

Introduction



Fig. 1: "Mocro's be like. Born Here," tweet @Nasrdin_Dchar (March 17, 2014)

I want to say one thing! I am Dutch and yes my parents are from another country, Morocco just to make it clear, and I'm proud of that!! Because I have been raised with two totally different cultures and I'm happy to have been able to experience that

– Meryam, fifteen-year-old (Facebook post, March 23, 2014)

"Do you want more or less Moroccans in this city and in the Netherlands?" This was the question Geert Wilders asked his audience during a party rally in The Hague. "Fewer, fewer, fewer!" chanted his supporters thirteen times before applauding. The audience had gathered on the occasion to celebrate

municipal election results.¹ To this, the leader of the anti-immigration and anti-Islam Party for Freedom (Dutch: Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) smiled and made the promise: “then that will be arranged” (NOS, 2014). A storm of protest erupted, with several actions going viral online. On Twitter, using the hashtag #bornhere, Moroccan-Dutch celebrities such as the award-winning actor Nasrdin Dchar posted selfies showing their Dutch passports.² Many fellow Moroccan-Dutch people copied the tactic, #bornhere became a trending topic on Twitter, alongside other hashtags such as #spreadtheword, #bornthere, #leefhier (in English: living here), #ProudMoroccan, #mocro, #ookikbennederlands (in English: I’m also Dutch). In addition, more than 95,000 Facebook members liked the page “Ik doe aangifte tegen wilders” (I will report Wilders to the police) while 15,000 liked “Meer Marokkanen” (in English: More Moroccans). Eventually, more than 6,400 people reported Wilders’s rally to the police, and a similar number of complaints was filed with Dutch antidiscrimination agencies. The Dutch Public Prosecution Service (OM) announced in December 2014 they will prosecute Geert Wilders “on suspicion of insulting a population group based on race and inciting hatred and discrimination” (OM, 2014).

This book considers how Moroccan-Dutch youth, mostly born in the Netherlands, navigate digital spaces to articulate their politicized identities in a time when claims over the failure of multiculturalism, anti-immigration sentiments and Islamophobia sweep across Europe. *Digital Passages: Migrant Youth 2.0* addresses not only to how these mostly second-generation migrant youth navigate across digital spaces, but also considers the digitization of key identity-formation processes, such as coming of age, rites of passage and the negotiation of offline/online gender, diaspora, religious and youth cultural expectations. For example, Meryam, a fifteen-year-old informant who also participated in the #bornhere protests, is a headscarf-wearing girl who is called a “*gangster*” in her school because she likes hip-hop. With her

1 Geert Wilders made these comments at the moment exit polls from local elections in The Hague revealed the PVV was running neck-and-neck with the liberal-oriented Democrats 66 (Dutch: Democraten 66, D66). The PVV ended up in second place with 14% of the votes after the D66 with 15%.

2 Born in the Netherlands from parents who migrated to the Netherlands from Morocco as guest workers, Nasrdin Dchar is famous for his acceptance speech for winning the Golden Calf for best actor at the 2011 Dutch Film Festival: “A few months ago I read an article in which Minister Maxime Verhagen said that having fear of foreigners is very understandable. Well, Minister Verhagen and Geert Wilders and all those people that stand behind you: I’m a Dutchman. I’m very proud of my Moroccan blood. I am a Muslim and I have a fucking Golden Calf in my hands.”



Fig. 2: Geweigerd.nl website top banner (March 6, 2005)

Moroccan-Dutch friends, she posted selfies on Twitter, “Insta” (Instagram) and Facebook. Meryam mostly received positive comments and likes from coethnics, youth of other migrant backgrounds as well as ethnic-majority Dutch kids. However, in her Facebook post, she also addressed a few of her white Dutch classmates who had expressed sympathy with Wilders, writing she hoped they would change their minds: *“stop following someone who is so blind, you have to open your own eyes and think about what you say.”* To sign off she stated, *“the Netherlands is a free country so I wanna say, do whatever you wanna do.”* Inzaf, a fellow fifteen-year-old girl, shared *“I have filed a report myself. I have written that I’m of the opinion that he discriminates.”* She added, *“I have also had everyone I know file a report. You can do it online in no time.”* Geert Wilders’s speech and the responses triggered illustrate that in the Netherlands a particular configuration of cultural difference, whiteness and (secularized forms of) Christianity has gained prominence. Through such discourses, binaries and borders are constructed. As a result, Muslim and migrant bodies may be feared and considered out of place. Many migrant and minority groups do not fit the norms and are therefore not seen to fully belong to nations like the Netherlands, yet they live inside them.

Fifteen years ago, Moroccan-Dutch digital media enthusiast Abdelilah Amraoui initiated a movement in the Netherlands called Geweigerd.nl (*geweigerd* in English: denied) in direct response to the discrimination among owners of club venues and discotheques that required bouncers to refuse people entrance based on their ethnicity, race or religion. Amraoui started the website because he believes that with access to the Internet *“you can now create media yourself in case you cannot find it elsewhere.”* The site invited young people who felt they were wrongfully refused entry to a venue to submit their stories of being refused access. Figure 2 displays the top banner of the Geweigerd.nl website, an animated GIF image which combines (in) famous Dutch club logos with stop-signs and the “top five of bouncer excuses” such as “this is not a multicultural event” and “there

are already plenty of your sort inside.” Personal experiences sent in by young people were published on the site. Collecting personal stories of mainly frustrated Dutch ethnic-minority youth, Amraoui hoped to engage in dialogue with those places of entertainment in order to renegotiate their admission policies. The issue received wider attention after Amraoui collaborated with the nationally famous Moroccan-Dutch rapper Ali B. in the release of the song similarly titled “Geweigerd.nl” that also scrutinized unfair and discriminating admission policies.

#bornhere and Geweigerd.nl illustrate how Moroccan-Dutch youth become ‘digital space invaders.’ The concept of digital space invaders builds on Nirmal Puwar’s research on offline, institutionalized spaces where minority bodies are considered to be “out of place,” upon successfully entering those they become “space invaders” of locations “which have not been ‘reserved’ for them, for which they are not, in short, the somatic norm” (2004, p. 1). The metaphor of space invaders is developed in this book to empirically, theoretically and politically consider what happens when Moroccan-Dutch youth articulate digital identities across digital spaces where they may not be expected or fit the norms. The argumentation draws mostly from extensive qualitative empirical data; however, descriptive quantitative data of 344 Moroccan-Dutch survey participants is used to contextualize the findings. The qualitative fieldwork consisted of in-depth interviews with forty-three mostly second-generation, Moroccan-Dutch migrant youth across five cities in the Netherlands and a virtual ethnography of Internet forums, instant messaging (IM), social networking sites (SNSs) and video-sharing websites. Theoretically, I connect and intervene in dialogues across new media, gender, antiracial and postcolonial studies, critical geography, migration and transnationalism as well as religious studies. The focus is on how Internet platforms are appropriated by Moroccan-Dutch youth to position themselves between cultures of origin, youth cultures and cultures of immigration and how issues of gender, ethnicity and religion are negotiated.

1. Online/offline space and power relations

The lens of space invaders will be developed to excavate dominant positions in/of digital media and their subversion. Similar to offline institutions, across digital space, templates, norms and interface decisions reserve certain dominant consumer, national, gendered, ethnic and racial positions. These socio-technical processes have uneven spatial effects, both online



Fig. 3: Google.nl search for “Marokkanen” (June 28, 2012)

and offline. Space dynamically materializes and structures behavior at the interplay of how hierarchical social relations distribute bodies and how bodies position themselves (Foucault, 1980; Lefebvre, 1991; Grosz, 1995; Puwar, 2004; Gilbert, 2010; Soja, 2010; Ahmed, 2012). As summed up by Raka Shome: “a focus on spatial relations of power enables scholars of communication and culture to understand and theorize the complex ways in which identities are being reproduced in our current moment of globalization” (2003, p. 39).

For example, Figure 3 displays the dominant positions that the Google Netherlands search engine associates with “Marokkanen” (the Dutch word for Moroccans). The auto-complete search query suggestions that Google provides appear automatically upon typing “Marokkanen” in the search field. The auto-complete algorithm offers query suggestions in a drop-down list, predicting behavior based on queries typed previously by Google users as well as generating items on the basis of traffic, page visits and recently crawled websites (Google, 2015).³

3 The search was carried out in a Mozilla Firefox browser, using the “Private Browsing” settings, while being signed out from a Google account, with “Web & App Activity” turned off and without having searched for the topic earlier. The results do thus not present my earlier search behavior or that of my contacts.

The search query suggestions reveal some of the ways young Moroccan-Dutch people are allocated particular narrow gendered and racialized positions in digital space. From top to bottom they can be translated from Dutch as follows: “Moroccan jokes,” “Moroccans must die” and “Moroccans and Polish people.” The suggestions on “Moroccan jokes” provide results of websites that host offensive anti-immigration, anti-Islam and racist jokes. The second suggestion points the Google user toward discussion forums where right-wing extremists discriminate against ethnic others. For example, Google’s third search result links toward a forum posting on MeetHolland.com where a user left the following comment about Moroccan-Dutch youth: “Those rotten bastards must die!!!!!!! Dirty, cowardly, disgusting, stinking cancer goats” (Wilders, 2005, my translation from Dutch). The third suggestion equates Moroccan-Dutch people with Polish guest workers arriving after the recent EU expansion. Simultaneously, without having pressed the search button, results are shown, including Google Image Search results. The four results are all stereotypical images of aggressive masculine street culture representing Moroccan-Dutch youth as dangerous loiterers and the inclusion of a policeman emphasizes Moroccan-Dutch boys as troublemakers.

The auto-complete algorithm (which is partly based on the search-term popularity among prior users) exemplifies sedimented ideas that emphasize particular associations and stereotypes of Moroccan-Dutch people – particularly those voiced by right-wingers rather than others. Spearheaded by the anti-Islamic Geert Wilders and the sensationalist press, young people of Moroccan migrant descent are often seen as a problem. Moroccan-Dutch boys are dismissed as strangers to Western democracies, possibly dangerous Islamic fundamentalists, terrorists or thieves while headscarf-wearing girls, in particular, are constructed as either un-emancipated and backward or oppressed by Muslim culture. In the context of the United States, danah boyd similarly argued that when, for instance, searching for the name “Mohammed” Google auto-complete suggestions provide suggestions related to Islamic extremism and terrorism. She defines this process as a form of “guilt through algorithmic association,” as the search suggestions for Mohammed exemplify how people can be “algorithmically associated with practices, organizations, and concepts that paint them in a problematic light” (boyd, 2011a). Similarly, Eighteen-year-old Safae told me after her friend who covers her hair uploaded a picture on the Dutch social networking site Hyves, somebody sent her a message that stated *“we live in 2010, a headscarf is out-dated, and it’s something of the past.”* Thus, digital spaces are not mere mute, neutral and external backdrops of identity formation, but distinct expressive cultures filled with ideologies, hierarchies and politics. These

two examples remind us that digital space is not neutral but power-ridden: indeed, new digital divides are constructed this way.

Digital divides

Inequality in/of the Internet has first and foremost been considered with the digital divide metaphor. Scholarship on digital divides initially focused on making visible material divides across static geographic scales and across markers of difference. An uneven geographical distribution in terms of ownership of hardware and access to the Internet was noted: the rich, overdeveloped parts of the world were highly connected, while underdeveloped third countries were disconnected. Ownership and access was also unequally spread across different isolated axes of differentiation: younger and/or white and/or upper-class males were found to be more connected versus older and/or nonwhite and/or lower-class females. Used this way, the term “digital divide” is thus ideologically loaded, particular in its proposal that once the gap is closed, a “computer-revolution” will take place, spreading democracy, promoting equality and potentially ending poverty (Murelli & Okot-Uma, 2002). Emerging in the early 2000s, the second wave of scholarship on the digital divide shifted its focus from access and ownership toward skills and literacies. The gaps between “the information haves” and the “information have-nots” were again purported as operating at geographical and personal markers of difference (Selwyn, 2004). Policy makers and government institutions mobilized resources to provide the information have-nots with the skills for a more egalitarian distribution of knowledge.

Focusing on digital spatial hierarchies and their contestations, using feminist, postcolonial/antiracist, critical geography and Internet studies approaches this book contributes to a new wave of scholarship aiming to situate digital divides in everyday user contexts. There is an urgent need to acknowledge that so-called “have-nots” are people who are embedded in an intersectional web of power relations differentiated along axes including gender, race, religion and generation (Gilbert, 2010). As nonmainstream users, they may possess agency to appropriate digital spaces in order to counter or negotiate exclusion (Leurs, 2015). A grounded and intersectional perspective allows us to move beyond technologically deterministic utopian and dystopian renderings of social media use. On the one hand, promising alternative ways of being and the collapse of difference, postmodernism and neoliberal progress reconciled in a Californian ideology that framed cyberspace as a disembodied, equalizing, liberating, democratizing and empowering world separated from

the offline world (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011a). On the other side of the spectrum, techno-pessimists have made sweeping dystopian remarks in response to utopian appraisal of the Internet. Most famously, Jaron Lanier warns that digital technologies make us lose democracy, devalue individuality and deaden creativity (2010) and Evgeny Morozov argues Internet activism is a delusion that makes us unable to recognize technologies are used for the purposes of propaganda, manipulation, censorship and surveillance (2011). These two perspectives, however, are not helpful to explain why migrant young people who encounter excluding practices online are still also heavy users.

So-called Web 2.0 Internet applications promise users to become active agents over their own representations. Internet applications such as blogs and SNSs signal the ongoing shift from people being represented by the media to people asserting self-presentation. Internet researchers have reached consensus in seeing the Internet as “an extension of life as it is, in all its dimensions, and all its modalities” (Castells, 2001, p. 118). As more users are promised to have a presence online, scholars need to start acknowledging the inherent unevenness in the ways in which they call all to make a contribution to digital culture (Graham, 2011). Unfortunately, Web 2.0 is no great equalizer, digital territories augment material, fleshy and concrete power relations of offline lives: indeed, “self-representation is actually a condition of participation in Web 2.0” (Thumim, 2012, p. 17). As audience members are increasingly also expected to construct a representation of themselves to sustain a public presence, Nick Couldry asked the question “are changing norms and expectations of presencing generating new types of political repertoire”? (2012, p. 51). The answer is yes, in tandem with offline locations, any digital space should be seen as organized around a durable but not fixed “habitus” of embedded hierarchical divisions (Kvasny, 2005; Freishtat & Sandlin, 2010; Leurs, 2015b; Papacharissi & Easton, 2013).

When considering Internet applications as platforms, their intricate functioning becomes more obvious. As an actual and symbolic stage from where to speak and perform actions, the “platform” is a semantic construct that combines computational and architectural fundamentals with socio-cultural and political figurative imaginations (Gillespie, 2010). Digital practices increasingly take place in distinct spaces, resulting in a “platformed sociality” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 5). Such platforms on the “Internet hails its audiences” in a way that is similar to how nondigital environments are intended for particular groups of people (Nakamura & Lovink, 2005, p. 61). As a result, there is a need to consider not only different levels of access but how through “differentiating practices” some digital identities are relegated to the periphery and some are privileged (Sims, 2013).

Repurposing Pierre Bourdieu's understanding of the habitus, online platforms can be considered as social structures where communities of practice engage in digital practices that cultivate habituated dispositions. Conceptually, a habitus dialectically emerges at the interplay of structure and agency, and continuity and change. In the words of Bourdieu, the habitus emerges around

systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72)

The user is both the creator and product of their habitus, and micro-politics resides in the individual, subjective strategies of meaning making that may challenge or reproduce organizational principles.

Across online platforms, habituated routines offer users a sense of stability, while everyday sociality is constantly evolving, most notably in the lives of the informants during their dynamic life phase of adolescence. For example, normative behavior on the social networking site Facebook is shaped and disciplined through the habitus of mainstream digital practice “in ways that are similar to the ways they perform in face-to-face interaction – policing the persona and actions of others within the social norms associated with those personas in particular cultural contexts” (Freishtat & Sandlin, 2010, p. 517). In contrast to Bourdieu, scholars have flagged that markers of difference such as gender, race and class impact upon habitual “embedded predispositions” of individuals and coconstruct digital taste preferences (Papacharissi & Easton, 2010, p. 177). However, so far little attention is paid to how these markers intersect in the everyday life of marginalized users across different locations where digital culture is expressed (Gilbert, 2010). The general lack of scrutiny of how intersecting power relations relate to spatial configurations of Internet applications is problematic because digital spaces are not neutral and/or innocent.

Internet platforms as passages

Building on the analogy of Internet platforms as passages and the notion of invasion of space I carve out a middle-ground position to account for how nonmainstream people in their everyday use are hailed and bound by

but not fully determined by medium-specific characteristics, commercial incentives and user norms. First I will posit that Walter Benjamin's work on passages can be transposed to theorize social and symbolic meanings attributed to technological developments. In the mid-nineteenth century, arcades or pedestrian passageways ('passages' in French) emerged in Brussels, Bologna and Paris among other places. Historically, the term "arcade" refers to a pedestrian passageway that links two streets. Unlike public space, this glass, iron or brick roofed passage is open at both ends and concentrates a row of commercial establishments (shops, cafés, restaurants) in a small space. In the words of Walter Benjamin, arcades were "the most important architecture of the nineteenth century" (1999, p. 834). In parallel, it can be argued that nowadays, social media platforms play a fundamental role in the daily lives of millions of people.

Benjamin recognized that passages carried an ambivalent meaning, as objects of history they simultaneously contained a "dream and wish image of the collective." He observed the dialectic tension between collective desires and exploitative "ruins." Indeed, Benjamin urged to reflect on the social and technological imaginaries surrounding arcades by assessing whether technology users were truly "emancipated" (1999, p. 115). As a "technical organ of the collective," innovations such as the arcades were imagined as a "new nature": "these images are wish images; in them the collective seeks both to overcome and to transfigure the immaturity of the social product and the inadequacies in the social order." "Caught in a dream," Benjamin added "the new, in order to shape itself visually, always connects its elements with those pertaining to a classless society." The "new nature" furthering utopian imaginings remains "concealed within machines." Instead of these imaginations, Benjamin argued for the figuration of "ambiguity." The role of the arcade is double-faced, as Benjamin exemplifies: "during sudden rainshowers, the arcades are a place of refuge for the unprepared, to whom they offer a secure, if restricted, promenade – one from which the merchants also benefit" (1999, p. 31). Neither skepticism nor evangelism captures the dynamics of passages completely, and Benjamin argued for a consideration of its "constellation saturated of tensions" (1999, p. 475).

Although focused on the scrutiny of economic power relations in a striated modernizing society, the argument can be expanded to account for the ambiguous power relations with regards to politics and culture technologies sometimes conceal. Insights on ambiguous power relations in a modern, democratizing and urban mass society allow us to draw parallels to contemporary forms of exclusion, distinction, and contestation. Similarly in their scrutiny of Internet culture, critical media and feminist theorists

have developed a creative, ambiguous middle-ground position between the utopian dreams and dystopian nightmare perspectives that were dominant in writings on digital embodiment, identity, and activism. For example, Judy Wajcman unravels the constellation of gendered technologies from the perspective of “mutual shaping,” “where neither gender nor technology is taken to be preexisting, nor is the relationship between them immutable” (2007, p. 287; Van Doorn & Van Zoonen, 2009). In particular, I will empirically sustain how the situated negotiating of hierarchies and inequalities online may be an empowering experience.

