10 'One Community, Many Faces'

Non-sectarian Social Movements and Peace-building in Northern Ireland and Lebanon

John Nagle

Introduction

Deeply divided societies are those places where ethnicity contains 'permeative propensities' (Horowitz 2000: 7-8) in which virtually all political and social issues align on the dominant ethnonational rather than the socio-economic cleavage. Social movements here play a key role in advancing sectarian interests, fomenting inter-communal antagonism, and even spawning collective violence. Some movements may take to the streets to defend their cultural capital, while others emerge to petition for various group-based rights, or to press for an enlarged share of public goods to be distributed among co-ethnics. In such societies, it is often assumed that there is little space for alternative modes of politics that cross-cut ethnic cleavages. In such discussions, non-sectarian movements are either invisible or rendered as actors that are marginalized, co-opted, stripped of agency, and disempowered. Yet – as this chapter will highlight – non-sectarian social movements in divided societies, like Northern Ireland and Lebanon, represent important forms of mobilization that can even foment policy and social transformation. Such movements include lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) groups, environmentalists, trade unionists, housing tenants, the global justice movement, feminists, anti-racists, and peace mobilizations.

In this chapter, I explore the complex forms of mobilization engendered by non-sectarian social movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. I ask how these movements contribute to peace-building in the aftermath of inter-communal violence, especially in the context of power-sharing institutions that seek to recognize and accommodate divergent ethnic and ethnonational identities. Such institutional frameworks are critiqued as they supposedly 'close down the space for other ways of being, other ways of being political, other forms of political conflict' (Finlay 2011: 10). Instead of this narrow view, non-sectarian social movements, I argue, force us to question the supposedly isomorphic relationship between ethnicity and conflict in divided societies. Yet, through examining social

movements, we apprehend the multiple ways in which ethnicity and ethnic groupness is constructed to allow for violent conflict to materialize and how it may be transcended to facilitate peace. Towards this, I note two different types of non-sectarian social movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon that aim to create change in different ways – transformationist and pluralist movements. While transformationist movements seek to strive to completely transform identities by undermining what they view as a sectarian form of politics that exacerbates ethnic cleavages in divided societies, pluralists seek to force the divided society to recognize and accommodate a greater range of interests and identities that are permitted by a binary, 'either/or' system that reinforces particularistic and antagonistic ethnic politics.

Non-sectarian movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon can contribute towards political and social change consonant with the goals of sustainable peace-building. Certainly, there are quite obvious ways in which some movements position themselves as fundamental to peace-building. Some movements appoint themselves as guardians of peace in the divided society. They take to the streets, for example, to call for the militants to end violence, or hold vigils during peace negotiations, and then mobilize to gather popular support for a peace agreement (see Smithey, in this volume). However, in this chapter, I argue that many non-sectarian movements can support peace-building in extremely complex ways that are, in themselves, not always classified as traditional forms of conflict management. They engage in activities, for instance, to promote equality for LGBT members, to demand better rights for workers, for greater choice for women over reproductive rights, and for better public services. Yet, in calling for these changes, these social movements challenge and unsettle the basic grammar and structure that supports violent separation and the articulation of narrow ethnic interests in the divided society.

Given the strength of ethnic divisions in divided societies, how might non-sectarian social movements provide an alternative? Determining a movement's impact on policymakers requires demonstrating that 'state-related collective goods would not have appeared in the absence of the movement or specific actions taken by it' (Amenta et al. 2010: 300). Given the number of third parties existing between the movement and the state, the 'principal difficulty is how to establish a causal relationship between a series of events that we can reasonably classify as social movement actions and an observed change in society, be it minor or fundamental, durable or temporary' (Giugni 1998: 373).

This issue of causality is notably challenging in relation to movements involved in peace-making activities. Hermann (2009) identifies a number of difficulties with assessing peace movements' achievements and failures in Israel. Such movements were interpreted by politicians and ordinary citizens alike as a threat to the national consensus, and sometimes even to national security. The problem of determining social movement outcomes is, I argue, compounded in violently divided societies. Research has demonstrated that the prospects of social movements to influence public policy is bleak when it is closely tied to the national cleavage structure and on which public opinion is very strong (Giugni 2004). The very intensity of ethnic and ethnonational cleavages in divided societies means that practically all issues become points of extreme communal polarization and antagonism. Thus, the mobilization on distributive policies, such as public goods, or over the environment, nuclear weapons, or economic investment, tend to reinforce rather than weaken divisions. Further mitigating the effect of non-sectarian movements is the fact that the state is often weak or highly fractured in divided societies, thus limiting the available political opportunity structure for movements.

