

5. A Spy or a Go-between? Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the *Itinerario* and the Rise of Dutch Overseas Expansion (1583–1611)

Abstract

This chapter examines the Dutch-Iberian relations, with a focus on the well-known case of Jan Huygen van Linschoten, the famous Dutch traveler to Portuguese Asia in the 1580s. It discusses the methods used by Van Linschoten to acquire Iberian (Portuguese and Spanish) maritime knowledge, and how his reshaping of the contents for the *Itinerario* publication in 1596 affected not only Dutch overseas expansion, but also the English and French maritime expansion in the early 17th century. Additionally, the chapter demonstrates how, at the transition to the 17th century, Iberian maritime knowledge had become so widespread among its maritime rivals that it became impossible for the Iberian Crowns to successfully implement secrecy policies.

Keywords: Dutch Republic, Spain, Iberian Union, Portuguese Asia, traveler, espionage

Introduction

Jan Huygen van Linschoten (1563–1611) and his 1596 *Itinerario* was of critical importance in Northern Europe for several years. As Charles McKew Parr has pointed out, the *Itinerario* contained all the knowledge the Dutch and the English had been waiting for, emboldening them to launch their enterprises in Asia.¹ Hitherto hesitant to embark on relatively unfamiliar

¹ Charles McKew Parr, *Jan van Linschoten: The Dutch Marco Polo* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), XV, XXV, XXVII, XXXIV and XLVI.

sailing routes, both countries took Van Linschoten's exaggerated portrait of Portuguese decline as an invitation to mount a direct challenge for dominion in Asia. Parr also regarded Van Linschoten as an unusual figure who, carrying large volumes of intelligence, was able to move between two worlds torn apart by the wars of religion: King Philip II's Spain and the nascent Dutch Republic. Ernst van den Boogaart also recognized that the publication of the *Itinerario* triggered the beginning of Dutch overseas expansion,² showing that Van Linschoten drew an emphatically moral map of the diversity of Asia.³ The *Itinerario*'s significance is likewise attested by its pattern of distribution: after being swiftly translated into many European languages, roughly 10,000 to 15,000 thousand copies of the book circulated during the 17th century.⁴

Yet, as Arie Pos has noted, Dutch historiography seems to have forgotten the *Itinerario*.⁵ Considered to be one of the most important books about 16th-century Portuguese Asia, and a snapshot of India before the arrival of the North Europeans, the *Itinerario* has also received little attention in Portuguese historiography, despite an excellent 1997 translation and edition by Arie Pos and Rui Manuel Loureiro.⁶ Neither Dutch nor Portuguese historians have fully explained how Van Linschoten, having spent a mere five years in Asia, gained unprecedented access to Portuguese knowledge (nautical rutters, cartography, trade, botany, medicines, weighs, measures) and then brought such precious intelligence back to the Netherlands. Van Linschoten was by no means the first Dutchman in Portuguese Asia, but none had managed to collect the material he did. Faced with this puzzling historical and historiographical landscape, the question immediately emerges: why was Van Linschoten the man "fated" to do what his fellow countrymen had not?

2 Ernst van den Boogaart, *Jan Huygen van Linschoten and the Moral Map of Asia* (London: The Roxburghe Club, 1999), 1.

3 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 1 and Ernst van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia: Word and Text in the Itinerario and the Icones of Jan Huygen van Linschoten* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

4 Adrien Delmas, "L'*Itinerario* de J.H. van Linschoten, Ou l'histoire d'un divorce entre le livre et la compagnie hollandaise des Indes Orientales (VOC), 1595–1619," *Quaerendo* 42, no. 1 (2012): 13.

5 Arie Pos, "A Stranger's Testimony: Some of Jan Huygen van Linschoten's Views on and from Goa Compared with Portuguese Sources," *Itinerario* 28, no. 2 (2004): 117; Arie Pos, "Sources and Organisation of the Botanical Section of the *Itinerario* (1596) by Jan Huygen van Linschoten," *Review of Culture: International Edition* 20 (2006): 41.

6 *Itinerário, viagem ou navegação de Jan Huygen van Linschoten para as Índias Orientais ou Portuguesas*, ed. Arie Pos and Rui Manuel Loureiro (Lisbon: CNCDP, 1997), 1–53.

Parr and van den Boogaart,⁷ perhaps Van Linschoten's two main biographers, were succeeded by several scholars. Two other important contributions to tracing Van Linschoten's biography include an article by Arun Saldanha and the introduction to the aforementioned translation by Arie Pos and Rui Manuel Loureiro. Additionally, a wide range of cultural studies on diverse aspects of the *Itinerario* have been presented by several authors. Many of these studies examined how Van Linschoten portrayed Asia, associating it with the topic of the Portuguese black legend in Asia.⁸ However, recent studies failed to problematize the ways that the Dutchman obtained and moved around with secret Portuguese knowledge, embodied in documents such as nautical rutters and cartography. By eliding this matter, scholarship on Van Linschoten tacitly suggests that the feat must have been easy. This, in turn, has led to the idea that Van Linschoten was a spy, with the *Itinerario*'s assertion of Portuguese decline evidenced by lackadaisical Portuguese response to the plunder of such sensitive knowledge by the Dutch.

The aim of this chapter is to probe a pivotal unanswered question: how and where, during his stay in Asia between 1583 and 1588, did Van Linschoten become acquainted with the Portuguese knowledge that he later published in the *Itinerario* and that ended influencing the rise of Dutch overseas expansion? In order to answer this question, I will rely on Iberian sources whenever that is possible. Although the Portuguese and Spanish sources do not mention Van Linschoten directly and the personal notes that he brought back to the Dutch Republic have not yet been located, the chapter will re-examine several aspects of his biography in the context of the broader evolution of the Estado da India during the 1580s.⁹ Combining this with a careful re-reading of Van Linschoten's claims in the *Itinerario*, this chapter will argue that he is better perceived in the framework of Renaissance intra-European knowledge transfers, than through the classical perspective of Van Linschoten as a spy. After debating whether Van Linschoten had become a spy during his stay in Goa or later during his sojourn in the

7 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*; Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten* and idem, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*.

8 For a more detailed reassessment of Linschoten's scholarship see: Nuno Vila-Santa, "Jan Huygen van Linschoten (1563–1611): An Annotated Bibliography," RUTTER technical notes, 2021, https://www.rutter-project.org/uploads/1/2/9/4/129482413/vila-santa_tn9.pdf. [accessed on 7 December 2023].

9 The expression Estado da India refers to the Portuguese ports network in Asia that functioned as another Asian power, as defined by Luís Filipe Thomaz, *De Ceuta a Timor* (Lisbon: Difel, 1994), 207–8.

Azores and Lisbon between 1589 and 1592, it will investigate the editorial process of the *Itinerario* preceding its publication. It will also address the revisitation of one of the major features of the *Itinerario*, its black legend of Portuguese decline. All these topics will be connected with Van Linschoten's non-participation in Dutch expeditions to Asia from 1595 onwards and with Dutch-Portuguese rivalry in Asia.

This chapter will thus propose a new approach to Van Linschoten, bearing in mind that his case is situated in a whole process of knowledge transfer between Portugal and the rest of Europe during the 16th century, as has been argued for the cases discussed in the previous chapters. It will quickly become apparent that although the main scenario for Van Linschoten's interchange was not in Europe but overseas, the mechanisms for knowledge transfer were very similar to the ones previously identified. In a way, this chapter will also demonstrate that the Dutch-Iberian interchange of maritime knowledge followed the same patterns as the Portuguese-Spanish, the Anglo-Iberian or the Franco-Iberian ones.

5.1 A Dutchman in the Entourage of an Archbishop of Goa: D. Frei Vicente da Fonseca and King Philip II (1580–1583)

It is difficult to understand the conditions under which Van Linschoten departed for Portuguese Asia in 1583 without mentioning the historical relations between the Low Countries and Portugal. Ever since the conquest of Lisbon from the Muslims in 1147, the first Portuguese King Afonso Henriques (1139–85) had granted privileges to the crusaders from the Low Countries who had helped him capture the city.¹⁰ Starting then, and especially from the 13th century onwards, a mercantile community from the Low Countries took root in Portugal, affirming Lisbon's status as a key commercial port between Northern and Mediterranean Europe. By the 14th century, Portuguese merchants also established themselves in Bruges and in Zeeland with the onset of the salt trade around 1400.¹¹ The 15th century witnessed a tightening of relations when Princess Elizabeth (1397–1471), King John I's (1385–1433) daughter, married Philip, duke of Burgundy (1419–67). The Burgundian dukes, lords of parts of the Low Countries, quickly started to hire Portuguese

10 H. Houwens Post, "As relações marítimas entre Portugueses e Holandeses na Idade Média," *Olísipo* 23 (1960): 124.

11 Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its rise, Greatness, and Fall. 1477–1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 16.

carpenters and adopted Portuguese nautical and cartographical advances.¹² Similarly, the participation of Flemish settlers in the colonization of some Azorean islands is well-documented in the 15th century.¹³

These international bonds deepened throughout the 16th century, with marriages serving to cement alliances between the houses of Avis and Austria, lords of the Low Countries, and intensifying commercial traffic at the Portuguese factory of Antwerp. Lisbon also aided in intensifying relations; as a global trade hub during the Renaissance, it supported a growing community of merchants from the Low Countries.¹⁴ By the middle of the 16th century, the Portuguese had outsourced some of their Atlantic freight cargoes to Dutch ships. This, in turn, enabled the first Dutch merchants to settle in Brazil in 1582.¹⁵

The Portuguese overseer/consul at Antwerp acted not only as a commercial, financial, and cultural liaison to the Low Countries, but was also charged with recruiting Flemish-Dutchmen and Germans to serve in Portuguese Asia as artillerymen or *harquebusiers*. This borderline mercenary practice was a direct result of a shortage of these specialists in Portugal.¹⁶ John Everaert has documented several Flemings and Dutchmen who served in Asia under the Portuguese during the 16th century.¹⁷ Dutchmen and Flemings served in the military field in the other Portuguese overseas areas as well.

Turning to the arts, Portuguese patronage of celebrated painters and engravers from the Low Countries is conspicuous throughout the 16th century, with the Portuguese Avis kings providing notable examples. Thus there are the well-known cases of the hiring of António de Holanda (1480–1571) and of his son Francisco de Holanda (1517–85). This “Dutch-Flemish specialty” was

12 Richard W. Unger, “Dutch Nautical Science in the Golden Age: The Portuguese Influence,” *e-Journal of Portuguese History* 9, no. 2 (2011): 70–71 and 79.

13 Cátia Antunes, “Portugal and the United Provinces, Two Innovative Countries: Common Factors, Related Developments – A Handover,” in *The Sea in History: The Early Modern World*, ed. Christian Buchet and Gérard Le Bouedec (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2017), 342; Jacques Paviot, “Les flamands au Portugal au XVe siècle (Lisbonne, Madeira, Açores),” *Anais de História de Além-Mar* VII (2006), 7–40.

14 Eddy Stols, “Lisboa: um portal do mundo para a nação flamenga,” in *Lisboa em 1514. O relato de Jan Taccoen van Zillebeke*, ed. Jorge Fonseca (Vila Nova de Famalicão: Centro de História da Cultura da Universidade Nova de Lisboa/Edições Húmus, 2014), 51.

15 Houwens Post, “As relações marítimas,” 111–3.

16 Gregor M. Metzger, “Guns in Paradise: German and Dutch Artillerymen in the Portuguese Empire (1415–1640),” *Anais de História de Além-Mar* XII (2011): 63 and 68.

17 John Everaert, “Soldiers, Diamonds and Jesuits: Flemings and Dutchmen in Portuguese India (1505–90),” in *Vasco da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia*, ed. Anthony R. Disney and Emily Booth (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 87.

so highly regarded that the Portuguese viceroy of India D. Luís de Ataíde (1568–71) did not hesitate to risk his reputation for its sake. He saved Philip of Brias, condemned by the Goa Inquisition, on the condition that the Fleming would draw plans for the fortress of Onor and supervise its construction.¹⁸

Before Van Linschoten's departure, the acclaimed academic Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) in 1578 published a letter to his countrymen exhorting them to travel. Lipsius contended that travel was the only way to know and study the natural world.¹⁹ His statement may hint at the impact of Iberian scientific texts circulating in translation across the Low Countries during the 16th century.²⁰ When Van Linschoten set off for Spain in 1579, he was following the spirit of Lipsius's mandate, as he stated in a letter to his parents in 1584 and in the *Itinerario* itself.²¹ Van Linschoten's commitment to traveling may also be linked to his family's move to Enkhuizen in 1572, after the Spanish conquest of Haarlem. In Enkhuizen, a maritime city with direct commercial connections to Portugal, Van Linschoten's ears were filled with tales of Asia. He also saw his father lending money to shipowners on multiple occasions.²² In a time when the outcome of a successful Dutch rebellion against King Philip II was uncertain,²³ there was still a chance for Van Linschoten to follow the paths of many Dutchmen before him and serve in the Iberian empires. Therefore, as argued, there is no evidence or any serious reason to consider that by 1579 Van Linschoten was a Dutch spy sent to pilfer Iberian maritime knowledge.²⁴

Arriving at Seville in 1580, Van Linschoten observed the intense activity of the *Casa de la Contratación*, but soon decided to join in King Philip II's invasion of Portugal. This may mean he had already resolved to travel to Asia using Portuguese conduits. Prior to 1583 he learned both Spanish and Portuguese, prerequisites to securing an office in the Portuguese empire. Profiting from his brothers' connections at King Philip II's court, he attended the King's ceremonial arrival in Lisbon. In 1580–81, he entered the employ of a local merchant, while he awaited authorization to head onward to Asia.

18 Nuno Vila-Santa, *Entre o Reino e o Império: a carreira político-militar de D. Luís de Ataíde (1516–1581)* (Lisbon: ICS, 2015), 158.

19 Harold J. Cook, *Matters of Exchange: Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch Golden Age* (London: Yale University Press/New Haven, 2007), 48.

20 Harold J. Cook and Sven Dupré, *Translating Knowledge in the Early Modern Low Countries* (Zurich: LIT Verlag GmbH, 2012).

21 *Itinerário*, 1997, 57 and 69.

22 *Itinerário*, 1997, 9–14.

23 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 184–94.

24 *Itinerario*..., 1997, 35–36; Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 3.

Attentively following Portuguese current events since 1580, Van Linschoten witnessed, at a distance, the war between King Philip II and Dom Antonio (1531–95), the Portuguese pretendant to the Portuguese throne, which affected both the Azores and the broader Portuguese overseas empire. Van Linschoten was certainly aware that King Philip II feared insubordination in Portuguese Asia, where the possibility of open rebellion against Spanish rule and even rumors of D. António's departure for India were constant in 1580–81. In response to his insecure position, King Philip II named D. Francisco Mascarenhas (1581–84) viceroy of India in early 1581, giving him special powers to legitimize his recognition as King of Portugal in Portuguese Asia. But the king was only informed that the Estado had sworn Philip II in mid-1582.²⁵ It was at that time,²⁶ that King Philip II appointed the new archbishop of Goa, who would thus have an important role in solidifying the king's rule in Asia against D. António.²⁷

The *relaciones geograficas* of the 1570 and 1580s, a way of ruling the Spanish empire,²⁸ soon influenced the king's rule in Portugal. By 1583, King Philip intended to apply them in Portugal,²⁹ and it is possible that they influenced the appointment of D. Frei Vicente da Fonseca. Philip's choice of Fonseca as archbishop shows that the king aimed to forge his own path in the nomination of bishops and archbishops that applied the decrees from Trent Council, and favoring humble, experienced academics over thirty years old. Fonseca met all these conditions.³⁰ King Philip II's choice was justified by Fonseca's fame. A Dominican royal preacher, Fonseca was held captive after the 1578 battle of Alcazar-Quibir and became known for his conversions of Jews. After escaping imprisonment in disguise, Fonseca became a trusted adviser to Cardinal-King Henry (1578–80). However, as had happened in 1559 with the first archbishop of Goa, Fonseca was reluctant to take an office that required traveling by sea to Goa. Still, King Philip was determined to have his way; as he saw it, Fonseca was *the* man for the job, destined to help rule a whole new territory. Philip promised Fonseca that

25 Vila-Santa, *Entre o Reino e o Império*, 288–329.

26 Diogo do Couto, *Da Ásia* (Lisbon: Régia Officina Typográfica, 1787), decade X, 422–23.

27 Frank Bill, "A European View of Life in 16th-Century Goa: The Images of Jan Huygen van Linschoten," In *India & Portugal: Cultural Interactions*, ed. José Pereira and Pratapaditya Pal (Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2001), 48.

28 Antonio Barrera-Osorio, *Experiencing Nature*, 94–100; Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 211–56; Arndt Brendecke, *Imperio y información. Funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español* (Madrid: Iberoamericana-Vervuet, 2016), 354–411.

29 Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 212.

