

3 Vacillators or Resisters?

The Unionist Government Responses to the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland

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Introduction

How do authorities respond to social movement tactics, campaigns, and demands? Early research on social movement outcomes typically focused on the characteristics of the challengers (e.g. the size of protests, the number and type of tactics adopted, the goals and ideologies of protest campaigns, etc.) to address this key question. This strand of research aimed to analyse the strategies adopted by authorities to deal with protesters, from symbolic concession and co-optation to resistance and outright repression, by examining mostly movement-centric variables (for an early review of this literature, see Giugni 1998). This relatively static and reactive view of states responses, however, has been recently challenged by various scholars (see Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). A growing wealth of scholarship is now inspecting the strategic interactions between social movements and systems of authority (e.g. Duyvendak and Jasper 2015; for a review, see Bosi and Uba 2016), attempting to unpack the decision-making processes within movements and authorities alike. In *The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change*, Joseph Luders further expanded on how to assess social movement outcomes by focusing on target action motivations. While not the first scholar to note the lack of target-centric theorizing (e.g. Burstein and Linton 2002; Andrews 2004), Luders was the first one to explicitly detail *how* to analyse targets' role. Examining the Civil Rights Movement in the United States in the 1960s, he argued that social movement success could be predicted by estimating target perception of disruption and concession costs (Luders 2010: 1-5). He contended that both movements and third parties, like countermovements and the media, should be examined to determine the perception of costs by movement targets, differentiating between movement demands. Based on these assessments, targets are predicted to act according to one of four ideal typical responses (detailed below).

In this chapter, we apply Luders' model of rational disruption and concession costs to analyse the unionist government responses to the civil rights

movement (CRM) in Northern Ireland. More specifically, we adopt Luders' analytic design and adapt it to the Northern Ireland context to examine the evolution of the Five-Point Plan put forth by Prime Minister Terence O'Neill in November 1968. We estimate disruption and concession costs of the Unionist cabinet relative to two specific civil rights demands (fair access to housing and universal suffrage), to test the empirical validity of the framework. Close readings of historical documents and primary sources unveil the decision-making process of the targets of the CRM in Northern Ireland.

This chapter thus transposes the analytical framework proposed by Luders into the novel setting of Northern Ireland. This case study raises important theoretical and empirical questions: was rational cost evaluation the primary mechanism behind target responses in Northern Ireland? In the context of a society riven by an ethnonational divide, are target decisions still mostly based on a conscious calculation of concession and disruption costs? Does the activation of competing ethnonational identities and claims alter the perceptions of political threats and therefore the ideological/emotional evaluation of concession and disruption costs by various state actors?

Luders' focus on targets agenda, motivations, and rational evaluations represents an innovative way of looking at social movement outcomes. As far as we know, this chapter is the first attempt to inspect the consequences of the CRM in Northern Ireland from this original theoretical perspective. We believe that Luders' framework is very promising in proposing better explanations of social movement outcomes, even though it requires some modifications to broaden its analytical power. In particular, we will argue that emotional and ideological costs need to be recognized and factored in the decision-making processes to provide a fuller account of movement-authorities strategic interactions.

Theoretical Framework

Luders (2006, 2010) contends that target action is motivated not by ideology or emotion, but by a rational assessment of potential disruption and concession costs of different courses of action. *Disruption costs* are those directly caused by a movement: whether stemming directly or indirectly from social movement actions, the movement *causes* these costs. This variable measures the amount of leverage a movement has, or the amount of pressure it can exert on its targets. *Concession costs* are the 'actual or

anticipated losses resulting from acceding to movement demands’ (Luders 2010: 3). The degree of vulnerability of a target is also a key factor to understand its calculation of costs, which explains why identical tactics from the same movement may affect different targets in different ways (Luders 2010: 7). The interactions between disruption and concession costs are summarized in the target classification matrix shown below. This table predicts target response, and therefore movement success, through targets’ perception of costs.

