emphasized that law must give in to moral principles, but this does not mean that they denied the necessity of law and the effects that law had on society. It is just that they believed that an institution – be it the institution of law or the institution of ritual and music – would lose its purpose and significance without an inner spirit. Confucius once asked, if humans were evil by nature, what would be the use of ritual and music?[3] In his view, people observed laws and showed reverence toward the institution of ritual and music because from within their hearts they wanted to do so, not because they were forced to do so by the authorities. Also, the pre-Qin Confucians emphasized that law should not violate moral principles. Compared to the Legalists, the Confucians set out more detailed and complicated requirements for people to observe laws from within their hearts, supporting that laws should be made from the bottom up. They opposed government interventions of forcefully changing local customs, and one of the fundamental principles of law-making they promoted was “when in Rome, do as the Romans do” (Ma 2015: 59). Their reasoning as such exerted everlasting influence on the institution of law of imperial times, which is perhaps why there was no nationwide civil code ever enacted in imperial China. Therefore, we need to be critical when it comes to the question of whether the absence of a written civil code is a natural outcome or a result of the ruling class being incompetent to produce it. For a large agricultural nation, it might have been a wiser decision to employ ritual propriety and local customs to maintain harmonious order and resolve disputes within a community. The Confucians might have considered it unwise to govern the society and people’s life by means of a detailed code of law.

Confucianism shares similar views with some Western schools of jurisprudence, including the natural school of law, the historical school of law, and the sociological school of law. Yet we cannot simply equate Confucianism with any of these schools, just as we cannot regard the ritual propriety promoted by the Confucians as the same thing as customary law, constitutional law, or civil law, even though some parts of ritual propriety are similar to the principles of these three fields of law. Confucianism is Confucianism and ritual propriety is ritual propriety: they are not something else. In addition, some “generally accepted opinions” also need to be reconsidered here, i.e. that “laws” in Confucian philosophy actually refer to “punishments.” This misunderstanding has been extended to make the claim that the laws of imperial China were all penal by nature. This is not true.

Yan Fu, who was one of the leaders of China’s Hundred Days of Reform (1898) and was acclaimed by Liang Qichao as the first of the Qing dynasty to introduce Western culture to China (Ma 2015: 60), pointed out in his translation of Montesquieu’s work, The Spirit of the Laws:

The Western concept of law actually includes the ritual propriety we have in China. China has both ritual propriety and penal laws, with the former being employed to teach people how to behave politely following the ethical norms while the latter to punish those who commit crimes. The West tends to make compilations of different fields of laws for their citizens to follow. They call these compilations “codes,” and the penal code is part of them. China’s Rites of Zhou, Tang Tongdian encyclopedia, Great Qing legal code, and Qing Tongdian encyclopedia are actually encompassed in Western concepts of law and code. It is thus inaccurate to simply equate laws in imperial China with only the imperial decrees or precedents issued by the Ministry of Justice (xingbu). The nationwide laws passed by the Parliament in the West are equivalent to the imperial decrees (which were compiled on a regular basis starting from the Qin dynasty) issued by emperors in China. This is called law-making by central government (Yan 1909: 4; see also Yan 2014; our translation[4])

Zhang Guohua stated this more simply: “the ‘rites’ of Zhou are the ‘laws’ established by the Zhou rulers to regulate the relationship between members of the aristocracy and between the commoners” (Zhang 1991: 13). Another “generally accepted opinion” is that the Confucians despised the law and lacked awareness of “playing by the rules.” This is doubly wrong. The Confucians emphasized the spirit of the law and questioned whether a law was benevolent and whether it violated moral principles. This questioning is the supporting structure of Confucian legal idealism.

2 Confucius’s thinking on law

Living in a period of ritual and music, Confucius was disheartened by the fact that traditional values were diminishing and that the “rule of law” proposed by the Legalists was gaining increasing support.

It was through his study of history that Confucius distilled his unique idea of law, which can be understood from the following four aspects. First, it is important to understand that the traditional rule of ritual propriety of the Western Zhou dynasty was a combination of both ideology and institutional rules. The institution of ritual and music embodied not just the spirit of law but also the principles in applying punishments (which were just one component of ritual and music). Punishments (note here that Confucius said “punishments” instead of “the law”) were only instrumental in the traditional rule of ritual propriety, without which they would not fit the crimes, just as Confucius stated in the Analects: “if ritual and music cannot be developed, then criminal punishments will not be appropriate” (Ames and Rosemont 2022: 246).

The second aspect is the significance of filial piety (xiao), which is believed to be inherent in humans. Filial piety, as the cornerstone of both one’s life and the institution of ritual and music, played a key role in applying punishments. When filial piety contradicted a law, such as in cases where a filial son commits murder to take revenge on those who have killed his father, or where a righteous man breaks the law for defending justice, law enforcement officers should hold to the spirit of law, granting pardon to these filial law breakers. In the view of Confucius, morality is more important than law. Confucius states: “the father conceals the wrongs of his son, and the son conceals the wrongs of his father. This is the moral and righteous way” (see Analects: Zi Lu, 13).[5]

Third, the ultimate purpose of law was to help build a society where there was no civil litigation being brought. It was incumbent on clans and community members to live in harmony and take pride in being courteous while feeling humiliated if hostile to others. Such was the ideal way advocated by the Confucians to rule a state.

Finally, the ruler was expected to set a good example for his people to follow, which was far more crucial than the mandatory application of his law. Confucius held that the ideal way for a sage king to rule his state was for his people to follow the ruler’s good example, and as Confucius famously taught, achieving personal clarity and balance is the foundation for effective leadership. When one’s own life is in order, guidance flows naturally, and success follows effortlessly. Conversely, attempting to lead without first attending to one’s own affairs results in futile effort, regardless of the instructions given.

