Home Liberal Justification and the Limits of Neutrality
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Liberal Justification and the Limits of Neutrality

  • Arthur Ripstein
Published/Copyright: May 12, 2016
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

This paper examines a style of political justification prominent in contemporary liberalism, according to which policies are legitimate only if they can be shown to be acceptable to all. Although this approach is often associated with neutrality about the good life, it is argued that liberalism cannot be neutral about questions of the role of various goods, such as work, play and community. The paper closes by exploring the implications and applicability of this account of justification to contemporary political practice.

Published Online: 2016-05-12
Published in Print: 1992-05-01

© 1992 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

Downloaded on 17.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/auk-1992-0101/html
Scroll to top button