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Deliberate Metaphor Affords Conscious Metaphorical Cognition

Contrary to what is assumed in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT), the conceptual power of metaphor may not lie in its widespread unconscious use but in its more limited and targeted deliberate use, which may or may not give rise to conscious metaphorical cognition. Deliberate and conscious metaphorical thought is connected to the general functions of all conscious thought as described by Baumeister and Masicampo (2010). Their theory provides a basis for demonstrating how deliberate and conscious metaphorical cognition facilitate social and cultural interactions, by reconsidering Musolff's (2004) analysis of metaphor in political discourse on European integration. The paper concludes by formulating some implications of CMT's neglect of conscious metaphor and of deliberate metaphor more generally. If the power of metaphor lies in thought, as has been held by CMT for thirty years, it may be that conscious rather than unconscious cognition – or, more generally, deliberate rather than non-deliberate metaphor use – enables that power. Given the relative infrequency of deliberate and conscious metaphor use, this, in turn, may entail that the online effect of metaphor is more restricted than has been assumed over the past three decades.

Keywords: metaphor, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, intentions, attention, consciousness.

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea that metaphor is a matter of thought not language has revolutionized the field. The recent *Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought* (Gibbs, 2008) bears testimony to the explosion of cognitive-scientific metaphor research over the past decades by offering a thoroughly renewed version of the picture provided by its predecessor (Ortony, 1993), itself a revised edition of the classic volume appearing fourteen years before. One important part of this cognitive-scientific re-conceptualization of metaphor is the proposal of the existence of so-called conceptual metaphors: extensive, systematic, complex, entrenched mappings across distinct conceptual domains that are activated during all sorts of cognitive tasks (Lakoff 1993, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999; Gibbs 1994, 2006). Familiar examples include LIFE IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, LOVE IS A DISEASE, ORGANIZATIONS ARE MACHINES, TIME IS SPACE, and HAPPY IS UP. The fruits of and issues raised by thirty years of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) are considerable and have been widely summarized and reviewed: e.g., (Gibbs 2011; Steen 2007, 2011a).

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Yet one fundamental question has been neglected: the distinction between metaphor as a matter of conscious vs. unconscious thought. Almost all metaphor research – especially in CMT – has focused on metaphor's *unconscious* character. Consciousness has been a controversial issue over the past decades (see e.g. Baars & Gage 2010); this may be one reason why conscious metaphorical cognition has been ignored. The more important reason, however, is CMT's central, provocative claim that most metaphor works automatically and unconsciously.

Over the past decade, a number of discourse analysts have inspected this claim critically and drawn attention to deliberate metaphor (e.g., Cameron 2003; Goddard 2004; Charteris-Black 2004; Müller 2008; Semino 2008; Steen 2008, 2010, 2011a; *cf*. Gibbs 2011). As a result of these discussions, I have argued (2011b) that a distinction is needed between conscious metaphorical thought and deliberate metaphor use. I define conscious metaphorical thought as cases of deliberate metaphor use – in production or reception – whereby the language user pays attention to their use of metaphor for making cross-domain comparisons. This takes place in the deliberate metaphorical design of texts, products, organizations, etc. Yet awareness of metaphor *as* metaphor is not a necessary precondition for metaphor being used deliberately: the intentional use of metaphor as metaphor need not become conscious, just as many other intentional actions need not become conscious (Gibbs 2011). Deliberate metaphor affords conscious metaphorical thought but is not the same (Steen 2011b).

I define deliberate metaphor (2008, 2010, 2011a) as an instruction for addressees to adopt an 'alien' perspective on a target referent so as to formulate specific thoughts about that target from the standpoint of the alien perspective. Typically this is achieved by some form of explicit, direct metaphor, such as simile. Such metaphors are probably processed by comparison; however, this can happen without any attending awareness that the language user is dealing with metaphor.

I will first analyze the complex relations between deliberate metaphor and consciousness. Then I will frame both deliberate and conscious metaphor use in thetheory of conscious thought offered by Baumeister and Masicampo (2010). I will apply their general claim – that conscious thought is essential for facilitating social and cultural interaction – to metaphorical thought in political discourse on European integration (Musolff 2004). I will argue that not just conscious metaphorical thought *but* all deliberate metaphor use facilitates social and cultural interactions. Future research must establish which deliberate metaphors give rise to conscious metaphorical cognition, why, and to what effects.

In the final section, I will spell out the most important implications of these ideas for CMT. The power of metaphor may reside not in its unconscious use, as CMT has claimed, but in its conscious and – more generally – in its deliberate use. Essential to conscious and deliberate metaphor is that they involve observable, online, cross-domain mappings (i.e., processing by comparison); non-deliberate metaphor does not necessarily require the use of such online mappings (Steen 2008). This proposal raises new questions about the structure and function of metaphor – questions addressed in a new theory of metaphor working in new directions after thirty years of CMT (Steen 2011a).

2. DELIBERATE METAPHOR

A wonderful and well-known deliberate metaphor is found in the first twelve lines of Shakespeare's Sonnet 18, reproduced here from (Booth 1977):

> Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?
> Thou art more lovely and more temperate:
> Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,
> And summer's lease hath all too short a date;
> Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,
> And often is his gold complexion dimmed;
> And every fair from fair sometime declines,
> By chance or nature's changing course untrimmed:
> But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
> Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow'st,
> Nor shall death brag thou wandrest in his shade,
> When in eternal lines to time thou grow'st.
> So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,
> So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.