30 José Pedro Paiva, *Os bispos de Portugal e do Império 1495–1777* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 2006), 369–70.

if he agreed to accept the Goa post, he could return to Europe after five years and expect a prompt promotion.³¹ Documents on the archbishop's nomination and Fonseca's missives have not been found in Portuguese and Spanish archives,³² but it is very probable that King Philip granted him special powers, as he did for Viceroy Mascarenhas in 1581. There are signs that Fonseca was plied with promises of power. Notable examples include Philip II's appointment of Fonseca to preach at the burial of the bones of Kings Sebastian and Henry, followed by the king's public announcement of Fonseca's appointment as archbishop of Goa,³³ and the general role played by previous archbishops of Goa in the government of Portuguese Asia. The political dimension of Fonseca's position in India is unmistakable: in 1584, he managed the transition of temporal power from one viceroy to another,³⁴ and in 1587 he set off from Asia to Portugal to complain about the viceroy.

In 1583, Van Linschoten quickly recognized that Fonseca's impending departure to Goa would be an ideal opportunity to embark for Asia. Once again exploiting his family connections (one of his brothers had been appointed Welser and Fugger's overseer on one of the ships in the archbishop's fleet, and his brother's patron was friends with a secretary to King Philip II), Van Linschoten pushed to be included on Fonseca's forty-man entourage. Ultimately, he was made part of Fonseca's retinue.³⁵

Van Linschoten was not the first Dutchman to depart for Asia. His unusual skillset must have piqued Fonseca's interest; he spoke Portuguese and Spanish, claimed noble roots (having bought the surname "Van Linschoten" before leaving the Low Countries), and evinced both natural curiosity and a talent for note-taking and drawing.³⁶ It is likely that he initially served as Fonseca's accountant. After all, Van Linschoten had only lately learned Portuguese and Spanish; appointing a foreigner with only three years' experience in Portugal as bookkeeper or even secretary of an archbishop of Goa would have been quite unlikely. Given Van Linschoten's past dealings

31 *Itinerário* 1997, 73–74.

32 No data was found in several Portuguese (Torre do Tombo, Portuguese National Library in Lisbon and Ajuda Library) and Spanish archives (Simancas, Archivo de Indias and the Spanish National Library in Madrid), nor in the Vatican Apostolic Archive in several fonds that might contain Fonseca's possible letters to the pope (*Fondo Calfaloniere*, vol. 31, *Nunziatura di Portugallo* 1, 3 and 4, as well bishops' indexes). Most of the correspondence from the archbishops of Goa dates from the 1590s onwards, that is, after Fonseca's death.

33 Pero Roiz Soares, *Memorial*, ed. M. Lopes de Almeida (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1953), 208.

34 Diogo do Couto, 1787, decade X, 9–11.

35 *Itinerário*, 1997, 73–74.

36 *Itinerário*, 1997, 12–14.

with merchants and his father's profession, the role of accountant would have been quite fitting. It is likely that he was promoted to secretary or bookkeeper once he had won Fonseca's confidence.

There should not be any doubt that Van Linschoten must have been a Catholic by the time he entered the archbishop's retinue. It is almost inconceivable that a young Van Linschoten would have been able to trick the Catholic ministers of the king in 1583, when they were perfectly aware of the problem that the Dutch rebels' abjuration of the king posed to Philip's pan-European reputation. It is also unlikely that he was a secret Protestant during his residence in Goa, considering the enfeebled state of the Flemish-Dutch community after two decades of Inquisitorial persecution of alleged Flemish-Dutch and German Protestants.³⁷ Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Van Linschoten could have concealed any Protestant sympathies from his employer, who had powers over the Goa Inquisition and could easily jail Van Linschoten at the slightest suspicion. In fact, his statements reveal that he admired Fonseca, and made a concerted effort to win his confidence.

The first instance in the *Itinerario* is found in Van Linschoten's claims that Fonseca had ordered him to draw a strange fish that had appeared in the river of Goa, to be sent to King Philip II.³⁸ This episode suggests that Fonseca had been charged with collecting and relaying natural knowledge from India. For this, Fonseca relied on Van Linschoten and his drawing talents. A second example can be found in the case of the four Englishmen who arrived at Hormuz and were sent by the local captain to Goa to be jailed under suspicion of espionage for D. António. Van Linschoten was named, alongside other Flemish-Dutch missionaries, to speak with them and receive their confessions. Later he successfully persuaded the archbishop to ask clemency from Viceroy Mascarenhas, securing their release. Even when three of the Englishmen fled and wary eyes turned on Van Linschoten, he was left untouched.³⁹ This event confirms the trust he enjoyed with Fonseca as early as 1584. A third example is Van Linschoten's improved employment conditions by the time of Fonseca's departure for Portugal in 1587: his salary had grown and he had been given the keys of the archbishopric's coffers.⁴⁰

In light of the relationship sketched out by these examples, it seems likely that Fonseca tasked Van Linschoten with writing a major work for King Philip II, to help familiarize the monarch with his Asian dominions, a

37 Everaert, "Soldiers, Diamonds, and Jesuits," 90.

38 *Itinerário*, 1997, 201.

39 *Itinerário*, 1997, 279–82.

40 *Itinerário*, 1997, 294.

clear need of the king in the early 1580s.⁴¹ This had already taken place back in 1582, when an anonymous author who was aware of Philip II's accession to the Portuguese throne and his insufficient knowledge of the Estado, dedicated such a work to him.⁴² It is time to look deeper into Van Linschoten's years at Goa and figure out how he became acquainted with the knowledge that he later published in the *Itinerario*. As stated, given the lack of direct references to Van Linschoten in Iberian sources, this will be an attempt to identify his likely main informants.

5.2 The *Itinerario*, a Book for the Iberian World? Revisiting Van Linschoten's Career in India (1583–88)

5.2.1 Collecting Knowledge: The Archbishop's Trusted Servant and the Cultural Circles of Goa

Although there are many uncertainties surrounding Van Linschoten's life in Asia, it has already been pointed out that he was probably initially hired as an accountant for the archbishop. In any case, Van Linschoten had secured a prestigious office; the archbishop's palace, like the Jesuit headquarters in Rome and the later VOC and EIC command centers,⁴³ was a place where large volumes of information were compiled. Although it is not possible to document patronage during Fonseca's office, the case study of one of his successors, D. Frei Aleixo de Meneses (1595–1612), makes clear the patronage powers that any archbishop of Goa enjoyed.⁴⁴ Ever since the arrival of the printing press in Goa (the publishing activities were supervised by the archbishop and involved the indirect participation of Dutch printers in Lisbon),⁴⁵ a library must have existed in the archbishop's palace. While the precise contents of this library are not known, it is clear that, in the course of executing his duties, initially as accountant and later as secretary

41 Pedro Cardim and Jorge Flores, "An Imperial Formation Joins a Composite Polity: The Portuguese Empire and the Information System of the Hispanic Monarchy (1580–1640)," *European Review of History* 30, no. 4 (2023): 602.

42 *Livro das cidades, e fortalezas, que a Coroa de Portugal tem nas partes da India, e das capitãias, e mais cargos que nelas ha, e da importancia deles*, ed. Francisco Paulo Mendes da Luz (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1960).

43 Steven, "Long-Distance Corporations," 270.

44 Carla Alferes Pinto, "'Traz à memória a excelência de suas obras e virtudes.' D. frei Aleixo de Meneses (1559 – 1617), mecenas e patrono," *Anais de História de Além-Mar* XII (2011), 53–180.

45 Everaert, "Soldiers, Diamonds, and Jesuits," 96.

or bookkeeper, Van Linschoten must have consulted it almost since the beginning of his stay in Goa. Besides religious texts, Van Linschoten would undoubtedly have found there the first edition of Garcia de Orta's (1501?–68) book on the drugs of India, which had been authorized for printing by Archbishop D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira in 1563.⁴⁶ Van Linschoten even seems to have acquired his own Portuguese edition of Orta's book during his stay in Goa, later selling this copy in the Dutch Republic in 1593. This fact explains why textual similarities between Orta's text and some chapters of the *Itinerario* have been identified.⁴⁷

Other books Van Linschoten may have perused in the archbishop's library include the *Lusíadas*, the epic poem by Luís de Camões (1524–80), and other Portuguese chronicles, such as those by João de Barros (1496–1570) and Fernão Lopes de Castanheda (1500–59).⁴⁸ All these texts contained knowledge about Portuguese history in Asia and would have fed the Dutchman's innate curiosity, although Van Linschoten seems not to have used entire passages of them as he did with Orta's text. In spite of his limited travel within Asia (spending most of his time in Goa, fifteen days in Mozambique, fifteen days in Cochín, eight in Onor, and half a day in Cananor),⁴⁹ Van Linschoten's social position allowed him to gather ample information through personal contacts.

Van Linschoten could have sourced general facts on Malacca, Indonesia, China, Japan, and the Moluccas from several individuals: his friend Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,⁵⁰ his Flemish acquaintance Gerrit van Afhuysen (with whom he was reunited at Santa Helena Island in 1589),⁵¹ or, very likely, the Portuguese noblemen that he encountered in Goa. It was via conversations with a Portuguese captain imprisoned in Goa, for instance, that Van Linschoten gained information on the Banda islands. A Flemish correspondent at Coromandel reported data about Bengal to Van Linschoten.⁵² Similarly, Matias de Albuquerque, a captain of Malacca and Hormuz, likely shared his

46 Teresa Nobre Carvalho, *Os desafios de Garcia de Orta* (Lisbon: A Esfera do Caos, 2015), 144 and 155.

47 Pos, "Sources and Organisation," 43; Agnes Sedlmayr Trindade, "Duas Visões da Índia do século XVI: Garcia de Orta e Jan Huygen Van Linschoten" (MA thesis, University of Algarve, Faro, 2005).

48 *Itinerário*, 1997, 33–35.

49 *Itinerário*, 1997, 31.

50 Arie Pos, "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp e Jan Huygen van Linschoten, Amigos–Aventureiros Na Índia Portuguesa e Pioneiros Da Expansão Marítima Holandesa," *Revista Portuguesa de História Do Livro* III, no. 5 (1999): 57–92.

51 *Itinerário*, 1997, 325.

52 Ernst van den Boogart, 2003, 3.

insights with Van Linschoten when the two met in India.⁵³ D. Paulo de Lima Pereira, another Malacca captain, may also have provided intelligence to the Dutchman. Van Linschoten mentions his departure and later triumphal return to Goa,⁵⁴ and may well have met with him and discussed Malacca. This would have happened during Van Linschoten's first days of departure from India, since Lima Pereira was also returning home in 1589 and was shipwrecked in an incident reported in the *Itinerário*.⁵⁵ Regarding Ceylon, Van Linschoten could have relied for information on a Dutch friend,⁵⁶ or on Manuel de Sousa Coutinho. Coutinho had served as a captain of Columbus and later became the governor of India who authorized the Dutchman's departure.⁵⁷ For Mozambique and Mutapa, Van Linschoten stated that he drew on first-hand experiences from his stay there in 1583, reports from previous captains of Mozambique,⁵⁸ and accounts given by a black slave.⁵⁹ Turning to Arabia, Hormuz, and the Middle East, Van Linschoten likely relied on knowledge he extracted from the Englishmen that he helped to release. He also collected information from Bernard Bruchets (the archbishop's servant who wrote Van Linschoten letters of his return trip to Europe via the Hormuz-Basra-Aleppo-Tripoli land route),⁶⁰ from Venetian merchants,⁶¹ and likely from Captain Matias de Albuquerque.

Van Linschoten met personally with Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas upon his arrival in 1583.⁶² It is reasonable to assume that he also met Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses (1584–88). Moreover, he became close to Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho (1588–91). Bearing in mind the close relationship between Fonseca and these viceroys, it is also quite likely that Van Linschoten collected general information about trade, botany, medicines, natural history, and animals during conversations with these rulers of the Estado. Van Linschoten also probably made contact with Diogo do Couto (1542–1616), future Portuguese chronicler of Asia, whose stay in Goa overlapped with the Dutchman's. However, there is no direct documental

53 *Itinerário*, 1997, 352.

54 *Itinerário*, 1997, 297–98.

55 *Itinerário*, 1997, 316–20.

56 *Itinerário*, 1997, 31.

57 *Itinerário*, 1997, 300. Nuno Vila-Santa, "Manuel de Sousa Coutinho," in *Virtual Encyclopedia of the Portuguese Expansion*, 2008, <http://www.cham.pt/eve>. [accessed 7 December 2023]

58 *Itinerário*, 1997, 82.

59 Thomás A. S. Haddad, "Um olhar estrangeiro sobre a etnografia implícita dos portugueses na goa quinhentista," *Revista Brasileira de História da Ciência* 4, no. 2 (2011): 158.

60 *Itinerário*, 1997, 296.

61 Haddad, "Um olhar estrangeiro," 158.

62 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 80.

reference to knowledge exchanges between him and Couto, nor between Van Linschoten and the Italian merchant-humanist Filippo Sassetti (1540–88).

Van Linschoten's perspective may have resulted from his conversancy with manuscript texts about the decline of the Estado circulating in Goa. These manuscripts, which have provoked historiographical debates on the Portuguese black legend in Asia,⁶³ were the *Primor*, by an anonymous writer (c. 1578),⁶⁴ and the *Soldado Prático* by Diogo do Couto (Van Linschoten would have consulted the first version, of 1564, and not the second, from the 1590s).⁶⁵ It may also be assumed that Van Linschoten was familiar with the *Desengano dos Perdidos* (1573), by Archbishop D. Gaspar de Leão Pereira (?–1576).⁶⁶ The same can be said of a 1569 account by Archbishop D. Jorge Temudo addressed to King Sebastian with several proposed reforms for the Estado.⁶⁷ Both works would have been in the archbishop's palace. On the other hand, Van Linschoten could not have been more than vaguely aware of the *Reformação* of Rodrigues da Silveira.⁶⁸

Outside the palace walls, Van Linschoten might have communicated with other crucial sources. Taking into account the close ties between the archbishop and the Jesuit visitor and provincial of Asia Alessandro Valignano (1539–1606), it is possible that he was also one of Van Linschoten's informants, although he is never explicitly mentioned in the *Itinerario*. Van Linschoten may have met Valignano due to his close relation to Fonseca,⁶⁹

63 George Davison Winius, *A lenda negra da Índia Portuguesa. Diogo do Couto, os seus contemporâneos e o Soldado Prático. Contributo para o estudo da corrupção política nos impérios do início da Europa Moderna* (Lisbon: Edições Antígona, 1994).

64 *Primor e honra da vida soldadesca no Estado da Índia*, ed. Laura Monteiro Pereira, Maria Augusta Lima Cruz and Maria do Rosário Laureano Santos (Ericeira: Editora Mar de Letras, 2003).

65 Nuno Vila-Santa, "O Primeiro Soldado Prático de Diogo do Couto e os seus contemporâneos," in *Memórias* 2017 (Lisbon: Portuguese Navy Academy, 2018), 171–90.

66 Ricardo Ventura, "D. Gaspar de Leão e o Desengano de Perdidos: estudo histórico-cultural," 2 vols (MA thesis, University of Lisbon, 2005).

67 Joseph Wicki, "Duas relações sobre a situação da Índia portuguesa nos anos de 1568 e 1569," *Stvdia* 8 (1961), 133–220.

68 As it was written after his time in Asia between 1597 and 1622. Francisco Rodrigues da Silveira, *Reformação da milícia e governo do Estado da Índia Oriental*, ed. Luís Filipe Barreto, George Davison Winius and Benjamim N. Teensma (Lisbon: Fundação Oriente, 1996), 12.

69 The archbishop preached at the Jesuit college of Goa in 1584 (*Documenta Indica* (DI), edited by Joseph Wicki, vol. 13 (Rome: Instituto Societa Romanum Iesu, 1975), 520 and 550) and in several letters Valignano points out his good relationship with Fonseca who authorized him to build the Jesuit professed house at Goa and who also collaborated with him regarding the approach to the Christians of Saint Thomas at the Third Provincial Council of India of 1585 (DI, vol. 14, 1979, 107–108, 193, 302 and 687–88).

and their encounter may explain the similarity between the moral map of the *Itinerario* and Valignano's *Summarium Indicium*.⁷⁰ It is also plausible to think that he was acquainted with Valignano's 1575 report on Estado affairs,⁷¹ and with the letters of Jesuit missions in China and Japan. More facts could have reached Van Linschoten when he witnessed the departure and arrival of the famous Japanese embassy to Europe. Van Linschoten could also have made queries with the Flemish-Dutch Jesuits whose presence he records in Goa.⁷² Thus, from his position in Fonseca's retinue, the Dutchman had access to Portuguese debates and he learned the contours of Goa's cultural circles.

Passing sequentially through the *Itinerario*'s chapters, it is clear that Van Linschoten's enthusiastic "discovery" of elephants and their abilities and the mistreatments of them, as well as descriptions of Indian cattle, the rhinoceros, crocodiles, and other maritime animals,⁷³ were heavily based on direct observations. Van Linschoten mentions his personal observations in his narrative and they are also quite evident in his drawings. For his comments on several commodities and their value, Van Linschoten relied on information picked up in such places as the market of Goa (an illustration of which is included in the *Itinerario*). Van Linschoten likely made use of opinions from Italian, Flemish-Dutch, German, and French merchants and soldiers present in Goa, as he recorded that they lived like brothers due to Portuguese prejudices against foreigners.⁷⁴ Most of the *Itinerario*'s description of the goods exchanged on the maritime Asian market seem to be rooted in personal experience, supplemented by reports from merchants. These may have included the Italian merchant and humanist Filippo Sassetti, whom he possibly met during his 1583 voyage to India, as has been seen. Van Linschoten also collected several scientific specimens and had a pronounced interest in depicting plants like the *arvore triste* and the pineapple. He additionally availed of oral Asian testimonies.