Table 3.1 Predicted Responses to Movement Actions

	Low Concession Costs	High Concession Costs
Low Disruption Costs	Conformers: Target will conform to local customs.	Resisters: Target will offer solid resistance to movement goals.
High Disruption Costs	Accommodators: Target will concede to movement.	Vacillators: Target will oscillate between token concessions, negotiation and repression.

Source: Adapted from Luders 2010: 5

Depending on the targets evaluation of concessions and disruption costs, four different types of responses can be predicted: Conformers, Accommodators, Resisters, and Vacillators. Luders used in-depth qualitative analysis (internal documents, interviews, newspaper articles) to understand what weighs on targets in regard to specific movement demands. He analysed the CRM in the United States to show how different targets – be they political authorities (Luders 2010) or businesses (Luders 2006) – acted upon these costs evaluations in the decision-making process.

In his efforts to maintain target decision-making as rational, Luders, however, underestimates the emotional and ideological contributions to target actions. He aims to illustrate that targets are not monolithic political or economic structures acting only as the system allows, nor are they ‘irrational’ actors responding solely to prejudiced beliefs. While we agree that targets are comprised of a set of rational players, in much the same way as social movements are, to deny the ideological or emotional connections to or against a cause is to limit the theory’s applicability. The introduction of cost-benefit reasoning is necessary for understanding target reactions to movement tactics and, thus, predicting movement success; yet, neglecting the effect of ideological or emotional ties substantially weakens the model’s effectiveness.

Social movement research has abundantly showed the role of emotions (e.g. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009; Flam and King 2007) and ideology (e.g. Oliver and Johnston 2000; Zald 2000) in movement decision-making processes. In fact, emotions 'are a core part of action and decisions, which we analysts ignore at our peril. Actions, whether consciously made as choices or not, come with long lists of potential risks, costs, and benefits. We need to include the emotional risks, costs, and benefits because these help shape actions and choices' (Jasper 2011: 298). While research applies these lenses almost exclusively to social movement actors, in this chapter we propose to examine the *emotional/ideological cost* of actions and decisions to state actors too. Rather than taking away rationality from target decision-making, this additional analytic dimension acknowledges that real-world decisions are not absolute processes, but often the result of an interactive compromise between 'rational' costs evaluations and emotional and ideological beliefs, thus broadening the applicability of Luders' approach.

Methodology

The first step in testing a theory's applicability is a 'most similar' case study research design (Gerring 2007). If the theory works in the new environment, then further stepwise-dissimilar case studies can advance the realm of its empirical validity (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Northern Ireland and the southern United States have been consistently compared within a 'most similar' case research design (see De Fazio 2009, 2012; Rose 1976), due to their being divided along ethnic or racial lines, respectively, making this case study an apt one to assess Luders' theory. Moreover, this case is a good test of the analytical power of this framework, as the Five-Point Plan, the main object of this study, was itself the result of negotiations and concessions between the Stormont and Westminster cabinets. According to this and other perspectives emphasizing agency and strategic interaction, state actors should be analytically treated as 'players', as well as 'arenas' where conflicts and compromises are central features of the decision-making process (Duyvendak and Jasper 2015: 9-11). This study thus further explores the actor-based approach embraced in this volume, as it also tries to contextualize the power dynamics behind state responses to contentious politics.

The guiding methodology for analysis in this project involves process-tracing (Bennett 2010). Process-tracing focuses on the mechanisms of change within a case, herein policy reform. Using a variety of in-depth sources, and temporal sequencing within a clearly defined model like

Luders', process-tracing can successfully assess case variables. Typically, it examines intervening variables to identify a causal mechanism. However, this chapter applies Luders' model to the Northern Ireland case, hence using process-tracing to corroborate Luders' hypothesized causal mechanisms of decision-making and evaluate its strength and limitations (Bennett 2010). A close reading of historical documents, including cabinet documents, internal letters, and concurrent interviews aims to unveil the rational motivation behind targets' decision-making processes and cost estimation, ascertaining the sources of different and countervailing pressures, and how reluctant government officials perceived and acted on them. Furthermore, the documents and interviews demonstrate how it is the *interplay* of concession and disruptions costs, together with the vulnerability of the targets, which will determine what category the target falls into. By considering the interplay of pressure and relief offered to targets, a picture of each decision's price in the *target's* eyes will emerge.