Space invader tactics

My middle-ground perspective acknowledges early-twenty-first-century Internet platforms – analogous to nineteenth-century arcades – as ambiguous constellations full of tensions and hierarchies but with room for subversion. Power emerges at the interplay of top-down forces that Michel Foucault described as “the great strategies of geopolitics” and everyday subversion from below which he labels as “little tactics of the habitat” (1980, p. 149). Institutional and corporate power “strategies” may be negotiated by individuals or collectives through potentially subversive everyday life “tactics” (De Certeau, 1984). Accounting for both negative experiences of exclusion and positive experiences of agency and empowerment, digital practices are coconstructed by digital-space-specific user norms, application templates and interface decisions as well as their subversions. Spatial boundaries and hierarchies are not visible to those who can freely flow, they only show when bodies cannot pass and physically or metaphorically bang their head into a wall: “When a category allows us to pass into the world, we might not notice that we inhabit that category. When we are stopped or held up by how we inhabit what we inhabit, then the terms of habitation are revealed to us. We need to rewrite the world from the experience of not being able to pass into the world” (Ahmed, 2012, p. 176). This book documents such experiences as felt among young migrants in the digital realm.

During fieldwork, for instance, it became apparent that in video game culture, the tide of anti-immigrant feelings is perpetuated online. From the experiences of interviewees Ryan and Oussema, I learned that computer game culture is structured by mainstream Dutch normative and habituated ways of being. Fifteen-year-old Oussema shared that he often encounters racism and stigmatization in video games. He explained having similar experiences away from the screen. He mentioned, for instance,

being frustrated when seeing people anxiously keep a firm grip on their purses upon encountering him in the supermarket. In the first-person shooter game *Counter-Strike*, players have the opportunity to talk to each other through their headsets and microphones. After saying, “*I am a Moroccan, I am a Muslim*,” when asked to introduce himself by people in the game, Oussema sometimes finds ethnic-majority Dutch opponents cursing him out and calling him a “*terrorist*.” In contrast, Fifteen-year-old Ryan explains that he feels accepted as a gamer, because he argues he does “*not look like a Moroccan*,” in the sense that he is seen as “*very different from what normal Moroccan youth in my school do, they mostly use MSN, YouTube and listen to music*.” He feels gaming is more “*Dutch culture*” and it is mostly “*Dutch kids who play games*.” He is accepted, as a space invader tactic he backgrounds his Moroccan affiliations during in-game interaction using voice-chat programs like Skype or Teamspeak: “*When I talk I do not appear to be Moroccan*.” On his Hyves SNS profile page he also subverts the dominant image of Moroccan-Dutch youth: “*When someone sees me there, they say I do not look like a Moroccan, but obviously I am one, but I do not let it show*.” Masking his Moroccanness, Ryan passes as an ethnic-majority Dutch boy.

Ryan’s act of passing acts offers self-protection but also reflects his desires to be accepted by the majority group (Sánchez & Schlossberg, 2001). Nakamura notes that “racial impersonation” is a form of passing that “reveals a great deal about how people ‘do’ race online.” However, she argues that passing does keep the foundations of dominant exclusionary, white national identities intact (2002, pp. xvi, 37). The ambivalence of passing is elaborated by postcolonial theorists like Homi Bhabha, who recognizes processes of passing as “mimicry.” Mimicry offers camouflage and can become a site of resistance and transgression. The other achieves “partial presence” by passing for something one is not and “becoming a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite” (1994, pp. 122-123). Ryan does so by strategically employing dominant Dutch cultural repertoires and making less visible the ways he diverges from majority norms while emphasizing resemblances. These examples illustrate that digital terrains are hierarchical passageways, they are uneven geographies marked by material, symbolic and affective borders. Young, white, masculine and middle-class bodies participating in mainstream digital spaces produce and occupy certain habituated dispositions, ideal types and mainstream reserved positions, but young migrants can begin to destabilize representational hierarchies by using digital space invader tactics to manifest themselves across different online territories.

2. Digital identity performativity

I'm Muslim and all things considered I have decided to wear a headscarf. No one has directed or obliged me to do so, believe it or not, it's out of free will.... I am an adult woman who has tasted from all facets of life, and this is the direction I want to take... I do not force anything upon anyone, I function properly, I adapt myself and participate in Dutch society, but based on the fact that I wear a headscarf, people think they have the right to treat me as a second-rank citizen.... And believe me I do not have to be saved....

What one considers as freedom is not the same for everyone. However, how I define it for myself is up to me, and myself only.... The next time when you see a girl, who covers her hair, please consider the other side of the story.... Islamization does not pose a threat to our society, but the growing intolerance against Islam does.

– Dunyahenya (2011, my translation)

In this section I theorize agency on the side of migrant youth as space invaders to become active agents in their own representation, for example, through articulating digital ethnic, religious and gender identifications. Above I included a blog post segment written by the Tunisian-Dutch blogger Dunyahenya to introduce how minority youth turn to digital spaces to perform alternative identifications. In her posting Dunyahenya states she is a well-educated conscious woman who has personally chosen to wear a headscarf. She emphasizes she does not need to be saved from Islamic oppression and questions people who take her veil as a pretext to treat her as a second-rank citizen. Dunyahenya publicly wrote about the implications of wearing a headscarf in the context of Dutch society, performing her identity as a young conscious Muslim woman. Being able to author and publish narratives about herself is a significant act for Dunyahenya and other minority youth alike to constitute themselves as specific individual beings. In contemporary multicultural Europe social institutions including the state and public opinion seek to interpellate and “resignify” everyday practices of wearing a headscarf as “inappropriate,” relieving those wearing them “from the power to define their own actions” (Duits & Van Zoonen, 2006, p. 103). miriam cooke coined the neologism “Muslimwoman” to critically reflect on the lumping together of such singular ascribed discourses that deprive female followers of Islam of their individuality, diversity and agency (2007). In the Netherlands, the headscarf is a heavily debated signifier often taken as a symbol that hails Islam as “Other” and

that subordinates the subject to the (secularized/Christian) West (Said, 1979). The way its perceived inappropriateness is contested by Dunyahenya lays bare everyday mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, appropriation and subversion across digital space (Leurs, Hirzalla & Van Zoonen, 2012, pp. 129-130).

Not swayed by the apparent apathy, laziness, and narcissism of young people, nor blaming neoliberal popular culture nor social media entertainment for their lack of interest in top-down parliamentary democracy, I feel it is urgent to consider (digital) identifications as processes with micro-political potential. Namely, it appears that

most young people are engaged not by the “macropolitics” of politicians, and political parties, which are seen to be dominated by older generations and outdated cultural modes, but by the “micropolitics” of everyday life, single-issue campaigns, and so-called DIY (do-it-yourself) politics. (Banaji & Buckingham, 2013, p. 5)

I feel that this also holds for issues related to multiculturalism and migration in the lives of young people. Therefore, politics is here not taken to refer to the macro perspective of top-down governance of cultural diversity by politicians and policy implementation, but rather the micro-perspective of specifically located, everyday power struggles involved in becoming subjects by performing specific identities.

The micro-politics of everyday life will be considered by drawing on poststructuralist feminist's expansion of “the political” beyond traditional forms of politics. Inspired by the work of Michel Foucault – who has highlighted that “power is everywhere” (1978, p. 93): it is embodied, ubiquitous, distributed, diffuse and multidirectional – in this book I trace politics on the grounded level of subjects performing certain identities. I do so because I feel that identification, as an exercise of power, is a micro-political act, because in one's self-making (although it is not necessarily fully conscious) one can, for example, be held accountable for the ways in which one engages with other-ness and same-ness. The socio-cultural construction of identities is made possible and also bound but not fully determined by discursive frameworks. Following Foucault's approach to power, we can diagnose how subjects are dialectically produced and produce themselves within discursive settings. The room for action resides in between how discourses operate both as restricting power (“*potestas*”) and empowering (“*potentia*”) (Braidotti, 2006, p. 250). A certain degree of power is held over any subject, and one's action is limited and restricted, but there always remains room

for maneuver, resignification and subversion as “points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network” (Foucault, 1978, p. 95).

Micro-politics

Identity stems from the Latin words “*identitas*” and “*idem*” that can be translated as sameness. Simply put, identification is thus an expression of being/feeling the same as someone, something or a community. Identification, however, operates in tandem with difference. Traditionally, reflexive self-making revolved around narrative practices such as, for example, diary writing (Braidotti, 2006, p. 250). Such narratives are constantly updated resulting from changes in one’s context and are built on the basis of the choices offered and appropriated, as Anthony Giddens explained: “the reflexive project of the self which consists in the sustaining of coherent, yet continuously revised, biographical narratives, takes place in the context of multiple choice as filtered through abstract systems” (1991, p. 5). Such biographical narratives commonly include “stories that people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)” (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 202).

Children and young people increasingly face “the expectation” of seeking out their own rights and taking responsibility for their biographical “project of the self” (Livingstone, 2002, p. 300) requiring them to act upon and anticipate risks and insecurities in a context of diminishing traditional family and community support. Media play an important role in children and young people’s “new responsibility to construct an explicit project of the self” especially because they are expected to “increasingly participate in explicit discourses of identity and identity construction” (Livingstone, 2002, p. 301). For example, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and What’s App mark “the emerging requirement in everyday life to have a public presence beyond one’s bodily presence, to construct an objectification of oneself” (Couldry, 2012, p. 50). The recent explosion of social media use, especially among young people, and the constant stream of invitations users receive from platforms (think of Facebook prompting users to post status updates – “What are you doing now?”) to make their identities explicit, resonate with the diagnosis Livingstone and Couldry made. The material infrastructure of the Internet has altered the ways in which reflexive narratives are constructed in a networked form of “mass self communication” (Castells, 2009), as online texts are increasingly networked, multimedial and shared with a wider audience.

Identifications performed on digital media platforms are tangible results of micro-political action. Action refers here to the performative power

involved in being able to articulate identity alignments, for example, within, across or against axes of ethnicity, class, gender and religion. Following feminist poststructuralist theories on identity performativity, for example, performing gender revolves around a two-fold dynamic: a capacity to bring one's gender identity into being by carrying out (speech and other) acts, while relating to a normative set of prescribed rituals (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2014a). Seeing the construction of identities and differences as performative acts can be traced back to John Austin, who theorized that speech acts are "doing something rather than simply saying something" (cited in Nunes, 2006, p. 12).

