1. The Cultural Security of Ethnic Groups in Contemporary China and Mongolia

Jarmila Ptáčková and Ondřej Klimeš

Abstract: The introductory chapter situates the collective monograph's findings within the existing discussion on cultural security. It introduces its general principles, accentuating common dynamics between a dominant and a minor group, and points out direct connection between the perceived degree of cultural security and the need to emphasize, restore, or invent cultural identifiers. In the context of the People's Republic of China, this chapter discusses how cultural security is perceived by minority nationalities and by the state. It refers to various state stability and institutional dimensions of cultural securitization, as well as horizontal and/or bottom-up mechanisms of cultural security building, and identifies a firm connection between the effectiveness of ethnic and cultural policies and the degree of cultural security perceived by targeted minorities and by the state. In contrast, the case of Mongolia shows how collective identification and participation in national cultural security building can enhance citizens' cultural self-confidence.

Keywords: Xi Jinping, ethnic policy, cultural identity, nation-building, cultural securitization

This book continues the discussion of cultural security initiated by the German sinologist and Tibet specialist Andreas Gruschke and others in 2015. The contributions to this volume explore various dimensions of the cultural security of ethnic groups in China and Mongolia and how these dynamics interrelate with alternative modes of cultural security and broader sociopolitical developments. Cultural security is understood below as the need to emphasize, restore, invent, or maintain the cultural markers of a group. It is thus an indicator of a cultural self-confidence and the freedom

of a group, or of an individual within the group, to act out their identity. Drawing on examples from various contexts in China and Mongolia, this book analyses the relation of perceived cultural security to the strengthening of the cultural identity of different parties in a minority-majority relation, in an inter-ethnic relation, or in the relation of a state to its people. Culture, in this context, is anything through which a certain number of people identify themselves as a group. It is shared history and common experience demonstrated through a set of markers, including behavioral patterns, such as religion, language, literature, oral traditions, clothing, or diet (Kolås and Thowsen 2005), which are the core of the group's cultural identity and help to establish a sense of common affiliation and boundaries with the cultural "Other" (Klieger 2002). From an international perspective, culture can be defined as a globally prevalent pattern of values, beliefs, norms, and symbolic structures (Lynch 2013, 629).

While the identity of an individual is based on self-perception and does not necessarily need visual markers, cultural identity is something that binds an individual with a certain group. Cultures as well as cultural identifiers are under constant external influence from various (political, historical, economic, social, cultural, or environmental) factors (Harrell 2001) and are also continually being adjusted and created as a reaction to these factors, rendering them prone to constant transformation (Barth 1969). Consequently, considering the "purity" of any culture is at least questionable; in their day-to-day form, cultures are better described as constructs that are "ultimately hybrid" (Flüchter and Schöttli 2015, 2)—a term we find suitable to represent the contemporary construct of "Chinese culture" (*Zhonghua wenhua*; Clark 2018). Perceived cultural security is then typically predicated upon a group's or a group member's ability to live out, maintain and develop, or even abolish shared cultural markers without calling their cultural identity into question. Cultural security is not necessarily predicated upon groups that are defined by ethnicity (for this argument see also Anttonen 2005, 86), but can be recognized in any type of group that shares a common identity or set of self-identified cultural traits. It is a subjective notion shifting according to circumstances (Yeh 2002), and it is the circumstances and the confrontation with the "Others" that generate the need to define an identity (Mullaney 2012). The subsequent choice of emphasized cultural markers or "identity repertoires" (Goode and Stroup 2015, 722) reflects the nature of the confrontation. The importance of cultural identifiers changes with the perspective of an observer and those within the contested group might see it differently from external actors. The internal and external dimension of cultural security (Gruschke 2021) can be driven by similar mechanisms,

such as commodification, policy arrangements, or political circumstances, but for each one, different cultural identifiers might appear essential to demonstrate cultural identity in a given situation.

In global as well as local contexts, (minority) groups are prone to assimilation into the mainstream (or majority) by the dilution of their distinctive features. Consequently, in a globalized world we face increasing "transculturality," i.e., dissolution of cultural boundaries and evolution of a collective identity. This can, however, encourage "reverse processes of re-affirmation and of the assertion of some kind of difference" (Flüchter and Schöttli 2015, 2) when groups conceive of this transculturality as a danger to their self-perceived cultural identity. Cultural security can thus serve as a "moral good" (Carbonneau, Gruschke, Jacobs, and Keller 2021, 52) ensuring the cultural diversity of heterogeneous societies. This positive connotation of cultural security is possible only in societies where the autonomous development of cultural diversity is not obstructed or prevented. Some aspects of cultural security in the positive sense, as discussed in this book, resemble the concept of ontological security seen by Michael Skey (2010, 720) as a state when individuals can "rely on things—people, objects, places, meanings—remaining tomorrow, by and large, as they were today and the day before." The below chapters address situations when continuities in individual or communal cultural lives are changing—for instance, through a bottom-up invention of collective identities or through a top-down state intervention. Such developments can lead to perceived "cultural insecurity" and a community's growing desire for clear cultural boundaries and awakening of cultural consciousness demonstrated through the increased display of sometimes re-invented "traditional" cultural identifiers (see Ptáčková 2019).

Cultural identity, like ethnic identity as described by Vatikiotis (2017, 277), is "transactional in nature" and "a product of opportunity." In the context of creating a national identity or national cohesion, cultural identity can be equally well understood as "political identity," defining "cultural" self-perception through loyalty towards a chosen authority (see Anttonen 2005, 103). Depending on whether the chosen authority is from within or outside a group, cultural identity building is then called either separatism or integration. The decisive factor is often whether under these applied circumstances a group is able to effectively control its own cultural development, define the identification markers of its "cultural identity," and choose to whom it will be loyal, or whether its "cultural identity" becomes the object of a top-down nation-building process, when groups with lower "national cultural capital" (Hage 1998, 53), i.e., cultural markers less compatible with

those required by the dominant party, will face either discrimination and marginalization or assimilation.