The philosophy of Confucius, despite being criticized by the Legalists as pedantic and impractical, served as the orthodox school of thought for centuries, beginning with the reign of Emperor Wu of Han (156–87 BCE), and whoever challenged Confucian philosophy was considered to be deviant and heretic. A much-quoted proverb states that in imperial China a ruler could “rule the state well following half of the teachings from the Analects” – this is because a disproportionate part of the book involved discussions on rules and laws. Regarded as golden rules that were passed down from generation to generation, these discussions also served as legislative and judicial principles, dominating imperial China for thousands of years.

2.1 The role of punishments (xing) – “if ritual and music cannot be developed, then punishments will not be appropriate”

Confucius believed that the governance of state and society was a comprehensive system that involved policies, punishments, virtue, and ritual propriety, with policies and punishments being the instruments to force the people to follow the rules and laws of the state, whereas virtue and ritual propriety were the instruments to help cultivate people’s sense of shame and their capacity to discern right from wrong. He also believed that the teaching of virtue and ritual propriety took priority over any other task of the ruler. The ruler should set the cultivation of the two qualities among all his people as the ultimate objective of his reign because virtue and ritual propriety were fundamental to the growth of society, teaching people to voluntarily promote righteousness instead of being forced to follow policies. He believed that mere policies and punishments would lead the people to avoid them but have no sense of shame (Yang 2009: 13). This method of governance only showed people how severe the punishments were when they violated policies but did not convince people that the policies were beneficial for society. Confucius did not favor a form of rule that emphasized external forms of coercion, because he believed that rule maintained by force would lead to the decline of people’s morality, destroying their sense of shame. In contrast, he saw the rule of virtue and ritual propriety as the ideal way to govern a state – as “people will have a sense of shame and fulfill their roles” (Ames and Rosemont 2022: 89). People having a sense of shame and not violating ritual propriety was the key to the cultivation of morality (which was not just something inherent in humans, but also the ultimate objective of educational transformation).

Confucius considered “punishment” to be a method inferior to the guidance of ritual propriety, observing that the appropriate application of punishments was to be decided by the flourishing of ritual propriety, or in other words, ritual propriety served as the benchmark for the application of punishments. In the Confucian philosophy of governance, ritual propriety was so pivotal that it determined whether a person could be correctly aware of his social status and the position he held within a social order, whether his speech could function properly, and whether his undertakings would succeed. In addition, the flourishing of ritual propriety also determined the appropriate application of punishments so that the people did not live in terror of unjust punishments. The Analects documented that Zilu once asked Confucius what his first priority would be if the ruler of the State of Wei were to entrust him with governance of the state, and Confucius replied saying that it would be to instruct all the people to be aware of their social status and the positions they held in society, and to persuade them to stay satisfied with where they are and who they are (Ames and Rosemont 2022: 246).

Zilu did not agree with him on this statement, but he was quickly criticized by Confucius, who said:

If people are not properly aware of their social status and the positions they hold within a social order, then their speech will not function properly. If their speech does not function properly, then their undertakings will not succeed. If their undertakings cannot succeed, then ritual and music will not flourish. If ritual and music do not flourish, then sanctions and punishments will not be justly administered. If sanctions and punishments are not justly administered, then the people will not be successful. (See Analects: Zi Lu 13.3)[6]

3 The core of law – “follow the Way of Heaven and govern in accordance with the feelings of men”

The Analects documented that the Duke of Ye once instructed Confucius, saying that there was an upright man in his hometown. His father had stolen a sheep, and the upright man testified against him. Confucius disagreed with his remarks, saying “the upright men in my hometown are different. Fathers cover up for their sons and sons cover up for their fathers. Uprightness lies therein.”[7] Confucius was proud that his disciple Zilu could gain trust among his community because of his frankness and honesty, praising that when asked to adjudicate a lawsuit Zilu would only need to hear a single statement from either side (of the plaintiff or the defendant), because no one would want to lie to him. Confucius said: “Able to adjudicate a lawsuit by hearing a single statement – would this not characterize Zilu?”[8] This also reflected how Confucius saw the law: the law itself had nothing to do with uprightness or justice. A person who adhered to the letter of the law was not necessarily an upright person, but he who acted by considering the feelings of men was regarded as upright, for justice was reflected in the feelings of men. This explains why Confucius favored the fathers who covered up for their sons, the sons who covered up for their fathers, and his disciple Zilu, who was able to adjudicate a lawsuit by hearing just a single statement. Confucius believed that only the law that embodied the feelings of men was upright and just, and whether a ruling was just and convincing depended primarily on the moral character of the judge and his interpretation of the law, not upon the law.

The “feelings of men” in Confucian philosophy refers to what was promoted by the teachings of ritual propriety, and this was: “the duties and love toward blood relatives, the paying of respect to those in authority and to elders, and the maintenance of the differences between men and women.”[9] Humans were born with the foundations upon which conditions of peace and order were maintained. A fulfilling and meaningful life was one in which individuals were properly aware of the position they held within a social order, and in which each individual readily fulfilled their responsibilities as a father, a son, a king, a minister, an elder, a youngster, a husband, or a wife. The Confucians did not encourage an individual to report the crimes committed by his father or blood relatives, as this was against both the principles of being a good man and against the feelings of men. The law that promoted a person telling on his father was against the feelings of men, and therefore would not work as well, as the law that encouraged fathers to cover up for their sons and sons to cover up for their fathers. If a father broke the law, his children had to do whatever necessary to conceal it as a way of showing filial piety to their parents. Likewise, if a child committed a crime, their parents had to help cover it up as a way of showing love and affection to their child. This was the way to safeguard the feelings of men,[10] which in the view of Confucius represented the greatest justice under Heaven. Confucius was deeply convinced that the feelings of men were the benchmark for the determination of whether a law was good or not. When the feelings of men were at odds with the law, Confucius chose to stand on the side of the former. When his disciple Gongye Chang was imprisoned, he defended him against his critics saying that though he was now in shackles, it was through no crime of his own. Confucius even wed his daughter to Gongye Chang while he was still in prison, just to demonstrate his faith in his future son-in-law.

