Gender Pay Gap in the Gig Economy
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Abstract
The rapid ascent of digital platforms and the gig economy has prompted concerns about the gender pay gap. The results show that in the gig economy, gender continues to be a crucial determinant of workers’ earnings, with women earning 85% of what men earn on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, in comparison to the traditional waged employment during the same period, the gender pay gap in the gig economy has narrowed. While some gig jobs (e.g., ride-hailing services, delivery services, online education) exhibit certain occupational segregation, women in gig economy work are no longer concentrated in low-paying roles, thereby challenging the occupational crowding hypothesis prevalent in traditional employment. In the gig economy, the vast majority of the gender pay gaps arise from factors within occupations, and occupational segregation only has a very limited impact on the earnings gap. Additionally, the gender pay gap among platform gig workers can be mostly explained by observable factors, which implies that compared to traditional employment, the gig economy exhibits a lower level of implicit gender discrimination in China. Finally, we investigate new factors that determine the gender pay gap in the gig economy. Women exhibit a stronger aversion to algorithmic control, a preference for job flexibility, and a tendency toward more isolated and less socially interactive work environments—all of which serve to widen the gender pay gap that might have otherwise narrowed. The results of this research suggest that despite the criticisms surrounding the gig economy, it continues to exert a positive influence on China’s labor market.
1 Introduction
The rapid rise of digital platforms has dramatically changed the nature of work, giving rise to a gig economy based on digital platforms. According to the World Bank (2019), one-third of the world’s population has entered the gig economy. There are also tens of millions of workers in China who are working flexibly and independently through various platforms such as Didi, Ele.me, and Douyin (Liu et al., 2022). On the one hand, the platform gig economy promotes employment due to the better detection of temporary job opportunities. On the other hand, it also makes jobs more precarious, which in turn leads to concerns about issues such as workers’ rights and wages (Chen, 2022a), including concerns about potential gender pay gaps (Hunt and Samman, 2019).
Gender wage gap is a long-standing problem in the traditional labor market, and it is also a classic research topic in labor economics (Luo et al., 2019). Unlike traditional 9-to-5 work, the gig economy allows individuals to choose jobs based on their time, skills, and interests, making it easier for women to participate. However, new gender inequalities may arise due to differences in the ability of both genders to adapt to changes in the way they work and the impacts they are exposed to. Therefore, the question raised in this paper is: Is there a gender pay gap in the gig economy? At present, there are few relevant studies on this issue.
Based on a unique dataset, this paper examines the gender pay gap in Chinses gig economy and attempts to answer a series of important questions: What are the characteristic facts of the gender pay gap in China’s gig economy? Compared with traditional waged employment, has the gender pay gap in the gig economy widened or narrowed? After controlling for a series of observable factors such as age, education, experience, job characteristics, does the gender pay gap still exist? Is the gender pay gap different across jobs and occupations? Is there occupational segregation by gender? To what extent can inter- and intra-occupational factors, observable and non-observable factors, explain the gender pay gap in the gig economy? What are the new factors that play significant roles in the gender pay gap in the gig economy? The answers to these questions can not only provide new insights into the new forms of employment in our country, but also provide valuable insights into narrowing the gender pay gap.
2 Literature Review
In the existing literature, almost all the research on the gender pay gap in China focuses on the traditional employment field (Luo et al., 2019). Most of these literatures use urban labor force samples to estimate the gender income ratio (= female income/ male income) between 0.66~0.94, and the vast majority of them are about 0.8. The becomposition of implicit discrimination, i.e., the contribution of unobservable factors to the gender pay gap, is basically above 60%. In contrast, there are few studies on the gender pay gap in China’s gig economy, and the only relevant study available is Chen (2022b). The research found that female doctors on the “Chunyu Doctor” health consultation platform charged 2.5% less than male doctors, and received 12.5% fewer consultation requests than male doctors, which was related to the platform’s ranking algorithm.
Different from China, there is a large number of relevant research literature in the world. Their views can be summarized in five areas. First, many scholars believe that the gig economy can help narrow the gender pay gap (Goldin, 2014; Weinberg and Kapelner, 2018; Churchill and Craig, 2019). The platform pursues the flexibility of employment, and the design of microtasks and microjobs can not only enrich the work content, but also greatly improve the tradability of the work. The new way of working allows for a deorganized work arrangement and more freedom and flexibility in when and where to work (Dong, 2022). Studies have shown that women’s lack of job flexibility is one of the main sources of gender pay gap (Cubas et al., 2019), and that is why the disadvantages of female workers should be reduced when work is more flexible. In addition, the platform can use big data technology and massive information about employee salary to design algorithms that can help increase pay transparency to address the gender pay gap caused by information asymmetry in pay negotiations (Kässi and Lehdonvirta, 2016; Schneider, 2017). Studies have also shown that for most women, especially in less developed regions, the gig economy expands employment opportunities and pushes them into the labor market, increasing the likelihood that women’s skills will be matched to jobs (Galperin and Greppi, 2019). According to a report by Hyperwallet in 2017, a U.S. payment platform, 86% of female platform workers believe that flexible gig work helps them balance family, childcare and work. This literature implies that the rise of the gig economy has helped to narrow the gender pay gap.