Judith Butler famously deconstructed the category of gender by foregrounding that gender identities are to be understood as something *we do* rather than something *we are*. She argues that identities are constituted through performative acts. There is no preceding or following gendered "I" that exists apart from performativity; rather, people come into existence through a matrix of gender relations. With her notion of performativity, Butler went beyond distinctions between dichotomies of materiality and embodiment. Gender identity performativity is the constitutive stylized repetitious process through which one acquires a gendered subjectivity (Butler, 2003, p. 392). In parallel with gender, "race as an identifier of difference is not in the body but rather made through the bodily acts" (Warren, cited in Rybas & Gajjala, 2007, p. 10). Similarly I understand other axes of differentiation such as class, religion, and generation also as *something people do* by carrying out certain acts, rather than *something they are*. The focus on the doing places emphasis on the dynamic character of identities, or rather identification, as identities are always in process.

In a similar vein, digital identity performativity, then, focuses not only on how identities are visible online but more specifically how they are executed (Cover, 2012). As Nakamura and Chow-White describe with regards to the identity category of race: "users don't just consume images of race when they play video games, interact with software, and program: instead, they perform them" (ibid., p. 8). Digital identity performativity is a "way of doing things" (ibid., pp. 8-9). By composing a nickname, posting a status update or making a profile photo people perform actions that bring into being race, gender and religious identities. Through digital identity performativity, such as liking a Facebook page dedicated to rap music a networked process is triggered that works as a "transformation" "transformation of some others into unlikeness ('not like me') and other others into likeness ('like me') (Ahmed, 2004, p. 355).

Intersectionality

In order to be able to make a meaningful cartography of situated digital identity performativity, it is important not to single out singular axes of identification such as ethnicity, diaspora or gender, but rather look at how they intersect across online/offline spaces (Gilbert, 2010). Migrant youth navigate a complex trajectory of belongings, as Meenakshi Durham explains

the psychological transition of adolescence, already charged in terms of gender and sexuality is then imbricated with the conundrums of the other transition – the diaspora identity that demands delicate negotiations of race/ethnicity, nation, class, language, culture and history. (2004, p. 141)

Although I mention researching second-generation migrant youth, it is my intention not to separate out Moroccan-Dutch youth in order to reify a set of their stable essentialist traits. Rather, by taking an intersectional approach I take seriously the political value-ladenness of the label. This is necessary in order to be able to deconstruct, destabilize and make the label more porous. Making an intervention in dominant cultural essentialisms, it is my intention to uncover the variety of different positionalities, ambiguities and contrasts hidden behind the seemingly singular and closed-off category of Moroccan-Dutchness.

As a feminist theory and methodology, the perspective of intersectionality allows for a thorough analysis of the dialectic of oppression and empowerment in such multilayered identity-construction processes. Aimee Rowe (2008) developed intersectional theory in the field of communication studies, arguing that intersectionality allows one to scrutinize the “politics of relation.” She argues that “differential belonging” or who/what people relate to is political. For example, she notes, when transracial alliances are formed across power lines of difference, “coalitional subjectivities” emerge (*ibid.*, pp. 8, 15). In practice, intersectional thinking urges me to be reflexive and strategic in considering which connections to attend to, when, how and why. To explore the negotiation of multiple intersecting categories of difference the aim is to “situate subjects within the full network of relationships that define their social locations” while also pushing to “uncover the differences and complexities of experience embodied in that location” (McCall, 2005, p. 1781-1782). Digital identification practices, emergent from positionality and relationality, provide a window on everyday micro-politics. Online, identity performativity often becomes an explicit manifestation of the politics of relation, as connections within, across and

against we-ness and otherness are published in the form of tweets, status updates and nicknames.

In sum, guided by intersectionality I can consider how identities are “embodied” digitally as material practices, “shifting, altering and realigning on a regular basis, and situated within multiple discourses of gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality” (Nayar, 2010, p. 81). Turning back to Dunyahenya’s blog entry, “Muslimness,” “Tunisian-Dutchness” and “womanness” are not social categories she possesses, but they result from the process of her (online) interaction with multiple, hyphenated communities of practice and engagement with normative expectations of in/appropriateness. Considering digital identities from the perspective of performativity and intersectionality sharpens the focus on differential representation and acknowledges how digital experiences of migrant youth may be empowering and restricting vis-à-vis the habitus of the platform in question. In the final section below, I specify what digital identities are made of.

Digital identities: Materiality, representation & affectivity

Digital identities are both material, representational and affectively felt performative connections articulated in distinct social media platforms. Throughout the book, my intersectional cartography of digital identity performativity unpacks “interlocking conditions of identity” by addressing “the symbolic, material, and affective connections through which a subject engages a particular discourse” (Hahner, 2012, p. 147).

Firstly, in contrast to the early myth of the Internet being somehow immaterial, I incorporate a “digital-materialist” perspective to consider “new media objects as material assemblages of hardware, software, and wetware” (Boomen et al., 2012, pp. 10-13). The material building blocks of digital identities demand a medium-specific analysis of the materiality of “digital infrastructure,” “contents” and “context” (Miller & Horst, 2012, p. 25). Automated and user-generated data, algorithms, protocols, interfaces and default settings are examples how digital material works as “techno-cultural constructs” and “socioeconomic structures” (Van Dijck, 2013, p. 28). Together, these coconstruct the “affordances” of digital media platforms. Usually, especially when working smoothly, affordances remain invisible – black-boxed – in the experience of users, but as boyd emphasizes: “the architecture of a particular environment matters” (boyd, 2011b, p. 39). She adds, “affordances do not dictate participant’s behavior, but they do configure the environment in a way that shapes participant’s engagement” (ibid.). Affordances do not determine specific practices, but they do allow a specific

radius of action, in terms of infrastructures, contents (hyperlinks, text, images, videos, audio) as well as contexts. These affordances are specific constellations of material characteristics (opportunities and limitations posed by interface properties), user cultures (how these properties are appropriated), perceptions (how affordances are experienced) and wider ideological processes of meaning making (norms that shape dominant discourses) (boyd, 2011b; Zhao et al., 2013). For example, users have negotiated the affordances of SNSs that blurred boundaries between private and public space for innovative forms of identity construction (Papacharissi, 2010).

Not in a linear or causal way, but certain material medium-specific configurations may hold a specific appeal for young people in comparison with adults, or migrants in comparison with nonmigrants. For example, young people find themselves in a state of becoming, beyond childhood; they have yet to reach the autonomy of adulthood. Digital platforms have become key spaces for young people to explore questions of identity, belonging and autonomy and to experiment with romantic relationships and sexuality (boyd, 2014). Scholars have, for example, recognized how social media have given new meaning to psycho-developmental “modes of adolescent connectivity” such as private self-identity formation and public social identity formation – these two resonate very well with private messaging and social networking, respectively (Boneva et al., 2006, p. 202). The concept of “polymedia” is useful to account for choices migrants make between technologies on the basis of the material, social, emotional and moral dimensions, for purposes such as transnational connectivity, the maintenance of relationships and identification (Madianou & Miller, 2012).

Secondly, in their tactics to negotiate infrastructural affordances, users coshape the representational symbolic content circulating on digital platforms. The generation of representational data results from “implicit” and “explicit” user participation (Schäfer, 2011). “Implicit” participation refers to the automated generation of data resulting from user action that is channeled by design and “explicit” user participation refers to how users become subjects as they use tactics to negotiate their presence on their own terms (Schäfer, 2011, p. 51). It is therefore of chief importance to “meld close interface analysis with issues of identity”: the implications of medium-specific affordances and restrictions need to speak back to critical theories of cultural difference to raise more awareness of underlying ideologies (Nakamura, 2006, p. 35).

The construction of an online profile on, for example, a SNS is often “menu-driven” (Nakamura, 2002, p. 104). When designing a computer game

avatar, users often have to choose from a restricted set of facial and bodily features, creating a “normative virtual body,” which is “generally white, conventionally physically attractive, as well as traditionally gendered, with male and female bodies extremely different in appearance” (Nakamura, 2011, p. 338). SNSs are visually dominated by “Western standards of beauty” and the heterosexual male gaze persists: similar to offline space, digital space is “dominated by patriarchal, heteronormative belief, fueled by heterosexual masculine fantasy” (Donnelly, 2011, p. 174). Upon introduction, a new application such as the weblog is often discursively constructed as masculine and adult, marginalizing the activities of women and youth, while racialized bodies are still mostly absent as active agents in popular accounts of our globalized techno-cultural world, strengthening the myth of the technological lag of minorities (Everett, 2009, p. 133). Chicanos living in the Mexican-United States borderlands are, for example, often perceived in mainstream discourse as somehow being “culturally handicapped,” displaying a “cultural unfitness” to handle technologies and contribute to digital cultures (Gómez-Peña, 2000, pp. 80-81). Indeed, it is important to remain aware of the “unequal (racialized, gendered) social life of information and its technologies where Euro-American ‘sites’ control the lives, labors, and identities of non-white races across the world” (Nayar, 2010, p. 162). The Eurocentric, Western and white ideologies that guide programming decisions and impact upon representational practices are profit-driven interventions that seek to monetize user-generated content (Schäfer, 2011; Gillespie, 2010; Andrejevic, 2011; Shepherd, 2014).

Thirdly, nonetheless, as space invaders nonmainstream users such as migrant youth continue to use these Internet applications. The #bornhere selfies posted in response to Wilders, transnational communication or the feeling that online one can be among likeminded people in a space of one’s own (see Chapter 2 on forum discussions) illustrate positive affective experiences users have in articulating digital identifications. Affectivity is used here to address the ways in which interactions on a computer screen trigger certain responses in the body of a user. By being affected the emotional state of the user may change. In other words, affect concerns “the passage from one experiential state of the body to another,” resulting from an encounter with another body, technology or text (Massumi in Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. xvii), while emotion “is the biographically specific meaning ascribed” to that passage (Jones, Jackson & Rhys-Taylor, 2014, p. 2). In particular, affect is produced through three interrelated processes: (1) *circulation*, which affect flows through people, text and objects across online and offline space, (2) *accumulation*, the affective sensation that

grows through repetition, and (3) *endurance*, affective responses that can stick to people, texts and objects (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 45, 46, 91). In sum, digital identity performativity can therefore be considered as a multispatial process, taking place within and across socially produced spaces, each with their own habitus formed around their own material, representational and affective dynamics.

