Abstract
This paper argues for a possible-worlds interpretation of the arguments marshalled by Socrates against Protagoras in Plato’s Theaetetus. Specifically, it reads Protagoras’ position as implying a limited form of modal realism, and evaluates both the self-refutation sequence at 170a–71d and the Future Argument at 177c–9c on the basis of this reading. It emerges that Socrates’ project is only partly successful: while the three main arguments of the self-refutation sequence force Protagoras into ever more awkward and metaphysically top-heavy positions, and the Future Argument is psychologically compelling, these arguments do not force a collapse of the relativist position. Protagoras can still defend himself, though the cost is high.
References
Barker, E. 1946. The Politics of Aristotle. Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Appendixes. Oxford: Clarendon.Search in Google Scholar
Black, M. 1952. “The Identity of Indiscernibles.” Mind 61 (242): 153–64.10.1093/mind/LXI.242.153Search in Google Scholar
Brogaard, B., and J. Salerno. “Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/fitch-paradox/.Search in Google Scholar
Burnyeat, M. 1976a. “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Later Greek Philosophy.” Philosophical Review 35/1: 44–69.10.1017/CBO9780511974052.003Search in Google Scholar
Burnyeat, M. 1976b. “Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato’s Theaetetus.” Philosophical Review 35/2: 172–95.10.1017/CBO9780511974052.004Search in Google Scholar
Burnyeat, M. 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato. Indianapolis: Hackett.Search in Google Scholar
Carnap, R. 1967. The Logical Structure of the World, trans. Rolf George. Berkeley: University of California Press.Search in Google Scholar
Carnap, R. 1947. Meaning and Necessity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Search in Google Scholar
Chappell, T. 2004. Reading Plato’s Theaetetus. Indianapolis: Hackett.Search in Google Scholar
Chappell, T. 2006. “Reading the περιτροπή: “Theaetetus” 170c–71c.” Phronesis 51 (2): 109–39.10.1163/156852806777006787Search in Google Scholar
DeLacy, P. 1958. “οὐ μᾶλλον and the Antecedents of Ancient Scepticism.” Phronesis 3: 59–71.10.1163/156852858X00057Search in Google Scholar
Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.Search in Google Scholar
Denyer, N. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
Emilsson, E. K. 1994. “Plato’s Self-Refutation Argument in Theaetetus 171A–C Revisited.” Phronesis 39/2: 136–49.10.1163/156852894321052144Search in Google Scholar
Guthrie, W. K. 1950. The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle. London: Methuen.Search in Google Scholar
Halmos, P. R. 1970. “How to Write Mathematics.” L’enseignement mathématique 16: 123–52.10.1007/978-1-4613-8211-9_16Search in Google Scholar
Holmes, M. R. “Alternative Axiomatic Set Theories.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/settheory-alternative/.Search in Google Scholar
Jaśkowski, S. 1999. “A Propositional Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive Systems.” Logic and Logical Philosophy 7: 35–56.10.12775/LLP.1999.003Search in Google Scholar
Kant, I. 1965. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Search in Google Scholar
Kerferd, G. B. 1949. “Plato’s Account of the Relativism of Protagoras.” Durham University Journal 42: 20–6.Search in Google Scholar
King, P. J. 1995. “The Ontology of Possible Worlds.” D. Phil thesis, Oxford. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20180618162803/http:/users.ox.ac.uk/∼worc0337/modal.realism.html.Search in Google Scholar
Lee, E. D. 1973. “Hoist with His Own Petard.” Phronesis 18: 225–61.10.1163/156852873X00168Search in Google Scholar
Levett, M. J., trans. 1990. The Theaetetus of Plato. In Burnyeat (1990, 249–351).Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1968. “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic.” Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–26.10.1093/0195032047.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Padstow: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
Makinson, D. C. 1965. “The Paradox of the Preface.” Analysis 25 (6): 205–7.10.1093/analys/25.6.205Search in Google Scholar
McDowell, J. 1973. Plato’s Theaetetus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Newman, J. 1982. “The Recoil Argument.” Apeiron 16: 47–52.10.1515/APEIRON.1982.16.1.47Search in Google Scholar
Parsons, T. 1978. “Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties, Meinong, and Leibniz.” Noûs: 137–51.10.2307/2214689Search in Google Scholar
Perseus Digital Library at Tufts University (source of quotations from greek texts). Available at https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.Search in Google Scholar
Pollock, J. L. 1986. “The Paradox of the Preface.” Philosophy of Science 53 (2): 246–58.10.1086/289309Search in Google Scholar
Postal, P. M. 1974. On Raising: One Rule of English Grammar and its Theoretical Implications. Cambridge: MIT Press.Search in Google Scholar
Sayre, K. M. 1969. Plato’s Analytic Method. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Search in Google Scholar
Sider, T. 2010. Logic for Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Smullyan, R. 1978. What is the Name of This Book? Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.Search in Google Scholar
Sokal, A. 1996a. “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” Social Text 46/47: 217–52.10.2307/466856Search in Google Scholar
Sokal, A. 1996b. “A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies.” Lingua Franca 6 (4): 62–4.Search in Google Scholar
Swoyer, C. “Relativism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta. Available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/relativism/.Search in Google Scholar
Thomas, A. D. 2020. “Extended Modal Realism—A New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.” Philosophia 48: 1197–208.10.1007/s11406-019-00126-zSearch in Google Scholar
Tigner, S. S. 1971. “The ‘Exquisite’ Argument at Tht. 171 A.” Mnemosyne Series IV 24: 366–9.10.1163/156852571X00046Search in Google Scholar
Varzi, A. C. 2020. “Counterpart Theories for Everyone.” Synthese 197: 4691–715.10.1007/s11229-020-02720-1Search in Google Scholar
Vlastos, G. 1956. Plato’s Protagoras. New York: Liberal Arts Press.Search in Google Scholar
Waterfield, R. 1987. “Essay.” In Plato’s Theaetetus. London: Penguin Books.Search in Google Scholar
Waterlow, S. 1977. “Protagoras and Inconsistency: Theaetetus 171a6–c7.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 59: 19–36.10.1515/agph.1977.59.1.19Search in Google Scholar
© 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Unseating the Craftsman: Natural Efficient Cause in Aristotle's Craft Analogy
- Circular Motion and Circular Thought: A Synthetic Approach to the Fifth Element in Aristotle’s de Philosophia and de Caelo
- Play and Moral Education in the Choruses of Plato’s Laws
- Subjective Realism: A Possible-Worlds Interpretation of the Anti-Relativist Arguments in Plato’s Theaetetus
- The Chicken or the Egg? Aristotle on Speusippus’ Reasons to Deny the Principle is (the) Good
- The Body, Experience, and the History of Dream-Science in Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- Unseating the Craftsman: Natural Efficient Cause in Aristotle's Craft Analogy
- Circular Motion and Circular Thought: A Synthetic Approach to the Fifth Element in Aristotle’s de Philosophia and de Caelo
- Play and Moral Education in the Choruses of Plato’s Laws
- Subjective Realism: A Possible-Worlds Interpretation of the Anti-Relativist Arguments in Plato’s Theaetetus
- The Chicken or the Egg? Aristotle on Speusippus’ Reasons to Deny the Principle is (the) Good
- The Body, Experience, and the History of Dream-Science in Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica