

2. Unexpected or Predictable Espionage and Diplomacy? Portuguese Nautical Knowledge and the English Voyages to West Africa (1551–59)

Abstract

This chapter examines Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations, drawing on recently discovered original documents that detail one of the earliest episodes of interchange and rivalry between Portugal and England: the first systematic English voyages to West Africa in the 1550s. It analyzes the diplomacy, espionage, and interchange of maritime knowledge between both sides and its role in the re-emergence of English overseas expansion. The goal is to demonstrate how, already during the early 1550s, the pattern of rivalry, emulation, and interchange of nautical knowledge was present in Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations.

Keywords: John III, Mary I, Philip II, pilots, maritime espionage, West Africa

Introduction

The exchange of nautical knowledge between England and the Iberian Peninsula since the 15th century played a crucial role in the development of English overseas endeavors. This has been acknowledged by notable English scholars for a long time.¹ The first English oceanic explorations,

¹ David Waters, *The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times* (London: Hollis and Carter, 1958); David Waters, *The Iberian Bases of the English Art of Navigation in the Sixteenth Century* (Lisbon: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1970); David Waters, *English Navigational Books, Charts and Globes printed down to 1600* (Lisbon: IICT, 1985); E. G. R. Taylor, *The English Debt to Portuguese Nautical Science in the 16th Century* (offprint from Lisbon: I

from Bristol, under King Henry VII (1485–1509) with John Cabot (1450–1500), his son Sebastian Cabot's (1474–1557) later sojourn in Spain, and even the Portuguese involvement in those attempts from Bristol are generally known. However, the fact that King Henry VIII (1509–47) did not become a full patron of oceanic exploration slowed English overseas plans. It was under King Edward VI (1547–53), and above all Queens Mary I (1553–58) and Elizabeth I (1558–1603), that English overseas expansion fully restarted. While the first Iberian kingdom to be affected by the English overseas voyages was Portugal, particularly in West Africa under Queen Mary I, Spain also soon felt the impact, as the reign of Queen Elizabeth I showed. Nevertheless, behind the superficial maritime rivalry that emerged between England, Portugal, and Spain in the middle of 16th century, there was also, as has been underlined in the previous chapter for Portuguese-Spanish maritime relations, a less visible process of decisive maritime knowledge circulation. The intensity of this process and its overall impact on the restart of English overseas plans in the mid-16th century will be the focus of this chapter, which will deal mainly with Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and nautical interchange. The analysis will focus on the time of Queen Mary I, whose reign has been revised by historians in terms of its impact in nautical matters. Recent studies argued that the development and growth of the English navy under Queen Elizabeth I should be seen in light of the events of Queen Mary I's reign.²

During the analysis, it will become clear that the intensity of this process existed from the beginning and how it came to have a deep influence on key English overseas plans, much in the same way that has been observed for Portugal and Spain. However, it is important to highlight that for Anglo-Portuguese relations, sources are not as abundant as for the Portuguese-Spanish interchange. But the perception that this exchange was not as intense as the Portuguese-Spanish one is misleading. It is essential to bear in mind that Portugal and England had one of the oldest military alliances in world history, and that this alliance always played a key role

Congresso da História da Expansão Portuguesa no Mundo, Lisbon, 1958), 5–11; E. G. R. Taylor, *The Haven-Finding Art: A History of Navigation from Odysseus to Captain Cook* (London: Cambridge University Press/The Institute of Navigation, 1971); Louis B. Wright, *English Explorers' Debt to the Iberians* (Coimbra: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1980).

2 On this topic see the traditional work of David M. Loades, *The Making of the Elizabethan Navy 1540–1590: From the Solent to the Armada* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2009) and W. D. Benjamin Redding, "English Naval Expansion under the French Threat, 1555–1564," *International Journal of Maritime History* 28, no. 4 (2016): 640–53; W. D. Benjamin Redding, *The English and French Navies, 1500–1650: Expansion, Organization and State-Building* (Boydell & Brewer, 2022).

in their maritime relations. Thus, for Anglo-Portuguese relations, there is a plausible suspicion that many more episodes occurred in addition to those that will be detailed.

To examine the Anglo-Portuguese interchange, the study will begin by providing a brief overview of the influence of Iberian maritime knowledge on the first English overseas projects in the late 15th and early 16th centuries. It will then delve into how the English systematic voyages to West Africa in the 1550s were shaped by this pattern of Anglo-Portuguese nautical interchange, using a set of recently found Portuguese archival records that document Portuguese maritime espionage in England in this period. Through an examination of the motivations of the skilled Portuguese pilot who inspired Thomas Wydham's voyage in 1553, the study will also address the official response of the Portuguese. During this analysis, attention will be paid to all the other English voyages up to the coronation of Queen Elizabeth I in 1558, including the diplomacy, espionage, and knowledge exchange that occurred. It will become clear that the cases studied in the 1550s are an intensification of a process that was already underway since the late 15th century. Finally, the conclusion will consider the extent to which this Anglo-Portuguese interchange may have contributed to the development of the English scientific milieu that supported England's overseas expansion and scientific progress under Queen Elizabeth I. The continuation of this process of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and interchange, which intensified under Queen Elizabeth I, will be further explored in chapter 4 when examining João Pereira Dantas's embassies to France and England in the 1560s.

2.1 The Iberian Connection in the Early English Overseas Projects

The Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry that came into full clarity under Queen Mary I had its initial manifestations in the 15th century. Early English voyages to Morocco in 1465 and 1469, together with King Edward IV's (1461–70; 1471–83) petition to the pope to authorize English trade in the area,³ were the first signs of Portugal's and England's conflicting overseas interests. Still, the 1386 Treaty of Windsor (the oldest European alliance

3 Rogério Miguel Puga, "'Scramble for Africa': as viagens inglesas à África Ocidental no reinado de D. João III," in *D. João III e o Império. Actas do Congresso Internacional comemorativo do seu nascimento* (Lisbon: CHAM, 2004), 726–27.

between the two realms) prevented a major breakdown of relations. Under King John II's reign (1481–95), however, tensions escalated. The issue at stake was the prevention of the participation of two Englishmen in the Atlantic ventures that Lopo de Albuquerque, the Portuguese earl of Penamacor, who had fled to England, intended to organize. An opponent of King John II's centralistic policy, Penamacor fled to England after his participation in the first attempt to dethrone King John. Soon afterwards, the Spanish duke of Medina Sidonia also attempted to hire Portuguese and Englishmen to aid in his Atlantic ventures against Portuguese interests. Medina Sidonia's plans were connected to the Portuguese-Castilian rivalry in the Atlantic between King John II and the Catholic Kings. With these events in mind, John sent two embassies to England to disrupt the plans of the earl of Penamacor. He succeeded in reiterating the traditional alliance with England, but only after several fruitless bids to have Penamacor jailed in the Tower of London. Although Penamacor was imprisoned at one point, he was never extradited to Portuguese authorities to face justice, and he ended his days in Spain.

In this process, King John II benefited from the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and chiefly from the fact that English maritime ambitions were very limited, as England lacked the requisite nautical knowledge by then only accumulated by the Iberians.⁴ In this way, the English attempted voyages in the 1480s, as well as the first two Flemish voyages to West Africa, were all organized during or as consequence of the Portuguese-Castilian war between 1475–79. All these voyages employed Andalusian crews and pilots, based on the contacts of Flemish and English merchants in Andalusia, and profited from Castille's attempt to enter the West African market against Portuguese interests.⁵ Aware of these facts, King John II ordered the building of the fortress of São Jorge da Mina in 1482, to dissuade intruders (Castilians, English, and French) from breaking the Portuguese monopoly.

Worried about possible English interests in West Africa, even after erecting the Mina fortress, John also pressed King Henry VII to hand over Portuguese exiles who might assist in the preparation of any English expeditions. In 1485, King Henry VII agreed to forbid Englishmen from participating in such schemes, but refused to extradite the Portuguese collaborators. To confirm the formal alliance, Henry also approved a law prohibiting non-Englishmen

4 David M. Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490–1690* (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 20–21.

5 Lior Blum, "Empire Later: England and West Africa, 1553–1631, and the Foundations of English Dominance in the Region in the Late Seventeenth Century" (PhD diss., University of Southampton, 2019), 29.

from serving in the English navy. Nevertheless, he subsequently took steps to facilitate the naturalization of foreign seamen, thus guaranteeing that England would have a constant supply of the best nautical knowledge for overseas voyaging. It is in this context that, in 1489, King John II forced the Catholic Kings to pass a motion forbidding English merchants in Spain from recruiting Iberian pilots to sail for Guinea.⁶ John might have been aware of the plans by Bartholomew Columbus, brother of Christopher Columbus, to enter Tudor service after 1492. Although these plans did not materialize,⁷ the king was well-aware that English overseas ambitions could seriously harm Portugal and Spain's interests.

Nevertheless, Anglo-Portuguese maritime contacts remained very intense during the 1490s and escaped control by the Portuguese Crown, despite King John II's attempts. The first voyages of John Cabot (1450–1500) in the service of King Henry VII, although they did not target areas granted to the Portuguese by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, were financed and secured by an Anglo-Portuguese syndicate from Bristol.⁸ This joint collaboration took place in the context of intense commercial contacts between Bristol and Portugal,⁹ and can be fully understood when looking at Portuguese commercial networks in late medieval Europe,¹⁰ which included important connections with England. As a consequence of this collaboration and following the abovementioned policy, King Henry VII naturalized some of the Portuguese members of this syndicate.¹¹

It is also well-known that King Henry VII authorized two Portuguese in 1502 to sail with the Bristol merchants Thomas Ashurt and Hugh Elliot to

6 Consuelo Varela, *Inglese en España y Portugal, 1480–1515: aristócratas, mercaderes e impostores* (Lisbon: Colibri, 1998), 47–52; John William Blake, *Europeans in West Africa, 1450–1560. Documents to Illustrate the Nature and Scope of Portuguese Enterprise in West Africa, the Abortive Attempt of Castillians to Create an Empire There, and the Early English Voyages to Barbary and Guinea*, vol. II (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1942), 264–66.

7 Pagden and Subrahmanyam, "Roots and Branches," 280.

8 Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of British Empire, 1480–1630* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 47–49.

9 On this topic see: Hilário Casado Alonso and Flávio Miranda, "Comércio entre o porto de Bristol e Portugal no final da Idade Média, 1461–1504," *Anais de História de Além-Mar* XIX (2018): 11–36.

10 For more details on Anglo-Portuguese trade see: Flávio Miranda, "Portugal and the Medieval Atlantic: Commercial Diplomacy, Merchants and Trade, 1143–1488" (PhD diss., University of Oporto, 2012), 72–80 and 207–13. On this topic see also: Wendy R. Childs, *Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1978); Wendy R. Childs, "Anglo-Portuguese Trade in the Fifteenth Century," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 2 (1992), 195–219.

11 Jessica S. Hower, *Tudor Empire: The Making of Early Modern Britain and the British Atlantic World, 1485–1603* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 81.

undertake geographical discoveries in North America, on the condition that they would not visit Portuguese overseas areas.¹² These Portuguese sailors were João Gonçalves and Francisco Fernandes, who came to Bristol after the Portuguese inability to continue the Corte-Real's discovery expeditions.¹³ Despite the fact that this order indicated that the English monarch wished to maintain good relations with Portugal, it is undeniable that Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry was re-emerging. King Manuel I (1495–1521) disputed King Henry VII's supposed discovery and rights of occupation to Newfoundland, particularly in the wake of the Portuguese expeditions of the Corte-Real brothers. However, the controversy did not last long as both monarchs later dropped their plans,¹⁴ owing to other priorities. Still, the intersection between Portuguese and English private interests was a reality in these first episodes of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry and it continued to play a pivotal role.

The arrival of Sebastian Cabot in Spain in 1512, combined with the accession to the throne of King Henry VIII in 1509, meant a slowing down of English overseas plans. Still, in 1517, profiting from the knowledge brought by John Cabot's expeditions, a new (albeit unsuccessful) mission to explore Newfoundland was launched from Bristol. While not so vocal a supporter of oceanic exploration as his father, Henry VIII played a key part in the process of English maritime expansion. In 1513, he had a motion passed enabling the hiring of experienced pilots who were not English or Scottish by birth for the main commercial routes that the English used in Northern Europe and the Mediterranean, thus creating the conditions for foreign pilots to pursue legitimate careers in England.¹⁵ In a way, this law was a continuation of his father's of 1489. Taking advantage of England's intense contacts with maritime ports in France, the Iberian Peninsula, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, Henry was able to develop a systematic policy for recruiting French, Spanish, and Portuguese pilots. If his focus was mainly on European policy, the king did not neglect new opportunities.

12 Gordon Kay McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion: English Economic and Diplomatic Relations with Portugal and Incursions into the Portuguese Overseas Empire, 1550–1590" (PhD diss., University of Cincinnati, 1975), 42.

13 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "New Worlds: 1485–1505," in *Tudor & Stuart Seafarers: The Emergence of a Maritime Nation, 1485–1707*, ed. James Davey (London: Adlard Coles/National Maritime Museum Greenwich, 2018), 30–32.

14 Varela, *Inglese en España y Portugal*, 63.

15 R. C. D. Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange of Navigational Information and Technology between the Maritime Communities of Iberia, North-Western Europe and Asia, 1500–1620" (MA thesis Durham University, 1980), vol. I, 208 and 220.

In 1526, Robert Thorne and English merchants of Seville arranged for the participation of Roger Barlow and Henry Latimer in Sebastian Cabot's expedition to the River Plate. During this expedition, Barlow accumulated experience and knowledge not only on the Spanish side, but also from several Portuguese with whom he contacted during the voyage. Indeed, it has been underscored in the previous chapter how Sebastian Cabot's voyage in 1526 was deeply influenced by the knowledge of several Portuguese pilots. Furthermore, previously Barlow had also acquired trading experience in Portuguese fortresses on the Moroccan coast and Portuguese Atlantic islands.¹⁶ King Henry VIII was duly informed of these events. He was urged to organize an expedition to Asia through the Strait of Magellan, but instead patronized the 1527 voyage of John Rutt in search of a route to Asia through the Arctic.¹⁷ Like his father, Henry VIII was reluctant, in 1527, to challenge the Portuguese overseas areas openly, which explains why he supported an attempt to reach Asia that did not include the Portuguese hemisphere.

Between 1525 and 1527, the Tudor court also discussed the possibility of buying the Spanish rights to the Moluccas, which were being negotiated between Portugal and Spain as has been mentioned in the previous chapter. Despite Archbishop Edward Lee of York's (1482?–1544) favorable opinion, Cardinal Thomas Wolsey (1473–1530) opposed it and the idea was abandoned.¹⁸ A French historian has also stated that King Henry VIII wrote to the Verrazzano brothers, after their expedition's return to France, in 1525, to convince them to come to England. Although the project failed, Henry received the latest cartographical knowledge of North America brought by the Verrazano brothers.¹⁹ Almost at the same time, Robert Thorne tried to convince Henry VIII to buy the Spanish rights, but the Tudor monarch declined due to England's lack of money. When Thorne published his 1531 geography demanding support from the English Crown for the discovery of the northwestern passage to Asia, his appeal remained unanswered. In the meantime, Roger Barlow failed to entice Sebastian Cabot to return to England in 1530 and to convince King Henry VIII to patronize other attempts overseas. A notable exception seems to have occurred in 1536 with the Londoner Mr. Hore's voyage to North America, an expedition

16 Heather Dalton, *Merchants and Explorers: Roger Barlow, Sebastian Cabot, and Networks of Atlantic Exchange 1500–1560* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 23–24, 87 and 90.

17 Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 53–55.

18 Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange," vol. I, 222.

19 Maurice de Brossard, "La France de la Renaissance et ses rois face aux problèmes océaniques," *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra* XXXIII (1985): 308.

that ended in piracy against the French.²⁰ Even though there were some English overseers established in Mexico as part of Anglo-Spanish networks of trade with Western Indies during the second quarter of the 16th century, this did not motivate the beginning of a new English interest overseas.²¹ Still, Barlow continued to gather important knowledge in case the English Crown were to advance with explorations, and dedicated his *Brief Summe of Geography* to King Henry VIII.

Although the 1530s were not conducive to the plans that Barlow and Thorne wanted the English Crown to pursue, the decade witnessed the voyages of William Hawkins the Elder to West Africa and Brazil in 1530, 1532, and 1540. William Hawkins, like his son John Hawkins (1532–95), employed Portuguese pilots for such expeditions whenever possible,²² but his voyages did not make much of an impact due to the Tudor court's limited support of oceanic navigation. It is usually assumed that William Hawkins also spent some years in Spain and Portugal between 1525 and 1530, as Harry Kelsey suspects, based on Spanish documents, that he sailed to the Caribbean as early as 1527.²³ What is certain is that William Hawkins used these contacts in Portugal and Spain to plan his 1530 and 1532 triangular voyages between England, Guinea, and Brazil. On the last one, he brought an Indian native to King Henry VIII.

William Hawkins's voyages are undocumented in Portuguese sources, as the Portuguese were focused on fighting French interlopers in both Guinea and Brazil. Still, it is likely that Hawkins hired Portuguese or French pilots. Collaboration between English and French merchants also took place in 1539–40 in a syndicate.²⁴ This early Anglo-French collaboration did not pass unnoticed to Portuguese spies in Europe. João Fernandes Lagarto, a Portuguese spy in France, traveled to England around 1541–42 after reports that French ships from Dieppe were being prepared in English ports to head for Brazil. He found that an unnamed Englishman was promised a role in the voyage and a share of its profits.²⁵ Lagarto's findings were not,

20 Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, 34 and 43.

21 Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530–1630* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 109.

22 Wright, *English Explorers' Debt*, 5–6; Waters, *English Navigational Books*, 5. The authors do not mention the pilots' names.

23 Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins: Queen Elizabeth's Slave Trader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 5–6.

24 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 44–46.

25 Marco Oliveira Borges, "O trajecto final da Carreira da Índia na torna-viagem (1500–1640). Problemas da navegação entre os Açores e Lisboa: acções e reacções" (PhD diss., University of Lisbon, 2020), vol. I, 354–55.

thus, new, but they did not seem to have bothered the Portuguese king too much. Once more no formal reaction is known, and it was certainly not comparable to the one that will be detailed below for the reign of Queen Mary I.

Nevertheless, the 1540s marked a change in English attitudes towards oceanic navigation. In 1541, King Henry VIII wrote to King John III (1521–57) asking for permission for some Englishmen to sail to Calicut in Portuguese India Run ships, a request firmly refused by the Portuguese monarch.²⁶ King Henry VIII's interest in navigation to Asia may be linked with the fact that in 1533, John More, son of Thomas More (1478–1535), had translated into English a Portuguese report about Prester John and Ethiopia, written by the Portuguese humanist Damião de Góis (1502–74).²⁷ It is also well-known that the main character in Thomas More's *Utopia*, the bringer of news, was the Portuguese Raphael Hythlodæus. More's choice of a Portuguese character is usually associated with an unnamed Portuguese sailor that More met in Antwerp,²⁸ but it can be interpreted as a sign of burgeoning English curiosity about the New Worlds being discovered by the Iberians. After all, as Barlow and Thorne's story demonstrate, the English connection to the Iberian Peninsula was very intense already by the 1520s.

In light of ongoing wars with Francis I (1515–47), King Henry VIII saw fit to fortify the English navy, creating the post of Lord Admiral in 1545 and offering it to John Dudley (1504–53), later duke of Northumberland.²⁹ With Anglo-French rivalry and traditional interchange of knowledge unfolding simultaneously, Henry displayed an increasing interest in acquiring French maritime knowledge. In 1542, he hired Jean Rotz as his royal hydrographer and arranged for Rotz's famous atlas, originally meant for King Francis I, to be dedicated to him. The king's evident concern with geographical and mathematical knowledge likewise prompted German mathematician Petrus Apianus (1495–1552) to send the monarch some of his work, in 1546.

In terms of his nautical practitioners, King Henry VIII sought experts of various national origins. French experts such as Jean Ribault (1520–65) and Nicholas de Nicolay (1517–83) were successfully persuaded to serve the English Crown, and John Dudley stopped at nothing, including

26 Susana Oliveira, "Uma cartografia das mentalidades. A diplomacia portuguesa na corte isabelina" (PhD diss., University of Lisbon, 2018), 42.

27 Ana Paula Menino Avelar, *Veredas de Modernidade. Escrevendo o Mundo no Portugal de Quinhentos* (Lisbon: Colibri Editions, 2022), 36.

28 Andrade, *Mundos Novos*, vol. I, 741.

29 On Dudley see: David M. Loades, *John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland 1504–1553* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

imprisonment, to deter them from returning to French employ.³⁰ During the 1540s, King Henry VIII also hired the French mathematician and cosmographer Jean Mallard.³¹ Despite the open war with France in the 1540s, Henry patronized Anglo-French interchange, precisely as he did for the Anglo-Portuguese one.

It was not only for geographical purposes that the English monarch drew on foreign knowledge—when building up his fleet, King Henry frequently engaged Portuguese shipbuilders.³² The Portuguese Fernando Oliveira (1507–85) provides an interesting example. Captured during a naval fight between the French and the English during the war between Henry VIII and Francis I in the 1540s, Oliveira in those days already was an important authority on shipbuilding. He had traveled to Spain, France, and Italy and had taken notes on nautical construction techniques. Oliveira did not waste his stay in England to enlarge his experience and knowledge on the matter. Thus, he ended collaborating in 1546 with James Bakker and his son Mathew, appointed by King Henry VIII to reinforce the English navy.³³ Indeed, Mathew Bakker's (1530–1613) first English treatise on shipbuilding, written during the Elizabethan era,³⁴ shows some influence from Oliveira. Later, Oliveira was sent to Portugal by King Edward VI with an embassy.³⁵

In the meantime, he was very well treated by Henry VIII and Edward VI and awarded with substantial sums. Still, it remains unclear what exactly was his role in those times: that of a Portuguese pilot sharing Iberian nautical knowledge or a diplomat between Portugal and England? The question remains open, as some of the English awards are related to diplomatic missions to Portugal. Without finding new documents it will be difficult to uncover this decisive phase in Oliveira's career. What is certain is that Oliveira's stay in England later influenced his problems with the Portuguese Inquisition in 1552, particularly because he had dressed as a layman and

30 Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange," vol. I, 225–226; Taylor, *The Haven-Finding Art*, 194.

31 Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, 44.

32 A.B. Wallis Chapman and V. M. Shillington, *The Commercial Relations of England and Portugal* (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1907), 131.

33 On this topic: Richard Barker, *Fernando Oliveira: The English Episode, 1545–47* (Lisbon: Portuguese Navy Academy, 1992).

34 Stephen Andrew Johnston, "Making Mathematical Practice: Gentleman, Practitioners and Artisans in Elizabethan England" (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 1994), 114–19.

35 Rogério Miguel Puga, "Scramble for Africa": as viagens inglesas à África Ocidental no reinado de D. João III" in *D. João III e o Império. Actas do Congresso Internacional comemorativo do seu nascimento* (Lisbon: CHAM, 2004), 728.

ate at Henry VIII's table.³⁶ But Oliveira's case is not a single one at the end of King Henry VIII's reign.

A similar story took place with Portuguese cartographer Diogo Homem, who was also in England, together with Fernando Gonalo, a Portuguese navy captain well-versed in cosmography, in 1547, where he composed an important atlas. The value of Diogo Homem's cartographical works was recognized by an English court. Diogo Homem went to court to claim payment for his works as his original Venetian order-taker refused to pay. Evaluations of Diogo Homem's atlas were made, all of them with higher prices, proving how valuable this knowledge was in England. King John III (1521-57) was duly informed, in 1547, by Gaspar de Figueiredo, a Portuguese envoy sent to England to complain to Henry VIII of English seizures of Portuguese ships, of Diogo Homem's presence in London. He instructed Figueiredo to negotiate his return to Portugal.³⁷ Yet in 1547, the Portuguese king issued a letter of pardon to Diogo Homem on the condition that he returned to Portugal. The letter identified him as the son of Portuguese cosmographer Lopo Homem.³⁸ Nonetheless, there is no sign that Diogo Homem returned to Portugal, even considering that his father tried to repatriate him. As has been argued, the fact that Diogo Homem went to an English court to have a written testimony in Latin, indicates that he was likely seeking employment outside England.³⁹ Possibly, he considered employment in a place where maritime plans were more advanced (Spain or France), although it would be an irony that his appearance in England took place in the same year when Sebastian Cabot accepted to come to England. Still, it is important to recall that Diogo Homem was the son of Lopo Homem, the Portuguese royal cosmographer whom the Spanish ambassadors in Lisbon in the 1520s attempted to hire for Spain, as has been underscored in the previous chapter. Diogo Homem was not the only son of the Portuguese royal cosmographer over whom the European nations quarreled for his knowledge. These disputes lead us to think that the 16th-century familial tradition of cartographical craft learning was followed in Diogo Homem's case, as his works have a clear connection with his father's.

Although it remains unknown if Diogo Homem remained in England during the next years, it can be assumed that he was in England in 1557-58.⁴⁰

36 Couto, "Some Remarks," 196-97; Barker, *Fernando Oliveira*, 9. For Oliveira's overall career see also: Contente Domingues and Guerreiro, *Ars Nautica*; Livermore, "Padre Oliveira's Outburst," 22-41 and Loureiro, "Experiencia de navegaci3n," 41-49.

37 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo (ANTT), *Colec3o de S3o Vicente* (CSV), vol. IV, fl. 155v.

38 Cortes3o, *Cartografia e cart3grafos portugueses*, vol. I, 330-31.

39 Kildushevskaya and Pinheiro Marques, *Atlas Universal*, 148-50.

40 *Portugaliae Monumenta Cartographica*, vol. II (Lisbon: INCM/Casa da Moeda, 1987), 5-7.

This was due to another atlas authored by Diogo Homem, which comprised maps from all the world, and which seems to have been commissioned by Queen Mary I. It is usually assumed that this atlas dates from 1557–58 and that it was a special gift from Queen Mary I to King Philip that was not delivered due to the queen's death.⁴¹ Furthermore, Diogo Homem's atlas shows clear analogies and similarities with the one signed by his brother André Homem in Antwerp in 1559. As it happened across Europe, new geographical knowledge was also a precious gift for royal matrimonial occasions. Yet, it is worth highlighting that Queen Mary I could not have asked many of her English subjects to make such an atlas, and instead had to choose a Portuguese. As has been highlighted in the previous chapter and as will be seen in the next chapter concerning France, this fact indicates the degree to which the cartographical techniques and works of the Portuguese were valued in England and more generally in Europe.

Two other figures also probably played an important role as mediators of knowledge between Portugal and England in the later stages of King Henry VIII's reign. The first was the London merchant Robert Brasentur, who traveled to Persia in the 1530s in the service of Emperor Charles V. After he finished his mission, he went to Portuguese Hormuz and embarked from there to Lisbon. It remains unknown whether he learned nautical knowledge from the Portuguese, but the possibility must not be completely ruled out. Another more critical example is that of the Scotsman George Buchanan (1506–82), who lectured at Coimbra University from 1547 onwards in King John III's service. Some of his writings from this period evidence clear admiration of the Portuguese ability to create an overseas empire that stretched the oceans of the globe, and they even include important praise of the Portuguese king. Still, it remains unknown whether Buchanan accumulated any sort of Portuguese nautical knowledge and used it, particularly after leaving Portugal in 1560.⁴²

Thus, by King Henry VIII's death, English attraction to oceanic exploration was taking root, thanks in part to the king's contributions. No wonder, then, that the process initiated by Henry developed significantly under King Edward VI. During Northumberland's regency, Sebastian Cabot was offered appealing conditions for a return to England, and more systematic training in astronomical and oceanic techniques was put in place.⁴³ In this context,

41 British Library (BL), Add MS 5415 A.

42 Pagden and Subrahmanyam, "Roots and Branches," 289–92.

43 On this topic see Eric H. Ash and Alison Sandman, "Sebastian Cabot between Spain and England," *Renaissance Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), 813–46.

Richard Chancellor's (1521–56) inaugural 1553 voyage to Russia, supported by King Edward VI, Dudley, and Cabot, takes pride of place as the first systematic school of navigation in the English environment. In the same year, Richard Eden (1520?–76) began translating the work of the German cosmographer Sebastian Munster (1488–1552) into English.⁴⁴

From 1548 onwards, profiting from the recent Portuguese withdrawal from some fortresses in the region, Dudley supported the full resumption of English trade with Morocco.⁴⁵ This proposition emerged against a background of considerable diplomatic tensions, with King John III having been notified that Englishmen were selling weapons to Muslims in North Africa. With the English refused to cease this trade, the problem soon escalated, and was certainly not ameliorated by the 1553 English voyage to Guinea, which was guided by a Portuguese pilot newly arrived in England.

2.2 Pilot António Eanes Pinteado's Career: A Typical Nautical Broker between Portugal and England (1547–53)

António Eanes Pinteado was born in Oporto. Few details about him are known, except that he was a skilled pilot and became an important captain and merchant doing business from Northern Europe to the South Atlantic. Pinteado also had a personal history with England. In 1545, he appeared in England to complain about the seizure, by English privateers, of French cargo. In 1547, King John III appointed him to escort Portuguese ships to Brazil during the ongoing French-Portuguese maritime rivalry. In this capacity, Pinteado was noted for his victories over French interlopers. After he seized a French ship, Pinteado was jailed at King John's orders upon his return to Lisbon, possibly in 1548.⁴⁶ A letter from Pinteado to the Portuguese king, dated April 4, 1553, and signed from London, together with other sources allow the reconstruction of these events.

Pinteado began his letter by saying that he had felt forced to go to England because of the injustices he had suffered. He stressed that he was Portuguese by birth, had not wanted to betray his king and underscored the fact that King John III's ministers had ordered him to serve with his ship against the French in Morocco, Guinea, and Brazil. Pinteado pointed to his long career at sea and to the reputation he had acquired by fighting the French and the

44 Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 83 and 86.

45 Taylor, *The Haven-Finding Art*, 195.

46 Taylor, *The English Debt*, 6.

Scottish. He then complained that he had spent two years in jail in Lisbon because of the accusations a Portuguese and a Spaniard had made against him. Doubting that he would ever be treated fairly, he fled to England. Since his arrival, Pinteado continued, the English had tried to enlist him in their maritime expeditions, but he had refused. Instead of the royal decree from King John III promising that Portuguese authorities would not prosecute him for a year, Pinteado proposed his own conditions for returning home: he would come back if all his seized goods were restored to him, and if he was granted a reward. He finished by recalling that although he was an old man, he was still able to serve the king.⁴⁷ But the key question that must be solved is: why did Pinteado choose to flee to London above all other possible places?

The letter summarized above indirectly explains this decision. As he had already exchanged hostilities with French ships, he could not think of following the example of other Portuguese pilots and fleeing to France. Spain, too, was a risky option—it was the first place that Portuguese pilots tended to go when defecting, and Pinteado's previous quarrel with a Spaniard made it likelier he would face an extradition order if discovered. In King Edward VI's England, however, Pinteado knew that apprehension by Portuguese authorities was improbable, given that religious differences had decreased political and judicial collaboration between the two realms. He probably heard of the resumption of English voyages to Morocco from 1548 onwards, and may have been aware of Thomas Wyndham's North African voyages in 1551 and 1552.⁴⁸ As Pinteado himself had served in Morocco, he was likely to have been acquainted with the fact that Wyndham traded in the abandoned Portuguese fortresses of Safi and Azamor. Wyndham had a long career as a privateer against Iberian navigation in the English Channel under Henry VIII and Edward VI, and had learned nautical techniques from French sailors. Furthermore, like Pinteado himself, Wyndham had fought against the Scots and the French and had been promoted to the rank of vice admiral. When Wyndham started to serve in London merchants' overseas ventures, he was already an experienced and important character in the English maritime milieu.⁴⁹ Thus, when Pinteado came to England he knew that he would have a ready market for his knowledge in Wyndham.

47 ANTT, *Corpo Cronológico* (CC) I–89–120, fo. 1–iv.

48 Perhaps because Wyndham's second voyage was completed with a ship bought from a Portuguese settled in Wales: Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 101; Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 89–90; Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 271–72 and 305.

49 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 48–49.

Foreseeing the danger of having a skilled ocean pilot offering his knowledge to England, precisely in the same way the cartographer Diogo Homem had done in 1547, the Portuguese king reacted immediately. In late 1551, he knighted Pinteado and gave him a corresponding pension. With Pinteado still abroad, he probably asked his brother, Prince Luís (1506–55), to write him in December 1552. The letter was published by Richard Hakluyt (1553–1616) in his *Principal Navigations*. The prince in this letter begged for Pinteado to return, assuring him that the king had already given him a royal pardon and that he would grant him new privileges upon his arrival. As proof of the Portuguese king's good will, the prince stated that he was also sending an emissary, Pedro Gonçalves, to convince him to come back.⁵⁰ However, by the time Pinteado replied to the king in April 1553, other events had already transpired.

Together with the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues, well-versed in West African navigation,⁵¹ and who was also in England by that time, Pinteado had offered his services to Wyndham. Richard Eden, who met him personally, inherited his belongings, and later published the report of the first English voyage to Guinea, stated that Pinteado was “a wise, discreet, and sober man, who for his cunning in sailing” was “as well an expert Pilot as a politike captaine.” Eden portrayed Pinteado's coming to England as a happy miracle. When reprinting Eden's original report, Richard Hakluyt not only published the abovementioned letters to Pinteado, but also Eden's final notes in defense of Pinteado's memory (he was ultimately mistreated by Wyndham during the voyage).⁵² During this period, Rodrigues proposed to Wyndham that he should be the pilot of the English expedition to Guinea and Pinteado the captain.⁵³ It was Pinteado who had suggested to Wyndham that such a voyage be organized in the first place.⁵⁴ Pinteado likewise supported Richard Chancellor's plan to sail to Russia and gave Richard Eden the *Decades of the New World* by Peter Martyr d'Anghiera (1457–1526), which Eden later translated into English.⁵⁵ In the end, neither Pinteado

50 Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of The English Nation*, ed. Edmund Goldsmid, vol. 11 (Edinburgh: E. & G. Goldsmid, 1889), 76 and 82–83.

51 Although the document is undated and does not allow for a full confirmation, it is possible that this Francisco Rodrigues is the same who had offered his knowledge to António Carneiro, Portuguese secretary of state, to organize mercantile voyages to Guinea in partnership with a man from Oporto (Sousa Viterbo, *Trabalhos náuticos*, 307–8).

52 Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, vol. 11, 82–83.

53 Puga, “Scramble for Africa,” 743.

54 Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, vol. 11, 82.

55 Taylor, *The English Debt*, 6–7.

nor Rodrigues were captains during the first English voyage to Guinea, but their role throughout the expedition is well-documented.⁵⁶ Thus, when Pinteado wrote the abovementioned letter to King John III, he had already decided not to return to Portugal. As Hakluyt states, he feared being killed.⁵⁷

Pinteado's action is also intimately tied up with the context of Sebastian Cabot's role in the English voyages of the 1550s, a convergence of interests from different actors, such as merchants, seamen, and cosmographers. It was precisely this ambience that fostered the creation of the Muscovy Company in 1555. It is important to highlight how Pinteado, both a seafarer and a merchant, fitted so well into this English milieu, just like previously other Portuguese sailors mixed well in the Anglo-Portuguese syndicate from Bristol that financed John Cabot's expeditions. This pattern of collaboration continued to influence Anglo-Portuguese maritime relations.

Pinteado's final decision was influenced by the arrival in England of King John III's agents. Although their instructions are unknown, it seems clear that they were sent to spy on the first English voyage to Guinea and, if possible, sabotage it. Estêvão da Mota and Pedro Gonçalves managed to convince pilot Francisco Rodrigues to return to Portugal, as well as other Portuguese that lived in England. Such repatriations sometimes went hand in hand with a considerable degree of coercion. Pinteado himself had already faced threats when Wyndham intervened. Mota and Gonçalves's actions are confirmed by a letter written to Lord Admiral William Howard (1510?–73) on February 28, 1553.⁵⁸ Prior, in March 1552, the two agents had already been jailed for making offending statements, but they were released as the accusation was not proved.⁵⁹ On March 3, 1553, Wyndham asked the High Court of Admiralty to jail Mota and Gonçalves, as they were disrupting his departure by threatening pilots Rodrigues and Pinteado. He reminded the High Court that the voyage had been authorized by King Edward VI. Wyndham's request was granted, the agents imprisoned, and plans for the voyage to Guinea went ahead unimpeded.⁶⁰

Jean Schefve (1515–83?), Emperor Charles V's ambassador in England between 1550 and 1553, reported in a letter to his master dated March 7, 1553, that Pinteado and Rodrigues were planning to sail on an English expedition.

56 Edmond Smith, *Merchants: The Community that Shaped England's Trade and Empire* (New Haven/: Yale University Press, 2021), 15–16.

57 Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations*, vol. 11, 82–83. Also see illustration 2.

58 Puga, "Scramble for Africa," 735–37.

59 John Roche Dasent, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, vol. 4, 1552–1554 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892), 235.

60 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 313–14.

He stated that Pinteado had used his letters of pardon from the Portuguese king to bolster his reputation before the members of the Privy Council, a ploy so effective that Schefve considered Pinteado to be solely responsible for the Portuguese agents' imprisonment.⁶¹ On May 11, after being asked by Emperor Charles V to facilitate the Portuguese agents' release, Schefve replied that he would attempt to help them, but that Pinteado would sail with the English nonetheless. He could not know for sure if Pinteado was going to sail with Wyndham to Guinea or with Chancellor to Russia.⁶² It is also very likely that Pinteado collaborated with Sebastian Cabot in planning Chancellor's voyage to Russia, and he was certainly acquainted with John Dudley. Thus, when Pinteado wrote to King John III on April 4, 1553, his aim was to deceive the king and his agents. He had already chosen his path. The Portuguese authorities did not halt their vigilant watch on Pinteado's movements, even after his departure for Guinea with Wyndham. Keeping track of Pinteado proved a constant challenge, but King John had good reasons for his concern. Yet in 1553, Pinteado participated in the attacks on Madeira and Deserta Islands. News of Pinteado's death reached England when Wyndham's fleet returned in August 1554.⁶³ By that time, Queen Mary I had ascended to the throne and Portugal already had a new strategy.

Shortly after her coronation, Queen Mary's court seriously considered reviving the 1537–38 negotiations to marry the now-queen to the Portuguese Prince Luís.⁶⁴ Aware of these deliberations, King John III instructed Ambassador Lourenço Pires de Távora (1500–73) on September 20, 1553 to personally congratulate Mary on her succession and discuss the plan in the Tudor court. Queen Catherine of Austria (1507–78), wife of King John III, as well as the Portuguese Princess Mary (1521–77), John's sister, also wrote to Queen Mary concerning her succession and Távora's embassy. Both documents are in the British Library.⁶⁵ King John also wrote an undated letter to Emperor

61 Royall Tyler, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, 1553* (London: By His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 14.

62 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1553*, 38–39.