Analysis: The Five-Point Reform Package

As Luders (2010: 7) points out, rather than viewing movements as single-goal monolithic entities, it is important to recognize their separate goals to properly estimate the specific costs perceived by targets for each movement demand. When it emerged in the late summer of 1968, the CRM in Northern Ireland had three main objectives: ending discrimination in employment, equalizing access to public housing for the Irish Catholic minority, and universal suffrage (see Ó Dochartaigh, in this volume). Here, we specifically examine the latter two goals, as they were strictly related. Local voting in Northern Ireland was ratepayer-based, thus unbiased housing allocation was vital to proper representation in government (Campaign for Social Justice 1969: 13).

The Civil Rights Movement Campaign

The civil rights march on 5 October 1968 and the subsequent formation of People's Democracy (PD) were particularly influential in the Five-Point Plan's passage. The 5 October march in Derry is commonly recognized as the key event in the civil rights campaign against the injustices in housing allocation, employment, and enfranchisement (Purdie 1990: 159). Those attending the march included three British Labour and Stormont MPs and an RTÉ television crew. Organized by the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) and supported by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

(NICRA), the march was promised retaliation by the loyalist organization of the Apprentice Boys of Derry (Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 10). This tactic was common for loyalists, as it provided the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force in Northern Ireland, a reasonable prediction of public disruption, violence, and property damage (Farrington 2008: 529). For example, a civil rights march planned on 24 August 1968 was rerouted by the RUC and banned from entrance in most of the city of Dungannon (Sterritt 1968). Though billed as maintaining order,¹ the CRM accused the RUC tactic of banning, or carefully rerouting, their marches as purposefully stifling the civil rights campaign.²

In a move typifying future governmental actions, on 3 October, Minister of Home Affairs William Craig had announced a parade ban in Derry's Waterside area and city centre, utilizing the public disorder threat as a justification. NICRA and DHAC chose to continue as planned, encountering RUC blockades. However, what separated this interaction from a simple reroute were the RUC baton-charging the civil rights marchers, captured by the Irish RTÉ television, leading to international news coverage. The police brutality left several protesters injured, including MPs, and resulted in two days of rioting between the RUC and Derry's Catholic residents (Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 10-11). International news coverage increased pressure on Westminster (see Maney, in this volume), and that escalating pressure factored prominently into the reform package's creation and passage.

Only four days later, the student-organized PD formed in Belfast (Arthur 1974). About 2000 students from Queen's University of Belfast organized a march in response to the recent police brutality. Ian Paisley and his loyalist supporters forced the already-rerouted march away from Shaftesbury Square, but a three-hour sit-in occurred when students met the police behind City Hall, at which point Paisley also moved to City Hall. Most students returned to campus and decided to form PD. This increased peaceful, radical mobilization placed further stress on Stormont, trapped between their loyalist voter bloc and the movement's ever-increasing disruption costs.³ This latter cost would soon intensify, as the CRM proved to be capable to compel Westminster into action.

1 'Public order was kept due to the civil rights march being re-routed, a step taken solely in the interests of law and order [...] Police intervention was based solely on their duty to keep the peace and not in any way on party or sectarian grounds' (PRONI 1968c).

2 Martin Melaugh, <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/chron.htm>.

3 As Ó Dochartaigh noted, the civil rights 'campaign proved impossible to repress or ignore. It exerted pressure on the Unionist government of Northern Ireland [...] The pressure operated on the ground, and also via media coverage, through Westminster and Dublin' (2005: 19).

