Is Decoloniality a New Turn in Postcolonialism?

1 Conceptual Issues of Decoloniality

To find answers to the question raised above, it is imperative to discuss the relationship between decolonization and decoloniality from both the historical and conceptual perspectives, because the concept of decoloniality cannot be clearly defined unless we compare and contrast the two terms against the larger background of colonial history. Historically, “decoloniality” is related to coloniality, which in turn is related to colonialism, the outcome of colonization. In roughly five hundred year since the 16th century, the Euro-American imperialist countries not only colonized most of the world’s land but also left behind an enduring colonial legacy in the life and mind of the colonized people and the colonizers. After World War II, former colonies won independence one after another. With the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the epic of geopolitical decolonization finally came to its end. Although political decolonization has come to a close, has the decolonization of the colonial legacy been completed? The answer is an obvious “No.” As colonialism went hand in hand with modernity, the “colonial matrix of power” has spawned an enduring legacy of coloniality, which is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. In the historical context of global colonialism, a conception of decoloniality that adequately reflects its real conditions cannot be divorced from the conditions of decolonization and its consequence – coloniality.

This seems to be what the participants in the Decoloniality movement have done in their conceptualizations of decoloniality. Taking inspirations from Quijano’s “coloniality of power,” the co-authors of On Decoloniality provide a definition of coloniality: “Coloniality (shorthand for the CMP) is a concept that uncovers the underlying logic of Western civilization, its formation and planetary expansion since the sixteenth century” (Mignolo and Walsh, 225). Both authors have elaborately discussed colony, colonization, colonialism, and decolonization, but they do not offer a clear and easy-to-grasp definition of “decoloniality.” There are many places in the book in which decoloniality is mentioned, discussed, and conceptualized, but I have not located a place where coloniality is clearly defined. The closest to a definition is like this: “Decoloniality, as we argue in this book, is not a new paradigm, or mode of critical thought. It is a way, option, standpoint, analytic, project, practice, and praxis” (2018, 5). This statement has both its strengths and weaknesses. Its strength lies in its capacious openness and its weakness is its vague indeterminism. Mignolo’s further conceptualization moves in this capacious and vague direction and conceives of decoloniality as a way of thinking and living: “The conceptualization and analytic of coloniality – a decolonial way of thinking and therefore of living, doing, sensing – came into being as such at the same moment in which decolonization mutated into decoloniality. Undoing is doing something: delinking presupposes relinking to something else. Consequently, decoloniality is undoing and redoing; it is praxis” (2018, 120).

This capacious and vague way of conceiving decoloniality and its elaborate conceptualizations are both appealing and dissatisfying. It is appealing because it leaves open the scope of the topic; but it is dissatisfying as it does not offer a clearly defined conceptualization. If decoloniality is a way of thinking and living, coloniality is also a way of thinking and living. So are colonization, decolonization, colonialism, coloniality, and many other human activities. It therefore tells us practically little about what decoloniality is. To say that there is no definition is not entirely fair, for relevant issues central to the concept are discussed extensively. After examining the existing definitions of “colonialism,” “colonization”, “coloniality,” and “decoloniality,” Mignolo articulates the defining differences between decolonization and decoloniality: “The point is that decoloniality has changed the terrain from aiming at forming sovereign nation-states (decolonization) out of the ruins of the colonies to aiming at decolonial horizons of liberation (decoloniality) beyond state designs, and corporate and financial desires” (2018, 125). This statement seems to suggest that decolonization is a political movement for national liberation while decoloniality is a social movement for institutional changes. But it also emphasizes another point that effectively separates the two dimensions. The separation seems to suggest that decolonization is a done deal and therefore should be left behind; we should look forward to the present and future and aim at thinking and living in ways different from colonialism and colonization. But this separation is contradicted by the author’s view in other places (2018, 249). If coloniality is a complex structure of management and control, a colonial matrix of power (CMP), and if decoloniality works only when a necessary condition for delinking from coloniality is achieved (2018, 125), how can we separate political, economic, and even military decolonization from epistemic and cultural colonization?