If we were to use Gamson's (1990) criteria of 'acceptance' – the capacity of the state to cede to movement requests – then non-sectarian movements in divided societies could claim little evidence of impact. As such, we need to consider different ways to measure the influence of non-sectarian movements. One way to consider this is via Diani's (2000: 391) concept of social movements that create 'intersecting' networks. For Diani, intersecting movements are those that forge relationships which are voluntary, multiple, and overlapping, thereby contributing to the creation of new models of communitarian and organizational action. Such intersecting movements contain relationships that cut across established social and political cleavages. These movements are able to 'draw upon, or generate, new solidarities and group memberships which cut across the boundaries of any specific traditional political cleavage, and thus undermine current forms of encapsulation' (Diani 2000: 399). Diani points to the 'patterns of social relations they generate through the overlapping memberships and personal linkages of their activists, and through the alliances between the different groups which identify with a given cause' (2000: 387). Although Diani is not necessarily writing about divided societies, non-sectarian movements, by providing intersecting networks and advancing issues that transcend established sectarian cleavages, provide powerful alternative forms to narrow ethnic politics in divided societies.

Identity, Consociationalism, and Divided Societies

Northern Ireland and Lebanon are usually categorized as prototypical examples of deeply divided societies (Kerr 2005). These are places in which the main ethnic groups have mobilized into separate political parties and high levels of residential segregation are prevalent as the main groups 'live alongside each other in parallel subsocieties' (Horowitz 2000: 6). In divided societies, it is assumed that 'ethnic divisions are resilient rather than rapidly biodegradable, and that they must be recognized rather than wished away' (McGarry and O'Leary 1995: 338). This conceptualization of ethnicity is broadly coterminous with the prevailing explanation of conflict in Lebanon and Northern Ireland (Kerr 2005). In viewing conflict as the product of competing ethnonational or ethnoreligious identities, specific institutions and forms of governance which aim to manage destructive intergroup conflict have been created. In consequence of this understanding of ethnicity, the objective of conflict management is to accommodate the salient, conflicting groups in structures of governance.

This process of accommodation finds fullest expression in consociational forms of ethnic power-sharing. In assuring ethnic minorities some minimum representation in government and influence over policy, including veto power, consociationalism conforms to 'accomodationist strategies' of conflict regulation. By seeking to equally accommodate dual or multiple identities in the polity, consociationalism stands in contrast to centripetal approaches which seek to forge an all-embracing public identity through integration (McGarry and O'Leary 2009).

Consociational power-sharing provides the fundamental point around which conflict management in Northern Ireland and Lebanon rests. Although Lebanon has a long history of power-sharing, consociationalism was recalibrated and reintroduced in 1989 as part of efforts to end the civil war which began in 1975 and led to circa 150,000 deaths. The Lebanese civil war is often portrayed as essentially one between Christians (wishing to preserve their control over the state) and Muslims (seeking to challenge Christian hegemony). In reality, the conflict involved a much greater degree of complexity, encompassing a wide range of external actors, political goals, and high levels of intracommunal fracture. Nevertheless, the signing of the Taif Agreement (1989), which returned consociationalism to Lebanon, primarily sought to revise power-sharing in a way that accommodated the shifting balance of power between Christian and Muslim sects. The agreement's ethos – 'no victor, no vanquished' – signified that no group could exercise dominance over the others within a finely tuned institutional

apparatus which managed competing group identities (Haddad 2009). Towards this objective, Lebanese power-sharing created an equitable formula in which positions are distributed equally to Muslims and Christians in governance and throughout the public sphere. As part of maintaining this equilibrium, Lebanon's power-sharing is a classic example of 'corporate consociationalism', a form that assumes 'group identities are fixed, and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded' (McGarry and O'Leary 2007: 675). Group representation is enforced in Lebanon via a quota system which rigidly reserves and allocates executive and legislative positions for the main groups, an arrangement mirrored across the public sector. Until 2009, all citizens had to carry identity cards demarcating ethnic identity in order to apply for public sector jobs.