The *Itinerario*'s treatment of precious stones is an exception, as it was based entirely upon information from Van Linschoten's jeweler friend Frans Connigh (who likely wrote the first draft of these chapters).⁷⁵ The major contribution Van Linschoten makes is commercial insight; he gives a rundown of the economic advantages of various trades, specifies which

70 Van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*, 45–46.

71 *DI*, vol. 10, 1968, 387–411.

72 *Itinerário*, 1997, 279–81.

73 *Itinerário*, 1997, 193–203.

74 *Itinerário*, 1997, 302.

75 *Itinerário*, 1997, 267–78.

regions yield the best products, breaks down classes of goods according to their value, and explains where and how one ought to buy and sell for maximum profit.⁷⁶ All this data is summarized in the chapter on the weights, measures, and coins of India.⁷⁷

Van Linschoten's merchant-cum-scientific collector mentality, characteristic of the Dutch Golden Age,⁷⁸ may also have been a reason for his inclusion in the entourage of the archbishop. Such an extensive trade report, carefully complemented with scientific observations, would have been invaluable to both the archbishop and King Philip II. Some aspects of the report seem tailor-made for a Portuguese ruler (among them, the maps of Mozambique and Goa). The presentation and dedication of this work to Philip II could have been accomplished through cardinal-archduke Albert of Austria (1559–1621), viceroy of Portugal between 1583 and 1593, whose coat of arms Van Linschoten placed on the bird's-eye view of Goa.

It should by now be apparent that the intended audience for the *Itinerario* may have been King Philip II, with Archbishop Fonseca acting as intermediary. Was Van Linschoten planning to write a book structured like those of Duarte Barbosa and Tomé Pires from the 1510s, to be regarded as an updated compendium of knowledge about Asia? If this was his intention, where did Van Linschoten consult such books? By Van Linschoten's time in Goa, only Barbosa's book and a small part of Pires's had been published by the Italian geographer Giovanni Battista Ramussio (1485–1557), who compiled and printed several travel accounts in the 1550s. But Van Linschoten probably only got his hands on Ramussio's works once he returned homeland. The same was probably true of the 1578 treatise by Cristóvão da Costa (1515–94) on Indian drugs.⁷⁹ Could Van Linschoten have read these authors in Goa? And more perplexingly, how and where did he have access to secret cosmographical sources such as nautical rutters and cartography?

5.2.2 Copying Intelligence: Van Linschoten and Portuguese Cosmographical Knowledge

The compilation of Portuguese nautical rutters published in the *Reysgeschrift* section of the *Itinerario* had successfully been kept out of the hands

⁷⁶ *Itinerário*, 1997, 203–71.

⁷⁷ With equivalent conversion rates in Dutch currency. *Itinerário*, 1997, 170–72.

⁷⁸ Cook, *Matters of Exchange*.

⁷⁹ *Itinerário*, 1997, 32.

of foreigners since almost the beginning of the Portuguese discoveries, and scholars disagree on how Van Linschoten came to copying it. Parr argues that he got to know them during his stay in Angra, where he found the Portuguese eager to hand over such intelligence, traumatized as they were by the Spanish conquest of Terceira Island in 1582.⁸⁰ Van den Boogaart is not sure if Van Linschoten copied them in Goa or Angra,⁸¹ while Tan suggests that the pilot Vicente Rodrigues, whom Van Linschoten met in India, gave the Dutchman Portuguese rutters.⁸² But Tan's hypothesis may lose credibility as it implicates the famous pilot, author of two relevant India Run's rutters, in an act of treason, punishable by death under Portuguese laws. Pos states that Van Linschoten may have copied rutters while still in Goa. In the case of the nautical rutters from the Far East (i.e., the Malacca-Macau, and Macau-Nagasaki voyages), we are on firmer footing. There is little doubt that Van Linschoten acquired them from his friend Dirck Gerritsz Pomp, who traveled to Japan in 1585 in the service of Francisco Pais, captain of Macau and of the vessel *Santa Cruz*. In fact, the information published in some of these rutters seems to have come directly from the logbook of the *Santa Cruz*.⁸³

This still does not explain how Van Linschoten accessed the others rutters published in the *Reys-gheschrift*, particularly those concerning intra-Asian voyages and the general routes of India Run ships. Although Pomp could have compiled them during his long Asian career and later delivered them to Van Linschoten, I contend that Van Linschoten consulted these rutters in the viceroy's palace in Goa. Nautical rutters were written and updated at Lisbon's Armazéns da Índia, where prior to each voyage they were copied and distributed to pilots and captains, alongside nautical charts and instruments.⁸⁴ Exactly the same happened in Goa, where there was a "ribeira" (or shipyard) at which Portuguese governors and viceroys regularly convened to coordinate the departures of fleets. It is certainly conceivable that nautical rutters for the India Run and intra-Asian routes (i.e., Goa-Cochin; Goa-Ceylon; Goa-Coromandel coast; Goa-Mozambique) were held in the viceroy's palace for storage, copying, and issuing to pilots. The question is whether Van Linschoten could have gotten hold of such copies and under which conditions.

80 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 165.

81 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 7.

82 Bonny Tan, "The *Itinerario*: Key to the East," *BibloAsia* (2010): 1.

83 Pos, "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp," 68–72.

84 Antonio Sánchez, "Charts for an Empire: A Global Trading Zone in Early Modern Portuguese Nautical Cartography," *Centaurus* 60 (2018): 177.

It is thus, relevant to consider the degree of Van Linschoten's access to the palace. That the Dutchman had gained ongoing admission is confirmed by several passages in the *Itinerario*. The first is his description of the palace looking like an abandoned house when Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas left Goa to meet the newly arrived Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses in 1584. The second is his reference to how the same happened when Viceroy Meneses died in 1588 and Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho succeeded him. Van Linschoten states that this triggered a flurry of refurnishing and redecorating, something that he alleges happened every time there was a change of ruler. That Van Linschoten had first-hand knowledge of the palace is further evidenced by his description of the gallery of paintings of the Portuguese annual fleets to India and portraits of the Portuguese viceroys and governors.⁸⁵ His ability to come and go in the palace must have been a consequence of the high social status he enjoyed in the entourage of the archbishop, which also granted him access to high-ranking officials,⁸⁶ and won him special viceregal dispensation to temporarily leave Goa. This brief departure was, incidentally, to join a company of Portuguese noblemen who had gone to nearby Salsete and Bardez to watch the Hindu *sati*. The sojourn enabled Van Linschoten to make drawings of mosques and Hindu temples, and also got him mixed up in a near-skirmish between the noblemen and Brahmins, with the Dutchman acting as a peacekeeper.⁸⁷

Like his predecessors during the 1570s, Archbishop Fonseca was charged with provisionally governing Goa on two occasions. The first was between December 1583 and April 1584, when Viceroy Mascarenhas visited the Northern Province.⁸⁸ The second took place during the transfer of power between Viceroys Mascarenhas and Meneses in April 1585, when Fonseca jointly ruled with the chancellor and the captain of Goa.⁸⁹ This factor becomes crucial, as Van Linschoten copied the Spanish rutters published in the *Reys-gheschrift* from Francisco Gali's expeditions (the routes Acapulco-Manila, Manila-Macau and Macau-Acapulco) using a copy sent from Macau to Viceroy Meneses.⁹⁰ He could only have accessed it in the viceroy's palace.

Van Linschoten might have copied these rutters under the archbishop's direction, with the purpose of better informing King Philip II about nautical

85 *Itinerário*, 1997, 161 and 300.

86 Pos, "A Stranger's Testimony," 121–22.

87 *Itinerário*, 1997, 191–92.

88 Diogo do Couto, 1787, Decade X, 436 and 460.

89 *Itinerário*, 1997, 286.

90 Rui Manuel Loureiro, "Inquérito sobre um navegador enigmático. Francisco Gali e as suas viagens transpácificas," *Revista de História da Cultura* 60 (2019): 96–97.

matters in Portuguese Asia. He may have also drawn on the *Codex Casanatense*, produced in the 1550s; he would have access to this from 1583, when Fonseca first ruled in the absence of Viceroy Mascarenhas. Many of the drawings and corresponding textual accounts published in the *Itinerario* could have been modeled after this Codex.⁹¹ The fact that Van Linschoten produced charts of Mozambique and Goa, as well as other drawings very probably at the request of Fonseca, make viceregal authorization to consult Portuguese cartography less incredible than it might otherwise have seemed. Such would be the case for Van Linschoten's likely consultation of a 1570s famous atlas, authored by the Portuguese cartographer Fernão Vaz Dourado (1520–80), that compiled several charts of Asia.⁹² Some of the maps that were later published in the *Itinerario* concerning the geographical area of Indonesia, China, and Philippines show some similarities with Dourado's previous maps for this region.⁹³ In addition, Van Linschoten could have studied the orders originally written at Lisbon's Casa da Índia while at the palace.⁹⁴ These would have included several "regimentos" (orders to rulers and captains), political and religious decrees, and merchant laws.

Mixed in among such documents, Van Linschoten could not have failed to come across the general India Run rutters. And, I reiterate, there is reason to believe he had studied them at Fonseca's orders, with the archbishop acting in the service of King Philip II. Although Portuguese nautical rutters were well-known to Portuguese seafarers, they may have only circulated in manuscript form among mariners; no published compendium had been issued until that moment. As has been demonstrated in the first chapter, like his predecessors since the beginning of the 16th century, King Philip II also employed Portuguese experts at Seville's Casa de la Contratación and the Spanish court in order to profit from Portuguese nautical knowledge.

91 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 7, 167 and 175.

92 Donald F. Lach, *Asia in the Making of Europe*, vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 225.

93 Cortesão, *Cartografia e cartógrafos portugueses*, vol. II, 27–28 and 288–89. The author is uncertain whether or not Van Linschoten obtained information for his atlas from Dourado's or by bribing the Portuguese cartographer Bartolomeu de Lasso during his stay in Lisbon in 1592. However, it should be noted that it was the Houtman brothers, not Van Linschoten, who bribed Lasso. Based on the evidence presented, it is likely that Van Linschoten obtained access to Dourado's atlas while it was in the palace of the viceroy of India, as the atlas had been originally produced by Dourado and later presented with a dedication to D. Luís de Ataíde, viceroy of India (1568–71; 1578–81).

94 Arun Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography: Jan Huygen van Linschoten's *Itinerario* and Dutch Expeditions to the Indian Ocean, 1594–1602," *Annales of the Association of American Geographers* 101 (2011): 158.

Meanwhile, it stands to reason that the monarch, obsessed as he was with accumulating and cataloguing scientific knowledge, would wish his library at the Escorial Palace⁹⁵ to boast an updated compilation of the chief Portuguese rutters of Asia. This hypothesis is even more probable after Juan de Herrera's (1530–97) renewed scientific projects and the foundation of the Royal Academy of Mathematics in 1583,⁹⁶ as this meant the beginning of open and formal Portuguese-Spanish scientific cooperation, as was noted in the first chapter.

Although the potential pragmatic motivations of Van Linschoten's research and writing have been stressed, it is relevant not to understate the Dutchman's sincere interest in the topics he treated in the *Itinerario*. As a man hailing from a maritime town on the North Sea, Van Linschoten took copious notes during his voyage to India in 1583, writing rather in the manner of a formally trained seaman and consistently noting latitudes and debating navigational options.⁹⁷ Comparing the chapter on this with the one in which he describes the perilous return voyage to Europe in 1589, there is an undeniable improvement in Van Linschoten's nautical knowledge of the India Run route. In his remarks he carefully discussed shallows, tides, the impact of meteorological conditions, navigation outside the channel of Mozambique, and perceived faults in the decisions made by the Portuguese pilots.⁹⁸ This fact demonstrates that between 1583 and 1589, Van Linschoten did much more than gawk at shipwrecks. He actively gathered information from Portuguese pilots such as Gaspar Reimão Ferreira, whom he met on his 1589 trip back to Portugal.⁹⁹ Moreover, this suggests that, having returned to Enkhuizen and spoken with the former pilot Lucas Waghenaeer (1534–1606) and cartographer Petrus Plancius (1552–1622), Van Linschoten was perfectly able to make changes to the Portuguese nautical rutters that he had compiled, as was already argued.¹⁰⁰ Van Linschoten's portrait of an Arab pilot and his references to Chinese pilots raise questions of whether he sought or acquired expertise on these two navigational cultures while voyaging in the Indian Ocean. Even if he did not, these visual and textual

95 On El Escorial library see: María M. Portuondo, "The Study of Nature, Philosophy, and the Royal Library of San Lorenzo of the Escorial," *Renaissance Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2010): 1106–50.

96 Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 83–86.

97 *Itinerário*, 1997, 74–79.

98 *Itinerário*, 1997, 315–25.

99 Kioko Koiso, *Mar, medo e morte: aspectos psicológicos dos naufrágios na História Trágico-Marítima, nos testemunhos inéditos e noutras fontes*, vol. I (Cascais: Patrimonia, 2004), 101.

100 On this topic: Nuno Vila-Santa, "Jan Huygen van Linschoten and the *Reys-gheschrift*: Updating Iberian Science for the Dutch expansion," *Historical Research* 95, no. 265 (2021): 736–57.

allusions display a cognizance of the still-important role Islamic and Chinese knowledge played in 16th-century Portuguese seafaring.

The deep knowledge of Portuguese political, social, economic, financial, and religious system in Asia that Van Linschoten exhibits across the *Itinerario* documents the privileged access he enjoyed in both the archbishop's and viceroy's palaces in Goa. Van Linschoten's expansiveness on these topics is also a testament to his information network, which was cultivated in a similar manner to that of any Portuguese chronicler based in India and setting about gathering data.¹⁰¹ Van Linschoten's "Portuguese-eye-view" presentation of Asia in the *Itinerario* could readily serve the administrative needs of the Estado in the 1580s.¹⁰² Following the Renaissance tradition inherited from Classical authors, Van Linschoten described Asia from West to East, precisely as Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Tomé Pires, and Duarte Barbosa had done in the beginning of the 16th century. Van Linschoten may even have read these last two authors' works at the viceroy's palace.

This becomes clear through an analysis of how Van Linschoten details so many historical, geographical, and ethnographical events based solely on five years of residence in Asia. Good examples can be found in his accurate descriptions of the fortresses of Mozambique and Goa, which are peppered with curious details (like the Dutchman's allegation that Goan military security fell upon the shoulders of a single boy, with a clapper to warn the whole island of threats). Another case is his geographical description and drawings of Santa Helena and Ascension islands. The same can be said of his thorough historical and ethnographical discussion of Hindu brahmins and his comments on the duplicitous merchants of Gujarat, the inhabitants of nearby Goa and Cochin, and the remarkable forbearance of the Arabs.¹⁰³ The same applies to his description of the monsoon seasons and navigational systems in India, as well as his exhaustive accounts of Portuguese vessels, Lisbon-bound and richly loaded, in Cananor and Cochin.¹⁰⁴

Still, this same degree of factuality and specificity can be found in reports on places that Van Linschoten did *not* visit: his description of the Indu Valley and of Diu; remarks on the Portuguese renegades in Chatigan; his reference to the 1568 war between Pegu and Siam; and his narration of the Portuguese destruction of the famous Buddha teeth in Ceylon in 1560.¹⁰⁵ While Van

101 A clear example of this would be the comparison with Gaspar Correia, who wrote his *Legends of India*, or later the more studied case of Diogo do Couto for his *Decades*.

102 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17.

103 *Itinerário*, 1997, 172–80.

104 *Itinerário*, 1997, 166–69 and 235.

105 *Itinerário*, 1997, 94, 109, 113 and 189–90.

Linschoten is largely ignorant of the religious principles of Hinduism and Buddhism, he evinces a typical European and Christian sense of superiority when he touches on Islam (an antipathy particularly evident in the drawings of the *Itinerario*). This attitude towards Islam in Van Linschoten's case might also be connected with his own career serving the Portuguese, who had had that same vision almost since their arrival in the Indian Ocean.

However, following his participation in the Third Provincial Council of India in 1585, Van Linschoten felt compelled to describe the Saint Thomas Christians. He did so with the same blend of disdain and grudging respect seen in his treatment of Brahmins and the *Naires* of Malabar (whom he perceived to be the closest India had to European nobility). The same spirit pervades his portrayal of the Jewish community at Cochin de Cima. Despite being a servant of the archbishop, among whose main goals was the "conversion" of Jews and surveillance of New Christians, Van Linschoten felt some empathy towards this group. Van Linschoten admitted that, when visiting a Jewish house, he held in his hands a Hebrew version of the Bible.¹⁰⁶ The clear exception to this European superior pattern comes in his description of Japan and China. Impressed by Mendonza's work on China, which he read upon return to the Dutch Republic, Van Linschoten regretted that he did not have 300 ducats to travel with Pomp to China and Japan, in 1584.¹⁰⁷ This statement shows that he was not only rueful at missing commercial opportunities, but disappointed to have lost a chance to see if Chinese civilization matched his expectations.