A minority group in a multiethnic state constructs its identity based on its own "tradition," which can, but does not necessarily have to, accentuate contrast with that of the majority. Identity can, however, also be applied as a top-down construct of an "invented national identity," and a sense of collective belonging can be created by mass symbolism "expected to yield legitimacy to the state institution and its power over a territory." Especially in the case of ethnically and religiously heterogeneous polities, it is important to choose symbols that everyone can identify with to create a national cultural identity that not only appears "real and unquestionable" (Anttonen 2005, 83–86) but is also stable. Shared national cultural identity does not necessarily mean a denial of the local cultural identities of different ethno-cultural groups. On the contrary, under a functioning and self-confident state apparatus it is possible to allow for cultural diversity, and members of an ethnic minority can simultaneously feel culturally secure in their "ethnic identity" and in their "national identity." The cultural identities of minorities within a state should thus not be seen as "simply a convenience" (Vatikiotis 2017, 216). Instead, they should be perceived as an important component of a healthy society (see also Schein 2000).

However, the presence of alternative (ethnic or religious) cultural identi-ties can also be understood as an absence of national identity (see Tobin 2015; 2020, 319), i.e., a lack of identification with the present sociopolitical order or state project. Subsequently, the identity or cultural identity of ethnic, religious, or otherwise socially defined groups can be disregarded, challenged, or explicitly rejected by the state or the dominant ethnic group. The only valid identity is the imposed "fundamentally homogenous" mass identity of the people—the nation (Greenfeld 1992, 3). Modern nation-states have generally been viewed as conducive to replacing cultural heterogeneity with homogeneity (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). The homogenization of ethnic and other identities can be seen as the most effective method for the state to impose a national identity on its citizens. Proactive assimilatory pressures or policies towards minorities can result in "cohesion against either a rival population or the state power" and jeopardize the state nationalism construct (Kang and Sutton 2016, 8). The state's cultural identity and the cultural identities of minorities are closely intertwined and influence each other. For a state to maintain its integrity, it is necessary to achieve a balance in nurturing both. Cultural identities are thus directly connected to "political processes, legislation, minority and majority policies, local, regional and national politics" (Anttonen 2005, 108), and there is a "close relation between

cultural security for national minorities and state stability" (Carbonneau, Gruschke, Jacobs and Keller 2021, 46).

Securing Culture in the People's Republic of China

Parallel to ethnic minorities' efforts to articulate their cultural identity in relation to a majority, a state can direct its cultural affairs to enhance internal security by limiting the cultural attributes and activities of its constituent communities. In such case, the state's cultural securitization reduces the cultural security of ethnic minorities. The interplay of cultural security and state stability has been seen as an interesting phenomenon in the People's Republic of China (PRC; Gruschke 2021; Grunfeld 2021).

Previous research has shown that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has regarded shaping cultural and other ideational values as a principal means of legitimation and power projection which needs to be safeguarded against perceived domestic and foreign challenges. Historically, the CCP's cultural governance draws both on imperial and republican elites' ideologies and efforts to make cultural transformation the essence of statehood and on the Marxist-Leninist cultural model implemented in the Soviet Union (Levenson 1968; Townsend 1992; Brady 2008). The party made "cultural work" (*wenhua gongzuo*) and "cultural construction" (*wenhua jianshe*) a focus of its politics already in the Jiangxi (1931–34) and Yan'an (1936–48) control zones, where Mao Zedong's conceptualizations of culture and the disciplining of the intelligentsia termed the "rectification campaign" (*zhengfeng yundong*) established a pattern of cultural governance for the PRC (Mao 2005, 357–69; Hung 1994, 221–69; Teiwes 1993). The cultural realm was often an initial or proxy battlefield of devastating upheavals of the Maoist era, such as the Anti-Rightist Movement (1956–59) or the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76; Fokkema 1991).

The rejuvenation of domestic cultural life and the influx of foreign trends in the post-Mao era from 1978 led the CCP to construct China as a "spiritual civilization" (*jingshen wenming*) with regard to political objectives, for instance through the ideological campaigns "against bourgeois liberalization" (*fandui zichan jieji ziyouhua*) and to "eliminate spiritual pollution" (*qingchu jingshen wuran*; Carrico 2017). The domestic protest movement in the late 1980s, along with the collapse of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, underlined the importance of ideological work and prompted the CCP to "re-Orient" its cultural governance from overtly ideological work

to cultural nationalism referencing Chinese culture, tradition, history, and patriotism (Perry 2013).

The party-state's deployment of culture-imbued propaganda, education, and other thought-work as defensive strategies against Western cultural influences and ideological subversion during the Cold War era continued as a response to globalization and Westernization (Alsudairi 2019; Johnson 2021). The ideology of Jiang Zemin (in power 1989–2002), known as the Three Represents (*sange daibiao*), argues that the CCP represents the "vanguard orientation of China's advanced culture" (*Zhongguo xianjin wenhuade qianjin fangxiang*). Under the Jiang leadership, the concept of national cultural security (*guojia wenhua anquan*) became influential in policy-making circles and became central to the party-state's conceptions of national and regime security (Johnson 2017). The Hu Jintao (2002–12) leadership grasped cultural securitization as crucial for the CCP's political legitimation, national cohesion-building, and international politics (Edney 2015; Lynch 2013; Alsudairi 2019). The party also explicitly sought to shape Chinese people's ethics and morality using the "socialist core value system" (*shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhi tixi*) and the "socialist core values outlook" (*shehuizhuyi hexin jiazhiguan*).