Sonnet 18 offers an extended metaphorical comparison that introduces all the important characteristics of deliberate metaphor (Steen 2010, 2011a). Deliberate metaphor is *metaphorical* because it maps correspondences from one conceptual domain to another. It is *deliberate* because it involves people using metaphor *as* metaphor: it makes intentional use of something to think about something else. In Sonnet 18, this is made linguistically explicit in the subtly playful first line, 'shall I compare thee to a summer's day?' Seemingly, the poet intentionally presents a metaphorical taunt to himself, then rises to the challenge by producing a brilliant exercise in figurative thinking. Deliberate metaphor involves paying attention to a source domain during online production or reception, in order to engage in cross-domain mapping – whether this comparison targets external resemblance or proportional analogy, includes irony or overstatement, is new or conventional, etc.

All of this contrasts sharply with non-deliberate metaphor, as when one uses spatial prepositions to talk about e.g. time ('*in* 1999') or emotions ('*in* love'). When encountering such expressions, people do not pay attention to space to think about time or emotions. It is quite possible that people do not even activate concepts of space in unconscious processing. How much unconscious, automatic metaphor processing is based on online cross-domain mapping remains an open empirical question, even though it is a central tenet of most cognitive-linguistic research on CMT. The alternative view holds that language users may simply disambiguate the preposition *in* lexically before starting to build conceptual structures – and not set up cross-domain mappings in unconscious cognition at all (Steen 2008, 2011a). Much processing of metaphorical language may take this form. Just because the linguistic structures are metaphorical does not mean that the cognitive processes must be, too.

Deliberate metaphor is based in online comparison. Its function is to change the addressee's perspective on some referent in the discourse: a matter of what is attended to, and conceptually represented, during processing. In the first line of Shakespeare´s sonnet, readers cannot avoid

attending both to 'lover' and 'summer´s day': the language instructs them to represent both when they process the sentence in working memory. As I will show, non-deliberate metaphor is different.

Building cognitive representations of deliberate metaphor *as* metaphor – including shifting one's perspective from a target-domain referent to a source-domain perspective on that referent – may, or may not, be recognized by language users as ´doing metaphor´. When this does happen, it leads to metaphor recognition and, hence, conscious metaphorical cognition. Spontaneous metaphor recognition is possible because deliberate metaphor forces people to shift their attention away from the target domain referent and adopt another referential standpoint created by a deliberately introduced 'alien' concept – then use that as a source from which to re-view the target. In Sonnet 18, the source and target referents are explicitly juxtaposed in the first line. The following lines verbally thematize a selection of the many potential correspondences between the two domains. These cross-domain mappings are the focus of attention when people read the text – allowing them to recognize the references as involving metaphor and so producing conscious metaphorical cognition. Yet this is not an obligatory consequence of processing deliberate metaphor. It is more correct to claim that deliberate metaphor affords conscious metaphorical cognition (Steen 2011b).

Before proceeding to elaborate the relationship between deliberate metaphor and conscious metaphorical cognition, some more ideas on deliberate metaphor are in order. Shakespeare's poetry – Elizabethan poetry in general – is full of extended deliberate metaphors, including the famous 'metaphysical conceits'. Of course, metaphors are used deliberately in all sorts of linguistic forms for all sorts of communicative purposes in all sorts of discourse. Top Gear presenter Jeremy Clarkson is no Shakespeare, but he has a web page of magical metaphors, featuring some of the most outrageous of his deliberate figurative comparisons. These typically involve overstatement and humour: e.g., 'Aston Martin DB9, that's not a race car, that's pornography' or 'this air conditioning feels like there's an asthmatic sat on my dash-board, coughing at me.' More serious instances of deliberate metaphor can be found when complex or unfamiliar topics are explained by explicit comparison with something simpler and more familiar, as in this quotation from *Time Magazine,* 17 July 2000:

> Imagine your brain as a house filled with lights. Now imagine someone turning off the lights one by one. That's what Alzheimer's disease does. It turns off the lights so that the flow of ideas, emotions and memories from one room to the next slows and eventually ceases. And sadly--as anyone who has ever watched a parent, a sibling, a spouse succumb to the spreading darkness knows--there is no way to stop the lights from turning off, no way to switch them back on once they've grown dim. At least not yet.

When the Dutch right-wing politician Geert Wilders spoke of 'a tsunami of Islamization' washing over the Netherlands, the word *tsunami* still meant what it meant before it was conventionalized as a hyperbolic version of metaphorical *streams* or *floods*. He deliberately – quite possibly, consciously – invoked the image of recent natural catastrophe in Indonesia and its neighbouring countries as the source domain to look at the development of Islam in the Netherlands. His goal was to appeal maximally to fear and have maximal persuasive effect on the right wing of Dutch politics.