Although, as has been argued, the *Itinerario* was likely planned as a major cosmographical work for Iberian audiences, it ended up being published in the Dutch Republic. Therefore, it is relevant to make sense of why and how, after the archbishop's death, Van Linschoten was authorized to leave Portuguese Asia.

5.2.3 A Damned Fate and Broken Heart: Van Linschoten and the Reasons behind his Departure from India

In the 1584 letter to his parents, Van Linschoten mulls an imminent return trip home by land.¹⁰⁸ But sometime after penning the missive, he must have realized how much he had left to learn, and he stayed in Goa four more years. The archbishop's growing trust in him stoked Van Linschoten's ambitions.

¹⁰⁶ *Itinerário*, 1997, 183–85 and 187.

¹⁰⁷ *Itinerário*, 1997, 57.

¹⁰⁸ *Itinerário*, 1997, 55–56.

He may have dreamed of being fully integrated into Goa's upper cultural echelons.¹⁰⁹ In later comments on his decision to leave India, he remarks that the choice was a tough one. He states that he had even considered settling there permanently, and notes that he expected a promotion if the archbishop had returned.¹¹⁰

Van Linschoten's ultimate decision to leave India came after news of his father's, his brother's, and the archbishop's death, leaving the Dutchman bereaved and unemployed. Van den Boogaart points out that Van Linschoten may have already amply enriched himself at this point, which could have been a contributing factor to his departure.¹¹¹ Still, even bearing in mind the conflict between the archbishop and Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, it remains to be explained how Van Linschoten was cleared to leave India carrying stacks of sensitive information. Even those who have stressed that Van Linschoten received news from Europe on the evolution of the Dutch rebellion, and thus might have feared for his life without the protection of the archbishop,¹¹² do not explain how he was able to leave India. The news in question was that of the duke of Parma's victories in the South, the fall of Antwerp, and the arrival of the earl of Leicester, all events happening between 1583–1586.¹¹³

Recent clashes between Fonseca and Meneses were a major impetus for Van Linschoten's departure from India. Therefore, it is important to analyze them, using new Iberian sources, because if they had not happened, Fonseca would not have departed from India so soon and Van Linschoten might not have felt forced to leave Portuguese Asia. Van Linschoten and, later on, the Portuguese chronicler Diogo do Couto, agree that the discord between the viceroy and archbishop emerged out of jurisdictional disputes. Another source posits that the conflict originated with Fonseca's order to imprison some of the viceroy's soldiers after they had attacked some of his own servants. Meneses had countered that Fonseca lacked the secular authority to do so and ordered their release. The top judicial officer of India was pressured to take a stand, but despite threats of excommunication from Fonseca, he supported the viceroy's allegation.¹¹⁴ This last event probably

109 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 100.

110 *Itinerario...*, 1997, 306–8; H. Houwens Post, *João Huygen van Linschoten, administrador da casa do Arcebispo de Goa e espião da Holanda (1583–1587)*, Reprint from *Ocidente* (1960), 129.

111 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 7.

112 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 109–11.

113 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 214–30.

114 Frei Paulo da Trindade, *Conquista Espiritual do Oriente*, ed. F. Félix Lopes (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1962) 99 and 219–20.

happened because King Philip II had appointed Meneses as viceroy for a period longer than the usual three years. This is implied by the king's 1587 denial of Meneses's request for a successor.¹¹⁵ Terms longer than three years were very unusual in Portuguese Asia and can only be explained (in Meneses's case) by the king's high expectations of him.

Humiliated in the aftermath of the incident with the viceroy's soldiers, the archbishop left India. Both Van Linschoten and Couto state that Fonseca intended to go to Portugal and Rome with written testimonies to denounce what he considered the religious and secular immoralities of India. No one could persuade the archbishop otherwise.¹¹⁶ He temporarily entrusted important management tasks to Van Linschoten, leaving him the keys to the coffers and in charge of collecting taxes on the authority of the pope for the release of captives from Morocco. Van Linschoten was well-aware of the scandal of the whole situation; it was the first time an archbishop left for Portugal in the midst of a public conflict with a viceroy. While all previous archbishops of Goa died in office, Fonseca had abandoned his post before finishing the five years' service he had promised King Philip II. Thus, Van Linschoten's statement that Fonseca had been poisoned before arriving in Lisbon, to the great delight of his rivals, cannot be ignored.¹¹⁷

The relationship between Fonseca and Meneses had not always been acrimonious, and in earlier letters to Portugal it is impossible to detect any bitterness.¹¹⁸ But in a letter to King Philip II dated December 6, 1587, Viceroy Meneses spoke of problems with Fonseca, claiming that the archbishop incessantly demanded additional funds for the archbishopric. When these requests were denied by Meneses, Fonseca allegedly tried to force the appointment of financial officers. Meneses blocked this scheme. It was at this point, Meneses reports, that Fonseca embarked for Portugal in the company of a rich captain, leaving his house in charge of Nuno Fernandes Sequeira, and setting a terrible example. To end this crisis, Meneses asked for a reinforcement of his powers.¹¹⁹

115 Letter from Philip II to D. Duarte de Meneses, 3.III.1587, Arquivo Nacional Torre Tombo (ANTT), *Corpo Cronológico* (CC) I–112–19. On Meneses's career: Nuno Vila-Santa, "D. Duarte de Meneses," "Manuel de Sousa Coutinho," and "Matias de Albuquerque," in *Virtual Encyclopedia of the Portuguese Expansion*, <http://www.cham.pt/eve>. [accessed on 7 December 2023].

116 *Itinerário*, 1997, 297; Diogo do Couto, *Da Ásia*, 1787, decade X, 324–25.

117 *Itinerário*, 1997, 306.

118 The archbishop merely petitioned for whatever necessary church building materials the viceroy of Portugal was unable to provide. Letters from Cardinal Albert of Austria to Philip II, 1.XI/6.XII.1586 – AGS, *Secretarias Provinciales Portugal* (SPP), book 1550, fls. 596v. and 701.

119 AGS, *SSP*, book 1551, fls. 13v. and 17–17v.

The battle between the secular and ecclesiastical spheres in the Estado had reached its apex. Parr argues that Viceroy Meneses died soon after hearing news from a Hormuz courier that Fonseca had landed in Lisbon and discredited him.¹²⁰ But this is contradicted by other reports. Valignano, for instance, mentioned Fonseca's departure (but not his motives) and urged his Jesuit colleagues to welcome Fonseca, should he arrive in Rome.¹²¹ Moreover, Viceroy Meneses had been on good terms with the Dominicans, the order to which Fonseca belonged.¹²²

Van Linschoten was formally discharged from all duties in Fonseca's household by September 1588 at the latest, when word of the archbishop's death reached India. André Fernandes claimed, in a letter to King Philip II, dated November 20, 1588, that he had been overseeing the archbishop's household since Fonseca's ill-fated departure, although Viceroy Meneses had called him several times to assist at the court of Goa.¹²³ Faced with jurisdictional ambiguity and a backlog of royal orders to India from throughout 1587–88, Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho summoned the previous bishop of Cochim, D. Mateus, to assume the archbishopric of Goa. King Philip II commanded cooperation between the governor and the new archbishop, as is confirmed by a missive penned on November 25, 1588 from D. Mateus to King Philip II.¹²⁴ With no official role and the loss of a powerful patron, Van Linschoten's position had become precarious.

In September 1588, around the same time he learned of deaths in his family and of his employer, Van Linschoten also caught wind of reports that an Iberian fleet was being prepared for an offensive against England. The implications were worrisome. The invasion could affect the Dutch rebellion, which by that time was openly supported by Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603). This could bring about added scrutiny and harsher treatment for Dutchmen in Portuguese Asia. On the eve of a new archbishop taking over the Inquisition of Goa (which, as Van Linschoten records, had previously forced many Dutchmen to flee to the Bijapur sultanate),¹²⁵ Van Linschoten's accumulated research now exposed him to great danger. Without Fonseca, he was just a foreigner with a dossier of sensitive information, and he needed to find a way out. By then, the quarrel between Fonseca and Meneses no longer was at issue as both were dead.

120 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 110–11.

121 *DI*, vol. 14, 1979, 459–60.

122 Frei Luís de Sousa, *História de São Domingos*, ed. M. Lopes de Almeida, vol. 2 (Porto: Lello & Irmão – Editores, 1977), 287.

123 AGS, SSP, book 1551, fls. 502–502v.

124 AGS, SSP, book 1551, fl. 500.

125 *Itinerário*, 1997, 297.

In the end, Van Linschoten's authorization to leave India was granted to him by Governor Coutinho, with whom he enjoyed a close relationship. Van Linschoten witnessed the governor's succession ceremony and reports that Coutinho signed all the legal documents needed for his departure.¹²⁶ Van Linschoten might have secured this permission in exchange for promises to help the governor in loading of the vessel *Santa Cruz*. Governor Coutinho wrote to King Philip II on December 18, 1588 concerning the loading of this ship, which was hired due to a cargo surplus. The governor stressed he had no one he could trust on this.¹²⁷ Thus, an offer of assistance from Van Linschoten, who had previous experience with this kind of issue, might have been a godsend.

The *Santa Cruz* belonged to Francisco Pais, the same man who employed Dirck Gerritsz Pomp on his voyage to Japan in 1585.¹²⁸ Pomp was also returning to Lisbon at the end of 1588. Van Linschoten could easily have asked for his help securing passage on the ship. Van Linschoten likewise used his Flemish-Dutch contacts in India (representatives of the Welsers and Fuggers in Cochin) to secure appointment as pepper overseer of the *Santa Cruz*. With all these pieces in place, Van Linschoten's final step was probably to assure Governor Coutinho that the departure was temporary as he wrote in the *Itinerário* that he always gave the impression that he was only leaving India temporarily.¹²⁹ Thus, wielding Coutinho's trust, the fact that Portuguese law did not forbid the appointment of Flemish-Dutch overseers for ships, and given his connections with the well-reputed Pomp, Van Linschoten won formal approval for his departure. This does not, however, explain how he was able to make off with so much information, especially in light of the non-surreptitious avenues by which he conducted his research. It was no secret that the Dutchman had gathered sensitive data at the archbishop's orders; why did they let him abscond with it?

Van Linschoten could have told Coutinho that he was returning to Lisbon to present Cardinal Albert of Austria, viceroy of Portugal, with some or all of the information he had been collecting. He could have pointed at the bird's eye view of Goa, emblazoned with Albert's coat of arms, and explained that he was hoping for a reward. If these were his arguments, Governor Coutinho would be hard-pressed to block his departure. Although Coutinho was effectively granting safe conduct to the man fated to plunder

¹²⁶ *Itinerário*, 1997, 300.

¹²⁷ AGS, SSP, Libro 1551, fls. 381v. and 385v.

¹²⁸ Pos, "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp," 73.

¹²⁹ *Itinerário*, 1997, 306–8.

the Portuguese,¹³⁰ he could not know this at the end of 1588. In order to embark with his chest and keep all his belongings safe during the maritime voyage, although he could not mention it in the *Itinerario*, Van Linschoten had to bribe the dockers. He also needed to keep close to his friend Pomp, who could provide him with both military and social protection.

During his journey back to the Azores, Van Linschoten was intermittently employed by the Portuguese to draw coastal profiles such as those of Santa Helena and Ascension Islands.¹³¹ As a subtle social operator with ties to the former archbishop, Van Linschoten might have managed to initiate candid discussions of nautical knowledge with Portuguese pilots and seamen on this voyage. His remarks about the trip suggest as much when they go into detailed technical observations and touch on the mistakes precipitating the wrecking of the *São Tomé*.¹³² Does his unending quest for nautical knowledge indicate that, by the time of the return trip, Van Linschoten was working for the Dutch as a spy? The answer to this question cannot be given without considering the events he witnessed in the Azores between 1589 and 1591.

5.3 The Azorean Stay and Return Home (1589–92): Loyal Subject of King Philip II or Spy for the Dutch Republic?

Sailing to Europe in 1589, Van Linschoten recorded his trip more accurately than on his 1583 voyage to India. His 1589 notes disclose persistent unease and a feeling that his life was in the hands of God. He feared he would perish on the coast of Natal and during the passage around the Cape of Good Hope. He also faced terror when his vessel exchanged cannon fire with an English ship and had to delay anchoring at the bay of Angra, since the port authorities suspected they were English rather than Portuguese.¹³³ Van Linschoten was beginning to see how Europe had changed in his absence.

He had managed to keep abreast of some news while in India, as he reported in the *Itinerario*. He had kept up correspondence with contacts in Holland through the Italian merchants who frequented Goa, by land routes and by India Run ships,¹³⁴ and was informed of the death of William of Orange (1533–1584) and the marriage of King Philip II's daughter to the

¹³⁰ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 116.

¹³¹ *Itinerário*, 1997, 37.

¹³² *Itinerário*, 1997, 315–17.

¹³³ *Itinerário*, 1997, 318–23 and 332–33.

¹³⁴ *Itinerário*, 1997, 285–87.

duke of Savoy. While in India, Van Linschoten also received letters from the illustrious physician Bernardus Paludanus (1550–1633), whom he would meet in person only in 1592. In his missives, Paludanus urged Van Linschoten to collect and bring home scientific specimens, something he continued to do on his 1589 voyage.¹³⁵ However, there is no extant letter to Van Linschoten from the leaders of the Dutch Republic attempting to enlist him in espionage. By the time of his departure from India, Van Linschoten knew that his notes and work could profit his homeland; maybe it was there that he could build the career he had strived for in India. But this could hardly be hoped for if the Iberian fleet defeated the English, leaving the young Dutch Republic isolated and imperiled.

After landing in Angra in 1589, Van Linschoten was notified that the Iberian fleet had been defeated, and that Queen Elizabeth I had sent Francis Drake (1540–96) with D. António to besiege Lisbon and try once more to unseat Philip II. At his older friend Afhuysen's request, Van Linschoten agreed to stay in Angra to help recover the lost cargo of a wrecked Malacca ship. He also needed time to negotiate the charter of a ship to carry the cargo from the *Santa Cruz* to Lisbon. Although Drake's assault on Lisbon failed, trepidation about a potential English conquest of the Azores swept across Angra. Yet in 1589, during his stopover in Angra, Van Linschoten watched a ship with Pomp on board depart for Lisbon. He later noted that they were lucky to arrive in Lisbon just a day before Drake plundered Cascais.¹³⁶

Firm connections between the Flemish isles (as he called the Azores) and the Dutch Republic helped Van Linschoten to keep up to date on the evolving situation in Europe and the Low Countries (despite open war between Philip II and the Dutch Republic).¹³⁷ As a former archbishop's servant and current royal overseer, Van Linschoten readily gained the ear of the governor of Terceira.¹³⁸ Although King Philip had donated the island to D. Cristóvão de Moura, one of the architects of his accession to the Portuguese throne, its governor was the Spanish-born Juan de Urbina (who had ruled Angra since the 1582 defeat of D. António by the marquis of Santa Cruz).

In light of Van Linschoten's curriculum vitae, Urbina may have also been led to believe that the Dutchman wished to present his collection of writings, drawings, and maps to the viceroy of Portugal. Indeed, Urbina treated Van Linschoten as a full-fledged citizen of the island. In a period marked by

¹³⁵ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 196.

¹³⁶ *Itinerário*, 1997, 336.

¹³⁷ *Itinerário*, 1997, 37.

¹³⁸ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 161–63.

European wars of religion, Urbina's warm reception of Van Linschoten was exceptional. He welcomed the Dutchman in spite of frequent accusations of heresy with regard to foreigners on the basis of nationality. While the English naval threat lingered and war raged between the Spanish and the Dutch, Urbina allowed Van Linschoten to explore the island on horseback twice, a privilege not even conferred on the native Portuguese of Terceira. Furthermore, Urbina requested that the Dutchman map Angra and produce drawings of Terceira Island, possibly to inform King Philip II on the on-going works on the fortresses of Angra. Van Linschoten refused to map the whole island but agreed to give a depiction of Angra.¹³⁹ However, no reference is made directly to the Dutchman in Urbina's letters, preserved at Simancas and covering the dates of Van Linschoten's stay at Angra.¹⁴⁰

The resultant map of Angra was produced in just two years, and is exceedingly detailed; I agree with Humberto Oliveira that Van Linschoten could only have created it if he had been trained in cartography. Oliveira hypothesizes that Urbina provided Van Linschoten with a team of people to assist him in the depiction of Angra. Such a team could have included the Portuguese cartographer Luís Teixeira (?–1604), who was also in Angra at the time.¹⁴¹ In its turn, this fact may explain why Luís Teixeira's maps later circulated so widely in the Low Countries, were sold at high prices, and influenced some works from the Edam cartographical school.¹⁴² The fact that the Angra map was immediately sent to Philip II was seen by Urbina as proof of Van Linschoten's loyalty to the Spanish king, but Van Linschoten recorded that he kept a copy for himself (which later appeared in the *Itinerario*).¹⁴³

139 *Itinerario*..., 1997, 341 and 344.

