Guojin Hou* and Qingsheng Jiang

GP and NCP

A challenge to the two new pragmatic principles that challenge Grice

Abstract: Despite its theoretical significance, Paul Grice's CP, as the heart of classic and neo-Gricean pragmatics, has been a bone of contention for the last four decades for both Western and Eastern scholarship. This study addresses the contribution of four Chinese pragmaticians to the anti-CP principles: Guanlian Qian, Meizhen Liao, and Yameng Liu and Chunshen Zhu, focusing on the latter two. We briefly discuss Liao's Goal Principle (GP) and Liu and Zhu's Non-Cooperative Principle (NCP), which challenge Grice's CP head-on. It points out that Liao's GP is loaded with neo-Gricean pragmatic value as an alternative interpretation of CP but is not deemed "more applicable" as they claim, and that the NCP of Liu and Zhu, based on their CP query, sheds some light on neo-Gricean pragmatics and rhetoric, and yet calls for suspicion of their NCP as an "antistrophos/counterpart rhetoric-principle." We maintain that cooperation in CP suggests pragma-philosophical cooperativeness or cooperationality between rational humans and that it applies to pragmatics and rhetoric alike, as well as to forensic, daily, and rhetorical utterances. It seems that so-called "non-cooperation in cooperation" or "cooperation in non-cooperation" is only logico-semantic non-cooperation, deeply rooted in the soil of pragma-philosophical cooperativeness or cooperationality.

Keywords: cooperation; Cooperative Principle; Goal Principle; Non-Cooperative Principle; pragma-rhetoric

─────
*Corresponding author: Guojin Hou, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou, China,
e-mail: nationelf@126.com
Qingsheng Jiang: Southwest Medical University, Luzhou, China,
e-mail: johnjiangqingsheng@163.com

1 Introduction

In the pragmatic camp known as "neo-Gricean pragmatics," Paul Grice's follower rivals like Horn (1984), Levinson (1987), Sperber and Wilson (2001 and

more), among others throughout the world who attempt to amend or replace CP, are numerous. This paper focuses on two updated principles, namely, the Goal Principle (GP) and the Non-Cooperative Principle (NCP), which have been contributed by Chinese scholars. The former derives from a series of articles (Liao 2004 ff.) which are rooted in Grice's CP while taking nutrition from the "Goal-Intention Principle" proposed by Qian (1997). Liao claims that GP could rescue both CP and Speech Act Theory (SAT) and can be counted as a "fundamental" and "universal" principle for language use or communication. The latter is proposed by Liu and Zhu (2011). They start from identifying the mutual misunderstandings of the relation between pragmatics and rhetoric and then assume that the two are actually antistrophos.[1] To them, rhetoric can neither appropriate CP nor create a correspondent principle to it if we do not want to blur the relation between pragmatics and rhetoric. Hence, they present a counterpart in rhetoric termed the Non-Cooperativeness Principle (NCP). What is wrong with CP? Why does it invite new principles? In what ways are the new rival principles original? How do they relate to CP? This paper attempts to address these questions.

2 The Goal Principle

Liao claims that the forensic data of one million Chinese words/characters he has collected could only be accounted for by the Goal Principle (GP for short),[2] rather than Grice's CP. Then he generalizes the power of GP to cover all daily communication and holds that "GP is more applicable than CP" (2004). Without listing any maxims or sub-maxims, he identifies eight "aspects" of GP (Liao 2004):[3]
    1) Goals motivate the generation of discourse;
    2) Goals initiate and develop discourse;

---

1 "Antistrophos" is Liu and Zhu's borrowed imitation of classical art of dialectic vs. classical rhetoric (Aristotle's model). If rhetoric is "antistrophos of dialectic," we assume that there is not as much difference between the Greek word "antistrophos" and the English word "counterpart" as they think (Liu and Zhu 2011).
2 In Liao's works, he uses the term of "Principle of Goal." We change that into "Goal Principle" for terminological uniformity.
3 We cite his works without modification except for a few punctuation and wording adaptations. He says that this is his adaptation from one of his earlier paper entitled "Goal Principle and goal analysis: A new approach for pragmatics" (2003), but it is pitiably unavailable in any medium.

3) Goals make discourse meaningful;

4) The goals of social participation fall in a number of kinds, as do the goals of speech acts;

5) If one communicates with another for a certain goal, the two participants are bound in a goal relationship;

6) Given the variety of goals, the goal-bounded relationships must have varieties (multifarious), hence the following three major types of goal-bounded relationship:[4]

  a) with identical goals,

  b) with conflictive goals,

  c) with neutral goals (neither favorable nor unfavorable);

7) Since goals constrain language choices, language analysis must bring goals into consideration;

8) Goal analysis goes before speech act analysis.

Liao argues that cooperation (note that his sense of cooperation here is daily collaboration) or not is determined by the type or relation of goals. When goals are identical, it is default cooperation, otherwise it is an "expected" cooperation. In goal-neutral or goal-uncertain situations, it is possible to be either cooperative or non-cooperative. It can be seen that in Liao's framework, CP is interpreted as a model that only covers situations whose goals are identical, i.e., all other situations go beyond the explanatory power of CP. Liao holds that "analysis of goals and goal-relation is more fundamental than and prior to CP analysis" (Liao 2004). CP is "secondary to GP" (Liao 2004). In the later part of that paper, Liao scrutinizes different goal relations as well as cooperativeness relations using his forensic data. He tries to "rescue" the Politeness Principle (PP) of CP, implying that his GP is more capable than PP.

    Note that the term "cooperation" in Liao's paper, as noted before, refers to daily collaboration rather than cooperation as a technical term in the language philosophers' mind. The fact that his GP does not stand at the same level as CP seems to disqualify GP's capability of "rescuing CP" or his claim of GP's being "more valuable than CP." If, as Liao says, CP specializes in accounting for implicatures, it fares less well for forensic discourses since they have no implicature at all (2004). However, due to the wide universality of human discourse and CP's universal power, we assume that CP is applicable to most if not all natural language(s) or discourse, though occasionally it needs the

---

4 The original number is four but only three types are presented (it may have been a slip of the pen).

assistance of secondary pragmatic principles like the Politeness Principle or the Humor Principle.