Deliberate metaphors occur in a wide range of linguistic forms and conceptual structures and serve a wide range of communicative functions. Their analysis is a prerequisite for understanding which deliberate metaphors typically elicit conscious metaphorical thought, and when. Their linguistic form may range from a single word or phrase to a clause, a paragraph, or even a complete text. They may invoke local wisdom in the form of a saying or proverb, a novel insight, a joke, or another conspicuous rhetorical ploy. They may present extended metaphorical comparisons within or between paragraphs or speech turns for purposes of explanation and instruction, encompassing metaphorical models expressed in such conventionalized text forms as fairy tales, allegories, parables, and myths: all are diverging forms of deliberate metaphor, in which the sender asks the addressee to change perspective and intentionally look at something in terms of something else.

The conceptual structures of deliberate metaphors are not necessarily or even typically novel (Müller 2008), as Semino (2008) suggests – or opposed to conventional metaphor, as Cameron (2003) suggests. The 'tsunami of Islamization' is nothing but an exaggerated version of the conventional conceptual metaphor by which large quantities can be expressed as streams of liquid: one often used by right-wing politicians to talk about immigration (Charteris-Black 2006). Similarly, descriptions of Alzheimer's disease in terms of lights going out in a house evoke a concrete image of the conventional conceptual metaphor by which understanding is compared to seeing. Overall, 99% of metaphors are conventional (Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal & Krennmayr 2010; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, Krennmayr & Pasma 2010), meaning that the bulk of deliberate metaphor is conventional, too. It typically involves the phenomenon of *revitalization* (Müller 2008), which has been neglected in CMT but might offer one reason why deliberate metaphor can be so powerful.

The communicative functions of deliberate metaphor are diverse, as the above examples illustrate. Somehow, they must be related to the situated genre event within which the deliberate metaphor is used (Steen 2002, Semino 2008). Depending on how *communicative function* is defined, deliberate metaphor may function to signal a particular style (e.g., the way Jeremy Clarkson talks) or register (e.g., the language of the novel) of a particular discourse event, its content (e.g., a scientific topic), its type (e.g., a type of narrative or argument), its goal (e.g., persuasion, information, or instruction), its domain (e.g., literature or religion), and others of its discourse aspects (Steen 2002).

The linguistic forms, conceptual structures, and communicative functions of deliberate metaphor are all part of a situated genre event in which people use language to think and to interact with each other. It is to be expected that properties of distinct genres constrain the variation of these three dimensions of deliberate metaphor (Wee 2005) – as they may of non-deliberate metaphor (Semino 2008). Wee suggests that explanatory function and a constructed source domain go together; but the Shakespearean example shows that other functions may be in play.

Awareness of the role of deliberate metaphor as metaphor – as a rhetorical ploy – may vary for genre-constrained reasons. Although it is difficult to forget that Sonnet 18 is one extended metaphorical comparison, other uses of deliberate metaphor may give rise to brief glimpses of

awareness soon submerged in the more important concerns of a specific genre event. Large-scale corpus work is needed to create sophisticated, precise models that are empirically valid and can be used in subsequent behavioural research, examining when deliberate metaphor gives rise to conscious metaphorical thought.

3. DELIBERATE METAPHOR AND CONSCIOUS METAPHORICAL THOUGHT

What, exactly, makes all these metaphors deliberate, and how does this relate to conscious metaphorical thought? An answer involves taking a closer look at the relationship between words, concepts, and referents: general linguistic and discourse-analytical notions that can usefully be related to a well-known psychological model of discourse processing by recalling the distinction between *surface text* (words), *text base* (concepts and propositions), and *situation model* (referential state of affairs as depicted by any given discourse) (see e.g. MacNamara & Magliano 2009). Approaching metaphor this way allows for a sophisticated, well-motivated picture of the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor use in relation to conscious metaphorical cognition.

For the clearest cases of deliberate metaphor, the situation is simple: words and concepts directly posit 'alien' referents in the situation model to be constructed during online comprehension; these referents must somehow be integrated for the discourse to stay coherent (Steen 2007). The first line of Sonnet 18 establishes a cross-domain mapping by explicitly evoking and contrasting two distinct concepts with two distinct referents. In discourse-psychology terms, readers must represent the first line as surface text, text base, and situation model such that two concepts are explicitly and separately activated: the main referent – the addressee – is compared to an 'alien' referent: a summer's day.

The referents through the rest of the poem belong to these two, distinct conceptual domains. One pertains to the lover, the ostensive addressee of the sonnet; the other to a summer's day. Both are concepts in the text base and referents in the situation model in their own right. One has a different status from the other, being the 'true' referent and overall topic of the discourse: the beloved, viewed anew from the alien perspective of a summer's day. For most of the poem, the reader must compare aspects of the one referent to aspects of the other: e.g., 'more' in Line 2, the implied contrast in lines 3 and 4, etc.; if the reader does not do this, the text falls apart or loses its point. Suddenly it contains unconnected referents attended in isolation from each other.

All this is a matter of intention and attention – but not necessarily of consciousness, either on the part of the reader or the writer (Baars & Gage 2010). One may safely assume that all language use is intentional: i.e., it is goal directed, related to some knowledge- and interaction-oriented genre event such as writing or reading a sonnet. One may also assume that all language use involves attention – at least to those concepts evoked by the content words. Discourse processing – in production or reception – is an intentional form of attending to language structures, representing them at various levels in working memory as part of the developing surface text, text base, and situation model. This is not the same as conscious processing or conscious thought (Chafe 1994): what is represented in working

memory on the basis of intention and attention is *available* for conscious attention; it remains an empirical question whether – and, if so, which – aspects of cognitive representation impinge on consciousness. One factor clearly concerns the discourse structure and function of deliberate metaphor; I will now take a closer look at it.