140 AGS, *Marina y Guerra Felipe II*, Legajo 250, fls. 159, 185 and 186, Legajo 251, fl. 171, Legajo 253, fls. 211–13, Legajo 254, fls. 131–33, Legajo 260, fl. 120, Legajo 285, fl. 385, Legajo 287, fls. 313–19, Legajo 288, fls. 297 and 301–4, Legajo 292, fls. 79–80, Legajo 293, fl. 49, Legajo 294, fl. 164, Legajo 295, fl. 169, Legajo 296, fl. 401, Legajo 297, fl. 166, Legajo 317, fls. 2 and 173, Legajo 324, fls. 220 and 234, Legajo 328, fl. 183 and 254. All these letters from Urbina are dated between July 1589 and December 1591. None of them directly mentions Van Linschoten (even considering possible hispanized form of his name). It is surprising to note that even though Urbina wrote about depictions and fortifications being built in Angra in those days, he never mentioned any Dutchman working on them (in the letters exchanged between King Philip II and Urbina in September 1589 and also in September 1590 – Legajo 251, fl. 177 and Legajo 260, fl. 120 and Legajo 272, fl. 79). The main topic of his missives are the English naval raids in the Azorean Sea and the defensive measures that the governor adopted.

141 Humberto Oliveira, *Angra na visão de Linschoten* (Borba: author's edition, 2012), 428–35.

142 The same was to happen with maps by João Teixeira, Luís Teixeira's son. See Guerreiro, "A Cartografia portuguesa," 262.

143 *Itinerário*, 1997, 341 and 344.

Extending Oliveira's argument, it is time to consider authorship issues for the map of Goa as well. Although Van Linschoten would have had more time to draw this map, he may have merely directed its composition, following the archbishops' orders. Van Linschoten may have solicited assistance from his contacts in Goa such as the captive English painter he had helped to release. Van den Boogaart has shown that many drawings in the *Itinerario* underwent multiple alterations, and argues that it is difficult to discern how skilled a draftsman Van Linschoten really was.¹⁴⁴ The maps of Angra and Goa were not simple aerial views or coastal profiles. The creation of both maps required training and preparation, and cartographic know-how was something in which Van Linschoten freely declared himself to be deficient.¹⁴⁵

Turning back to Van Linschoten's activities in Terceira, it must be stressed that while the Dutchman was gaining Urbina's trust, he was also probing English prisoners in Angra for information, and serving as an English-Spanish interpreter. Leading up his departure in late 1591, Van Linschoten witnessed several naval battles between the English and the Spanish, and likely continued to exchange and debate nautical knowledge with the English, Spanish, and Portuguese seamen he encountered. He also wrote; it is probable that much of the *Itinerario* was composed in Angra.¹⁴⁶ Still, it is unclear what Van Linschoten thought of the things he saw in the Azores. Perhaps he finally came to the realization that the Iberian empire was not, after all, the invincible force that Northern Europe had judged it to be for decades.¹⁴⁷ Two episodes in the *Itinerario* suggest scepticism of Iberian invulnerability emerging during Van Linschoten's Azorean stay. First, Van Linschoten recorded that in 1590, King Philip II had been forced to send warnings to the fleets from America and Asia not to come to Europe: the waters were controlled by the English, putting Iberian vessels at risk. Second, he reported that even during a storm, all of the 140 vessels stationed at Angra sailed to Lisbon to avoid capture by the English, resulting in a loss of ships exceeding that of the 1588 Invincible Armada.¹⁴⁸

There is a certain strategic plausibility to the notion that, hedging his bets, Van Linschoten was working in secrecy for the Dutch Republic while stationed in Angra; recent events, after all, favored the odds of the young Republic. But Van Linschoten could never have confessed to such duplicity in

144 Van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*, 8 and 39–40.

145 *Itinerário*, 1997, 65.

146 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 117.

147 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17.

148 *Itinerário*, 1997, 351 and 355.

the *Itinerario* even if it were the case. In so doing, he would have denigrated previous technical espionage missions of the Dutch in Lisbon, such as that of the Houtman brothers, sent in 1592 by Petrus Plancius to acquire Portuguese nautical rutters of the India Run.¹⁴⁹ In the absence of positive evidence, it is more reasonable to stick with the mundane but realistic conjecture that Van Linschoten wished to use the knowledge that he had compiled to elevate himself in society. This could be achieved in the service of either the king of Spain or the Dutch Republic.

While in the Azores or during his Lisbon sojourn in 1592, Van Linschoten must have connected with the Flemish-Dutch merchant community and absorbed news of the Dutch Republic's plans to stage a world-wide maritime war against Spain. After landing in Lisbon on January 2, 1592, Van Linschoten spent seven months in Portugal taking care of some curiously unspecified affairs.¹⁵⁰ I contend that it was in these crucial months that Van Linschoten seriously grappled with the question who he would serve in the future: would he present his compiled data to the viceroy of Portugal, Cardinal Albert of Austria? Or would he dissemble, as he did when he left India in 1589, and convince Iberian authorities of his ongoing service while he negotiated passage on a vessel bound for Texel in 1592?

Although it is hard to draw firm conclusions owing to the lack of Iberian references to Van Linschoten, it is quite conceivable that the same Dutch merchants who turned informant for the Houtman brothers in 1592,¹⁵¹ could have pressed Van Linschoten to publish his work homeland. Considering both the final version of the *Itinerario* and the editorial process it underwent between 1592 and 1596, the hypothesis that Van Linschoten might have planned to present his writings to the viceroy of Portugal until 1591 cannot be abandoned. As late as 1596, Van Linschoten was to be found actively tending his ties with Iberian elites, and sending his map of Angra to D.

149 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 168; Delmas, "*L'itinerario* de J.H. van Linschoten," 9.

150 *Itinerário*, 1997, 358.

151 Günter Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica Neerlandica* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Canaletto, 2003), 229. The Dutch scholar Erik Odegard is preparing an edition of a manuscript, kept at the Maritime Museum in Amsterdam, which is believed to have been the result of a spy mission undertaken by the Houtman brothers in Lisbon in 1592. In the article that Odegard will publish on this topic, he posits that Petrus Plancius dispatched a "man" to gather intelligence on the East India and Moluccas trade. According to Odegard's argument, the information compiled in Lisbon and present in the manuscript was also crucial for the planning of Cornelis de Houtman's voyage in 1595. However, it is unclear whether or not Van Linschoten was contacted by the "man" sent by Petrus Plancius during their time in Lisbon. The author expresses gratitude to Odegard for allowing access to the article. For further details see: Erik Odegard, "To Go There and Back Again: Preparations for the First Dutch Voyage to Asia, 1592–1595," to be published soon.

Cristóvão de Moura, the lord of Terceira Island.¹⁵² Ultimately, the scales were tipped by the fact that, as Van Linschoten eventually recognized himself, he could reap greater benefits by offering his work to the Republic. Van Linschoten may have understood that it would be harder to extract a reward from King Philip II at a moment when the king was far away in Castile, without patronage at court, something that he may have lacked when he sailed for Texel.

5.4 The *Itinerario*: The Publication of a Dutch “Hero” (1592–96)?

5.4.1 Reshaping the *Itinerario*, a Work of Many Hands: Van Linschoten, the Scientific and Political Elites of the Dutch Republic

Arriving at Enkhuizen in December 1592, Van Linschoten was soon the target of enormous attention. Pomp had talked him up in his absence, and had arranged for Van Linschoten’s 1584 letter to his parents to be printed alongside the interview he had given to Lucas Waghenaeer about China and Japan (published in Waghenaeer’s 1592 *Treasure of Navigation*).¹⁵³ A former pilot and refugee from Antwerp, Waghenaeer had partnered with printer Cornelis Claesz (1546–1609) and Petrus Plancius, former disciple of the geographer Gerardus Mercator (1512–94) and future hydrographer of VOC, since his 1588 arrival in Enkhuizen. Waghenaeer presented Van Linschoten to Claesz.¹⁵⁴ This trio, together with Paludanus, was especially interested in meeting Van Linschoten and poring over the materials he had collected during his career in Asia. Moreover, they had all suffered because of orders of King Philip II,¹⁵⁵ and had a personal stake in the way publishing Van Linschoten’s materials might kickstart Dutch overseas voyages.

This was particularly true of Plancius, who, aside from his duties as a Protestant minister, directed a school of sailors and preached Dutch overseas expansion until his death.¹⁵⁶ It was he who had sent the Houtman brothers to acquire Portuguese nautical rutters in Lisbon, apparently without trying to profit from Van Linschoten’s presence there in 1592. Ironically, it was

¹⁵² Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17.

¹⁵³ Pos, “Dirck Gerritsz Pomp,” 61 and 78–84.

¹⁵⁴ Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17.

¹⁵⁵ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 198–200; Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 120–23.

¹⁵⁶ Saldanha, “The Itineraries of Geography,” 168 and 211–12.

Van Linschoten, not the Houtman brothers, who procured the rutters.¹⁵⁷ Waghenauer and especially the diplomat Franciscus Maelson (1538–1601), advisor to Prince Maurice of Nassau (1567–1625), were also supporters of Dutch expansion in Asia.¹⁵⁸ The third element of this group, and probable the most decisive, was Cornelis Claesz. Formerly a typographer in Antwerp, Claesz fled when Parma's forces retook the city in 1585. Settling in Amsterdam, he worked closely with Waghenauer and Plancius to publish any geographical and nautical knowledge that could help the United Provinces to launch overseas enterprises. Claesz is considered the true father of the Dutch plan to dominate the European book market in the 17th century. Not only was he a relentless salesman, but he also advocated for the translation of books into French, English, German, and Latin.¹⁵⁹ His mercantile activities had a political goal: Claesz wanted to weaponize books to support the Dutch Republic in its struggle against King Philip II. It is no wonder that many of the books Claesz published and sponsored made a contribution to the Spanish black legend.

This pro-expansion Dutch milieu was one factor, but other events similarly directly affected Van Linschoten and his *Itinerario*. The highest leader of the United Provinces, Prince Maurice of Nassau, summoned Van Linschoten after he arrived in 1592.¹⁶⁰ The meeting took place on the heels of important military victories for Prince Maurice, achieved while King Philip II was occupied with France.¹⁶¹ Like Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547–1619), Prince Maurice hoped to export the war with Philip to the seas, thereby easing military pressure on the borders of the Republic and enabling the establishment of firm terrestrial boundaries between the two powers. As has been detailed in the previous chapter, in doing so, Prince Maurice was following the most recent and successful Protestant examples of this strategy: Admiral Gaspard de Coligny (1519–72) in France and Queen Elizabeth I in England.

¹⁵⁷ Cornelis Koeman, "Jan Huygen Van Linschoten," *Revista Da Universidade de Coimbra* XXXII (1985): 39. Erik Odegard has documented that the Maritime Museum manuscript contains additional nautical information on Portuguese East Indies routes. He also highlights the differences between the information provided in the manuscript and that published by Van Linschoten in the *Itinerario*. Thus, the author argues that Van Linschoten was not the sole source used in the preparation of Cornelis de Houtman's voyage, as evidenced by the contents of the manuscript. For more details see Erik Odegard, "To Go There and Back Again."

¹⁵⁸ *Itinerário*, 1997, 17.

¹⁵⁹ Arthur der Weduwen and Andrew Pettegree, *The Bookshop of the World: Making and Trading Books in the Dutch Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 37–41.

¹⁶⁰ Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 160.

¹⁶¹ Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 241–53.

In 1594, Philip declared an embargo on Dutch navigation to Iberian ports,¹⁶² forcing the Dutch Republic to forge a plan to reach Asian markets by their own means to avoid endangering their economy of war. The very same year, and by no means coincidentally, the States General and Cornelis Claesz signed a contract for the future publication of the *Itinerario*.¹⁶³ Van Linschoten's book could no longer be packaged as a mere travel narrative. It had to instead read like a work of Ramussio,¹⁶⁴ and serve as a guiding cosmography for the upcoming voyage of Cornelis de Houtman, who aimed to undertake, in 1595, the first Dutch expedition to Asia by the Cape route.

Lacking a strong scholastic background, and sensing that the inchoate *Itinerario* needed major reshaping, Van Linschoten asked Claesz to enlist Paludanus's help.¹⁶⁵ A renowned and traveled academic, educated in the Erasmian philosophy, Paludanus was delighted to share Van Linschoten's burden and to learn from all his scientific notes on the *naturalia* of Asia. The support of an academic like Paludanus, who had once refused to lecture at Leiden University, was a prized endorsement for Van Linschoten, who had only lately pivoted towards a career in the Dutch Republic. The changes that emerged from the Van Linschoten-Paludanus collaboration are telling. First of all, the botanical and trading chapters of the *Itinerario* were reworked to fit the commercial objectives of Houtman's planned expedition. Paludanus's several annotations were based on the access that the botanist Carolus Clusius (1526–1606) had given him to Garcia de Orta's book, while Van Linschoten's text body was more centered on his personal experience.¹⁶⁶

They also collaborated on the *Beschryvinghe*, the section of the *Itinerario* containing geographical and ethnographical information on Africa and the Americas. As stipulated by a contract with the States General, the *Beschryvinghe* was to be published as a second volume since Van Linschoten would translate Father José de Acosta's (1540–1600) work on America. Due probably to miscommunication between Claesz and Van Linschoten, this plan was aborted.¹⁶⁷ Consequently, Van Linschoten and Paludanus set about preparing a version of the *Beschryvinghe* to be published in the *Itinerario*. They relied on a map of Africa and America that was in Paladanus's possession,¹⁶⁸ as well as major Spanish works Claesz loaned them (such as texts by Acosta,

162 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 341.

163 *Itinerário*, 1997, 38.

164 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17 and 162–64.

165 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 199.

166 Pos, "Sources and Organisation," 49 and 54.

167 Van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*, 5.

168 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 157.

Pedro de Medina, Pietro Martyr, Rodrigo Zamorano, Oviedo, Las Casas) and other sources (Filippo Pigafetta and Jean de Léry).¹⁶⁹ For the nautical rutters of the Manila-Mexico-Spain route,¹⁷⁰ the duo drew on data from the Spanish pilot Francisco Gali and the Portuguese pilot Nuno da Silva, who had been captured by Drake to guide part of his 1579 circumnavigation voyage.¹⁷¹ Another influential work that directly influenced this Dutch milieu was the art of navigation published by Michel Coignet in Antwerp, in 1580, in Dutch, which itself contained important Iberian contributions from Pedro de Medina, Martín Cortés, and Pedro Nunes.¹⁷² Van Linschoten and Paludanus influenced the first generation of Dutch explorers in America.¹⁷³

For the *Reys-gheschrift*, printed in advance of the *Itinerario* so that it would be available to Cornelis de Houtman in 1595, Plancius contributed his maps of Asia and America. The maps were originally bought (in Lisbon) by the Houtman brothers from the Portuguese cartographer Bartolomeu de Lasso in 1592 and were later adapted and published by Plancius.¹⁷⁴ When Van Linschoten was away on his 1594 and 1595 journeys to the north, he entrusted Claesz with continuing the still-unfinished *Reys-gheschrift*.¹⁷⁵ His faithful editor added a list of the coordinates of ports, a regiment of the compass between Lisbon and Goa, and a set of questions and answers for sailors.¹⁷⁶ Some of the Portuguese and Spanish nautical rutters that Van Linschoten used in *Reys-gheschrift* and also some of the major changes that were introduced by Van Linschoten and his collaborators in the writing of *Reys-gheschrift* have been identified. When analyzing the editorial overhaul of the *Reys-gheschrift*, it becomes clear that Van Linschoten also added his personal comments on several nautical and geographical issues concerning sailing routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Once more, this aspect casts new light on Van Linschoten's rising scientific status within the Dutch Republic during the 1590s.¹⁷⁷ Most decisively it also shows how updated

169 *Itinerário*, 1997, 17–18; Delmas, “L’*Itinerario* de J.H. van Linschoten,” 7–9; Benjamin Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad: The Dutch Imagination and the New World, 1570–1670* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 161–62.

170 Loureiro, “Inquérito sobre um navegador enigmático.”

171 *Itinerário*, 1997, 24. On Nuno da Silva see: Moreno Madrid and Salomoni, “Nuno da Silva’s Third Relation,” 64–82.

172 Almeida, *A carta de navegar*, 224–25.

173 Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad*, 162.

174 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 204.

175 Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica*, 111 and 205.

176 Saldanha, “The Itineraries of Geography,” 157.

177 For more details see my article Nuno Vila-Santa, “Jan Huygen van Linschoten and the *Reys-gheschrift*.”

Portuguese nautical information was transformed into a coherent body of knowledge for Dutch purposes, in a similar vein to what has been observed previously for Spanish, English, and French instances.