Regarding the absence of sub-maxims in his GP, Liao says it is because of "limited space." In his later works, he continues his GP formulation and reformulation (2004, 2005a-c, 2009a, b, 2012). Liao (2005a) promotes GP as a "universal pragmatic principle" with its "operable process and methods." It is not hard to note his further explanation that "any rational (normal) people's rational (normal) speech acts" must be goal-oriented, in other words, any rational (normal) people's rational (normal) speech acts must presuppose or guarantee a goal, i.e., "communicative goals" (Liao 2005a). The problem here is that, although Liao, like Grice, assumes rational people's rational acts rather than irrational people's irrational acts, his "goals" are communicative goals, which may be abstract on one occasion but specific on another, rather than Grice's constant abstract objectives. In another paper (2009a), from the perspective of GP, Liao views "communication as a collaborative creation or activity between interlocutors." A goal in his terms is "derived from human brain or consciousness, taking charge of human actions and having itself realized in human actions." It is distinct from and also similar to motivation. Goals are realized by speech acts, so they can be captured by speech act analysis and speech acts can also be captured and analyzed by goals (2005a).

Mention should be made here of Liao (2009b) admitting that GP is not intended to overthrow CP or other principles; rather, in his model, goal is "root" while other parameters like age, identity, gender, education, etc. are all merely "branches." Therefore, GP, rather than CP, is the root principle for communication interpretation. GP, in his mind, could develop and remedy CP and SAT. GP enjoys top priority, at least for the purpose of SAT "reviving" (2009b).

3 The Non-Cooperative Principle

3.1 Liu and Zhu's queries about CP

Liu and Zhu (2011) plough deeply into several "misunderstandings" of rhetoric from rather original perspectives. They argue that NCP can serve as an important principle in rhetoric. It relates in some way to CP but is essentially different from it, making NP and CP an "antistrophos" of each other.

Liu and Zhu (2011) first of all present CP to rhetoricians before they argue with pragmatists. Grice (1975) brings CP into being supported by its four maxims: maxim of quantity, maxim of quality, maxim of relation, and maxim of manner. Language users, either in written or spoken communication, are expected to observe these maxims. That is to say, a language user should make his/her contribution as informative as required, truthful, relevant, and clear (prescriptive). And in actual communication, the communicators do observe these maxims (descriptive). However, on some particular occasions, the communicators may opt out or exploit some maxims to give rise to implicatures. Nevertheless, such cases are just marked deviants (from unmarked general cooperativeness or cooperationality). It is a pity, as far as we see it, that Liu and Zhu keep blind eyes to this point and switch, too promptly perhaps, to what they or Gu (see below) dub "rhetorical cooperativeness."

Liu and Zhu (2011) introduce the notion of "rhetorical cooperation" of Gu (1993, 1994), an amender of CP. Gu differentiates two kinds of cooperation: pragmatic cooperation and rhetorical cooperation, via a reconsideration of CP and SAT. The former (cooperation) deals with attainment of "informative goals" while the latter deals with "rhetorical and extralinguistic goals" (Gu 1994). A rhetorical goal, according to Gu, is highly sensitive to "situational contingencies." It is by nature unassumable but achievable by effort (Gu 1994). A perlocutionary act is essentially transactional, a joint endeavor between S and H (Gu 1993). Rhetoric, according to Gu, should not be confined within "persuasive speeches" but ought to extend to any forms of communication in Grice's sense, and operate in unique cooperative ways. Liu and Zhu (2011) realize that Gu's "rhetorical cooperation," in contrast to "traditional rhetoric," is but "conversational rhetoric," which is free from any "improper connotations" of traditional rhetoric, and it suggests only that "S makes H do sth. by saying x" or "S gets H to do sth. by saying x" (Gu 1993).

Liu and Zhu (2011) point out that "even though Gu's 'rhetorical cooperation' bears much surface resemblance to the kind of cooperation rhetoricians talk about, underneath it assumes only a pragmatically redacted 'rhetoric,' one that is deprived of the relational tension and the persuasive dynamics deemed essential to traditional rhetoric."

We can learn from the above discussion that Gu or others who transfer terms like "rhetoric" or "cooperation" to their own field(s) cannot guarantee intactness of the original meaning of the terms proper (Liu and Zhu 2011). Liu and Zhu (2011) recognize that it is tricky business to have a clear cut between CP and NCP since the senses of "cooperation" are not identical in pragmatics and rhetoric. In pragmatics, cooperation "refers to a general agreement by

participants in talk exchanges to abide by a common set of norms," while in rhetoric,

> it is actually suggestive of two separate agreements: S's agreement to make all the necessary adaptations and adjustments to H so as to produce the effect or result S desires, and H's consent to yield eventually to S's argument on condition that it makes sufficient sense to H. At the root of this variation are two discrepant presumptions about language users' communicative purposes. (Liu and Zhu 2011)

3.2 The Non-Cooperativeness Principle (NCP) of Liu and Zhu

Liu and Zhu (2011) go on to say that pragmatics largely assumes that communicators share "a common purpose" or at least "a mutually accepted direction" (Grice 1989: 26). Such being the case, cooperation is a set of universal norms. However, that is not the case in rhetoric. The "teleological divergence" is highlighted between S and H, which "makes it necessary to talk about 'cooperation' or its ironical embodiment in NCP separately for the two parties involved." If CP is viewed as the "alter ego" of NCP, NCP would posit the following maxims for S and H respectively (as an item-by-item analogy to Grice's CP maxims) (Liu and Zhu 2011):

Maxim of quantity:
    1) Say no less than is required for producing the intended effect on your addressee;
    2) Concede no more to the addressor than you feel non-coercively compelled to.
Maxim of quality:
    1) Say only what your addressee believes or could be made to believe is true or valuable;
    2) Grant the addressor's point only when you are not in doubt of its truthfulness or value.
Maxim of relation:
    1) Say only what your addressee deems or could be made to deem relevant;
    2) Consider only those of the addressor's remarks which you find relevant.
Maxim of manner:
    1) Adapt your mode of presentation to both your addressee and the context of communication;
    2) Treat the addressor's talk seriously only when you find its mode of presentation appropriate.

What are the differences between the maxims of CP and NCP? While the Gricean maxims presuppose a "normative context," which justifies, for example, the specific prohibition against "ambiguity" or the "specific injunction for brevity," the NCP maxims, under Liu and Zhu's analysis, presuppose a variable context capable of rendering it pointless to "preordain specific manners of expression." In the framework of Gricean pragmatics, they say, the participants' own particular interpretations of each actual discoursal setting are supposed to largely coincide, which enables the participant to utilize a "common measure" for a "quantitative determination of informativeness" or a "qualitative determination of truthfulness" (Liu and Zhu 2011).

However, in NCP, the understanding of the situation is very separate between S and H. Their "quantitative and qualitative interests" are far different, inviting separate interpretation (Liu and Zhu 2011). Gricean maxims are applicable to both S and H since they are dependent on the "built-in intersubjective validity" of communicators while the maxims of NCP are "party-specific subjective," hence far from equally applicable to both communicators (Liu and Zhu 2011).

