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Negated concepts interfere with anaphor resolution

  • William H. Levine and Joel A. Hagaman
Published/Copyright: November 20, 2008
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Intercultural Pragmatics
From the journal Volume 5 Issue 4

Abstract

Across three experiments, we studied whether the mental representations of negated concepts are suppressed. In two reading-time experiments, we tested whether the presence of a negated nonreferent distractor (e.g., Justin bought a mango but not an apple. He ate the fruit.) interfered with the process of anaphor resolution. We found evidence that highly-typical category exemplars (e.g., apple) in the negated nonreferent role interfere with anaphor comprehension; evidence regarding less-typical category exemplars was mixed. In a third experiment, participants read brief passages like those from the prior experiments and their memory for the category exemplars was tested in a surprise cued-recall task. Once again, we found evidence that negated nonreferents are considered during anaphor resolution. These results are inconsistent with a theoretical perspective that posits that negation of a concept obligatorily leads to suppression of that concept. Instead, we argue that the comprehension of negation will be dictated by its pragmatic role.

Published Online: 2008-11-20
Published in Print: 2008-November

© 2008 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin

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