As a response to the wave of civil rights contention, on 22 November 1968, Prime Minister O'Neill released a Five-Point Plan aiming to improve equality in housing allocation, introduce an ombudsman to deal with complaints, and review the Special Powers Act. The plan contained a very limited voting reform, as it eliminated the company vote, but failed to grant universal suffrage in local elections, one of the most important requests of the CRM. The Five-Point Plan thus sidestepped the issue of full enfranchisement, while allowing Stormont to claim formal support for voter equality. The content of these proposed reforms is also interesting because the release of the plan divided the CRM, emphasizing the ideological and tactical rift between PD and other civil rights organizations. While moderate groups like NICRA responded to the plan by calling a truce, PD planned a controversial march (Purdie 1990: 212-213) that would contribute to radicalizing the political situation in Northern Ireland (De Fazio 2013, 2014; Bosi and Davis, forthcoming).

The Five-Point Plan: Origins and Development

On 13 November 1968, Craig announced a ban on all non-customary marches and parades in Derry for one month. Excluding 'customary' marches protected loyalist parades, thus ensuring recently established CRM marches remained the true target of the ban. A later letter by the RUC's Chief Inspector detailed the meeting between senior RUC officers and government officials, including Craig, to determine the ban's extent. Initially, the Londonderry police officers argued that 'the march [organized by NICRA in Derry to take place on 16 November] should be permitted to proceed along the full route' proposed by the organizers, but Craig responded with letters from loyalist groups warning of retaliation should the march proceed as planned (Kennedy 1968a). This spurred the police to re-route the march. Craig then went on to 'initiate a discussion on the question of a ban of all processions and meetings'. The Chief Inspector reminded Craig that *'it is clear that the police did not advise you to impose a ban or, indeed, to interfere with the marchers at all'* (Kennedy 1968a; emphasis added). The ban on civil rights marches was thus largely inspired by a single cabinet member, Craig, rather than derived organically from the RUC.

In a meeting at 10 Downing Street on 4 November 1968 among several Stormont and Westminster cabinet members, just nine days before the meeting with the senior RUC officials, Craig had expounded on the importance of the Special Powers Act at the time, citing potential IRA involvement in the movement. The meeting was attended by O'Neill and

various Stormont cabinet members, as well as by British Prime Minister Wilson. Meeting minutes report that Craig argued that:

If circumstances were normal most of the various regulations under the Acts could have been put into cold storage, but, unfortunately, some disquieting news about I.R.A. policy had come to light which gave grounds for thinking that a new campaign of violence might be mounted [...] Mr. Craig gave other details of I.R.A. activities in Northern Ireland to illustrate the need for retaining the Special Powers legislation, which he considered indispensable in present circumstances. (PRONI 1968b)

Later, the British Minister of State, Education and Science, Alice Bacon, stressed that:

In Great Britain there was today, thanks to the television coverage of the Londonderry Riot, a strong feeling supporting the demand for 'one man – one vote' [...] She had difficulty in understanding Mr. Craig's argument about 'dust bin' functions; if in fact local authorities were to be given such exiguous duties surely there could be no objection to allowing everybody to vote in Council elections. (PRONI 1968b)

She reiterated the pressure put on the issue earlier in the meeting by Wilson, exacerbated by Great Britain's popular support for the issue, pushing for full enfranchisement. Craig retorted that power should be taken away from local government and transferred to Stormont:

The emphasis so far had been on reducing numbers [of local government representatives] but must now be switched to a consideration of the functions which it was proper to ask Local Government to carry out in the future. There were arguments [made by Craig] for transferring the responsibility for some of the more important functions to the Northern Ireland Government leaving local authorities with such minor services as street-lighting and refuse collection. (PRONI 1968b)

