Tony Jappy*

Example, Metaphor, and Parallelism in the Object

How Peirce's late semiotics validates the hypoicons

Abstract: The paper addresses the origins of Peirce's innovative theory of the hypoicons from the Lowell Lectures of 1903, metaphor in particular, and seeks to justify Peirce's definition of these by referring to his later, six-correlate theory of semiosis and the hexadic, 28-class typology it generated. After discussing Peirce's apparent preference for metaphor over example as the realization of the third and most complex hypoicon, the paper goes on to substantiate in two ways the definition of metaphor as the representation in the sign of a parallelism in the structure of the object represented. First, it shows how the typology of 1908 accommodates the classification of a sign in relation to both dynamic and immediate objects more complex than itself. Second, by drawing on Peirce's late conception of the object, it shows how the dynamic object can be formed from entities belonging to two or more different universes. At the same time, Peirce's conception of signs and typologies is shown to evolve from a strictly phenomenological approach to the classification of signs involving three categories as distinguishing criteria in 1903 to an ontological framework characterized by three universes with respect to which the sign and its correlates were referred in classification in 1908.

Keywords: category; hypoicon; phenomenological bottleneck; universe of existence

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*Corresponding author, Tony Jappy: University of Perpignan Via Domitia, Perpignan, France, e-mail: tony@univ-perp.fr

1 Introduction

In 1903, in the drafts of a document entitled *Syllabus* intended to supplement his Lowell Lectures on logic, Peirce defined the sign and its correlates in two complementary ways in two different manuscripts: The later, R540, combined phenomenology and a theory of triadic relations, whereas the earlier, R478, was

based almost exclusively upon the phenomenology, and contains two contrasting accounts of the hypoicons. In the variant of R478 entitled "Sundry Logical Conceptions" (R478 43–157),[1] after having introduced a classification of the sciences and a section in which he set out his ethics of terminology, Peirce went on to define the phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, following this with a presentation of three principles of abstraction underwritten by the categories, the most important for establishing the subdivisions of classes of signs being precission (EP2 270–271). Finally, after introducing a definition of the sign, he proceeded to define the three subdivisions of the sign's mode of representation as the now well-known icon, index, and symbol, qualifying this particular trichotomy as his "first and most fundamental" (EP2 273). He then, in the very same paragraph, recursively applied the same categorial distinctions to define the three grades of Firstness of the icon – its First, Second, and Third Firstnesses – these being recorded in a dense and slightly re-worded statement in the *Collected papers* as an independent paragraph in which the third hypoicon was identified as metaphor, the most complex of the three hypoicons, and defined as representing a parallelism in the sign's object (EP2 274).

Now it so happens that Peirce also defined the hypoicons in the following statement from another variant, incomplete section of the manuscript, in which we find not "metaphor" for the Third Firstness, but "examples":

> Icons may be distinguished, though only roughly, into those which are icons in respect to the qualities of sense, being *images*, and those which are icons in respect to the dyadic relations of their parts to one another being *diagrams* or dyadic analogues, and those which are icons in respect to their intellectual characters, being *examples*. (R478 209, 1903)

The version selected and published as paragraph 2.277 by the editors of volume two of the *Collected papers*, formally uncompromising but more precise, is the earlier in the *Syllabus* as this appears in R478, and is the version to be found, too, as Chapter 20 of volume two of *The essential Peirce* (Peirce 1988), and it therefore constitutes the better-known statement of the definition. This raises two questions of interest for the Peircean semiotician. First, can we assume, rather boldly, perhaps, that Peirce himself preferred the highly innovative definition of metaphor actually published in the *Collected papers* to the alternative concept of example, and, second, what is the justification for the

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1 The pagination follows the online version of the manuscript, MS Am 1632 (478). Houghton Library, http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:25842215. Accessed March 2018.

parallelism in the object that the metaphoric hypoicon is defined in the earlier version to represent? The paper takes up these two problems and offers a justification on both counts. Furthermore, it explains the rationale behind the parallelism of metaphor by referring to Peirce's later conception of semiotics, from which, owing to a change of theoretical framework in the hexadic 28-class version presented below, the icon, and, consequently, the hypoicons, are in fact absent.