Second, there is some literature that argues that the gig economy is neither gender-neutral nor represents women’s emancipation. Long-standing gender inequality and gender pay gap will persist and be reinforced in the gig economy (Hunt and Samman, 2019). Platforms do not operate independently of society, they arise from socializing in ways that interact with each other economically, as well as gendered and racialized socializing (Woodcock and Graham, 2019). The discriminatory ideas in the human mind can easily be influenced by algorithms, consciously or unconsciously, and eventually form algorithmic discrimination. Moreover, it is an automated process of discrimination, making it more difficult to identify and judge (Carmichael et al., 2016). Studies have shown that women are more susceptible to the adverse effects of gender-biased algorithms and platform design, leading to various forms of gender discrimination in the gig economy (Cook et al., 2021) and gender-occupational segregation (Churchill and Craig, 2019). However, the literature does not seem to strongly support that the gender pay gap will be further widened.
Third, empirical evidence from countries suggests that there is a gender pay gap in the gig economy, but to varying degrees. Cook et al. (2021) used data from more than 1 million ride-hailing drivers on the Uber platform to find a significant 7% difference in hourly wages between male and female drivers, which is much smaller than the gender wage gap in the traditional economy (according to the Women’s Law Center of America, the gender wage pay gap in the United States in 2021 was about 20%). Liang et al. (2018) analyzed IT freelancers on the Freelancer platform and found that the average hourly wage for female workers was 81.4% of that of men. The study of workers on other online crowdsourcing platforms similarly found a significant gender pay gap.
Fourth, the gender pay gap in the gig economy is partly due to the continuation of traditional factors. Education, experience, occupational segregation, negotiation skills and gender discrimination are all traditional factors that influence the gender pay gap. Studies have shown that the impact of these traditional factors has been passed on from offline to online. Some professions, such as ride-hailing, food delivery riders, and program development, are globally male-dominated (Galperin, 2021), so there is still gender segregation in some occupations of the gig economy. Of course, the role of some traditional factors may be changing, for instance, Herrmann et al. (2023) found that higher education is neither important for providing the necessary skills for gig workers, nor does it increase the hourly wage rate for gig workers.
Finally, there are new factors in the gig economy that contribute to the gender pay gap. First, algorithmic bias. Platforms use algorithms to control how people experience online, including controlling workers’ labor processes (Woodcock et al., 2019; Chen, 2022a), and there is a possibility that the algorithm is gender-biased. Algorithms may be gender-biased, for example, algorithm-controlled online advertisements favor men, and job advertisements related to science and engineering are more likely to target male job seekers (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2019). Customers’ bias against women can also be amplified by the platform’s scoring and ranking algorithms, making women rank low in searches (Chen, 2022b). Second, women’s preference for job flexibility. Employers, clients, and workers all seek job flexibility (Woodcock and Graham, 2019), but women generally prefer job flexibility more than men, and job flexibility often comes at the cost of lost income. Female Uber drivers place more emphasis on flexibility in working hours and locations than male drivers, and the gender pay gap among drivers is associated with this (Hall and Krueger, 2018; Cook et al., 2021). Offline and online communities help platform workers share experiences, exchange success stories, and gain new knowledge or useful information with each other, thereby increasing productivity (Xia et al., 2023), which can help improve their income. Female gig workers are often less likely than men to participate in online or offline community activities, which may be a source of income disadvantage.
3 Data and Feature Facts
3.1 Data introduction
The dataset used in this paper is based on a survey of platform workers jointly conducted by South China University of Technology and Xinbao Technology Enterprises. The survey was conducted in April-July 2021, covering 31 provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) in the mainland, as well as Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and the survey subjects covered 21 occupations such as food delivery riders, ride-hailing drivers, freelance photographers, online anchors, freelance lawyers, self-media experts, online education and training. According to the subject of the study, the raw data are processed as follows: Only practitioners who are not less than 16 years old and whose place of work is in the mainland are retained, and 10110 samples are finally obtained. Merge similar occupations (e.g., freelance copywriters, web novel writers, and freelance translators into an online content service) to increase the sample size of specific categories of occupations. In the end, 21 occupations are merged into 14 types, namely ride-hailing services, home delivery services, delivery services, community group buying, online education, live broadcasting, program development, self-media authors, online content services, art creation, online consulting, micro-business, independent entrepreneurship, and other occupations. Of these, the first four are “geographically tethered work” because they require a specific geographic location to do it. The last three are “platform management work”, that is, using the platform as the carrier for entrepreneurship. The rest are “cloud work” which can be done online and not constrained by geospatial.
3.2 Main Variables
The variable we focus on the most is the monthly income of platform workers, identified by the question “What is your average gross income per month?”. There are fifteen income ranges for the answer options to this question, and the upper and lower bounds of each range are detailed in note (a) of Table 1. Gender is the key explanatory variable as well as a dummy variable, with respondents being female=1 and male=0. We are also concerned about other factors that may affect income, including individual characteristics, individual economic status, individual social behavior, and individual work-related situations. See Table 1 for details.