In the Xi Jinping era, since 2012, the CCP has perceived the ideological challenges to its power as particularly complex and intense, and resolved to strengthen its ideational governance, for instance by improving the management of propaganda on the "cultural front," where the dissemination of ideology is seen as "the most important political task" (*ChinaFile* 2013). The consolidation of power also involves securitization of culture and other ideational spheres, for example through the State Security Commission formed in 2014 (*Guojia anquan weiyuanhui*; Johnson 2020). Newly promulgated laws, such as the 2015 State Security Law and the 2018 amendment of the Counter-Terrorism Law, have established cultural and ideational affairs as a vital field of state security and defined principles of cultural securitization (Central government of the PRC 2015; National People's Congress 2018; Mohammed Alsudairi's chapter in this volume).

Cultural discourse also increasingly features in the Xi-era ideology. The party has called on Chinese people to strengthen their "four confidences" (*sige zixin*), i.e., "cultural confidence" (*wenhua zixin*) along with the "confidence in the path, theory, and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics" (*Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi daolu zixin*, *lilun zixin*, *zhidu zixin*). The contemporary Chinese party-state's alleged "specifics" (*tese*) evolved from ancient and imperial China's "unique" (*dute*) culture, tradition, history, and overall "national conditions" (*guoqing*; *People's Daily* 2013). The CCP also hopes to raise China's "cultural soft power" (*wenhua ruanshili*)

and "discursive power" (*huayuquan*) and build a "socialist cultural power" (*shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo*; Xi 2014; Klimeš 2017).

Cultural Securitization in Ethnic Governance

The CCP's shaping of the culture and values of the PRC's citizens also affects the non-Han "minority nationalities" (*shaoshu minzu*).[1] A common and distinctive culture, understood as a specific spiritual and psychological frame developed from generation to generation and a manifestation of national character, remains recognized in the PRC's ethnicity theory as one of the defining features of a nation according to the definition of Joseph Stalin (Stalin 1953, 306–7; Klimeš 2020a, 39). Drawing on the Soviet model of "national-territorial delimitation" (*национально-территориальное размежевание*) and "indigenization" (*коренизация*; e.g., Martin 2001), the PRC's "identification of nationalities" (*minzu shibie*; also rendered in English as recognition of nationalities or ethnic classification; Mullaney 2010) acknowledged selected ethnic communities' existence and accommodated their cultural markers to some extent, allowing for "permissible forms of difference" (Schein 2000, 73). The PRC has also regulated or restricted minority nationalities' cultural and intellectual life (Leung 2005; Bulag 2004; Bovingdon 2010; Zenz 2013).

A specific and desired "culture" remains the concept that defines the sociopolitical boundaries between the "civilized" people, i.e., the "Chinese" part of society, and the groups "in need of civilization," i.e., the ethnic minorities on the periphery, such as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. Between these two poles are situated other groups whom the central authorities view as less incompatible with their political priorities, such as the Yi or the Qiang. Possessing or not possessing "culture" (*wenhua*) defines whether a person or a group stands inside or outside the inner "Chinese" circle. The understanding of the term "culture" has changed with the development of national consciousness and the changing definition of national values and virtues during the successive political regimes in China. But whether described as a grade of literacy, sedentary life, a common religion or language, or socialist culture with Chinese characteristics, the core function remains to separate people into those loyal to the regime and the Others, variously labeled as "barbarians," "backward ones," "counterrevolutionaries," "rightists,"

---

1   This publication prefers translating the term *minzu* as "nation," "national," and "nationality" as opposed to "ethnic."

"separatists," "terrorists" or "extremists." The nationality identification ascribed to each PRC citizen and stated clearly on personal documents provides for sharp and unbridgeable social demarcation and nurtures what has been called the "nationality paradigm" (Bulag 2019) of the PRC's ethnic governance.

The CCP's cultural securitization involves strengthening the citizenry's identification with the "Chinese nation" (*Zhonghua minzu*; Johnson 2021, 249, 252–54, 256). In the "autonomous" regions of Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, the party-state seeks to strengthen local nationalities' identification with the "great motherland, Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the CCP, and socialism with Chinese characteristics" (*dui weida zuguo, Zhonghua minzu, Zhonghua wenhua, Zhongguo gongchandang, Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyide rentong*), as well as their "correct views of state, history, nation, culture, and religion" (*zhengquede guojiaguan, lishiguan, minzuguan, wenhuaguan, zongjiaoguan*; Klimeš 2018; Baioud and Khuanuud 2023). The party-state under Xi has accented the "fusion" (*jiaorong*) of nationalities as a top policy objective and represented non-Han populations not as minority nationalities, i.e., groups that are "racially and culturally distinct" (Gillete 2008, 1013, 1015), but as segments of a homogeneous Chinese nation to which they are "linked by blood" (*xuemai xiangliande*; Central government of the PRC 2021). The "correct handling of the relationship between Chinese culture and local nationality culture" (*zhengque chuli Zhonghua wenhua he benminzu wenhuade guanxi*) is one of the preconditions for forging the "Chinese national community consciousness" (*Zhonghua minzu gongtongti yishi*; Xinhua 2021; Central government of the PRC 2021; Tibet Autonomous Region Government 2021; Xinhua 2022).

The official discourse has intensified previous Chinese elites' efforts to imbue the concept of Chinese nation with the implied meaning of "Han people," which started when the term appeared in China's political debates in the late Qing dynasty (Schneider 2017, 46). Similarly, advancing "Chinese culture" can mean coercive promotion of Han cultural features, such as language and script, with an intensity prompting concerns of assimilation of non-Han nationalities by the obliteration of their distinct identities along the lines of so-called second-generation ethnic policies (Leibold 2013; Elliott 2015; Anonymous 2020; Salimjan 2020; Harris 2020; Atwood 2020; Tobin 2021; Ptáčková 2021; Smith Finley 2020). The authorities have also sought to replace the notion of the "good Han," which was previously applied to the PRC's majority nationality—itself hardly a homogeneous category (Mullaney et al. 2012, 10; Joniak-Lüthi 2017)—with the image of a "good Chinese."