2 The phenomenological background

To begin with, why should Peirce have alternated between the idea of the Third Firstness of the icon being a metaphor or an example? The definition defining the third hypoicon as a metaphor comes from a second attempt to compose the syllabus in the more complete section of R478 referenced earlier in which Peirce first defines the trichotomy of the icon, index, and symbol (see EP2 273–275), and then isolates a new trichotomy in which the erstwhile subdivisions of the symbol going back to 1866–1867 (CP 1.559, 1867) were given independent status as the sign–interpretant division defining sumisigns (later "rhemes"), dicisigns, and suadisigns, these corresponding approximately to the term, proposition, and argument series of the tradition (cf. EP2 275).

   One possible explanation for this hesitation was that in the metaphor version of the three hypoicons he was already anticipating the implications of his definitions of the triadic relations in the later manuscript, R540, in which the sign division itself came to be defined and placed in initial position in the typology (Table 1). It was at this point, too, that he introduced the concept of the replica of the legisign, a term from the same semantic field as "example," the replica being the realization in Secondness of the generality of the legisign (EP2 291). If this is the case, the choice of example as the Third Firstness of the icon was logically unsound since it would appear to belong not in the sign–object division as a formal realization of the sign's mode of representation, but in the one concerning the sign itself: The notional similarity between replica and example might have seemed too obvious to Peirce.

   More likely, however, was the need to distinguish formally between the three levels of Firstness, and in this case to respect the structure of the categories of the forms of experience: "the logical categories of the monad, the dyad, and the polyad or higher set, [which] are categories of the forms of experience" (CP 1.452, 1896). Moreover, he was well aware of the relation

between metaphor and resemblance, as we find in this early discussion of Cuvier's remark to the effect that all metaphysics is metaphor:

> Metaphor. If metaphor be taken literally to mean an expression of a similitude when the sign of predication is employed instead of the sign of likeness – as when we say this man is a fox instead of this man is like a fox, – I deny entirely that metaphysicians are given to metaphor; on the contrary, no other writers can compare with them for precision of language; but if Cuvier was only using a metaphor himself, and meant by metaphor broad comparison on the ground of characters of a formal and highly abstract kind, – then, indeed, metaphysics professes to be metaphor – that is just its merit – as it was Cuvier's own merit in Zoölogy. (CP 7.590)[2]

To understand how Peirce should have come to define the hypoicons at all, we need to consider the important theoretical statement concerning the framework within which he was defining the two divisions of R478:

> Phenomenology is that branch of science ... in which the author seeks to make out what are the elements, or, if you please, the kinds of elements, that are invariably present in whatever is, in any sense, in mind. According to the present writer, these universal categories are three.... They may be termed *Firstness*, *Secondness*, and *Thirdness*.... It is possible to prescind Firstness from Secondness... But it is impossible to prescind Secondness from Firstness... Everything must have some non-relative element; and this is its Firstness. So likewise it is possible to prescind Secondness from Firstness. But Thirdness without Secondness would be absurd. (EP2 270)

This serves as the general introduction to the way Peirce intended to approach the problems of logic in 1903. Moreover, his elaboration of the principle of precision in the extract (EP2 270–271) made it possible for him to establish the important implication principle holding between the subdivisions of the various trichotomies used to classify the sign in 1903: Firstness can be prescinded from Secondness, and Secondness from Thirdness, which means that any sign identified as partaking of Thirdness can logically be assumed not only to involve Secondness, but also, by transitivity, to involve Firstness. Later in the manuscript, this principle was stated quite clearly in a description of the symbol as follows:

> A Symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future. Its Interpretant must be of the same description; and so must be also the complete immediate Object, or meaning. But a law necessarily governs, or "is embodied in" individuals, and prescribes some of their qualities. Consequently, a constituent of a Symbol may be an Index, and a constituent may be an Icon. (EP2 274)

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2 The text is tentatively dated 1867 by the editors of the *Collected papers* (CP 7.579n34).

However, in R478, as mentioned above, Peirce completed his presentation of the icon by trichotomizing it. Just why he should have wished to do so isn't difficult to imagine. Given his three categories of the forms of experience, and given the fact that the icon is qualitative in nature and therefore characterized by distinctions concerning its form, it is safe to assume that he would necessarily at some stage have come to posit three ways in which entities might resemble one another, and indeed we find this in his anticipation of the trichotomization of the icon in his Lectures on Pragmatism: "Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call for any such division" (CP 5.74, 1903). And so, after having derived the icon subdivision through the application of his categories, Peirce proceeded to derive the three hypoicons by recursively applying the principle of precission to the icon itself, a process recorded in the statement establishing the three degrees of structural complexity – in effect three grades or forms of resemblance – exhibited by the hypoicons. The trichotomy resulting from this recursive process is the definition – "singularized" as paragraph CP 2.277 in the *Collected papers* even though it occurs toward the end of the very same paragraph in the manuscript in which Peirce defines the icon – describing image, diagram, and metaphor in order of increasing complexity:

> Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are *images*; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are *diagrams*; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are *metaphors*. (R478 62; EP2 274, 1903)

By virtue of the implication principle mentioned earlier, it was now possible for him to state in the later manuscript, R540, that the index involves a sort of icon and the symbol a sort of index (EP2 291–292). Since the recursive precisive application of the categories to the icon yields image, diagram, and metaphor, it follows by transitivity that indices and symbols, too, can involve an icon and, consequently, any or all of the three hypoicons. Table 1 sets out the typology as synthesized from manuscripts R478 and R540 of 1903.

Table 1: The three-division typology of 1903 integrating the hypoicons

	Division		
	Sign	**Sign-Object**	**Sign-Interpretant**
Category			
Thirdness	Legisign	Symbol	Argument
Secondness	Sinsign	Index	Dicisign
Firstness	Qualisign	Icon	Rheme
		metaphor	
		diagram	
		image	

3 The hypoicons

The three ways in which the sign can resemble its object by virtue of Peirce's categorial distinctions are represented below as Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, skeletal graphic representations of the structure of, respectively, generic image, diagram, and metaphor, and a concrete example of the latter, in which the "arrows" represent both the process of determination and the passage of the sign through an inescapably "sensible" – in other words, dyadic, existential – medium, such as a piece of painted canvass, the page of a book, a cinema screen, or an old-fashioned school blackboard. Note that in all cases the sign is necessarily a sinsign or the replica of a legisign, as it has to be perceivable – were it a legisign, it would be of the nature of thought or habit and would therefore *not* ordinarily be perceivable. Note, too, that it is the sign alone which has hypoiconic structure since it is the "representing" correlate in the process.


Figure 1: The generic structure of a sign with image hypoiconicity

Figure 1 is a very basic representation of the qualities inhering in some object which determine corresponding qualities – the First Firstnesses of the definition – in a given sinsign. As Peirce suggests in a general definition of the

hypoicons,[3] "[a]ny material image, as a painting" illustrates the process: Grant Wood's *American Gothic* is a sinsign composed of such qualities as lines, forms, and colors arranged in so distinctive a manner that it is interpretable as the painting of a man and a woman in front of a wooden house with a Gothic window. Since the qualities represented are phenomenologically less complex – Firstnesses – than the painting medium representing them, the representation of the qualities in the object is in no way inhibited.


Figure 2: The generic structure of a sign with diagram structure

Figure 2 represents the structure of a very basic diagram, an icon composed essentially of Second Firstnesses, namely the dyadic relations mentioned in the definition and represented as the relation **a–b** between the two partial objects **a** and **b** in the fact or event represented by the sign, such relations being a step up the phenomenological scale from the vague, unstructured Firstnesses composing the image. The diagram is thus an icon of at least one dyadic relation informing the object it represents (CP 4.418, 1903), and "informs" not only photographs and dyadic diagrammatic verbal expressions such as *The sound and the fury* or utterances such as *John loves Helen* and ditransitive diagrammatic utterances such as *John gave Helen a diamond ring*, but also all manner of instruments of measurement, the instructions for building kits or installing electrical appliances, and the illustrations in geometry manuals, for example. In such cases, the diagrammatic complexity of the sinsign partakes of Secondness and consequently the representation of the structure of the object is similarly in no way inhibited.

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3 "An *Icon* is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality that it has *qua* thing renders it fit to be a Representamen… But a sign may be *iconic*, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic Representamen may be termed a *hypoicon*. Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a *hypoicon*" (EP2 273–274).

Figure 3: The generic structure of a sign with metaphor structure

Finally, metaphor is the hypoiconic structure presenting Third Firstness – a phenomenological complexity compatible with mediation, synthesis, and representation (see, for example, CP 1.378, c. 1890) and, like the symbol, requiring the participation of the interpretant in the structuring process.[4] Whereas the simplified scheme of the diagram in Figure 2 contains a relation constitutive of some fact such as *This man is untrustworthy* in which the partial objects **a** and **b** are, respectively, *man* and *untrustworthiness*, for example, metaphor as defined by Peirce places two such relations in parallel, indicated by the pairs of **//** symbols in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 displays counterpart mappings between elements from some generally uncontroversial, well-known fact or relation (**a** — **//** — **b**) to, respectively, elements in the relation (**a'** — **//** — **b'**) composing the fact or event that is being judged or commented upon. The first is sometimes referred to within cognitive linguistics as the "base domain," the fact considered to be the basis of the judgment and hopefully self-evident to the addressee or interpreter (the idea that foxes are cunning, for example, is a culturally accepted and widely known judgment, even if anthropomorphic and therefore highly dubious), while the elements in the target relation or "target domain," are somehow controversial or contentious and not yet accepted: In the simple case in Figure 3, **a** maps to **a'**, and **b** maps to **b'**.

Note that the repetition of the parallel structure of the object in the structure of the interpretant is a way of showing that the metaphor has been correctly interpreted. Should a child hear an adult state that a certain man is a fox, for example, the child might reply "*But that's silly, a fox is an animal.*" In such a case the structure of the interpretant has not realized the intended parallelism. What Figure 3 is intended to show, too, is that while the medium – painting, page, blackboard, or screen – partakes necessarily of Secondness, the parallelism in the structure of the object constitutes a Third Firstness and is therefore more complex than the sign representing it. Consequently, the

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4 Cf. "A symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by virtue of its being understood to have that signification" (CP 2.304, 1902).

representation of the full structure of the object is, in this case, inhibited, with the consequence that metaphorically informed signs are both underspecified – not all the elements of the original parallelism can find their way into the sign – and characteristically incongruous, as such signs perforce represent elements drawn from distinct and not necessarily similar domains.

Thus, while working within the phenomenological framework of 1903, Peirce must have realized that there are signs more complex than the common diagrammatic type, signs which represent objects structurally more complex than themselves, signs, in short, which "synthesize" in the guise of some generally judgmental statement involving elements from two distinct relations: two facts or relations such as *This man is untrustworthy* and *Foxes are cunning*, based upon one of Peirce's own examples (as in CP 7.590, 1867?). However, this "two-tiered" parallel structure, as seen in Figure 3, is too complex to be accommodated fully by the Secondness of the medium through which it necessarily has to be communicated – the medium has to have the existent character of Secondness, for otherwise we would not perceive it – and results in the unidimensional metaphorical sign (1):

(1) This man is a fox.

This necessarily simplified situation is represented as a sort of "phenomenological bottleneck" in Figure 4, in which the nominals *This man* and *a fox* have been simplified respectively to *man* and *fox,* while the bracketed items in the parallelism have been, in a sense, "sifted out" by the less complex medium, which in this way constrains the perceivable unidimensional form of the sign.

Figure 4: The metaphoric structure of the utterance *This man is a fox*

The problem now is how to justify Peirce's choice of a parallelism to constitute the most complex hypoiconic structure. It can be hypothesized that the 1903 triadic definition of the sign and the 1908 hexadic conception of semiosis as set out in the December 23 letter to Lady Welby (EP2 478–481) and the set of divisions each determines must be logically compatible even though

the criteria used by each are different. We therefore examine the problem posed by this exclusion of the icon and its three subdivisions, showing that although these subdivisions cannot be explicitly identified within the hexadic system, it is possible to explain how prescient Peirce's trichotomization of the icon turned out to be. The explanation, however, involves the following changes in the theoretical framework: The typology retained of the two defined by Peirce in 1908 is the six-division system yielding twenty-eight classes of signs, while the classifying criteria are no longer phenomenological but, rather, ontological.

