Balanced or Biased? Voice Engagement in Australian News Media’s Communication of China

3.1.1 Chinese News Sources

As shown by Figure 3, Chinese political elites are the most prominent actors in both periods. However, not all of them have equal opportunities to be quoted. Governments at national and local levels (e.g., People’s Republic of China, China, Chinese government, Beijing, Zhejiang, etc.) are preferred over individual officials. Such a pattern is at odds with that found in presenting Australian and US political elite sources, in which the voices of individual officials (e.g., Mr Whitlam, Mr Fraser, Mr Nixon, Mr Morrison, Mr Turnbull, Mr Trump, Mr Biden, etc.) outnumber those of the government and government organizations. In other words, political elites from Australia and the US are rarely assimilated, but often individualized and nominated (e.g., personified in the person of the prime minister), whereas Chinese political actors are often referred to generically and backgrounded, which helps to distance the reader from them (van Leeuwen 2008). As such, a dichotomous line is drawn between these countries: Australia and the US belong to ‘us’, while China is alienated as ‘them’.

Figure 3:

Distribution of Chinese news sources.

Chinese journalists and media are another favoured information source. A closer reading of these quotation lines demonstrates that these actors are always modified by ideology-loaded evaluations, such as Chinese Communist Party journal, Communist Party newspaper, China’s state-run, official Communist Party mouthpiece, Communist Party-controlled, China’s international propaganda news tabloid, etc. However, no similar modifiers are found to be attached to their Australian and US counterparts. In so doing, Australian journalists imply that news media in China are not free media, but are propaganda machines strictly controlled by the Chinese government. The frequent mention of communist further intensifies the audience’s suspicion and fear of these news sources, which damages their credibility.

The last noteworthy group of actors is Chinese business elites. Though seldom quoted in 1972–1978, they acted as the second most quoted news actors in 2017–2023. Detailed analysis reveals that representatives include Huawei, TikTok and Alibaba. These business corporations all stood at the centre of controversy during that period, which to some extent, accounts for their high frequency in Australian China-related news reports.

3.1.2 Australian News Sources

The distribution of Australian news sources is presented in Figure 4. Political elites are the most cited news actors in engaging with Australian news sources as well, but individual politicians are more likely to be quoted than political institutions. These officials are affiliated with various government departments, and statistics show that the majority of them come from two departments, that is, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence (Figure 5).

Figure 4:

Distribution of Australian news sources.

Figure 5:

Distribution of government departments in Australian political elites (Notice: The DFAT were formed by amalgamating the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Trade in 1987).

When Australia emphasized establishing a good relationship with China in 1972–1978, journalists relied more on information provided by the Foreign Affairs Department (40 %) than the Defence Department (14 %). However, in 2017–2023, there was an upsurge in the number of news sources from the Department of Defence (34 %), catching the percentage of the DFAT, which decreases by 6 %. The military and defence establishment is playing a larger role in the Australian narrative of China than in the previous period (Raby 2018). Compared with the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Defence drives a more hawkish line, identifying China as a primary threat which must be confronted (Menadue 2018). For example,

1. Speaking at an event hosted by ANU’s National Security College earlier this week, the top intelligence official alluded to China’s more assertive posturing in the region as “very alarming” (CT, 03-11-2022).

2. After revelations that the Solomon Islands was looking to sign a security deal with China, Ms Noble said Australia was “concerned about China in our region” (SMH, 07-04-2022).

3. A group of former senior officials at the Department of Defence has issued a call for a “radical” overhaul of defence policy to confront the potential threats posed by a surging China and disrupted world order (CT, 27-09-2018).

Examples 1–3 show that the defence and security officials have identified China as a major security threat and appealed to take more effective measures to contain China’s influence. Indeed, such strong anxiety is well reflected in its government documents. In the latest Defence White Paper, Australia realized that the growth of China’s national power means China’s policies and actions will have a major impact on the stability of the Indo-Pacific to 2035. Not saying it bluntly though, Australia has identified China as a major unstable factor (Commonwealth of Australia 2016).