The Xi era has also brought forth an intensified correlation between domestic ethnic affairs and international politics. One dynamic is the international community's critical attention to the PRC's repression of non-Han nationalities and their cultural practices, notably in Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, or the Hui regions. In this context, an important role can be played by transnational ethnic groups, as evidenced by the Mongolian president Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj's September 2020 letter to Xi Jinping asking him to uphold PRC Mongols' rights to use their native language and script (Elbegdorj 2020). Another facet of the internationalization of the PRC's ethnic issues is the party-state's increased management or repression of ethnic diasporas, also known as transnational repression. By thematizing culture and identity of the PRC's non-Han transnational populations, the CCP tries to impose its values and norms on other countries and thereby reduces their national cultural security (see, for example, Reuters 2016; Martin 2018; Safeguard Defenders 2023). At the same time, minority nationality diasporas can be used by the CCP as conduits for ethnic propaganda and united front work, advancing the party-state's broader political objectives (Klimeš 2020a; 2020b). The party-state's domestic ethnic policies affecting the cultural security of minorities can also win the international support of the CCP's allies.

Continuing the Discussion

This collective monograph builds on the debate by Andreas Gruschke and other experts at the *International Symposia on Cultural Inclusion* held in 2015 in Freiburg im Breisgau, and in 2016 in Bautzen (Carbonneau et al. 2021). Our collection was inspired by the third symposium entitled *Minorities in Their Own Lands: Cultural Security among Ethnic and Cultural Minorities across Asia* held in December 2017 in Prague, where the contributions to this book by Jarmila Ptáčková, Michal Zelcer-Lavid, Yang Minghong, Jan Karlach, Gabriel Thorne, and Mei-hua Lan were first presented.[2] Several case studies of cultural security in contexts outside the PRC presented in Prague could not (for various reasons) be included in the final version of this collection, which therefore only partially reflects the geographical variety

of the cultural security issues discussed at the event. The book took shape during Jarmila Ptáčková and Ondřej Klimeš's work on the project *Balancing the Interests: Correlations of Ethnic and Foreign Policy in Contemporary China* throughout 2019–23, in which they were joined by Giulia Cabras and Jan Karlach. Contributions by the rest of the authors were included at this stage.

In their summary of previous discussions of cultural security, Carbonneau, Gruschke, Jacobs, and Keller (2021) define five dimensions of compensatory mechanisms as necessary for the maintenance of minorities' cultural security. The institutional dimension comprises the degree to which a state and its majority society provide a minority with community institutions or acknowledge them, as well as the degree of the minority's representation in the institutions of the majority society and the resulting degree of its political self-determination. The territorial dimension entails the extent to which a state recognizes an ethno-linguistic minority's bond (often historically established) to a specific territory and grants a degree of territorial autonomy. The state stability dimension comprises the extent to which a state sees the cultural security of its minority population as a factor strengthening or weakening its own stability. Besides these top-down factors, cultural security is also conditioned by bottom-up dynamics. The dimension of collective identification comprises the patterns of individuals' bonding with and belonging to the minority group. Finally, cultural security is also informed by the participatory dimension, which comprises individuals' political and cultural activism and their preservation of collective practices inherent in belonging to an ethnic and linguistic minority.

In reference to these findings, the contributions to our volume bring forth a wealth of data on the various dimensions of the cultural security of ethnic groups in the PRC and Mongolia. Mohammed Alsudairi's chapter explores the state stability dimension and unravels the party-state's embrace and conceptualization of cultural security. Cultural security for the CCP means mostly political and ideological security, and its main function is to maintain power. The party-state's ideology thus collapses the notions of Chinese culture, the Chinese nation, the PRC, and the CCP into the single category of culture, which is seen as being in need of defense against ideological currents propelled by globalization and Western hegemonism. The chapter also shows how the CCP's maintenance of state stability by culture relies on both tangible (state organs, periodicals, think tanks) and intangible institutions (historical narratives, political ideologies, political events).

Hacer Gonul and Julius Rogenhofer's exploration of the CCP's securitization of Uyghur and Hui religious practices also contributes to the understanding of the state stability dimension of cultural security. The

chapter traces the differences in the party-state's treatment of Uyghurs and Hui in the Jiang and Hu eras and the convergence of restrictive policies in the Xi era. The chapter's illustration of the political narratives featuring in the CCP's securitization of Islam attests to the crucial role representational politics (Bovingdon 2010, 7–10) play in the PRC's ethnic affairs. The inter-relation of the state stability and the institutional dimensions of cultural securitization is shown through an explanation of how the party-state uses the China Islamic Association and religious interpretation (*jiejing*) to disseminate an official version of Islam tailored to the CCP's political objectives.

On the case of the Hui Muslims and the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Jarmila Ptáčková's chapter illustrates the party-state's requisition of the right to construct or deconstruct the "cultural identity" of its ethnic groups and instrumentalize it purposefully to sustain state-defined goals such as economic growth or state stability. Mechanisms of collective identification and the participatory dimension are thematized through an investigation of how the top-down introduction or denial of identificatory cultural markers enhances or endangers the perceived cultural security of a particular nationality, in this case the Hui.

Michal Zelcer-Lavid explores Uyghur masculinity and male authority as articulated in literary works partially in response to party-state policies in Xinjiang. Male authority is central to Uyghur and other Islamicate societies and constitutes an important intangible institution of an ethnic group's cultural security. Uyghur literary works and the symbols of masculinity articulated therein thus illuminate patterns of collective identification affecting the cultural security of Uyghurs. As the status of Uyghur men in contemporary Xinjiang declines due to the privileged position of the Han, the constructed Uyghur masculinity articulates "imagined hegemony" and enables Uyghur males to experience superiority over Han males. The literary depiction of the Uyghur struggle to preserve male status is simultaneously an effort to preserve Uyghur identity and culture, which is reflective of the collective insecurity of Uyghurs in contemporary Xinjiang.