4 The hexad of 1908

In the letter dated December 23, 1908, Peirce included in the ten divisions, potentially yielding sixty-six classes of signs, six divisions based upon the correlates themselves in the order defined below (Table 2), this system generating twenty-eight classes of signs. Before defining the process in which the sign is engaged in 1908, however, Peirce first identifies three universes characterized by their respective modalities of being and containing, in order of increasing complexity, possible, existent, and necessitant entities:

> I recognize three Universes, which are distinguished by three Modalities of Being. One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being [...]. I denominate the objects of this Universe *Ideas*, or *Possibles*, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization.
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> Another Universe is that of, 1st, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, 2nd, the Facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call Facts.
>
> The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its Nature *necessitant*, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a universal proposition. Especially, *continua* are of this nature. I call objects of this universe *Necessitants*. It includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning. (EP2 478-479)

This description of the universes is followed by an important statement which is apparently the only mention of a 28-class system in the Peirce canon although it figures necessarily in the constitution of the sixty-six classes. It not only establishes the logical order of determination holding between the six correlates but, by means of the reference to the modalities of being (possible, existent, and necessitant) of the universes to which each correlate can be referred in the

classification process, defines the dependency relation reducing the 792 possible classes to 28 (Table 2):

> It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. Hence, it follows from the Definition of a Sign that since the Dynamic Object determines the Immediate Object,
>
>> which determines the Sign itself,
>> which determines the Destinate Interpretant,
>> which determines the Effective Interpretant,
>> which determines the Explicit Interpretant,
>
> the six trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were independent, only yield 28 classes. (EP2 481, 1908)

The passage shows Peirce discarding the phenomenological framework of the Lowell Lectures and adopting what is broadly referred to here as an ontological one. The ten-class typology obtained from the three divisions in Table 1 was defined within a phenomenological framework, since it used Peirce's three categories and the principle of precission as criteria in order to subdivide the sign and the two sign-correlate relations. The later typology, on the other hand, is now defined within an ontological framework and employs three universes to define the subdivisions of the six correlates of semiosis which, when properly combined, generate twenty-eight very different classes of signs. The determination process itself can be represented more simply by the scheme in Figure 5, in which the interpretants have been standardized respectively from destinate, effective, and explicit to immediate, dynamic, and final, although whether this is the order of the trichotomies in the classification system yielding the twenty-eight classes of signs is an issue we turn to below. Figure 5 displays the hexadic structure of sign-action as Peirce defined it in 1908, in which the arrow '$\rightarrow$' indicates the process of determination, and in which **Od**, **Oi**, **S**, **Ii**, **Id**, and **If** represent, respectively, the dynamic and immediate objects, the sign, and then the immediate, dynamic, and final interpretants:

$$Od \rightarrow Oi \rightarrow S \rightarrow Ii \rightarrow Id \rightarrow If$$

Figure 5: Hexadic semiosis in 1908

4.1 The ordering problem

Table 2 sets out the six correlates involved in semiosis as "subjects" capable of belonging to one or another of the three universes described by Peirce in his

letter to Lady Welby. In the course of a given classification process, the sign is referred to one of these three universes. For example, a given sign might, proceeding from left to right, be classified as a collective at **Od**, as a copulant at **Oi**, as a token at **S**, etc. Crucial to the argument to be developed is the establishment of the correct, logical occurrence order of the subjects (correlates) on the table, a problem which has given rise to much debate amongst Peirce scholars, but in particular with respect to the ten-division typology potentially yielding sixty-six classes of signs.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the order retained in Table 2 is in sharp contradiction with the order implied by remarks made by Peirce to Lady Welby concerning the English common noun *beauty*. In the letter, he suggests to Lady Welby that "it is the ultimate reference, and not the grammatical form, that makes the sign [the word *beauty*] an *Abstractive*" (EP2 480). However, if this were the case, the hierarchy principle would be infringed, as can be seen from the following discussion. Although there are other criteria in favor of the order retained in Table 2, the *beauty* example is sufficient for present purposes to justify that order.

Table 2: The 28-class typology of 1908[5]

	Subject					
	Od	**Oi**	**S**	**Ii**	**Id**	**If**
Universe						
Necessitant	collective	copulant	type	relative	usual	to produce self-control
Existent	concretive	designative	token	categorical	percussive	to produce action
Possible	abstractive	descriptive	mark	hypothetical	sympathetic	gratific

Peirce's remark concerning *beauty* is problematic, as the word *beauty* is a type – all words in a dictionary are by definition necessitant and are therefore classified as types (EP2 480). However, a type can only be classified as an abstractive sign whose dynamic object is a member of the universe of possibles if it precedes the dynamic object in the classification system. In this case, the