63 Royall Tyler, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Spain (1554–1558)* (London: By Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), doc. 28.

64 H. F. M. Prescott, *Mary Tudor: The Spanish Tudor* (London: Phoenix, 2003), 272; Sarah Duncan, *Mary I: Gender, Power, and Ceremony in the Reign of England's First Queen* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 61–64. For a more recent overview see: Alexander Samson, *Mary and Philip: The Marriage of Tudor England and Habsburg Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), 82.

65 BL, *Cotton MS Vespasian F III*, fl. 100r–v (for the Portuguese Princess Mary's letter, dated October 1553) and *Cotton MS Titus B II/1*, fl. 133 (for Queen Catherine of Austria's letter, dated September 1553).

Charles V with news of his matrimonial proposal.⁶⁶ Prince Luís was a highly suitable candidate for Queen Mary, as they were close in age.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, Emperor Charles V could not lose the opportunity to place his son on the English throne. For this reason, he retained Ambassador Távora in Brussels for a month, buying himself time to negotiate Prince Philip's marriage with Queen Mary. He also stalled the negotiations, already very advanced, for Prince Philip's wedding with the Portuguese Princess Mary. Even after receiving formal confirmation of the intended marriage from England, when Távora was finally authorized to leave Brussels to visit Queen Mary in December 1553, Charles ordered agents to spy on his movements. The emperor needed to be sure that Portugal's proposal would not spoil his plans.⁶⁸

For this reason, a crisis erupted at the court in Lisbon when news spread that Prince Philip would not marry Princess Mary. The king sent a special ambassador to complain to Emperor Charles and Prince Luís wrote a letter to Prince Philip urging him to disobey his father's orders. Despite these maneuvers, and although he was personally interested in marrying the Portuguese princess, Prince Philip was not in a condition to challenge his father's decision.⁶⁹ Thus, Ambassador Távora left the Tudor court empty-handed. Antoine de Noailles (1504–63), the French ambassador to England between 1553 and 1556, informed King Henry II (1547–59) that Távora was so upset with Emperor Charles V that France should attempt to benefit from this. As Távora was going to France, Noailles recommended that a great reception should be given for him at the Valois court.⁷⁰ Until Prince Luís's death in 1555, a potential marriage with the future Queen Elizabeth I was debated but the project came to nothing.⁷¹

The failed Portuguese attempt to marry Prince Luís to Queen Mary was also linked to another 1554 event in Portuguese-Spanish relations that

66 ANTT, CSV, Vol. III, fo. 220. Almost all of the letters from this collection that will be quoted are undated.

67 David M. Loades, *Mary Tudor* (Stroud: Amberley, 2012), 140.

68 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1553*, 380.

69 Further details in: Annemarie Jordan Gschwend, "The Queen's Gambit: Infanta Maria of Portugal, the Duchess of Viseu, the Court Painter Anthonis Mor, and Fake News at the Lisbon Court," *Portuguese Studies Review* 30. no. 1 (Summer 2022): 98–101.

70 Abbé Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, vol. II (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 322–23.

71 Hélder Carvalhal, "Casar para reinar: a política europeia quinhentista e as propostas matrimoniais do Infante D. Luís," in *Casamentos da Família Real Portuguesa. Diplomacia e Cerimonial*, ed. Ana Maria Rodrigues, Manuela Santos Silva and Ana Leal Faria (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 2017), 368.

affected Anglo-Portuguese relations: the birth of the future King Sebastian, the premature death of the Portuguese heir John Manuel (1537–54) and the later return of Juana (1535–73), princess of Portugal and mother of King Sebastian, to Spain. As Princess Juana left Portugal and never assumed the role of regent, this facilitated the Spanish position of ending the negotiations for marrying Prince Philip to Princess Mary. In turn, this change sparked Tudor disapproval of a potential Portuguese marriage for Queen Mary.

Mary married Prince Philip in July 1554. Still, it is perfectly possible that King John III's interest in his brother's marriage to the English queen was related not only to the fact that England had returned to Catholicism, but also to the re-emerging Anglo-Portuguese overseas rivalry. As king consort of England, Philip used his power to delay the emergence of Anglo-Spanish overseas rivalry. It should be asked if this was not also King John III's intention in 1553–54. I consider that King John III attempted to pursue this strategy, but the abovementioned Portuguese-Spanish relations disturbed his original plans. In any case, Prince Philip's marriage to Queen Mary was used by Portugal to reinforce its claims in the Tudor court, as the appointment of Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa shows. Nor, for that matter, was Pinteado forgotten.

2.3 Spying on Wyndham, Lok, and Towerson's Voyages to West Africa (1554–58)

2.3.1. Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa's Appointment and the First Portuguese Diplomatic Protests against Wyndham and Lok's Voyages (1554–55)

Sometime, King John III ordered his secretary to write a first draft of the instructions to Diogo Lopes de Sousa. The first instruction is undated but it is likely from October–November 1554. Sousa, a wealthy nobleman from an important Portuguese lineage, was formally named to pay a visit to King Philip in England and to congratulate him and Queen Mary I on their recent marriage. He was entrusted with letters to be delivered to the members of the Privy Council, and was told to inform Lisbon on the degree to which King Philip was accepted by his English subjects and whether he was in direct communication with Emperor Charles V. But the real purpose of this first instruction lay beyond these tasks. The king recalled that Sousa must have heard of a certain “Pinteado born in this kingdom,” about whom all manner of rumors were circulating. Some stated that he had sailed with an

English expedition that had gone badly and had perished. Others insisted that Pinteado was alive and well, and that the English had already loaded many goods along the Mina coast. Those who were of the latter opinion averred that Pinteado was planning to return that year to the region, and mentioned new English preparations. Thus, King John ordered Sousa to inform him “of what had happened [with Pinteado], and about the route they (the English) made and what happened to that expedition (Wyndham’s).” Sousa was also asked to report on all the merchandise that the English trafficked, as well as where they acquired it and from whom. Concerning the new English fleet said to be in preparation, Sousa was instructed to provide intelligence on the names of the ships, the people and artillery that went on board, and the route and calendar of departure. He was asked to report on all these details without delay. Toward the end of the instruction, the king stated that Sousa would bring with him “a cypher so that you can write me all the things that seem to you important in a manner that nothing that you may write to me shall be lost.” Only in closing the instruction, the king mentioned that Sousa should present his formal condolences at King Edward VI’s death to the Tudor court.⁷²

In appointing a formal ambassador to England, King John III was in reality sending over a maritime spy. Sousa’s *de facto* goal was to profit from King Philip’s rule in order to disrupt new English expeditions to West Africa. It is important to highlight the fact that the Portuguese king not only wanted to know commercial details, but also ordered Sousa to undertake technical espionage by acquiring information about the routes in question. These orders were not merely connected to organizing a military naval response to the English challenge. King John III wanted to be informed on the quality of the English art of navigation to West Africa, as he knew the English were sailing with Portuguese knowledge. Thus, he also ordered Sousa to report on the route the second expedition would follow, so that he could determine if the English had improved their nautical expertise. His worry that other Portuguese might be assisting the next English fleet is clear from his request for intelligence about people on board. By this time, King John III had already got word of his agents’ failure in England in 1553, and knew that two of the

72 ANTT, CSV, Vol. V, fl. 457–462. It is important to note that King John III had ordered some of his ships to be sent in assistance to King Edward VI in 1553 to help the English in the war against the French and the Scots. The French ambassador to England reported the important contribution made by the well-armed Portuguese vessels to the English war efforts (Abbé Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, vol. III (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 31–32).

ships in Wyndham's voyage were from King Edward VI.⁷³ It is no surprise that John instructed Sousa to react dispassionately to Edward's death. The way in which the instruction was written also strongly suggests that Sousa was to act more as an ambassador to King Philip than to Queen Mary, as, despite the formal Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the Portuguese king could not be sure of Mary's reaction to Wyndham's voyage. Concerning King Philip, John was much more certain, owing to his education (Philip had a Portuguese mother—Empress Elizabeth, John's sister), that he would favor his cause at the Tudor court. Other documents delivered to Sousa illustrate how uneasy the king felt about the English challenge in West Africa.

On November 7, 1554, Sousa was given an additional instruction. Large parts of this dispatch are crossed out, pointing to some hesitations. The king reminded Sousa of Pinteado's action against Portuguese interests and ordered him to press King Philip and Queen Mary to respect Portuguese maritime rights in West Africa. John explicitly asked that Sousa propose the cancelation of the next English expedition, invoking his personal affection for Philip and good relations with Mary as justification for this request.⁷⁴

Another undated document, probably dated November 1554, documents the confusion in Lisbon before Sousa's departure. Its author is unknown, but I believe it is likely the Provedor dos Armazéns, the Portuguese officer in charge of organizing the departure of Portuguese fleets at Lisbon's Casa da Índia. News had recently arrived from England that a new English fleet was being prepared to sail to Mina and that the English merchant Alexander Coles had come to Lisbon to buy merchandise and recruit Portuguese pilots for the expedition. Faced with these developments, the author of the document warned several Portuguese pilots not to betray the Portuguese Crown and recalled the fact that all pilots swore loyalty to King John III. The author also delivered the warning to Sousa, which explains why the document ended up in Sousa's instructions.⁷⁵

In this context, King John III ordered that Sousa, after visiting King Philip and Queen Mary, should also visit the duke and duchess of Alba and Rui Gomes da Silva.⁷⁶ On the official accreditation letter to Philip and Mary, however, John merely presented Sousa as an ambassador arriving to congratulate Queen Mary on her wedding.⁷⁷ This fact shows how behind

73 Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 106.

74 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 463–463v.

75 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 471.

76 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 470–470v.

77 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 465.

Sousa's official mission, there was the unofficial and more important goal: maritime espionage. A list of the documentation delivered to Sousa shows that in addition to all these documents, he was given a cypher and five letters. These five letters were already written by King John III. Sousa was merely to add a heading specifying the addressee once he had arrived in England and chosen members of the Privy Council to contact.⁷⁸ Unfortunately, the content of those letters has not survived, but what is extant from the documents transmitted to Sousa merits comment.

Firstly, the English fleet mentioned in these documents is that of John Lok, brother of Thomas Wyndham. Although at the writing time of these documents, the king of Portugal did not know that Pinteado had already died, he was worried that the English would sail to West Africa again. For this reason, and foreseeing that he could not prevent Pinteado from further navigation with the English, he instructed Sousa to present a diplomatic protest. This objection was to be made first to King Philip and only afterwards to Queen Mary I. The purpose of this strategy was to exploit Portugal's closer relationship with Philip and, in turn, make use of the love and reverence that Mary always evidenced for him. Should this prove inadequate, the Portuguese king instructed Sousa to gather the support of important advisors that King Philip had brought with him to England: the duke of Alba and the Portuguese Rui Gomes da Silva, who had grown up with Philip while he was a prince and was an intimate friend and advisor.⁷⁹ Silva, the king reasoned, could play an important mediator role.

To complement this strategy, King John III issued letters addressed to members of the Privy Council so that they could be persuaded of his main goal: the need to respect the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* and maritime rights for occupying and monopolizing all trades in West Africa. Such Portuguese intentions were merely a repetition of what had happened previously with France and, even, with Spain. Still nothing definitive can be said about the addressees of these missives and the potential use of bribery, since the letters themselves have been lost. That bribery may have been attempted is nevertheless plausible—in analogous situations with France, King John III ordered his agents, envoys, and ambassadors to ply key figures with gifts and money.⁸⁰ In 1562, for example, as will be detailed in chapter 4, when

78 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 474.

79 On the career of Rui Gomes da Silva see: James M. Boyden, *The Courtier and the King: Ruy Gómez de Silva, Philip II, and the Court of Spain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

80 As happened with Ambassador Rui Fernandes de Almada in the 1530s: Maria do Rosário Sampaio Themudo Barata Azevedo Cruz, *Rui Fernandes de Almada. Diplomata português do século XVI* (Lisbon: Instituto de Alta Cultura, 1971), 148. On Portuguese maritime espionage in

João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador to France, was appointed to visit Queen Elizabeth I on a *Mare Clausum* embassy, he attempted to bribe William Cecil (1520–98). I think it is also likely that King John III gave Sousa oral instructions to get closer to Cardinal Reginald Pole (1500–58), Queen Mary I's chief minister,⁸¹ as the king ordered the archbishop of Braga and other bishops to celebrate England's return to Catholicism and the permission given to Pole in 1554 to return to England.⁸² As shall be detailed below, the king even wrote to Cardinal Pole.

Meanwhile, the king was notified too that the English had sent Alexander Coles to Lisbon in search of Portuguese pilots for their next expedition to West Africa. Even though Coles was an English merchant involved only in the trade with Morocco (and not with Guinea and Mina),⁸³ John Lok's 1554–55 voyage had no Portuguese pilots on board when it set sail from England in October 1554.⁸⁴ Still this does not mean that the English would not need Portuguese nautical knowledge. Wyndham's pioneer voyage had not gone well in nautical terms. His early death and that of Pinteado forced the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues to guide the fleet as English sailors were not familiar with the Guinea currents that complicated any returning voyage to Europe. It is plausible that, in 1554, Coles was sent to gather such knowledge by hiring Portuguese pilots. Similarly, as Hakluyt records, Robert Tomson's 1555 voyage to New Spain was only made possible by his sojourn of several years in Seville in the house of the English merchant John Fields, where he learned Spanish and the customs of the land.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Coles's and Tomson's cases bear resemblance with Robert Thorne's espionage and training in Seville during the 1520s.