It is obvious so far that in their opinion, the discrepancy between pragmatics and rhetoric is irreducible. In the framework of pragmatics, cooperation is a taken-for-granted foundational assumption while in rhetoric it is a goal to be achieved "with strenuous efforts," "a hard-won end product of persuasion" (Liu and Zhu 2011). Both pragmatists and rhetoricians, they argue, are aware that cooperation and non-cooperation interplay in actual communications. It is likely that pragmatists treat non-cooperative act(ion)s as cooperative "in deep soil" since flouting a CP maxim is to "[reaffirm] the same principle [...] in its very violation" (see Burke 1969: 3). The "apparent clash between commitment and action" serves to start the inference process of achieving "meaning in context or meaning$_{nn}$" (Liu and Zhu 2011). However, to rhetoricians, the superficial cooperative acts should be "presumed to be strategically motivated and artistically designed" and ultimately identified to be non-cooperative acts. "For S to flout Non-Cooperation as a general principle, or to behave in a cooperative manner discursively, is in general to induce the as yet unrealized cooperation from H." "The conflict between the presumption of non-cooperation and the apparent act of cooperation is meant to initiate and sustain a persuasive process that leads eventually to the production of the desired perlocutionary or persuasive effects" (Liu and Zhu 2011).

4 A brief joint review of GP and NCP

4.1 Cooperation over or overthrown?

The key notion of "非合作"/ *fei hezuo* (non-cooperation, non-cooperative) or "不合作"/*bu hezuo* (no cooperation, not cooperation, un-cooperative) in both Liao (2004 and more) and Liu and Zhu (2011) can be dated back to (essentially is) the "不合作现象"/*bu hezuo xianxiang* (non-cooperative phenomena) in Qian (1989). Therefore, it is worthwhile spending a page on the gist of Qian (1987, 1989, 2005 [1997]).

It can be noticed that in the literature of these authors, 非/*fei* (non-) and 不/*bu* (not/*un-*) are used sometimes interchangeably as if they were absolute synonyms. That is certainly not the case, for the former just denotes any entity or property other than X (cooperation/cooperative here) in question and the latter suggests a strong attitudinal bias toward the opposite of X (cooperation/cooperative here). But it is a coincidence to see "不合作"/*bu hezuo* in Qian's works and "non-cooperation," "non-cooperativity," or "un-cooperative" in Liu and Zhu's article (all used synonymously) meaning the same thing, viz., the strong version of cooperation negation. In communication, "non-cooperative phenomena" that are actually cooperative in their deep essence are not very rare, presented often as non-cooperative in quantity, relation or manner, according to Qian. "Non-cooperative in quantity" means that the utterance is not as informative as required (either under- or over-informative). Under-informativeness is caused by S's expectation of H's information supplement/input, or by adherence to the Principle of Least Effort, or simply by "situation prohibition" (like an emergency, a physical discomfort, an interruption, or a threat). Over-informativeness, on the other hand, occurs usually because of the requirement of H (H's direct or indirect need for redundant information) or "making up for the erosion caused by communication tunnel" (for instance, the weakening signal of the mobile phone, a great deal of surrounding noise) or "abnormal functioning of S" (over-excited, over-active, over-nervous, etc.). "Non-cooperative in relation," according to Qian, means "an answer irrelevant to a question or an utterance irrelevant to a topic in question," "an inconsistent or faltering thought," or understandable "evasiveness" (like hedges, redundancy, ambiguity, etc.). Finally, "non-cooperative in manner" can be accounted for by "evasiveness of S's mind." S at times might sound as if "hesitating," so that "he is at a loss for words."

Qian (1989) argues that although the foregoing "un-cooperative phenomena" flout CP, they do not give rise to implicatures, and usually end up with cooperation because of the affiliated techniques like "making up, correction, verification, disambiguating, and so on." These techniques fall into categories like "non-verbal means, common sense, logic, convention, pre-locutionary behaviors, habit, context, etc." Subject to adjustments of those means, an un-cooperative speech act is likely to veer to final cooperation. Curious readers may take cognizance of Qian's model excluding "un-cooperative in quality" in his formulation, because part of his explanation is that the essential non-cooperative acts or "non-cooperative in quality" relate either to "false information concerning interest relation" or to "functionally false information" (Qian 1989). Both of them intend to mislead and constitute the case of cunningly and deliberately flouting the maxim of quality of Grice's CP. The reason why "functionally false information" is also excluded from Qian's consideration is that it can cause luxuriant implicatures, which go against his focus (only on acts that flout CP but generate no implicature).

We certainly find Qian's account of the key term "cooperation" of Gricean pragmatics novel and interesting, and we also endorse his insight about the claim that cooperation makes the rudimentary premise of language communication. The overt "un-cooperation, less-cooperation, or non-cooperation" is deeply rooted in cooperativeness. This is also an acknowledgement and affirmation of "cooperativeness" in principle (for details, see below). In other words, no communication is independent of cooperativeness. Any form of non-cooperative instances is but a case of CP deviation, viz., deviating from observation of CP. Then, how far does a logical form (LF) deviate from CP to be counted as non-cooperation? Deviating from (or "flouting" in Qian's and Grice's terms) any maxim to the extent to give rise to the intended particular implicature will provide H with meaning which is (un)available to her. Grice actually treats CP with its maxims as "moral commandments" (1989, epilog), a rational principle (see Feng 2005). If this is reasonable, it is unnecessary for Qian to exclude "non-cooperativeness in quality." To us, the general working principle beneath the four parameters (quantity, quality, relation, and manner) is roughly identical, though the degree of cooperation (or observing or not) is superficially various. That flouting the quality maxim (and the other three maxims) would (not always) give rise to implicatures has been frequently elaborated by Grice and neo-Gricean pragmaticians. For instance, if one person wants to invite another to dinner but the latter does not want to go, then she would lie by saying something like "Sorry, I happen to have an earlier appointment" or "Sorry, my nose is running like the Yangtze" (adapted from He et al. 2000: 156) to avoid offending H by

bluntly telling the truth. H would be able to infer the "untruth" of these casual utterances and get to know the particular conversational implicature, i.e., pretext of rejection for "another appointment or catching a cold," if she is not deliberately deceiving (He et al. 2000: 157).