Consociational power-sharing was introduced to Northern Ireland as part of the Good Friday Agreement (1998). Like the Taif Agreement, the purpose of the consociational agreement was to end violent conflict in the region, which began in 1969, and it also outlined a framework for creating inclusivity in representation between the main groups – nationalists and unionists – as well as institutional roles for the salient external actors, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. In contrast to the corporate structure of the Taif Agreement, Northern Ireland's consociational model is celebrated by its proponents for its 'liberal' characteristics; that is, it 'rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections' (McGarry and O'Leary 2007: 675). Thus, neither seats nor public positions are reserved for the ethnonational groups in advance of elections. In so doing, proponents argue that liberal consociationalism 'is more likely to transform identities in the long run' (McGarry 2001: 124) compared to corporate forms.

While power-sharing is largely recognized as instrumental in ending destructive violence in the two regions, a number of commentators have critiqued both forms of consociationalism for prohibiting a stronger, more enduring peace including intergroup reconciliation. Certainly, one major consequence of the elite level focus of consociationalism in relation to sustainable peace-building is that it typically occludes a range of non-ethnic identity groups that are not institutionally recognized and accommodated. In fact, the de facto process of excluding these identity groups may even have negative consequences for the human rights of individual members. It also fails to include all sectors of society, most especially civil society. Yet, while it is undeniably clear that we need to be careful when crafting institutions to end violent conflict, consociational arrangements may expedite uncertain outcomes some of which are unintended by the architects of these measures. Towards this, this chapter examines the intertwining limitations

and opportunities afforded by power-sharing and the complex forms of engagement created by non-ethnic movements in response. Power-sharing generates various dynamics that can result in either hegemonic compliance, constructive engagement, or active resistance by social movement actors that cross-cut established ethnic cleavages and who even foment policy and social transformation.

Transformationist Movements

Transformationist social movements are those that strive to completely transform sectarian identities and politics in the divided society. Transformationist social movements in Northern Ireland are those that strive to completely change a polity dominated by zero-sum ethnonational politics and encourage 'individual actors to transform their social identities into something other than merely Protestant Unionist or Catholic Nationalist' (Edwards 2007: 139-140). An example of this can be seen in class-based movements, which asks citizens to see their common interests as workers rather than as divided ethnicities. In this way, antagonistic ethnic identities will be superseded by unified class encapsulations. One socialist movement campaigns to 'make the class we belong to more important than the community we come from' (Socialist Environmental Alliance 2005).

The main focus of this type of social movement is annual socialist and trade union May Day march through Belfast city centre. The Belfast May Day parade is relevant to the present discussion due to how the event has been reimagined during the peace process as a form of mobilization that embraces ethnic diversity within the broad unity of a class-based movement. Prior to the peace process, in the late 1960s and 1970s, when sectarian violence was its most intense in the city, the May Day organizers fought to provide an image of working-class unity in distinction to the acrimony promulgated by the divisive narratives of ethnonationalism.

The development of the Northern Irish peace process in the 1990s provided impetus for the trade union movement to reframe its objectives in terms of diversity enshrined in the aims of the international workers movement and peace-building. Trade unionists use the May Day parade to challenge the competitive nationalisms which contribute to the sedimentation of violence and segregation in Northern Ireland. A May Day organizer told me:

> What we have strived to do is to create a safe space for people of all religions and none to come together to mark their relationship as working

> people rather than as Catholics, as Protestants, as atheists, whatever [...] It's a non-sectarian, non-denominational march. (Interview No. 1, 2007)

Another organizer described the annual May Day demonstration thus:

> It's a very good thing coming out and saying: 'My identity does not necessarily come from the religion I was born into or my perceived political baggage or my past or my age or my race or my gender or for that matter my sexuality'. What you do when you take part in that May Day parade is that you are expressing [...] solidarity [...] based upon our class and also our common humanity. I think it is quite important that it happens every year in Belfast. (Interview No. 2, 2007)