The English need for Portuguese pilots and Portuguese nautical knowledge remained critical as late as Francis Drake's (1540–96) circumnavigation, with Drake completing a maritime espionage mission in Lisbon before the voyage,⁸⁶ and later employing Portuguese pilot Nuno da Silva during the

France see also: Marco Oliveira Borges, "Rivalidades entre Portugal e a França e o papel dos espíões portugueses nos portos franceses (1503–1566)," *Revista de História da Sociedade e da Cultura* 21 (2021): 165–84.

81 On Pole see: Thomas F. Mayer, *Reginald Pole: Prince & Prophet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

82 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 273–274.

83 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 275–76.

84 Puga, "Scramble for Africa," 737.

85 Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques, and Discoveries of The English Nation*, ed. Edmund Goldsmid, vol. 14 (Edinburgh: E. & G. Goldsmid, 1890), 138.

86 In August 1579, the president of the Spanish Council of Indies advised King Philip II to order the Spanish ambassador in Portugal to contact the Portuguese cartographer that had provided

circumnavigation itself.⁸⁷ David Waters states that between 1558 and 1568, all English fleets sailing ocean routes, with one exception, were guided by Portuguese, Spanish, or French pilots, and that in 1577, the president of the Spanish Consejo de Indias attested that most English fleets were still being guided by Portuguese pilots.⁸⁸ As Taylor argues, it took England almost 50 years to raise sailors prepared to compete, in terms of skill, training, and requisite nautical knowledge, with their Iberian counterparts on long ocean routes.⁸⁹ Other authors even speak of an English tradition of hiring of Portuguese pilots for the 16th-century great voyages of discovery.⁹⁰ By the early 1550s, when England was recommencing its overseas expansion, this need for nautical knowledge was more salient.

For King John III, the English maritime re-awakening was disturbingly reminiscent of the maritime rivalry that he experienced with France. Like in his previous attempts concerning France, John also tried, in 1554, to monopolize the acquisition of nautical knowledge by his English rival, a reality that can also be observed in Franco-Spanish or even Anglo-French maritime relations in the period. Thus, French-Portuguese maritime rivalry unmistakably underpins the orders he gave to Sousa in 1554. It is, thus, important to look at the events after Sousa's arrival in England.

Soon after landing, probably in December 1554, Sousa wrote a letter to the Portuguese secretary of state declaring that he had not been able to present his protest to King Philip and Queen Mary I; when he arrived, Lok's expedition had already departed, and King John III had not explicitly directed him to present a protest under such circumstances.⁹¹ It may be that the crossed-out order mentioned previously was not included in the final instruction delivered to Sousa, due to King John's hesitations on this point. Tracking Sousa's subsequent actions is impeded by the loss of most of his letters and the fact that his extant communications do not address maritime affairs and espionage. Still, other surviving documents show how the Portuguese king envisaged and directed his mission.

Drake with nautical charts. King Philip approved the suggestion: Calvar Cross, *La Batalla del Mar Océano: corpus documental de las hostilidades entre España e Inglaterra (1568–1604)*, vol. I (Madrid: Turner, 1988), 187.

87 See José María Moreno Madrid and David Salomoni, "Nuno da Silva's Third Relation: An Unknown Report on Francis Drake's Voyage (1577–1580)", *Terrae Incognitae* 54 (2022): 64–82.

88 Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 82–83 and 101.

89 Taylor, *The Haven-Finding Art*, 195.

90 Megan Barford and Louise Devoy, "Using the Seas and Skies: Navigation in Early Modern England," in *Tudor & Stuart Seafarers: The Emergence of a Maritime Nation, 1485–1707*, ed. James Davey (London: Adlard Coles/National Maritime Museum Greenwich, 2018), 106–7.

91 Biblioteca Nacional Portugal (BNP), *Coleção Pereira e Sousa*, maço 6, fl. 306v.–7.

Probably in January 1555, the king asked Sousa to petition King Philip on the issue of French navigation to the Portuguese *Mare Clausum*, as soon as war between Spain and France came to a close. The request was made because Emperor Charles V was too busy with war against the Valois to take up the issue himself.⁹² King John III also wrote a formal letter to Philip and Mary congratulating them on their marriage and England's return to Catholicism and, in May 1555, praising them on the birth of a son.⁹³ Queen Mary's response to Queen Catherine of Austria, on January 30, 1555, is also known. The English queen reported that Sousa had been very well received at her court, and expressed her admiration for the Portuguese queen.⁹⁴ Also on August 18, 1555, Mary wrote to King John III thanking him for the January letter regarding the restoration of Catholicism in England.⁹⁵

Thus, Sousa only made his formal protest after Lok's return. As Sousa puts it in his letter of August 20, 1555, it was thanks more to Mary than to Philip that the decision to embargo the next English voyage to West Africa had been made. Sousa states that when he approached King Philip, he was already working on the issue with Queen Mary. He also mentioned that Philip demanded of him the record of the English shipowners and merchants who had participated in Lok's expedition, which Sousa immediately delivered.⁹⁶ In reporting these events, Sousa recognized what has been underscored previously: that by his own departure from Lisbon, King John III doubted that Queen Mary I's position could be more favorable to Portugal than that of King Philip's.

Sousa's reaction was also connected to the fact that Mary had not authorized Lok's voyage. Before his departure, Lok was ordered not to sail to Portuguese overseas areas.⁹⁷ In this case, this would mean that he should not trade directly in current or abandoned Portuguese outposts but nothing stopped him from doing so in West Africa in general, as by this time the London merchants that financed Lok's voyage already contested the Portuguese rhetoric of *Mare Clausum* in the entirety of West Africa. Thus, as has been argued,⁹⁸ it seems that Queen Mary was persuaded to patronize

92 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 476–77.

93 *Ibid.*, fo. 173, 175, 177, 485 and 487–487v. Queen Mary I had previously sent an emissary to Portugal notifying the king of this news, see John Roche Dasent, ed., *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, vol. 5, 1554–1556 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892).

94 ANTT, CC I–94–107.

95 ANTT, CC I–96–61.

96 ANTT, CC I–96–65.

97 Dasent, *Acts*, 5:162.

98 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 56–57.

Lok's departure in secrecy and, as a consequence, was not surprised by Sousa's formal protest. However, the queen's position is justified: while secretly patronizing English overseas attempts, she did not and could not jeopardize the commercial and political relations with Portugal, especially now that she was married to King Philip, whom she knew would likely (owing to familiar connections) stand up for Portuguese interests.

In this first conversation, Sousa also benefited from the fact that King Philip was still in England, something that changed after Emperor Charles V's abdication. Under these circumstances, and doubtless influenced by Lok's successes in his voyage (despite encounters with the Portuguese in Mina and Martin Frobisher's (1535?–94) imprisonment there), King John III decided to send a new envoy to England. Sousa was supposed to return to Portugal as soon as Manuel de Melo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador to Charles, was appointed ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands.⁹⁹ Sousa's mission was, by all indications, complete, although the time it took for King John III's new agent to arrive prolonged his embassy in England. If the embargo on English navigation was complicated by King Philip's absence from England, the Portuguese could still rely on his interference in English affairs, as he was kept well-informed by Cardinal Pole,¹⁰⁰ maintained a representative in England, and received minutes of the topics debated by the Privy Council. Still, the orders King John III gave to his new agent prove that Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry continued to escalate.

2.3.2 A New Agent for a New Challenge? The Spy João Rodrigues Correia and Towerson's Voyages (1555–58)

In August 1555, King John III chose João Rodrigues Correia for a mission in England. He provided him with three different sets of instructions, each of them documenting more Portuguese efforts at maritime espionage in England. It is relevant to underscore that by the time of his appointment, Correia was already an experienced agent trained in the classical "schools" of Portuguese maritime espionage in Europe: Spain and France. In 1553, the king had sent him to Spain with secret orders to secure the Spanish document from the Consejo de Indias by which Emperor Charles V forbade his Spanish subjects of Asunción and Peru from crossing the Brazilian frontier in search of gold. Correia was also directed to intercede with Prince Philip in order

99 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 489–489v.

100 Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 47.

to abort an expedition that was being prepared in Seville to the River Plate (which King John III claimed belonged to Portugal).¹⁰¹ Although further details of Correia's mission in Spain are unknown, it is plausible that he had some degree of success, as King John rarely entrusted secret missions to unsuccessful spies. Furthermore, the context with England in 1555 advised the choice of an experienced person, as João Rodrigues Correia was.

Correia's first instruction was written after Lisbon received a letter from the captain of Mina fortress (originally dated January 1555), in which the presence of Lok's six ships was mentioned. The Portuguese court could not have failed, by then, to notice that the new English voyage to West Africa had been much better planned than Wyndham's, and most decisively, secured a more powerful and numerous fleet. Thus, King John III complained about the violation of the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* and maritime rights and noted indignantly that the English gold trade in the area constituted an overt challenge to his monopoly. On the grounds of their mutual affection and familial ties, King John expected King Philip to punish his English subjects. He demanded that measures be taken against the English merchants and shipowners who had financed Lok's voyage and that any Portuguese collaborator be delivered to him. Correia was given a list of people who had participated in Lok's voyage so that English authorities would have no excuse not to act immediately. In a crossed-out section of this letter, the Portuguese king authorized Correia to hint at military retaliation should the English attempt to return to Mina and Guinea. He also ordered Correia to collaborate with Sousa to gather more intelligence on the ships, people, goods, and merchants involved in Lok's voyage. If the English prepared another expedition, Correia was asked to gather the same information and to report on the new ships' names, routes, and calendar of departure. This intelligence was to be sent to the king quickly—it was a matter of urgency.¹⁰² In seeking out such news with respect to the second English voyage to West Africa, John wanted to confirm the information received from his captain in West Africa and mainly aimed at evaluating the state of English nautical knowledge.

The second instruction to Correia was written after the king received Sousa's letter, dated July 17, 1555, in which the ambassador mentioned that the Privy Council had asked for proof of the Portuguese property rights in West Africa. King John III revealed his astonishment at such a request and demanded a full embargo on English sailing to West Africa, the handover

101 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 49 and 93.

102 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 156–61.

of Portuguese collaborators and all goods acquired during Lok's voyage. He could not understand how the Privy Council dared to ask for Portuguese rights, as they would never have had the audacity to contest Emperor Charles V's rights to the Antilles. John then allowed Correia to threaten the use of force if the English returned to West Africa, but depending on how Sousa's negotiations progressed in London. Once again, Correia was to apply to King Philip before approaching Queen Mary I. If Philip had already left for the Netherlands, Correia should make his appeal to the queen and the Privy Council. Correia was then to present the case to Cardinal Pole, to whom the king addressed a letter. Additionally, he was to speak with Rui Gomes da Silva, the earl of Arundel (then Henry Fitzalan (1512–80)), and the English chancellor (then Stephen Gardiner (1483–55)). In concluding this second instruction, the Portuguese king ordered Correia to let him know of the results speedily.¹⁰³

Correia's third instruction bears even more amendments than the previous ones, with almost all of its text crossed out and with annotations to several parts. King John III ordered him to confirm a critical piece of intelligence he had received from Sousa: that Lok's fleet had included ships owned by Queen Mary I.¹⁰⁴ The king wanted to know if the queen was following the example of King Edward VI, in which case, diplomatic approaches would need to be adjusted. Attached to Correia's third instruction were other relevant documents. Firstly, the letter to Cardinal Pole, in which King John praised his role in English Catholic affairs and informed him that he was sending Correia to assist Sousa in a very important matter, for which he begged his attention. This "matter," however, is not specified in the letter. Secondly, the letter to Rui Gomes da Silva, thanking him for his services and enlisting his help once more. Thirdly, the accreditation letters given to Correia, in which the Mina/Guinea affair is not mentioned directly. Instead, the letters state that Correia was sent to present the Portuguese king's response to an "exorbitant" affair that endangered the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Fourthly, there was a letter to Sousa asking him to assist Correia in his meetings, but to let Correia take the lead and deliver the main speech. Sousa was also instructed to accompany Correia during his meetings with Cardinal Pole and Rui Gomes da Silva. Fifthly, Correia received a list of the London merchants who had financed Lok's voyage, with the English names in Portuguese form. Among the merchants, there seems to be one Portuguese (one "Peter George, marchyant aporugall") and a note that

103 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 164–169v.

104 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 170

Lok had hired three French pilots to guide his expedition and one surgeon from Rouen.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, it seems that Lok ultimately sailed with French nautical knowledge, as the voyage promoters failed to hire Portuguese pilots in Lisbon in 1554. Similarly, Portuguese merchants were also cooperating with the London merchants that patronized Lok's voyage, without King John III being able to stop it.