3. Moroccan-Dutchness in the context of the Netherlands

Migrant youth seeking to find their place in Europe have to negotiate public suspicions resulting from recent claims about the failure of multiculturalism, anti-immigration sentiments, Islamophobia and fears over urban unrest and riots. Perhaps an excessive example, Wilders's supporters shouting "less Moroccans" during a local election discussed in the opening of the chapter does illustrate the recent "Dutch backlash against multiculturalism," as policies and public opinion have shifted from toleration to repression (Prins & Saharso, 2010). In the Netherlands and elsewhere, parts of the majority population feel threatened by changes in their lives brought about by the forces of globalization that include migration, computerization, neoliberalism, increasing corporate influence, financial instability, consumerism and individualism (Essed & Hoving, 2014). Ethnic strife arises when ethnic-majority groups grow a "fear of small numbers" by distrusting newcomers and bestowing negative meanings upon ethnic minorities (Appadurai, 2006). Immigrant integration has steadily advanced, but Dutch discourse does hardly reflect such facts (Entzinger, 2014). This process can be explained because globalization cannot be countered "but you can attack minorities" (Jaikumar, 2011, p. 235). As Baukje Prins put it "the essential trait of Dutch identity is assumed to be its non-identity, its fluidity, its openness to 'others.'" However, she added,

by assuming that Dutchness is an unmarked (but actually Western, Dutch, white, etc.) category, a subject position that does not strike the eye because it does not differ from modern culture in general, it turns out to coincide with what is considered the norm or normal. Hence, everything non-Dutch gets marked as "other," as different from the norm. (Prins 1997, p. 126)

In the Netherlands, Moroccan-Dutch youth receive a lot of attention in media reporting, governmental policy making and scholarly research.

They are systematically stigmatized and made hyper visible by right-wing journalists and politicians, who frame them as anticitizens that pose a threat to Dutch society (Harchaoui & Huinder, 2003, pp. 7-11; Poorthuis & Salemink, 2011). Prior academic research has predominantly focused on elements of the so-called “Moroccan drama” (Jurgens, 2007), singling out issues like juvenile delinquency, radicalization, mental health problems and early school leaving. Of course, these issues are undeniably important and significant, but they present a narrow understanding of Moroccan-Dutchness. Things are going well for the majority of Moroccan-Dutch youth, but their realities remain largely invisible in contemporary debates. This study aims to contribute to an emerging strand of scholarship that considers everyday experiences of migrant youth in the Netherlands.

The first and most dominant strand of scholarship concerns juvenile delinquency and the overrepresentation of boys of Moroccan-Dutch descent in nuisance and petty crimes (e.g., Van Gemert, 1998; Werdmölder, 2005; De Jong, 2007). Secondly, anti-immigration politicians such as Geert Wilders emphasize that the traditions of the Netherlands, based on secularized Christian-Judaist belief systems are colliding with Islam. Islamic radicalization, in particular, is presented as a major concern after the murder of the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh by radical Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004, an event that can be understood in the wider context of Islamic fundamentalist attacks across the United States and Europe, including the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City. The Muslim minority population is specifically singled out, as the Dutch researchers’ focus is mostly on Islam and not on other religious extremisms (e.g., Slootman & Tilly, 2006). Recently, sensationalist media attention for the Charlie Hebdo murders in Paris (France), the arrest of home-grown Jihadi terrorists in Verviers (Belgium) and Dutch Muslims traveling to Syria and Iraq to fight for the Islamic State (IS) caliphate has added fuel to the fire. The study of mental health problems is a third focus. Second-generation Moroccan-Dutch youth are found to be at risk, as they have a greater chance of developing schizophrenia in comparison with ethnic-majority Dutch youth. Stress caused by stigmatization and culture/language barriers faced in Dutch society as well as specific Moroccan cultural, religious and societal factors are taken to explain this discrepancy. Scholars add that Dutch mental health institutions experience difficulties reaching Moroccan-Dutch people (e.g., Veen et al., 2010; Liberman & Williams, 2010). The fourth theme, early school leaving, concerns studies on uneven unemployment rates, problems in education and reliance on social security benefits (e.g., Heering & ter Bekke, 2008).

These studies all emphasize specific problems that pertain to a small segment of the Moroccan-Dutch community. Playing into the hands of Dutch right-wing anti-immigration parties when taken out of their contexts, these studies may be taken to paint a negative picture of the community as a whole. Scholars with other results have a difficulty of being heard, for instance, Frans Verhagen argues that in contrast to the dominant views of the failed integration of immigrants, the generation of descendants of migrants born in the Netherlands are rapidly advancing toward Dutch national averages in terms of education, language, employment, religion, marriage and birth figures (2010). Indeed, the rhetoric does not correspond with Dutch social reality; as a matter of fact, there is a “growing gap between facts and discourse on immigrant integration in the Netherlands” (Entzinger, 2014, p. 693). A focus on negative depictions may not only foster feelings of unbelonging but may also further worsen the situation by installing disproportionate anxieties over the Moroccan-Dutch community.

This book adds to a new strand of scholarship that aims to capture the rich textures of the everyday lives of Moroccan-Dutch young people. In this strand researchers have, for example, examined parenting styles and socialization patterns (Pels & De Haan, 2003, 2007), coming of age (Ketner, 2010), home making (Stock, 2014), gender relations (Buitelaar, 2007), religiosity (Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006), urban language accents (Nortier & Dorleijn, 2008), the popularity of kick boxing among girls (Rana, 2011), music and youth culture (Gazzah, 2009) and Internet use (Brouwer, 2006a). Below, I further deconstruct the label of “Moroccan-Dutchness” to provide a situated account of the experiences that informants may have.

Deconstructing labels

The category “Moroccan-Dutchness” needs to be unpacked carefully to recognize it is not an ahistorical, homogeneous, singular label. In this book, second-generation Moroccan-Dutch youth are considered as active agents, but I realize “agency is not individual, it is relational.” For example, “children’s actions and choices are codependent on the lives of others, particularly their family members” (Scott, 2014, p. 419). The social categories of ethnicity, language, gender, social stratification, education, living conditions, generation and religion may intersect very differently. Moroccan-Dutch people are the second-largest minority group in the Netherlands, following those of Turkish-Dutch background. With 374,996 people, the Moroccan-Dutch community amounts to 2.2% of the total Dutch population of 16.7 million (CBS, 2014a). Of this group, 45% migrated to the Netherlands from the 1960s

onward as guest workers, while the other 55% were born in the Netherlands, after their parents had migrated (CBS, 2014a).

The 1960s form an important turning point in Dutch migration history, as the focus on colonial migration shifted toward guest workers the Dutch government recruited from various Mediterranean countries (Meijer et al., 2005, pp. vi-vii; Verweij & Bijl, 2012, p. 239). In the early 60s guest workers included Spaniards, Italians and Greeks mostly, while from the early 1970s, Turks and Moroccans outnumbered them. Estimates of the total number of Moroccans living in the diaspora range between 2.5 and 7 million (Loukili, 2007, p. 3). Both Moroccan migrants and the Dutch government expected guest workers to return to their countries of origin after working for a number of years. Especially after the 1973 oil crisis, guest workers increasingly sought to reunite with their family members in the Netherlands. Various factors played a role, such as: having a job while the economic forecasts in their countries of origin looked bleak; getting better accustomed to Dutch life and accruing more rights and realizing they would not be able to return back to the Netherlands upon their departure (Verweij & Bijl, 2012, p. 241).

The majority of guest workers who arrived in the Netherlands originate from the northern Morocco Rif area. They come from places like Al Hoceima, Berkane, Nador and Oujda and their surroundings where a Berber language is spoken.⁴ Currently, 75% of Dutch people of Moroccan decent have ties with the Rif area. In Morocco, Berber languages hold an inferior status to the institutional Moroccan-Arabic (Darija) and French – a colonial remnant – that are dominantly used in urbanized parts of the country.⁵ The Moroccan-Dutch population thus consists of Moroccan Berbers and non-Berbers, speaking a combination of a Berber language and/or French and/or Moroccan-Arabic and/or Dutch. The first language of their Dutch-born children is primarily Dutch (Cottaar & Bouras, 2009; Gazzah, 2010, p. 311).

4 Berber languages include Riffian/Tarafit spoken in the northern Rif Mountains, Tashelhit in the High Atlas and Anti Atlas in southern Morocco and Tamazight in the Middle Atlas in Eastern Morocco.

5 Since the seventh century Arab invasion in Morocco that brought Sunni Islam to Morocco, Amazigh cultures and languages have been marginalized by its rulers and authorities (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2000). Mohamed VI, the present king of Morocco, improved Morocco's human rights record and sought to expand the boundaries to what constitutes Moroccan national identity. Recognizing Amazigh as an official state language next to Arabic, he underlined Berbers are an integral part of the Moroccan social fabric (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 157).

Moroccan guest workers were mostly hired as manual laborers in factories, mines, harbors, textile industry and road construction, accepting jobs of low socio-economic status. The situation is slowly improving among their children, but Moroccan-Dutch people on average tend to live in small houses in relatively segregated, socially and economically deprived neighborhoods compared to the average in the Netherlands (Cottaar & Bouras, 2009; Van Praag & Schoorl, 2008). Moroccan-Dutch women on average also have more children in comparison with ethnic-majority Dutch women, although the generations born in the Netherlands have fewer children in comparison with those who migrated to the Netherlands (Schoorl, 2006, p. 9).