It seems to me, the conception of decoloniality has left the concept vaguely defined due to the capacious way of conceptualizations. Moreover, the conception has almost little to do with the etymological meaning of the word “decoloniality,” which is the combination of the prefix, “de” and the root, “coloniality.” I think, to have a workable definition of what decoloniality is, we must start with an etymological examination of “coloniality.” According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “coloniality” is a word that came to use in the mid-19th century, having the meaning of “Colonial quality or character; the fact or state of being a colony.”^[1] In contrast to his capacious definition of decoloniality, Mignolo provides a narrow scope of “coloniality”: “coloniality” is “a concept that came into being from the former colonies of the South American Andes, at the closing of the Cold War (geopolitical knowing)” (2018, 225). Clearly, this argument is historically and etymologically too restrictive in meaning and scope. The author’s further elaboration attests to the restricted scope: “If by coloniality we mean the underlying logic common to all Western colonialisms and therefore the darker side of modernity, decoloniality means both [sic] the analytic of such underlying logic rather than the historic-socio-economic analysis of colonization” (Ibid.). My argument with this point is that if decoloniality is concerned with the analysis of the underlying logic responsible for the appearance of colonialism and colonization, how can we avoid analyzing the historic-socio-economic process and conditions of colonization? Furthermore, if the focus of coloniality is the underlying logic of colonialism, it is historically problematic to claim that the concept of decoloniality did not appear until after the ending of the Cold War, because the logic common to all colonialisms appeared at the start of colonialist expansions and the struggle for political independence of former colonies started much earlier than the end of World War II.

The conception of “decoloniality” seems to have paid insufficient attention to what has brought about colonialism and coloniality in the first place. This is evidenced in the argument: “coloniality of knowledge and of being is the target of decolonial work: decolonial knowledge shall restore many issues that coloniality of knowledge and the narratives of modernity disavowed and relegated to the past and to tradition and it shall also open up the imagination without restriction to avoid and undermine the latest technological advances of coloniality in the name of modernity (progress, salvation, freedom, and the like)” (2018, 230). Thus, the existing conception of decoloniality is more concerned with decolonization of knowing and knowledge than with the material means responsible for the colonial existence. Decolonization of Western ontology and epistemology and knowledge production is certainly a most important task of decoloniality, but to give inadequate attention to what brought about colonization and coloniality in the first place is very likely to turn the project of decoloniality into an impractical and utopian project. Moreover, the conception of “decoloniality” may not incite the common sense responses that the word would arouse in the mind of the common reader.

2 Decoloniality and Postcolonialism

Proponents of “decoloniality” have reiterated that although it is related to postcolonialism, they are not the same thing, and have expressed regrets for the conflation of the two terms. To avoid confusion, they have gone to certain length to distinguish the two terms. In their conception, “postcolonialism is viewed as a general movement of resistance practiced by people of color, third world intellectual, and ethnic groups who oppose imperialist and colonialist dominance” (Mignolo 2000, 87) By contrast, decoloniality as both an analytic and a programmatic endeavor aims to move “away and beyond the post-colonial” praxis. While “post-colonialism criticism and theory is a project of scholarly transformation within the academy” (Mignolo 2007, 452), the ultimate goal of decoloniality, in both its analytic and programmatic function, as succinctly stated by Quijano is to realize the destruction of global coloniality of power through a recognition that the colonial matrix of power has made an instrumental use of reason and produced a Western-centric episteme that give rise to distorted paradigms of knowledge and spoil the emancipatory promises of modernity (Ibid.). If we want to summarize the differences between postcolonialism and decoloniality, it seems that while the former mainly adopts a political and ideological approach to colonialism and decolonization, decoloniality seeks to demystify Western ideas of universality, modernity, and knowledge and to engage in epistemic reconstitution and knowledge reconstruction by tapping into native cultural traditions and lived experiences of former colonies for inspirations and resources. To use the Chinese terminology, while postcolonialism emphasizes the dismantling and destruction of Western epistemology and knowledge (po), decoloniality lays more emphasis on reestablishment of the native episteme and system of knowledge (li).

Having examined the claimed differences between postcolonialism and decoloniality, I must say that the distinction is not really as neat as that. After all, in some fundamental ways, the idea of decoloniality overlaps those of postcolonialism. Nevertheless, the project of decoloniality does not show much interest in postcolonial thinkers and their work. Baffled by the lack of interest in postcolonial theory, a reader is bound to find out the reason for such a lack. It seems, this lack of interest may have to do with what they conceive of decoloniality and how decoloniality is related to decolonization. In arguing that decolonization has many faces, Mignolo professes his intention: “[W]hat I intend to do is to explain one particular meaning of (de)coloniality, the meaning it has acquired in the works of the members of a collective identified by three key words: modernity/coloniality/decoloniality” (Mignolo and Walsh 2018: 108). For this purpose, it turns elsewhere for inspiration and intellectual resources. In his conception of decoloniality, Mignolo acknowledges his indebtedness to Quijiano’s idea of epistemic reconstitution, which refuses to establish new schools of thought within Western cosmology, and instead, seeks to tap the intellectual wealth in the native knowledge and praxis of living that have been either demonized as superstition and barbarism or reduced to folklore, tradition, spiritual poverty in the name of reason and Western civilization. One would truly appreciate the idea of epistemic reconstitution. But it seems, Mignolo tends to equate “decoloniality” with “epistemic reconstitution,” as shown in his use of the phrase, “Decoloniality (epistemic reconstitution)” (Mignolo and Walsh 231). In my opinion, this equation may not fully cover the range of meanings in decoloniality and its source in decolonization. And to think that by epistemic reconstitution which rejects modern thoughts from both the left and right, the people of former colonies can accomplish the task of complete decolonization and achieve decoloniality may come close to an illusion, or is utopian, to say the least.

The main reason lies in the fact that colonialism was based on and supported by material power of Western industrialization and intellectual power of modernity. While industrialization is driven by the advance in science and technology, which equipped Western imperialism with hard power, modernity possesses the enticing trappings of reason, enlightenment, and progress, which bestow soft power on the Western colonialists. Colonialism was invincible all over the world in the colonial age not simply because of its hard power sustained by industrialization and military strengths but also because of its soft power growing out of enlightenment and modernity.^[2] Due to the 500 years of history of colonial expansion, the influence of colonialism is pervasive all over the world. Both the colonizer and the colonized have come under its influence, with the only differences in the forms of expression. As a result, colonialism has shaped the mind and consciousness of both colonizers and the colonized who form the two sides of the same coin of coloniality with the only differences to be found in the rationale for its rise, psychological mechanism, and the content and form of practical operations. I believe, if the people of former colonies and the Third World countries cannot achieve material, intellectual, and spiritual equality with the West, complete decolonization will remain an unfinished task, and decoloniality will be forever beyond reach.

Here, I will supply one example. Walsh conducts a detailed and meticulous examination of the resistance to coloniality in various South American countries, especially in Ecuador. She especially looks into the massive uprising of 1990 in Ecuador and its significance for Latin America as a whole. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE 1997) calls for the establishment of a plurinational state with a new democracy, which is “anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-segregationist,” and regards interculturality as the key to its realization (CONAIE 11). Their proposal is politically and ideologically sound, but realistically impossible to materialize because of political, economic, and intellectual reasons. It is therefore utopian. Perhaps, because she may be aware of the unrealistic nature of CONAIE’s proposal, Walsh talks about conducting decolonial endeavors in the cracks and fissures of Western civilization. This is certainly a creative option, but I think this perspective is too limited and will not remove coloniality strategically, and it certainly is incapable of accomplishing decoloniality on the global scale. We should aim at strategic removal of coloniality.

To view decoloniality in the existing conception, I have obtained the impression that decoloniality is a project that has objectives radically different from those of decolonization. Mignolo states: “While the goal of decolonization was marked by the struggle of the native or indigenous population to expel the settler from their colonies and to form their own sovereign nation-states on the ruins of the former colonies, decoloniality’s aims are no longer those of decolonization. Decoloniality’s goal and orientation, in the shift introduced by Quijano, are epistemic reconstitution” (Mignolo and Walsh 228). I have no argument with the shift to epistemic reconstitution, but argue that the aim of decoloniality is no longer that of decolonization has some problems. First, this argument seems to suggest that decolonization and decoloniality are two separate and even unrelated issues. Second, it gives the impression that decolonization is already an accomplished project, whereas it is in reality not a simple issue of driving away the colonizers and taking sovereignty into the native people’s hands. It involves a complex heterogeneity of issues, some are material, some institutional, and some intellectual and spiritual. After more than half a century of national independence for most former colonies, the project of decolonization is far from being complete. Decolonization has two major dimensions: one has to do with the colonization of land, while the other involves the colonization of the mind. Colonizers are gone forever, but their legacies remain deeply entrenched in the mind of both the colonizing and colonized people. It is no exaggeration to say that the people of former colonies have not been sufficiently emancipated from colonialism in their mentality and spirituality. The second dimension is certainly covered by epistemic reconstitution, but we must be clear that the colonization of the mind was the long-term (500 years) effects of colonization of the land. It is therefore reasonable to argue that we cannot separate decoloniality from decolonization. And if we insist on the separation of the two, decoloniality would inevitably be endowed with utopian wishful thinking.