Thus, Correia departed with clear orders and instruments to pressure the Privy Council and Queen Mary I personally. For the first time, King John allowed hints of the use of force against England to be used. The king, engrossed in the traditional Portuguese rhetoric, diplomatic, and legal approach to *Mare Clausum* and the maritime rights conferred to Portugal by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, failed to understand that the maritime protest could not be treated as a political matter between two realms. The organization of Wyndham's and Lok's voyages by far surpassed King Philip's and Queen Mary I's ability to control all its details, something that John did not realize. This may be due to the fact that Portuguese and Spanish maritime expeditions were usually organized officially by the Crown, whereas in these early times of the English overseas expansion they were organized by private merchants and the direct involvement of the English Crown was not always clear. This fact certainly confused the king, explaining why he asked for details on this issue.

Beyond (and based upon) the dispute on political and maritime compensation between Portugal and England, there was the combination of commercial and private interests that fostered Wyndham's and Lok's expeditions, precisely as had happened previously in John Cabot's expeditions. This time, the London merchant Barne played a key role in financing and organizing both Wyndham's and Lok's voyages.¹⁰⁶ However, other London merchants, such as Edward Castlyn, Anthony Hickman, Sir Thomas Wrocth, and Sir John Yorke had also financed Wyndham's and Lok's voyages, and would continue to patronize Towerson and several other voyages under Queen Elizabeth I.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, not only a diplomatic protest was required to ensure that there would be no new English voyage. Direct attempts to sabotage or to negotiate with the promoters of the voyages were needed, especially considering that 1555 was the foundational year of the Muscovy Company. The Company was formally approved by the English Crown and the appointment of Sebastian Cabot as its first director (a

105 ANTT, CSV, vol. III, fl. 174, 176–176v., 178–80, 182–83, 188.

106 Robert Brenner, *Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653* (Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 17.

107 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 222–23.

position he maintained until his death),¹⁰⁸ signaled to Portuguese agents that English maritime plans would not stop, but, on the contrary, were receiving a new boost. This factor explains why Ambassador Sousa understood, when receiving Correia, that his stay at the Tudor court was by no means finished.

Prior to Correia's arrival, Sousa had already succeeded in halting the departure of a new fleet.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, no documentary evidence was found for the means he employed in this attempt. With Correia's arrival, Sousa had a reinforced margin of maneuver to petition the English government, even though King Philip was already in the Netherlands. On October 21, 1555, Giovanni Michelli, the Venetian ambassador to England, wrote to the Venetian senate and doge with word that King John III had sent an envoy (Correia) to complain about the English voyages to Guinea and Mina. He stated that the envoy had issued a warning: if English ships were again found there by the Portuguese, the English should expect an attack. On November 4, the petition was presented to Queen Mary and the Privy Council and the Venetian ambassador reported that Correia was expecting a final answer as soon as Philip had been acquainted with the case. On December 16, Michelli wrote that Sousa had achieved all his goals. After hearing King Philip's position, Queen Mary had declared an embargo for London merchants on the expedition to West Africa. He also mentioned the expenses that the London merchants had accrued in preparations, and their complaint over the cancelation. The merchants asked for the final authorization to depart, while Sousa claimed Portugal's rights in coastal areas that the Portuguese were unable to control. Finally, on December 23, the Venetian ambassador reported that Sousa had also successfully managed to oppose a formal authorization for the expedition. Still, Michelli stated that two or three ships were able to depart in secrecy.¹¹⁰ The English merchants presented a formal complaint to Queen Mary and King Philip for their losses, demanding authorization to make the voyage as they had not previously traded in Portuguese areas.¹¹¹ Mary and Philip asked Portugal for financial compensation for the merchants, suggesting that King John III should buy up the goods that had been assembled for their journey.

¹⁰⁸ Dalton, *Merchants and Explorers*, 183.

¹⁰⁹ Joaquim José da Silva Mendes Leal, Visconde de Santarém and Luiz Augusto Rebello da Silva, *Quadro elementar das relações políticas e diplomaticas de Portugal com as diversas potencias do mundo, desde o principio da monarchia portugueza ate aos nossos dias*, vol. XV (Paris: Oficina Typografica de Fain e Thunot, 1865), LXXXIII/94–96.

¹¹⁰ Rawdon Brown and G. Cavendish Bentinck, eds., *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, 1554–1558* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), docs. 251, 269 and 316.

¹¹¹ Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 355–58.

The issue was also debated in Brussels between King Philip and the English envoy John Masson, as, in a letter dated December 17, 1555, Masson reports a meeting with Philip. Masson understood that Philip would ask King John to compensate the English merchants for their losses but Masson was forced to apologize when he perceived King Philip's preference for a policy of banning all English sailing to West Africa.¹¹² On December 18, Queen Mary wrote to King John informing him that she had forbidden her subjects from sailing to Mina and Guinea. As for Portuguese collaborators on the English voyages, she was unable to hand them over as they were absent or dead.¹¹³ But if Sousa was able to delay the departure of a new expedition as soon as Lok returned, he was unable to prevent William Towerson from departing before the end of 1555,¹¹⁴ as he sailed prior to Queen Mary I's formal prohibition.¹¹⁵ Towerson's small fleet left England after spreading news that the French were preparing a voyage to Mina and Guinea, which motivated London merchants to risk the venture.¹¹⁶

Towerson's first voyage was a success, as he had received prior advice from Lok himself,¹¹⁷ followed Lok's route, and returned in May 1556 with profits. It is possible that Sousa's and Correia's protests did not prevent other departures, since on the return voyage, Towerson found other English ships heading for West Africa.¹¹⁸ Thanks to Lok's voyage, the most successful English voyage to West Africa in the 1550s, Richard Eden was able to publish the first English nautical rutter on navigation to West Africa,¹¹⁹ thus codifying English knowledge of the area. King John III was likely not informed of this, as he continued to fight for a formal decree, signed by the queen's government, forbidding all English navigation to West Africa. Despite the queen's formal position in August 1555, the Privy Council delayed the publication of a decree until August 1556, given the resistance it provoked among merchants.¹²⁰

112 William Barclay Turnbull, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Mary, 1553–1558*, vol. II (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1861), doc. 441.

113 Frei Luís de Sousa, *Anais de D. João III*, ed. M. Rodrigues Lapa, vol. II (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa, 1954), 306.

114 On Towerson's overall career, see James Alsop, "The Career of William Towerson, Guinea Trader," *International Journal of Maritime History* IV, no. 2 (December 1992): 45–82.

115 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 290–91.

116 A. B. Wallis Chapman, V. M. Shillington, 1907, 138.

117 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 61.

118 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 291.

119 Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 91.

120 David M. Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor: Politics, Government, and Religion in England, 1553–58* (London: Longman, 1991), 186.

This fact is another example of the resistance aroused in early modern states by conflicting public-state intentions and private-commercial interests. Overall, with Towerson's first departure, even if the English government was pressed and decided in favor of Portuguese protests, the tensions between the queen's will and the Privy Council ended up playing a key role in the continuation of English voyages to West Africa. Indeed, if it is true that Queen Mary I delayed a formal answer to King John III for months, it is undeniable that she ordered the mayors of London and Bristol to forbid any new expeditions to West Africa. The queen's order motivated the abovementioned merchants' protest on their losses for the preparation of the voyage and even Queen Mary's decision to financially compensate them in December 1555.¹²¹ In this context, it is not surprising that Portuguese protests and espionage continued.

In early 1556, King John III wrote to Manuel de Melo Coutinho, the Portuguese ambassador to Emperor Charles V, informing him that he had previously sent Correia to England to urge Queen Mary and King Philip to embargo English navigation to West Africa. In the meantime, the Portuguese king received news that Correia had accomplished his goals and rejoiced at these events. To maintain good relations with Queen Mary, King John had also ordered Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos, the Portuguese consul/overseer in the Netherlands, to buy the goods assembled for the aborted voyage from the English merchants. In another letter, addressed to Manuel de Melo Coutinho and rife with strikethroughs and annotations, John revealed his true feelings about the recent events. He writes that it was unfair to ask him to buy the goods from the English merchants, as they had violated his rights by planning such a voyage to begin with. He had refrained from making a formal protest only because of his love for Queen Mary and King Philip, and his appreciation for the way they had reacted to the situation. He therefore directed letters to the queen and king thanking them for their interventions, although not without hinting at his displeasure about paying the London merchants (in the letter to Queen Mary I). John then authorized Sousa to return to Portugal and instructed him to leave Correia in charge of all diplomatic affairs. Finally, the Portuguese king wrote to Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos confirming his orders to buy all the goods that the English merchants had bought, working together with Sousa and Correia if needed.¹²² Thus, these documents show that King John III was not informed that Queen Mary I had already paid financial compensation to the London merchants.

121 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 57–59.

122 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 69–70, 71–72, 505–505v., 509, 511, 513–513v. and 519–519v.

But, while these letters were being written, neither Sousa nor Correia left England.¹²³ On May 19, 1556, Queen Mary I addressed a letter to King John III stating that she and the Privy Council had once more banned English navigation to Mina and Guinea. The queen so trusted Sousa that she informed King John that he could speak as her proxy, as he had been present at the Privy Council meeting that deliberated on the matter of West African navigation.¹²⁴ Cardinal Pole also wrote to the Portuguese king, on May 25, answering his previous letter. He, too, signaled his support for Sousa's position on the Mina-Guinea affair. Pole likewise promised King John that he would continue to protect Portuguese claims, and even insinuated that Queen Mary and King Philip were so deeply obliged to Portugal that he had no reasons for further worry.¹²⁵ Pole's letter is testimony to how Queen Mary I at that point intended to follow the agreement with Portugal very closely. However, the queen and the Privy Council were unable to fully control the movements of her subjects, especially when they planned new maritime expeditions in secrecy, as happened with Towerson's first voyage.

Successfully maintaining monopoly required constant diplomatic and espionage activity. When Towerson returned from his first voyage, Sousa hastened to petition, in May 1556, for another embargo on English voyages to the Portuguese monopoly zones. Yet despite the letters mentioned above (and Sousa and Correia's opposition), Towerson soon set off on his second voyage.¹²⁶ Like in 1555, despite a formal prohibition and orders by the Privy Council not to depart, Towerson was able to elude port authorities and set sail.¹²⁷ As a consequence, Sousa found himself presenting yet another protest in July 1556, demanding that Queen Mary I and King Philip forbid all English navigation to Mina, Guinea, and Brazil. Sousa's wish was granted the same month, as published documents from the Privy Council show.¹²⁸

Still, the outlawing of sailing to Brazil, raises the question: did Portugal already envisage an English interest in that area? Although there is no known documented English voyage to Brazil in these years, it is perfectly

123 The French ambassador Noialles confirms that Sousa only left England some days before him in May 1556. It is also noteworthy that both ambassadors were close, as Noialles's letters reveal. Noialles recounted how Sousa argued twice with him, in 1555, that France should sign a peace with Emperor Charles V and even gave him information on this topic (Abbé Vertot, *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles en Angleterre*, vol. V (Paris: Dessaint et Saillant, 1763), 259–260, 284 and 370).

124 *As Gavetas da Torre do Tombo*, vol. I, 64–765.

125 Brown and Bentinck, *Calendar ... Venice, 1554–1558*, doc. 493.

126 Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 108–9.

127 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 61–64.

128 Dasent, *Acts*, 5:305 and 315.

possible that, owing to the first shipment of slaves to England in Lok's voyage and especially after the formalization of the Muscovy Company, English merchants were already planning to expand their trade market to Brazil and the Caribbean. It is likely that Sousa realized this interest and intervened to prevent it being acted upon by forcing Queen Mary to sign a prohibition of voyages to Brazil. A possible concretization of English interest in Brazil during the 1550s was a terrifying scenario for the Portuguese Crown, particularly as it coincided with the Portuguese war against *France Antarctique*, as shall be detailed in the next chapter.

It was probably after being informed of the queen's ban that King John III ordered Correia to return to Portugal, considering that his work was done. Around this time, the Portuguese king also wrote to Cardinal Pole and Rui Gomes da Silva thanking them for their assistance and begging their help in securing Correia's authorization to leave England. Only after this did King John III definitively allow Correia to return, and he informed him that he had already acknowledged Cardinal Pole for his aid. Following up on the matter of the London merchants, he directed Rui Mendes de Vasconcelos to pay Rui Gomes da Silva the money given to the thwarted traders, as Silva had advanced funds for the compensation and the Portuguese king did not want to inflict debts upon such a devoted servant. Although all these letters are undated, they were likely written after July–August 1556, when Sousa effected the formal prohibition.¹²⁹

Meanwhile, Towerson's second voyage was another success, as he struck an alliance with the French captain Blundell to fight Portuguese ships and he received a local proposal to build an English fortress in West Africa. After his return, Towerson readied a third expedition to depart in October 1557. John William Blake states that Portugal appealed to the English government to forbid the voyage,¹³⁰ but no documents to this effect were found in Portuguese archives. Assuming this voyage triggered another pressure campaign, who lodged the complaints at the Tudor court: Sousa, Correia, or both? It is possible that Correia remained in England until 1557 to fulfil his mission, despite the abovementioned letters by King John III allowing him to return.

After all, the Portuguese king could not hazard being left without a good agent in England to report on English maritime preparations. In the event King John III's decided that, he still knew he could rely upon his ambassador to King Philip to obtain updates on English maritime movements, since Philip was still king consort of England. This was precisely what happened

129 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 521–23 and 525.