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5 It must be understood that Peirce did not isolate the six correlates as in Table 2: They were included in the ten, but in a problematic order. Nor did he ever set out a table in this "orthogonal" manner: Those of the Logic Notebook and the letters to Lady Welby were generally organized in three columns down the page. Note, too, that the contents of the final three trichotomies are derived from the draft to Lady Welby of December 25, 1908 (EP2 484–490), and that Peirce had misgivings about the nature of the immediate interpretant division (EP2 489).

order displayed in Table 2 would be incorrect, and would need to be replaced by a system displaying the order **S, Oi, Od, Ii, Id, If**, for example (Table 3).[6] Peirce's disconcerting description of the common noun *beauty* as an abstractive sign therefore has significant consequences for the way the table is to be ordered. There is one conclusive way to approach the problem: namely, to analyze the term *beauty* with the sign in initial position as in Table 3.

Table 3: The common noun beauty in initial position in the table

	Subject					
	S	**Oi**	**Od**	**Ii**	**Id**	**If**
Universe						
Necessitant	*beauty*	copulant				
Existent		designative				
Possible		descriptive	abstractive	hypothetical	sympathetic	gratific

Table 3 displays the consequences of retaining the order suggested by Peirce's discussion of the classification of *beauty* as an abstractive: The noun has been placed first in the table in the necessitant sign position as Peirce's comments suggest, followed by the immediate object division – with respect to which it is of no consequence whether the sign is copulant, designative, or descriptive – while with respect to its dynamic object it is classified as an abstractive. Now, according to the hierarchy principle, an abstractive sign – a sign with a possible object with respect to the **Od** division in Table 3 – can only determine a sequence of interpretants from the universe of possibles, necessarily identifying the sign here as also hypothetical, sympathetic, and gratific.

This, in fact, is the real problem concerning the classification of the common noun *beauty* as an abstractive sign, namely, it is difficult to see how the effect produced by a verbal sign might be limited to feelings without verbal semantic content – we are socialized to learn what the word *means* – as in the case of such a sign being classified as gratific, with the possible but theoretically dubious exception of onomatopoeia if the interpretant sequence proposed in Table 3 were adopted. The very meaning of the word has first to be "processed" cognitively, so to speak, at the immediate interpretant stage in

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6 In this case the correlates are set out in an order favored by Peirce in most of his typologies. See Jappy (2016: Ch. 3) for a discussion.

semiosis as relative or categorical for it to be capable of producing any subsequent effect at all, even a feeling.

Put differently, if we did not understand the language we might conceivably find the sound of the character for the number "four" in Mandarin Chinese – 四, *sì* in pinyin – pleasant or interesting, making it a (hypothetical) gratific type. We realize from its use in conversations between Chinese speakers that it is a type and that it therefore represents some concept or other, but we don't know what it means or what other characters it may sound like; on its own it simply sounds pleasant. But it is unlikely that many native Chinese speakers would agree, even though they know that it simply represents the number "four," since it sounds unpleasantly like another character whose meaning they also know – 死, *sǐ* in pinyin– signifying "dead." Thus, while any object, such as a rose, or a sunset, if deemed beautiful might excite a feeling of pleasure or well-being, the word *beauty*, like any other verbal sign, must surely require at least a mental immediate interpretant for the interpreter to be able to understand it. The order of correlates in Table 3 is therefore incorrect, and the only logical order of the correlates adopted here will be that which corresponds to the order of semiosis as set out in the extract from the letter to Lady Welby given above (EP2 481) and represented in Table 2.

5 Universes and the parallelism in the object

How does this justify the parallelism that Peirce attributed to the structure of the dynamic object? In order to address this question fully we need to examine Peirce's late conception of the dynamic object and the sorts of universes it could determine, for his conception of the object, no less than the interpretants, underwent considerable revision after 1903 and involved a considerable change in the theoretical framework he was working in.

