On anti-identity construction and anti-modeling

1 Vignette: In lieu of an introduction

By the time the concept of anti-identity was officially introduced and published (Yu & Zhang, 2015, 2016), it had actually undergone seven to eight years of contemplation and pedagogy. The term anti-identity was first mentioned, albeit en passant, by Jie Zhang in one of his classes in Contemporary Western Aesthetics I was attending as an MA student in the School of Foreign Languages and Cultures at Nanjing Normal University in 2008. As I recall, the topic discussed in the class was Russian formalism and there was an inevitable emphasis on Viktor Shklovsky’s conception of defamiliarization. An unforgettable conclusive statement made by Zhang on that day was that only through anti-identity construction can a literary image be made immortal. Like many other ideas he has imparted over the years, that term struck an extraordinary chord with me. Since then, my interest in the concept has never diminished. The term itself has also become a recurring topic in Zhang’s class in Russian formalism and, in particular, Shklovsky’s defamiliarization, although it had never been put in any written documents or publications.

During the subsequent period of my doctoral studies on cultural semiotics, I attended another one of Zhang’s courses designed for PhD and MA students in the School. It was titled Western Aesthetics, which I have had the honor of teaching since the spring semester of 2015 when Zhang handed over to me the teaching responsibilities for this course. It was when I was attending the course myself that I had some further discussions with him about the matter of anti-identity construction. Even by then, we still had not gone beyond Shklovsky’s defamiliarization, but basically understood anti-identity construction as a case in point subordinate to defamiliarization.

Later on, in December 2014 to be exact, when I got to the point of Russian Formalism in my preparation for the class of Western Aesthetics I was to teach in the subsequent semester, I found it of great import to differentiate between defamiliarization and anti-identity construction and necessary to publish the conception of anti-identity. I drafted a Chinese paper of well over ten thousand words and sent it Zhang for comments and suggestions. Over the following two months we worked on this paper together and had even more insightful discussions of anti-identity construction. It was essentially co-authored and co-edited.

The work was then published in Chinese in the journal Foreign Literature Studies in 2015. After that we re-theorized the concept based on the Chinese paper and published an updated version of the original paper in English in Semiotica in 2016. Among the most important changes made in the English version is the addition of a part on Charles Peirce’s semiotic triad that had been left out in the Chinese paper on account of the pertinence of our argument presented in that paper.

For the sake of analysis, the scope of the formulation of the concept in both versions of the paper was deliberately confined to literature, art theory, and narratology. At this stage, however, it should be pointed out that anti-identity construction is by no means a solitary concept, although it mainly pertains to narratives – fictional and non-fictional alike. On the contrary, it is in fact subordinate to a hypernym that can be defined as anti-modeling, by which I mean a representational or cognitive process whereby a person creates models that challenge or defy certain stereotypes of specific groups of people or individuals, objects, and events.

2 Anti-identity construction as a type of anti-modeling

Despite the prefix in the term, anti-modeling is invariably a process of model construction, one specific type of modeling, which essentially means “the innate ability to produce forms to stand for objects, events, feelings, actions, situations, and ideas perceived to have some meaning, purpose, or useful function. The form may be imagined, in which case it is called a mental image, or it may be something externalized, in which case it is called a representation” (Sebeok & Danesi, 2000: 1). For the purpose of analysis in terms of Modeling Systems Theory (MST), Sebeok and Danesi define the model as “a form that has been imagined or made externally (through some physical medium) to stand for an object, event, feeling, etc., known as a referent, or for a class of similar (or related) objects, events, feelings, etc., known as a referential domain. An imagined form can be called, simply, a mental form; a form made externally to stand for a referent can be called an externalized form” (Sebeok & Danesi, 2000: 2). In other words, a model can be either internal or external. In our analysis of anti-identity construction (Yu & Zhang, 2016), understood in light of Modeling Systems Theory, stereotypes are themselves habitually fixed and automatically activated internal models that have been formed in people’s minds in relevant socio-cultural contexts.

As we have demonstrated, anti-identity construction is a uniquely semiotic behavior that can be witnessed in both fictional and non-fictional narratives and is essentially “a special and effective textual narrative strategy that is wielded by the author as a means to break stereotypical cognitive models” (Yu & Zhang, 2016: 11). As a narrative strategy, its raison d’être is that “the process of modeling can easily produce a sort of inertia. With habitual interpretive routes, cognitive models are inclined to become fixated and even rigid” (Yu & Zhang, 2016: 8). It is clear that anti-identity construction is generally about revolting against those kinds of mental images that people habitually hold of certain characters in their minds and that consequently risk becoming misleadingly unchangeable. Therefore, a factor of a subject, be it human or anthropomorphic being, is inevitably involved. As is implied by MST, models are the building materials for the processes of human cognition, representation, and communication concerning identity formation. Quintessential manifestations of these processes include both fictional and non-fictional narratives, in which lies the ubiquitous inevitability of identity formation in the presence of a human or human-like subject in any process of agency.