Chu and Huo (2004) are supporters and representers of Qian's GIP in their counter-argumentation with Lin and Yu (2002). We discover Zhang and Wang (1998) also to be supporters of Qian, for they try to develop or strengthen Qian's argument by stating that CP is distinct from cooperation in two aspects (Zhang and Wang 1998): 1) flouting the maxims of CP does not necessarily mean being un-cooperative. Some overt un-cooperative acts are covertly cooperative; 2) adhering to the maxims of CP does not guarantee cooperation. Some overt cooperative acts are covertly un-cooperative. "The ways of being cooperative or un-cooperative vary from case to case." At least these three ways can be exploited to attain cooperation (Zhang and Wang 1998: 1) by adhering fully to the maxims of CP; 2) by taking advantage of the implicatures generated by flouting the maxims; 3) by flouting the maxims while giving rise to no implicature (proposed by Qian).

The thesis of Zhang and Wang (1998) can be summarized as assuming the "cooperativeness" premise behind the interlocutors' utterances; observing some actual cases deviating away from CP; and excluding some vicious, rare, and marked "un-cooperative" cases. However, as far as we observe, all of the non-cooperative cases in both Qian (1989) and Zhang and Wang (1998) are essentially cooperative, like the case of Bernard Shaw of example (1) or the case of the rich man of example (2), both adapted from Zhang and Wang (1998):

(1) (*Once George Bernard Shaw was suffering from vertebra pains and the doctor said a bone should be taken from his heel for substitution. After the operation, the doctor hit upon the idea of making more money out of the case.*)

Doctor: Mr. Shaw, this is a novel operation, you know.
Shaw: (*grinning*) Wonderful! So how much do you pay me for the experiment?

(2) (*A rich miser happened to have a sick horse but hated to spend a cent on it. When he met the local vet on his way to his clinic, he asked:*)

Miser: My horse is OK sometimes, and not OK at other times. What shall I do?
Vet: When it is OK, sell it.

According to Zhang and Wang (1998), the replier in both examples understands the first speaker's implication but un-cooperatively turns away the right channel, hence demonstrating "non-cooperation in the disguise of

cooperation." We think that in these examples the replier does cooperate with the questioner; it is cooperation in the disguise of non-cooperation.

Based on earlier elaborations, Qian (1997/2005) goes further,[5] taking a bolder step to discredit CP as a principle and claims that all language communication is subject to the "Goal-Intention (Principle)" (GIP), hence a new rival for CP (1997, details omitted here).

4.2 Scant comments upon GP

Liao shows us good academic courage and spirit in his analysis of forensic discourses and GP formulation. However, the model in Liao (2005a) can hardly be viewed as feasible. The model of Liao (2005b) is confined to the analysis of courtroom discourses. Specifically, it is from GP to the analysis of goal-relation, specific goals, and goal hierarchy, from the choice of top-down or bottom-up analysis to the analysis of goal and discourse coherence, then to the analysis of goal and means of discourse, goal and power, and finally to the analysis of goal and the results. Even if the model "has been testified in forensic discourses," its effects can hardly be generalized to other fields like (other kinds of) "institutional discourses" and "ordinary discourses," at least not to the extent as he strongly claims.

Liao extends GP step by step in a series of papers, in which he demonstrates his criticism and development of Qian's GIP, let alone of Grice's CP. In addition to Zhang and Wang (1998) and Chu and Huo (2004), among supporters of Qian, we find opposite opinions about GIP on the part of Lin and Yu (2002, 2004), Feng (2005), and Du and Li (2012). Lin and Yu do not accept Qian's GIP because a purpose or goal should be a premise for a successful communication, and it should not become a principle to replace CP and because GIP may lead to "pragmatic nihilism" (2002) by its over-simplification and self-contradiction (Lin and Yu 2006). Du and Li (2012) doubt the applicability of GIP, saying that some of his examples of GIP or non-cooperation can be better explained by CP. Feng (2005), who provides the most noteworthy anti-GIP research, is critically unhappy with Qian's ideas. Feng says that Qian does not differentiate superficial non-cooperation as we encounter in competitive daily discourse from philosophical cooperativeness or cooperationality (see §5 below). We find inconsistency in Qian's co-textual literature if we run from Qian's (1987) early

---

5 Liao (2005a: 1) represents Qian's first mention of the "Goal-Intention Principle" without detailing it. Unfortunately, Liao does not list this entry in his references.

anti-Grice attempt to Qian's (1989, 2005) bluntly self-adaptive opposition to Grice, and even Qian's (1995) self-hostility, which is but a eulogy to Grice's CP. Then with Liao's ideas about CP and his own GP, there can be found supporters in China, like Chu (2013), but hitherto we have not spotted any opposition. Putting aside the other pragmatic principles (of imagining they are not available), GP is reliable in accounting for most language communication. Nevertheless, Liao is merely following neo-Griceans like Horn, Levinson, Sperber and Wilson, etc., in his attempt to (further) reduce Grice's four maxims to two or three, or approbating one key term like "relevance" or "intention" from Grice for further inducing or even over-generalizing it and ultimately overstating its explanatory power. Though we admire every effort of the neo-Griceans and recognize the reasonable part of GP, it would be haunted by the following questions if we take a harsh critical stance to it.

1) If Qian's GIP makes do, why GP or any other similar "P"?
2) Even if Qian's GIP is not flawless, all Liao has to do is remedy or strengthen it.
3) Now that GP stems from CP, GP should be a semi-sublation of CP, rather than a thorough overthrow of it.
4) Liao is expected to (but he does not) make clear in which aspects GP overrides CP or other neo-Gricean principles in explaining language communication.
5) Liao fails to make a distinction between "goal, intentionality, intention" of CP and "goal, motivation" of GP/GIP, unable to tell which one is (more or the most) rational, perceptual, fundamental.
6) Liao fails to posit the relation between CP and neo-Gricean pragmatics. Which is the leader and which is/are the follower(s), and why?
7) Liao's "cooperation" does not hold at the same level as Grice's "cooperativeness."
8) How is the "rescuer" rescuing the "rescuee"? What would occur to the other neo-Gricean "rescuers" other than GP?
9) What are the maxims of GP as a model in the camp of neo-Gricean pragmatics at all?
10) If there is no specific maxim, then Liao's claim that GP is more operable and more valuable than CP is made groundless.
11) The (eight) aspects of goals Liao lists are based on differences rather than similarities between the interlocutors, which invites a further comparison between GP and CP as well as other Gricean pragmatic counterparts so as to prove the would-be rationality of GP.

12) Liao's claim that GP applies to all forms of utterances is corroded by his own confinement to forensic discourse examples.

13) A large number of papers of Liao's on the same topic fail to show the expected development of his GP, or is this abandonment? There is a great proportion of repetition and redundancy.

14) If, as Liao contends, the "goal" of GP cannot be explained by motivation or motif, then how can it be explained by speech acts? It is a vicious circle if Liao looks to goals for accounting for speech acts.