Description of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
| Variable | A brief description of the variable | N | Mean | S.D. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monthly income | 1~15 indicates 15 income rangesa | 10110 | 3.565 | 2.203 | 1 | 15 |
| Gender | Female = 1, Male = 0 | 10110 | 0.412 | 0.492 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 2021–Year of Birth (years) | 10110 | 27.25 | 7.043 | 16 | 68 |
| Household registration | Urban = 1, Rural = 0 | 10110 | 0.621 | 0.485 | 0 | 1 |
| Length of education | Years of National Education (years) | 10110 | 14.900 | 2.095 | 6 | 22 |
| Marital status | Married = 1, Other (Unmarried/Divorced/Other) = 0 | 10110 | 0.427 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Native or not | Yes = 1, No = 0 | 10110 | 0.523 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Self-rated health | 1~4 grades, higher grades and healthier | 10110 | 3.157 | 0.696 | 1 | 4 |
| Owner-occupied housing | Yes=1, None=0 | 10110 | 0.466 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| The amount to be repaid each month | 0~5 indicates six repayment amount rangesb | 10110 | 0.923 | 1.036 | 0 | 5 |
| Participate in offline communities | Participate = 1, otherwise = 0 | 10110 | 0.619 | 0.486 | 0 | 1 |
| Participate in online communities | Participate = 1, otherwise = 0 | 10110 | 0.708 | 0.455 | 0 | 1 |
| Invest in your own assets | 0~6 indicates seven investment amount rangesc | 10110 | 2.542 | 1.745 | 0 | 6 |
| Full-time gig workers or not | Full-time = 1, part-time = 0 | 10110 | 0.577 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| The work is introduced by acquaintances | Yes=1, No=0 | 10110 | 0.520 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Time in office | 1~7 represents seven time length intervalsd | 10110 | 3.716 | 1.686 | 1 | 7 |
| Onboarding | 0~4 indicates five time length intervalse | 10110 | 2.018 | 1.374 | 0 | 4 |
| Whether or not an employment contract has been signed | Yes = 1, No = 0 | 10110 | 0.108 | 0.311 | 0 | 1 |
| Whether or not a labor contract has been signed | Yes = 1, No = 0 | 10110 | 0.180 | 0.384 | 0 | 1 |
| Whether or not to sign a cooperation agreement | Yes = 1, No = 0 | 10110 | 0.421 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Whether or not to pay social security | Yes = 1, No = 0 | 10110 | 0.837 | 0.370 | 0 | 1 |
| Hours of work per day: <4H | Work < 4 hours per day, yes=1, no=0 | 10110 | 0.206 | 0.404 | 0 | 1 |
| Hours of work per day: 4–8H | Work 4~8 hours a day, yes=1, no=0 | 10110 | 0.436 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Hours of work per day: 8–12H | Work 8~12 hours a day, yes=1, no=0 | 10110 | 0.327 | 0.469 | 0 | 1 |
| Hours of work per day: >12H | Work > 12 hours per day, yes=1, no=0 | 10110 | 0.031 | 0.173 | 0 | 1 |
| Number of days worked per week | Number of working days per week (days) | 10110 | 4.675 | 1.737 | 1 | 7 |
| Work pressure | 1~5 grades, the higher the grade, the greater the pressure | 10110 | 2.931 | 1.125 | 1 | 5 |
Note: (a) The fifteen income ranges are 1=2500 yuan and below, 2=2500~5000 yuan, 3=5000~7500 yuan, 4=7500~10000 yuan, 5=10000~12500 yuan, 6=12500~15000 yuan, 7=15000~17500 yuan, 8=17500~20000 yuan, 9=20000~25000 yuan, 10=25000~30000 yuan, 11=30000~35000 yuan, 12=35000~40000 yuan, 13=40000~45000 yuan, 14=45000~50000 yuan, 15=50000 yuan and above. (b) The six ranges of bank loan amount to be repaid each month are 0=no loan, 1=less than 3000 yuan, 2=3000~5000 yuan, 3= 5000~10000 yuan, 4=10000~30000 yuan, 5= more than 30000 yuan. (c) In platform work, the amount of assets invested by the workers themselves is divided into seven intervals, 0 = no input, 1 = less than 1000 yuan, 2=1000~3000 yuan, 3=3000~5000 yuan, 4=5000~10000 yuan, 5=10000~30000 yuan, 6 = more than 30000 yuan; (d) the length of time the worker is engaged in the current job is divided into seven intervals, 1 = less than 3 months, 2 = 3 ~ 6 months, 3 = 6 ~ 9 months, 4 = 9 ~ 12 months, 5 = 1 ~ 3 years, 6 = 3 ~ 5 years, 7 = more than 5 years. (e) The orientation training time of workers is divided into five sections, 0=no training, 1=1 day training, 2=1~3 days of training, 3=3~5 days of training, and 4=5 days of training.
3.3 Statistical Facts
Table 1 provides descriptive statistical results for the variables covered in this paper. First of all, the average value of the monthly income variable is 3.565, that is, the average monthly income of workers is in the middle of 5000~7500 yuan (corresponding to about 6412 yuan). Further statistics show that more than two-thirds (68.12%) of workers have an income of more than 5000 yuan. In 2021, the average annual wage of urban non-private sector employees was 106837 yuan (i.e., 8903 yuan/month) and the average annual wage of private sector employees was 62884 yuan (i.e., 5240 yuan/ month) released by the National Bureau of Statistics., and the monthly income of platform workers is lower than the former and higher than that of the latter.
