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Co-deliberation, Joint Decision, and Testimony about Reasons

Reply to Tobias Steinig. Experts, Teachers and Their Epistemic Roles in Normative and Non-normative Domains, in: Analyse & Kritik 34, 251 – 274
  • Karen Jones and François Schroeter
Published/Copyright: February 11, 2016
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Abstract

We defend the claim that there can be testimonial transfer of reasons against Steinig’s recent objections. In addition, we argue that the literature on testimony about moral reasons misunderstands what is at stake in the possibility of second-hand orientation towards moral reasons. A moral community faces two different but related tasks: one theoretical (working out what things are of genuine value and how to rank goods and ends) and one practical (engaging in joint action and social coordination). In between, simultaneously theoretical and practical, lies the activity of co-deliberation. Virtuous participation in co-deliberation can require limited moral deference. Refusal to recognize this, combined with excess self-trust, can derail co-deliberation.

Published Online: 2016-02-11
Published in Print: 2014-05-01

© 2014 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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