Giulia Cabras explores the status of language and its implications for Uyghurs' cultural security. Uyghur intellectuals' and artists' discourses on Uyghur language maintenance and their efforts at language protection prior to 2017 in response to increased language contact and the siniciza-tion of spoken Uyghur showcase the participatory dimension of cultural securitization. Specifically, the explored ideas of authenticity and purism, the role of intellectuals and artists, the question of bilingualism, and the reality of language practices illustrate how the Uyghur language works as

a means of building modern Uyghur identities in Xinjiang and as a catalyst for the present and future well-being of the group. The chapter's treatment of the language and script policy organs and state media's translation and editorial departments elucidates the institutional aspects of Uyghurs' cultural security.

Yang Minghong and Zeng Benxiang contribute a case study of a state-initiated partnership-assistance scheme involving the support of Guangdong Province for the local tourist economy in Lunang Township in Nyingchi Prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region, which started in 2010. The chapter demonstrates the variation in the perception of local ethnic culture by residents, who experience culture as an integral part of their daily lives, and by external stakeholders, who tend to perceive culture from the perspective of touristic marketability. Their chapter elucidates the maintenance of cultural security by the commodification of culture and the "sale of ethnicity" (Goode and Stroup 2015, 730) encouraged by the Chinese authorities. The research also shows a degree of collective identification and participation of local actors in defining and articulating their identity and culture as "Tibetan."

Compared to the Uyghurs or Tibetans, the Yi and the Qiang could be perceived as groups with higher "national cultural capital." Jan Karlach's chapter examines everyday actions by which the *bimo*—ritual practitioners—and other actors belonging to various sub-groups included within the Yi nationality compete with other stakeholders using the resources of the Han majority-dominated state in an effort to become a hegemonic voice within the Yi cultural debate. It thus illustrates how the party-state's stability concerns can be conditioned by the need to allow for some extent of collective identification and participation in the maintenance of the cultural security of communities identified as Yi. The conclusions expose the limits of the PRC's official representation of the Yi nationality as a homogeneous community bound by shared culture.

Bian Simei's contribution illuminates the collective identification and participatory aspects of cultural security by describing the revival and adaptation of traditional ritual practices by the Rrmi people, a sub-group of the Qiang nationality living in Yunshang Administrative Village in northwest Mao County in Aba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in northwest Sichuan Province. The Rrmi's reinterpretation of cultural practices to conform to state-administered intangible cultural heritage procedures shows how institutional dynamics can affect a community's cultural security. The chapter also shows the interplay of simultaneous identities and modes of cultural security, in this case that of local Rrmi

people with those of the Qiang and Tibetan nationalities and with that of the Chinese nation advanced by the party-state.

Gabriel Thorne studies the protests against the extradition bill in Hong Kong in 2019 as a case of the communal defense of language, popular culture, the economy, the legal system, and territory. The party-state's reduction of Hong Kong's autonomy exhibits state stability maintenance by dismantling the territorial and institutional features of Hong Kong's autonomy, an essential component of identity and cultural security. At the same time, the communal nature of the protest shows how Hongkongers collectively identify and participate in the maintenance of cultural security. The chapter also underlines that Hongkongers' animosity toward the CCP and occasionally also toward mainland Chinese are cultural effects not only of Beijing's policies but also of unfettered capitalism, housing oligopoly, and globalization. The chapter also theorizes the concept of scalable cultural security by demonstrating the micro, meso, and macro levels of Hongkongers' cultural security.

Mei-hua Lan's contribution describes Mongolia's search for identity by reviving national culture after decades of authoritarian policies imposed by the country's membership of the Soviet bloc. The examples of legislation on national culture, efforts to revive Mongolian script, the rehabilitation of Chinggis Khan, new historiographies, the transformation of Ulaanbaatar, and religious revival demonstrate the collective identification and participation mechanisms by which various Mongolian actors have established institutions of national cultural security. The chapter also posits that voluntarily accepted external influences stemming from globalization can strengthen Mongolia's cultural independence from Russia and China. In contrast to the case of the PRC, the Mongolian case shows how national cultural security can enhance both state stability and the cultural self-confidence of citizens by the inclusion of bottom-up cultural initiatives. Compared to the PRC, however, as an ethnically relatively homogeneous state Mongolia does not face complex ethnopolitical issues.

The chapters also provide explicit or implicit insights into the interrelations of the explored contexts with alternative cultural security modes and into the importance of cultural security issues within broader sociopolitical developments. Several chapters illustrate the bottom-up or horizontal interaction of cultural security issues (Yang Minghong and Zeng Benxiang, Jan Karlach, Bian Simei, Mei-hua Lan) and the "creative resilience strategies" (Kolboom 2021) ethnic communities can develop to adapt and maintain their identities and cultural security even when faced with concerted state efforts to advance a particular mode of cultural identity or impose it upon them.

The book also shows examples of a nonconsensual, vertical imposition of culture (as defined by the CCP's ideological apparatus) on various target groups, which often results in the endangerment of their cultural security and the exacerbation of existing social problems. The presented research shows that parallel cultural securities can generate multiple ways in which an entity's cultural security can be shaped, challenged, disputed, or suppressed. State cultural security and the cultural security of PRC nationals may not only be inconsistent with one another but even exist in inverse proportion. The illustrated state stability dimension of Xi-era cultural securitization is a departure from the concept of the "diverse unity" (*duoyuan yiti*) model toward the idea of a homogenized Chinese nation consisting of acculturated, assimilated subjects. The fact that the CCP's monopoly on power is dependent on the suppression of autonomous expressions of the cultural identity of various nationalities and other groups shows that the negative impact of the CCP's cultural securitization on the cultural security of the PRC's constituent nationalities and other communities is a lasting characteristic of modern Chinese politics. The recent developments at the dawn of Xi Jinping's third functional period, such as the impending promulgation of the Law on Patriotic Education mandating state institutions to disseminate the CCP's version of culture (China Law Translate 2023) or Xi's August 2023 vow to continue the ongoing acculturation of minority nationalities and "cultural embellishment" (*wenhua runjiang*) in at least some non-Han regions (Central government of the PRC 2023), indicate the possible direction the CCP intends to take in handling the nationality question. Moreover, the Global Civilization Initiative announced in 2023 indicates the CCP's intent to shape global cultural values (*Global Times* 2023).

The book also addresses the impact of international developments on cultural securitization by the state and the cultural security of China's ethnic communities. The contributions by Hacer Gonul and Julius Rogenhofer and by Gabriel Thorne, for example, highlight the negative impact of state cultural security on the PRC's foreign relations due to criticisms of the deteriorating status of Uyghurs, Hui, and Hongkongers. Jarmila Ptáčková's chapter illustrates the loss of reputation, resources, and diplomatic assets incurred by the policy shift toward de-Saudization and de-Arabization in Ningxia. Additionally, Hacer Gonul and Julius Rogenhofer show how the Global War on Terrorism contributed to the CCP's policy towards Uyghurs and Hui. Chapters by Mei-hua Lan, Gabriel Thorne, and Bian Simei reference globalization and commercialization as trends substantially impacting the cultural security of the populations of the PRC and Mongolia. The interaction

of politics and global commercialized sports in forming cultural security is illustrated by Gabriel Thorne.

A culturally and ethnically heterogeneous society can be bound together as a nation by a voluntary loyalty to state authority. Such loyalty, however, can only develop when cultural identity on a personal level is secured. In contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, when the party-state allowed for a degree of cultural inclusion of minority nationalities through economic development, the Xi leadership has disregarded the cultural security of minority nationalities and other constituencies as an important or even essential factor for a stable social development of the entire state. Recurring ethnocultural issues in China show that a lack of effective cultural policy supporting the cultural specifics of China's population on the local level, or rather the frequent efforts of the PRC authorities to eliminate these distinctive features, are a major obstacle for contemporary China to become culturally secure. This book thus highlights that cultural security is conditioned by a consensus among all involved actors and communities.

References

Al-Sudairi, Mohammed. 2019. "Fighting the Many Smoke-less Wars: A Comparative Study of the Origins, Conceptualizations and Practices of Cultural Security in China and Saudi Arabia." PhD diss., the University of Hong Kong.

Anderson, Benedict. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso.

Anonymous. 2020. "You Shall Sing and Dance: Contested 'Safeguarding' of Uyghur Intangible Cultural Heritage." *Asian Ethnicity* 22: 121–39.

Antonnen, Pertti. 2005. *Tradition through Modernity.* Helsinki: SKS.

Atwood, Christopher. 2020. "Bilingual Education in Inner Mongolia: An Explainer." *Made in China Journal*, August 3. https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/08/30/bilingual-education-in-inner mongolia-an-explainer/.

Baioud, Gegentuul, and Cholmon Khuanuud. 2023. "Yearning for a Homogeneous Chinese Nation: Digital Propaganda Campaigns after the 2020 Protest in Inner Mongolia." *Central Asian Survey* 42(2): 319–40.

Barth, Fredrik. 1969. "Introduction." In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, edited by Fredrik Barth, 9–38. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Bovingdon, Gardner. 2010. *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "'We Are All Part of the Same Family': China's Ethnic Propaganda." *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 41(4): 159–81.

Bulag, Uradyn. 2004. "Inner Mongolia. The Dialects of Colonization and Ethnicity Building." In *Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers*, edited by Morris Rossabi, 84–116. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Bulag, Uradyn. 2019. "Nationality." In *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*, edited by Christian Sorace, Ivan Franceschini, and Nicholas Loubere, 149–54. Canberra: Australian National University Press and Verso Books.

Carbonneau, Jean-Rémi, Andreas Gruschke, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller. 2021. "A Multidisciplinary Approach to Cultural Security." In *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*, edited by Jean-Rémi Carbonneau, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, 35–58. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Carbonneau, Jean-Rémi, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, eds. 2021. *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Carrico, Kevin. 2017. "Eliminating Spiritual Pollution: A Genealogy of Closed Political Thought in China's Era of Opening." *The China Journal* 17: 100–119.

Central government of the PRC. 2015. "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia anquanfa" [The PRC state security law], July 1. https://web.archive.org/save/http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-07/01/content_2893902.htm.

Central government of the PRC. 2021. "Xinjiang geminzu pingdeng quanlide baozhang" [Protecting the equality and rights of all nationalities in Xinjiang], July 14. https://web.archive.org/web/20230905215811/https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-07/14/content_5624800.htm.

Central government of the PRC. 2023. "Xi Jinping zai tingqu Xinjiang Weiwuer zizhiqu dangwei he zhengfu, Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan gongzuo huibaoshi qiangdiao: laolao bawo Xinjiang zai guojia quanjuzhongde zhanlüe dingwei, zai Zhongguoshi xiandaihua jinchengzhong genghao jianshe meili Xinjiang" [When hearing the work report of the party committee and government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Xi Jinping emphasized: let us firmly grasp the strategic positioning of Xinjiang in the state's overall situation and better build a beautiful Xinjiang in the process of Chinese-style modernization], August 26. https://web.archive.org/web/20230905211810/https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202308/content_6900328.htm.

Clark, Hugh R. 2018. "What's the Matter with 'China'? A Critique of Teleological History." *The Journal of Asia Studies* 77(2): 295–314.