Nevertheless, in other situations of modeling where such a subject is absent or can be reduced to a considerable minimum, e.g. interpretations of natural phenomena or mathematical representations, identity formation can be either a missing element or simply not as pronounced as in narratives. In terms of narratives, we have identified two major types of anti-identity construction, one of the characters and the other of the author (Yu & Zhang, 2016: 8–9), the latter of which also includes a variant that can be called the anti-identity construction of the narrator (ibid.: 10) and coincides with Shklovsky’s (1965 [1917]: 13–14) conception of defamiliarization. In all these situations, a certain identity or identities can always be identified, either in the text or in the author/narrator. However, in interpretations of natural phenomena or mathematical representations, the modeling process can somehow stand free of the major criterion for the categorization of anti-identity construction, that is, a recognizable process of identity formation concerning a subject. Imagine a situation where one observes an ordinarily shaped cloud in the sky but creates an analogy between this cloud and a giant white cotton candy. The cloud is not modeled as it normally is but rather as an iconic representation or an imagined mental image. Thus, a similar effect of novelty can be achieved to what happens in the case of anti-identity construction, although it is not to be taken for anti-identity construction as no identity of a certain subject is changed or challenged in this case. What we are looking at belongs to anti-modeling, a broader category to which anti-identity construction is subordinate.

3 Anti-modeling vs. defamiliarization

We have argued that anti-identity construction is fundamentally different from defamiliarization (Yu & Zhang, 2016: 5). When it comes to anti-modeling, I must stress that the position is still the same. However, given the fact that there are similarities, albeit rather limited, between anti-modeling and defamiliarization, I am obliged to elaborate a bit further to untangle their subtle relations in the present paper.

On the surface, when it comes to the effect of novelty, anti-modeling – especially anti-identity construction as a subcategory of anti-modeling – does remind one of Shklovsky’s defamiliarization in that “anti-” also indicates a “method of seeing things out of their normal context” (Shklovsky, 1965 [1917]: 17), a method that is explicated by the very term of defamiliarization (the Russian word is ostraneniye, literally meaning “making strange”). However, a noteworthy fact that distinguishes anti-modeling and defamiliarization is that in terms of the concept of defamiliarization per se, Shklovsky’s formulations revolve mainly around art. Even when he contends that “defamiliarization is found almost everywhere form is found” (ibid.: 18), it refers only to the artistic form, of which poetic speech is representative. See below (italics are as they appear in the original):

[A]rt exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects “unfamiliar”, to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the object is not important. (Shklovsky, 1965 [1917]: 12)

Prose, or “practical” language in Shklovsky’s words, is not focal in his formulations of defamiliarization, which are therefore criticized as an attempt to “negate or cancel out the existence/possibility of ‘real’ perception” (Crawford, 1984: 218). The main function of the concept of defamiliarization per se, a formula much needed by the Formalists back then, was to define the difference between literature and non-literature more precisely and more generally than had been done and at the same time to state the purpose of literature. In essence, defamiliarization is an artistic technique and exclusively addresses the problems of art. Shklovsky formulated the whole concept on the basis of negating the relevance of prosaic language. Even in the discussion of the matter of the economy of mental effort or energy, he claims: that we must, then, speak about the laws of expenditure and economy in poetic language not on the basis of an analogy with prose, but on the basis of the laws of poetic language (Shklovsky, 1965 [1917]: 11).

Inferred from Shklovsky’s formulations, what separates an artistic work – poetic speech in particular – from the ordinary language of prose is that the former is “created to remove the automatism of perception” (ibid.: 22). In an earlier part of the same famous essay, Shklovsky treats some previous thoughts of others on the economy of energy as laws that can be applied to “practical” language but have been wrongly extended to poetic language, which features quintessentially an artistic technique that slows and impedes perception. To him, the language of poetry is “a difficult, roughened, impeded language” (ibid.: 22) and poetry can be defined as attenuated and tortuous speech, which is formed speech, whereas prose is “ordinary speech – economical, easy, proper” (ibid.: 23). This should mark a major difference between anti-modeling and defamiliarization in that the former recognizes both prose and poetry, among all the other types of human modeling systems, verbal and nonverbal alike. Neither the impediment to perception nor the removal of the automatism of perception should be a yardstick against which to measure the difference between art and non-art, prose and poetry, for the very simple reason that both can be seen in any of those modeling processes that aim at novel representations and/or interpretations in daily life. The way leading to this kind of novelty is what can be called “de-stereotyping”, fashioned from the morphology of defamiliarization.

Among the many criticisms of defamiliarization, a representative view holds that in the case of literature, defamiliarization stands for the Formalist denial of links between literature and life and refers to “a real experience in terms of empty, dead, and automatized repetition and recognition” (Crawford, 1984: 218). In contrast to defamiliarization, we also have argued “the purpose of anti-identity construction is not to deliberately pursue a sort of strangeness in literary forms, but only to seek to represent human experiences with high-level fidelity, as well as their global restoration. It should rather be called an attempt to construct a ‘panorama’ with innovative perspectives. The focus is no longer on the character’s ‘resemblance’, but on its ‘actuality’ and ‘realness’ in terms of human nature and emotion” (Yu & Zhang, 2016: 5). Likewise, in terms of anti-modeling, its main purpose is also to represent or cognize what is modeled in a way that defies relevant stereotypes. Different from defamiliarization, which changes a form without changing its nature, in anti-modeling, not only the form but also its nature is changed (cf. Shklovsky, 1965 [1917]: 17).