The *Extract*, another subsection of the *Itinerario*, included information on Iberian royal revenues. Van Linschoten may have copied the Portuguese Crown's revenues at the viceroy's palace of Goa. The data concerning Spanish overseas crown revenues were acquired by way of Franciscus Maelson (also the mayor of Enkhuizen),¹⁷⁸ whose daughter Reinu became Van Linschoten's wife in 1595.¹⁷⁹ This wedding was part of a scheme, masterminded by Claesz and Waghenaeer,¹⁸⁰ to impel Van Linschoten to abjure Catholicism, temper his admiration for the Spanish, and convert to Calvinism. Maelson also asked Theodorus Velius (1572–1630), Petrus Hoogerbeets (1542–99), and Cornelis Taemisz (1567–1600) to write sonnets for the final version of the *Itinerario*.¹⁸¹ The idea behind this may have been to aggrandize Van Linschoten's achievements. Using literary tropes employed in Camões's *Lusíadas*, Van Linschoten was cast as a Dutch Magellan.¹⁸²

Impatient to make a profit from the *Itinerario*, Claesz hired engravers to complete a portrait of Van Linschoten and perfect all the drawings and maps to be incorporated in the book. Some of these engravings were sold as isolated sheets and could command a high price.¹⁸³ During this process, Claesz took advantage of Van Linschoten's Spanish and Portuguese fluency and tasked him with translating Acosta's work. It should be noted that Claesz sold several editions of the *Itinerario*, possibly changing the text as he saw fit without consulting Van Linschoten, a common practice among editors of the time.¹⁸⁴

A final effect of the editing process, the importance of which cannot be overstated, concerns the *Itinerario*'s political subtext. Possibly at the urging of Claesz and Plancius, Van Linschoten's *magnum opus* plays up any and all hints of Portuguese and the Spanish decline.¹⁸⁵ What were Van Linschoten's intentions at the time of the book's publication? To provoke direct war against the Portuguese by depicting an empire in tatters?¹⁸⁶ Or merely to

178 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 19.

179 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 185.

180 Koeman, "Jan Huygen Van Linschoten," 37.

181 *Itinerário*, 1997, 17.

182 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 157; Van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*, 5.

183 Der Weduwen and Pettegree, *The Bookshop of the World*, 94.

184 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 205.

185 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 278.

186 Ana L. Méndez-Olivier, "Chaotic, Effeminate and Promiscuous "Bodies" in John Huygen van Linschoten's *Itinerario*," *Anais de História de Além-Mar* XVII (2016): 340.

warn of the dangers of miscegenation that the Portuguese practiced in Asia?¹⁸⁷ Is Van den Boogaart correct when he points out that the *Itinerario* should not be interpreted literally?¹⁸⁸ Insofar as the *Itinerario* disparages Portuguese Asia, it is relevant to determine whether this is deliberate and, if so, to elucidate Van Linschoten's motives.

In repackaging the *Itinerario* for a Dutch audience, Van Linschoten knew he had to desist from praising King Philip II.¹⁸⁹ A book teeming with accolades for the Iberian monarch would have never passed muster with his new patrons; Prince Maurice, Oldenbarnevelt, and Claesz were all embroiled in a life-or-death battle against Philip. Aware of this, Van Linschoten formally dedicated his book to Oldenbarnevelt and Prince Maurice. He stated that many had insisted that he publish his notes on Asia, and although he had considered them of little significance, he had at last acquiesced.¹⁹⁰

Because the final version of the *Itinerario* resulted from an intensive collaborative effort, it is almost impossible to know who did what, or how the concept for the book changed over time. But one thing is nearly certain: the final version of the *Itinerario* was as much a work of Paludanus and Claesz as it was of Van Linschoten. If it is true that for the *Itinerario*, Van Linschoten capitalized on Pomp's knowledge because he did not take notes in Asia,¹⁹¹ it is also probable that Van Linschoten erased notes or chapters about Portugal and Spain that he deemed inconsequential from the final version in 1596. References to Portuguese authors and sources may have similarly been removed, either because they lacked validity in the eyes of the Dutch audience, or to avoid compromising Iberian informants.

Still, a careful reading of the *Itinerario* reveals that Van Linschoten retained some admiration for the Spanish and may have seen the Portuguese decline as a form of justice.¹⁹² But if Van Linschoten was so anti-Portuguese, why did he not participate in the expedition of Cornelis de Houtman in 1595 and why did he advise, in the *Itinerario*, to sail to Java and settle where the Portuguese were weaker in Asia, instead of navigating directly to India?¹⁹³ Whether Van Linschoten's depiction of Portuguese decline was voluntary

187 Haddad, "Um olhar estrangeiro," 151 and 160–63.

188 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 17.

189 Ivo Kamps, "Jan Huygen Van Linschoten," in *Travel Knowledge: European "Discoveries" in the Early Modern Period*, ed. Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna G. Singh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 164.

190 *Itinerário*, 1997, 63–65.

191 Pos, "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp," 76.

192 Kamps, "Jan Huygen," 179.

193 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 34–35.

or imposed on him can be inferred by assessing several key moments in the *Itinerario* and looking more closely at its author's later career.

5.4.2 Rereading the *Itinerario*: Van Linschoten, an Admirer of Portugal and Spain?

Although numerous studies cast Van Linschoten as a strongly anti-Portuguese figure,¹⁹⁴ the *Itinerario* itself contains several episodes that challenge or even reverse this assumption. This might come as a surprise bearing in mind the editorial overhaul the *Itinerario* went through to ready it for publication in 1596.¹⁹⁵ Also noteworthy is the fact that in 1599, the De Bry brothers gave Van Linschoten financial support for a Latin edition of the *Itinerario*.¹⁹⁶ They republished the book in three volumes within a major project to publish travel and geographical accounts, adding more drawings and adapting the text.¹⁹⁷ Since the Latin *Itinerario* was to be sold to and read by Catholics, Van Linschoten removed his critical remarks on the Jesuits.¹⁹⁸ The pragmatism of the editor was matched by Van Linschoten's desire to expand his readership, and willingness to alter his book to this end. Reading between the lines, the *Itinerario* presents a balance of well-worn criticisms alongside insinuations of Portuguese potency. Indeed, Van Linschoten could hardly have regarded the Portuguese with unmitigated contempt given his ease in adapting to the Goan milieu¹⁹⁹ (to say nothing of his thoughts of settling in India permanently). Moreover, it has been argued that Van Linschoten's career in the Iberian world was driven more by his curiosity and careerism than by his "patriotism."²⁰⁰

194 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 113; Giuseppe Mazzocchi, "Una Imagen Holandesa de Goa: La "Navigatio" de Jan Huyghen van Linschoten," *Criticon* no. 87–89 (2003): 505; Ana L. Méndez–Oliver, 2016, 341. A more recent study even argues that Van Linschoten's anti-Portuguese views were based on his stay in Goa, during which he became a spy for the Dutch Republic. However, the author does not provide any documentary evidence for this hypothesis (William Blanke Elgin, "The Itinerary of Jan Huygen van Linschoten: Knowledge, Commerce, and the Creation of the Dutch and English Trade Empires" (MA thesis, Oxford University, 2021), 16–25). Only Saldanha does not follow the opinion that Van Linschoten was anti-Portuguese (Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 163 and 173).

195 See illustration 5.

196 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 159–61.

197 Ernst van den Boogaart, "Heathendom and Civility in the *Historia Indiae Orientalis*: The Adaptation by Johan Theodor and Johan Israel de Bry of the Edifying Series of Plates from Linschoten's *Itinerario*," *Netherlands Yearbook for History of Art* 53, no. 1 (2002): 71–74, 77 and 102.

198 *Itinerário*, 1997, 36.

199 Van den Boogaart, *Jan Huygen van Linschoten*, 2.

200 Schmidt, *Innocence Abroad*, 155.

Van Linschoten's admiration of the Portuguese can be documented with revealing examples. When describing his voyage to Asia in 1583, he wrote about the competition between ship captains as to who would arrive first in India, and he told about how mariners staged plays on board which invariably led to brawls. In the resulting confusion on one occasion, the ship's captain ended up on the floor, trampled by the crew. Under the harsh conditions of India Run voyages, Van Linschoten knew personally how difficult it could be to stave off chaos and mutiny. His laudatory remarks on the archbishop's behavior, who had gone around personally to retrieve all the swords and put an end to escalating havoc in the case cited above, are a testament to the courage the Dutchman recognized in his employer.²⁰¹ And despite his later criticism of "palanquins" and the viceroy's opulent palace, Van Linschoten initially had no qualms about the sumptuous arrival ceremonies of the archbishops of Goa.²⁰²

Describing Goa, Van Linschoten also noted the general atmosphere of confessional freedom outside the city, which must have been refreshing for a man hailing from lands torn apart by religious wars. It was also this circumstance that allowed him to travel to nearby lands of Goa to witness and draw the life of the Hindus. Following such visits, Van Linschoten realized that Hindu medical knowledge outshone that of Europeans, making them more desirable as physicians in Goa than their Western counterparts. This detail makes his compliments to the viceroy and other rich Portuguese noblemen who periodically volunteered at the Goa hospital all the more meaningful. Van Linschoten further expressed his regard for the Portuguese when acknowledging their ability to impose their authority. He lauded the determination of the non-European inhabitants of Goa in defending the lands rented to them by the Portuguese, and commended the patience and good manners of Arab crews employed on Portuguese ships.²⁰³ These passages must not be overlooked, since Van Linschoten says the opposite on several occasions. Still, the most obvious statements of Portuguese potency relate to Van Linschoten's portrayal of Portuguese rulers.

In the case of Viceroy D. Francisco Mascarenhas, he starts by noting the death of the viceroy's nephew in an expedition to punish the Malabar pirates, who had wrought considerable havoc. Later, however, the same viceroy sent an expedition that decisively routed the pirates. Van Linschoten also acknowledges that several peace treaties were signed during Mascarenhas's

201 *Itinerário*, 1997, 77.

202 *Itinerário*, 1997, 79.

203 *Itinerário*, 1997, 145, 166, 168, 177 and 179–80.

tenure. He draws special attention to the custom house of Cochin, one of the major responsibilities given to the viceroy by King Philip II; Van Linschoten says it was so well-managed that nothing was loaded onto a Cochin-Lisbon vessel without being properly registered at penalty of total confiscation. In discussing Viceroy D. Duarte de Meneses, Van Linschoten paints a picture of a weak ruler who chronically came to the battlefield unlucky and underequipped. Still, he does not brush aside major victories at Malacca and Ceylon, achieved notwithstanding a shortage of backup troops. His generalized scorn for Meneses has a straightforward explanation: the previously discussed conflict between the viceroy and the archbishop that forced Fonseca's return to Portugal and influenced Van Linschoten's decision to return to Europe. In contrast, Van Linschoten presents Governor Manuel de Sousa Coutinho as a successful military leader, who had risen to remarkable heights despite his low birth.²⁰⁴

Van Linschoten also praises the courage of a viceroy he did not meet: D. Luís de Ataíde, third earl of Atouguia (1578–81). He recounts an episode in which Ataíde decided that diplomatic gifts should be collected by the Estado rather than given directly to the Jesuits. In punishment, Ataíde was accused of heresy by the Jesuits (who, incidentally, Van Linschoten accuses of lust for power). Van Linschoten also commends King Philip II's choice of Matias de Albuquerque (1591–97) as viceroy of Portuguese Asia, although the Dutchman only encountered him before his appointment. He applauds the valor Albuquerque evinced by successfully sailing to Asia alone when, in 1591, his fleet scattered in the Atlantic and the timing of the voyage augured ruin.²⁰⁵ In all these cases, Van Linschoten discloses his enduring respect for the Portuguese.

It is possible that Van Linschoten's original chapter on his stay in Asia had contained additional relevant events that did not survive the editing process. After all, in 1596, when the Dutch had already sent their first expedition to Asia, it would be difficult for Van Linschoten to dwell too long on his personal knowledge that Mascarenhas, Meneses, Coutinho, and even Albuquerque were still feared and respected rulers across maritime Asia. This is especially true of Albuquerque, the presiding Portuguese viceroy when Houtman sailed to Java. Acquainted by his personal experiences with Albuquerque, Van Linschoten may have counselled Cornelis de Houtman *not* to sail directly to India, fearing that this first Dutch expedition to Asia awaited sure defeat in any standoff with Albuquerque's forces.²⁰⁶ I agree

204 *Itinerário*, 1997, 235, 283–85, 292–98.

205 *Itinerário*, 1997, 162 and 352.

206 On Albuquerque's career: Nuno Vila-Santa, "Matias de Alburquerque."

with Van den Boogaart: far from evoking a Portuguese Asia in shambles, the *Itinerario* does the exact opposite.²⁰⁷ But to state this frankly would have cost the *Itinerario* a sizeable segment of its hoped-for audience, putting the fame Van Linschoten hoped to win in the Dutch Republic and across Europe in jeopardy. However, this does not mean that Van Linschoten envisaged future Dutch-Portuguese confrontation as a completely victorious to the Dutch, as shall be discussed. Before touching on this topic, it is important to evaluate the anti-Portuguese sentiments that do exist in the *Itinerario*.

Van Linschoten's chief criticism of the Portuguese is found in his description of Goan society. Since the beginning, he condemned what he dubbed generalized "corruption" in Portuguese India. According to Van Linschoten, everyone in Goa, from viceroy to soldier, sought only to enrich and ennoble themselves, and they pursued these ends at the cost of good governance. Even the king had his share of the blame, with his habit of conceding captaincies, voyages, and government posts for three years as mere favors. Van Linschoten emphasized the adverse effects this had on the lives of soldiers, who were stuck in India and reliant on liaisons with women to secure food and housing, especially when there were no wars to be fought and no good military leaders.²⁰⁸ On the other hand, Van Linschoten also pointed out the dangers manifested by the total absence of social barriers in Goa's society. The *Itinerario*'s remark that Goan mestizos physically resemble Indians,²⁰⁹ is usually seen as Van Linschoten's most overt warning to the Dutch against miscegenation.²¹⁰

Van Linschoten's obsessive indictment of the behavior of European women in India is also well-known. He accused women of murdering around forty men per year, resorting to poison and treachery to get rid of unwanted husbands (a fate that befell his unfortunate friend Frans Connigh).²¹¹ This critique is usually linked to Van Linschoten's dismay at Goan society's racial fluidity, and his support for a white supremacy policy.²¹² As Van Linschoten noted, the Portuguese already tended to look down on non-Portuguese, and in consequence, many foreigners (and even some Portuguese renegades)

207 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 160.

208 *Itinerário*, 1997, 150, 155, 157–58 and 161–62.

209 *Itinerário*, 1997, 148.

210 Carmen Nocentelli, "Discipline and Love: Linschoten and the Estado Da India," In *Rereading the Black Legend: The Discourses of Religious and Racial Difference in the Renaissance Empires*, ed. Walter Mignolo, Margaret Rich Greer, and Maureen Quilligan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 208, 216 and 224.

211 *Itinerário*, 1997, 157–58 and 301–6.

212 Arun Saldanha, "Whiteness in Golden Goa: Linschoten on Fenotype," In *Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural, Social, and Political Perspectives*, ed. Shanti Moorthy and Ashraf Jamal (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 343 and 353–54.

were forced to flee Goa and serve Indian rulers, to whom they confided the secrets of European artillery. Conversely, Van Linschoten mocked the chivalric value system that played out on Goa's streets, in which the slightest of perceived insults could trigger a deadly duel.²¹³

In all these instances, Van Linschoten is far from impartial. Nor is he uninformed; during his years in India, he became acquainted with contemporary literature on the decline of Portuguese Asia (written in the wake of the political and military crisis of 1565–75, the Avis dynastic crisis, and the accession to the Portuguese throne of King Philip II), and many of his reprovals seem to be lifted from the pages of earlier Portuguese critiques, especially from the first version of the *Soldado Prático* (1564) by Diogo do Couto.²¹⁴ When he denounces Goan society, Van Linschoten vacillates between voicing Portuguese opinions and speaking as a Dutchman. Nonetheless, scholars often exaggerate Van Linschoten's portrait of India without taking into account the impact that the *Devotio Moderna* movement had in the Low Countries during the 15th century,²¹⁵ and how it evolved into "experimental" humanism in the 16th century.²¹⁶ It is exactly this "experimental" humanism that Van Linschoten exhibits throughout the entire *Itinerario*, a book that is, at its most basic level, a curious merchant's earnest effort to describe the natural world as he found it.²¹⁷ This is why Van Linschoten is also, paradoxically, often labeled an "impartial" observer of the Portuguese, when his book, like that of François Pyrard de Laval (1578–1623) and the memoirs of Jacques de Coutre (1572–1640), was a contribution to the Portuguese black legend in Asia.²¹⁸ But it cannot be forgotten that Van Linschoten, like any author, had his own personal views and agenda. Indeed, it is very likely that some of Van Linschoten's disparaging comments arose from simple culture shock. Coming from a more urbanized, Protestant, and mercantile-capitalist society (the Low Countries), Van Linschoten must have struggled to internalize the logic of a more aristocratic, Catholic, and monarchical society (Portugal).

213 *Itinerário*, 1997, 152 and 297.

