China and Belarus’ High-Quality Collaboration in the Belt and Road Initiative: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects

1.1 Smooth and Efficient Policy Coordination

China and Belarus have established smooth and efficient policy coordination, primarily reflected in three key aspects. First, frequent high-level interactions between the two countries have continuously strengthened bilateral relations. In turn, the high level of political relations has fostered sustained engagement at the leadership level. On December 6, 2005, a joint statement issued by both countries declared that “China-Belarus relations have entered a new stage of comprehensive development and strategic cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2005) In July 2013, during Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s state visit to China. Both sides agreed to establish a comprehensive strategic partnership. In September 2022, the heads of the two states met again and announced the elevation of bilateral ties to an all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership. Second, a multi-level intergovernmental coordination mechanism has been established to facilitate strategic alignment, policy communication, and sectoral cooperation, forming an extensive policy coordination network. The China-Belarus Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee, chaired by vice-premier-level officials, consists of multiple subcommittees and a secretariat. It convenes biennially, issuing meeting minutes and cooperation documents to ensure the effective implementation of agreements reached by national leaders. This institutional framework has served as a long-term mechanism for ensuring the success of bilateral cooperation projects. Third, close collaboration in multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS has contributed to advancing global governance reforms. China has supported Belarus in becoming a full member of the SCO, a partner country of BRICS, and an observer state in the China-Central and Eastern European Cooperation Mechanism. Meanwhile, Belarus has actively backed initiatives such as the integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with the BRI and endorsed several Chinese-led proposals, including strengthening international cooperation on artificial intelligence and establishing an International Day for Dialogue among Civilizations. Belarus has been an active respondent to China’s three global initiatives and has participated in the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Think Tank Forum and the Second “Global South” Think Tank Dialogue, where it co-initiated the establishment of the Global South Think Tanks Alliance (Embassy of China in Belarus 2024).

The efficiency of China-Belarus policy coordination can be attributed to: 1) mutual respect for core interests and a high degree of political trust; 2) alignment of strategic interests, as the BRI complements Belarus’ national development goals; and 3) political systems in both countries, which grant heads of state a central role in foreign policy decision-making. President Xi Jinping places great importance on China-Belarus relations, while President Lukashenko has consistently recognized China’s development model, issuing multiple presidential decrees to enhance bilateral cooperation. Their strong personal relationship and close communication have enabled high-level diplomacy to play a strategic guiding role in policy coordination between the two nations.

1.2 Continuous Deepening of Economic and Trade Cooperation

Since the launch of BRI, trade between China and Belarus has shown steady growth (see Table 1). China has been Belarus’ second-largest trading partner for two consecutive years. According to Belarusian statistics, China-Belarus trade volume reached $7.7 billion in 2023, accounting for approximately 9.22 % of Belarus’ total foreign trade (Zberenovskaya 2024). However, in January–June 2024, bilateral trade declined by 13.2 % year-on-year (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2024), amounting to $3.93 billion. The trade structure between the two countries has continuously improved. Belarus primarily exports potash fertilizers, agricultural products, and food products to China, while China mainly exports vehicles and parts, electrical equipment, machinery, and plastics and plastics products to Belarus. In 2024, container transport volume between China and Belarus increased by 144.3 % year-on-year (Минская областная организация 2024), reflecting strengthened logistics and trade connectivity. Additionally, air connectivity has improved significantly, with Belavia (Belarusian Airlines) launching a direct Minsk–Ürümqi route and Air China opening a Minsk–Xi’an route, further facilitating economic and people-to-people exchanges.

In recent years, China has steadily increased its investment in Belarus (see Table 2), making it the country’s third-largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI). Currently, nearly 100 Chinese enterprises operate in Belarus, with over 50 investment projects, primarily concentrated in Minsk and the Minsk region. At the end of 2023, China’s non-financial direct investment stock in Belarus amounted to USD 793 million (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 2024). Chinese investments in Belarus are mainly focused on infrastructure, automobile and home appliance manufacturing, as well as hotel and residential construction. Key projects include the China-Belarus Industrial Park, the Belarusian National Biotechnology Corporation’s (BNBC) high-tech agro-industrial complex, the Geely Automobile assembly plant, the Beijing Hotel, the “Swan” residential real estate development, and the Midea Group’s small home appliance assembly project.