The contemporary pursuit of honesty and justice within the legal system is exemplified by Zilu’s method of adjudicating lawsuits, wherein he would attentively consider just a single testimony from either the plaintiff or the defendant. The law, only when accepted willingly by the general public, can have real authority and be said to have achieved its intended purpose. This is why when the law was at odds with the feelings of men, the Confucians insisted on the abandonment of the letter of the law while prioritizing the feelings of men, because the latter were the eternal law of society.

3.1 The ideals of law – “cruelty can be overcome and killing dispensed with” and “what is imperative is to make it so that there are no lawsuits”

Confucius said: “In hearing lawsuits, I am no better than others. What is imperative is to make it so that there are no lawsuits.”[11] He also said: “If good men governed for a hundred years, cruelty could indeed be overcome and killing dispensed with.”[12] “Zero lawsuits,” a familiar phrase to the people of imperial China, was their ideal way of life: living harmoniously in multi-generational households and getting along with their neighbors. Confucius admitted that disputes were inevitable among humans, but what was more important were the methods by which disputes were resolved: choosing which was the proper method of resolution depended on what purpose the parties intended to achieve. It is interesting to note that the idea of “reducing the number of disputes” could also be found in Western historical documents, such as in Title XVI “The penalties for reckless litigation,” Book IV of the legal code The Institutes of Justinian, issued by Justinian I (whose reign stretched from 527 to 565 AD) (Zhang 1996: 236–237). But the difference between the Western idea of “reckless litigation” and the Confucian idea of “zero litigation” lay in the fact that the former stipulated the penalties for reckless litigation, which aimed at restraining unjustifiable litigation through fines, the employment of the oath, and the fear of infamy, whereas the Confucian concept emphasized the importance of educating the people in the understanding of the feelings of men through building a society free of litigation. In addition, the Confucians believed that the law should be targeted at government officials instead of the general public. That is, the performance of government officials was evaluated based on how many lawsuits they had handled during their service: the fewer, the better.

The concept of “zero lawsuits” gave rise to the establishment of the number of lawsuits as an index of social and political stability. During the Spring and Autumn period, Shuxiang sent a letter to Zichan, which said: “When there was disorder in the Xia dynasty, they created the Punishments of Yu. When there was disorder in the Shang dynasty, they created the Punishments of Tang. When there was disorder in the Zhou dynasty, they composed the Nine Punishments. These three penal codes in each case arose in the dynasty’s final age” (Ma 2015: 74). This means that the excessive use of punishments would eventually lead to chaos and even the collapse of a state. The achievement of “zero lawsuits” required people to cultivate self-discipline and to have tolerance toward others. When Confucius expressed that he was no more adept than others in adjudicating disputes, he underscored the paramount importance of preventing such disputes altogether. His message to the ruling elite was clear: even in resorting to legal measures, they must remain steadfast in their pursuit of minimizing conflicts, aiming ultimately for a society where litigation becomes obsolete, and that even when they had to apply punishments, they should keep a merciful and benevolent heart.

The Confucian followers of the Han dynasty explained “zero lawsuits” as follows: “The sages use punishments to transform people through education. Once they succeed in doing so, punishments will no longer be needed. The sages may seem imposing and stern but they are not proponents of killing, and though they have made penal laws but no one dares to break them.”[13]

3.2 The best way to implement law – “when you have gotten your own life straightened out, things will go well without your giving orders”

Confucius said: “When you have gotten your own life straightened out, things will go well without your giving orders. But if your own life is not straightened out, even if you give orders, no one will follow them.”[14] He believed that the role of the ruler was more significant than that of the law. This statement has a two-fold meaning. First, it is incumbent on the ruler to get the right people doing the right thing and to make a strong team of his officials. A strong governing team is more important to ensuring good governance of the state than simply enacting a set of laws and regulations. He believed that only the rule of a benevolent ruler, rather than that of harsh laws, could set the state on the path to the ideal of “zero lawsuits.” Second, the ruler should lead by example, which is more effective in state governance than issuing orders and mandates. If the ruler himself is upright, all people will follow him, even if he does not give orders. But if he himself is not upright, even if he gives mandatory orders, they will not be obeyed. Therefore, the first priority of the ruler in state governance is to cultivate self-discipline, and only after that comes the establishment of the law. This is known as the “rule of men.”

Further developed by the Han Confucian followers, the idea of the “rule of men” came to be the guiding principle of the imperial Chinese system of justice for thousands of years. It was also one of the most researched topics in the study of imperial China’s justice system. This idea justified the role of men in the legislative process and in the enforcement of the law. In imperial China, the effects that law had on society were decided more by the moral character of law enforcement officials than by the completeness of the legal system: the self-discipline of an officer, together with his leading by example, was the key in the proper enforcement of the law. When an honest official, or a filial person, was asked to decide a case, they could, through a fair and impartial ruling, not only convince the parties involved but transform the opinions of people within the community. In this manner, an official could lead by example and have influence on the masses.