In a draft to Lady Welby dated December 25, 1908 (CP 8.366), Peirce illustrated the range of dynamic objects of signs according to the universe to which they belong: signs of possible objects are abstractives; signs of existent objects (individuals and the facts concerning them) are concretives; while signs representing collections or classes are collectives, a brief inventory which gives us some idea of the sorts of entities these universes might be the receptacles of.[7]

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7 Cf. from "Prolegomena to an apology for pragmaticism": Oh, I overhear what you are saying, O Reader: that a Universe and a Category are not at all the same thing; a Universe being a receptacle or class of Subjects, and a Category being a mode of Predication, or class of

In the first case the objects are qualitative entities represented by colors, mass, texture, etc.; in the second, existents such as humans, animals, tables, individuals, and named individuals such as Napoleon and Charlemagne; finally, in the third, general classes such as mankind, prime numbers, classes, categories, habits, and types, etc. However, in another text of 1908, "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (CP 6.452–493), he takes this inventory further, describing the three universes and, more importantly, the sorts of objects they comprise in greater detail. The least complex, the universe of possible objects, is composed of ideas; the second universe is composed of existent objects – occurrences and the facts containing them; while the third and most complex universe comprises more general objects:

> The third Universe comprises everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign, —not the mere body of the sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living institution, —a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." (CP 6.455)

By 1908, Peirce had considerably extended the range of possible dynamic objects and had suggested that the dynamic object is not necessarily like the immediate in any way at all: "The immediate object of a sign may be of quite a different nature from the real dynamical object" (R339 277r, 1906). In this way, Peirce's late illustration of various types of dynamic objects extends considerably our conception of what sorts of entities a sign might stand for. Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that by defining universes and the sorts of entities they can contain, including signs, objects, and interpretants, Peirce had changed the theoretical framework within which he approached the problem of the classification of signs. While the ten-class typology of 1903 in which the hypoicons were defined was based upon Peirce's phenomenology and its three categories, the 1908 typology as displayed in Table 2, on the other hand, was defined within an ontological framework, and employed these three universes – receptacles of what there **is**, in all senses of the term, and, as mentioned above, covering possible, existent, and general objects – to define the subdivisions of the six correlates of semiosis and, when properly combined, to generate twenty-eight very different classes.   All of which brings us to two relevant considerations of Peirce's development of the object and their implications for

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Predicates. I never said they were the same thing; but whether you describe the two correctly is a question for careful study" (CP 4. 545, 1906).

the parallelism in the object defined within the earlier and less complex semiotic system of the *Syllabus* from the Lowell Lectures.

First, the logical principles involved can be established by examining the hexad as represented in Table 2, from which we can infer that while a universe of existence such as the one determined by, say, an individual or "occurrence" such as Napoleon being a member of it, the sort of universe determined by "a living consciousness, the life, the power of growth, of a plant....a living institution, —a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social 'movement'" enjoys a more complex logical status: These are objects from the universe of necessitants, and therefore the signs representing them are to be classified at the dynamic object position in the hexad in Table 2 as collectives (EP2 480). However, as the table also shows, while a given sign can be classified as a collective in reference to its dynamic object, at the immediate object stage (**Oi** in Table 2) that same sign can be classified as either copulant, designative, or descriptive. If the sign is designative or descriptive, the immediate object will necessarily belong to a different universe from that of the dynamic. Furthermore, even if in the immediate object division, the sign is copulant, to be physically perceivable at all, it will itself have to be a token (the **S** division in Table 2). This means that a given sign can therefore have both an immediate and a dynamic object more complex than itself, which is necessarily the case of all perceivable verbal signs. In short, it was possible to demonstrate how there could be signs which can represent objects more complex than themselves, and this by up to two possible degrees.

Given this situation, the second consideration concerns the sorts of objects and the relations holding between them that such signs can represent. Syntactically complex signs such as verbal utterances, for example, require a necessitant immediate object, making them copulant as signs (cf. CP 8.350, 1908). Compare the following:

(2) Napoleon was an emperor.

(3) Cats make good pets.

(4) The cat is a domesticated mammal.

Utterance (2) asserts that a certain individual is the member of a class, which is, of course, a necessitant object. Utterances (3) and (4), on the other hand, express class union and have generic value. In all three cases, the immediate object is copulant and the dynamic object is necessitant. Whereas all three utterances would be classified as (replicas of) dicent symbols in the ten-class system of 1903, there is no obstacle within the later sign-system to identifying

classes as objects distinct from individuals within this new version of the logic; in other words, there is no obstacle to the representation of the association within a given sign of two or more distinct collections or classes of objects. Now Peirce's example metaphor, (1), is also, from a syntactical point of view, an expression of class membership. This suggests that although his system of 1903 was inadequate to the task of proving it – it would have been unthinkable as well as logically impossible within the earlier system to associate in a classification a sinsign (a token, an existent sign) with a symbol representing a general object, for example – he clearly knew that there were signs which were capable of representing objects far more complex than themselves, signs which were capable of representing the association of classes in the object.

