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Heidegger on Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness

  • Peter Grove
Published/Copyright: March 19, 2010
SATS
From the journal SATS Volume 5 Issue 1

Abstract

The article aims at a determination of Heidegger's contribution to a theory of subjectivity and self-consciousness. It does so through a discussion of Øverenget's book on this topic and in particular of his thesis that according to Heidegger the self is given “with” our consciousness of objects. Three ways are considered in which this thesis might apply on the one hand to Heidegger's argument and on the other to the phenomenon in question: with Kant as an expression of a functional conception of our self-awareness, as a determination of its epistemic structure, and as a claim of the irreducible concreteness of subjectivity. It is, among other things, argued that the first way at best does not exhaust the thesis, that the second way corresponds to Heidegger's intention, but that his argumentation does not reach such a determination, and that the third way expresses both his ultimate intention and the field of his real contribution in the theory of subjectivity. Besides, it is argued that Heidegger at these points is much closer to German idealism than he and Øverenget realize.

Published Online: 2010-03-19
Published in Print: 2004-05-01

© Philosophia Press 2004

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