Craig aimed not just to reduce the number of locally elected officials, but, more importantly, to reduce their overall power. Thus, even if the CRM had gained its equal voting demand, Craig's proposal would have essentially rendered the local vote less consequential. He then established a timetable for this project, vis-à-vis 'one man, one vote':

The aim was to complete the Local Government investigation within a period of three years [...] [Craig] found it difficult to speculate on what the franchise should be in the new conditions after re-shaping. If, for example, the new local authorities were to be entrusted with only the simplest functions, such as refuse collection, capable of being financed entirely out of the rates there could clearly be a case for a ratepayers' franchise. Northern Ireland was accused of resisting a move towards one man – one vote but it should be realized that as more and more houses were built the discrepancy between the size of the two franchises was always diminishing [...] [Craig] thought that when the re-distribution of functions as between Stormont and the local authorities was settled the matter could be re-examined – particularly if Stormont were seen to be taking over functions from local councils. (PRONI 1968b)

It is clear that, even when openly criticized before Wilson and O'Neill, Craig maintained that there was little difference between 'one man, one vote' and ratepayer/company votes, wherein housing determines voting abilities and landlords are granted more voting power than tenants. Craig held that power should be removed from local government over the next three years, at which time the issue of enfranchisement may be raised again.

Up to this point, Craig can still fit within Luders' cost assessment model. He may aim to gain power by transferring local government's responsibilities to Stormont. Considering his future actions makes this motivation less likely, however, and Craig emerges as a potential contradiction of Luders' prediction. His refusal to concede to the CRM even when his position would suffer as a result, and his lifelong opposition to the movement despite high disruption and concession costs over time, fall outside of the model's predictions. Craig's outspoken resistance led to his dismissal and subsequent power loss. However, he gained notoriety outside Stormont. Once dismissed, he led the Ulster Loyalist Association. In 1972, when Stormont was suspended leaving Northern Ireland under direct British rule, he left the Ulster Unionists to form the Vanguard Unionists. Craig not only offered 'durable resistance' to the CRM while in office, eventually losing his cabinet position, but continued to oppose it years later. His legacy is as a hard-line Unionist (see Watson 2013).

It is clear that in this instance Craig was torn between letters from loyalist supporters representing a potential threat to his political position, and the increasing disruption costs of the civil rights demonstrations. Based on Luders' rational model, Craig should be a 'vacillator', yet he consistently embodies a 'resister', in that his policy initiatives 'offer durable opposition

to [the] movement'. Luders fails to correctly assess this target's response. Craig may be a case of ideological or emotion-based decision-making taking priority over cost assessment, particularly when we consider the direction of his political career after losing his position in the government. Even decades later, Craig felt a stronger allegiance to the British crown rather than Northern Ireland.⁴ This points more to an ideological belief and emotional attachment, than a careful cost-benefit analysis.

External Pressure from Westminster

In a Stormont cabinet meeting on 20 November 1968, just two days before the reform's passage, policy reform and possible legislative actions were discussed vis-à-vis the current Northern Irish and British policymakers. The primary concern of the cabinet meeting is the maintenance of law and order in Derry, specifically as related to enforcing the ban on all demonstrations within Derry's walls (PRONI 1968a).⁵ The RUC Chief Inspector argued that the ban was unenforceable and that 'further really firm police action could lead to the most serious and prolonged disorder in Londonderry and elsewhere [...] The police view was given that unless the heat could be taken out of events by political means, the law and order situation could get completely out of control' (PRONI 1968a).

This is of particular importance, touching directly upon potential disruption costs mentioned in the previous meeting. The relentless stream of civil rights demonstrations gave Northern Ireland an appearance of instability, presenting a power threat should Westminster deem it necessary to intervene (see Warner 2005: 17-23). At Wilson's request, O'Neill, Craig, and Minister of Commerce Brian Faulkner, had already met with him to discuss the situation. At that meeting, Wilson repeatedly expressed this threat. First, in the opening of the meeting Wilson immediately mentioned that the situation embarrassed not only Stormont, but himself and his colleagues, and that 'the United Kingdom government did not need to get involved in a constitutional crisis in order to exert its will on Northern Ireland but could have recourse to other possibilities, for example, the financial contributions made to Northern Ireland expenditure', which he called 'generous' (PRONI 1968b). Judging the 'Northern Ireland scene' as 'irksome,

4 'The government was not loyal to the crown. The government compromised the crown' (BBC 2011).