15) If GP is identified as a pragmatic principle at all, what is the relation between GP and other principles? Can GP really be counted as a "SAT-reviving flag" (Liao 2009b)?

4.3 A brief critique of the Non-Cooperativeness Principle (NCP)

Liu and Zhu (2011) is the latest study of pragmatic-rhetoric relations, shedding insightful light on the controversial issues of the boundary between pragmatics and rhetoric. Zhang (2015) is the only paper we have so far found, which is, so it seems to us at least, nothing but a praising representation of the key points of Liu and Zhu. He supports Liu and Zhu's claim and elaboration on rhetoric's presupposing "an initial attitude of non-cooperation on the addressee's part," premised on "a relational tension between S and H" when S tries to persuade H to believe sth. or take an expected action. No one can ever "perform rhetorically without making efforts to overcome a resistance from the audience." Zhang, like Liu and Zhu, thus maintains that it is in pragmatics or "pragmatic performance" that cooperation between S and H can be seen (Zhang 2015).

A colder and closer look will help us see that, among other things, the real problem of Liu and Zhu, as we think of it, is the vagueness of relation between cooperation and non-cooperation. Is it "non-cooperation in cooperation" or "cooperation in non-cooperation"?

Liu and Zhu lead the readers to revisit CP and its maxims in order to present the "real face" of "cooperation" to rhetoricians. Many of their observations can be regarded as right if not accurate. They adopt Gu's "rhetorical cooperation," integrate pragmatic and rhetorical cooperation, so as to set it apart from Grice's "pragmatic cooperation, conversational cooperation, communication cooperation." However, in Gu's mind, "pragmatic cooperation deals with attainment of informative goals" while "rhetorical cooperation is concerned with the attainment of rhetorical and extralinguistic goals" (Gu 1994). It does not appear as convincing as it claims. Attaining the "informative goal" (exchanging information) is a stereotypical conversational pattern in classic

Gricean pragmatics which can hope to be successful via observation of maxims of quantity (as informative as required) and quality (being honest). Nevertheless, there are in actual situations many other communicating models, viz., those involving no exchange of genuine information (neither quantity nor quality). Consider daily greetings, requests for leave, apology letters, condolence letters, congratulatory letters, application letters, invitation letters, crosstalks, talk shows, dumb shows, imitation shows, advertisements, public signs, etc. – all these non-information-exchange models or means of communication are situation-sensitive, i.e., "situational contingencies," as "rhetorical goals" in Gu's term. The goals of those means do not lie in information but for rhetorical effect or "rhetorical goals," which cannot be "assumed" but "hard-won." (Gu 1994)

Some judgments of Gu's, like the "transaction" essence of "perlocutionary act (effect)" and perlocutionary act as "a joint endeavor" of the interlocutors (Gu 1993) are firmly true. His thought that rhetoric should not be confined only to "persuasive discourse" but ought to reach for other forms of communication in the scope of "neo-Gricean pragmatics" is also enlightening. However, it is a pity that those thoughts are ignored by Liu and Zhu while they insist that "rhetorical cooperation" in Gu's sense is essentially "pragmatically redacted" rhetoric, "deprived of the relational tension and the persuasive dynamics deemed essential to 'traditional rhetoric.'" Cooperation in pragmatics and in rhetoric, according to Liu and Zhu, is "divergent" (Liu and Zhu 2011). In pragmatics, cooperation is "a general agreement by participants in talk exchanges to abide by a common set of norms," while in rhetoric, it is "separate agreements": S's adaptation and adjustment for an effect and H's agreement to S's argument and the subsequent retrieval of that expected effect.

Based on their particular understanding of cooperation, different from Grice and Gu, Liu and Zhu propose the "Non-Cooperativeness Principle" with NCP's several paired maxims. A close read of the maxims would find that the first article of maxim of quantity, "say no less than is required for producing the intended effect on your addressee," is not distinctively different from its counterpart in CP. The second article, "concede no more to the addressor than you feel non-coercively compelled to," seems to have a little to do with quantity of information. The first article of maxim of quality, "say only what your addressee believes or could be made to believe is true or valuable," is almost identical to the counterpart in CP. Then the second article, "grant the addressor's point only when you are not in doubt of its truthfulness or value," is self-evident to H. The first article of maxim of relation of NCP, "say only what your addressee deems or could be made to deem relevant," is again similar to Grice's counterpart. The second article, "consider only those of the addressor's

remarks which you find relevant," is an entailment (response/result) of the former article. The first article of maxim of manner of NCP, "adapt your mode of presentation to both your addressee and the context of communication," is just paraphrase of CP's last maxim. The second article, "treat the addressor's talk seriously only when you find its mode of presentation appropriate," is the natural resultant action on the part of the addressee. Put in another way, NCP is nothing but a paraphrase or explanation version of CP. In its deep essence, NCP is CP in that their "N" (not or non-(cooperation)) is nowhere to be found, far from their expectation or formulation ambition.

Liu and Zhu (2011) call into question what they say is the presupposition of CP, viz., "a normative context" which prohibits "ambiguity" of any sort. What Grice is concerned about, they say, is a general, symmetrical (four maxims) description of rational humans' communicative cooperation in a normal context.[6] Communicators are normally required to communicate cooperatively, and to do so in the four unmarked dimensions (this is really what happens in actual communication). Such being the case, Grice does not necessarily ignore dynamic contexts and individuality of interlocutors. On the contrary, Grice spends large space on cases giving rise to implicatures by violating or deviating from the maxims, though not backed by very fine-grained or scientific analysis. Liu and Zhu's claim that "the NCP maxims presuppose a variable context that renders it pointless to preordain specific manners of expression" goes too far perhaps from the true picture of human communication, be it pragmatic or rhetorical. "Variable," or "variation, variability" for that matter, is to us just a matter of degree. It per se presupposes the acceptability of "normative context," otherwise there would be simply no context comprehensible to ordinary people (Liu and Zhu 2011).

The key tone of the major concerns of Gricean pragmatics (or CP) is "to be alike, identification, convergence," "a quantitative determination of informativeness" or "a qualitative determination of truthfulness." (Liu and Zhu 2011) As far as we see it, CP covers all rhetorical discourses, whereas Liu and Zhu maintain that in their NCP, S and H have divergent understandings of the context, resulting in invalidity of "a quantitative determination of informativeness" or "a qualitative determination of truthfulness" characteristic of Gricean pragmatics (Liu and Zhu 2011). They agree that the Gricean maxims are applicable to both S and H, but they hold that the maxims of their NCP are not equally applicable to S and H, or in other words, applicable to S or H and not to both parties. We find that their formulation of paired sub-maxims a and b

---

6 "Rational"/"rationality" reappears several times in Grice (1975).

in NCP, with their charming dichotomy (bi-article) pairing, means only that S and H have various concerns and therefore various know-hows and various requirements of them. It is entirely possible for Grice or any neo-Gricean pragmatician to recompose CP's maxims, using two articles like those of NCP, for elaboration of pragmatic constraints for either S or H and not for both. What seems to matter for CP then is nothing but a formulation analogy or parody of NCP's bipartite maxims, each article serving only one communicating party. If this is the case, it will greatly reduce the plausibility of NCP.