Business elites also play a significant role in Australian news sources, including mining companies (e.g., Rio Tinto, Fortescue Metals Group, BHP and Newcrest Mining), baby food companies (e.g., Bubs Australia and Bellamy), grain companies (e.g., GrainCorp), wine-making companies (e.g., Treasury Wine Estates and Chester Osborn), gaming and entertainment companies (e.g., Crown Resorts and Nine Entertainment) as well as banks (e.g., Westpac, ANZ, National Australia Bank and Reserve Bank of Australia). The diversity of Australian business elites is compelling evidence of the comprehensive and multidimensional commercial transactions between China and Australia.

Another noteworthy characteristic is that Australian news sources possess the highest proportion of civil society sources among the three countries and that has become more salient during 2017–2023. Here, we pay special attention to think tanks. They are distinct from government sources and many are non-profit organizations, but they may work for governmental as well as commercial clients. An examination of their quotation lines reveals that in 2017–2023, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) was the most frequently quoted one (Figure 6). However, compared with other think tanks, ASPI has long been denounced as fomenting anti-China hysteria to the alleged benefit of its benefactors in Australia (Robin 2020). In February 2020, Australian Labor Senator Kim Carr described ASPI as ‘hawks intent on fighting a new cold war’ (Carr 2020). Likewise, former NSW premier Bob Carr said it provided a ‘one-sided, pro-American view of the world’ (Baxendale 2017). Ex-ambassador to China Geoff Raby also added ‘I see it as very much the architect of the China threat theory in Australia’ (cited in Robin 2020). Australian journalists could have selected other more centrist think tanks as news sources, yet ASPI has secured ample discursive space to influence the Australian public perception of China.

Figure 6:

Distribution of Australian think tank sources.

3.1.3 US News Sources

The structure of US news sources resembles that of Australian news sources, showing the dominance of political elites as well as a preference for individual politicians over political institutions in both periods (Figure 7). An increasing dependence on business elites and social elites is also detected. Yet one significant difference is that US journalists and media (e.g., Associated Press, United Press International, The Washington Post and The New York Times) used to be the second most quoted sources in 1972–1978, which is convincing evidence of their active part in providing information about China during this period.

Figure 7:

Distribution of the US news sources.

3.2.1 Chinese News Sources

As shown in Table 6, the dialogic space for Chinese political elites has been expanded over the past few decades by showing more ‘acknowledge’ and ‘distance’ markers. The voices of Chinese political elites are most likely to be acknowledged. However, a close reading of these quotation lines reveals that except for using the acknowledge marker say, other markers containing strong emotions are frequently used, including accuse, argue, attack, blame, criticize, condemn, deny and deplore. The image of an uncooperative and unsatisfied China is thus created, which always blames other countries (examples 4–6).

1. The Chinese embassy has accused Australia of “political manipulation” by issuing a statement to mark the anniversary of a landmark UN decision (CT, 14-07-2021).

2. Mr Lord’s comments come days after China’s foreign ministry directly attacked the Australian government for “blatant discrimination against Chinese companies” and for “lecturing other countries” (SMH, 09-09-2019).

3. The Chinese embassy condemned Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement yesterday and accused Australia of groundless accusations, hypocrisy and gross interference (SMH, 10-07-2020).

The ‘distance’ patterns mark an explicit separation of internal authorial voice from external voice. Such markers are usually avoided in news reports to reduce journalistic intrusion. However, to expand the dialogical space for Chinese political elite sources, ‘distance’ is another noticeable ‘engagement’ pattern here, whereas such a preference is not found when mediating Australian voices. By using ‘distance’ markers like allege, claim and maintain (examples 7–9), Australian journalists are deliberately distancing themselves from the voices of these Chinese actors. In other words, Australian newspapers decline to align with Chinese political elites, and in doing so, their utterances are represented as untrustworthy.

1. But the Chinese alleged it was on a spying mission (CT, 10-05-1974).

2. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly claimed the reason for their questioning of ABC journalist Bill Birtles and Australian Financial Review Mike Smith was due to their involvement in the case of Australian TV anchor Cheng Lei, who is being detained under national security laws in Beijing (SMH, 10-09-2020).