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of gender income in different intervals, showing a visual comparison of gender pay gaps. It can be seen that more than 95% of both men and women earn less than 20000 yuan (20K). Among them, women’s income is more inclined to the left, with the highest frequency in the [2500,5000] yuan range, while men’s income is relatively far to the right, with the highest frequency in the [5000,7500] yuan range. The KS test (P<0.01) showed that there are significant differences in income distribution between the gender. From the mean value of the interval scale, the male value is 3.735 (about 6837 yuan), which is significantly higher than the female 3.323 (about 5807 yuan), and the income gap is 1030 yuan (P<0.01).

Distribution of Monthly Income of Workers in the Gig Economy by Gender
According to the 2021 China Workplace Gender Pay Gap Report by the BOSS Zhipin Research Institute, the gender wage ratio of urban workers in China in 2021 was 0.77, that is, the monthly salary of women was 77% of that of men, which is comparable in time. In addition, the period comparable is the 2021 CGSS data mentioned earlier, in which the annual income of men is 76796 yuan (equivalent to 6399 yuan per month), the annual income of women is 50844 yuan (equivalent to 4237 yuan per month), and the ratio of female income to male income is 0.66. According to the survey data of this paper, the proportion of women’s monthly income to men’s monthly income in the gig economy is 5807 yuan/6837 yuan = 0.85, which is higher than 0.8, 0.77 or 0.66. This means that the gender pay gap in the new employment form of the gig economy has narrowed compared with the traditional employment form, especially when compared with the data of the same period.
4 Regression Analysis: Controlling for the Impact of Observables
4.1 Regression Model Setting
Does gender still have a significant impact on income after controlling for observables? For this reason, the regression model is set as follows:
Among them, the explained variable ln(Incomei) is the logarithm of the monthly income of individual i, and Female is the core explanatory variable, that is, the gender dummy variable (female=1). Xi is the individual characteristics and the work characteristics of i (e.g., working hours). Some characteristics (e.g., education, health, work) may be inherently gender-influenced, so they are undesirable control variables, and their inclusion in the controls may underestimate or overestimate the gender pay gap. However, we are concerned with not only the gender pay gap, but also whether the impact of gender on income (direct or unobservable) persists after individual income is explained by observable characteristics. We still try to control for more observable features, even though they may be affected by gender. In addition, IND is an occupation-fixed effect, and PRV is a region-based fixed effect, which excludes the income gap caused by individuals working in different occupations and regions. ϵi is a random perturbation term.
4.2 Benchmark Model Estimation Results
Monthly income is interval rather than continuous, and the appropriate estimation method is interval regression.[1] Table 2 shows the benchmark model estimates. Column (1) does not have any control variables. Column (2) controls for relatively independent and exogenous factors such as age, household registration, and whether or not they are local. Column (3) further controls for observable individual characteristics. Column (4) further controls for observable work characteristics (although these may not be qualified control variables). First, the regression coefficients of the gender variables in each column are significantly negative, and the qualitative results are consistent. Using column (4) as the benchmark result, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and work characteristics, the monthly income of women in the gig economy is still significantly lower than that of men by about 10.8%. In other words, more than half of the income gap between the gender can be explained by observable characteristics. These results support the idea that gender pay gap still exist in gig work, even after controlling for observables.
Baseline Estimates (Explained Variable: Monthly Income)
| Model number | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gender: Female = 1 | –0.197*** | –0.203*** | –0.158*** | –0.108*** |
| (0.029) | (0.026) | (0.019) | (0.015) | |
| Age (years) | 0.138*** | 0.084*** | 0.059*** | |
| (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.009) | ||
| Age squared/100 | –0.188*** | –0.115*** | –0.085*** | |
| (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.013) | ||
| Household registration: town = 1 | 0.211*** | 0.085*** | 0.063*** | |
| (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.011) | ||
| Native: Yes=1 | –0.012 | –0.029* | –0.038*** | |
| (0.021) | (0.017) | (0.014) | ||
| Years of education (years) | 0.045*** | 0.040*** | ||
| (0.004) | (0.004) | |||
| Marital status: married = 1 | 0.062*** | 0.022 | ||
| (0.017) | (0.017) | |||
| Self-rated health: (1~4) | 0.056*** | 0.026** | ||
| (0.010) | (0.010) | |||
| Owner-occupied housing: Yes = 1 | 0.225*** | 0.161*** | ||
| (0.016) | (0.014) | |||
| Monthly repayment amount | 0.098*** | 0.074*** | ||
| (0.012) | (0.011) | |||
| Participate in offline communities: Yes = 1 | 0.152*** | 0.058*** | ||
| (0.019) | (0.013) | |||
| Participate in an online community: Yes = 1 | 0.099*** | 0.040*** | ||
| (0.014) | (0.013) | |||
| Self-provided asset investment | 0.093*** | |||
| (0.005) | ||||
| Full-time gig worker: Yes=1 | –0.020 | |||
| (0.014) | ||||
| The job is introduced by an acquaintance: yes = 1 | 0.022** | |||
| (0.010) | ||||
| Time in occupation | 0.064*** | |||
| (0.005) | ||||
| Onboarding | 0.018*** | |||
| (0.004) | ||||
| Sign an employment contract: Yes = 1 | 0.054** | |||
| (0.023) | ||||
| Signing a labor contract: Yes = 1 | 0.077*** | |||
| (0.019) | ||||
| Sign a cooperation agreement: Yes = 1 | 0.083*** | |||
| (0.017) | ||||
| Insurance: Yes = 1 | 0.157*** | |||
| (0.023) | ||||
| Work 4–8H every day | –0.026 | |||
| (0.020) | ||||
| Work 8–12H every day | –0.002 | |||
| (0.019) | ||||
| Work more than 12H every day | 0.053 | |||
| (0.046) | ||||
| Number of working days per week (days) | 0.018*** | |||
| (0.004) | ||||
| Working Pressure: (1~5) | –0.036*** | |||
| (0.006) | ||||
| Constant terms | 8.821*** | 6.644*** | 6.289*** | 6.390*** |
| (0.018) | (0.189) | (0.157) | (0.175) | |
| Occupational fixed effect | N | N | Y | Y |
| Regional fixed effects | N | Y | Y | Y |
| Log psedudolikelihood | –20003.677 | –19107.512 | –18291.772 | –17441.005 |
| Wald Chi^2 | 46.500 | 927.760 | 5520.610 | 9355.450 |
| N | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 |
Note: All models are estimated using interval regression. Values in parentheses are the robust standard error of clustered at the municipal level. ***, **, * indicate significant at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Unless otherwise specified, the same for the following tables.