The diversity of May Day is further expressed through the range of groups who participate: not only trade unions, but also nationalist and unionist groupings traditionally linked to paramilitary organizations (such as Sinn Féin and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)), the Anti-Racist Network, the Campaign Against Water Privatization, environmentalists, the Anti-War Coalition, the Northern Irish Gay Rights Association (NIGRA), amongst many others. One of the most successful mobilizations in recent years was in 2005 when 6000 people marched to protest against rising levels of racism and to proclaim solidarity with the city's migrant groupings. The 2003 May Day celebration was described as 'rejecting sectarianism and celebrating diversity in Northern Ireland. Today's parade is seen as one of the few marches in Northern Ireland which has been designed to embrace participation from people of different backgrounds' (Belfast Telegraph 2003). Lebanese transformationists are more direct in seeking to end state-sanctioned sectarianism, such as the use of the ethnic quotas to determine political representation and public positions, and the role of religion in governing public life. These movements may deal with specific aspects of political sectarianism or generate broad-based platforms that encompass a range of interconnected campaigns. Issues advanced by movements focus on civil marriage (Laïque Pride), electoral reform (Take Back Parliament), domestic violence, women's reproductive rights (Nasawiya), LGBT rights (Helem, Meem), and even the introduction of a shared history text for Lebanon's school children (AUB Secular Society). Given the intersectionality of issues these movements engage in, it is often the case that the membership of these movements strongly overlaps.

A good example of a Lebanese Transformationist movement is the 'You Stink' mobilization that emerged in 2015. In July 2015, the power-sharing

government, stuck in a fierce political deadlock, was unable to renew the contract for the main refuse company to dispose waste in a landfill. As a result, more than 20,000 tonnes of rubbish amassed uncollected in Beirut's streets. In response, a newly formed protest movement – 'You Stink' – gathered tens of thousands of protestors in Beirut city centre to demand the government's resignation for allowing sectarian differences to supersede the public's environmental and health needs. Many protestors – reported as 'people from across the sectarian and political spectrum' (Al Jazeera 2015) – carried placards and symbolic refuse bags and wore paper masks to cover the stench of the trash and what they viewed as the decaying political class.

For You Stink's activists, the incapacity of the state to deliver key public goods is an outcome of the power-sharing system that incentivizes corruption and sectarian conflict. A leading activist explained that the sectarian elites 'are using the confessional system for their corruption, so it is a vicious circle and you have to find a way to stop it' (Interview No. 5, 2016). The You Stink protests, which attracted up to 100,000 participants in Beirut city centre, exposed the level of opposition to how power-sharing has been deployed to legitimate corruption and to diminish the public sector. A You Stink leader argued that the movement represented 'the silent majority that is disenfranchised, but they are not powerless' (Interview No. 6, 2016). In mobilizing these people, You Stink articulated a powerful alternative politics to the sectarianism reproduced by political leaders. You Stink, therefore, connect to 'cognitive liberation': the process through which activists encourage individuals to formalize shared understandings of their situation as one of oppression and marginalization so that they achieve groupness (McAdam 1982). While sectarian politics has typically operated by reproducing ethnic antagonism, You Stink's encourages cross-cleavage alliances and a political sensibility that fosters civic interests. A leader explained:

> People are angry in Lebanon and what the politicians do is that they turn this anger towards the sectarian 'other'. What we try to do is redirect the anger at the actual culprits. For once we realise that our economic and our day-to-day anger shouldn't be directed at one another. It should be directed at the people in power and for us to make them accountable. As long as we keep redirecting the anger, this might get the people to forget about their confessional background and go towards the higher goal: a better country for us all [...] There is no such thing as sectarian segregation unless it's in the mind of our politicians. (Interview No. 6, 2016)

Rejecting the status of marginalized and disempowered actors that are unable to affect social and policy change in the context of a monolithic sectarian structure, You Stink activists see the protests as fomenting significant opposition to a form of political sectarianism that incentivizes ethnic antagonism, corruption, and dysfunctional political institutions. For a You Stink leader, an important achievement of the movement is to break the 'godlike' stature of the ethnic elites:

> They have been treated as gods for the past thirty years [...] They are supposed to be held accountable when they fail and they have failed us miserably. We are killing off their godlike aspect and bringing them down to the ground and when you have them on the ground, you will beat them up. (Interview No. 6, 2016)

Pluralist Movements

Pluralists are typically cross-cleavage groups who feel that their identities have traditionally been rendered mute or even anomalous in a divided society characterized by ethnonational/ethnoreligious conflict and either/or approaches to social identity. Their job is to make wider society more appreciative of 'difference', especially in regards to issues concerning gender and ethnicity. If divided societies are characterized by intolerance, the purpose of pluralists is to be heterogeneous so that society, in time, will become more open to the presence of multiple identities. Examples of pluralist social movements in Northern Ireland include LGBT, feminist, and anti-racist mobilizations.

The LGBT rights movement in Northern Ireland emerged in response to Victorian legislation that criminalized homosexuality. Northern Ireland's first LGBT organization – the Gay Liberation Society (GLS) – began in 1971 to demand homosexual law reform. In 1974, members of GLS formed the Campaign for Homosexual Law Reform (CHLR), which was then followed by the Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association (NIGRA), a broad-based social movement designed to promote equality for the region's LGBT population (Nagle and Clancy 2010). The rise of the Northern Irish LGBT movement coincided with the intensification of violent conflict over national self-determination in the early 1970s. Political resistance to homosexual law reform came from the Rev. Ian Paisley, a unionist MP, who collected nearly 70,000 signatures as he led a petition to 'Save Ulster from Sodomy'. The campaign for law reform, led by LGBT activists, finally succeeded in 1981

when the European Court of Human Rights declared that criminalization represented a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Despite law reform, sexual minorities represented a marginalized community with little recognition within wider policy debates in Northern Ireland. Decriminalization did not represent a mandate for equality but a mere act of toleration. Whereas equality belies approval and acceptance, tolerance is a tacit form of disapproval and tolerance has limits. In response, LGBT activism started to mobilize in public spaces, especially an annual 'Belfast Pride' event, which began in 1991 with a short parade containing 50 participants singing 'gay rights anthems' (Nagle and Clancy 2010: 122). In the 1990s, Belfast Pride become a broader-based movement characterized by interleaved alliances seeking to pluralize a society defined by ethnonational division (Nagle 2013). Pride increasingly focused on a number of interrelated issues: achieving equality in all spheres of social life; increased visibility in public policy; and promoting diversity to foster mutual tolerance between all groups in society. Pride positioned the LGBT movement as a model of peaceful coexistence between groups.

The development of the Northern Irish peace process in the early 1990s created the broader context for the LGBT movement to articulate an agenda for minority rights. At this point, increasing – albeit incomplete – consensus was that the conflict in Northern Ireland was essentially one anchored in identity: two ethnonational groups with clashing national self-determination aspirations. The peace process, consequently, centred on the discourse of 'parity of esteem' for ethnic identities. Within this framework, the LGBT movement situated itself as a peace process actor. Evidence of this can be seen in the official theme of the 1995 Pride celebration: 'Time for Peace, Time for Pride'. At the same time, NIGRA (1995: 1) declared its mission statement as 'Let Us Unite in Diversity': 'It is our object to found an organization not merely to protect the interests of minorities in Northern Ireland but to argue the fact that in diversity is genuine strength'. In subsequent years, organizers of Pride, both in the lead up and after the signing of the peace agreement, framed the event as a celebration of all forms of diversity to counter ethnonational polarization. Such emphasis on alliances and relationships is apparent in the theme given annually to Belfast Pride: 'Unity Through Diversity' (1998); 'One Community, Many Faces' (2001); 'Let's Respect Diversity' (2003).

The experience of Lebanon's sexual minority population is formed by Article 534, which criminalizes non-heterosexuality by carrying a maximum one-year prison sentence. Article 534's impact ranged from

'discrimination in employment and arbitrary dismissal, to limited access to housing, health, and social services, to political and financial extortion' (Makarem 2011a: 100). A 2015 report noted that sexual minorities 'are still periodically arrested, detained, and tortured by Lebanese security forces, while incidents of societal and family-based discrimination have not abated' (Nasr and Zeidan 2015: 7).

