Home Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law
Article
Licensed
Unlicensed Requires Authentication

Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law

  • James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas
Published/Copyright: August 17, 2009
Become an author with De Gruyter Brill
European Company and Financial Law Review
From the journal Volume 6 Issue 2-3

In this paper, we provide an overview of the most significant empirical research that has been conducted in recent years on the public and private enforcement of the U.S. federal securities laws. The evidence reviewed shows that the PSLRA's provisions have largely achieved their intended purposes. For example, many more private suits are headed by an institutional lead plaintiff, such plaintiffs appear to fulfill the desired role of monitoring the suit's prosecution and their presence is associated with suits yielding better settlements and lower attorneys' fees awards. SEC enforcement efforts, while significant, have tended to focus on weaker targets, suggesting that the big fish get away.

Published Online: 2009-08-17
Published in Print: 2009-August

© Copyright 2009 by the European Company and Financial Law Review (ECFR)

Downloaded on 18.9.2025 from https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/ECFR.2009.164/html
Scroll to top button