In ruling a state, the ruler and his ministers and other functionaries were far more decisive than the establishment of law or a legal system. The general public also tended to have trust more in sage rulers and honest officials than in the law. The late Qing jurist Shen Jiaben summarized Tang law saying: “The law is important, but what’s more important is how it is enforced by the law officials” (Sheng 1985: 51).

4 Prominent Confucian philosophers

Confucianism was founded by Confucius in the Spring and Autumn period, and two of the most famous Confucian philosophers of the Warring States period are Mencius and Xunzi. The pre-Qin Confucians were worried about the reforms of their time, resisting the idea of law reforms and the concept of “the rule of law” proposed by the Legalists (which will be discussed in detail in the next section). The dominant lens through which Confucius and Mencius viewed “the rule of law” was one of fierce opposition to harsh administrative policies. Both Confucius (“the Sage of Confucianism”) and Mencius (“the Second Sage of Confucianism”) held that ruthless laws would lead to a situation in which the ruler became non-benevolent and the people “unrighteous.” They believed the methods of state governance in the past, characterized by rule of ritual propriety (lizhi), rule of virtue (dezhi), and rule of men (renzhi), were more effective than “the rule of law” advocated by the Legalists.

Pre-Qin Confucian thought was centered on the concept of “ren” (often translated as “benevolence” or “humaneness”), and the Confucians believed that harsh laws and punishments that went against moral principles would have negative effects on society. After Confucius died, Confucianism was divided into eight sub-schools led by eight of his most influential followers, two of whom were Mencius and Xunzi.

Confucius lived during the late Spring and Autumn period, a time marked by significant reforms in vassal states. Each state implemented its own unique strategies, while some reforms proved to be more successful than others. The State of Lu,[15] for example, preserved most of the traditions and ideas of the Western Zhou dynasty, including the idea of rule of ritual propriety, as documented in the historical book Commentary of Zuo (zuozhuan),[16] which states that the “rule of ritual propriety is completely preserved in the State of Lu.”[17] In his early years, Confucius performed rituals, a task that offered him many opportunities to learn about the rites of Zhou, which he was much interested in; meanwhile he also studied the Zhou government codes, regulations, and institutions (dianzhang zhidu). He admired the Duke of Zhou, who invented the institution of ritual and music. Confucius believed a refined version of the Duke of Zhou’s system of thought would make all states under Heaven a better place.

The Confucian philosophy was based on the concept of “benevolence,” underpinned by the belief that humans were good by nature. The Confucian concept of benevolence had a myriad of meanings, with the most fundamental one being “love for others” or “universal love for others,” which was also one of the basic principles in dealing with human relationships. To follow this principle, at home a father should be kind to his children, a son should be filial to his parents, an elder brother should befriend his little brothers, while a little brother should show respect to his elder brothers. In the ruler–subordinate relationship, he insisted that the ruler should treat his ministers with ritual propriety, while in return the ministers should serve their ruler with loyalty. In dealing with strangers, a benevolent man was expected to establish himself and witness the establishment of others, while simultaneously desiring his own success and seeing that others achieve theirs.[18] At the same time, he should not do to others what he did not want done to himself. In short, the principle required people to show filial piety to their parents, love to their siblings, loyalty to their ruler, and kindness to others. All that was emphasized in the rites of Zhou – loyalty toward the ruler, filial piety, female chastity, and moral obligations – was preserved in the Confucian philosophy as demonstrations of being benevolent. The political ideals of Confucius were to achieve governance by moral principles that emphasized the importance of being benevolent; governance that advocated extending the kind of love characteristic of that among family members to others was a good fit for the agricultural society of imperial China. In Confucian philosophy, the law – constituting an integral part of governance by moral principles – assumed dual roles: it could be both mother and father at every turn, a loving parent as well as a disciplinarian. On the one hand, both rulers and parents should try their best to instruct their subordinates and children in moral teachings, training them to be self-disciplined so that they have fewer disputes with others. And when disputes did occur, they should be resolved in a way acceptable to both parties. The attitude that the Confucians took toward dealing with civil “lawsuits” is what we call paternalism today. On the other hand, the Confucians supported the infliction of harsh punishments for some horrific “crimes.” Confucius considered the infliction of harsh punishments as a last resort, saying that the purpose of harsh punishments, serving as a deterrence to criminals, was to help them form a sense of shame, just as when a strict father punished his children, he was to let them know that they had done something wrong and that they must have a sense of shame.

Mencius (full name Meng Ke and literary name Ziyu) is believed to have lived from 372 BCE to 289 BCE in the State of Zou (now Zou County, Shandong Province). He was a descendant of the Meng (or Meng-sun) clan, one of the three ruling families in the State of Lu, and it is said that he was educated by a student of Confucius’s grandson Zisi. Before he turned forty, Mencius had spent most of his time teaching, delighted that “he had attracted the flower of the young men and nurtured them with instruction.” After forty, he traveled to different states in an attempt to convince the rulers to “govern through benevolence” (renzheng). His later years were devoted largely to the writing of books in which he elaborated his philosophical ideas. One of the greatest works produced by Mencius and his students is the Mencius, which, according to the chapter titled “Biographies of Mencius and Xunzi” in Shiji (Historical records), consists of seven “books,” respectively “King Hui of Liang,” “Gongsun Chou,” “Duke Wen of Teng,” “Li Lou,” “Wan Zhang,” “Gaozi,” and “Exhausting the mind.” Another source, “The record of arts and literature,” however, states that the Mencius has eleven “books” in total, with four supplementary ones. It is commonly accepted that the seven books as documented in Historical records are by Mencius, while the supplementary four are not his writings.