ChinaFile. 2013. "Document 9: A *ChinaFile* Translation. How Much Is a Hardline Party Directive Shaping China's Current Political Climate?", November 8. https://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.

China Law Translate. 2023. "PRC Patriotic Education Law," June 29. https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/patriotic-education-draft/.

Edney, Kingsley. 2015. "Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China." *Politics* 35(3–4): 259–72.

Elliott, Mark. 2015. "The Case of the Missing Indigene: Debate Over a 'Second-Generation' Ethnic Policy." *The China Journal* 73: 186–213.

Elbegdorj Tsalhiagiin. 2020. "Regarding the Mongolian Language and Script." Twitter, September 24. https://web.archive.org/web/20230906081243/https://twitter.com/elbegdorj/status/1309466615335927809.

Flüchter, Antje, and Jivanta Schöttli. 2015. "Introduction." In *The Dynamics of Transculturality*, edited by Antje Flüchter and Jivanta Schöttli, 1–26. London: Springer.

Fokkema, Douwe. 1991. "Creativity and Politics." In *Cambridge History of China, Vol. 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982*, edited by Roderick MacFarquhar and Jahn K. Fairbank, 594–615. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gillette, Maris. 2008. "Violence, the State, and Chinese Muslim Ritual Remembrance." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67(3): 1011–37.

Goode, Paul, and David Stroup. 2015. "Everyday Nationalism." *Social Science Quarterly* 96(3): 717–39.

Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Grunfeld, Tom. 2021. "Cultural Security in Tibet and the Example of Quebec." In *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*, edited by Jean-Rémi Carbonneau, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, 233–48. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Gruschke, Andreas. 2021. "Cultural Security and Economic Development in China's West." In *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*, edited by Jean-Rémi Carbonneau, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, 249–81. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Hage, Ghassan. 1998. *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*. New York: Routledge.

Harrell, Stevan. 2001. *Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Hung, Chang-tai. 1994. *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937—1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Johnson, Matthew. 2017. "Securitizing Culture in Post-Deng China: An Evolving National Strategic Paradigm, 1994–2014." *Propaganda in the World and Local Conflicts* 4: 62–80.

Johnson, Matthew. 2020. "Safeguarding Socialism: The Origins, Evolution and Expansion of China's Total Security Paradigm." *Sinopsis*, June 11. https://sinopsis.cz/en/johnson-safeguarding-socialism/.

Johnson, Matthew. 2021. "Propaganda and Security from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping." In *Redefining Propaganda in Modern China: The Mao Era and Its Legacies*, edited by James Farley and Matthew D. Johnson, 241–65. Oxon: Routledge.

Joniak-Lüthi, Agnieszka. 2017. *The Han: China's Diverse Majority*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Kang, Xiaofei, and Donald Sutton. 2016. *Contesting the Yellow Dragon*. Leiden: Brill.

Klieger, Christiaan. 2002. "Introduction." In *Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora*, edited by Christiaan Klieger, 1–9. Leiden: Brill.

Klimeš, Ondřej. 2017. "China's Cultural Soft Power: The Central Concept in the Early Xi Jinping Era (2012–2017)." *Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Philologica 4, Orientalia Pragensia*: 127–50.

Klimeš, Ondřej. 2018. "Advancing 'Ethnic Unity' and 'De-Extremization': Ideational Governance in Xinjiang under 'New Circumstances' (2012–2017)." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 23(3): 413–26.

Klimeš, Ondřej. 2020a. "Xinjiang in China's Public Diplomacy in Central Asia: Case Study of Almaty." In *Transnational Sites of China's Cultural Diplomacy: Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Middle East, and Europe Compared*, edited by Jarmila Ptáčková, Ondřej Klimeš, and Gary Rawnsley, 35–63. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Klimeš, Ondřej. 2020b. "China's Xinjiang Propaganda and United Front Work in Turkey: Actors and Content." *Monde Chinois – Nouvelle Asie* 63: 44–71.

Kolås, Ashild, and Monika Thowsen. 2005. *On the Margins of Tibet*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Kolboom, Ingo. 2021. "Some Reflections on the Issue of Minorities." In *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*, edited by Jean-Rémi Carbonneau, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, 19–33. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Leibold, James. 2013. *Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?* Honolulu: East-West Center.

Leibold, James. 2016. "Interethnic Conflict in the PRC: Xinjiang and Tibet as Exceptions?" In *Ethnic Conflict and Protest in Tibet and Xinjiang: Unrest in China's West*, edited by Ben Hillman and Gray Tuttle, 223–50. New York: Columbia University Press.

Leung, Beatrice. 2005. "China's Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity." *The China Quarterly* 184: 894–913.

Lynch, Daniel. 2013. "Securitizing Culture in Chinese Foreign Policy Debates: Implications for Interpreting China's Rise." *Asian Survey* 53(4): 629–52.

Mao Zedong. 2005. "On New Democracy." In *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912–1949. Vol. VII: New Democracy, 1939–1941*, edited by Stuart R. Schram, 330–69. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Martin, Miguel. 2018. "Global Religion and the United Front: The Case of Mongolia." *Jamestown China Brief* 18(12): 10–14.

Martin, Terry. 2001. *Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–39*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mullaney, Thomas. 2010. *Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mullaney, Thomas. 2012. "Critical Han Studies." In *Critical Han Studies*, edited by Thomas Mullaney, James Leibold, Stephane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, 1–22. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mullaney, Thomas, James Leibold, Stephane Gros, and Eric Vanden Bussche, eds. 2012. *Critical Han Studies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

National People's Congress. 2018. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fankongbuzhuyifa* [The PRC counter-terrorism law], June 12. http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2018-06/12/content_2055871.htm.

Perry, Elizabeth J. 2013. *Cultural Governance in Contemporary China: "Re-Orienting" Party Propaganda.* Harvard-Yenching Institute Working Paper Series. Harvard University, May 17. http://www.harvard-yenching.org/features/hyi-working-paper-series-elizabeth-perry.