Nearly 50% of the second-generation youth obtain secondary education, and it must be emphasized that this is a remarkable accomplishment when considering a significant number of their parents were illiterate farmers who generally had received little schooling (CBS, 2012, p. 66; De Valk & Crul, 2008, p. 84). However, the educational achievements among Moroccan-Dutch youth are lower in comparison with ethnic-majority Dutch youth at this point. Dutch institutional structures, racist views as well as in-group dynamics form major obstacles to the educational development of Moroccan-Dutch students (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2014b). Poor second-language training, together with particular selection mechanisms result in the fact that a majority of Moroccan-Dutch students are consigned to short, mostly vocational school tracks (CBS, 2012, pp. 75, 82). Unemployment is high among those graduating from these school tracks and Moroccan-Dutch youngsters are hard hit by discrimination in the labor market (Crul & Doomernik, 2003): youth unemployment in the among Moroccan-Dutch youth aged fifteen to twenty-four is a disproportionate 37% in comparison with one in ten among ethnic-majority Dutch youth (Dagevos, Huijnk & Gijsberts, 2014, p. 183).

It has been assumed that Moroccan-Dutch girls perform better in schools in comparison with Moroccan-Dutch boys (Verhagen, 2010, p. 220). In the last years, the number of Moroccan-Dutch girls graduating from educational tracks preparing for higher education and universities is growing at a faster pace in comparison with graduation rates of Moroccan-Dutch boys (CBS, 2014c). The schooling and employment dynamic is complicated further as Moroccan-Dutch fatherhood and motherhood have been found to sometimes operate a gendered “double standard” in the socialization of their children. Daughters are encouraged to pursue an education and to enter the job market but simultaneously parents are sometimes recognized to hold on to the male breadwinner model (Pels & De Haan, 2003, 2007).

Unpacking gender relations further, Moroccan parents are said to emphasize cultural and religious dictums of modesty especially toward their daughters, as boys are traditionally allowed a “wider radius of action outside the house” at the onset of puberty. Generational specificity is thus also gendered, as Moroccan-Dutch girls are sometimes seen as gatekeepers “to maintaining the family honour,” and, Trees Pels and Mariëtte de Haan added, as “they still face the most restrictions, and they spend much of their leisure time with female family members and friends in domestic settings” (2003, pp. 52–61). Moroccan-Dutch parents are sometimes found to be more prohibitive about direct contact with the opposite sex than ethnic-majority Dutch parents. Under the supervision of their parents this contact may be monitored, for girls this may imply they have to avoid bringing shame on themselves in the presence of boys, “i.e. to behave timidly and modestly and to refrain from any looseness in appearance or expression” (Pels & De Haan, 2003, p. 58). Similarly, Moroccan-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch girls often spend a small amount of their spare time outdoors in public spaces, in contrast to Moroccan-Dutch boys who spend a lot of their time there (Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006, p. 27).

This observation has parallels with gendered spatial practices in Morocco. In Morocco, gender norms historically hierarchically govern space: “[S]pace boundaries divide Muslim society into subuniverses: the universe of men (the *umma*, the world of religion and power) and the universe of women, the domestic world of sexuality and the family” (Mernissi, 1987, p. 138). Although the situation is changing, Fatima Sadiqi notes these observations still hold as gender relations dichotomously structure space in Morocco, where public space (such as the street) is reiterated as masculine, as opposed to the private space of feminine domesticity (such as the kitchen) (2003, pp. 85–86).

Perhaps because they spend more time indoors, Moroccan-Dutch girls have been found to turn to the Internet more than boys (Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006, p. 46). Digital technologies are used among descendants of migrants to reinvent traditions while simultaneously seeking to assert their independence and circumvent family norms (Brouwer, 2006a; De Leeuw & Rydin, 2007; Green & Kabir, 2012, pp. 100–101; Alinejad, 2013). Coming of age concurrently with digital media, the literature suggests that these young people in their articulation of digital identities can subvert the gendered reputation-management dichotomy of masculine public versus feminine private space (Graiouid, 2005). Moroccan-Dutch girls sometimes lack access to outdoor informal meeting places, and scholars have observed that the Internet may offer viable alternatives.

In her study on Moroccan-Dutch girls' use of online discussion forums, Lenie Brouwer argues that these "girls are more restricted in their freedom of movement than boys, and thus, the Internet widens their horizons" (2006a). The broadening of their horizon occurs at the crossroads between cultural and religious concerns of their parents and the gendered norms and expectations of contemporary Dutch and global youth culture. For instance, in their dress, Moroccan-Dutch girls are expected to carve out a middle-ground position in choosing from the "headscarf" and "porno chic" clothes that dominate the wider spectrum of youth and fashion in the Netherlands (Duits & Van Zoonen, 2006). Moroccan-Dutch girls have been found to draw upon "multicultural capital" in negotiating chastity, virginity and obedience toward parents cherished within "Moroccan circles" and the peer norms of ethnic-majority Dutch youth. Moroccan-Dutch youth born in the diaspora in general have been found to stake out a middle ground between the specificities of "Dutch individualistic society" and "the collectivistic values" which are said to characterize "Moroccan" or "Islamic culture" (D'Haenens et al., 2004, pp. 73-74; see also Buitelaar, 2007; Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2014c). Finally, it must be noted that in comparison with the other major ethnic-minority communities in the Netherlands, a recent study found Moroccan-Dutch people are the "happiest," they largely feel "healthy," "at home in the Netherlands," "not often discriminated against" and are positive about "identifying with their country of origin" (CBS, 2014d; see also Gokdemir & Dumludag, 2011).

The rise of political Islam in majority Muslim countries, the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City, and the growing visibility of Islam in Europe and the Netherlands "contributed not only to the sudden realization of the Dutch that their country now hosted a substantial number of Muslims, but also the identification of these migrants in religious, rather than ethnic terms. As a result, their culture was also understood and defined as essentially Islamic" (Peters, 2006, p. 3). However, although the majority of Moroccan-Dutch people present themselves as Muslim, the way religiosity is practiced differs widely. Descendants of Moroccan migrants attach less importance to the religious origins of their parents (Maliëpaard, Lubbers & Gijssberts, 2010, p. 466-468; Phalet & ter Wal, 2004, p. 39). Islamic religious practices are becoming a more individual, symbolic and affective experience among Moroccan-Dutch youth (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2014c).

A growing number of young people do not actively practice their religiosity by carrying out religious rituals or visiting mosques but they perform being Muslim as a part of their identity. Islam is performed as a "cool" cultural imaginary (Boubekeur, 2005, p. 12), which gets united with youth cultural

music styles such as rap (LeVine, 2008). Islam is used as a cultural repertoire to give music, fashion, food and lifestyles “an Islamic touch” (Gazzah, 2009, p. 413). Islam is also a source of political struggle. Moroccan-Dutch girls have reportedly chosen to wear a headscarf in response to the politicization of Islam in the Netherlands (Gazzah, 2010, p. 312; Nabben, Yeşilgöz & Korf, 2006). In a recent survey among Muslim girls in the Netherlands, nine out of ten respondents stated to have proudly chosen to wear a headscarf, and one-third reported their headscarf is a “fashion statement” (Knaap, Stoeper & Wegloop, 2011, p. 40). Muslim women stake out their identities vis-à-vis two general prejudiced discourses that seek to discipline them (Piela, 2012, pp. 2-3). In the (neo)Orientalist discourse, Muslim women, especially those wearing the hijab, are represented as backward, irrational, silent and subjugated by Muslim male oppressors (Said, 1979; Afshar, 2008). In the conservative patriarchal Islamist discourse, women are also essentialized, albeit differently. This latter discourse foregrounds the role reserved for Western women as sex objects and places it in contrast to the rights granted to Muslim women within their families by Islam (Piela, 2012).

A focus on everyday practices offers much-needed nuance. For example, sixteen-year-old Naoul shared: “*I follow my own path.*” Similarly Loubna, a fourteen-year-old interviewee, illustrates that sweeping remarks should be treated with caution. She reports a variety of experiences in her personal autonomy and radius of action: “*In terms of culture, my background is Moroccan, but I do go out and visit the cinema, I go to the city and buy clothes. Those are things I also love.*” Digital practices allow for innovative negotiations of the specific intersection of gender, religiosity and generation experienced among second-generation migrant youth, as is evident from the Meryam’s narrative:

I was born and raised here in the Netherlands, but my father emigrated to the Netherlands together with my grandfather when he was eighteen years old. He has taken Moroccan customs to the Netherlands and he uses them here. I think the habits of my parents are just very old-fashioned, even though they do try to learn the customs of the Netherlands. My parents were raised much stricter in terms of religion. My parents do teach me many things about our belief, but most of the time I go on and look up things about Islam myself. This is different from what they did: listening to the stories of their parents and copying those.

Thus, it is impossible to speak of a singular and homogeneous label of Moroccan-Dutchness, as various divisional lines position individuals differently.

Similarly, I recognize that the ethnic-majority label of “Dutchness” must also be critically unpacked to reveal its constructedness around notions of Calvinism, secularized Judeo-Christian traditions, the Dutch language and whiteness (Essed & Hoving, 2014). The fierce debates spurred by a recent speech delivered by Dutch Princess Máxima, born in Argentina, reveal that the category of Dutchness is neither ahistorical nor homogeneous. In the speech she spoke about her personal search to find “the Dutch identity.” Causing controversy she stated “*the* Dutch identity, however? No, I didn’t find it.” Rather, she emphasized her multilayered identity: “I have different loyalties and I am a citizen of the world, a European and a Dutchwoman” and claims “human identity and affiliation cannot be fenced off.” She concludes by stating “the Netherlands is too complex to sum up in one cliché.”⁶ Princess Máxima was strongly criticized for claiming – from an elite position – that there is no singular, bounded Dutch identity. Having the luxury to be able to define her own position, she first deconstructs Dutchness and subsequently chooses her own categories. Criticizing Máxima’s speech, right-wing anti-immigration politicians expressed their fears over Muslim migrants not assimilating enough into “the Dutch national identity” and changing the traditional fabric of Dutch society.⁷

6 These excerpts were taken from a speech Princess Máxima delivered on September 24, 2007, to celebrate the release of a study on Dutch national identities by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). In her speech, she foregrounds that people do not embody a singular Dutch identity but they rather identify with the Netherlands, a process that “leaves room for development. And for diversity.” She explains her view by arguing her personal identification is multilayered: “I do not know what it is like to be a Dutchwoman.... Buenos Aires, New York, Brussels, The Hague, Wassenaar.... Different places and the people who live there have become a part of my life.” She also stressed the economic potential of an ethnically diverse society. She emphasized the point that people in the Netherlands think too much according to divisional lines: “Birds of a feather flock together. But the Netherlands is not like the zoo Artis [Artis in Amsterdam is the oldest Animal zoo in the Netherlands]. Diversity and mixing give us strength” (my translations from Dutch, RVD, 2007).