5 The memo first lists all present MPs, then begins with 'The Maintenance of Law and Order in Londonderry', indicating the issue's importance for cabinet members.

including the Londonderry situation and the Local Government franchise', Wilson further stated that the Special Powers Act, which Craig strenuously defended, required a special exception in the international Human Rights agreement the United Kingdom had recently signed (PRONI 1968b). This 'weakened the United Kingdom's standing abroad and gave other countries an excuse to criticize' (PRONI 1968b). The CRM thus proved to be capable to threatening Westminster's international reputation directly.

British Home Secretary Callaghan had also explicitly asked to prioritize the local government franchise over job creation as Stormont's 'prime objective' during the 4 November meeting.⁶ Wilson then threatened Stormont with 'complete liquidation of all financial agreements with Northern Ireland' should the voting matter remain unresolved (PRONI 1968b). Thus, the actions of the CRM cost Stormont directly, and also presented a larger financial burden should the instability maintain its level. Even greater than the financial threat, however, was the concrete possibility of a direct power loss. Under Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act, 'the United Kingdom has residual responsibility [...] [for] Northern Ireland's [...] internal affairs' and while Wilson 'recognized that the issues under discussion were the constitutional responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government, [they were] subject, however, to the residual rights of the United Kingdom Government' (PRONI 1968b).

At that very 20 November Stormont cabinet meeting, Craig pointed out that removing the ban might upset the loyalist movement. The minutes indicate that Craig 'expressed great concern that, if the ban were to be removed at this stage, elements hostile to the Civil Rights demonstrators might take the law into their own hands' (PRONI 1968a). The cabinet minutes continue that it was the 'general opinion of [other] Ministers, however, that the police advice that they simply could not enforce the ban could not be ignored' (PRONI 1968a). Craig is corroborated in a letter from Chief Inspector Kennedy dated 25 November 1968, wherein the Chief Inspector comments on oppositional forces' inability to distinguish between CRM and IRA. groups,

6 The minutes record the Home Secretary's comments as follows: 'Many people in Northern Ireland seemed to think that new jobs constituted the prime objective of Government policy but so far as the United Kingdom administration was concerned, there were other matters that also seemed important, e.g. the local government franchise. He did not see how the Prime Minister could possibly defend at Westminster such things as the company vote and the failure in Northern Ireland to grant the local government vote to all over 21 years of age. If Northern Ireland were to concede only the abolition of the multiple vote then it was natural that attention should focus on the question of adult suffrage.'

and thus their perception as a constitutional threat (Kennedy 1968b).⁷ Rather than decrease tension or gain loyalist support, the ban on marches placed the cabinet in a precarious political situation. As the civil rights machination kept a constant state of political instability in Northern Ireland, the unionist government had to respond to the protests, due to concession costs of loyalist violence and disruption costs of Westminster intervention.

The cabinet minutes identify potential financial and power losses from instability, detailing the pressure exerted by Westminster, in particular Wilson, over Stormont. A much-discussed letter from Wilson stating that 'if [Stormont] refused to accept universal adult suffrage, it would be imposed by Westminster', best exemplifies London pressure on the Stormont cabinet (PRONI 1968a). O'Neill also reminded the cabinet that 'if the current agitation was not brought under control, a situation could arise in which Mr. Wilson could say law and order in Northern Ireland was not being maintained', and Westminster would intervene (PRONI 1968a). This explicit loss of power further reinforces how CRM's creating an image of instability represented a sizeable disruption cost for the unionist regime.