214 Diogo do Couto, *O Primeiro Soldado Prático*, edited by António Coimbra Martins (Lisbon: CNCDP, 2001).

215 Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 85.

216 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 44, 47 and 53.

217 Bill, "A European View of Life," 41.

218 Célia Cristina da Silva Tavares, "Aspectos da vida em Goa segundo os viajantes Linschoten, Pyrard e Della Valle," In *D'Aquém, d'Além e d'Ultramar: homenagem a António Dias Farinha*, ed. Francisco Contento Domingues, José da Silva Horta, and Paulo David Vicente, vol. II (Lisbon: Centro de História da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 2015), 1142.

This explains how Van Linschoten could believe that the Goan Hindus and the “*casados*” (the Portuguese settled in India) were at once crucial to the military viability of the Estado, and simultaneously a cause of Portuguese decay. This contradiction is not solely based on his misunderstanding of Goa’s multicultural society,²¹⁹ but is related to the fact that Van Linschoten might have harboured personal resentment towards the Portuguese. If Van Linschoten wanted to remain permanently in India, he knew he had to get married (like his friend Connigh), therefore becoming slightly “more Portuguese.” But for unknown reasons Van Linschoten demurred; perhaps he thought it would be impossible while he served the archbishop, or his Dutch morals recoiled from the laxer sexual mores of the Portuguese in India,²²⁰ or he simply could not commit to becoming “completely” Portuguese. Again, the *Itinerario* is proof of a kind of identity crisis Van Linschoten confronted during his travels. This inner turmoil was not erased, and is documented in the 1596 edition when he divulges his hesitations and regrets about leaving India.

None of this is to suggest that Van Linschoten could not or did not make valid judgements on the Portuguese. One of the *Itinerario*’s strongest categories of evidence for Portuguese decline relates to Van Linschoten’s experiences at sea on the India Run. Van Linschoten’s descriptions of the shipwrecks of the *Santiago*, in 1585, and of the *São Tomé*, in 1589, were staggering assaults on Portugal’s reputation as an invincible naval power after almost a century of sailing the India Run. Van Linschoten’s treatment of the *Santiago* wreck is an unflinching picture of a pilot’s hubris: utterly assured of his own competence, the pilot failed to steer clear of the infamous shallows of Judia; Van Linschoten also references a ship that perished near Cochin under ludicrous circumstances (a chicken escaped, causing people to chase it to starboard en masse, triggering a deadly weight imbalance on the already overloaded vessel). The Dutchman gives a general etiology of the Portuguese shipwrecks of the 1580s: they were caused, he avers, by overweight cargoes; bad pilots, officials, and crews; and the absence of proper inspections before the start of voyages.²²¹

His description of life on board during the 1589 voyage also documents the confusion and disorder on Portuguese ships during dangerous moments.²²² This image strongly contradicted widespread Portuguese propaganda about

219 Mazzocchi, “Una Imagen Holandesa de Goa,” 499.

220 Pos, “A Stranger’s Testimony,” 119–21.

221 *Itinerário*, 1997, 287–90, 294–95 and 315.

222 *Itinerário*, 1997, 287–90, 294–95 and 315.

its maritime prowess. Although this sort of shipwreck reportage was already accessible in certain maritime circles in France, England, and even the Low Countries, it became available to a new and wider audience when published in the *Itinerario*. Considering also that Van Linschoten described the naval battles in the Azores and the fact that the Portuguese (and to a lesser extent, the Spanish) faced meaningful challenges from the English, the invitation to breach the Iberian *Mare Clausum* was obvious. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) later threw down the same gauntlet in his *The Free Sea*.²²³ But Van Linschoten's message had a greater impact on the Portuguese maritime empire than the largely terrestrial Spanish empire; Portugal had sought to build a seaborne empire, and the *Itinerario* was a nail in the coffin of the realm's maritime hegemony. Although Portuguese dominance had been contested since almost the beginning of the 16th century, as has also been underscored in all previous chapters, the most recent serious blow, in the eyes of the broader European audience, had occurred with the end of the Avis dynasty in 1580.

Van Linschoten takes the Spanish perspective on this question, surveying Portugal's 1580 defeat with contempt.²²⁴ No words of compassion are to be found in his comments on the shipwrecks of the India Run. But on the topic of Anglo-Spanish engagements in the Azores, the tables are turned. The same Van Linschoten who had ridiculed Portuguese customary courtesy in India praises Spanish notions of decorum, singling out their polite treatment of the Englishman Richard Grenville (1542–91), who had been captured after a quintessentially chivalric naval battle.²²⁵ However, this does not necessarily mean that when the Dutch started their enterprise in Asia, Van Linschoten regarded the Portuguese as a trivial threat. Thus, it is important to reevaluate the Dutchman's last years before we attempt to formulate conclusions.

5.5 Van Linschoten's Final Years and the Dutch Enterprise in Asia (1594–1611): Approval or Disapproval?

In 1594, at the peak of his career, Van Linschoten embarked on a voyage on the ship *Mercurius*. The aim of the fleet Van Linschoten had joined was to find a northern route to China along the Scandinavian and Russian coasts

²²³ Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty*, 124–33.

²²⁴ Kamps, "Jan Huygen," 165 and 179.

²²⁵ *Itinerário*, 1997, 356.

in order to avoid engaging in the Cape route against the Portuguese.²²⁶ This northern route was believed to be shorter than the Cape route. The voyage was defended and sponsored by Franciscus Maelson, and endorsed by Petrus Plancius. Having been appointed clerk by Prince Maurice,²²⁷ Van Linschoten once more proved his nautical know-how by keeping a logbook, producing 36 drawings of places the fleet passed, writing nautical rutters, and collecting specimens for Paludanus.²²⁸ The expedition ended in failure because the Dutch were unable to determine their location. On the verge of a punishing Russian winter, they turned back before their vessels could be trapped in the ice. Their only consolation was the founding of a fortress at Waygats Island.

The expedition formed part of the Republic's response to King Philip II's decision of the same year to bar Dutch navigation from Iberian ports. Van Linschoten saw a northern route as the best chance at tapping into lucrative Chinese markets, while Petrus Plancius argued for a trans-Artic approach.²²⁹ Although the failure of the expedition had immediate consequences, a friend from Hoorn could still dedicate a poem to Van Linschoten in 1594, comparing his enterprise to those of Vasco da Gama and Francis Drake.²³⁰ Several merchants, motivated by the information Van Linschoten brought back from Asia, decided to finance Cornelis de Houtman's voyage to Asia by the Cape route. Strikingly, Van Linschoten was *not* given a formal appointment to participate in the Cape route expedition, even though he and Dirck Gerritsz Pomp were the only Dutchmen at that time with the requisite nautical knowledge. Why?

Van Linschoten's involvement in the 1594 northern expedition strongly suggests that he did not want to take part in Houtman's expedition. There are several potential reasons: trauma from previous experiences on the Portuguese India Run;²³¹ a sense of having reached a status above hands-on involvement; and, finally, an unspoken conviction that it would be foolhardy to directly challenge the Portuguese on the Cape route. Having written orders for Cornelis de Houtman, Petrus Plancius tried, without success, to exclude Van Linschoten from the debate on the route to be followed. However, it was Van Linschoten, and not Plancius, who had managed to deliver the most detailed Iberian nautical rutters to the Republic, and who now had

226 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 214–18.

227 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 216.

228 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 217–18, 223–24 and 231.

229 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 159.

230 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 19.

231 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 163.

the backing of the States General.²³² In his orders to Houtman, Plancius specified that he should not provoke outright war with the Portuguese, and should sail directly from the Cape of Good Hope to Bantam, on Java.²³³ It was Van Linschoten who proposed the idea of sailing to Java, knowing that the Portuguese lacked a fortress in the area, and of the potential of the Bantam market.

In 1576, King Sebastian had sent a fleet of ships under Captain Matias de Albuquerque to sail directly from Lisbon to Malacca by a route west of Madagascar.²³⁴ This was the route preferred by the Portuguese throughout the 1580s. Van Linschoten might have learned of its existence from a number of informants: the pilot Gaspar Reimão Ferreira, whom he had met on the 1589 voyage; his friend Afhuysen; or Captains D. Paulo de Lima Pereira and Matias de Albuquerque. Starting with Cornelis de Houtman, this would also be the main route the Dutch would take for the next years, causing the original Portuguese route to fall into disuse.²³⁵ Still, Van Linschoten and Plancius disagreed about the coordinates of Bantam, and engaged in political rivalry.²³⁶ On one matter, however, they concurred: it was unthinkable to wage head-on war with the Portuguese. Oldenbarnevelt and Prince Maurice, who received Van Linschoten personally at The Hague on his arrival from the North in 1594, may have agreed.²³⁷ The merchants who sponsored the Houtman expedition surely would not want to risk their investment in Asia by confronting the Portuguese. Such a decision is not that different from what has been noted in chapter 2 concerning the English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s.

Also, in 1595, the Dutch Republic resolved once more to explore the possibility of a northern route to China. Special orders were written in case the fleet reached China, and Van Linschoten was commissioned by the States General to produce a nautical chart for the voyage.²³⁸ Van Linschoten participated in this expedition as well, and was appointed supervisor of

232 Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 169–71.

233 *Itinerário*, 1997, 19.

234 "Vida e acções de Mathias de Albuquerque cappitão e Viso-Rey do Estado da Índia. Primeira e segunda parte em que se contam todas as suas acções, e as dos insignes feitos que se obraram na memorável tomada do Morro de Chaul. Tresladado no anno de 1749," *Mare Liberum* 15 (1998): 171–72.

235 Pos, "A Stranger's Testimony," 129. Part of this nautical route had been previously suggested. For details see: Madeira Santos, *O character experimental*.

236 Siding, respectively, with Zeeland and Holland. Saldanha, "The Itineraries of Geography," 169–71.

237 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 239–40.

238 Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica*, 201.

the whole fleet.²³⁹ The route to be followed was again via Scandinavia and northern Russia (to the disgust of Plancius, who still insisted on an Arctic route). This second expedition proved another failure. On the verge of death several times, Van Linschoten learned from locals how far the Dutch were from finding the southeast passage to China. Returning to the Republic, he was summoned by Prince Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt to account for his lack of results. He was unable to convince the merchants and leaders of the Republic to finance another attempt the following year, even after reminding them of his hitherto impressive track record and noting that the Portuguese had also endured failures on the path to their maritime achievements.²⁴⁰ This time, the Dutch explorer was bested by Plancius, who persuaded a detractor of Van Linschoten, Willem Barentsz (1550–97), to sail through the Arctic, resulting in Barentsz's death. Van Linschoten, on the other hand, decided not to explore new places.

In 1597, Van Linschoten was named treasurer of Enkhuizen,²⁴¹ and in 1598 he published the Dutch translation of Acosta's work,²⁴² and was publicly praised by Waghenauer for his expeditions in the North.²⁴³ Meanwhile, he engaged in a polemic against Gerrit de Veer (1570–98), who had published an account of Barentsz's expedition that Van Linschoten considered inaccurate. Van Linschoten also tried, without great success, to publish an academic edition of his journeys of 1594 and 1595. But the version Van Linschoten managed to print in 1601 did not capture the Dutch imagination, as it lacked a tragic hero like Barentsz.²⁴⁴ With Houtman's return in 1597 and the publication of his travel journals,²⁴⁵ the Cape route began to appear viable, and the northern option a dead end. The *Itinerario* was now fighting obsolescence, since more detailed information arrived with the return of each Dutch expedition from Asia.

Claesz and Linschoten issued a new Dutch version of the *Itinerario* in 1604, republishing the *Icones* edition alongside a revised text.²⁴⁶ In 1606, Van Linschoten was appointed hospital administrator of Enkhuizen and was consulted about a plan to create a West Indies Company for the Atlantic. The idea was struck down when the Dutch Republic got tied up

²³⁹ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 241–42.

²⁴⁰ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 263–67.

²⁴¹ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 270.

²⁴² *Itinerário*, 1997, 22.

²⁴³ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 273.

²⁴⁴ Der Weduwen and Pettegree, *The Bookshop of the World*, 96.

²⁴⁵ Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 128.

²⁴⁶ Van den Boogaart, *Civil and Corrupt Asia*.

in negotiations with Spain over the Twelve Years' Truce (signed in 1609). Also in 1609, Claesz died and Van Linschoten published King Philip III's (1598–1621) letter to his favorite, the duke of Lerma, about the Moorish revolt in Spain.²⁴⁷ When the States General issued a license the same year allowing Van Linschoten to reprint the *Itinerario* for a decade to come, he bought all relevant publishing rights and unsold copies of his book from Claesz's widow, hoping to put together future editions.²⁴⁸ However, he died just a year later, in February 1611.²⁴⁹ His position had slid somewhat at the time of his death. The States General refused to grant him a pension for his services to the Republic, ruling that he had enough income from his books. When Van Linschoten died, he was popularly regarded as a proponent of exploring the northern route. Plancius, his sometime scientific adversary, had even summoned him to the States General to testify in support of the Arctic route, but he died before he could make an appearance.²⁵⁰

Like Paludanus, Van Linschoten only invested in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), in 1606,²⁵¹ although his *Itinerario* was primarily a book for anyone wishing to be a merchant, sailor, or explorer of the world, all that Van Linschoten had been during his life. In contrast to his friend Pomp, who died in 1606 after sailing across the Magellan Strait,²⁵² Van Linschoten had elected not to intervene in the political and military trajectory of the Dutch expansion in Asia. This decision demands explanation. Even in the wake of the second failed voyage to the North in 1595, Van Linschoten still had an audience at the VOC. An important contributor to the foundation of Dutch Batavia, Van Linschoten probably refused to get involved for very simple reasons: he was now a married man with a daughter, and he did not need or want to leave his family behind and risk his life again. He likely suspected until his death that dislodging the Portuguese from Asia would be gruelling, if it was possible at all. Bearing in mind that Van Linschoten proposed kicking off the Dutch enterprise in Java because it was a Portuguese weak spot, the question remains: was Van Linschoten sympathetic to the Portuguese and averse to open war, as his insistence, until the day he died, on finding a northern route to China and not sailing to Asia anymore suggests? Or did he merely know from his years in Asia, despite what he wrote in the

247 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 276–79.

248 Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica*, 203.

249 Der Weduwen and Pettegree, *The Bookshop of the World*, 96.

250 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 277 and 279–81.

251 Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 20.

252 Pos, "Dirck Gerritsz Pomp," 65–66.

Itinerario, that the Portuguese could still put up a fight? An initial reply can be reached by looking into the first Dutch-Portuguese wars in Asia.

During his lifetime, Van Linschoten witnessed the outcomes of the early Dutch expeditions to Asia. In the beginning, mariners were under strict orders not to engage militarily with the Portuguese, but this changed after the establishment of the VOC in 1602.²⁵³ Not everyone at VOC agreed with militarization to face the Portuguese in Asia, especially due to the costs entailed and the financial difficulties VOC went through in its infant years.²⁵⁴ While the VOC was able to expel the Portuguese from Tidore and Amboina in 1605, it was nonetheless thwarted in Malacca in 1606, and Mozambique in 1607. Even though Van Linschoten had provided a detailed military description of the Mozambique stronghold in the *Itinerario*, the Dutch were overpowered. Studies on the VOC's privateering against the India Run show that until the 1609 truce, Portuguese losses to the Dutch were not exorbitant.²⁵⁵

The Portuguese tried out a number of responses to the VOC's militarization: orders were issued from Lisbon that all India Run ships had to sail together without separating; the calendar for the departure of fleets was altered; a direct Lisbon-Goa route, circumventing Santa Helena and thus, ostensibly, avoiding heavily armed VOC vessels, was attempted; 16th-century plans to turn Mozambique into a Portuguese depot linking inland Africa and the Atlantic were reconsidered; and, in 1613, the Portuguese cosmographer João Baptista Lavanha (1550–1624) dispatched a spy to discover the route the Dutch followed between Madagascar and Java. All these attempts faced opposition in India.²⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the Dutch-Iberian nautical interchange did not stop, mainly in Asia. During Cornelis de Houtman's inaugural Dutch expedition to Asia, the Dutch were given decisive access to Portuguese cartography, when the Portuguese defector Pedro de Ataíde handed over a package of Portuguese charts of Asia. Because of his perceived treason, Ataíde ended up killed by the Portuguese.²⁵⁷ His death is reminiscent of the similar attempts by

253 André Murteira, "A navegação portuguesa na Ásia e na rota do Cabo e o curso neerlandês, 1595–1625" (PhD diss., Nova University of Lisbon, 2016), 136–37 and 149; Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 61–62.

254 Murteira, "A navegação portuguesa," 203.

255 Murteira, "A navegação portuguesa," 206.

256 Maria Emília Madeira Santos, "O problema da segurança das rotas e a concorrência luso-holandesa antes de 1620," *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra* XXXII (1985): 121–22, 125, 132, 137, 139–40 and 144–45.