Since Article 534 discouraged individuals from publically identifying as gay, it has been argued that that sexual minorities rarely 'express any particular group solidarity [...] based on a perceived common sexuality or one informed by a mutually embraced political cause' (Merabet 2014: 112-113). An LGBT activist explained to me: 'It is very difficult for me to conceive of a LGBT community in Lebanon much less a LGBT movement' (Interview No. 4, 2015). In other words, while there are many individual gay men and women in Lebanon, they have yet to identify themselves as part of a collectivity with unified political goals. The task of Helem, therefore, was to generate 'cognitive liberation' (McAdam 1982): the process through which activists encourage individuals to formalize shared understandings of their situation as one of oppression and marginalization so that they achieve groupness.

Despite unpropitious conditions for activism, LGBT social movements emerged. In Lebanon, most notably Helem, identified as the first gay rights movement in the Middle East and North Africa. Helem developed in 2002 out of a network of lesbians and gay men that socialized together and in 2004 became a public movement by forming an NGO to advocate on behalf of Lebanon's sexual minorities. Helem's strategic options were initially constrained by the law on criminalization, which deprived the organization from gaining official recognition as an NGO. In 2005, leading members were subsequently detained and interrogated by the security forces.

The emerging LGBT social movement in Lebanon interlinks its campaign against homophobia with the wider fight to oppose the political sectarianism of power-sharing. In interviews with Lebanese LGBT members, Naber and Zaatari (2014: 100) note how these informants view 'Lebanon's sectarian structure [...] as a key site of struggle not only because it is divisive [...] but also because it is patriarchal and requires compulsory heterosexuality'. An LGBT activist explained to me that the power-sharing 'system has always been opposed to us [sexual minorities]'. In turn, LGBT activists argue that their task is 'fighting to end confessionalism of the political system' (Makarem 2011a). A lesbian social movement called Meem (M. 2010: 15) is 'resisting sectarianism' since 'the biggest challenge to any form of social

justice in Lebanon is the sectarian makeup of its society'. Thus, rather than mobilize for rights within the system, Lebanese consociationalism disavows the opportunities for sexual minorities to claim incremental reform. Meem argues:

> [H]ow does one advocate for gay rights in Lebanon? Suppose the government did want to expand gay rights, how would they even do that? Any effort to reform laws and practices towards expansion of gay rights would have to negotiate independently with each religious community because [...] any major political development in Lebanon requires the support of all the various sects. (M. 2010: 17)

Radical opposition to power-sharing embodies the protest politics of a body of LGBT activists. Some activists view 'Lebanon's sectarian structure [...] as a key site of struggle not only because it is divisive [...] but also because it is patriarchal and requires compulsory heterosexuality' (Naber and Zaatari 2014: 100). This opposition to power-sharing is evident in the statements of movement activists. For one former Helem leader, a fundamental objective of the LGBT movement is 'fighting to end confessionalism of the political system' (Makarem 2011b). A lesbian movement identified one of its major goals as 'resisting sectarianism', since 'the biggest challenge to any form of social justice in Lebanon is the sectarian makeup of its society' (M. 2010: 15). LGBT activists also align themselves with non-sectarian movements that call for political 'deconfessionalism', the abolition of power-sharing. Thus, Helem's development as an 'anti-imperialist movement led to the adoption of an anti-sectarian, anti-racist, and anti-xenophobic position' (Makarem 2011a: 105).

In identifying power-sharing as censoring non-heterosexuality, radical Lebanese activists oppose it. LGBT resistance, therefore, is articulated through rejecting a sectarian identity (Naber and Zaatari 2014: 103). Such politics, as Seidman notes (2012: 22), is a 'resistance to identity-based models of self and politics [...] in a nation in which kin and sect impose enveloping and inflexible identities on all individuals'. One lesbian movement's (M. 2010: 9) 'very existence as a diverse [...] community – one of the rare few in Lebanon – is in itself a challenge to the sectarianism endemic in Lebanese society and politics'. The movement's non-identitarian resistance to the political sectarianism of power-sharing is further achieved by the relationships of members. To freeze the balance of power between the main groups, Lebanon's power-sharing system forbids marriage between members of different religious sects unless one of the partners converts to the other's

religion. The existence of same-sex relationships that cross sectarian boundaries profoundly disturbs the ethnic mosaic in which individuals are assigned to monolithic and discrete communities. Naber and Zaatari (2014: 101) illuminate, in relation to Lebanon, that 'nonconformist sexuality challenges sectarianism, and there are more same-sex couples that come together across sectarian divides than heterosexual couples'. Yet, while LGBT activists view the movement as a challenge to political sectarianism, they also recognize that, in some ways, it can reproduce sectarian divisions. A Helem activist noted:

> The way that confessional politics works here is amazing, because sometimes it seeps into the LGBT community itself, much less so than the rest of the country [...] You see a lot more bi-sectarian relationships among the community. However, you also notice that there are a lot of LGBT people with a heightened sense of confessional and religious belonging. They go to two churches, the gay bar and the actual church. (Interview No. 3, 2012)

Conclusion

The literature on social movements in ethnic conflict largely focuses on the mobilization of insurgents seeking to challenge state power (Olzak 2006; Gurr 2000; Della Porta 2013). These are groups historically excluded from the polity and which demand forms of national self-determination. Such social movements figure predominantly in the literature associated with the 'politics of collective violence' (Tilly 2003) and/or 'clandestine political violence' (Della Porta 2013). This focus is also evident in social movement research in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, though Northern Ireland merits a caveat in so far as there has been a rich corpus of literature on the inter-communal civil rights movement of the 1960s. Yet, in order to understand how conflict and peace is achieved in such societies, it is necessary to develop a broader analysis to include movements that do not readily fit into the dominant narrative. This mode of analysis is particularly important in relation to the aftermath of peace agreements, such as the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Taif Agreement (1989), since the objective of both agreements is to recognize and even strengthen the power of the main ethnic groups. Such models of conflict regulation are predicated on the assumption of the relative homogeneity of the respective groups. While ethnicity is undoubtedly a salient and widespread form of belonging

and organization in divided societies, the ability of social movements to challenge, overcome, and even provide radical alternatives is extremely important.

Social movements can foster a public sphere of debate in which issues salient to all groups can be deliberated so that shared polices can be forged, and which make ethnonational politicians accommodate identities unconfined to their own narrow constituencies. This public sphere of debate is also essential to conflict resolution by allowing many issues of communal contestation to be aired so they can be potentially resolved through rational debate. Many movements also bring about many important policies that contribute to social change. The LGBT movement in Northern Ireland, for example, has successfully brought about many legislative changes conducive to engendering equality for gay and lesbian people in the region. As such, polices aimed at enhancing equality and the tolerance of diversity can make a significant alteration to the social structure.

At the same time, this chapter illuminates the complex ways in which non-sectarian movements operate in their respective societies relative to different types of power-sharing. In Northern Ireland's relatively liberal power-sharing form few movements purposely mobilize to directly reform or end consociationalism; instead movements – such as those associated with the May Day event – aim to provide alternatives to sectarianism. They are transformative movements in the sense that they desire to transform antagonistic concepts of ethnicity into ones more redolent of shared class encapsulations. In Lebanon, the corporate power-sharing system institutionalizes ethnicity to such an extent that non-sectarian movements – such as secularists – organize to directly transform this system by calling for the end of political sectarianism. A slightly different type of movement explored in the chapter concerns pluralists, groups that attempt to encourage cross-cutting and hybrid identities and interests.

Interviews

No. 1, with a May Day organizer, 2007
No. 2, with another May Day organizer, 2007
No. 3, with a Helem activist, September 2012
No. 4, with an LGBT activist, June 2015
No. 5, with a leading You Stink activist, January 2016
No. 6, with a You Stink leader, January 2016

Works Cited

Al Jazeera. 2015. 'Lebanese Protest against Waste-Disposal Crisis'. *Al Jazeera*, 26 July. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/lebanon-beirut-trash-rubbish-crisis-150725060723178.html.

Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. 'The Political Consequences of Social Movements'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36: 287-307.

Belfast Telegraph. 2003. 'May Day parade set to draw the crowds'. *Belfast Telegraph*, 5 May.