Pushing aside momentarily (not ignoring) the pragmatic and rhetorical divergence of an utterance and the variety of generating and understanding an utterance in pragmatics or in rhetoric, Grice by no means negates the possible divergences such that they drop out of the common interest of Gricean pragmatics. NCP of Liu and Zhu does pay the right heed to these aspects but it emphasizes, perhaps exaggeratingly, many types of abnormal as well as normal linguistic usages, correlating "positive rhetoric" and "negative rhetoric."

It is interesting to notice that Liu and Zhu do realize that cooperation and non-cooperation co-occur in one discourse, and for different utterances or chunks of language, an entire discourse is an artwork of more cooperation here and more non-cooperation there, considering the miscellaneousness of modern human communication. The reason why Grice and his followers look on "not-cooperative, less-cooperative, un-cooperative" phenomena as cooperative is that cooperativeness, different from actual cooperation or non-cooperation, is fundamentally a common prescriptive feature of human communication, *iff* human beings are social beings at all. Grice's CP demands metaphysical cooperation or cooperatives, while the cooperation in Liu and Zhu's NCP (though they really address non-cooperation) is physical or dialectal cooperation, in other words, layman's cooperation. English adjectives like *cooperative*, lend themselves to such modifications as *extremely*, *very*, *comparatively*, *almost*, and so on, but their phrasal referent, in NCP's formulation, is turned into one thing, non-cooperation, if the communication is seen rhetorically. We hold that if one flouts CP (if floutable at all) one really flouts a CP maxim (an article thereof), and this flouting per se negatively presupposes Gricean cooperation or cooperativeness. Likewise, if one flouts NCP (if floutable at all), one actually flouts an NCP maxim (an article thereof), and that in turn, also negatively, affirms and conforms with Gricean cooperation or cooperativeness.

5 Further discussion

No matter which means we as human beings cash in on, we are essentially cooperative in communication. In Grice's terms, communicators bear in mind "a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction" (1975, quoted from Hou 2008: 84). The possible reason why some scholars are opposed to CP is that they downgrade the general objective of CP to be specific context-specific communicative goals which are sensitive to many factors, varied from person to person, from case to case, etc. The goal of CP is, on the one hand, general and universal, but on the other hand, inclusive and difference-embracing. It is "a mutually accepted direction" between interlocutors. The gist of CP is merely "making your contribution adaptive to the common goals and direction" (Grice 1989: 26). If so, rational people, or model humans, would not violate CP. They may at most "deviate" from one or more maxims of CP. What we have to recognize is that "it is all likely to give rise to implicatures by observing a maxim or not (violating, opting out, flouting)" (Hou 2008: 85).

Since both GP and NCP derive from the term "cooperation" of CP and the assumed "misunderstandings," we turn several misunderstandings inside out (together with what can be considered sensible understandings), like Gu's "rhetorical cooperation", etc. We argue that "cooperation" of CP is rational people's "cooperative attitude, cooperativeness," which is applicable to pragmatics and rhetoric alike, and to forensic, daily and rhetorical utterances alike. We find that their rejection of CP is derived from Qian (1987, 1989, 2005), so their conception and formulation call for as much dubiety if not rejection as Qian's. From our point of view, "un-cooperative in quantity, relation or manner" as well as "un-cooperative in quality" (labeled as "implausible and unnecessary" by Qian) are all merely the "non-cooperative, less-cooperative, un-cooperative" behaviors of ordinary people (non-academic), rather than essentially cooperativeness as envisaged from the stance of language philosophy or pragmatics. CP cannot be violated, or rather, it is its maxims that can be flouted, intentionally more often than not. Deviation from a maxim of CP does not suffice by itself as a criterion whereby to tell philosophically or pragmatically cooperation from non-cooperation, and cooperativeness from un-cooperativeness. If Qian (1989) justifiably views his three "non-cooperative" phenomena as deeply cooperative,[7] then Qian (2005 [1997]) unwisely exhibits

---

7 The first version of Qian's CP rescue endeavor is "Non-Cooperative Choice" (NCC, for short) (1987). In that paper, he states that "the principled" CP and "the insistent request of part-

some un-cooperative cases in order to shut Grice's CP out of the pragmatic door so as to make way for his "Goal-Intention Principle." Qian (2005) only quotes un-cooperative examples from his earlier works to add to more "un-cooperative facts" at the sacrifice of his earlier judgment of those un-cooperative cases being deeply rooted in the cooperation "soil" (see §4.1). His non-cooperation hypothesis and other views have all been unthinkingly accepted by Zhang (1999). This is encouragement enough for more such theoretical attempts, like GP and NCP. But we still tend to believe that all the "un-cooperative" phenomena in Qian's and Liao's works, as well as Liu and Zhu's "non-cooperation in cooperation" or "cooperation in non-cooperation," are in fact cooperativeness, viz., true and profound cooperativeness in the disguise of seemingly non-cooperation. "It is cooperation in principle" (Feng 2005).

In China, 4,835 papers relating to CP have been published from the 1980s (to August 15, 2016). However, many of them are short of the right understanding of CP as a principle. For instance, there is the practice of equaling CP to its subordinate "conversational maxims," mistaking principles as maxims or the other way around. These opinions are certainly "incorrect" and "self-contradictory" (Liu 2002). Feng (2005) criticizes many scholars like Qian (2005), Sperber and Wilson (2001 [1995]), Clark (1996), Finch (2000), and so on for "failing to distinguish cooperation in general (lexical) meaning from cooperation in pragmatic principle" (see Hou 2008: 85). The statement "[it] is cooperation in principle" (Feng 2005) and Liu's (2002) comment gear right to the point of CP. Levinson (1983: 50) contends that "implication relies on some very general expectation of interactional co-operation." Fais (1994) holds that conversation is essentially cooperative and it is one of the designated features of conversation. Then how does deviation occur? If both S and H observe the underlying CP, then, any deviation from the four maxims is pragmatically meaningful: deviation per se orients toward cooperation, according to Pym (2000). "Once CP is observed, every conversation goes ahead under its cover" (Hou 2008: 86).