People's Daily. 2013. "Keguan renshi dangdai Zhongguo yu waibu shijie" [Let us gain objective knowledge of contemporary China and the outside world], August 30.

Ptáčková, Jarmila. 2019. "Traditionalization as a Response to State-Induced Development in Rural Tibetan Areas of Qinghai, PRC." *Central Asian Survey* 38(3): 417–31.

Ptáčková, Jarmila. 2021. "Where the 'Chinese' are Herding Yaks." In *Crossing Boundaries*, edited by Diana Lange, Jarmila Ptáčková, Marion Wettstein, and Mareike Wulff, 574–82. Praha: Academia.

Reuters. 2016. "Mongolia Says Dalai Lama Won't Be Invited Again," December 22. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mongolia-china-idUSKBN14B0N5.

Safeguard Defenders. 2023. "Chinese Police Kidnaps Writer in Mongolia," June 12. https://safeguarddefenders.com/en/blog/chinese-police-kidnaps-writer-mongolia.

Schneider, Julia C. 2017. *Nation and Ethnicity: Chinese Discourses on History, Historiography, and Nationalism (1900s–1920s)*. Leiden: Brill.

Skey, Michael. 2010. "'A Sense of Where You Belong in the World': National Belonging, Ontological Security and the Status of the Ethnic Majority in England." *Nations and Nationalism* 16(4): 715–33.

Smith Finley, Joanne. 2020. "Why Scholars and Activists Increasingly Fear a Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang." *Journal of Genocide Research* 23(3): 348–70.

Stalin, Joseph V. 1953. *Works. Vol. 2: 1907–1913.* Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Sterbling, Anton. 2021. "The Importance of Cultural Institutions for Romanian Germans." In *Dimensions of Cultural Security for National and Linguistic Minorities*, edited by Jean-Rémi Carboneau, Fabian Jacobs, and Ines Keller, 79–95. Bruxelles: Peter Lang.

Teiwes, Frederick C. 1993. *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950–1965.* Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Tibet Autonomous Region Government. 2021. "Jiaqiang minzu tuanjie, tongxin gongzhu mengxiang" [Strengthen ethnic unity, build a dream together], August 27. https://archive.ph/RCt6K#selection-169.25-169.38.

Tobin, David. 2015. "Worrying about Ethnicity: A New Generation of China Dreams?" In *China's Many Dreams*, edited by David Kerr, 65–93. The Nottingham China Policy Institute Series. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tobin, David. 2020. "A 'Struggle of Life and Death': Han and Uyghur Insecurities on China's North-West Frontier." *The China Quarterly* 242: 301–23.

Tobin, David. 2021. "Genocidal Processes: Social Death in Xinjiang." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45(16): 93–121.

Townsend, James. 1992. "Chinese Nationalism." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 27: 97–130.

Vatikiotis, Michael. 2017. *Blood and Silk*. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson.

Xi, Jinping. 2014. "Jianshe shehuizhuyi wenhua qiangguo, zhuoli tigao guojia wenhua ruanshili" [Let us build a socialist cultural power, let us focus on raising state cultural soft power]. *People's Daily*, January 1.

Xinhua. 2014. "Xi Jinping: Jianchi zongti guojia anquanguan, zou zhongguo tese guojia anquan daolu" [Xi Jinping: let us maintain a comprehensive state security outlook, let us follow the road to security with Chinese characteristics], April 15. https://web.archive.org/web/20220126001157/http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2014-04/15/c_1110253910.htm.

Xinhua. 2021. "Xi Jinping canjia Nei Menggu daibiaotuan shenyi" [Xi Jinping attends the deliberation of the Inner Mongolia delegation], March 5. https://archive.ph/LUUkv.

Xinhua. 2022. "Xi Jinping zai canjia Nei Menggu daibiaotuan shenyi shi qiangdiao: buduan gonggu Zhonghua minzu gongtongti sixiang jichu, gongtong jianshe weida zuguo gongtong chuangzao meihao shenghuo" [Xi Jinping at his attending the deliberation of the Inner Mongolia delegation emphasizes: let us unceasingly consolidate the ideational basis of the Chinese national community, let us

jointly build the great fatherland and jointly create good life], March 5. https://archive.ph/ygc63.

Yeh, Emily. 2002. "Will the Real Tibetan Please Stand Up!" In *Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora*, edited by Christiaan P. Klieger, 229–54. Leiden: Brill.

Xu, Liuliu, Qian Li, and Yuwei Hu. 2023. "The Global Civilization Initiative Full of Chinese Wisdom, Injects Fresh Momentum into Bright Shared Future: The Way of Civilization." *Global Times*, April 17. https://web.archive.org/web/20230920164147/https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1289306.shtml.

Zenz, Adrian. 2013. *'Tibetanness' under Threat? Neo-Integrationism, Minority Education and Career Strategies in Qinghai, P.R. China*. Leiden and Boston: Global Oriental.

Zenz, Adrian. 2019. "'Thoroughly Reforming Them towards a Healthy Heart Attitude': China's Political Re-education Campaign in Xinjiang." *Central Asian Survey* 381: 102–28.

About the Authors

Jarmila Ptáčková graduated from and earned her PhD at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, specializing in Chinese and Tibetan Studies. Her research focuses mainly on Chinese development policy and subsequent social and economic changes in China's Tibetan areas, on China's ethnic policy, and on the role of China's minorities in the PRC's cultural diplomacy. Currently, she is affiliated with the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences in Prague.
Email: ptackova@orient.cas.cz

Ondřej Klimeš is Research Fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences. His expertise is in modern and contemporary Xinjiang and China politics with focus on ethnic policy, political system, ideology and propaganda, and the Uyghur national movement.
Email: klimes@orient.cas.cz