Cost Evaluations and the Five-Point Plan

The majority of ministers at the cabinet meeting asserted that introducing profound and radical legislative change during what was continually referred to as a time of 'duress', would be unwise and 'most unacceptable' (PRONI 1968a). The ministers' perception of voter reform concession costs makes them reluctant to pass *effective* legislative reform. This placed the cabinet in the almost impossible position of having high disruption costs of ongoing movement actions (political instability and Westminster threat to reduce Stormont power) on the one hand, and high concession costs in response to universal adult enfranchisement (loyalist counterdemonstrations and voter backlash) on the other hand. Clearly, the cabinet was torn between impending universal adult suffrage legislation and an inability to ensure its enforcement without violent disturbances. They faced scrutiny on the issue from all sides, even their own party, and had to find the 'politically feasible' solution: a reform package that avoided dealing directly with universal suffrage.

7 Craig repeatedly claimed, both publicly and privately, that the CRM was an IRA front. He claimed the Derry march was primarily IRA members when Wilson suggested eliminating the Special Powers Act. The meeting minutes recorded Craig thusly: 'Balked in its efforts to use Republican Clubs as recruiting grounds by the ban on such clubs, [... the IRA] had turned its attention to the civil rights movement'.

Even though it may have been unenforceable, the ban on marches was enacted to appease the loyalist countermovement and maintain party support, demonstrating the unionist cabinet concession costs evaluation. Revoking the ban would endanger the loyalist voting bloc necessary to maintain the majority needed for the cabinet to retain power. The threat was actually twofold, as a reform with an impact as wide as 'one man, one vote' would likely incur a backlash from loyalist supporters, *and* enfranchise a larger section of the Irish Catholic minority hostile to unionist domination. Stormont's Chief Whip explicitly referenced this concession cost, arguing that if the cabinet 'announced a 'package' of proposals but did not deal with the franchise, the current agitation would continue and the pressures, internal and external, would not be relieved. [...] Roman Catholic votes must be secured if the constitutional position was to be maintained' (PRONI 1968a). The concession costs were thus quite high. While housing, employment, and minor local governmental restructuring were issues which would lose votes from loyalists if the cabinet acted in favour of movement demands, none were as volatile as 'one man, one vote'. The constant references to the 'wrong time' for this change reflected cabinet members' high level of *vulnerability* to both internal and external pressures. The cabinet was in a weak position as the disruption and concession costs had put its members into a corner, forcing them into action.

According to Luders' cost-benefit matrix, a target facing both high concession and high disruption costs will vacillate between minor or token concessions, and movement repression. The ban indicated in the letter from the RUC Chief Inspector to Craig was a concrete method of repression against the CRM, trying to suppress one of their most successful tactics.⁸ Thus, we see the first step in vacillation between repression and token reform that Luders predicts. The enfranchisement bill which was drafted in the end, the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1968, Chapter 20, addressed a range of movement demands: the permanent Boundary Commission directly dealt with the accusations of unionist gerrymandering, and it abolished the University as well as the Business vote in Stormont elections (Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 13). The Five-Point Plan, publicly announced by O'Neill on 22 November, touched on housing, local government reforms, and the Company vote, but never mentioned the 'one man, one vote' issue.

8 The effectiveness of the civil rights marches are further demonstrated by the fact that the British Prime Minister was involved enough to send letters and privately meet with O'Neill to discuss enfranchisement, specifically mentioning in the meeting the marches and their mishandling by the RUC.

Failure to include it makes the act a 'limited reform', as it ameliorated minor aspects, while ignoring the movement's primary demand. Rather than the emotional or ideological reasoning usually assigned to target reactions, Luders allows us to see how this reform package was the result of a build-up of pressure from Westminster, as well as third parties like the loyalist countermovement and international media, and a consistent level of pressure from the CRM.