Mencius admired Confucius, once saying of him, “all these stand out from their kind, far above the crowd. Since the birth of humankind, there has been no one as outstanding as Confucius.”[19] The only true successor of Confucius, in the view of Mencius, was Zisi. Mencius saw himself as the transmitter of Confucian philosophy; his teachings of Confucian thought, combined with the philosophy of Zisi, were developed into a sub-school of Confucianism called the “School of Zisi and Mencius.” For his contributions to the inheritance and development of the Confucian tradition, Mencius was and still is acclaimed as the “Second Sage” of Confucianism. In the late Han dynasty and afterwards, not only did the philosophies of Confucius and Mencius become the orthodox thought of both Confucianism and society as a whole, but they were favored by most rulers and became the official thought system of imperial China for centuries, acclaimed by scholars as “eternal classics.”

Mencius was born in the middle of the Warring States period, a time that differed remarkably from the Spring and Autumn period in which Confucius lived. Although the time Confucius lived was characterized by the destruction of ritual and music, the prevailing belief of society was still in the traditional rule of ritual propriety. No social reformer, no matter how outstanding he was, such as Guan Zhong or Zi Chan, dared to claim that they had abandoned the ancestral values that emphasized the importance of ritual propriety, righteousness, and sense of shame. Even if the regional rulers had become no less powerful than the king, they still dared not publicly defy the king but instead issued their mandates under the king’s name.

When it came to the Warring States period, however, things were completely different, as people were exhausted by the constant and seemingly never-ending wars, and the tyranny of the rulers prompted the collapse of traditional institutions along with the increasing questioning of ancestral values. Social reformers now dared to publicly dismiss traditional values, while regional rulers vied for power without fearing the king. The hegemonic idea of the Legalists “relying on force to make others submit” prevailed, whereas the kingly way proposed by the Confucians of “relying on virtue to make others submit” was deemed impractical. Reforms became the trend of the era: powerful states did so with ambitions to expand their territories and even to unify all states under Heaven, while small states did it in an attempt to keep themselves from being annexed.

Mencius knew the rule of Zhou would never return and that the philosophy of Confucius was difficult to disseminate. Despite his disappointment in the present, he had faith in the goodness of human nature, sticking to his ideals that Confucian philosophy was the only remedy to end the disorder under Heaven. Facing a different situation from Confucius, Mencius adhered to the thought of Confucius and improved it, making it more complete. The biggest contribution Mencius made to Confucian philosophy was that he proposed the concept of “governance through benevolence” (renzheng)[20] by extending Confucius’s idea of “benevolence” to the field of politics. “Benevolence” in the thought system of Mencius was something that humans were born with, and, more importantly, it was one of the most fundamental governing principles that the rulers should follow. To govern through benevolence, a ruler should set an example by adhering to moral principles himself, making benevolence the bedrock of his rule. His policies, methods of governance, and establishment of institutions should also meet the requirements of benevolence. He should govern people with merciful methods, particularly with merciful teachings.

Three main ideas of governance through benevolence are as follows:

  1. Humans are good by nature: The belief that “humans are good by nature” is fundamental to the concept of governance through benevolence. Mencius held that the “benevolence” advocated by Confucius originated from the innate goodness of humans.

  2. The people are more important than the ruler: The belief that “the people are more important than the ruler,”[21] which is core to the concept of governance through benevolence, is the most valuable part of Mencius’s philosophy. Mencius believed that Emperor Yao and Emperor Shun conquered all under Heaven because they gained people’s hearts, whereas King Jie and King Zhou lost all under Heaven because they lost people’s hearts. So it is incumbent on the ruler to win people’s hearts if his goal is to conquer all states under Heaven.

  3. Promoting educational transformation is a priority: The legal thought that emphasized the importance of governance through benevolence incorporated elements of idealism. Mencius maintained hope for human nature, reckoning that the disorder under Heaven would be ended if humans maintained or restored the goodness inherent in them. And their maintenance or restoration of the goodness of human nature should not be something they were forced to do, but something they wanted to do from within their hearts, as they were well cultivated and educated. In Mencius’s view, the best way to achieve governance through benevolence was to promote educational transformation. He was a proponent of the unification of all under Heaven, yet he also said the unification should be done by the ruler through winning people’s hearts.

Xunzi is another prominent philosopher who followed Confucius and Mencius. The philosophy of Xunzi, with the system of thought of Confucius as its underlying structure, incorporated the ideas of other schools of thought, evolving into a well-known Confucian sub-school toward the end of the Warring States period. Other famous philosophers of the Legalist School, such as Han Fei and Li Si,[22] were all students of Xunzi. The late Warring States period is generally regarded as the most fully developed period for most schools of thought. Xunzi was able to enrich Confucian philosophy by first summarizing the ideas of the hundred schools. Xunzi paid special attention to the “School of Zisi and Mencius,” and after intensive study, he wrote critiques on the thought of Zisi and Mencius. While analyzing and summarizing the ideas from a hundred schools, he gradually formed his own system of thought that was unique among all the Confucian sub-schools. Xunzi and Mencius were speaking at cross-purposes, as they assumed different concepts under several key terms. For example, Mencius advocated emulating the laws and institutions of the former sage rulers, while Xunzi emphasized the necessity of emulating the laws and institutions of the current rulers. Mencius believed that humans were good by nature, while Xunzi believed that humans were evil by nature. Mencius promoted the kingly way of governance while criticizing the hegemonic way of governance, whereas Xunzi supported the employment of both. Mencius emphasized the role of moral ethics in law, while Xunzi emphasized the roles of both moral ethics and punishments in law, stating that moral ethics and punishments were equally important. For all the complexity and comprehensiveness of Xunzi’s philosophy, its tenets are clear when studied following this line of thought: humans are evil by nature[23] and this nature can and must be transformed through education. In addition, strict laws are necessary because educational transformation will not completely erase the basic evil inherent in human beings. Despite the fact that Xunzi held different opinions on human nature from Confucius and Mencius, the remedy he provided for ending the chaos under Heaven was similar to that given by Confucius and Mencius: all three promoted the teaching of virtue and ritual propriety and the kingly way of governance (or governance through benevolence). Xunzi based his philosophy on Confucian thought while incorporating the ideas of other schools of thought to modernize the philosophy.