The China-Belarus Industrial Park is the largest Chinese investment project in Belarus, and represents China’s highest-level and largest overseas economic and trade cooperation zone. It has been recognized as a flagship project and a crown jewel of BRI. As of November 2024, more than 150 enterprises have established operations within the park. The Belarusian National Biotechnology Corporation (BNBC) high-tech agro-industrial complex is a joint initiative supported by preferential loans from Chinese financial institutions, with Chinese enterprises supplying technological equipment and overseeing construction. It is Belarus’ first amino acid production facility and the country’s first grain deep-processing project aimed at generating export revenue and substituting imports. In 2023, BNBC’s sales revenue increased by 60 %, meeting Belarus’ domestic demand for lysine, threonine, and tryptophan, while also exporting 85 % of its products to Russia.

The rapid advancement of China-Belarus economic and trade cooperation is driven by three key factors. First, the two economies exhibit strong complementarities and a mutual need for deeper collaboration. Belarus relies on Chinese capital and advanced technology for industrial upgrading, while also requiring Chinese industrial goods and exporting potash fertilizers and agricultural products to China. Meanwhile, Chinese enterprises seek to expand trade, transfer technology, and generate profits through foreign investment, making bilateral cooperation mutually beneficial. Second, high-level political relations have played a crucial role in fostering economic collaboration, with both sides implementing proactive measures to enhance trade and investment. Initiatives such as the designation of 2021–2023 as the “Years of Regional Cooperation” and 2024–2025 as the “Years of Scientific and Technological Cooperation” have created favorable conditions for expanding economic ties. Third, a strong legal framework supports economic cooperation, ensuring stability and predictability for investors. A significant milestone was the signing of the Agreement on Trade in Services and Investment Between China and Belarus on August 22, 2024, which established high-level mutual openness in services trade, investment, and business personnel mobility, further strengthening the legal foundation for economic collaboration.

1.3 Flourishing People-to-People and Cultural Cooperation

In 2018, China and Belarus signed a mutual visa exemption agreement, greatly facilitating cross-border travel. In 2019, the two countries signed an agreement on mutual recognition of higher education qualifications. In 2023, the China-Belarus University Alliance was established to promote educational cooperation. Interest in Chinese language learning has increased in Belarus, leading to the establishment of seven Confucius Institutes and two Confucius Classrooms, and the inclusion of Chinese in Belarus’ national standardized graduation and university entrance exams. At the same time, Belarusian research centers and Belarusian language instruction have been introduced in multiple Chinese universities. The number of Chinese students studying in Belarus has reached over 13,000. Belarusian people have shown a strong interest in Chinese culture, with both countries establishing cultural centers and organizing events such as “Tourism Year”, “Education Year”, and “Cultural Days”. In 2024, the two sides decided to jointly produce the film Eternal Friendship (《天长地久》） for the first time.

The rapid development of China-Belarus cultural cooperation can be attributed to several factors. First, both countries have shown a strong interest in and appreciation for each other’s culture. Second, similarities exist between their traditional cultures. Due to its unique geopolitical environment and historical background, Belarus has developed a culture of inclusiveness, respecting diverse values and traditions while actively absorbing outstanding elements from other cultures. This aligns closely with China’s traditional values of equality, respect, and openness to different cultural influences. Third, both countries have consistently maintained mutual respect and friendly relations. As former Belarusian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Tozik pointed out, China and Belarus maintain equal status in their bilateral relations, with neither side dominating the other (Tozik et al. 2014). In the course of cooperation, when information asymmetry leads to differences in perception, both sides have been able to resolve these differences through candid communication, continuously deepening cooperation.