Classic Gricean pragmatics brings a revolution to pragmatics by proposing CP with its inferential model (for inference of implicature, impliciture, and explicature, among other things). Though not perfect perhaps, it is still an unshakable foundation of classic and neo-Gricean pragmatics (see Huang 2001). We consistently regard utterances that adhere to CP as normal or unmarked ones, and consider others that more or less deviate from one or other maxim of

---

playing" NCC are inter-dependent. We find that Qian (1989) and Qian (1987) resemble each other in many aspects.

CP as special or marked ones. The degree of markedness is different from utterance to utterance. Whereas unmarked utterances make the biggest proportion of daily communication, weakly marked, mildly marked, and strongly marked utterances are meant to boost discursive tension, creativity, and variation, adding to the user's idiolect. Pragmatics (by CP) in various research endeavors can certainly focus on unmarked utterances, though it can also, in theory at least, cover marked utterances. On the other hand, rhetoric (by NCP?) can lay its hand on marked utterances. This is really a tentative "pragmatic labor division," actual pragmatic or rhetorical studies being open to either unmarked or marked utterances and phenomena. Nonetheless, it is theoretically pointless and misleading to overthrow the general, pragmatic "cooperativeness" only because of the (co)existence of specific, rhetorical cases of non-cooperation.

The "Cooperative Principle" by Grice is a universal principle covering all types and subtypes of human communication. It is a rational, metaphysical principle for human inference and evaluation. CP or its cooperativeness looms much higher than what may be suggested by terms like "very cooperative, collaborative or obedient," i.e., the layman's cooperation (Feng 2005). CP never holds us up from constructing other (sub-)principles like Politeness Principle (PP), Principle of Least Effort (PLE), Banter Principle (BP), Irony Principle (IR), Humor Principle (HP), etc. However, trying to replace CP by one of those above-mentioned principles or NCP should invariably be characterized by a proportion of implausibility. In other words, the "goal" or "intention" of neo-Gricean pragmatics is the premise of cooperativeness (Feng 2005). This also indicates that the cooperativeness of CP presupposes "goals" or "intention." Hence, it is unnecessary to coin any other terms sharing the same content only in different forms like GP or GIP or any other possible notions like Rational Principle, Implicature Principle, (Classic) Grice Principle, etc., to the astonishment of the Occam Razor. It is also unnecessary to go in the opposite direction of CP or PP to justify principles like NCP or Impoliteness Principle (IP).

6 Conclusion

This paper is a succinct comparative discussion of the two challenging principles of CP: Goal Principle and Non-Cooperative Principle. The GP of Liao (2004 and more) is but a paraphrase version of CP as we find. Though it is revealing here and there as part of the promising enterprise of neo-Gricean pragmatics, it can be plausibly inferred that GP may not be as valuable as

claimed, let alone "more capable than CP" (as claimed). Liu and Zhu (2011) come up with NCP from their dissatisfaction with CP for rhetorical data or phenomena, and NCP, as far as we understand it, can also be counted as part of neo-Gricean pragmatics although it is meant to serve rhetoric more than "pure pragmatics." But their claim of treating NCP as "antistrophos/counterpart rhetoric-principle" of CP, though interesting, engenders a cloud of suspicion.

Certainly, it is pointless to totally ignore any post-Gricean efforts, including Liao's GP, Qian's GIP, and Liu and Zhu's NCP, which more or less add to the theoretical construction of Gricean pragmatics, or pragmatics per se. However, what it seems to us is a groundless stance of overthrowing Grice's CP by a neo-Gricean pragmatic principle, other than Horn's two principles, Levinson's three principles, or Sperber and Wilson's one principle, or substituting much touted and simultaneously much clouted CP by one of the above principles, let alone a newer one like Liao's GP or Liu and Zhu's NCP. We venture to make a list of their flaws in the earlier part of this paper, and we do not mean that we are right in every aspect or their formulations want all of their self-alleged "feasibility" or "explanatory power." GP and NCP are not theoretically consistent with and within Gricean pragmatics, making unnecessary not only CP, but also any other neo-Gricean principles, including GP (on the scales of NCP), and NCP (considered by GP). And this inconsistency stems out of people's CP misunderstanding which occurs out of the following eleven causes:

1) their understanding of cooperation from the perspective of ordinary people rather than from philosophers' (like Grice's stance);
2) their misunderstanding of rational people's rational communication;
3) their exaggerating the irrational parts of rational people's irrational utterances;
4) their attempting to construct a counterpart for CP (because of its fame and explanatory power) in or beyond pragmatics;
5) the imitability and parodiability of the maxims of CP with their article-by-article elaboration;
6) the difficulty of grasping the essence of Grice's works since his ideas are not all consistent from his papers (e.g., 1975) and his book (e.g., 1989);
7) their viewing Grice (1975) as a still, static, isolated stance;
8) their ignoring the difference between classic Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics;
9) their making an absolute opposition between pragmatics and rhetoric, pragmatics and semantics, ordinary language and forensic language, rational utterances and irrational utterances, etc.;

10) their mis-confining the scope of pragmatics to nothing but Grice's CP and Searle's SAT;

11) their crudely transposing the academic terms in one discipline (e.g., *cooperation*, *act*, *rhetoric*, *implication*, *implicature*) to another.

Looking for a subtle understanding of CP or cooperativeness, we cannot but fall back on Grice's formulation per se, foreshadowed by the philosophy of Immanuel Kant's conception. The un-cooperative attitude of some communicators as we meet with occasionally in daily life, as represented by their linguistic contribution here and there, as we see it, constitutes a logico-semantic non-cooperation, whereas this kind of non-cooperation and what seems to Qian, Liao and Liu and Zhu as "better-behaved," so to speak, or more cooperative utterances, or simply cooperations, all put together, contribute to a pragma-philosophical cooperativeness or cooperationality. The series of GP papers of Liao (2005a, b, c; 2009a, b; 2012), and the paper of Liu and Zhu (2011), are interesting developments of Gricean pragmatics, making China's contribution to pragmatics of the world (mainly the Anglo-American school and the continental school). As no theory is flawless, we venture to find fault with their GP and NCP only to add our meta-pragmatic discussion to the neo-Gricean pragmatic repertoire. Encouraged by Qian (2000), who says of Chinese pragmaticians, we should "contribute to the world something new," we hackle three China-tinted pragmatic principles, GP, GIP, and NCP, focusing on GP and NCP, pointing out what we assume are flaws in their newness pursuits. And ours is certainly open to any informed criticism.

References

Burke, Kenneth. 1969 [1945]. *A grammar of motives*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chu, Xiuwei & Yongshou Huo. 2004. Goal-Intention Principles and "Pragmatic Nihilism." *Sichuan Waiyu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Journal of Sichuan International Studies University) 4. 78–82.