130 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 292–93.

when Towerson returned in 1558 from his third voyage. The expedition had been a disaster, even though Towerson had charted the whole West African coast on his second voyage and brought the Portuguese pilot Francisco Rodrigues on board for his third voyage.¹³¹ Rodrigues was the one responsible for providing Towerson with Portuguese nautical charts of West Africa, a common practice in early English sailings as Sarah Tyacke argued.¹³² The fact that he found a strong Portuguese fleet in West Africa, combined with the war declared between France and England in Europe, forced him to leave the area without trade, resorting instead to privateering against the French to recuperate his losses.¹³³ When Towerson returned, he lacked both means and conditions to repeat the voyage. Did Portuguese espionage in England influence this outcome?

2.4 A New English Monarch and a New Portuguese Spy: The Missions of D. João Pereira and Francisco de Mesquita (1558–59)

Towerson's third voyage departed from England in January 1558.¹³⁴ A formal decree by the Privy Council of January 22, 1558, forbade Towerson from sailing again to Guinea. However, he departed on January, 30, disobeying this order.¹³⁵ As has been underscored previously, the tension between Queen Mary I's orders and the Privy Council's intentions offered a chance to all voyage organizers to directly defy the queen's orders¹³⁶ without fear of incurring royal displeasure. After all, the profits that could be achieved were considerable, as Lok's and Towerson's previous voyages had shown. Once more, Portuguese agents immediately understood the danger for Portuguese interests. Thus, this time a stronger reaction was afoot.

After Towerson's departure, the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip pressed him to take a stand. On February 4, King Philip ordered his representative in England, the earl of Feria, to protest once more against Towerson's voyage.¹³⁷ On February 26, King Philip was informed of the

¹³¹ Puga, "Scramble for Africa," 743.

¹³² Sarah Tyacke, "Chartmaking in England and Its Context, 1500–1660," in *The History of Cartography*, ed. David Woodward, vol. 3 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007), 1735 and 1746.

¹³³ Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 292–94.

¹³⁴ Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 108–9.

¹³⁵ Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 410.

¹³⁶ Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, 66.

¹³⁷ On Feria's role in Anglo-Spanish relations see the work by Alberto M. Viso Outeiriño, "La influencia hispana en la restauración católica inglesa de María Tudor (1553–1558)" (PhD diss., UNED, 2015).

Privy Council's existing prohibition and he thanked Feria for Queen Mary I's measures.¹³⁸ In July 1558, new problems emerged when the English seized the Portuguese ship *Raposa*. Portugal urged King Philip to intervene, as aboard the ship were the correspondence of the Portuguese ambassador in France, several books, and the now-kidnapped Portuguese pilot Francisco Dias Salgado, already a familiar character to the English. In response to outcry from the pilot Roque Fernandes at his comrade's capture, Portugal made it clear that the ship and all its contents were to be returned.¹³⁹

Lisbon issued an ultimatum to King Philip: if he did not intervene, Portugal would send another ambassador to England to present a formal protest. In reply, Philip ordered Feria to press Queen Mary to return the ship, the cargo, and the artillery to the Portuguese, and told the Portuguese ambassador in the Netherlands that there was no need to send a new envoy to England. He would handle the situation himself out of love for his nephew, the new Portuguese King Sebastian (1557–78).¹⁴⁰ Still under Queen Mary's reign, the Privy Council ordered the case to be fully investigated.¹⁴¹ On November 25, 1558, Feria replied to King Philip, stating that even though Mary had given favorable orders, her death had endangered their appeal. After Queen Elizabeth I's accession, Feria promised that he would do his best, but he realized he was unable to make any guarantees.¹⁴²

Some days earlier, Cardinal Reginald Pole had died, leaving King Philip without an important support in the Tudor court. With Queen Mary I's death, Philip ceased to be king consort of England. Furthermore, Philip and Mary had struggled, almost since the beginning of their reign, with a party in England that opposed the re-Catholization program, and likewise with resistance to the limits placed on English overseas voyages for the sake of Iberian interests. The English corsair Killigrew, who seems to have been responsible for capturing the abovementioned ship *Raposa*, is a good example. Since he was prohibited from entering the Spanish *Mare Clausum*, Killigrew had made his living on seizures in the English Channel, later taking to privateering around Guinea and Mina.¹⁴³ The tension worsened in Queen Mary I's final months when Calais was lost to France. Somehow surprisingly, Lisbon served for Spain as a place to gather intelligence concerning the

138 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1554–1558*, docs. 398 and 408.

139 ANTT, CC I–102–113, fl. 1–2.

140 Tyler, *Calendar ... Spain, 1554–1558*, .. doc. 459.

141 Dasent, *Acts*, vol. 6, 369, 372–73 and 390–91.

142 Martin A. S. Hume, ed., *Calendar of State Papers (Simancas), 1558–1567* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1892), doc. 4.

143 Prescott, *Mary Tudor*, 478.

English plans to recover Calais.¹⁴⁴ Although the queen set aside King Philip's original orders relating to Calais, her premature death further reduced the space in which Philip could maneuver in defense of Portuguese maritime interests. It is in this setting that Portugal considered sending new agents to England.

Confirmation of Towerson's return from his third voyage cast further doubt on King Philip's capacity to protect Portuguese interests, especially when it was discovered that two ships belonging to Queen Mary and two to the Lord Admiral William Howard had sailed with the fleet.¹⁴⁵ Despite imposing formal prohibitions upon her subjects, Queen Mary I herself was a clear supporter of English voyages to West Africa, and had acted exactly as King Edward VI had when he patronized Wyndham's voyage to Guinea. For Portugal, this demonstrated for the first time that Mary had given official cover to English sailings to West Africa, something that contradicted her previous action to forbid her subjects from sailing to the Portuguese *Mare Clausum*. As King Philip was considered responsible for the failure to halt Towerson's voyage, Portugal reacted more harshly. Given Queen Elizabeth I's reign, the Portuguese contemplated sending agents to England.

D. Francisco Pereira, the new Portuguese ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands,¹⁴⁶ addressed a letter to King Sebastian on November 21, 1558 (that is, after Queen Mary I's death) expressing his outrage at Towerson's return and stating that he was considering sending his son D. João Pereira to protest. Since his son was ill at the time, he sent the agent Manuel de Figueiredo in his place to ask Feria to represent Portuguese interests. D. Francisco Pereira had also made representations to King Philip, and was instructed to address the issue with Feria. Finally, he promised King Sebastian that he would gather all possible intelligence related to Towerson's third voyage. He also advised Lisbon to station a powerful fleet on the Mina and Guinea coasts, and to sink all English and French interlopers without mercy. To

144 D. Juan de Mendonza y Ribera, the Spanish ambassador in Lisbon, in a letter dated February 1558, reported how he had interviewed several Englishmen who had arrived in Lisbon to gather more details about the loss of Calais and the English plans to recover it (Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), *Secretaría de Estado*, Estado 380, doc. 60). The ambassador's action in Lisbon is another sign of the distrust between the Spanish and the English that begun with the Calais affair during Queen Mary I's life.

145 Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 104.

146 D. Francisco Pereira was appointed to replace Manuel de Sousa Coutinho as the Portuguese ambassador to King Philip in the Netherlands in September 1557 (AGS, *Secretaría de Estado*, Legajo 379, doc. 11) but he only assumed his duties during the year of 1558 owing to the theft of his documents and personal belongings in France (*Idem*, Legajo 380, docs. 26 and 29). This topic will be discussed in the chapter 3.

Pereira's mind, harsh measures were the only way to prevent the damage the English and the French were inflicting on Portugal and to conclusively stop what he considered to be an intolerable challenge to Portuguese rights.¹⁴⁷

Shortly afterwards, in a letter likely dated December 1558, the Portuguese king thanked Pereira for the information he had sent regarding Towerson's third voyage and for his appeals to King Philip to punish those involved in the expedition. Having been apprised of Queen Mary I's death in a December 1558 letter from Spain, the Portuguese king also approved Pereira's offer to enlist Feria's assistance and urge Elizabeth's government to hand over the *Raposa*. In another letter, King Sebastian ordered Pereira, as King John III had done previously, to raise the issue of French navigation in the Portuguese *Mare Clausum* in the negotiations for the peace treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis between Spain and France.¹⁴⁸ Thus, in the absence of a formal ambassador or agent after João Rodrigues Correia's likely departure from England somewhere in 1557, Portugal used the Spanish network and its ambassador to King Philip to manage English affairs.

It was probably in January 1559 that King Sebastian notified D. Francisco Pereira of his decision to send his son D. João Pereira to visit Queen Elizabeth I and congratulate her on her accession to the throne. He was also to deliver letters to the new queen from King Sebastian and Queen Catherine of Austria, the Portuguese regent due to the minority of her nephew.¹⁴⁹ Queen Catherine also ordered D. Francisco Pereira to offer condolences to King Philip on the death of Queen Mary.¹⁵⁰ These missives offered the expected congratulations, and moreover included requests for the formal confirmation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. In tandem with this typical diplomatic envoy, King Sebastian launched an unofficial mission in January 1559, precisely as King John III had done with Ambassador Diogo Lopes de Sousa in 1554. He ordered Francisco de Mesquita to accompany D. João Pereira, providing him with a set of guidelines entitled "instructions to you that shall reside in the court of England." This document, like so many others discussed above, was subject to many revisions. It shows that Mesquita was not to work as a permanent ambassador, but was primarily intended to operate as a spy.

The king of Portugal began the instruction by noting that he had sent D. João Pereira to congratulate Queen Elizabeth I on her accession to the throne, but had seen fit to enlist Mesquita to take care of "other affairs."

147 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 341.

148 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 344–345 and 348.

149 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 341–341v, 352–352v. and 354.

150 AGS, *Secretaria de Estado*, Legajo 380, doc. 96.

Upon arriving in England, Mesquita was to proceed to Feria's house. Feria would arrange his meeting with Queen Elizabeth, since he had been handling the issue of English navigation to West Africa with King Philip and Queen Elizabeth. Before speaking to Elizabeth and the Privy Council about the seizure of the *Raposa* in his capacity as official Portuguese envoy, Mesquita should hear the advice of Feria. During his time in England, King Sebastian instructed Mesquita to "have particular care in knowing the names of ships, the qualities of people that are planning the voyages, the route they will follow, from which port they are, the munition and artillery they bring and the calendar in which they plan to depart. All of this you shall warn me as soon as you can." The Portuguese king also added: "If you come to know that some of these ships are being prepared to the Mina coast or any other of my overseas places, you will work, within your possibilities, to sabotage it and you will immediately demand the Queen [Elizabeth I] and her Council [the Privy Council] not to allow it." Finally, the king ordered Mesquita to write on the recent return to Anglicanism under Elizabeth, but as a second mission, and provided him a cypher.

Attached to this letter was another one from the Portuguese king to Feria, acknowledging his assistance in the Mina affair and begging him to assist Mesquita in his mission. Interestingly, King Sebastian recognized in the letter that the Spanish ambassador in England had defended Portuguese interests owing to King Philip's love for him.¹⁵¹ King Philip was also likely informed of Mesquita's mission, as he wrote to Feria again on January 20, 1559 to settle the affair the Portuguese had in England. He also wrote personally to Queen Elizabeth on the matter.¹⁵²

Thus, even after losing his role as king consort of England, King Philip continued to play an active part, often in the defense of Portuguese interests. Although the outcome of D. João Pereira's and Francisco Mesquita's espionage remains unknown because their letters have not survived, it is clear that Queen Elizabeth I was pleased by the desire of King Sebastian and Queen Catherine of Austria to confirm the traditional alliance. D. João Pereira was well received, as Elizabeth wrote in letters to both Sebastian and Catherine,¹⁵³ even though his mission was in response to Towerson's third voyage.¹⁵⁴ As for the Portuguese protests against Towerson's voyage,

151 ANTT, CSV, vol. V, fl. 29–32 and 258.

152 Blake, *Europeans in West Africa*, vol. II, 432–33.

153 Joseph Stevenson, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series, of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1558–1559* (London: Longman, Green, Longman & Roberts, 1863), 216–17.

154 Puga, "Scramble for Africa," 742.

neither Queen Elizabeth nor her chief minister William Cecil (1520–98) provided a definitive answer. The fact that Towerson was not able to launch another expedition in the wake of his disastrous third voyage can in part be attributed to opposition from Portugal and Spain.

Nevertheless, English navigation to West Africa continued, forcing the dispatch of another Portuguese spy, Manuel de Araújo, in 1561. Araújo's correspondence is incomplete, but it is evident that he worked for João Pereira Dantas, the Portuguese ambassador in France for whom he had previously acted as an agent in the French ports. The preparations for John Hawkins's first voyage would also prompt King Sebastian to appoint Dantas for a mission to England the next year. Once more, in 1562, and again in 1564 and 1567, for Hawkins's voyages, Dantas, and Portuguese maritime espionage and counter-espionage is documented in England, as shall be described in chapter 4. But, as the documents presented in this chapter prove, Dantas's activities in the 1560s were merely an escalation of a process already underway during the reign of Queen Mary I.