5 Confucius’s thinking on law further developed by Mencius and Xunzi

Confucius established his legal thought based on his development of the political ideas of the Duke of Zhou, arguing that the necessary way to set things right was to improve the philosophy of the Duke of Zhou and facilitate the recapture of traditional values. This is why he endeavored to justify the rule of ritual propriety proposed by the Duke of Zhou as effective in state governance. After Confucius’s passing, his two followers Mencius and Xunzi further developed his thinking on law, but from different perspectives.

5.1 Rule of ritual propriety

Confucius considered ritual propriety as the highest standard that guided people’s speech and behavior, and the Confucians held that the legitimacy of this hierarchy was rooted in history, as “ritual institutions” (lizhi) of the Western Zhou maintained the kinship and patriarchal hierarchy of control and power.[24] This hierarchy was preordained. Some people were born superior to others, which was something decided by Heaven and Earth and beyond the control of humans. This is why such terms as the “superior” and the “inferior” often appeared in the discourse of Confucius, and why Mencius said that “those who labor with their minds bring order to those who labor with their strength, and those who labor with their strength are ordered by those who labor with their minds.”[25] In the chapters of “Yue Ji” and “Fang Ji” of the Book of rites, the characteristics of ritual propriety are stated as follows: “Ritual propriety manifests the order of Heaven and Earth” and “Ritual propriety refers to the rules that are made in accordance with the feelings of men.”[26]

Xunzi believed there was nothing to doubt about ritual propriety, as it manifested the order of Heaven and Earth and recognized the feelings of men. To violate ritual propriety was to disdain the principles of Heaven and Earth, which would eventually bring chaos upon family, society, and state. Xunzi also emphasized the necessity of restoring the ritual propriety of the Western Zhou dynasty, but from a differing perspective: its origin and functions.

In Confucian philosophy, the term “li” (often translated as “ritual propriety”) is complex. It has a particularly wide range of connotations. Generally speaking, the Confucians divided the rites of Zhou (zhouli) into two parts: liyi and lizhi. On the one hand, liyi ‘ritual propriety and right,’ or simply put, ‘virtue,’ is a wider code of civilized ethical behavior which encompasses various broad fields, including loyalty toward the ruler, filial piety, female chastity, and moral obligations. In other words, ritual propriety and right represent the spirit of the law or the legal system. On the other hand, lizhi ‘ritual institutions’ is the visible and technical procedures of ritual propriety. While sometimes these detailed procedures might seem painstaking and time-consuming, they reflect the fundamental principles underpinning ritual propriety.

Mencius further developed the philosophy of Confucius, providing a more thorough explanation of the Confucian theory of feelings of men. He believed that when the law was at odds with ritual, the former should yield to the latter. And when “ritual institutions” were at odds with the “ritual propriety and right” that embodied the feelings of men, the ruler should put “ritual propriety and right” first without any hesitation. Mencius was seeking flexibility in applying any standards and rules such as ritual propriety, laws, and punishments, but what he insisted should remain constant was the spirit behind the concepts – that was what ancient Chinese called “liyi,” or ritual propriety and right.

Xunzi developed Confucian philosophy from two other perspectives: “exalting ritual propriety” (longli) and “perfection of institutions” (zhifa). Using the philosophy of Confucius as its supporting structure, Xunzi incorporated the ideas of other schools of thought into his philosophy. He insisted that the ruler seek a balance between ritual propriety and institutions, because, as he said, “When superiors do not observe the rules of propriety, and inferiors do not learn, then seditious people spring up, and that State will perish in no time.”[27] It is worth noting, however, that the concept of ritual propriety in the philosophy of Xunzi, who lived during the late Warring States period, was already totally different from that in the philosophies of Confucius and Mencius. “Perfecting institutions” emphasized the importance of institutions such as the law in governance; this concept, proposed by Xunzi after he studied the philosophy of the Legalists, was a major improvement to Confucian philosophy to adapt it for the contemporary period.

Another improvement to Confucian philosophy by Xunzi was that he stated that the role of ritual propriety was equal to the law, and he believed that as a necessary means of governing the state, “the law is the beginning of order.” Based on this thinking, Xunzi selectively assimilated the Legalists’ idea of “rule by methods of administration.” He also insisted that the punishment fit the crime, supporting that “the vile people’s hero” who “did not follow ritual propriety” be “executed first” when a sage king arose. It is Xunzi’s concept of “exalting ritual propriety” while “perfecting institutional rules” that helped integrate the political ideas of the Confucians and the Legalists.

5.2 Rule of virtue

Confucius introduced his key concept of the “rule of virtue” based on his understanding of the Western Zhou policy of making clear virtue and being circumspect with regards to punishments. He stated that the ruler should guide the people with virtue and align them with ritual propriety, and thus they would have a sense of shame and fulfill their roles (Ma 2015: 81). Confucius believed that this was the ultimate goal of the “rule of virtue,” by which he meant that the rule of virtue could compel people to cultivate a sense of shame, and therefore the people would avoid committing crimes. To achieve this goal, Confucius suggested that rulers conduct government in accordance with virtue with the method of educational transformation – a method of government contrary to punishment. The Confucians believed that rulers should govern with virtue, provide enlightened education to people, and exhort them to do good deeds.

