Home Dürfen Gesetze unglücklich machen? Sprache, Gewissen und Gesetz bei Moses Mendelssohn
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Dürfen Gesetze unglücklich machen? Sprache, Gewissen und Gesetz bei Moses Mendelssohn

  • Hans Kruschwitz EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: January 16, 2014
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Abstracht: Moses Mendelssohn’s philosophy of language and his use of the term »Gewissen« are not fully coherent. Whereas language appears in his early writings as a necessary medium for developing good sense and founding morality on reason, i.e. for setting up universal moral laws, positive law appears in his later writings as all but reasonable and worth being taken too literally. It rather proves the unfeasibility of setting up universally valid statutes. Hence, he proposes that Jewish law has never been intended to be taken literally, but incessantly interpreted, drafting it as an indispensable rampart against the aberrations of »literalness «. By doing so, however, he reverses the original hierarchy of language, reason, and law – and also alters his definition of »Gewissen«. Originally defined as the faculty of deciding what’s right, he now confines it to the faculty of deciding what’s true and substitutes the former with Jewish law.

Published Online: 2014-01-16
Published in Print: 2014-02-01

© De Gruyter

Downloaded on 4.10.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/asch-2013-0014/html
Scroll to top button