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4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible. A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947

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Sino-American Relations
This chapter is in the book Sino-American Relations
4Lost Opportunity or Mission ImpossibleA Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947Zh i gu o Ya n gAbstractAs Truman’s representative, George Marshall mediated the CCP-GMD conf licts in China between 1945 and 1947. A cornerstone of Truman’s China policy, the Marshall Mission has been studied by American scholars in the context of the emerging Cold War. Investigating it from a dif ferent angle and perspective, however, Chinese historians in both mainland China and Taiwan are more focused on its impact on the CCP-GMD power balance and the outcome of the Chinese civil war. A historiographical overview of their interpretations and analysis, this chapter discusses the most recent Chinese scholarship on the Marshall Mission and argues that the theoretical framework and research agendas of the Chinese scholars remain fundamentally China-centred or Taiwan-centred even after the Cold War.Keywords: Patrick Hurley, Truman’s China Policy, the Marshall Mission, Jiang Jieshi, Mao Zedong, ManchuriaWhen Henry Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States on April 12, 1945, he inherited from the FDR administration a China policy the purpose of which his Secretary of State James Byrnes def ined as to build ‘a strong, united, and democratic China’ (May 1974, 10). However, when Truman passed the presidency to Dwight Eisenhower on January 20, 1953, not only did China remain divided between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, but the United States had done its share in perpetuating such a division by f ighting the Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch04
© 2022 Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam

4Lost Opportunity or Mission ImpossibleA Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947Zh i gu o Ya n gAbstractAs Truman’s representative, George Marshall mediated the CCP-GMD conf licts in China between 1945 and 1947. A cornerstone of Truman’s China policy, the Marshall Mission has been studied by American scholars in the context of the emerging Cold War. Investigating it from a dif ferent angle and perspective, however, Chinese historians in both mainland China and Taiwan are more focused on its impact on the CCP-GMD power balance and the outcome of the Chinese civil war. A historiographical overview of their interpretations and analysis, this chapter discusses the most recent Chinese scholarship on the Marshall Mission and argues that the theoretical framework and research agendas of the Chinese scholars remain fundamentally China-centred or Taiwan-centred even after the Cold War.Keywords: Patrick Hurley, Truman’s China Policy, the Marshall Mission, Jiang Jieshi, Mao Zedong, ManchuriaWhen Henry Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States on April 12, 1945, he inherited from the FDR administration a China policy the purpose of which his Secretary of State James Byrnes def ined as to build ‘a strong, united, and democratic China’ (May 1974, 10). However, when Truman passed the presidency to Dwight Eisenhower on January 20, 1953, not only did China remain divided between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, but the United States had done its share in perpetuating such a division by f ighting the Li, X. and Fang, Q. (eds.), Sino-American Relations. A New Cold War. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2022doi: 10.5117/9789463726368_ch04
© 2022 Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter 1
  2. Table of Contents 7
  3. Note on Transliteration 9
  4. Abbreviations 11
  5. Acknowledgments 13
  6. Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad 15
  7. Part One. Background and Lost Voices
  8. 1 From Admirer to Critic. Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States 31
  9. 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience 55
  10. 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy. US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945 81
  11. Part Two. Did America Lose China?
  12. 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible. A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947 113
  13. 5 Negotiating from Strength. US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953 135
  14. 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises 185
  15. Part Three. Rapprochement and Opportunities
  16. 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation 215
  17. 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991 241
  18. 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States. Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge 261
  19. Part Four. Did China Lose America?
  20. 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy. Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America 293
  21. 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations 319
  22. Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II? 345
  23. Index 359
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048554775-008

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter 1
  2. Table of Contents 7
  3. Note on Transliteration 9
  4. Abbreviations 11
  5. Acknowledgments 13
  6. Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad 15
  7. Part One. Background and Lost Voices
  8. 1 From Admirer to Critic. Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States 31
  9. 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience 55
  10. 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy. US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945 81
  11. Part Two. Did America Lose China?
  12. 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible. A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947 113
  13. 5 Negotiating from Strength. US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953 135
  14. 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises 185
  15. Part Three. Rapprochement and Opportunities
  16. 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation 215
  17. 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991 241
  18. 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States. Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge 261
  19. Part Four. Did China Lose America?
  20. 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy. Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America 293
  21. 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations 319
  22. Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II? 345
  23. Index 359
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