Mencius supported the Confucian idea that rulers should conduct government in accordance with virtue.[28] He offered detailed explanations of the four concepts “guo,” “tianxia,” “ba,” and “wang” that had been proposed by the Legalists. The Legalists advocated building a wealthy nation with strong armed forces, annexing other states by force, and governing the state with the rule of law. “Guo” referred to sovereignty over a state, which, if acquired by force, demonstrated that the ruler was a “hegemonic” one, but if acquired by virtue, then he would be seen as a “kingly” one. He who ruled by force would never gain support from the people. There might be a hegemonic ruler who had come to rule a state, but there would never be a hegemonic ruler who had come to rule all under Heaven (tianxia). To rule all under Heaven, the ruler must win the hearts of all people under Heaven, and he who won the hearts of all people under Heaven must be virtuous.

Xunzi also advocated for educational transformation, but his reasoning was opposite from Mencius’s reasoning. Mencius stated that educational transformation served to preserve and promote the goodness of human nature, for he believed that humans were good by nature. By contrast, Xunzi supported educational transformation as part of the plan to eradicate the evilness of human nature, as he theorized that humans were evil by nature.

Xunzi observed: “People’s nature (xing) is evil. Their goodness is a matter of deliberate effort (wei).”[29] Xunzi believed that humans were born disloyal, non-filial, immoral, and unrighteous. So-called “goodness” was not an innate part of their nature but was achieved through deliberate effort, or, in other words, “goodness” was something created by people’s efforts, not innate. In the view of Xunzi, the sage ruler Yu and the tyrant Jie were no different in terms of their nature. All people under Heaven share one thing in common: “when hungry they desire to eat, when cold they desire warmth, when tired they desire rest, they like what is beneficial and hate what is harmful.”[30] If there were no measures in place for restraining the evilness of human nature, there would be chaos under Heaven. This drove Xunzi to call for the transformation of people’s evil nature through moral education as well as the use of law, which Xunzi saw as transforming nature and establishing morality by deliberate effort. While Xunzi held that humans were evil by nature, he believed that such evilness should and could be transformed, and there were indeed ways to transform it. He was pessimistic about the evilness of human nature, but he was confident that it could be transformed. He encouraged people to eliminate their evilness through deliberate effort, which differed from the Legalists’ idea of taking advantage of human nature.

Based on his conviction that human nature was evil, Xunzi further developed the Confucian concept of the rule of virtue, arguing that educational transformation was not a one-fits-all solution to every problem. The ruling class should govern the state with methods of both ritual propriety and law. Therefore, Xunzi aligned with Confucius’s belief that executing individuals without first providing them with guidance is tyrannical. He contested the notion that a ruler should solely focus on educating their subjects about ritual propriety without administering consequences for wrongdoing, or, alternately, only punishing individuals for their transgressions without acknowledging their virtuous actions.

A common misconception held by most legal scholars needs to be addressed here. Many textbooks say that the Confucian concepts of “educational transformation” and the “rule of virtue” overturned the Western Zhou tradition of “zhemin weixing,” a phrase originally documented in the chapter “Penal law of Marquis Lü” (lüxing)[31] in the Confucian classic Book of documents (shangshu). This is, however, not true, because many have misinterpreted the meaning of the phrase: they have misconstrued “zhemin” as ‘to make people submit’ and “weixing” as ‘only punishment,’ so in this case the phrase is misinterpreted as “only punishment can make people submit.” But “zhemin” and “weixing” actually mean ‘to enlighten people’ and ‘avoid committing crimes.’ The phrase properly stated is “to enlighten people so that they can avoid committing crimes.” This interpretation is correct because it is consistent with the Western Zhou rulers’ legal thought and the conditions of society. Therefore, the Confucian concepts of “educational transformation” and the “rule of virtue” can only be seen as the continuing and further development of the Western Zhou tradition of “zhemin weixing,” but not as a “breakthrough” or “change.” This misconception demonstrates how wrong it is to literally construe a phrase.

5.3 Rule of men

Confucius argued that the speech, decision-making, and even likes and dislikes of the highest ruler in his governance of a state were directly linked to the stability of the state and society and living conditions of the people, because it was one of the fundamental principles of society that the masses follow the example set by their ruler. Confucius made the analogy that the virtue of gentleman (often used to refer to the ruling class) was but wind, while the virtue of the common people (often referred to as the masses) was the grass.[32] When the wind blew over the grass, surely it would bend. Therefore, if a ruler has a good character, it is not likely that his people will have poor characters. That was why Confucius saw rule by virtuous men as being so important. Mencius succinctly summarized this sentiment as the necessity for high offices to be held exclusively by individuals of benevolence (The works of Mencius: Li Lou I).[33] He held the belief that the ruler’s moral character far outweighed the significance of the law, asserting its pivotal role in fostering public spirit and shaping the state.

Xunzi provided a more detailed argument for the superiority of the rule of virtuous men to the rule of law. His thinking on the rule of men was grounded in his conviction that humans were evil by nature. First, based on his learning from history, Xunzi theorized that, as laws are made by humans, “there are chaotic rulers; there are no states which are inherently chaotic; there are men who create order; there are no laws creating order of themselves.”[34] Second, “the gentleman is the source of the laws.”[35] Despite the fact that laws are vital to state and society and were even regarded as the “beginning of order,” they are, after all, made by “man” (the ruler), so whether a law is a good one or not depends entirely on the moral character and ability of the “man” who makes it. Third, laws and their interpretations cannot stand alone; they are implemented by men. So without the right ruler, even if there are good laws and rules, the laws are nothing but useless pieces of paper. Fourth, Xunzi believed that as the law does not encompass the full scope of human behavior, it inevitably has loopholes. The same applies to the establishment of state departments and agencies (which, though responsible for different affairs, are not likely to cover all affairs). The voids in legislation elucidated by Xunzi pertain to scenarios where legal jurisdiction falls short. These gaps should be addressed by individuals who consider the human aspect in their decision-making process.