Conclusions

The analysis of decision-making processes is becoming more prominent in social movement scholarship (e.g. Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). However, studies of the *target's* decision-making process (usually not the analytical focal point) largely ignore the nuances of why targets align against issues, whether on an ideological basis, or through rational cost evaluation (see Uba 2016). Because analyses typically adopt a movement-centric perspective, target decisions are often depicted as a force to react *to*, rather than rationally motivated decisions. If the target's decision is incorporated, it is as a result of the political structure itself, either allowing or disallowing concessions, not governing bodies (targets) evaluating actions on a case-by-case basis.

This chapter examined the Five-Point Reform package to examine the validity of Luders' model outside of its original application, and to assess whether targets rationally evaluate action costs in their decision-making process. The target actions analysed in this case correspond with Luders' theory, generally upholding the proposed cost-evaluation model. Prime Minister O'Neill and most of his cabinet turned out to be 'vacillators', attempting to navigate high disruption and concession costs by alternating limited concessions and repression towards the CRM and its main demands. However, the model fails to correctly assess Craig's political actions as Minister of Home Affairs during the second half of 1968. While the model would predict him to follow Prime Minister O'Neill's lead as a vacillator, Craig exhibited consistent oppression and resistance to the CRM, even after losing his position, unto his deathbed. Craig's case demonstrates that while targets do rationally assess options based on cost calculations and vulnerabilities, completely eliminating ideological and emotional influences on those decisions is imprudent.

Depending on time frame and domain, Craig's case could be construed differently, however. An argument could be made that, despite his resistance costing him power, Craig was still following Luders' model: once he lost

his cabinet position, he sought external power by maintaining his strong resistance stance, finding himself at the forefront of the loyalist political movement. Then, when Stormont was dissolved and Westminster imposed direct rule on Northern Ireland in 1972, he was in a prime position to fight for status in the resulting power vacuum. Delving into Craig's political ambitions after his dismissal might thus yield a different interpretation of his actions and decisions. However, this does not negate the fact that Luders' model would predict Craig acting as a vacillator while a minister in Stormont, yet, he is a hard-line resister prior to and after his dismissal.

Luders' approach opens new avenues of research: by considering the target, rather than simply the movement, scholars can begin to understand under which circumstances social movement actions may have the best result. When the target is analytically unpacked as both a player and an arena (Duyvendak and Jasper 2015), with motivations that transcend governmental structures, weighing costs and ideological beliefs, we eliminate the monolithic 'target' and can attune movement analysis to the target. Moreover, movements themselves can learn from and incorporate this perspective, and Luders breakdown of targets, into their tactical decisions. Actors participating in contentious politics, be they movements, counter-movements, authorities, or third parties, utilize some rational evaluation to determine the best course of action from their vantage point. This is even true in the context of an ethnically divided society like Northern Ireland, where the unionist government's early responses to the civil rights requests of public housing and universal suffrage can be correctly interpreted as that of a vacillator. The mix of repression and limited reform was the rational response to a very vulnerable political situation with high disruption and concession costs and no easy way out. The re-emergence of the loyalist threat increased significantly the concessions costs for O'Neill, who would a few months later resign as Prime Minister, while opening up the political space for ethnic entrepreneurs like Ian Paisley and William Craig.

Divided societies then add an additional layer of complexity to contentious politics. In the context of competing ethnonational mobilizations and a state not fully legitimized (see Bosi and De Fazio, in this volume), conceding to movement demands might represent a particularly costly strategy for the state. If concessions to movement requests are perceived to impinge directly, or even symbolically, on an opposite ethnonational faction, then the threat of political violence could be substantially higher than in other democratic regimes, making concession costs prohibitively high. Ethnonational claims can in fact elicit ideological and emotional reactions that make compromises very hard to reach, inevitably altering

the vulnerability of targets, as well as their 'rational' evaluation of costs. Future research should attempt to replicate this model in similar contexts to further advance our understanding of the dynamics of contentious politics in divided societies.

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