2.1 Western Sanctions

Western countries have imposed multiple rounds of sanctions on Belarus, introducing hundreds of restrictive measures which have constrained China-Belarus economic cooperation. In the investment sector, if a Belarusian enterprise or its executives are subjected to Western sanctions, Chinese companies investing in or engaging in projects with them risk secondary sanctions, which could impact their operations in other international markets. This has led some Chinese enterprises to adopt a cautious approach toward increasing investment in Belarus. Since 2022, Western sanctions have led to the withdrawal of several enterprises from the China-Belarus Industrial Park due to the cancellation of orders from European and American markets. Some potential investors have also postponed their entry plans into the park. Notably, Duisburger Hafen AG (Duisport), a German company that held a 0.67 % stake, decided to exit the industrial park and abandon its planned Eurasian railway gateway investment project. In the financial sector, the United States and the EU have disconnected major Belarusian banks – including the Belarusian Agricultural Bank, the Belarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction, and the Belarusian Investment Bank – from the SWIFT international payment system, significantly restricting banking transactions. As a result, Chinese enterprises have encountered difficulties in financial transactions with Belarusian counterparts, as Chinese financial institutions have taken a cautious approach in handling such transactions, often resulting in rejected or returned remittances. In the logistics sector, Western sanctions have severely affected China-Belarus logistics cooperation (Preiherman 2024). Due to restrictive policies on transit transportation imposed by Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Ukraine, China-Belarus trade is now largely dependent on China-Europe freight trains and road transport, leading to higher transportation costs. In the supply chain sector, the EU and Ukraine have banned the import of Belarusian goods, while Belarus has implemented counter-sanctions that prohibit the import of goods and equipment from these countries. This has disrupted Belarus’ access to technology and essential supplies, adding uncertainty to the operation of China-Belarus economic cooperation projects.

2.2 Belarus’ Economic Dependence

Belarus’ economy is characterized by three key factors. First, Western countries have imposed sanctions on Belarus since 1997, restricting its access to capital, technology, and markets from international financial institutions and Western nations. As a result, Belarus has remained partially isolated in foreign economic relations and has relied heavily on Russian funding, low-cost energy, transport channels, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) market. Second, state-owned enterprises account for over 50 % of the economy, and government intervention in economic management remains significant, incorporating elements of a planned economy. Third, Belarus operates a resource-based and export-driven economy, with more than 60 % of its GDP dependent on exports, making it highly vulnerable to fluctuations in external markets. The country relies on imported oil, gas, and raw materials, while its main exports include potash fertilizers, food, agricultural commodities, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, all of which are subject to global market price volatility. The escalation of Western sanctions has caused severe economic fluctuations in Belarus. In response, Belarus has strengthened its alliance with Russia, further increasing its economic dependence on its eastern neighbor. In 2022, Belarus’ GDP contracted by 4.7 % year-on-year (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Belarus 2023). In 2023, the economy recovered slowly, growing by 3.9 % year-on-year (Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Belarus 2024a). From January to September 2024, GDP grew 4.5 % year-on-year. According to Russian statistics, Russia-Belarus trade increased by 6 % from January to August 2024, reaching 2.9 trillion Russian rubles. In addition to supplying Belarus with cheap oil and gas, Russia has provided 105 billion Russian rubles in state loans, and the two countries are currently implementing over 20 joint projects (TASS 2024).

Belarus’ growing dependence on external factors, particularly Russia, has posed challenges toed China-Belarus BRI cooperation. The country’s narrow industrial structure, which relies heavily on raw materials and exports, coupled with Western sanctions limiting access to technology, capital, and markets, has constrained the scope and depth of China-Belarus cooperation, posing challenges to industrial upgrading and economic transformation. Moreover, Belarus’ close economic ties with Russia mean that Russian policies may influence Belarus’ cooperation with China. In BRI-related projects, Belarus must balance its economic interests with Russia, particularly in energy and transportation sectors, where competing interests may lead to complex negotiations which increase the difficulty of collaboration.

