

Internationalism or National Separatism. The Relationship Between Košice Social Democracy and Czechoslovakia 1918–1919*

Attila Simon

Power interests after the First World War and the altered aspirations of the Habsburg monarchy after self-determination fundamentally changed ethnic ratios in Central Europe, and thereby created a wholly new regional situation. Yet the establishment of new borders failed to resolve the region's ethnic problems, for although most of the newly emerged countries were defined as 'nation states', in reality these multi-ethnic countries had numerous problems. The ratio of national minorities was 28% in Romania, 31% in Poland, 26% in Yugoslavia and 35% in Czechoslovakia¹ – while the latter country's national unity was merely a fiction.

Various national scenarios came to light after the First World War ended, including the plan for German-Austria, Hungarian efforts to restore the pre-war status, and a Central European Federation plan dreamt up by the Hungarian minister of nationalities 1918–1919, Oszkár Jászi. The clear frontrunner, however, was the Czech project to restore the Czech state and enlarge its historical borders. In terms of Czech politics, this 'Czechoslovakia' was understood as a rebirth of the former Kingdom of Bohemia, but slightly larger, while the Czechoslovak Republic also included areas in particular with significant Hungarian and German population.

Hungarians who came to Czechoslovakia – and who maintained a strong sense of affiliation to the idea of Hungary – found it very hard to identify with the new situation. Since Czechoslovakia's foundational constitutional status had been considered a mere stop-gap. Hungarians initially felt rejection within Czechoslovakia, and this was reinforced by constant Hungarian revisionist propaganda and by the insensitive and dictatorial behaviour of the Czech state towards minorities. Hungarians gradually came to terms with the new reality after Czechoslovakia's final borders were



Fig. 1: The Honvéd memorial in Košice, reminiscent of the Hungarian revolution of 1848/49 against the domination of the Austrian Habsburgs. The memorial was built in 1906.

recognised, and as the Czechoslovak state gained economic and political resilience. This held true for the entire political spectrum within the Hungarian minority – including Hungarian social democrats.

While social democracy is generally considered an internationalist movement, within this left-wing movement – alongside the typical conflict between right and left wings – internationalism and nationalism were already at loggerheads in the early twentieth century.² This issue gained significance during the First World War, when most left-wing movements assumed the nationalist discourse and joined the pro-war faction. Such movements justified this position as being only a short-term measure, promising to return to business-as-usual proletarian internationalism after the war.³ But it is now clear that this generally did not happen, and the post-war years in several countries – including Czechoslovakia – brought about a further strengthening of nationalist tendencies.

Although the Kingdom of Hungary that existed until 1918 was a multinational state in which national Hungarians represented approximately 50% of the population, the country's political elite consisted exclusively of Hungarians and of those willing to assimilate into Hungary. This was also true of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary, which until the war's end retained the idea of a united Hungarian state and only provided incomplete and unsatisfactory responses to demands from non-Hungarian workers.⁴ Although the extraordinary party conference of 13 October 1918 approved a programme centred around the country's democratisation, representatives of the Slovak social democrats – grouped into the Slovak executive committee of social democrats – did not participate in the meeting. As they had already discussed

the issue of a common Czech-Slovak state with other Slovak political subjects, they strongly disagreed with the way in which the headquarters of the Budapest social democrats supported the integrity of Hungary.⁵

At end of the First World War, the area of present-day Slovakia was an organisationally unified yet nationally divided social democracy. The break-up of Hungary and the emergence of successor states continued apace, with each social democratic organisation responding to the new situation in accordance with its national affiliation: Slovak organisations supported the rise of Czechoslovakia, German and Hungarian organisations insisted they wanted to belong to Hungary. Within the social democratic framework – in territories from Hungary to Czechoslovakia – a fissure developed that turned these recent allies into adversaries.

In this study, I wish to present some points in this process through the example of Košice (Kassa, Kaschau) social democracy. I will primarily concentrate on how Košice social democracy responded to events in late 1918 and early 1919, and how such events influenced relations with the newly-established Czechoslovak Republic.

The history of Košice's social democracy is particularly interesting because this city has always been central to Hungarian-Slovak historical debates, which both parties wish to exploit for themselves. Discussions about Košice largely centre around the city's ethnic composition, often on the basis of contradictory censuses. Originally German, from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century this city witnessed oscillating ethnic majorities: Slovak in 1880, Hungarian in 1910, Slovak in 1930, and Hungarian once again in 1938.⁶ Although conventional ethnic historiographies have failed to explain the contradictory results of individual censuses, we now know that the key is the Košice population's tendency to switch between ethno-identification codes. This multilingual-based ability enabled residents to select their declared nationality in accordance with the current political and economic situation, as well as social circumstances and interests.⁷

In terms of this current study, it is important to point out that although at the time of the state coup, i.e. late 1918/early 1919, numerous Slovaks lived in Košice. As the young Slovak historian Ondrej Ficeri



Fig. 2: The pedestal of the demolished Honvéd memorial on 17 March 1919 with Czechoslovak soldiers.

points out, such Slovaks had not yet been involved in the ethnicisation of the Slovak-speaking population⁸ and they did not comprise a municipal community with political goals or bodies. Hence not only Hungarian but also contemporary Slovak sources refer to Košice as a city with a Hungarian character, where the Hungarian language was predominantly spoken on the streets and whose population was emotionally associated with the concept of a Hungarian state.⁹

The city's character naturally had a significant impact on local social democracy, which as the Upper Hungarian Social Democratic Party functioned as a distinct regional organisation of the Social Democratic Party of Hungary. The Košice hinterland was more Slovak than Hungarian, yet the Upper Hungarian social democratic leadership was solely Hungarian. However (as Frank Henschel indicates), although Košice social democrats were strongly attached to the idea of a Hungarian state, they were also familiar with foreign ideas of internationalism as well as multilingualism.¹⁰

In the present study I will therefore address Košice social democracy as an ethnic Hungarian organisation, and through that example I will seek to present the resulting dilemmas for Košicean as well as generally Hungarian social democracy in Czechoslovakia. I shall focus only on how Košice social democracy responded to three key events: the war's end and the establishment of Czechoslovakia; the city's occupation by the Czechoslovak army and the consolidation of new power; and the declaration of the Hungarian Republic and the struggle between Hungarian Bolsheviks and Czechoslovakia.

On 27 October 1918, Gyula Andrassy (1860-1929) the Younger (the Austro-Hungarian monarchy's minister of foreign affairs) wrote to US President Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) to request a separate peace for the monarchy and recognition of Yugoslavs' and Czechoslovaks' right of self-determination. Almost immediately, however, the situation in Central Europe changed dramatically. On 28 October, Czechoslovakia's independence was proclaimed in Prague, and two days later, in Turčiansky Svätý Martin, the Slovak political elite released the Declaration of the Slovak Nation, which stated a willingness to build a common state with the Czechs. In Budapest, the citizens' democratic revolution (the Aster Revo-



Fig. 3: The town hall of Košice 1918.

lution) won and the victors simultaneously declared the Hungarian People's Republic.

These revolutionary changes at the end of October and the beginning of November 1918 saw Slovak and Hungarian social democrats living in the area of today's Slovakia with quite distinct sentiments and mannerisms, because Slovak social democrats were already openly supporting the Czechoslovak project. This is additionally evidenced by the Martin Declaration signatories, including subsequent leaders of Slovak social democracy such as Emanuel Lehocký (1876-1930) and Ivan Dérer (1884-1973).¹¹ On 25 December 1918, this culminated in a meeting at which the Slovak social democrats unanimously signed up to the concept of a common state with the Czechs, and supported the establishment of a common Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, which was formed on 30 December 1918.¹² This clear support for the Czechoslovak project stemmed from the fact that



Fig. 4: Miklós Molnár (1887-1946), the last Hungarian Government Commissioner of Kassa/Košice.

for the Slovak left wing, this period was both a democratic and a national revolution – hence, the Slovak social democrats led by Ivan Dérer remained faithful advocates of the common state throughout the period of the first Czechoslovak Republic.

For the left wing in Košice, however, this period had the opposite effect. Even though local newspapers had already reported on the meeting in Turčiansky Svätý Martin and the declaration of an ‘independent Slovak country’ on 31 October,¹³ Košice inhabitants, including social democrats, paid such reports scant attention and did not associate them with their own futures. They instead focused on the Civic-Democratic revolution that won in Budapest on 31 October and subsequently in other Hungarian cities – in Košice the social democrats led the change and also gained strong positions in the Košice Hungarian National Council formed on the same day. Social democrat Miklós Molnár (1887-1946) became

president of the council and Budapest’s appointed government commissioner. Since the establishment of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the country’s democratisation were victories for the Košice social democrats, the events of those weeks further strengthened their connection with the concept of a Hungarian state. This in turn created a strong psychological barrier to the adoption of new national borders as defined in Paris.