This fact is connected with the initial question raised by recent studies: that Mary and Elizabeth shared important features in their maritime and overseas policies. Why did Portugal envisage Marian England as a serious competitor, as all this maritime espionage documents? The answer is connected to the development of a scientific milieu under Queen Mary I of which Queen Elizabeth I became the main beneficiary. This was also the ambience in which all Portuguese maritime espionage took place and it played a role in the escalation of tension between both sides. Again, aside from superficial maritime rivalry, there is another key factor that influenced English overseas expansion: the Anglo-Iberian maritime knowledge interchange.

2.5 The Development of the English Scientific Milieu under Queen Mary I

In 1555, when Queen Mary I and King Philip approved the charter for the creation of the Muscovy Company, Philip hoped to avoid a clash between England and Spain overseas. His support is usually seen as an attempt to deviate the English from dangerous overseas ambitions,¹⁵⁵ although it becomes clear that he intended to boost Anglo-Spanish maritime collaboration particularly towards France. The chief importance of the creation of the Company was that it allowed for the systematic training of the first generation of England's

¹⁵⁵ Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 101; Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange," vol. I, 233.

sailors in oceanic and astronomical navigation. Richard Chancellor, Stephen and William Borough were trained in the context of the Muscovy Company, together with other major figures of the Elizabethan era: Richard Record, Richard Eden, and John Dee (1527–1608).¹⁵⁶ It was also within this Company that Richard Eden translated the abovementioned works of Apiannus, Pietro Martyr, and González de Oviedo. The English translations of the first Spanish accounts of the Americas played a key role in instructing and inspiring the first sailors that Queen Elizabeth I inherited. But, once more, neither the arrival of this knowledge in England nor Eden's work can be understood without considering the particulars of Queen Mary I's reign.

It was because of Queen Mary's marriage with Philip that, in 1558, Stephen Borough was allowed (by Philip himself) to make a personal visit to the Casa de la Contratación in Seville. The dynastic bond between England and Spain, together with King Philip's attempt to acquire more information on the English ambition of sailing to Asia via an Arctic route,¹⁵⁷ provided the English with a crucial technical work: the nautical treatise of Martín Cortés de Albacar (1510–82), which contained knowledge from Portuguese nautical science,¹⁵⁸ as has been noted in the previous chapter. Borough brought this book to England, and was so impressed by the Spanish system that, in 1561, he urged Elizabeth's government to create the office of pilot-major of England.¹⁵⁹ Interestingly, it later became clear that the English did not fully understand the workings of the institution they were trying to emulate.¹⁶⁰

Although his idea was not adopted, Borough was able to convince the Muscovy Company's merchants to finance the translation of Cortés's treatise into English. Richard Eden soon finished it and it became the most important manual for the 16th-century English sailor.¹⁶¹ After Cortés's English edition and Borough's visit to Seville, English development of the art of navigation was correctly deemed inevitable. At Richard Chancellor's and Sebastian Cabot's deaths, during Queen Elizabeth I's early years, Stephen Borough and John Dee stepped in to fulfill their approximate roles. Elizabeth inherited a scientific and maritime milieu fully favorable to maritime and overseas expansion.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁶ Andrews, *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement*, 29.

¹⁵⁷ Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange," vol. I, 231 and 237–38.

¹⁵⁸ Waters, *The Iberian Bases*, 14.

¹⁵⁹ Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 496 and 513–14.

¹⁶⁰ On this topic see: Ash and Sandman, "Sebastian Cabot."

¹⁶¹ E. G. R. Taylor, 1971, 197.

¹⁶² Baldwin, "The Development and Interchange," vol. I, 524; Waters, *The Art of Navigation*, 94; E. G. R. Taylor, 1971, 194.

Thus, it is no wonder that Elizabethan London became a global experimental city with conditions ripe for making contributions to the emergence of modern science in Europe, as has already been argued by Deborah E. Harkness.¹⁶³ Still, this link cannot be explained without acknowledging the critical role that Queen Mary played, in the creation of the Muscovy Company, by supporting William Towerson's third voyage, and more dramatically, despite her marriage to Philip, by continuing to deny Spain's requests to turn over Sebastian Cabot. The most important moment in this refusal came precisely in 1555, when the Muscovy Company was created and Cabot's appointment meant that England could not consider allowing Cabot's possible return to Spain any longer given his role in directing overseas expeditions.¹⁶⁴

Another vital element in the successes of the Elizabethan era that had roots in Queen Mary I's reign are the activities of John Dee. Dee was trained in the context of the Muscovy Company and played a key role during Elizabeth's reign as an advisor to English maritime expeditions. It was during Mary's reign and Elizabeth's early years that Dee began to publish his most important works. Among his important contacts was that with the Portuguese royal cosmographer Pedro Nunes (1502–78). Dee not only kept Nunes's works in his personal library throughout his life, but in 1558 appointed Nunes executor of one of his mathematical works in the event of his death.¹⁶⁵ In 1559 and 1560, two more of his works were dedicated to Nunes,¹⁶⁶ and as late as 1584, Dee was still performing experiments with nautical instruments designed by Nunes.¹⁶⁷ Although the letters that Nunes and Dee exchanged have not survived, this scientific connection is worth highlighting, since it is analogous to the Spanish cases discussed above.

During the Elizabethan era, direct references to Nunes's works are also easily found in the works of English nautical literature written by mathematical practitioners. Such is the case for William Bourne's (1544–1625) *Nautical Supply* in 1597 or even Edward Wright's (1561–1615) famous *Certaine Errors in Navigation* from 1599, which include explicit references to Pedro Nunes's works.¹⁶⁸ Considering also the scientific role that John Dee played

163 Deborah E. Harkness, *The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the Scientific Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 2, 10 and 260.

164 Loades, *England's Maritime Empire*, 58.

165 Bruno Almeida, "On the Origins of Dee's Mathematical Programme: The John Dee–Pedro Nunes Connection," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 43 (2012): 460–69, 461 and 468.

166 Stephen Andrew Johnston, "John Dee on Geometry: Texts, Teaching and the Euclidean Tradition," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 43 (2012): 471.

167 Edward Fenton, ed., *The Diaries of John Dee* (Oxfordshire: Day Books, 1998), 165.

168 Almeida, *A carta de navegar*, 312–13 and 322–24.

under Queen Elizabeth I, a question arises: Did Nunes, owing to his pan-European reputation as a great mathematician, serve as a scientific role model for Dee in the same manner that the pilot-major of the Casa de la Contratación did for Stephen Borough? It is impossible to provide a final answer, but the possibility should not be forgotten when considering the ways that Anglo-Iberian nautical/scientific relations of the 1550s influenced the re-emergence of the English overseas expansion.

The character of these relations has been the focus of this chapter thus far, since it is arguably under the umbrella of such knowledge exchanges that Portuguese maritime espionage in England under Queen Mary I falls. The same avenues for the circulation of maritime and scientific knowledge that led Dee to Nunes's works also motivated Portuguese pilots, such as António Eanes Pinteado or Francisco Rodrigues, to come to England to offer their nautical expertise. If the English were trained in the art of oceanic navigation through Spanish manuals of navigation (in particular, those of Cortés and Pedro de Medina (1493–1567)) during the 1550s and 1560s, their formative interactions with Portuguese pilots should not be neglected either. As has been argued, beneath the surface of Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry, there was also a less visible process of English nautical apprenticeship with their Portuguese and Spanish counterparts in the art of navigation. This process contributed to the cultivation of an English nautical literature from the late 1560s onwards. Once more, the roots are to be found in Queen Mary I's reign, whose role in the overall process of English overseas expansion can be reassessed based on the Portuguese espionage and diplomatic documents presented in this chapter.

Conclusion

As has been demonstrated, the connection between England, Portugal, and Spain in nautical matters was always intense. The rivalry that emerged from the 1550s onwards between Portugal and England was a significant episode, but not the first. Similarly to the relationship between Portugal and Spain in maritime affairs, behind the Anglo-Portuguese maritime rivalry there was also a process of circulation of nautical experts that remained largely unregulated by the Portuguese Crown from the late 15th century to the 1550s. António Eanes Pinteado, the Portuguese pilot who suggested that Wyndham should organize the English voyage to Guinea, serves as a reminder of the consequences that such circulation had for both sides. As previously argued, Pinteado should be seen as another Portuguese character who contributed

to the emergence of the English overseas expansion process, similar to his predecessor, the earl of Penamacor.¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that King John III's maritime espionage goals vis-à-vis Marian England ended up failing as it did in Spain: in the end, despite Queen Mary's formal prohibitions, the English voyages to West Africa continued and defied Portuguese overseas interests in the way that King John II had already, in the late 15th century, envisioned. In the next chapter concerning France, a similar process shall be observed. This rivalry between England and Portugal also led to the development of a sophisticated Portuguese espionage and diplomatic apparatus, which, because of this competition and that with France, and in parallel with other European cases,¹⁷⁰ forced King John III to resort to a plurality of agents—from the ambassador (Diogo Lopes de Sousa), to the special agent (João Rodrigues Correia), to the classical spy (Francisco de Mesquita). It is also crucial to emphasize the pivotal role that Queen Mary I played in the broader context of English overseas expansion and its correlation to the accomplishments of Elizabethan England.

If it is true that Queen Mary publicly condemned and forbade her English subjects from sailing to West Africa, it has also been observed how the queen allowed Lok's departure in secrecy, how she commissioned an atlas from the Portuguese cartographer Diogo Homem, and how she sent her own ships in the fleet of Towerson's third voyage in 1558. Furthermore, it has already been argued in respect of this voyage of 1558 that the participation of the queen's ships might mean that she herself was promised a share in the voyage's profits.¹⁷¹ Queen Mary I, like King Henry VII did with regard to King John II's requests, never extradited Portuguese collaborators in the English overseas ventures, arguing that they were either absent or dead. Mary's position on this topic needs to be compared with her position towards the authorization for Sebastian Cabot's possible return to Spain: in the end the queen refused it, despite her marriage and all her reverence and love for Philip. These facts show clearly, as has been underscored with the examples in the previous chapter concerning Emperor Charles V and even King Philip II concerning the role of Portuguese nautical experts, that Mary understood the importance of nautical knowledge coming from

169 Puga, "Scramble for Africa," 752.

170 Dante Fedele, "Plurality of Diplomatic Agents in Premodern Literature on the Ambassador," in *Beyond Ambassadors: Consuls, Missionaries, and Spies in Premodern Diplomacy*, ed. Maurits Ebben and Louis Sicking (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 38–59.

171 Blum, "Empire Later," 52.

Portugal. That knowledge could be readily used by England to recommence its overseas ventures in search for opportunities to increase wealth.

In this process, Queen Mary I understood, like King John III, Emperor Charles V and King Philip II, that controlling and monopolizing nautical knowledge was pivotal to sustaining English overseas plans. Her views on the topic were no doubt understood by Queen Elizabeth I from the very beginning of her reign, despite all the religious and personal differences that separated the new queen from the old. The main difference between Mary and Elizabeth with regard to English ventures in Portuguese overseas areas was that, by Elizabeth's reign, England had achieved a stronger position than it had at the beginning of Mary's reign. England's previous preparation, its larger dimension and population, allowed Elizabeth to progressively defy Portuguese interests abroad and to answer Portuguese diplomatic pressure differently.¹⁷² The character of that change will be analyzed in chapter 4, with the study of Anglo-Portuguese rivalry and interchange in the 1560s, but it is important to highlight that even in the Elizabethan era the Portuguese nautical contribution to England's overseas ventures remained very intense, following the pattern already inaugurated by the end of the 15th century.

There is another key factor that decisively influenced Marian and Elizabethan England's maritime achievements: France. As has been mentioned, English nautical apprenticeship was not solely with Portugal and Spain, but also included France, as the hiring of French nautical experts by King Henry VIII or even the presence of French pilots for John Lok's voyage evidences. Furthermore, by Queen Mary I's reign, France had succeeded in challenging Portuguese and Spanish attempted maritime hegemony overseas. The French nautical example was also relevant for England's ventures overseas and was even more important for Marian England, considering that on the other side of the Channel, France was being ruled by King Henry II (1547–59), the 16th-century French predecessor to Colbert, as the Valois monarch was called by the renowned French historian Charles de La Roncière.¹⁷³ King Henry II's program for the development of the French navy was a maritime menace to England but also triggered a process of competition between the two sides that encouraged England to develop its navy and also its overseas ventures based on the French example.¹⁷⁴

172 McBride, "The Politics of Economic Expansion," 207–8.

173 Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, vol. III (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cto Imprimeurs et Editeurs, 1906), 455.

174 On this topic: Redding, *The English and French Navies*.

However, Valois France also presented a significant challenge for Portugal. Therefore, it is important to examine whether France also valued and utilized Iberian maritime knowledge to plan its overseas expeditions. Did King Henry II, like King John III, Emperor Charles V, King Philip II, Queen Mary I, and Queen Elizabeth I, also understand the importance of Iberian maritime knowledge and did he attempt to control the flow of nautical information? Was there an observable process similar to those ongoing in England and Spain regarding France? How does this connect to French-Portuguese maritime rivalry in the West Africa and Brazil? In the next chapter, the analysis of the French ambassadors' correspondence in Portugal helps to uncover these questions.