The coefficients of the other control variables are not the focus of our attention, and most of them represent only correlations, but they can still be meaningfully interpreted. According to the results of column (2)~(4), the age and income of the gig workers show a significant inverted U-shaped relationship, and it is estimated that the peak income appears around 35~36 years old, which coincides with the “35-year-old phenomenon” in the traditional employment market. The income of urban workers with household registration is significantly higher than that of rural households by 6.3%, which is consistent with the existing literature in the field of traditional employment (Yu and Chen, 2012; Wu et al., 2015). The estimated coefficient of years of education suggests that an individual’s monthly income will increase significantly by 4% for each additional year of education. This is in line with the classic assertion of labor economics that education contributes to income growth, and also implies that educating human capital may still be important for income in the gig economy, rather than as found by Herrmann et al. (2023) that education is no longer important for income in the gig economy. However, compared with the Asian average of 9.6% and the global average of 10.1% (Psacharopoulos, 1994) and the average rate of return to education of migrants in China (6.66% in 2017) (Yang and Wang, 2021), the role of education in the gig economy on income seems to be less than that of traditional employment. Social relationships and social capital still have an important impact on income in the gig economy, and workers’ participation in online or offline communities, as well as employment through acquaintances, have a significant positive impact on their income. In terms of job characteristics, workers are required to invest more self-owned assets, work more days per week, sign labor or work contracts/agreements, and enjoy social insurance, all of which are significantly positively related to higher monthly income. However, there is a significant negative correlation between work stress and income. There is no significant difference in income between the two types of full-time and part-time platform workers, and the regression coefficient is also small (–0.020). This is easier to understand from the perspective of labor market equilibrium, since the entry or exit platform is relatively free, then after controlling for other factors, there should not be a large income gap between full-time and part-time workers.
We also did some heterogeneity analysis, and the basic conclusions are: In the three categories of platform jobs, such as platform management jobs, geographically bound jobs, and cloud jobs, women’s earnings are significantly lower than men’s, but in more subdivided occupations, they are different. In most occupations, including platform self-employment, online ride-hailing, delivery services, community group buying, self-media, online education, and content creation, women’s income is significantly lower than that of men. In a few occupations, such as live streaming, home service, online counseling, program development, and art creation, the gap between women’s income and men’s income is not statistically significant, and even women in the first two occupations (live streaming and home service) have slightly higher income than men (although statistically not significant). This shows that although women’s income is significantly lower than that of men in the gig economy, there is also a heterogeneity effect in different occupations, and the gender pay gap is also different for different occupations and jobs.
5 Counterfactual Projections of Career Entry and Pay Gap Decomposition
Will gender occupational segregation be reproduced in the new form of employment in the gig economy? What is the relative importance of intra- and inter-occupational factors in explaining the gender pay gap? This section answers the first question with counterfactual projections of occupational entry and the second with pay gap decomposition.
5.1 Is There Occupational Segregation in the Gig Economy: A Counterfactual Prediction of Occupational Entry
Through counterfactual analysis, the basic idea of gender occupational segregation in the gig economy is as follows: Firstly, the multiple discrete choice mlogit model is used to estimate the probability of the two gender entering different occupations. Then, according to the coefficient of the male occupation acquisition equation, combined with female characteristics, the occupational distribution of a woman is predicted if she becomes a man. Finally, comparing the actual occupational distribution of women with the counterfactual predicted occupational distribution, if there is a gap between the two, it indicates that women have experienced preferential treatment or discrimination when entering the workplace. In the same way, the actual occupational distribution of men and the counterfactual predicted occupational distribution can be examined to determine the preferential treatment or discrimination that men experience when entering the workplace. Table 3 shows the structural gap between men and women in terms of career access. Among the four professions of ride-hailing, home delivery service, delivery service, and program development, men are more engaged (preferential) and women are less engaged (discriminated against). In the other ten occupations, including online education, live broadcasting, community group buying, self-media authors, online content creation, art creation, online consulting, micro-business, self-employment, women are more engaged (preferential) and men are less engaged (discriminated against). The above occupational distribution characteristics are similar to those found by Galperin (2021). We can conclude that the occupational segregation of gender in the gig economy is relatively prominent in the three occupations of ride-hailing, delivery service, and online education, and is not prominent in most other occupations. We have also tried to calculate the structural disparities in occupational access between the genders using the occupational distribution of non-discrimination as a reference point, and the results are generally consistent with Table 3.
