

THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS

EDITORS

Matteo Cervellati, *University of Bologna*

Yuk-fai Fong, *Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Business School*

Ronald Peeters, *Maastricht University*

Daniela Puzzello, *Indiana University*

Javier Rivas, *University of Leicester*

Burkhard C. Schipper, *University of California–Davis*

DE GRUYTER

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (BEJTE) welcomes submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied and „pure“ theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers published in the journal include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are not restricted to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.

ABSTRACTED/INDEXED IN AGRICOLA (National Agricultural Library), Cabell's Directory, Celdes, CNPIEC, EBSCO - Business Source, EBSCO - TOC Premier, EBSCO Discovery Service, ECONIS, EconLit, Elsevier - SCOPUS, Google Scholar, J-Gate, Mathematical Reviews (MathSciNet), Naviga (Softweco), Primo Central (ExLibris), ProQuest - International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS), Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), SCImago (SJR), Summon (Serials Solutions/ProQuest), TDOne (TDNet), Thomson Reuters - Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, Thomson Reuters - Journal Citation Reports/Social Sciences Edition, Thomson Reuters - Social Sciences Citation Index, Ulrich's Periodicals Directory/ulrichsweb, WorldCat (OCLC), Zentralblatt Math.

ISSN 2194-6124 · e-ISSN 1935-1704

All information regarding notes for contributors, subscriptions, Open Access, back volumes and orders is available online at <http://www.degruyter.com/bejte>.

RESPONSIBLE EDITOR Sandeep Baliga, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA, Email: baliga@kellogg.northwestern.edu

JOURNAL MANAGER Holger Kleessen, De Gruyter, Genthiner Straße 13, 10785 Berlin, Germany. Tel.: +49 (0)30 260 05-376, Fax: +49 (0)30 260 05-250, Email: holger.kleessen@degruyter.com

RESPONSIBLE FOR ADVERTISEMENTS Panagiota Herbrand, De Gruyter, Rosenheimer Str. 143, 81671 München, Germany, Tel.: +49 (0)89 769 02 – 394, Fax: +49 (0)89 769 02 – 350, Email: panagiota.herbrand@degruyter.com

TYPESETTING Integra Software Service Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India

PRINTING Franz X. Stückle Druck und Verlag e.K., Ettenheim

© 2013 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Printed in Germany



Contents

Advances

Alan W. Beggs

Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games — 1

Luis Rayo

Monopolistic Signal Provision — 27

Manfredi M. La Manna

Multi-task Research and Research Joint Ventures — 59

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Andrea Prestipino

Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information — 79

Noemí Navarro and Andres Perea

A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value — 131

Alvaro Sandroni, Sandra Ludwig, and Philipp Kircher

On the Difference between Social and Private Goods — 151

Luke Hu

Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding Is Costly — 179

Roman Chuhay

Labor Market and Search through Personal Contacts — 191

Contributions

Nicolas Jacquemet and Adam Zylbersztein

Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information — 215

Tamas Kovacs and Marc Willinger

Are Trust and Reciprocity Related within Individuals? — 249

Suren Basov and M. Ishaq Bhatti

Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs — 271

Sanxi Li, Hao Xiao, and Dongmin Yao

Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent — 285

Andrea Craig and Marie-Louise Vierø

Academia or the Private Sector? Sorting of Agents into Institutions and an Outside Sector — 303

Topics

Rocio Garcia-Diaz

Poverty Orderings with Asymmetric Attributes — 347

Anat Lerner and Rica Gonen

Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions — 363

Filomena Garcia

When Should a Monopolist Improve Quality in a Network Industry? — 381

Ahmed Doghmi and Abderrahmane Ziad

On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition — 415

Nicola Doni and Domenico Menicucci

Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations — 429