7 Critiques of this speech also mark the gradual demise of earlier Dutch multicultural policies oriented toward welcoming newcomers by allowing them to retain their cultural heritage. Initially, different cultural affiliations were not seen as conflicting with one’s ability to integrate and participate in Dutch society. Neorealist politicians dismissed this policy as a failure. Proponents of the earlier policies were increasingly framed as elite politicians who were unable to recognize the concerns and fears of “the Dutch people” about “strangers.” The years between 1950 and 1970 have been recognized as a period of nonintervention. From the 1980s onward multiculturalism policies of “integration while retaining one’s own culture” were oriented toward emancipation by improving the social, economic and legal positions of migrants. Policies have changed and newcomers now have to abide by strict requirements; they are increasingly forced to assimilate and relegate their ethnic/religious migrant cultural

In sum, in this section I argued labels such as “Moroccan-Dutch” and “Dutch” are inherently political and emerge from a variety of intersecting interests, including race, ethnicity, religion, gender and generation. Although Princess Máxima pointed at their socially constructed fabric, categories are often strategically used as each other’s opposites. The terms are used to normalize a particular set of hierarchical power relations – for instance, right-wing anti-Islam politicians define ethnic-majority Dutchness by emphasizing that Islam cannot be a part of it. The power of definition is used to create an opposition between Dutchness and Islam.

4. The transnational habitus of second-generation migrant youth: From roots to routes

Although this is still an underresearched topic, it is to be expected that studies of migrant children’s use of ICTs will reflect the particular circumstances of the child as a young person growing up in a family and struggling to assert their independence.

– Lelia Green & Nahid Kabir (2012, p. 101)

In this section I focus on how second-generation migrant youth use digital media to form a particular “transnational habitus” (Nedelcu, 2012) shaped by their parents who migrated themselves but also shaped by the society in which they grow up. Transnationalism is not a “one-generation phenomenon” (Mainsah, 2011, p. 203), rather the second generation develops distinct cultural repertoires, skill sets and social networks needed to navigate their local and transnational social fields (Levitt, 2009; Wessendorfer, 2013). Studies on acculturation show that people who have migrated themselves are primarily focused on acquiring a solid social-economic position, while identity issues play a large role for their descendants (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder, 2006). However, in contrast to claims made by anti-immigrant politicians, having transnational connections do not mean migrants are excluded from their local host society: multiple identifications can be combined, “belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of a zero-sum game based on a single place” (Vertovec, 2009, p. 78). Migrants’ digital media use exemplifies this two-folded dynamic. Once understood

heritages to the private domain (Prins, 2010; see also Scheffer, 2007; Van der Stoep, 2009; Verweij & Bijl, 2012, pp. 240-245).

as doubly absent, as migrants were said to be not here, nor there (Sayad, 1999), they are noted to benefit from networking opportunities, allowing them to become “connected migrants”; enabled “to be here and there at the same time” they maintain local connections and connections with elsewhere (Diminescu, 2008, p. 572). In *ICT for the Social and Economic Integration of Migrants into Europe* Christiano Codagnone and Stefano Kluzer note that digital technologies “provide no ‘magic bullet’ solution to social exclusion” but more importantly, the authors empirically sustain the “mixed embeddedness” of many ethnic minorities that suggest technologies are both used as “bonding” social capital to link up with “coethnics” across the host society and diaspora, as well as “bridging” social capital to connect across communities (2011, pp. 10-12). This book provides further proof that second-generation migrant youth use ICTs to develop a “transnational habitus” that is distinct from their parents. Although they can be expected to socially reproduce to a great extent their parental dispositions, there are also many generation-specific “mechanisms through which migrants manage multiplicity and develop transnational and cosmopolitan skills whether emotional, analytical, creative, communication or functional” (Nedelcu, 2012, pp. 1345-1346). In particular, I focus on the generation-specific ways of being and culturally constructed social dispositions that include transnational engagements across large distances but also include local orientations toward cosmopolitan cohabitation.

On a theoretical level, combining orientations toward elsewheres as well as local contexts implies migrants have to balance two modes of cultural identification. The first mode includes cultural identification with one’s “roots” (Gilroy, 1993a): a cohesive collective of coethnics, vital for feeling a sense of community belonging:

The first position defines ‘cultural identity’ in terms of one, shared culture, a sort of collective ‘one true self’.... within the terms of this definition, our cultural identities reflect our common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as “one people,” with stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divisions and vicissitudes of actual history. (Hall, 1990, p. 223)

“Routes,” the second mode, acknowledges the processual character of cultural identification shaped by active encounters (Gilroy, 1993a). “Identity, in this second sense, is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being.’ It belongs to the future as much as the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture” (Hall, 1990, p. 225).

Transnational communication practices illustrate the workings of cultural identification with one's roots. These practices of dispersed people networking across distance have received most attention from media, communication and migration scholars. A pioneering study by Daniel Miller and Don Slater focused on the Trinidadian diaspora. They describe how "de Rumshop Lime," a collective online chat room, was used by young people at home and abroad to "lime," meaning to chat and hang out (2000, p. 88). Subsequently, for example, transnational communication among Basque (Oiarzabal, 2013), Chinese (Parker & Song, 2009), Greek (Georgiou, 2006), Filipino (Madianou & Miller, 2012), Indian (Mallapragada, 2006), Inuit (Christensen, 2003), Italian (Wessendorfer, 2013), Mexican (Byrne, 2008), Nigerian (Everett, 2009), Romanian (Nedelcu, 2009; Trandafoiu, 2013); Somali (Leurs, 2014a) and South Asian migrants (Gajjala & Gajjala, 2008; Mitra, 2004) have been documented.

During my fieldwork, fourteen-year-old Loubna described how her whole family lives in Tetouan, northern Morocco, except members of her household and her two nephews. "*I cannot do without Morocco*" she shared. "*Everyday*" she has contact with her family members in Morocco. Together with her mother and siblings she sits in front of the computer: "*We talk to them using Skype, especially now that my grandmother is ill.*" Loubna and her household use Skype to sympathize with family members in the diaspora. Such practices are indicative of "ICT-mediated ordinary copresence routines" that enable transnational emotional support and care (Nedelcu & Wyss, forthcoming 2016). Copresence routines may affectively sustain feelings of "ontological security," a stable sense of continuous everyday being which provides "confidence" in "self-identity" (Giddens, 1990, p. 92). Myria Georgiou, in her study of transnational television viewing among Arab speakers in Europe, expressed that migrant "individuals have increasingly grounded their sense of ontological security on relational networks, which are often dislocated from the immediate locality" (2012, p. 307). Everyday affective forms of digital connectivity may become an emotional resource in the lives of migrants as they may accrue value in the form of "transnational affective capital" (Leurs, 2014a). It should be added that transnational communication, however, is appreciated mostly as a cheap and easy way of making do with difficulties involved in living at distance. It is not felt as a proper replacement for physically attending significant life events such births, deaths and weddings. Interestingly however, most informants did not engage in transnational communication themselves. Badr, a fourteen-year-old boy, explained his family has migrated from Morocco to countries across Europe, including Belgium, Germany, France, Spain and Denmark.

He described how he sometimes talks to his nephews who live in Belgium and Germany, but mostly his parents make use of Skype to talk to family members in the diaspora. They do not know how the program works, so he assists them in setting up the connection. Transnational communication was especially prevalent among parents and those interviewees who were themselves born in Morocco.

Second-generation migrants add a routed layer to transnationalism. Routed diaspora identifications result from ongoing processes “of movement and mediation” (Gilroy, 1993a, p. 19). Descendants of migrants appropriate transnationalism that can be symbolized and, for example, be digitally circulated as distinct markers of identification (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2011b). For example, South Asian-Americans (and Brits), Japanese-Peruvian and Moroccan-Dutch youth branding themselves as “Desi,” “Nikkei” and “Mocro,” respectively, signal symbolic transnational affiliations grounded in their (nationally and globally) situated contexts. These affiliations do not concern actual transnational communication practices but concern symbolic representations of transnational diaspora ties: diaspora aesthetics. In the YouTube video *You Are Not an Indian*, Pharag Khanna describes the self-branding label of Desi: “You do not know the backstreets of Karachi or Bombay. Chances are if you go over there, they treat you as an American. You like to think of yourself as an Indian, but you are not, you are Desi, you are of South Asia not from South Asia” (Mallapragada, 2006). Youth of South Asian descent in the United States and the United Kingdom have been found to identify with the label “Desi” (Maira, 2002). Translated from Sanskrit, the word means “those from the homeland” (Mallapragada, 2006, p. 217). Instead of, or next to, having Skype conversations with South Asians in the diaspora, youth of South Asian origins living outside South Asia identify as Desi. Young people include the term “Desi” in their nicknames on social networking sites like Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. Others consume “Desi” youth cultural products such as music by M.I.A., the Sri Lankan Tamil urban recording artist from the UK. Secondly; the label “Nikkei” directs our attention to Japanese migrant youth in the diaspora.⁸ Shana Aoyama found that the social networking site Hi5.com is taken up in Peru by young people of Japanese descent as an avenue for identity construction using the label

8 The word “Nikkei” originally related to a particular generation of Japanese-descended person in diaspora, at least in North America, terms like “Isei” and “Nikkei” refer to specific generations. There, Nikkei has a particular resonance inseparable from the experience in internment camps. However, over time and across space, the meaning of the term has been extended.

“Nikkei.” She found both group confirmation based on the performance of Nikkei-ness as well as expressions of individuality (2007).