The logical possibility for an existent sign to represent the necessitant relation between two classes in the dynamic object is clearly established within the 1908 conception of signs and their classification, but this doesn't explain how a parallelism enters the picture. Indeed, while utterances (2), (3), and (4) represent the ways in which individuals and classes can be combined or associated with other classes in a single sign, their hypoiconic structure is diagrammatic. What Peirce was accounting for in his definition of metaphor as the Third Thirdness of the icon was something quite different – he was concerned with the nature of similitude, a relation which transcends those holding between classes and individuals defined within set theory.

The formal complexity of the hypoicons progresses from the basic monad characterizing First Firstness to the triadic nature of Third Firstness. This can best be understood in relation to Peirce's late conception of the object to be found in his December 23 letter to Lady Welby (EP2 478–481) and the draft to William James of February 26, 1909 (EP2 492–497) and the sorts of universes of which it may be a member. The image, remember, was composed of qualities including any structural relations holding between them, but its qualitative, possible character is of no concern to us here. However, the existential nature of the diagram is such that the two or more partial objects that come to be associated in the sign belong perforce to the same universe.

(5) The fox bit the man.

As in the cases of utterances (2), (3), and (4), for the diagrammatic verbal sign (5) to be correctly interpreted, both partial objects must be members of the same universe. On the other hand, in the case of metaphor, the third and most complex form of similitude, the perceived similarity involves not partial objects from the same universe, but, rather, entities drawn from two or more utterly distinct universes: The third universe, remember, "comprises everything whose

Being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, *especially between objects in different Universes* [emphasis added]". Consequently, the sign, an existent bi-dimensional medium incapable of fully representing the two-tier structure of the parallelism holding between the two different, distinct universes associated in the object, is formally underspecified and diagnostically incongruous. In such cases, in a manner similar to the interpretation of symbols, and unlike diagrammatic signs in which the dyadic structure of the sign is determined by that of the object independently of the interpretant, the necessary implication of the interpretant in the process as shown in Figures 3 and 4 characterizes the triadic nature of metaphor. This situation is amply illustrated by Peirce's example, (1), above: The resemblance is established between the universe of the human and that of the wild animal.

6 Conclusion

In 1903 the theoretical status of the hypoicons was defined by successive applications to the sign–object relation of the three categories defined within the phenomenological framework prefacing Peirce's characterization of the sign and its correlates in the *Syllabus* intended to accompany the Lowell Lectures on logic. The reason for preferring as the characterization of the third hypoicon the concept of "metaphor" to that of "example" was probably due to the realization that, in spite of differences of meaning, the terms "replica" and "example" belong to the same semantic field, and to the need to establish clear formal distinctions between the three different levels of resemblance (or for the editors of the *Collected papers* having had a preference for "metaphor," in which case the choice would be editorial and not theoretical, a potentially embarrassing possibility which we cannot rule out).

However, the theoretical justification for a sign to be able to represent an object more complex than itself, as in the case where the structure of the object is a parallelism that the sign is unable to represent completely, only became possible once the following principles had been established: the expansion of the number of correlates involved in semiosis from the three of 1903 to the six from 1904 onwards, the late redefinition of the nature of the sign's object, and, most importantly of all, the introduction into the logical framework of ontological as opposed to phenomenological considerations in his classifications – in short, once, in the classification of signs, the subjects involved in the classification were referred to one or another of three universes as opposed to the three categories of 1903. The necessitant nature of the third

universe which this later framework defined is a repository for general objects, including unlimited numbers of classes and relations between objects from distinct classes. With these theoretical advances, it was logically demonstrable, as in Table 2, that there were such signs.

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Bionote

Tony Jappy

Tony Jappy (b. 1942) is *Professeur honoraire* at the University of Perpignan Via Domitia, France. His research interests include Peirce's late semiotics, visual semiotics, and metaphor. His publications include: *Regards sur le poème muet: petite introduction à la sémiotique visuelle peircienne* (2010); *Introduction to Peircean visual semiotics* (2013); *Peirce's twenty-eight classes of signs and the philosophy of representation: Rhetoric, interpretation and hexadic semiosis* (2016); and "Intentional signs from a Peircean perspective" (2018).