The wishful nature of decoloniality project is reflected in several ways: (1) it attempts to transcend the political positions of the both the left and right; (2) it refuses to be a state-led project; (3) it seeks to be an “emerging global society” (Mignolo and Walsh 254). These points suggest that the project of decoloniality is apolitical in nature and emphasizes epistemic reconstitution. It has both strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths reside in offering an alternative to political and ideological criticism of Orientalism and postcolonialism, and its weaknesses are to be found in the deemphasis of political repression, military conquest, economic exploitation that brought about colonialism in the first place and generated coloniality in the emotional, intellectual, and spiritual domains. The idealistic nature of the proposed project of decoloniality is expressed in this statement: “although to different ends, epistemic and emotional (and aesthetic) delinking means conceiving of and creating institutional organizations that are at the service of life and do not – as in the current state of affairs – put people at the service of institutions” (Mignolo and Walsh 126). This proposal is certainly laudable and admirable, but so long as the Third World countries and former colonies cannot gain economic independence, decoloniality would be an illusion, with which may be gone even political independence.

3 Decoloniality and Modernity

In the examinations of the rise of modernity, decoloniality thinkers have done an admirable job in exposing the myth of modernity as reason, progress, advance in civilization, and in revealing how modernity was instrumental in implementing colonization and complicit in the institutionalization of colonialism in former colonies and non-Western world. Their efforts have made a significant contribution to postcolonial studies. In his examination of the relationship between coloniality and modernity, Mignolo makes this sagacious remark: “coloniality is constitutive, not derivative, of modernity. That is to say, there is not modernity without coloniality, thus the compound expression: modernity/decoloniality” (Mignolo and Walsh 4). But in his efforts to demystify modernity, Mignolo argues that modernity is a fiction: “it is a fiction, a construction made by actors, institutions, and languages that benefit those who build the imaginary and sustain it, through knowledge and war, military and financial means” (Mignolo and Walsh 110). While I can see what he means by this claim to fiction, I have doubt about whether it is an overstatement. Modernity as a word or concept is invented, but modernity as material conditions is not at all fiction; its concrete manifestations are constructed on real geo-political, economic, military, intellectual, and cultural forces and materials. Perhaps, we should change our perspective and ask another question: Why did modernity arise in the West, not in non-Western countries and regions? In the 15th and 16th century, an early form of modernity already appeared in China’s Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), as China had all the necessary conditions for the rise of scientific and industrial revolution, as they are meticulously researched and documented in Joseph Needham’s monumental work Science and Civilisation in China. Several decades before Columbus’s small fleet of three ships sailed to and rediscovered the New World in 1492, China carried out seven large-scale maritime navigations led by the Chinese Admiral Zheng He. Each of the maritime ventures was many times bigger than that of Columbus, but none of them was carried out in the spirit of colonialism. At home, there had already appeared in China a dozen big cities with a large number of city dwellers and technological inventions identified by Francis Bacon as instrumental to the rise of the Renaissance: “Gunpowder, the magnetic compass, and paper and printing, which Francis Bacon considered as the four most important inventions facilitating the West’s transformation from the Dark Ages to the modern world, were invented in China” (Lin 1995: 270). But due to various reasons, which include cultural conservativism, alien invasion, etc., the incipient modernity died in its infancy. By contrast, On Decoloniality shows how modernity became the powerful instrument for the colonizers to facilitate their efforts of colonization and even bestowed a kind of noble aura to the bloody and violent colonial expansions. Now it has become fairly clear that if the third world countries cannot create their own version of modernity, decoloniality may indeed be forever an unfinished task.

Why does coloniality die hard? There are various reasons for the longevity of coloniality. Historically and geopolitically, coloniality is universal and transcultural, involving and affecting all humanity: “As a matrix of power, coloniality came to operate in Abya Yala, and subsequently elsewhere, in multiple spheres, exercising control over humanity, subjectivity and being, gender and sexuality, spirituality, knowledge production, economy, nature, existence and life itself” (Mignolo and Walsh 23). The universality and transcultural nature of colonialism is aptly described by Maldonado-Torees: “as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day” (2010, 97). This is true of not only former colonies, but also of nations and countries that were not colonized. Even people in the countries and nations that used to be colonizers are deeply affected by coloniality, albeit largely in different ways. Intellectually and psychologically, coloniality dies hard because it is rooted in the consciousness and unconscious of both the colonized and colonized as well as those whose land was not historically colonized like China.