Actual and Counterfactual Occupational Distribution of Male and Female Workers (%)
| Female | Male | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Occupational distribution | The distribution of facts as female | The counterfactual distribution as male | Gap | The distribution of facts as male | The counterfactual distribution as female | Gap |
| Ride-hailing services | 6.14 | 17.43 | 11.29 | 18.20 | 7.03 | –11.18 |
| Home service | 1.25 | 1.38 | 0.13 | 1.39 | 1.25 | –0.14 |
| Delivery services | 12.39 | 24.10 | 11.71 | 24.14 | 12.97 | –11.16 |
| Online education | 18.72 | 9.68 | –9.04 | 9.52 | 18.73 | 9.21 |
| live broadcast | 3.93 | 3.00 | –0.94 | 3.23 | 4.32 | 1.09 |
| Community group buying | 3.80 | 3.07 | –0.73 | 3.27 | 3.92 | 0.65 |
| Program development | 2.06 | 5.87 | 3.81 | 6.25 | 2.53 | –3.72 |
| Self-media author | 8.19 | 8.12 | –0.07 | 8.34 | 8.49 | 0.15 |
| Online content creation | 10.14 | 5.69 | –4.45 | 5.65 | 10.36 | 4.70 |
| Artistic creation | 7.93 | 5.80 | –2.12 | 5.91 | 8.41 | 2.50 |
| Online consultation | 0.89 | 0.71 | –0.18 | 0.64 | 0.82 | 0.18 |
| Micro-business | 8.49 | 4.33 | –4.16 | 3.84 | 7.26 | 3.43 |
| Self-employed | 9.41 | 7.14 | –2.27 | 6.49 | 8.48 | 1.99 |
| Other occupations | 6.67 | 3.71 | –2.96 | 3.14 | 5.43 | 2.30 |
Note: Gap = Counterfactual Prediction Distribution Probability-Actual Distribution Probability, which indicates that the probability that an individual of a particular gender will actually enter an occupation is higher (negative gap for female, preferential treatment) or lower (positive gap for female, discriminated against) because of their gender.
According to the traditional “occupational crowding” hypothesis (Bergmann, 1971), occupations with high status, high income, and prestige are mostly occupied by men, and female workers are often crowded in occupations with low wages, low social status, and low professional prestige. This hypothesis no longer seems to hold true in the gig economy. Figure 2 plots the average income bracket for each occupation (represented by bars), as well as the average income bracket for men and women (represented by solid and dashed lines, respectively), with the horizontal axis being the average income bracket (3.565, equivalent to 6412 yuan). Taking online education as the boundary (online education income is almost equal to the average income), 7 occupations on the left have a higher than average monthly income and can be defined as high-income occupations, and 6 occupations on the right, such as community group buying, have a lower monthly income than average and can be defined as low-income occupations.

Comparison of Gender Concentration and Average Monthly Earnings by Occupation
Note: The bars in the figure represent the average income levels of each occupation (sorted by occupational income level from high to low they are: 1.online consultation, 2. program development, 3. live broadcast, 4.art creation, 5.self-media authors, 6. independent enterpreneurship, 7. ride-hailing, 8. online education, 9.community group buying, 10. online content services, 11. delivery services, 12. micro-business, 13. home delivery services, 14. other occupations), and the horizontal axis is the average income level of all occupations. The color of the bar corresponds to the concentration of entry between the genders, with dark colors representing occupations where men are more concentrated and light colors representing occupations where women are more concentrated. The black solid line indicates the average income bracket for men, and the grey line indicates the average income bracket for women.
From Figure 2, the following characteristic facts can be obtained: (1) Neither men nor women are more concentrated in high- or low-income occupations. Concentrated entry and insufficient entry are scattered in occupations with different incomes, so the traditional “occupational crowding hypothesis” no longer holds. (2) Men are more concentrated in a few occupations (the dark bars corresponded to the occupations in Figure 2), while women are more concentrated in most occupations (the occupations corresponding to the light bars in Figure 2). The gender pay gap in which women earn lower exists in low- and middle-income occupations, and in some occupations the gap is even larger. This shows that although the gig economy has “broken” the occupational crowding hypothesis, there is still a prominent phenomenon of “unequal pay for equal work” within the occupation, and this phenomenon mainly exists in low- and middle-income occupations. The gender pay gap in the gig economy may not primarily come from occupational segregation, but from gender pay gap within occupations.
5.2 The Relative Importance of Each Factor to Pay Gap: Decomposition of Pay Gap
In order to evaluate the importance of different factors on the gender pay gap in the gig economy, the income gap is decomposed by using Appleton decomposition method. Table 4 gives the results of the decomposition: The proportion of intra-occupational income gap in the total income gap is as high as 91.88%. The part of intra-occupation that can be explained (by age, years of education, household registration) accounted for 54.28%. The gap in the unexplainable part of intra-occupation is 37.6%. This gap stems from the unobservable preferential treatment of men (16.95%) on the one hand, and the unobservable discrimination against women (20.65%) on the other hand. The inter-occupational income gap accounted for only 8.12% of the total income gap. This is consistent with the intuitive results in Figure 2 above, in which intra-occupational factors are the main source of gender pay gaps, and the influence of inter-occupational factors is very limited.