Extended comparisons – and their shorter variants, similes – are direct metaphors (Steen 2008, 2010; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal & Krennmayr 2010; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, Krennmayr & Pasma 2010). They directly express source-domain referents such as 'summer's day' or (in the Alzheimer's example) 'a house filled with lights' that the addressee cannot but represent and attend to separately. In Sonnet 18, lines three and four are presumably processed in working memory as containing a set of source-domain elements in the form of linguistic, conceptual, and referential discourse representations; all must be integrated into the target domain of the developing text. This demands attention and processing effort; it affords a concomitant degree of awareness that the alien elements are, indeed, alien; but such an affordance need not be realized. Direct metaphors are deliberate by definition. The more extended or highlighted they are or the more prominent their source-domain appearance, the greater the chance that they impinge on consciousness and elicit conscious metaphorical thought.

Direct metaphors should be differentiated from indirect ones, which constitute the typical case for linguistic expression of cross-domain mappings: 98% of all metaphor use in natural discourse (Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal & Krennmayr 2010; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, Krennmayr & Pasma 2010). Consider the phrase *a house filled with lights* in the Alzheimer's example: it directly indicates a referent in the source domain of buildings, used to re-view the referents in the target domain of Alzheimer's disease. The lexical unit *filled*, however, is a different metaphor: an indirect metaphor embedded in the source domain 'house' (Lakoff 1993, Gibbs 1993). My choice of terminology reflects the assumption, first, that *fill* has a basic meaning to do with putting something inside some container; and, second, that not this basic sense but some other, more abstract sense is in play in using this word in this context: something like 'equipped with from top to bottom'. The contextual sense 'equipped with from top to bottom' contrasts with the basic sense 'filled'. Semantically, the basic sense affords a mapping to the contextual sense – which is why the contextual, metaphorical meaning is called indirect (Pragglejaz Group 2007). According to CMT, the figurative sense is derived, online, by a cross-domain mapping from the more basic sense: in this case, 'put something inside some container'.

In general, indirect metaphor profiles the metaphorical or figurative sense of a word in a text; typically, the basic sense of source-domain terms remains hidden in the background, irrelevant – so the container sense of ´filled´ is downplayed. This is what differentiates indirect from direct metaphor: direct metaphor profiles the source-domain sense of a word in context; it is that sense that is needed for activating the correct concept and setting up the corresponding referent. In *a house filled with lights*, the language instructs the addressee to attend to the source domain 'house' as a genuine house.

With direct metaphor, there is always an observable, experienced incongruity between source-domain terms on the one hand and the encompassing target-domain frame on the other: e.g., a text about brains that suddenly talks about the lighting in a house. Because the incongruity is semantically and referentially observable, direct metaphor may be called deliberate: it is an intentionally constructed mapping between two semantic and conceptual domains. It *deliberately* uses metaphor as metaphor. The source-domain concept of *house filled with lights* is ineluctably present in the language user's discourse representation and attention; this, in turn, affords conscious metaphorical cognition.

With indirect metaphor, linguistic incongruity only arises if one assumes that a metaphorically used word like *filled* is approached via its basic sense. Only then does one have a comparable situation to the one with direct metaphor: only then is there an incongruity or referential clash between 'putting something inside a container' and the lighting of a house. When linguists identify indirect metaphor in natural discourse, they assume the priority of basic senses (see e.g. Charteris-Black & Ennis 2001; Cameron 2003; Charteris-Black 2004; Pragglejaz Group 2007; Semino 2008; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal & Krennmayr 2010; Steen, Dorst, Herrmann, Kaal, Krennmayr & Pasma 2010). Yet such an assumption is highly questionable for describing the way language users process words when reading a text. Indeed, Rachel Giora (2003) has shown that the distinction between basic and metaphorical senses does *not* drive the psycholinguistic process of lexical access in a way that prioritizes basic, concrete, literal senses. Instead, the most salient sense of a word, in context, gets privileged in extremely rapid fashion, and 'most salient senses' emphatically include conventionalized figurative senses. Prioritizing the basic sense of a metaphorically used word may be adequate for technical metaphor identification and analysis, but it clearly is not what people do when they process metaphor in reading or listening.

Quite possibly, most words that may be identified as metaphorical from a linguistic perspective are disambiguated in processing at the linguistic level, the appropriate contextual and metaphorical senses getting rapidly privileged over other, more 'basic' ones, simply because they are the most salient (Steen 2008, 2011a). This could be why many indirect metaphors are not experienced as metaphorical or deliberate, let alone as giving rise to conscious cross-domain mappings: they may not trigger any metaphorical cross-domain conceptual mappings in the first place. I suggest that this is the case for the indirect metaphor *filled* in 'imagine your brain as a house filled with lights': *filled* gets disambiguated lexically, then activates the abstract concept 'equipped with from top to bottom' without any detour via some more basic spatial concept pertaining to containers.