257 Schilder, *Monumenta Cartographica*, 267.

the Portuguese ambassador João Pereira Dantas, reported in chapter 4. However, as had happened before with the French and the English, they did not impede the Dutch use of this knowledge. The Portuguese were also quick to realize that they could appropriate Dutch nautical knowledge for their own profit, almost the same way they had done with the Spanish in the Moluccas as detailed in chapter 1. In his *Art of Navigation*, published in 1596, the Portuguese Father Francisco da Costa included a translation of Adriaen Veen's nautical works, almost in the same way the Dutch cartographer Jodocus Hondius (1563–1612) had acquired the English cosmographer Edward Wright's (1561–1615) famous scientific tables some years earlier.

Hondius brought Wright's tables to the Dutch Republic and even published them.²⁵⁸ Like the previous Anglo-Portuguese maritime interchange detailed in chapter 2, the Anglo-Dutch one was also full of technical consequences for both sides. Aside from Hondius, the Dutch were able to hire the English nautical expert, pilot, and author of English works on seamanship John Davis (1550–1605), to pilot the second Dutch expedition to Asia by Jacob van Neck (1564–1638). When Davis returned from the voyage to the Dutch Republic, agitation on the other side of the English Channel prompted Richard Hakluyt (1552–1616) to negotiate Davis's return to English service to stop the seepage of English nautical knowledge to the Dutch Republic. Still, at the same time, Hakluyt also appropriated Van Linschoten's *Itinerario* and used it for his re-edition of the *Principal Navigations*.²⁵⁹ This even included Van Linschoten's report of Francis Drake's circumnavigation that Hakluyt wanted to print because he had been previously forbidden to publishing any report due to Queen Elizabeth I's secrecy policy regarding Drake's voyage.²⁶⁰ The English edition of the *Itinerario* published just two years after the original Dutch edition (in 1598) played a critical role in the English designs for Asia in the following years. The same applies to the first and subsequent translations of the *Itinerario* and even of the *Reys-gheschrift* alone into French.²⁶¹ These facts points to the importance of the Anglo-Dutch interchange unfolding simultaneously and fully comparably with what has been stressed in chapter 2 concerning the importance of Anglo-Portuguese nautical interchange in the first English systematic expeditions to West Africa: two allies slowly becoming maritime competitors and appropriating

258 Almeida, *A carta de navegar*, 292–93 and 322–24.

259 Elgin, "The Itinerary," 56–60.

260 Harry Kelsey, *Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1998), 85–88.

261 For a quick reassessment of all of the editions of the *Itinerario* and *Reys-gheschrift* between 1596 and 1668 see: A sea of books – RUTTER Digital Library – <https://www.aseaofbooks.org/#linschotens-itinerario> [accessed on May 4, 2023].

the other's nautical knowledge. The Anglo-Dutch interchange remained intense throughout the 17th century with very similar stories such as those of Hondius or Davis, proving how for the English and the Dutch, too, it was impossible to control maritime knowledge circulation.

Thus, returning to the Dutch-Portuguese wars in Asia, the main military engagements in Asia up to Van Linschoten's death prove that the Portuguese and Dutch were deadlocked. The Portuguese were incapable of casting the VOC out of Asia, but the Dutch were also unable to land major blows on the Portuguese. The VOC's mission would not be easy, despite the Company's own wealth and funding from the Republic, which outstripped the meager resources of the Portuguese. All these factors, combined with the fact that Van Linschoten opted out of military actions in Asia and died promoting the failed northern route, imply that he was not keen on massive war against the Portuguese.

In 1595, Van Linschoten knew better than anyone else that the Portuguese would not stand quietly and accept the arrival of the Dutch. In a sense, these events also contributed to the declining influence of the *Itinerario* and help to contextualize Van Linschoten's later career in Enkhuizen. Although Van Linschoten's data on Mutapa could still win approbation from the Dutch governor of the Cape of Good Hope in the 1660s,²⁶² the *Itinerario* was old news even before Van Linschoten's demise. Nonetheless, for the English, who had less updated information about Asia, Van Linschoten's text could have provided valuable insights. For this reason, in 1619, the VOC formally forbade its re-publication for fear that English rivals in Asia would persist in using it against the Dutch.²⁶³ Still, Van Linschoten's warnings on the dangers of miscegenation continued to be taken seriously. In 1610, the VOC board were confronted with a corrupting portrait of Dutch Asia by Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629),²⁶⁴ that seemed to mirror the very situation Van Linschoten had repudiated in Portuguese Goa. They decided to send white European women to Asia and discontinue missions in the area.²⁶⁵ Arriving in 1592 to a hero's welcome, bearing invaluable data for the emergent Republic and its dream of shattering the Iberian *Mare Clausum*, Van Linschoten died in 1611 better-known outside the Dutch Republic than within its borders.

To conclude this re-examination of Van Linschoten's career, it is time to return to the earliest questions about the circumstances around the

²⁶² Van den Boogaart, *Huygen van Linschoten*, 21.

²⁶³ Delmas, "L'*Itinerario* de J.H. van Linschoten," 21.

²⁶⁴ Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 183.

²⁶⁵ Kamps, "Jan Huygen," 161, 174 and 179.

Dutchman's acquisition and abscondment with precious data, and attempt to weigh the ultimate legacy of the *Itinerario*. How can we make sense of this state of affairs without recourse to convenient, but unsubstantiated, claims that Van Linschoten was a spy?

Conclusion

The fundamental reason that Van Linschoten could harvest and make off with Portuguese intelligence is neatly expressed by the subtitle of a book by Russell-Wood, who tracked the ways the Portuguese Empire truly functioned as a world on the move, circulating people, ideas, and goods.²⁶⁶ Van Linschoten's well-documented capacity to adapt to new environments becomes very clear in the course of his whole career. It played as decisive a role in the Iberian world as the archbishop, who recognized Van Linschoten's drawing and organizing talents, and of Urbina, the Spanish governor of Terceira, who took an interest in them. But this adaptability and flexibility was also made clear when, back in the Dutch Republic, Van Linschoten accepted to reshape his materials for the Dutch publication, in order to win pan-European fame. Still, the *Itinerario* could have easily been published as either a travel narrative or a major cosmographical work within the Iberian world, were it not for the archbishop's death and its repercussions. It is hard to deny that, for Van Linschoten, making a living in Portuguese Asia was a tempting option. Otherwise, what could he have meant by his mention in the *Itinerario* that many of his hopes were hanging on the archbishop's return?

I argue Van Linschoten's goal was to become a celebrated writer/chronicler for the Portuguese, and that this explicit aim was the main reason he secured access to secret knowledge. The post of chronicler of Portuguese India was vacant by Van Linschoten's time in Goa, and the *Decades* of João de Barros was without a clear successor (only later, in 1595, would chronicler Diogo do Couto be thus instated). As has been demonstrated, the *Itinerario* was totally reshaped for a Dutch audience. In the process, the would-be Iberian cosmography was effectively transformed into a masterpiece of Dutch propaganda that stoked the black legend of the Spanish and Portuguese. The *Itinerario* was duly forbidden in Portugal and Spain,²⁶⁷ as it took the same negative perspective on the Estado that had seen other contemporary

266 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move* (London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1998).

267 Delmas, "L'*Itinerario* de J.H. van Linschoten," 21.

Portuguese debates banned from being published.²⁶⁸ But a careful calibration of its political commentary would have been all that was needed for the *Itinerario* to perfectly meet the standards required of a publication in Portugal or Spain, especially if someone as prestigious as the archbishop of Goa or the viceroy of Portugal had signed on as sponsor.

On the other hand, by the end of 16th century, both Portugal and Spain were increasingly unable to control sensitive cosmographical knowledge being published about their empires. For the Portuguese-Spanish case, several instances have been identified in the first chapter. The same goes for Anglo-Portuguese and French-Portuguese relations in chapters 2, 3, and 4. As for the Low Countries, a similar process took place, although the critical episodes occurred mainly from the 1580s onwards, with Van Linschoten's example being one of great significance. As Richard Unger has long ago demonstrated, the Low Countries had been importers of Portuguese nautical knowledge from as early as the 15th century, enabling them to cultivate leading thinkers such as Gerard Mercator and then Petrus Plancius.²⁶⁹ It is noteworthy that Michel Coignet (1549–1623) also used Iberian authors, in a manner fully comparable with those documented in chapters 2, 3, and 4, to Tudor England and Valois France. Furthermore, it is relevant to bear in mind that the cutting-edge works of the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes (1502–78) and D. João de Castro (1500–48) were likewise read throughout Europe,²⁷⁰ and obviously reached the Dutch Republic in the 1590s.

Thus, ever since the beginning of the 16th century, Europe was more than merely curious about the Portuguese discoveries, as was documented mainly for Italy and Germany.²⁷¹ Rather, rulers across the continent sought to understand how Portugal had managed to set up the first truly scientific European institution,²⁷² and then placed it in the service of imperial administration (starting with the Casa da Guiné, later renowned the Casa da Índia).²⁷³ This is why the celebrated naturalist Carolus Clusius visited not just Spain, but also ventured into Portugal, where he became familiar with

268 Vila-Santa, "O Primeiro Soldado Prático."

269 Unger, "Dutch Nautical Science," 73–74 and 83. Unger's argument was also made by Desiré Gernez, "L'influence portugaise sur la cartographie nautique néerlandaise du XVI^e siècle," *Annales de Géographie*, 259 (1937): 1–9.

270 Hooykas, "The Rise of Modern Science," 459 and 472–73.

271 Andrade, *Mundos Novos*, 2 vols.

272 Turnbull, "Cartography and Science," 7.

273 Teixeira da Mota, "Some Notes on the Organization," 51–60; Ângela Barreto Xavier, "The Casa da Índia and the Emergence of a Science of Administration in the Portuguese Empire," *Journal of Early Modern History* 22 (2018): 327–47; Sánchez, "Charts for an Empire."

Garcia de Orta's work. This transfer of maritime knowledge from the Iberian Peninsula to Northern Europe was also accelerated by the exile of D. António, the claimant to the Portuguese throne, at the French and English courts, and his supporters' contacts with the English and the Dutch. Although it is widely acknowledged that Richard Hakluyt employed D. António's supporters in his school of seamanship in England,²⁷⁴ much less is known of his supporters' connection with the Dutch in the 1580s. It is important to further investigate whether any of D. António's supporters who ventured into the Dutch Republic participated in exchanges of nautical information during this time. Furthermore, it is clear that the Dutch-Portuguese interchange continued, particularly evidenced by the marriage of D. António's heir, D. Manuel de Portugal (1568–1638), with Emily of Orange (1569–1629), daughter of William of Orange, in 1597.

On the Spanish side, although the Consejo de Indias tried to protect secret cosmographical knowledge from Dutch, French, and English rivals, its policy was foundering by the 1580s. A classic example is the publication, in Rome, of Juan González de Mendoza's (1545–1618) book on China, a complete bypass of the Consejo de Indias's control. With every Spanish ship captured by the English, Spanish cartography and rutters changed hands. Knowledge escaped at such a rate that when the Consejo de Indias denied the Spanish Captain Juan Escalante de Mendoza's (1526–96) request for permission to publish his maps and rutters, he rebutted that foreigners already had all of Spain's nautical knowledge. Even after the Consejo de Indias's decision, Mendonza's maps and rutters circulated in manuscript form in such a volume that King Philip II was forced to forbid their distribution in 1593. Abraham Ortelius (1527–98) also seemed to have had little difficulty securing Iberian maps of overseas areas, receiving a map of China and Japan by the Portuguese cartographer Luís Jorge Barbuda in 1584, and, in 1592, another by the Portuguese cartographer Luís Teixeira.²⁷⁵

Seen in this light, Van Linschoten's success in gathering nautical data in Goa between 1583 and 1588 should not come as a surprise. His situation is not much different from the efforts of Petrus Plancius to seize the Dutch longitude prize, all the while basing his theories on the cosmographical works of Spanish royal cosmographer Alonso de Santa Cruz (1505–67) and Portuguese authors such as Francisco Faleiro and João de Lisboa,²⁷⁶

274 McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, XXV.

275 Portuondo, *Secret Science*, 168–69 and 262–63.

276 Karel Davids, "Dutch and Spanish Global Networks of Knowledge in the Early Modern Period: Structure, Changes and Limitations," In *Centres and Cycles of Accumulation in and around the*

another critical example demonstrating how the Dutch-Iberian interchange continued in spite of the open war between both sides. It is in this context of technical and scientific espionage that the impact of the publication of the *Itinerario* should be discussed. While Van Linschoten's opus is frequently treated as a collection of completely new knowledge, there are many reasons to dispute this characterization. Were not Asian goods and their values already known across Europe within merchant communities? Had not rumors of the decline of the Estado circulated ever since the death of King Sebastian? Furthermore, nautical knowledge had been swapped daily in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Italian ports and global cities since the start of the 16th century. And finally, Portuguese and Spanish discovery accounts and even chronicles had indubitably reached pockets of readers across the continent by the 1580s.

With the exception of Portuguese nautical rutters, which no one before Van Linschoten seems to have been able to acquire to the same extent because the Portuguese Crown at an early stage issued strict orders for them to be destroyed if any Portuguese vessel was captured by the enemy,²⁷⁷ few aspects of the *Itinerario* were completely new. What *was* novel was the way the book merged several bodies of knowledge about Asia (nautical, cartographical, ethnographical, political, mercantile, social) and repackaged them into a manual for anyone bent on defying Iberian maritime hegemony. It contained data essential for the development of political strategies, and offered a pragmatic resource for any merchant, sailor, or explorer interested in entering the "Iberian" waters and markets. This was the selling point of the *Itinerario*, and the reason it saw a flurry of translations into English (1598), Latin (1599), German (1600), and French (1610) and several re-editions. This fact again invites reflection on the importance of intra-European knowledge transfers about Asia with critical repercussions.

As has been highlighted, the Dutch contribution to the emergence of modern science in Europe was directly influenced by the formation of the VOC and of a "Republic of Merchants."²⁷⁸ The Dutch cultivation of universities and cabinets of curiosities, and their untiring efforts to update information coming from Asia, are inextricably related with the Dutch Republic's particular sociocultural environment.²⁷⁹ Contrary to Spain and Portugal,

Netherlands during the Early Modern Period, ed. Lissa Roberts (LIT Verlag, 2011), 29–41.

²⁷⁷ McKew Parr, *Linschoten*, 165.

²⁷⁸ Cook, *Matters of Exchange*, 2, 5 and 58.

²⁷⁹ Klaas van Berkel, "The Dutch Republic. Laboratory of the Scientific Revolution," *BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review* 125, no. 2–3 (2010): 81, 103 and 105.

where scientific development was dominated by the royal sphere, the Dutch Republic was able to mix public and private spheres of influence in its pursuit of natural knowledge.²⁸⁰ In this sense, Van Linschoten was at the vanguard of a new kind of professional identity: the 17th-century VOC merchant-scientist.²⁸¹ In his own way, Van Linschoten made a major contribution to the trajectory of scientific development in the Dutch Republic. But he was only able to do so because of his “apprenticeship” in Portuguese Asia and experience in transforming his knowledge in the Dutch Republic.

During Van Linschoten's career, the trading of confidential information between Iberian and Dutch ambiances was a constant event. Furthermore, there is not enough evidence that he was acting as a spy in Portuguese Asia. For this reason, it may not be accurate to admit that Van Linschoten was ever a spy, and certainly not one comparable to the type of nautical espionage that has been documented in all previous chapters. On the contrary, reassessment of Van Linschoten's Iberian career and of several statements in the *Itinerario* reveals that he was not as anti-Portuguese or even anti-Iberian as is usually assumed. Moreover, there is reason to think that this might have influenced his decision not to depart again for Asia, and might even explain his later career in Enkhuizen. Therefore, it is more fitting to approach Van Linschoten as a cross-cultural broker,²⁸² in a pivotal period for the history of maritime knowledge transmission, between the Iberian world and the Low Countries. Van Linschoten's whole tale is directly related with a previous history of transfer of Iberian knowledge to northern Europe. The fact that Van Linschoten is frequently quoted as a major success case should not overshadow this major process, which was fundamental in the rise of the English and Dutch overseas expansion. This is why R. C. D. Baldwin correctly posited the importance of Asia as the place where the knowledge interchange between the Portuguese and the Dutch took place, with profound consequences.²⁸³ It is in this framework of understanding that Jan Huygen van Linschoten should be approached. After all, Van Linschoten's case stands against a backdrop of knowledge transmission within Europe about Asia that was happening since the beginning of the 16th century and that was being accelerated in the transition to the 17th century, when the Dutch, the English, and the French were in better shape to challenge Iberian claims to the *Mare Clausum*.

280 Davids, “Dutch and Spanish Global Networks,” 5 and 11–12.

281 Cook, *Matters of Exchange*.

282 Kapil Raj, “Go-Betweens, Travelers, and Cultural Translators,” in *A Companion to the History of Science*, ed. Bernard Lightman (John Wiley & Sons, 2020), 39–57.

283 Baldwin, “The Development and Interchange,” vol. I, 349.

It is now time to propose final conclusions on the mechanisms of Iberian nautical and maritime knowledge circulation in Europe during the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries and to discuss if there is good reason to think that there were successful Portuguese secrecy policies regarding nautical knowledge being transmitted to maritime rivals.