3. China has maintained the new national security laws are necessary to bring stability and safety after 15 months of protests in Hong Kong over Beijing’s increasing influence. (SMH, 10-07-2020).

Compared with Chinese political elite sources, Australian journalists seem to hold a more paradoxical stance towards Chinese business elite sources as well as Chinese journalists and media sources. On the one hand, Australian journalists are giving more credit to the information provided by these two groups by using more ‘attest’ and ‘endorse’ resources. In particular, ‘endorse’ markers are most frequently applied to mediate the voices of Chinese business elites (11.22 %) among all Chinese sources. Nevertheless, Chinese business elites are also most likely to be distanced from (5.1 %). Additionally, while mediating the voices of Chinese journalists and media, these actors are always accompanied by ideologically oriented modifiers, implying their close ties with the Chinese government (for more detail, see the section on News Actors in Australian News Discourse about China). In doing so, Australian journalists hint at their disapproval of those Chinese alternative propositions, which undermines the perceived credibility of these Chinese news sources.

3.2.2 Australian News Sources

According to Table 7, the distribution of ‘engagement’ patterns in mediating Australian political elite voices has not shown much variation over the past few decades. However, striking differences can be observed if we take nationality as a mediating factor. Unlike Chinese ones, Australian political elite voices are unlikely to be distanced from in both periods and are given more weight as evidenced by a higher percentage of ‘endorse’ and ‘attest’ resources. The voices of Australian business elites are also represented as more defensible by contracting the dialogic space. The last group to be discussed here is the think tanks. Not until 2017–2023 has this group been engaged and their voices are either ‘acknowledged’ or ‘endorsed’. Yet these sources occupy the largest proportion among ‘endorse’ resources (15.09 %), compared to all the other aforementioned Chinese and Australian actors. By using ‘endorse’ markers like find, identify and reveal, Australian think tanks are described as highly trustworthy information providers for the audience.

3.2.3 US News Sources

Table 8 illustrates that the voices of US journalists and media are exclusively mediated by ‘acknowledge’ patterns. Although US journalists and media serve as the second most quoted ones in 1972–1978, Australian journalists maintain a detached stance. The ‘engagement’ patterns in US political elite sources exhibit greater diversity. While the voices of the US political elite are frequently ‘attested’ or ‘endorsed’ in 1972–1978, none of them are ‘distanced’. This contrasts with a reduction in employing ‘attest’ and ‘endorse’ resources and an increase in ‘distance’ markers to 5.56 % in 2017–2023. Australian journalists are consciously distancing themselves from the viewpoints of these US political elites, especially those of President Donald Trump (examples 10–12). It shows that Australia, despite its long-established alliance with the United States, did not unconditionally align with the US positions, which is the case during the Trump administration.

1. Trump has since boasted about a renaissance in the industry thanks to his tax cuts and the removal of environmental regulations put in place by his Democratic predecessor Barack Obama (CT, 28-11-2018).

2. Mr Trump reportedly branded it the “worst deal in the world” during the leaders’ heated exchange last weekend – details of which were later leaked to the media – then saying on Twitter it was “dumb” (CT, 06-02-2017).

3. It might also recognise that tariffs that are actually paid by US companies and consumers – not China, as Trump has claimed – aren’t a productive way to boost America’s domestic activity (SMH, 06-08-2020).

To summarize, by strategically engaging with different news sources, Australian journalists have positioned Chinese news sources as more negotiable in the past few decades. The use of ‘distance’ markers as well as the infusion of ideological judgements greatly undermines their credibility. On the contrary, the dialogical space for Australian alternatives has been contracted, rendering them more credible in providing the Australian public with information about China. Additionally, the dialogical space for US news sources stabilizes at the highest level, positioning them as the most negotiable among the three groups. In other words, they play a rather limited role in shaping the Australian public understanding of China. Broadly, over the past few decades, Chinese news actors have become less reliable information sources, whereas Australian news actors seem to have gained prominence, with their perspectives being emphasized.