Appleton Decomposition Results
| Decomposition terms | Platform Worker Survey Data (2021) | China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS) 2021 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Pay gap | (2) Percentage of total gap | (3) Pay gap | (4) Percentage of total gap | |
| Intra-occupational pay gap (①+②+③): | –0.3790 | 91.88 | –0.5346 | 98.58 |
| ①Income gap determined by the observable characteristics of an individual | –0.2239 | 54.28 | –0.1196 | 22.05 |
| ②Intra-occupational implicit preference for men | –0.0699 | 16.95 | –0.1719 | 31.70 |
| ③ Intra-occupational implicit discrimination against women | –0.0852 | 20.65 | –0.2431 | 44.83 |
| Inter-occupational Gap (④+⑤+⑥+⑦): | –0.0335 | 8.12 | –0.0077 | 1.42 |
| ④Inter-occupational gap caused by male observable characteristics | –0.0047 | 1.14 | –0.0024 | 0.44 |
| Explode items | Platform Worker Survey Data (2021) | China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS) 2021 | ||
| (1) Pay gap | (2) Percentage of total gap | (3) Pay gap | (4) Percentage of total gap | |
| ⑤Inter-occupational gap caused by female observable characteristics | –0.0146 | 3.54 | –0.0015 | 0.28 |
| ⑥Inter-occupational implicit preference for men | 0.007 | –1.70 | –0.0703 | 12.96 |
| ⑦Inter-occupational implicit preference for women | –0.0212 | 5.14 | 0.0665 | –12.26 |
| Total explainable pay gap (①+④+⑤) | –0.2432 | 58.96 | –0.1235 | 22.77 |
| Total unexplained pay gap (②+③+⑥+⑦) | –0.1693 | 41.04 | –0.4188 | 77.23 |
| Total | –0.4125 | 100 | –0.5423 | 100 |
Note: The CGSS data in columns (3) and (4) in 2021 are comparable in time with the platform worker survey data in this paper, and the same or similar regression control variables as the platform worker survey data are used in the decomposition work. The logarithm of revenue in CGSS data is taken.
In the last two items of Table 4, the explainable income gap accounts for 58.96% and the unexplained income gap accounts for 41.04%. Academics often classify the latter as implicit discrimination. This means that the income gap caused by implicit discrimination in the gig economy accounts for about 40%, which is much lower than the estimated results in China’s traditional employment patterns. The proportion of unexplained income gap in the existing literature is basically not lower than 60% (Luo et al., 2019), let alone less than 40%. We should also note that there is a question of comparability between different data sources, different time periods, and different disaggregation methods. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 provide the results of the same decomposition of CGSS2021 data that are relatively more comparable in terms of both time and control variables. It can be seen that the unexplained gender pay gap in the CGSS data accounts for 77.23%. In summary, it can be concluded that implicit gender discrimination still exists in the gig economy, but it is much better than that of traditional employment.
6 A Test of the New Determinants of Gender Pay Gap in the Gig Economy
As mentioned above, there are at least three new and different factors affecting gender pay gap in the gig economy: algorithmic bias, women’s preference for job flexibility, and more atomic work organization. We attempt to conduct a preliminary examination of the mechanism of action of these new determinants. Algorithmic bias is difficult to measure, so we construct “algorithmic control” dummy variables as proxy indicators of algorithmic bias. If the individual needs to rely on the platform to engage in work (referring to the business matchmaking by the platform, and has an economic relationship with the platform such as fees and commission payments), the individual’s labor service process is easily managed and supervised by the platform algorithm, and the degree of control by the algorithm is higher, so the algorithm control is assigned a value of 1. On the contrary, if the individual’s work does not need to rely on the platform and the control by the platform algorithm is low, the algorithm control is assigned a value of 0. The individual’s preference for flexible work, identified by the questionnaire “Why did you choose to work as a freelancer?” If the individual’s answer includes “flexible working hours and locations”, it indicates that they have a preference for work flexibility, the value is assigned to 1, otherwise the value is 0. Atomized organization of work involves workers working more distributed, more independent, or more isolated. The “professional networking” indicator is constructed using whether the worker participates in the offline community of the same occupation as the proxy indicator, and the participation in the offline community is assigned a value of 1, otherwise it is 0.
The mechanism test is to include proxy indicators, gender, and the interaction between the two into the regression. The focus is on coefficients and symbols of the interaction terms, as we are concerned with the pay gap between male and female workers, not their income level. The results in Table 5 show that women are more averse to algorithmic control, but if they accept higher algorithmic control, it is beneficial to increase women’s wages. Women prefer flexibility at work, but at the same time face a “flexibility penalty”. Women are less likely to participate in professional networking, which contributes to higher wages. These results support that algorithmic bias, women’s preference for higher job flexibility, and less professional networking play a significant role in gender pay gap.
