Home Misprinted Representations in Stoicism
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Misprinted Representations in Stoicism

  • Christian Pineda ORCID logo EMAIL logo
Published/Copyright: December 15, 2022
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Abstract

This paper deals with the Stoic concept of misprinted representation (φαντασία παρατυπωτική), which has received little attention compared to other concepts of Stoic epistemology and philosophy of mind. I aim at showing that a better understanding of this concept is important for grasping some elements of the Stoic account of mental representations that have been ignored or misunderstood in modern Stoic scholarship. First, by clarifying the status of the misprinted representation as a genuine representation, we can understand what it means (and does not mean) to say, from the Stoic point of view, that the intentional object of a representation is the external object that caused it. Second, by understanding this issue, we obtain some resources to deal with the ambiguity of the preposition ἀπό in the definition of cognitive representation. Thus, the concept of misprinted representation proves to be important for appropriately understanding the Stoic concepts of representation and cognitive representation.


Corresponding author: Christian Pineda, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, Mexico, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

The ideas I develop in this paper have their origin in my doctoral dissertation at UNAM (2022). I am grateful to Ricardo Salles, my supervisor, for many years of support and advice. I am also grateful for his insightful comments and many valuable suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Miguel Ángel Fernández, Santiago Echeverri, Edgar González Varela, Diego Rodríguez, Alfonso Anaya, and Maricarmen Blázquez for helpful discussion. I am also thankful to anonymous referees for their constructive criticism and suggestions that improved this paper. All remaining errors and shortcomings are my own. Finally, I am grateful for the support of the research projects PAPIIT IN 403620 and 400123, and CONACYT CF 2023 I44 at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM. This paper is dedicated in memoriam to Fernando Pineda, my father, who died while this paper was in progress.

References

Annas, J. 1990. “Stoic Epistemology.” In Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology, edited by S. Everson, 184–203. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Backhouse, T. 2000. “Antipater of Tarsus on False ‘Phantasiai’ (PBerol Inv. 16545).” Papiri filosofici. Miscellanea di Studi 3: 7–31.Search in Google Scholar

Bett, R. 2005. Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511815232Search in Google Scholar

Boeri, M. D., and R. Salles. 2014. Los filósofos estoicos: Ontología, Lógica, Física y Ética. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.Search in Google Scholar

Bury, R. G. 1935. Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicias. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.10.4159/DLCL.sextus_empiricus-against_logicians.1935Search in Google Scholar

Caston, V. 1999. “Something and Nothing: The Stoics on Concepts and Universals.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 17: 145–213.10.1093/oso/9780198250197.003.0006Search in Google Scholar

Caston, V. forthcoming. “The Stoics on Mental Representation.” In The Oxford Handbook in Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by J. Klein, and N. Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Frede, M. 1983. “Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions.” In The Skeptical Tradition, edited by M. Burnyeat, 65–94. Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.Search in Google Scholar

Frede, M. 1999. “Stoic Epistemology.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield, 295–322. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CHOL9780521250283.010Search in Google Scholar

Harven de, V. 2019. “Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind.” In Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity. The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1, edited by J. E. Sisko, 214–35. London, New York: Routledge.10.4324/9780429508219-12Search in Google Scholar

Long, A. A., and D. Sedley. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vol. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511808050Search in Google Scholar

Moss, J., and W. Schwab. 2019. “The Birth of Belief.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1): 1–32, https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2019.0000.Search in Google Scholar

Nawar, T. 2014. “The Stoic Account of Apprehension.” Philosophers’ Imprint 14 (29): 1–22.Search in Google Scholar

Pineda, Christian 2018. “Las respuestas académicas a la objeción de apraxia.” Praxis Filosófica 46: 221–42, https://doi.org/10.25100/pfilosofica.v0i46.6170.Search in Google Scholar

Reed, B. 2002. “The Stoics’ Account of the Cognitive Impression.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23: 147–80.10.1093/oso/9780199259083.003.0005Search in Google Scholar

Salles, R. 2011. “Nominalismo, conceptualismo y realismo en la teoría estoica de Los universales.” Critica. Revista Hispanoamericana De Filosofía 43 (128): 27–53, https://doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2011.805.Search in Google Scholar

Sedley, D. 2002. “Zeno’s Definition of Phantasia Kataleptike.” In The Philosophy of Zeno: Zeno of Citium and His Legacy, edited by T. Scaltsas, and A. S. Mason, 139–54. Larnaca: The Municipality of Larnaca.Search in Google Scholar

Shogry, S. 2018. “Creating a Mind Fit for Truth: The Role of Expertise in the Stoic Account of the Kataleptic Impression.” Ancient Philosophy 38: 357–81, https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil201838230.Search in Google Scholar

Shogry, S. 2019. “What Do Our Impressions Say? The Stoic Theory of Perceptual Content and Belief Formation.” Apeiron 52: 29–63, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2018-0001.Search in Google Scholar

Shogry, S. 2021. “The Stoic Appeal to Expertise: Platonic Echoes in the Reply to Indistinguishability.” Aperion 54 (2): 129–59, https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2019-0013.Search in Google Scholar

Smith, A. D. 2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Soteriou, M. 2020. “The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/perception-disjunctive.Search in Google Scholar

Stojanović, P. 2019. “Zeno of Citium’s Causal Theory of Apprehensive Appearances.” Ancient Philosophy 39 (1): 151–74, https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20193918.Search in Google Scholar

Stojanović, P. 2020. “Chrysippus on Imagination in Aetius 4.12.” Classical Quarterly 70 (1): 332–46, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0009838820000567.Search in Google Scholar

Togni, P. 2006. “Rappresentazione e oggetto nella gnoseologia stoica.” Dianoia: annali di storia della filosofia 11: 41–84.Search in Google Scholar

Vasiliou, I. 2019. “Ancient Philosophy and Disjunctivism: The Case of the Stoics.” In New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, edited by C. Doyle, J. Milburn, and D. Pritchard, 63–88. London and New York: Routledge.10.4324/9781315106243-4Search in Google Scholar

Veres, M., and D. Macheck. 2021. “Expert Impressions in Stoicism.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 000010151520210038, https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2021-0038.Search in Google Scholar

Vogt, K. M. 2012. Belief and Truth: A Sceptic Reading of Plato. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199916818.001.0001Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2022-12-15
Published in Print: 2023-04-25

© 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Downloaded on 9.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/apeiron-2022-0036/html
Scroll to top button