Thinkers of decoloniality project is right in saying that Christian theology and secular empirical science have jointly created and contributed to the protracted dominance of Western ontology and epistemology in the production of knowledge, but it may be an overstatement to say that today “non-Indigenous people around the word begin to realize the trap of Western modern epistemology and the consequences of coloniality of knowledge and of being: that means coloniality of ontology or ontological coloniality” (Mignolo and Walsh 239). This view seems to be too optimistic because in my observation, if the “non-Indigenous people” refers to Westerners, I do not think most of them have already developed a conscious awareness of colonial matrix of power, especial in the unconscious dimension. For most Westerners, they are still trapped in western ontology and epistemology in their perception, conception, and understanding of the world. Even in knowledge production, their entrenched faith in Western universality and superiority still dominates all areas of knowledge.

Studies of decoloniality do offer a correct diagnosis of why coloniality is deeply entrenched. The root cause of coloniality’s enduring strengths lies in its inherent connection with modernity: “Decolonially speaking, modernity/coloniality are intimately, intricately, explicitly, and complicitly entwined. The end of modernity would imply the end of coloniality, and, therefore, decoloniality would no longer be an issue. This is the ultimate decolonial horizon.” (Mignolo and Walsh 4). This critical analysis of the epistemological foundation of colonialism dovetails with one scholar’s conception of the global cultural unconscious. In that view, the epistemic basis of colonialism is a kind of colonial unconscious closely related to modernity, and the internal logic of colonialism is nothing but a colonial unconscious in culture. Its surface dimension on the conscious level involves both people of formerly colonizing as well as colonized countries (Gu 2013: 26–41). From this point of view, the epistemic reconstitution and knowledge reconstruction proposed by the thinkers of decoloniality is endowed with world-wide historic significance.

Unlike Mignolo who engages in conceptualizations of the nature and analytics of decoloniality, Walsh focuses on the praxis and practical aspects of decoloniality. Her in-depth analysis of how decoloniality is and works is replete with fascinating insights and ideas for our rethinking about issues of colonialism, decolonization, but at the same time shows some views that are either inexact in terms of history or conflicts with Mignolo’s views. For example, at one place, she states: “Decoloniality has a history, herstory, and praxis of more than 500 years.” Then, she supports her idea by saying: “From its beginnings in the American, decoloniality has been a component part of (trans)local struggles, movements, and actions to resist and refuse the legacies of an ongoing relations and patterns of power established by the external and internal colonialism” (Mignolo and Walsh 16). In my opinion, her idea is that decoloniality did not start from the political movement to decolonize after the World War II, but began with the colonization of America. As though the beginning was not early enough, she argues that decolonizing praxis started as early as the beginning of colonization: “This is because of its 500-plus years of decolonial resurgence, insurrection, rebellion, and agency, and for its present-day shifts, movements, and manifestations that give possibility, sustenance, credence, and concretion to a decolonial otherwise” (Mignolo and Walsh 24). Her view of the chronology is corroborated by Mignolo’s similar view. Mignolo has drawn a distinction between decolonization and decoloniality, and in his distinction, he assigns each idea to different periods: “decolonization during the Cold War and decoloniality after the end of the Cold War” (Mignolo and Walsh 106) and his idea is based on Anibal Quijano’s concept of decoloniality introduced at the edge between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of neoliberal global age. At one place, he pinpoints the moment when decoloniality arose: “these concepts [coloniality, modernity] arose at the chronological moment of the Soviet Union’s collapse and, with it, the ideology that divided the world into First, Second, and Third” (Mignolo and Walsh 11). Both authors share a similar opinion about the rise of decolonization as their opinion limits decolonization to a period after the setting in of the Cold War. In their opinion, while decolonization is actualized, decoloniality may not. They have therefore raised the question of finding out the task of decoloniality. Mignolo also suggests that decoloniality becomes an issue because “the state can be neither decolonized nor democratized.”