Role Test of New Determinants
| Algorithmic control | Flexibility preference | Offline professional networking | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model number | (1) Algorithmic control | (2) Monthly income | (3) Work flexibility | (4) Monthly income | (5) Professional networking | (6) Monthly income |
| Estimation methodology | Probit | Interval regression | Probit | Interval regression | Probit | Interval regression |
| Gender: Female = 1 | –0.042*** | –0.171*** | 0.062*** | –0.071*** | –0.080*** | –0.149*** |
| (0.008) | (0.031) | (0.010) | (0.025) | (0.010) | (0.020) | |
| Algorithmic control | –0.067*** | |||||
| (0.020) | ||||||
| Gender×Agorithmic control | 0.082** | |||||
| (0.032) | ||||||
| Work flexibility | 0.081*** | |||||
| (0.019) | ||||||
| Gender×Work flexibility | –0.057** | |||||
| (0.025) | ||||||
| Professional networking | 0.030* | |||||
| (0.014) | ||||||
| Gender×Professional networking | 0.066*** | |||||
| (0.022) | ||||||
| Other control variables | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.170 | 0.059 | 0.072 | |||
| Log psedudolikelihood | –4609.683 | –17434.554 | –5933.169 | –17427.049 | –6235.764 | –17436.914 |
| Wald Chi^2 | 9305.480 | 9847.050 | 9060.490 | |||
| N | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 | 10110 |
Note: Models (1), (3) and (5) are Probit estimates, and the control variables include age, age squared/100, household registration, natives, years of education, marital status, self-rated health, occupation, and regional fixed effects, and the marginal effects are reported. Models (2), (4) and (6) are interval regression estimates, and the control variables are the same as those in Table 2.
7 Conclusions
Using a unique data set, this paper studies the overall picture of the gender pay gap in China’s gig economy and its specific performance in various occupations. The following conclusions are drawn from this paper: (1) The income level of China’s platform gig workers is neither too low nor too high, between that of traditional private sector and the state-owned sector, higher than the former and lower than the latter. (2) The gender pay gap still exists in the gig economy, and the wage ratio of female to male is 85%, which has narrowed compared with traditional work. There are large differences in income levels and gender pay gaps between different occupations in the gig economy, and in some emerging occupations (such as live broadcasting, online consulting and other cloud jobs), female may reverse their gender disadvantage. (3) When a series of observable factors such as personal characteristics, job characteristics, and working hours are controlled, gender is still a significant determinant of pay gap. Moreover, the gender pay gap of each occupation has different manifestations, among which there is a significant gender pay gap in platform management jobs, and the gap is basically explained by both observable factors and unobservable. (4) The counterfactual prediction of occupational entry shows that there is a certain gender occupational segregation in a small number of occupations (ride-hailing drivers, delivery services, and online education) in the gig economy. In most of the remaining occupations, gender occupational segregation is not prominent, and female in gig work are no longer concentrated in low-income jobs, and the traditional “occupational crowding hypothesis” no longer holds. (5) Appleton’s decomposition shows that the proportion of inter-occupational and intra-occupational disparities explaining the gender pay gap is 8.12% and 91.88%, respectively, which means that the gender pay gap in the gig economy is mainly caused by the intra-occupational gap, and the impact of occupational segregation on the gender pay gap is very limited. (6) 60% of the gender pay gap is explained by observable factors, and 40% is explained by unobservable factors. This is lower than the unobservable factors explained in the income decomposition of traditional employment, implying that the gig economy weakens implicit discrimination. (7) The gender pay gap of the gig economy is related to women’s reluctance to accept higher algorithm-controlled jobs, preference for highly flexible jobs, and more isolated jobs with less professional social interaction. Overall, this paper supports the view that the gig economy has generally improved gender discrimination and gender pay gap, although its role is currently limited and varies across occupations.
The above results help to deepen people’s understanding of the employment consequences of the platform gig economy, and also have certain policy implications. There is still a gender pay gap in the new form of employment in the gig economy, we need to face up to these problems, but we also need to see the improvement it has achieved compared to traditional employment, so that we can look squarely at the gig economy and solve its problems in a more rational and pragmatic manner. The same should be true for other problems in the field of new forms of employment in the gig economy. Supporting and standardizing the development of new forms of employment is the policy direction of China’s platform economy.
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© 2024 Zhiqiang Dong, Juan Peng, Shanshi Liu, Published by DeGryuter
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmater
- Frontmatter
- Column: China's Economic Development
- Gender Pay Gap in the Gig Economy
- Can Digital Transformation Definitely Improve Firms’ Markups?
- Crowding-in or Crowding-out: How Infrastructure Investment Affects Household Consumption
- Downstream Competition and Upstream Innovation: Theory and Evidence from China
- Stock Markets, Financial Depth, and Economic Growth in China: Evidence from ARDL Model
- Theoretical Mechanism and Implementation Path of Digital Technology Enabling Cultural Heritage Protection
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmater
- Frontmatter
- Column: China's Economic Development
- Gender Pay Gap in the Gig Economy
- Can Digital Transformation Definitely Improve Firms’ Markups?
- Crowding-in or Crowding-out: How Infrastructure Investment Affects Household Consumption
- Downstream Competition and Upstream Innovation: Theory and Evidence from China
- Stock Markets, Financial Depth, and Economic Growth in China: Evidence from ARDL Model
- Theoretical Mechanism and Implementation Path of Digital Technology Enabling Cultural Heritage Protection