(In)directness and (non-)deliberateness are orthogonal variables (Steen 2011a; *cf*. Müller 2008), pertaining respectively to the linguistic form and communicative function of metaphors. Metaphors can be expressed in forms that are direct or indirect; independently, they can be used deliberately or non-deliberately. This explains how indirect metaphor can be used deliberately. In the passage on Alzheimer's disease, one finds a number of indirect but deliberate metaphors. Once the reader has

processed the first three sentences, *Imagine your brain as a house filled with lights. Now imagine someone turning off the lights one by one. That's what Alzheimer's disease does.*
the fourth sentence moves into indirect metaphor: 'it turns off the lights so that the flow of ideas, emotions and memories from one room to the next slows and eventually ceases'. The metaphor is indirect: the construction *it turns off the lights* sets up a referential situation where Alzheimer's disease ('it') slows down the flow of ideas. The contextual meaning of *turns off the lights* is indirect, designating referents in the target domain 'slow down the flow of ideas'), not the source domain 'turn off the lights'. At the same time, the indirect metaphor is clearly deliberate.

Deliberate metaphor affords conscious (metaphorical) thought because source and target domain concepts are separately activated and attended to in working memory. They are metaphorically related concepts and referents coming from distinct domains and co-occurring in one utterance. This deliberate juxtaposition, which sometimes happens with indirect metaphor, may be inherent to direct metaphor. When, exactly, deliberate metaphor – indirect or direct – elicits conscious metaphorical thought is a separate question.

4. METAPHORICAL MODELS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTERACTIONS

Baumeister and Masicampo (2010) have recently offered a new, general theory of conscious thought that presents an opportunity to frame the above proposals in a more encompassing, independently motivated approach to cognition. They describe conscious thought as simulation of events, especially for future use in sociocultural interactions. Conscious thought constructs sequences of idea units that are typically applied to situations away from the here and now: past (conscious remembering) and future (conscious planning), as well as counterfactual (conscious reasoning), imagined (conscious design), and desired (daydreaming). The proposal fits within Tomasello's (1999) evolutionary perspective on the development of human cognition, according to which 'culture transformed primate cognition into human conscious thought' (2010: 952). It can be framed as well in such general models of attention and consciousness as the one expounded by Baars and Gage (2010).

Although Baumeister and Masicampo do not make the connection, their theory bears fundamental resemblances to Wallace Chafe's (1994) account of consciousness and its relation to language, cognition, and communicative discourse. Both theories are indebted to Baars (1988, 1997). Like Baars, Baumeister and Masicampo take conscious thought as a workspace or 'theater', not just for dealing with the here and now but – again – for simulating events away from the immediate present: 'conscious thought enables the processing of information from culture so that the human mind can operate within it' (2010: 955). Compare this with what Chafe (1994: 38-39) writes:

> Consciousness, then, is regarded… as the crucial interface between the conscious organism and its environment, the place where information from the environment is dealt with as a basis for thought and action as well as the place where internally generated experience becomes effective – the locus of remembering, imagining, and feeling. It might not be too much to say

> that the purpose of both behavior and thought is to satisfy the interests of the organism as they are represented in that organism's consciousness.

Deliberate metaphor requires attention in working memory to certain aspects of a source domain; this is done to provide a new, external perspective on some target-domain referent. Baumeister and Masicampo would see it as an instance of conscious thought, either for inner reflection or social interaction, that may arise in isolated thoughts but is more typically embedded in encompassing conceptual structures that amount to narration, argumentation, or other trains of thought. Although many issues remain about what counts as conscious thought – including the presence or absence of awareness that one is dealing with metaphor as metaphor – Baumeister and Masicampo´s framework provides opportunities for further developing the above proposals regarding deliberate metaphor.

Crucially, what is initially available for conscious thought about a deliberate metaphor, at the first moment it is used in discourse, is not the complete cross-domain mapping in all its conceptual detail. What is available is only the proposition that expresses the mapping: consider the 'tsunami of Islamization' or the first line of Shakespeare's Sonnet 18. As the previous section suggests, a potentially conscious metaphorical idea is a proposition available to working memory; it needs to be represented as a metaphorical idea in the text base and situation model capturing the ongoing discourse (Steen 2011c). The initial limitation of attention – to just the proposition expressed – is the reason why some (or many) deliberate metaphors require elaboration – either by the same speaker, in the form of a story, an argument, etc., or by other speakers through questions, comments, or critiques. Social interaction and public discourse provide the platform where this elaboration into partially and publicly shared metaphorical models takes place. Explicating the meanings of some metaphorical mappings is hard work indeed: it requires time – sometimes extending into years – and can often go in unexpected or even contradictory directions (Billig & MacMillan 2005).