Xunzi’s argument for the relationship between men and law was in line with that of Confucius and Mencius, yet it was more logical and persuasive. He emphasized the key role the ruler played in state governance, and he did not deny the use of institutions and laws in state governance.

The main ideas of pre-Qin legal thought can be generalized as: (1) support for the rule of ritual propriety, (2) advocating for the rule of virtue, and (3) emphasis on the rule of men. Despite the fact that the Confucians (especially Xunzi) admitted how important the law was to the ruling class, they denied it a prominent role in state governance and argued that the law was of no value without the rule of ritual propriety, the rule of virtue, and the rule of men.

This legal thought is characterized as “moral law” theory by Ronggen Yu, an expert on Confucian legal thought, who argued:

First, Confucian moral law represents a legal-cultural system grounded in kinship relationships that takes clan or family moral principles as the most fundamental laws that people must follow. Second, such moral principles override the law of the state, as they are seen as the sources of the highest values of state law. Moral principles replace the state law as the benchmark for ruling and judgement, and the making and enforcement of the state law should be done in accordance with moral principles. Third, there are no boundaries between moral principles and the state law in social and political life. Moral principles are vested with the authority of state law, so that which is legal becomes moral and vice versa. (Yu 1992: 134–136)

He further proposed the duality of Confucian moral law, which, on the one hand, was regarded as the supreme and ideal law in Confucian philosophy, playing the same role in the legal history of China as the theocracy and natural law did in Western legal history. On the other hand, it was positive law that could regulate people’s speech and behavior. In this sense, it was wrong to conclude that Confucian moral law was a purely ideal, unpractical law. This law had a dual nature with several features.

First, it is secular, as it is the fruit of an agricultural society rooted in the soil of a subsistence economy sustained by lineages, bloodlines, and family farm production units. The moral principles behind this law are not mystical beliefs but social norms that can regulate people’s speech and behavior and can guide their life.

Second, it is based on the royal patrilineal hierarchy. Based on people’s acceptance that bloodlines determined their social status, the Confucian moral law is intended to teach people the royal patrilineal principles and human relationships. This is why the Confucians believed ritual propriety, a system underpinned by royal patrilineal principles that determined the superiority of a lineage, a person’s political status and his social identity, and the distribution of wealth and power among different classes was solely dependent upon their birth and bloodline. Ritual propriety would not exist without the establishment of the royal patrilineal hierarchy.

Third, it is constructed based on emulating the laws and institutions of the former sage rulers. (Yu 1992: 134–136)

The Confucians saw themselves as the transmitters of the legacies of the sage rulers Yao and Shun and modeled their character on that of the sage kings Wen and Wu. They identified Yao, Shun, Wen, Wu, and the Duke of Zhou as the model rulers who combined moral and legal values within them, and integrated the Way of Heaven and the feelings of men. They were both the creators and enforcers of perfect moral principles and laws. It is such reasoning that transforms the Confucian moral law dependent on an ideal law into a positive law which exists in the real world.

6 Conclusions

These distinctive features mentioned above have granted Confucian legal thought a significant position in Chinese traditional culture. They have profoundly influenced social morality, the educational systems, and behavioral norms, and Confucian legal thought from the pre-Qin period still has a significant influence on contemporary society in China:

  1. Confucian legal thought emphasizes self-cultivation and moral responsibility, continuing to impact contemporary societal values. Concepts such as respect for others, concern for social welfare, and emphasis on family harmony are still highly regarded.

  2. The educational philosophy of Confucian legal thought continues to play a role in modern education. The ideas of cultivating moral character, promoting holistic development of individuals, and fostering a sense of civic responsibility have influenced educational systems and methods.

  3. Confucian legal thought emphasizes the importance of self-cultivation, family harmony, effective governance, and global peace, still providing guidance for social harmony and governance. Notions such as benevolence, respect for others, and concern for social welfare are crucial for social stability and development.

  4. Confucian legal thought also has a certain influence on leadership and principles of governance. Concepts like the “way of the gentleman” and the practice of benevolent governance promote leading by example and governing with benevolence, shaping the moral requirements and governance approaches of leaders.

  5. Confucian legal thought still holds significant importance in academic research and cultural heritage. Confucianism continues to be studied and passed down as an academic discipline, actively contributing to the preservation and development of cultural traditions.

In summary, Confucian legal philosophy from the pre-Qin period remains a potent force in contemporary society, profoundly shaping the values of the Chinese populace, educational doctrines, social cohesion, governance methodologies, and even academic inquiry and cultural legacy.


Corresponding author: Lijue Song, East China University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China, E-mail:

About the authors

Lijue Song

Lijue Song (b. 1982), PhD, is a professor at the School of Foreign Studies of East China University of Political Science and Law. Her current research interests include the interdisciplinary study of law and language. Her publications include “A study on the translation of the Chinese civil code” (2022), “The fourth generation of human rights in the digital era ” (2022), “Legal thought in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties” (2021), and “A corpus-based study on formulaic sequences in the digital era” (2021).

Xiaohong Ma

Xiaohong Ma (b. 1954), PhD, is a professor at Renmin University of China Law School. Her current research interests include legal history and legal culture. Her publications include “Li and punishment: The historical connection of law” (2004), “The structure and logic of basic concepts of China’s traditional law” (2003), and Legal thought of traditional China (2004).

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Published Online: 2025-03-31

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