2.3 The Unpredictable External Security Environment

Belarus is located at the geopolitical frontline of competition between Russia and the West. As great power rivalries intensify and the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues, Belarus’ external security environment has rapidly deteriorated. NATO views Belarus as an ally in Russia’s military actions against Ukraine and has reinforced its military presence in neighboring countries such as Poland and Lithuania, heightening tensions along Belarus’ borders. President Alexander Lukashenko has warned that the world is on the brink of major geopolitical upheavals, describing Belarus’ situation as precarious, akin to walking on thin ice where a single misstep could lead to national destruction (BELTA 2024). On April 25, 2024, Belarus approved the new version of its National Security Concept and Military Doctrine. The Belarusian government views Western countries, transnational organizations, international financial institutions, and terrorist groups as threats to national security, emphasizing that its top priority is to avoid being drawn into war.

The unpredictability of Belarus’ external security environment has directly weakened its appeal as a business destination, increasing geopolitical and security risks for Chinese enterprises operating in the country. This has led to a decline in investor confidence in long-term projects. In response to external security threats, Belarus may be forced to reallocate policy focus and resources to national defense and security, potentially adjusting its economic policies. Such shifts would alter the policy environment for China-Belarus economic cooperation, further heightening uncertainty in ongoing and future collaborative projects.

2.4 Domestic Political Uncertainty

Western countries have long pursued a policy of pressure against Belarus, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Lukashenko administration and continuously attempting to instigate a so-called “color revolution” within the country. Following the political unrest in 2020, the Belarusian government initiated political reforms, including constitutional amendments and strengthened social governance, gradually stabilizing the political situation. However, risks remain. With Western backing, the Belarusian opposition abroad remains active. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, a self-proclaimed leader of Belarus, has established her own political team and repeatedly called on Belarusian citizens to resist the Lukashenko government. The U.S. Embassy in Belarus has issued multiple statements urging American citizens to leave the country immediately and advising against travel to Belarus. Alexander Volfovich, Secretary of the Belarusian Security Council, has stated that the West, led by the United States, is waging a hybrid war against Belarus and Russia (Volfovich 2023). Meanwhile, a small number of political forces within Belarus oppose the Belarus-Russia alliance, organizing protests and rallies to pressure the government.

Due to the West’s geopolitical tensions with Belarus and its government, China-Belarus cooperation faces risks of external interference from Western countries. They may attempt to undermine cooperation projects through disinformation campaigns, political pressure, and sanctions, potentially influencing public perception in Belarus and obstructing the normal implementation of BRI projects. This creates pressure and uncertainty, which could slow down project execution, affect quality, and increase risks for Chinese enterprises operating in Belarus. Furthermore, Western-backed efforts to promote a so called “color revolution” in Belarus could trigger sudden political upheavals, posing security risks to Chinese enterprises and personnel in the country.

2.5 Complexity of China-Belarus Pragmatic Cooperation

The complexity of China-Belarus pragmatic cooperation is primarily reflected in the following aspects. First, differences in expectations between the two sides. Belarus expects China to provide larger-scale aid, greater investment, and more advanced technology, while also seeking to increase its exports to China. However, China adheres to the principle of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, making decisions based on domestic and international economic conditions. As a result, China’s decisions may not always align with Belarus’ expectations. Second, significant differences in national conditions, culture, legal frameworks, and standards. For instance, Belarusian regulations generally require foreign-invested enterprises to purchase parts and components from either Belarus or the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) market. However, Belarus’ domestic industrial supply chain is underdeveloped, leaving Chinese enterprises in a dilemma – they must either pay high prices for local components or struggle to source the necessary parts locally. Belarus also expects foreign-invested enterprises to contribute to local employment, yet the country faces a shortage of skilled labor, particularly in technical fields. This has resulted in a labor shortage for Chinese enterprises, forcing them to hire skilled workers from China at higher wages. However, this approach is not always well understood or accepted by Belarusian authorities. Additionally, Belarusian business culture is government-led and risk-averse, emphasizing stability and collective interests, which often results in a slow decision-making process. Belarusian society places a strong emphasis on work-life balance, and its labor laws are highly detailed and restrictive regarding overtime work, imposing numerous conditions and limitations on extended working hours.