Similar to Desis and Nikkei, “Mocro” refers to another expression of binational consciousness. Mocros initiated a new branch in urban youth culture in Europe. Above I mentioned the term “Mocro” was used as one of the hashtags in the #bornhere Twitter campaign alongside tags like #proud-moroccan. The term was incorporated within mainstream Dutch youth culture After Ali B., a Moroccan-Dutch hip-hop recording artist, released a music single in 2005 called *Crazy Mocro Flavour* that reached the higher levels of Dutch music charts. The term “Mocro” originated on the streets of the Netherlands during the late 1990s and is now commonly seen as a Dutch honorary nickname for people of Moroccan-Dutch descent. “Moker,” “Maroc” and “Mocro” are Moroccan-Dutch self-identification labels that are commonly used online (Boumans, 2002, p. 15). For instance, Amir, a sixteen-year-old informant, is a hip-hop fanatic who listens to Moroccan-Dutch artists like Ali B., Yes-R, Ree B. and Soesi B. He self-identifies as “Mocro”; in his e-mail address, for example, he combines his first name with the word “Mocro.” Similarly, fifteen-year-old Meryam includes “mocrogirl” in her e-mail address. Across digital spaces like the Dutch social networking site Hyves and the discussion forum Marokko.nl, users go by nicknames such as “My own Mocro styly,” “Mocro-licious,” “Mocro-boy” and “Miss_MocroLady.” A cursory glance at such nicknames displays how “Mocro” itself is often also already multilayered, as the term is often combined with age, gender, sexual preference, religious, sport, music, and generationally specific cultural affiliations. Chapter 3 further examines nicknaming practices from the perspective of intersectional digital identity performativity.

Desi-ness, Mocro-ness, and Nikkei-ness are common collective identification markers that are not just straightforward nationalisms. They refer back to different homelands, while simultaneously they also clearly mark one’s situation of being routed outside of this homeland. Digital diasporas may no longer be understood simply in terms of having transnational conversations with people in the diaspora. Those born in the diaspora engage in digital practices of branding themselves by circulating diaspora aesthetics, which reshuffle traditional understandings of origin and belonging. Contemporary youthful digital diaspora identifications are therefore far more complex in their engagement with digital media than most existing theory allows: connections are hybridized, and affiliations are turned into practices of branding diaspora consciousness. When taken up, these labels signal in-between or “liminal” positions (Bhabha, 1994).

In postcolonial studies, in-between positions are recognized as a source of differential and multivocal cultural production. Liminal positions, for example, increasingly leave their mark on transnationally circulating cultural objects, such as food, cinema, music, and fashion. Second-generation Desi, Mocro and Nikkei youth, in their cultural production and identity constructions, innovatively articulate new imaged forms of digital diasporas. Digital diasporas can no longer solely be understood simply only in terms of how migrants connect to a clearly marked transnational community. Indeed, a contemporary understanding of diasporas and transnationalisms pays attention “to actual physical migration but makes room also for imagined, discursive, material, cultural, virtual and socially networked places and travels” (Knott, 2010, p. 79). Second-generation migrant youth are imagining affiliations through context-specific transnational representations of diaspora branding, which reshuffle traditional understandings of origin and belonging. Such networked branding includes expressing diaspora identities that are communal and individual but also situated locally, transnationally and globally. Their diaspora aesthetics are also shaped by multicultural encounters in the wider domain of global youth culture.

5. Hypertextual selves: Digital conviviality

As the cultural identifications among second-generation migrant youth are increasingly “routed” in their local, transnational and global contexts, the question arises to what they identify across cultural differences, and, in particular, how they do so using digital media? With this book, I aim to emphasize the societal and academic significance of analyzing youth cultures and digital space by zooming in on the everyday “conviviality” of cohabitation, bottom-up multiculturalism that understands “multiculture [as] an ordinary feature of social life” (Gilroy, 2005, p. xv). Youth cultures, in particular, are political since they foster hybridity at the crossroads of local, transnational and global orientations. Also, being organized around age and generation, youth cultures may challenge “the logic of racial, national and ethnic essentialism” (Gilroy, 1993b, p. 6). Beyond state-managed attempts at antiracism, everyday youth cultural interactions between people of different backgrounds may showcase conviviality and cosmopolitanism, generating potential for contesting racism and nationalism.

As is the case for most migrants, most of the informants live in urban centers in the Netherlands. As cities are always in process, subject to flows of people, goods, ideas, money, etc., its inhabitants have to learn to live

together with people unlike them. City dwellers have to make do with living in the copresence and close proximity of racial, religious and cultural others. Building on Doreen Massey's concept, they have to negotiate a situation of "throwntogetherness": urban space can be characterized by the "contemporaneous existence of a plurality of trajectories," as inhabitants claim their position in the city, cultural difference is present in an intense "simultaneity of stories-so-far" (Massey, 2005, p. 11). As cultural identification increasingly takes place both offline and online, we can expect that online too a situation of "digital throwntogetherness" (Leurs, 2014b) will have to be negotiated. As personal trajectories are increasingly digitized, a great variety of stories is published across social media platforms by a growingly diverse user base. Therefore the micro-politics of presence, encounter and cultural difference also increasingly takes place online.

6. Structure of the book

The rationale of this book is to present a cartography of the performative practices of identification of Moroccan-Dutch youth across four different Internet field sites. In each of the four case studies one platform is singled out and grasped through a conceptual lens to account for the specificities of digital cultural identification processes and habituated dispositions of that particular space. Throughout the analyses, points of overlap, convergences, as well as differences across the spaces are noted. Following the preferences of the Moroccan-Dutch informants, four favorite spaces were chosen for analysis: forums, instant messaging, social networking sites and video-sharing platforms. The chapters are arranged in chronological order, the use of online discussion forums originated in the early 1990s, instant messaging began to take off in the mid-1990s, social networking sites became popular from the early 2000s onward, while video-sharing platforms like YouTube became fashionable after 2005. The emergence of a new platform did not lead to the fall of older applications, and the informants frequent these different digital territories next to one another. The four field sites do not exist in isolation but are inextricably connected. User practices travel and intertextually borrow from one another, facilitated by their digital formatting that include visual, textual and audio content and forms.

By emphasizing specificities of digital practices within and across these platforms, the continuities and changes that digital identity performances undergo over time and space are laid bare. My multispatial approach to identification therefore explores the different dimensions to how

Moroccan-Dutch youth become space invaders as they are positioned and interpellated but also strategically and tactically take up resources across applications to make multiaxial identity claims. Acknowledging that space invasion can be both a positive and negative experience, the case studies give more body to the middle ground perspective acknowledging digital identifications as specifically spatially hailed, situated and articulated.

In Chapter 1, methodological considerations are given and the empirical research process will be demystified. By outlining the creative collision of different methodological approaches I will locate myself within the continuum of social scientists' empiricism and humanities scholars' postmodern rejections of essentialism. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, different accounts of everyday identification through digital media use can be gathered. More specifically I introduce the decisions made and difficulties encountered in gathering and triangulating different sorts of empirical data. I combine large-scale surveys, in-depth interviews and observations of digital practices. These different partial, situated and contingent accounts allow me to construct a nuanced study. In the chapter I will present a reflexive account of the power relations I experienced. I will elaborate upon my efforts to avoid the pitfalls of speaking for the young informants and explain how I study digital practices and performativity of self with them.

In Chapter 2 I will argue how message boards such as Marokko.nl and Chaima.nl are taken up to narrate collective voices and identities. These discussion boards are used to maintain a national network of Moroccan-Dutch youth. The chapter zooms in on how informants discuss their gender, ethnic and religious positioning. First I consider the specific appeal among girls by considering how message boards are taken up to negotiate gendered issues of love, relationships, marriage and sexuality. Second, I consider what informants say about their experiences of power in reflecting and articulating their collective voice with regards to the situation of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. Considering message boards as viable "subaltern counterpublics," these semi-hidden discursive safe zones display how hegemonic views are contested. Third, message boards are recognized as communicative spaces used to dynamically perform versions of Islam.

Chapter 3 provides a window into the private identities and personal engagements of Moroccan-Dutch teens with their peers on instant messaging (IM). Instant messaging remains a relatively understudied and undertheorized social media technology because data gathering within this private space is not straightforward. The medium-specificity of IM is recognized to structure the performativity of self both with display names in view of a full audience of contacts through which informants

communicate communal ethnic, gender and youth cultural belongings to people they have added to their friend lists and as an under-the-radar activity of one-on-one chat conversations through which they articulate their individual, private and intimate identity expressions.

In Chapter 4 the focus is on selfies and hypertextual identifications on social networking sites. The chapter zooms in on two dimensions of visual representation. I address first how and why social networking site profile photos are imbued with gender and sexuality. As a way to brand the self, the particular ways of showing that get encouraged in profile photos signal specific power relations and expose forms of patriarchal subordination. Additionally I consider how hyperlinking – as a way to signal affiliations – offers the means to represent one's multiple self and belongingness. Hypertext is taken as an optic through which to address questions of identity differentiation and multicultural encounter. The perspective of hypertextual selves is elaborated further to innovatively map the ways in which Moroccan-Dutch youth mobilize various linked resources. Beyond institutional policies of multiculturalism, hypertextual selves exemplify how multiculturalism is a feature in young people's everyday conviviality of cohabitation.

In Chapter 5, the focus will be on affective dimensions of identification observable in interviewees' consumption of YouTube videos. In particular, the preference for two genres of YouTube youth culture will be considered. First, the affective engagement with diasporic videos shot in Morocco is unpacked. I discern the emotional workings of these videos as a form of affective transnational networking. Subsequently, accepting that viewing practices open up diverse subject positions, corporate music video clips are interpreted as resources to land global, transnational and national youth cultural flows. The analysis of the affective geographies of belonging the informants negotiate while watching YouTube videos presents another invocation of how identities become distributed, challenging essentialist representations of Moroccan-Dutch youth.

In the concluding chapter I synthesize the main findings, and consider broader consequences of quotidian multispatial digital cultural identification processes of Moroccan-Dutch youth. While navigating their selfhood between conflicting youth cultural, familial, gendered, religious and ethno-cultural motivations, digital practices expand the parameters of their social and physical worlds. By exploring whether digital forms of emancipation that I located in various corners of the Internet also cross over to the majorities in Dutch society, I consider wider implications for thinking about digital multiculturalism.