Chu, Yunyun. 2013. Analysis of goals of sellers and buyers in light of Liao's Goal Principle. *Xiandai Yuwen* (Modern linguistics) 4. 106–107.

Clark, Herbert H. 1996. *Using language*. Cambridge: CUP.

Du, Shihong & Juli Li. 2012. Grice's co-operative principle and Wittgenstein's natural understanding: A response to Guanlian Qian and Jiaying Chen. *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 5. 9–15.

Fais, Laurel. 1994. Conversation as collaboration: Some syntactic evidence. *Speech Communication* 15. 231–242.

Feng, Guangwu. 2005. Cooperation must be principle. *Sichuan Waiyu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Journal of Sichuan International Studies University) 5. 108–113.

Finch, Geoffrey. 2000. *Linguistic terms and concepts*. London: Macmillan Press.

Grice, H. Paul. 1975. Logic and conversation. In: Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and semantics*, Vol. 3: *Speech acts*. NY: Academic Press: 43–58. Reprinted in: Steven Davis (ed.), 1991, *Pragmatics: A reader*, 305–315. NY and Oxford: OUP.

Grice, H. Paul. 1989. *Studies in the way of words*. Cambridge, Mass.: HUP.

Gu, Yueguo. 1993. The impass of perlocution. *Journal of Pragmatics* 20. 405–432.

Gu, Yueguo. 1994. Pragmatics and rhetoric: A collaborative approach to conversation. In Herman Parret (ed.), *Pretending to communicate*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 173–195.

Horn, Laurence. 1984. Towards a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In Deborah Schiffrin (ed.), *Meaning, form and use in context* (GURT' 84), 11–42. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

He, Zhaoxiong, Dongming Yu, Gang Hong & Jianhua Wang. 2000. *A new introduction to pragmatics*. Shanghai: Shanghai Foreign Education Press.

Hou, Guojin. 2008. *Dominant pragmatics issues and the way to pragmatranslatology*. Chengdu: Sichuan University Press.

Huang, Yan. 2001. Reflections on theoretical pragmatics. *Waiguoyu* (Journal of foreign languages) 1. 2–14.

Levinson, S. C. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: CUP.

Levinson, S. C. 1987. Pragmatics and the grammar of anaphora: A partial pragmatic reduction of binding and control phenomena. *Journal of Linguistics* 23. 379–431.

Liao, Meizhen. 2004. Goal principle and cooperation in courtroom discourse. *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 5. 43–52.

Liao, Meizhen. 2005a. "Goal Principle" and goal analysis (Part 1): New approach of pragmatic research. *Xiuci Xuexi* (Rhetorical studies) 3. 1–10.

Liao, Meizhen. 2005b. "Goal Principle" and goal analysis (Part 2): New approach of pragmatic research. *Xiuci Xuexi* (Rhetorical studies) 4. 5–11.

Liao, Meizhen. 2005c. The principle of goal and analysis of discourse coherence: A new approach to the study of discourse coherence. *Waiyu Jiaoxue Yu Yanjiu* (Foreign language teaching and research) 5. 351–357.

Liao, Meizhen. 2009a. Goal principle and communication model (Part 1). *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 4. 62–64.

Liao, Meizhen. 2009b. Goal principle and communication model (Part 2). *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 6. 101–109.

Liao, Meizhen. 2012. Goal principle and speech acts interaction. *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 5. 23–30.

Lin, Dajin & Qiulong Yu. 2002. From Grice to Guanlian Qian: Comments on pragmatic principles. *Sichuan Waiyu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Journal of Sichuan International Studies University) 5. 72–75.

Lin, Dajin & Qiulong Yu. 2006. Re-evaluating the Goal-Intention Principle: A response to Chu and Huo. *Waiyu Xuekan* (Foreign language research) 3. 11–15.

Liu, Ji. 2002. Two problems in the research of cooperative principle and its maxims. *Sichuan Waiyu Xueyuan Xuebao* (Journal of Sichuan International Studies University) 5. 105–107.

Liu, Yameng & Chunshen Zhu. 2011. Rhetoric as the antistrophos of pragmatics: Toward a "Competition of Cooperation" in the study of language use. *Journal of Pragmatics* 43. 3403–3415.

Pym, Anthony. 2000. On cooperation. A talk presented to the conference research models in translation studies, UMIST. April 2000. http://www.tinet.org/~apym/on-line/cooperation.html; http://usuaris.tinet.cat/apym/on-line/intercultures/cooperation.html.

Qian, Guanlian. 1987. Conversational un-cooperation: Rescue of Grice's cooperative principle revisited. *Journal of E'xi University* 4. 63–67.

Qian, Guanlian. 1989. "Non-Cooperative" phenomena. *Waiguoyu* (Modern foreign languages) 1. 16–21.

Qian, Guanlian. 1995. What's new in the mechanism of neo-Gricean pragmatics? *Waiguoyu* (Modern foreign languages) 1. 17–24.

Qian, Guanlian. 2005. *Chinese cultural pragmatics* (3rd edn.). Beijing: Qinghua University Press.

Qian, Guanlian. 2000. Contributing to the world something new. *Waiyu Yu Waiyu Jiaoxue* (Foreign language and their teaching) 1. 10–14.

Sperber, Dan & Deidre Wilson. 2001. *Relevance: Communication and cognition* (3rd edn.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press.

Zhang, Keding. 1999. Book review of "Chinese cultural pragmatics". *Journal of PLA University of Foreign Languages* 1. 101–102.

Zhang, Yaqing. 2015. Revisiting pragmatics and rhetoric from the perspective of NCP. *Journal of Zhejiang International Studies University* 3. 2–7, 27.

Zhang, Yangfen & Da Wang. 1998. Cooperation and un-cooperation in conversation. *Journal of Hunan University of Commerce* 2. 90–91.

Bionotes

Guojin Hou

Guojin Hou (b. 1963) is a professor at the College of Foreign Languages, Huaqiao University, Fujian, China. His research interests span from pragmatics to rhetoric and construction grammar from the perspective of pragmatics. One of his recent papers is "Garden-path phenomena from the perspective of lexico-constructional pragmatics" (2017). His recent book is *Lexico-constructional pragmatics* (2015).

Qingsheng Jiang

Qingsheng Jiang (b. 1983) is a lecturer of English, School of Foreign Languages, Southwest Medical University, Luzhou, China. His research interest lies mainly in pragmatics and rhetoric. His recent publications include "Half-said but fully-meant: Politeness function of aposiopesis" (2018), "Pragmatic conditions and planning of idiom parody" (2014).