This analysis reveals the complex interaction between three realities that always partake in discourse: (a) semiotic meaning potential, (b) unconscious and conscious cognition, and (c) social interaction (Steen 2011a). The engine of this trilateral interaction may lie in logical reasoning. Logical reasoning enables working with thought sequences: it '…greatly increases the practical value of information. It enables the mind to realize new truths based on information it processes. Thus, one bit of informational input can lead to multiple useful conclusions' (Baumeister & Masicampo 2010: 953-954). In the case of deliberate metaphor, this can happen in monologic discourse, in connection with argumentation (Shakespeare) or exposition (Alzheimer's disease). It is the basis of much discourse-analytical work in CMT (e.g. Semino 2008), which has emphasized the power of metaphorical reasoning from the start; but that research typically has not considered what is specific to the deliberate or conscious nature, power, and danger of metaphor. The work of Baumeister and Masicampo allows that basic picture to be refined, showing how conscious metaphorical thought facilitates social and cultural interactions. Not just the conscious use of deliberate metaphor has this

effect: so long as the language makes clear that online comparisons are inevitable, all deliberate metaphor has the same function.

Andreas Musolff's (2004) work on metaphor in political discourse on Europe is quite revealing. He focuses on the way various conceptual metaphors have framed public debate about European integration. He is not a typical representative of CMT, by any means: he has consistently argued against CMT's 'unconsciousness' and 'automaticity' claims in relation to political discourse. Given his approach to discourse, he has not thematized the difference between deliberate and conscious metaphor on the one hand and non-deliberate, unconscious metaphor on the other. He assumes metaphor to be a conceptual product of and influence on people's thoughts, attitudes, and argumentation strategies without further differentiating how it works in (un)conscious thought in individual minds. For my purposes, however, most of the metaphors that Musolff studies can serve as crystallization points for logical reasoning about possible future cultural scenarios – which normally would make them deliberate and potentially conscious. A brief glance at his data shows this to be correct, as I will now illustrate.

The first empirical chapter of Musolff's monograph deals with metaphorical conceptualization of nation states as persons, which facilitates thinking about political alliances as marriages, family relationships, etc.; for example (Musolff 2004: 28):

> Within the LOVE-MARRIAGE scenario, British media often comment almost triumphantly on apparent *marriage problems* of the Franco-German *couple* that might lead to a *breakdown* or gradual *cooling down of the partnership* and provide Britain with a chance to establish a *ménage à trois*.

Many of the examples leading to this conclusion involve deliberate metaphors that expressly exploit the available conceptual possibilities of the metaphorically used LOVE-MARRIAGE scenario. They do so to think, talk, and communicate about a complex political situation in the more familiar terms of a marriage or family relationship. Here is one quoted excerpt where metaphorical comparison is inevitable (Musolff 2004: 27):

> The pound's *shotgun separation* from the exchange rate mechanism is proving painful for both Britain and the rest of Europe. *The two-year marriage itself was unhappy…. As in most marriage break-downs, there have been faults on both sides.* Sterling and the German mark – both big internationally traded currencies – were always going to be *uneasy bedfellows*….

For all its differences, this analysis is still compatible with CMT. What Musolff has *not* noted is that the important workings of metaphor in discourse may be due to its deliberate rather than non-deliberate use. This is even possible allowing for diverging attitudes and viewpoints on the same topic in the British and German press. In this type of public discourse, metaphor operates by a typically *deliberate* exploitation of the semiotic potential of the metaphorical conceptual and linguistic systems *as metaphor* – quite likely in the conscious thought of the reporter and quite possibly in the conscious thought of their readers, who realize new metaphorical perspectives for sociocultural interaction.

Consciousness of metaphor and its deliberate use for rhetorical and argumentative purposes in the service of political and cultural ends does, briefly, become an explicit theme at the start of the second empirical chapter. Musolff draws attention to Margaret Thatcher's awareness of metaphor, as reported in *The Times* of 31 October 1992. 'Misleading analogies such as the *European train leaving the station* have been used in the debate, she says. *"If that train is going in the wrong direction it is better not to be on it at all.* The Newspeak of Orwell has returned as EMU speak*"'* (Musolff 2004: 30).

Skilful orators have no problem turning misleading analogies inside out to become similarly misleading analogies in the opposite direction. This is where logic and conscious thought make use of deliberately metaphorical propositions to develop entire metaphorical scenarios and arguments that lead people to novel perspectives and standpoints. As Musolff shows throughout the chapter – which goes on to explore the metaphorical application of a JOURNEY scenario in political arguments over political integration – such a metaphorical model is not only available but, indeed, widely and often consciously exploited in the rhetoric of politicians and the media, all of whom all attempt to use it for their own purposes (2004: 60). If the metaphorical model is contested – as typically happens in this arena – it can be used in critical and subversive ways in public debate (2004: 61). This commonly involves a form of deliberate metaphor. In spite – or because – of its deliberate use, a contested metaphorical model keeps exerting power over argumentation and argumentative conclusions, including conscious thought and the political and other actions that follow (2004: 61).

In a later chapter dealing with Europe as a BODY POLITIC, Musolff demonstrates how the use of contested metaphorical models with their pithy, catch-phrase expressions can, over time, become the topic of multi-party discourse. Although he does not point this out, deliberate, possibly conscious metaphor use turns out to be the crucial explanatory factor in this process.