4 Habituation and expectation

It must be pointed out that defamiliarization does share a critical trait with anti-modeling, i.e. habituation or automatism for the economy of mental effort. However, in the case of defamiliarization, the habituation/automatism is one of perception, whereas in the case of anti-modeling, it is the habituation/automatism of interpretation. However, in both cases the factor of habit is of great import. According to Peirce, habit-taking, alongside chance and law, is one of the three elements that are active in the world (Peirce: CP 1.409). Moreover, “habits, from the mode of their formation, necessarily consist in the permanence of some relation” (Peirce: CP 1.415). This makes it more reasonable for us to restress that, as previously mentioned, stereotypes are habitually fixed and automatically activated internal cognitive models. In their formation, relation is an indispensable guiding force.

Shklovsky argues, “As perception becomes habitual, it becomes automatic” (Shklovsky, 1965 [1917]: 11). This habituation or automatism characterizes our perception of art by forming an “algebraic” method of thought, by which we perceive objects

only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics. We see the object as though it were enveloped in a sack. We know what it is by its configuration, but we see only its silhouette. The object, perceived thus in the manner of prose perception, fades and does not leave even a first impression; ultimately even the essence of what it was is forgotten (ibid.: 11).

Despite Shklovsky tenacious position against prose perception, his words cited above do provide a solid ground for anti-modeling, a commonly seen semiotic strategy that is consciously wielded not only in narrative, but also in representation and interpretation as understood in their broader senses, both verbal and nonverbal, to achieve an effect of novelty. This effect does not necessarily come at the expense of much mental effort, as it is not the result of a deliberate attempt or the outcome of a special device for prolonging attention. It is clear that Shklovsky’s perception is understood in its narrow sense to be physical sensation, with which people notice things. In contrast, we find that anti-modeling addresses the problem of fixed internal models and ultimately that of fixed semiosis, not just a fixed method of perception.

In light of fixed semiosis, a key factor in modeling, including anti-modeling, is the faculty or state of expectation, which is in itself an indication of habituation. As we can see in Peirce’s contemplation,

an expectation is a habit of imagining. A habit is not an affection of consciousness; it is a general law of action, such that on a certain general kind of occasion a person will be more or less apt to act in a certain general way. An imagination is an affection of consciousness that can be directly compared with a percept in some special feature, and be pronounced to accord or disaccord with it. Suppose for example that I slip a coin into a slot, and expect on pulling a knob to see a little cake of chocolate appear. My expectation consists in, or at least involves, such a habit that when I think of pulling the knob, I imagine I see a chocolate coming into view. When the perceptual chocolate comes into view, my imagination of it is a feeling of such a nature that the percept can be compared with it as to size, shape, the nature of the wrapper, the color, taste, flavor, hardness, and grain of what is within. Of course, every expectation is a matter of inference. For our present purpose it is sufficient to say that the inferential process involves the formation of a habit. For it produces a belief, or opinion; and a genuine belief, or opinion, is something on which one is prepared to act, and is therefore, in a general sense, a habit. A belief need not be conscious (Peirce: CP 2.148).

It appears that habituation and expectation presuppose each other and have the same aim of making things as digestible as possible. If we take into consideration some canonical expositions found in social psychology, we find that stereotypes can be regarded as both aids to explanation and energy saving devices in that they aid explanation by saving time and effort. For instance, treating individuals as members of certain groups saves mental effort, for we can ignore all of the diverse and detailed information associated with individuals (McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002: 4).

5 Pointing to the future: In lieu of a conclusion

Anti-modeling is the opposite of cognitive stereotyping, but if we take one step further, we may note that stereotyping is in fact an instantiation of the categorization process. In forming a habitually fixed impression of a group, an individual, an event or an object, categorization is a pivotal cognitive process by which we detect differences and similarities between groups, individuals, events, or objects in order to understand our Umwelten and Innenwelten. Although anti-modeling challenges stereotypical thinking, it still belongs to the superordinate concept of modeling, which in itself imbricates, if not coincides, with the categorization process. Therefore, in a sense, not only can anti-modeling be understood as “anti-stereotype modeling”, it can also be thought of as “cross-category modeling”. Here the prefix “cross-” is used instead of “anti-” due mainly to the fact that the process of categorization is a de facto state of perception and cognition, an on-going flow, the tracks of which can only be altered but not obstructed. One can perceive or think in novel or even unorthodox ways, but normally categorization is not a process that can be bypassed. However, further studies and explorations are needed for the import and position of the categorization process in modeling, or more broadly, in semiosis. That mayhap foretells a fruitful direction in the field of inquiry known as semiotics.