I have doubt on this chronology and its rationale. Historically, decolonization started during and after the World War II and it did not end with the ending of the Cold War, because colonies like Hong Kong continued to exist until the end of the 20th century. In conceptual terms, while colonization refers to the former colonized people’s struggle for emancipation of the land and the formation of nation-state with sovereignty, decoloniality in the common sense refers to the efforts by the Third World countries and people to change the social, political, economic, and cultural institutions established on the foundations of colonialism. And the sustaining spirit of coloniality is the colonial attitude and consciousness, which in turn are sustained by a cultural unconscious formulated by the process of colonization. The struggles to refuse and resist colonization can only be counted as resistance to colonialism, not as decolonial efforts. To say decoloniality has a 500 years history is a claim against commonsense. In terms of an etymological inquiry into “decoloniality,” the prefix “de” in “decoloniality” means “to remove.” In order to remove something, one must have it installed first. For decolonialization to take place, there must first be the establishment of colonialism. Similarly, for decoloniality to exists, there must be the existence of coloniality. Thus, in my opinion, “decoloniality” comes into being only after the large scale political movement for national independence at the end of the World War II when across the world, the former colonies of western imperialism struggled to emancipate their countries from colonial rule. From this point of view, “decoloniality” only has a history of 70 odd years, not 500 years. The author’s attempt to define “decoloniality” lends support to my argument: “With colonialism and coloniality came resistance and refusal. Decoloniality necessarily follows, derives from, and responds to coloniality and the ongoing colonial process and conditions” (Mignolo and Walsh 17). Decolonization cannot happen in a former colony if that nation or country does not have political independence, because despite the refusal and resistance by the colonized people, colonial rule is intact and the colonizers are in control and can suppress any resistance.

4 Toward an Open View of Decoloniality

My critical examination has demonstrated that the theory and praxis of decoloniality represents a new trend in postcolonial studies. In general, the project seeks to answer one fundamental question: How can we achieve complete decolonization after 500 years of colonial rule? In answering this question, decoloniality engages in the dual task of deconstruction and reconstruction. In terms of deconstruction, it demystifies the grand narrative of Western reason, proposes the concept of “decolonial matrix of power,” and exposes the dark side of Western modernity and the self-legitimating mechanism of Western civilization. The criticism of the ontology and epistemology of modernity challenges the universality of Western knowledge system. In terms of reconstruction, it calls on the people of former colonies to seek inspiration and resources in their own tradition and life praxis and to re-learn the knowledge of the native tradition “that has been pushed aside, forgotten, buried or discredited by the forces of modernity.” The theory and praxis of decoloniality have yielded a series of impressive and enlightening ideas and insights for the deepening development of postcolonial studies.

If we compare the achievements in the two aspects, however, we must say that like other branches of postcolonial studies, critical deconstruction obviously overwhelms reconstruction. Because of various reasons, it leaves much room for further conceptions. First, the project of decoloniality as it is conceived is still a work in progress; some of the ideas and conceptualizations are open to questions and reconceptualizations. Second, the conception of decoloniality radically departs from the common sense understanding aroused by the word “decoloniality” in the reader. In fact, decoloniality has not been clearly defined and the existing definition is somewhat removed from the denotations and connotations of the word, thereby causing a sense of alienation in readers like me who see a gap or distance between what one thinks decoloniality should be and what is actually presented. Third, thinkers of decoloniality seem to have believed that colonialism is a thing of the past and decoloniality should be an intellectual project for the future, thereby underestimating the resilience of colonialism and its legacies. Fourth, the project of decoloniality, as it stands, attempts to shun the cultural war between the left and right and displayed a tendency to jettison western modernity as a whole. This emphasis on the move to look for intellectual resources in native traditions and life overlooks the connectedness of knowledge in the age of globalization and telecommunications, thus implicitly showing signs of a restricted vision. Last but not least, it has intentionally distanced itself from the theories, paradigms, and practices of postcolonialism. I believe, decoloniality is not simply a project of intellectual reconstitution; it is first and foremost a political and social project on the global scale. Its conceptual issues remain an open topic that requires further explorations from multiple perspectives. It is therefore imperative to rethink the project of decoloniality from a perspective that combines geopolitics, international politics, and global capitalism with the historical conditions of colonialism, decolonization, and, last but not least, postcolonialism. To place the conception of decoloniality in the context of postcolonialism will not only enrich postcolonial studies but also benefit the project of decoloniality.