> In the course of the public debate within a discourse community, micro-traditions of metaphor use emerge, in which specific scenarios and special formulations (e.g. *premature birth, being at the heart of Europe, Eurosclerosis, the sick man of Europe*) become the foci of further extensions, variations and reinterpretations. These emerging traditions culminate in `conceptual contests`, in which no major participant in the public debate can afford to remain silent; hence a sudden inflation of tokens for the respective scenarios in the corpus at particular points in the discourse history of that community. Some of these contests become so prominent that they are reported in a neighbouring discourse community (such as the British claims of being *at the heart of Europe* that were commented on in the German media) (2004: 112-3).

Later (2004: 147*ff.*), he develops this into an analysis of what he calls ´metaphor negotiation´. The dynamics of deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor in language, thought, and communication comprise nothing less than a *discourse career of metaphor*, which may best be described with reference to certain cultural and historical boundaries.

The phrase *discourse career of metaphor* is coined, demonstrated, and elaborated in detail in a chapter on the development of the metaphor of the 'European house'. Once again, the composite materials comprise a large number of – clearly deliberate – metaphors requiring processing by

comparison, such as: 'Mikhail Gorbachev´s *Common European House* always raised heckles (*as anyone who has ever shared a flat with a large, aggressive, rather untidy person with little money will understand*)' (2004: 134). Many of these deliberate metaphors express metaphorical models that are contested so intensely that they evolve into their opposite equivalent: the value and attitude they initially represent in political argument gets turned inside out. The 'European house' was launched as a positive image of the European integration project but later became a house whose building plans were seriously flawed. Conscious metaphorical thought enables people to spell out hitherto implicit entailments; in turn, these can be used to criticize the model and either exploit it in another – sometimes even opposite – way or abandon it altogether.

This is how deliberate metaphor affords conscious metaphorical thought, which then facilitates sociocultural interactions – as one would expect deliberate metaphor relates to the general functions of conscious thought described by Baumeister and Masicampo (2010). Not only does this happen with the contested metaphorical models Musolff describes, but also with the time course of official metaphorical models in e.g. education and science, implicit metaphorical models in low and high culture, and emerging metaphorical models in institutional and more private settings (Steen 2011a). This is precisely where the linguistic (or semiotic) dimension of symbolization, the individual (or psychological) dimension of (un)conscious thought, and the interpersonal (or social) dimension of interaction come together, leading to the development of new metaphorical models in discourse; these, in turn, feed into culture, including the macro-domains of science and education, literature and the arts, the mass media, and professional and personal life. They can also feed back into language, individual thought, and social interaction. For this to happen, all these parameters are required in one complex configuration of discourse events. Through these processes, metaphorical models affect the dynamics of culture and history – and, perhaps, even evolution.

5. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY: FROM CONCEPTUAL TO DELIBERATE METAPHOR

For sake of argument, I suggest evaluating CMT in relation to deliberate and conscious metaphor starting from the following challenging supposition: at any moment in recorded modern culture and history, thought-based metaphor begins with deliberate metaphor, which may impinge on consciousness. As I have shown, both deliberate metaphor and its potentially conscious realization may be either quite restricted or extended. Deliberate metaphor need not be new at the moment it is used: it may well involve the revitalization of a familiar linguistic metaphor, or the coining of the novel linguistic expression of a fully conventional metaphor in thought. When this happens, deliberate and conscious metaphor triggers the inferential reasoning at the centre of discussion in cognitive-linguistic treatments of metaphor's cognitive power. However, I have introduced one crucial difference: a substantial number of these metaphorical reasoning processes are conscious not unconscious, and more often deliberate than non-deliberate.

The difference between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor is essential. It allows for diverging – even contradictory – uses of the same conceptual structure that lies dormant beneath linguistically expressed metaphorical ideas (Müller 2008). Comparisons, carried out deliberately, can be pointed in many directions, as illustrated by numerous examples in the domain of political debate.

This theoretical differentiation allows for precise analytic engagement with the dynamics of metaphorical models playing a role in politics, education, science, business, the media, arts, literature, etc. When a particular metaphorical model has been consciously developed through a number of distinct discourse events, the conceptual connections thus created may become conventionalized and automated – and so subsequently available for unconscious use. The extraordinarily fast workings of this process have been demonstrated experimentally by Bowdle and Gentner (2005).

From Baumeister and Masicampo's point of view, the process is predictable (2010: 948): ´conscious thought is for incorporating knowledge and rules for behaviour from culture. Over time, automatic responses then come to be based on that new input´. This is exactly the position George Lakoff has promoted over the past decade in his attempts to influence the American political scene. In *The Political Mind* (2002), he basically acknowledges the need for conscious metaphor use, negotiation, and eventually intervention by means of critical discourse analysis and civic participation, to set up new metaphorical models more apt to deal with current sociocultural interactions than the old ones. He even wants people to do this as a way of renewing their brain structures. This is completely in line with Baumeister and Masicampo's views on the relation between conscious and unconscious thought (2010: 948; see also 2010: 964): 'we agree that the impulse originates in the automatic system. The role of conscious thought is to reshape… and reprogram… those automatic responses through input from culture, as well as to simulate the event mentally before doing it – perhaps also discussing it with real or imagined people.' Conscious metaphorical cognition can change one's experience of the world.