Bourke, K. 2005. 'Gay Community to Stage Annual Parade'. *Irish News*, 6 August.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2013. *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diani, Mario. 2000. 'Simmel to Rokkan and Beyond: Towards a Network Theory of (New) Social Movements'. *European Journal of Social Theory* 3.4: 387-406.

Edwards, Aaron. 2007. 'Democratic Socialism and Sectarianism'. *Politics* 27.1: 24-31.

Finlay, Andrew. 2011. *Governing Ethnic Conflict: Consociation, Identity and the Price of Peace*. Abingdon: Routledge.

Gamson, William A. 1990. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Giugni, Marco. 1998. 'Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 371-393.

Giugni, Marco. 2004. *Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gurr, Tedd. 2000. *Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Haddad, Simon. 2009. 'Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation'. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15.3-4: 398-416.

Hayes, Bernadette C., and John Nagle. 2016. 'Ethnonationalism and Attitudes towards Gay and Lesbian Rights in Northern Ireland'. *Nations and Nationalism* 22.1: 20-41.

Helem. 2015. 'Article 534'. *Helem*, http://www.helem.net/?q=node/22.

Hermann, Tamar. 2009. *The Israeli Peace Movement: A Shattered Dream*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horowitz, Donald. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kerr, Michael. 2005. *Imposing Power-sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.

M., Nadine. 2010. 'Arab Queer Women and Transgenders Confronting Diverse Religious Fundamentalisms: The Case of Meem in Lebanon'. Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID) . https://www.awid.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/feminists_on_the_frontline_-_arab_queer_women_trans.pdf.

Makarem, Ghassan. 2011a. 'The LGBT Struggle in Lebanon', SocialistWorker.org, 2 February. http://socialistworker.org/2011/02/02/lgbt-struggle-in-lebanon.

Makarem, Ghassan. 2011b. 'The Story of Helem'. *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 7.3: 98-112.

McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McGarry, John. 2001. 'Northern Ireland, Civic Nationalism, and the Good Friday Agreement'. In *Northern Ireland and the Divided World*, ed. R. Wilford. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 109-136.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. 1995. *Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images*. London: Wiley-Blackwell.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. 2007. 'Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription'. *International Journal of International Law* 5.4: 670-698.

McGarry, John, and Brendan O'Leary. 2009. 'Power Shared after the Deaths of Thousands'. In *Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict*, ed. R. Taylor. London: Routledge, 15-84.

Meem (2009) *Bareed Mista3jil*. Meem: Beirut.

Melucci, Alberto. 1996. *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Merabet, Sofian. 2014. *Queer Beirut*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Naber, Nadine, and Zeina Zaatari. 2014. 'Reframing the War on Terror: Feminist and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ) Activism in the Context of the 2006 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon'. *Cultural Dynamics*, 26.1: 91-111.

Nagle, John. 2013. '"Unity in Diversity": Non-sectarian Social Movement Challenges to the Politics of Ethnic Antagonism in Violently Divided Cities'. *International Journal for Urban and Regional Research* 37.1: 78-92

Nagle, John, and M.A.C. Clancy. 2010. *Shared Society of Benign Apartheid: Peacebuilding in Divided Societies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Nagle, John, and M.A.C. Clancy. 2012. 'Constructing a Shared Public Identity in Ethnonationally Divided Societies: Comparing Consociational and Transformationist Perspectives'. *Nations and Nationalism* 18.1: 78-97.

Nasr, Nour, and Tarek Zeidan. 2015. '"As Long as They Stay Away": Exploring Lebanese Attitudes towards Sexualities and Gender Identities'. Gender & Sexuality Resource Center. Beirut: Arab Foundation for Freedoms and Equality. http://afemena.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Report-high-resolution.pdf.

NIGRA. 1995. *Let's Unite in Diversity*. Belfast: Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association.

Olzak, Susan. 2006. *The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Seidman, Steven. 2012. 'The Politics of Cosmopolitan Beirut: From the Stranger to the Other'. *Theory Culture Society* 29.2: 3-36.

Socialist Environmental Alliance. 2005. 'Election flyer', Socialist Environmental Alliance.

Tilly, Charles. 2003. The Politics of Contentious Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.