Re-entry

Claudio Baraldi; Giancarlo Corsi; Elena Esposito

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Re-entry

Claudio Baraldi
Claudio Baraldi

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, Giancarlo Corsi
Giancarlo Corsi

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and Elena Esposito
Elena Esposito

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De Gruyter De Gruyter Brill | Google Scholar

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This chapter is in the book Unlocking Luhmann

Re-entryThe concept of re-entry describes the ability of autopoietic systems [→Au-topoiesis]—which are differentiated on the basis of a distinction that allowsthe production of the unity of the system— to introduce this distinction intothemselves and to use it to structure their operations. It is a re-entry if, forinstance, a functional system differentiated on the basis of the particular dis-tinction of its→codelearns how to process this distinction internally: for in-stance, if the scientific system, whose operations are oriented to the codetrue/untrue, develops a scientific theory that observes the use of the codetrue/untrue using the code true/untrue. Epistemological reflection is the re-entry of the distinction true/untrue into the system established on the basisof this distinction: thus, there is a scientific operation in which the truth ofscientific operations—i.e., the truth of the distinction true/untrue—is ques-tioned. In this way, a situation arises in which the distinction is simultane-ouslythesame(whenitistheparticulardistinctionofthatsystemoperations)and different (when it is the observed distinction). The problem that followsfrom this situation is how to handle this→paradoxwithout being blocked byit. The problem of re-entry is the “otherness of the same”: the necessity ofprocessing the same distinction as if it were a different one.Re-entry indicates the “re-introduction” of a distinction into a domainthat is differentiated by the distinction itself.The term is derived from GeorgeSpencer Brown’s logical calculus [→Operation/Observation], a feature of whichis that it is based exclusively on the operation of indication/distinction. Sys-tems theory interprets this operation as observation: something is indicatedand at the same time distinguished from others things. The connections be-tween operations within one and the same system lead to the construction ofever more complex forms, until the point at which the calculus has reacheda sufficient level of complexity. Then the system includes an operation that,in place of an external object, again indicates the system-constituting opera-

196 Unlocking Luhmanntion of indication/distinction,i.e.,the same operation that the operation itselfrealizes.Through recourse to time, the system is able to process this operationwithin itself. It is then possible to produce an (observational) operation thatdistinguishes its own distinction from something else—i.e., an operation inwhich the distinction appears twice,both as a system-specific distinction andas a running distinction; as observing distinction and observed distinction.Here we have a re-entry.The concept of re-entry is useful first and foremost in order to tackle theissue of the→paradox, because it shows how a system can neutralize para-doxes through recourse to the temporal sequence of its operations. It is alsouseful because it allows the possible binary distinctions [→Code] to be discrim-inated in terms of which of them are appropriate for guiding the autopoiesisof a system. Only distinctions capable of re-entry enable a minimal level ofcomplexity to be overcome in the construction of a system. These distinctionsare capable of processing the unity of the distinction on one of their sides.Onesuchexampleisthedistinctionsystem/environment:oncethesystemhasreached a certain level of complexity,it is able to tackle the question of its ownrelationshiptotheenvironment.Thecapacityforre-entrysetsthisdistinctionapart from alternatives such as, for instance, the distinction whole/parts. Ifwe only had the distinction between the whole and its parts, it would not bepossible to take the surplus into account, which makes the whole more thanthe mere sum of its parts. In order to qualify this surplus, we would need aterm defined independently of the opposition of parts and whole: we wouldneed recourse to another distinction.[E.E.]Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990: 83 ff., 479 ff.); The Paradox of Observ-ing Systems (1995); Observing Reentries (1993).

Re-entryThe concept of re-entry describes the ability of autopoietic systems [→Au-topoiesis]—which are differentiated on the basis of a distinction that allowsthe production of the unity of the system— to introduce this distinction intothemselves and to use it to structure their operations. It is a re-entry if, forinstance, a functional system differentiated on the basis of the particular dis-tinction of its→codelearns how to process this distinction internally: for in-stance, if the scientific system, whose operations are oriented to the codetrue/untrue, develops a scientific theory that observes the use of the codetrue/untrue using the code true/untrue. Epistemological reflection is the re-entry of the distinction true/untrue into the system established on the basisof this distinction: thus, there is a scientific operation in which the truth ofscientific operations—i.e., the truth of the distinction true/untrue—is ques-tioned. In this way, a situation arises in which the distinction is simultane-ouslythesame(whenitistheparticulardistinctionofthatsystemoperations)and different (when it is the observed distinction). The problem that followsfrom this situation is how to handle this→paradoxwithout being blocked byit. The problem of re-entry is the “otherness of the same”: the necessity ofprocessing the same distinction as if it were a different one.Re-entry indicates the “re-introduction” of a distinction into a domainthat is differentiated by the distinction itself.The term is derived from GeorgeSpencer Brown’s logical calculus [→Operation/Observation], a feature of whichis that it is based exclusively on the operation of indication/distinction. Sys-tems theory interprets this operation as observation: something is indicatedand at the same time distinguished from others things. The connections be-tween operations within one and the same system lead to the construction ofever more complex forms, until the point at which the calculus has reacheda sufficient level of complexity. Then the system includes an operation that,in place of an external object, again indicates the system-constituting opera-

196 Unlocking Luhmanntion of indication/distinction,i.e.,the same operation that the operation itselfrealizes.Through recourse to time, the system is able to process this operationwithin itself. It is then possible to produce an (observational) operation thatdistinguishes its own distinction from something else—i.e., an operation inwhich the distinction appears twice,both as a system-specific distinction andas a running distinction; as observing distinction and observed distinction.Here we have a re-entry.The concept of re-entry is useful first and foremost in order to tackle theissue of the→paradox, because it shows how a system can neutralize para-doxes through recourse to the temporal sequence of its operations. It is alsouseful because it allows the possible binary distinctions [→Code] to be discrim-inated in terms of which of them are appropriate for guiding the autopoiesisof a system. Only distinctions capable of re-entry enable a minimal level ofcomplexity to be overcome in the construction of a system. These distinctionsare capable of processing the unity of the distinction on one of their sides.Onesuchexampleisthedistinctionsystem/environment:oncethesystemhasreached a certain level of complexity,it is able to tackle the question of its ownrelationshiptotheenvironment.Thecapacityforre-entrysetsthisdistinctionapart from alternatives such as, for instance, the distinction whole/parts. Ifwe only had the distinction between the whole and its parts, it would not bepossible to take the surplus into account, which makes the whole more thanthe mere sum of its parts. In order to qualify this surplus, we would need aterm defined independently of the opposition of parts and whole: we wouldneed recourse to another distinction.[E.E.]Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990: 83 ff., 479 ff.); The Paradox of Observ-ing Systems (1995); Observing Reentries (1993).