Yet this is not the whole story, because this analysis need not lead to the conclusion that the metaphorical meanings accrued by one or another linguistic expression or conceptual structure via the above processes are always, and automatically, online when metaphor is *not* used deliberately. It is this classic CMT assumption that I would like to question. In Section Three, I hinted at an alternative explanation for the use of these metaphorical structures in language, via shallow processing and lexical disambiguation of metaphorically polysemous terms (see also Steen 2007, 2008, 2011a). Consider the following proposal: the semiotic systems of language and thought indeed display many systematic metaphorical structures, but these involve meaning potential at a semiotic or symbolic level. This systematic meaning potential is abstracted from the semiotics of thousands if not millions of usage events in text and talk. It is psychologically available to individual minds as well as socio-culturally available in such public repositories as dictionaries, encyclopaedias, textbooks, and the cultural canon. At the same time, its psychological and sociocultural instantiation is likely always partial, and not full-fledged representation (Shore 1996). This is why the complete metaphorical

systems are semiotic meaning potentials that are reconstructions. The crux is that these systems are not necessarily activated during language users' unconscious cognitive processing. The full cross-domain mapping potential of any metaphor may remain dormant during regular discourse processing – unused as a cross-domain mapping – simply because people can disambiguate lexical items in fast, shallow fashion, so they do not need to consider underlying conceptual structures. Why would they go to all this trouble if they had the conventionalized metaphorical senses at their immediate disposal, too?

All of this is to suggest that metaphor in language need not give rise to metaphor in thought (in the sense of cognitive processing), as CMT has claimed. Most metaphor in language may be processed in non-metaphorical ways, raising a potential paradox (Steen 2008). A target domain may indeed get partially structured in terms of a source domain over time, as has happened for time in terms of space. This does *not* mean that language pertaining to the target domain is always still understood indirectly, via the source domain. It may be understood directly, by lexical disambiguation or shallow processing. This raises such follow-up questions as whether temporal thinking *without* language requires spatial grounding. Metaphorical models may turn out to be more a matter of semiotic or symbolic reality than individual psychological behaviour. Their metaphorical potential comes to life – is realized and developed – when a particular metaphorical expression or set of expressions (or thought or set of thoughts) is used deliberately – sometimes, but not necessarily, consciously – in a particular discourse context (Müller 2008).

Metaphor in language gives rise to metaphor in thought when it is used deliberately as metaphor – whether or not this turns into conscious metaphorical thought. This alternative account of the power of metaphor raises the question whether its *conceptual* power is as great as Lakoff and other cognitive linguists make it out to be. If people do not activate many metaphorical models during regular discourse processing – unless they are used deliberately – if most metaphor is used non-deliberately, then the effect of metaphor on people's lives may be much smaller than often claimed. Some deliberate metaphor may still have great consequences, or may have *had* great consequences historically; but that is a different research question.

6. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS

I have reviewed CMT's claim that metaphor is a matter of thought by reconsidering the importance of the distinction between unconscious and conscious thought. I have suggested moving the theoretical focus away from metaphor in unconscious thought – CMT's traditional concern – to conscious metaphorical cognition. Framing conscious metaphorical thought in Baumeister and Masicampo's (2010) theory of consciousness, I have argued that conscious metaphor is prompted by available metaphorical structures in thought and language. In general, observable metaphorical thought involves the deliberate use of socially available metaphorical models expressed in language or the deliberate use of linguistically available idea units that can be detected in conceptual propositions. Deliberate metaphor affords the emergence of conscious metaphorical cognition but does not demand it.

The effects of this reconsideration are twofold. First, it foregrounds the need for further work on deliberate metaphor in situated genre events: this is where the social, psychological, and semiotic realities of metaphor come together and find their concrete functional realization. Genre contexts can guide the search for deliberate metaphor's linguistic forms, conceptual structures, and communicative functions and elaborate its relation to non-deliberate metaphor, so that one can meaningfully look at metaphor contests (Musolff 2004); textual positioning and repetition of deliberate metaphor (Semino 2008); deliberate metaphor's interpersonal uptake, development, redeployment, and clustering (Cameron 2007); and metaphor awakening (Müller 2008). Degrees of metaphor awareness in ongoing discourse could then be modelled in current psychological approaches to discourse processing and related to the specifics of functional genre contexts. Such research would provide a new view on the discourse career of metaphor, which could eventually lead to a new account of metaphor's role in culture, history, and evolution. Genre events are likewise the appropriate platform for designing applied studies of metaphor as a tool for intervention – in e.g. product design, knowledge management and organization, human resource management (e.g. workplace bullying: Tracy *et al*., 2006), and ideological critique of politics (Lakoff 2002, 2004, 2008).

Second, the proposed reconsideration takes a fresh look at CMT's claims about the power of metaphor. Contrary to what CMT assumes, the power of metaphor may not lie in its widespread unconscious use but in its much more restricted and targeted deliberate – sometimes conscious – use. If so, then CMT claims about unconscious metaphor use need to be re-examined. Metaphor may largely be a matter of the history of language and thought and not play much of a role in unconscious metaphorical cognition during discourse processing. The arguments put forward in this paper stress the importance of research into the precise nature and function of special groups of metaphors that may be active in unconscious cognition – as metaphors – because they are entrenched in embodied image schemas (Gibbs 2006). They offer specific angles for future research on metaphor that makes constructive but critical use of thirty years' research on CMT.

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