On the same day (25 December) that the Slovak social democrats agreed to join the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, their Košice comrades also held their congress – but with opposite outcomes: the Košice social democrats declared the unity of Hungary and Košice’s place in the new democratic Hungarian state. However, they rejected a military defence of the city against the Czechoslovak army. One of their leaders, Lajos Surányi (1885-1969), described Prague politics as imperialist (‘We’re threatened from the east by communism and from the west by imperialism’¹⁴), and called on their Czech and Slovak comrades to support a plebiscite on disputed territories.¹⁵

The Czechoslovak occupation of Košice became a certainty following the *Pichonoca* – the first demarcation line between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on 21 December 1918. As this line extended south of Košice, the only question remaining was when the occupation would occur and what the local population’s response would be. Košice’s government commissioner, Miklós Molnár – who was meeting Czechoslovak government representative Milan Hodža (1878-1944) in Budapest – sought assurances that the occupation would not hinder the city’s administration or political continuity, and that the Czechoslovak troops would acknowledge that the peace treaty with Košice also applied to Hungary.¹⁶ Yet this idea was an illusion. After the city’s occupation on 29 December, a new power – which Košice considered an integral part of the Czechoslovak Republic – immediately deposed the city’s leadership, Mayor Béla Blonar (1866-1932) and Commissioner Molnár.

The occupation of the city and the first weeks of the new power brought about surprisingly few conflicts. This was due to the new authorities’ benevolent and hesitant behaviour – they had not even initiated a peace conference and aimed to avoid escalating the conflict. So although they replaced the

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Risposta al Signor Generale Piccione!

Signor Generale! Noi non abbiamo avuto l'onore di sentire dalla Sua bocca propria la risposta rivoltaci. Abbiamo però appreso, che il Signor Generale s'è espresso, di collaborar volentieri con ognuno, che coopera alla fondazione e al consolidamento delle relazioni normali. E noi con tutte le nostre forze lavoriamo a questo fine. Noi siamo stati quelli, che per comando sacrosanto del governo ungarico popolare e della democrazia sociale-internazionale impedimmo lo spargimento del sangue, sopra tutti noi siamo stati quelli, che li 28. ottobre, 1917., quando, dopo 3 mesi di un periodo di posizione infernale, giungemmo sull'altura di San Martino e vedemmo, che la Sua patria dalla Punta Sdobba, fino alle Dolomiti stà in fiamme, vedendo la terribile devastazione della Sua bella patria, ci vennero le lagrime agli occhi. E Lei pure ci punisce. Ci punisce perché ancora sempre non ci permette di poter ricevere i nostri giornali professionali e politici di lingua ungherese. Ci punisce, perché permette, che vengano congedate dal loro posto povere persone innocenti impiegate presso istituzioni pubbliche.

Signor Generale! Voglia gentilmente prendere a saputa, che noi lavoratori socialisti di lingua ungherese non ci identifichiamo con quella oligarchia feudale di lingua ungherese, che da prima fece patir la fame e poi mandò il popolo al macello della guerra. Noi da decenni combattemmo contro questi boia, fino a che li 31. ottobre dell'anno passato li abbiamo distrutto completamente. E il vero giudice non può punire per i crimini dei boia i loro distruttori.

Anche in riguardo alla disoccupazione informarono male il Signor Generale! L'amore al lavoro del lavoratore ungherese è mondialmente conosciuto. Prima dell'occupazione boemo-slovacca non ci fu a Kassa mancanza di lavoro. Mentre li 18. gennaio a. c. il numero dei disoccupati ammontò già a 1400 dirimetto a 108 impieghi. Ciò addimostra evidentemente, che non si può avere in orrore la disoccupazione dei lavoratori di Kassa, al contraro è urgentemente necessario, che per mezzo dell'importo del carbone e del ferro anche in questo campo subentri un miglioramento. Alla consolidazione delle circostanze normali son quindi necessarie le occasioni del lavoro, buoni salarii, il godimento della cultura nella nostra madrelingua, la libertà e la dignità umana.

Kassa, li 24. gennaio 1919.

Con distinta stima:
il Partito sociale democratico di Kassa.

Magyarország kilátásai az angol világpolitika szempontjából.

A Pitt testvérek uralma óta világos, avagy burkolt formában az angol világpolitika meghatározott célokat követ, mely célok elérésében és kivívásában egyedül és kizárólag az ész politikája által vezérelteti magát, félretéve pillanatnyi érdekeket, sovinstikus hűségöt, sőt nem véve figyelembe barátot, szövetségest, avagy ellenséget.

E politikának veleje: miképpen lehet megvalósítani, hogy egy aránylag kis nép egy óriási világbirodalomnak ura és parancsolója legyen, azt nemzeti és világpolitikai érdekeinek szolgálatába állítja, szédítő kereskedelmének és ipari exportjának biztosítására kiaknázza.

A külpolitikában ezen világhatalmi állás eléretett azáltal, hogy a tengerek körülán uralmát sikerült észszados következetes politikával megvalósítani. Fokozatos munkával felörölt minden ellenséget, mely e politika megvalósításának útját állotta. A spanyol nagy armadának megsemmisítése, valamint a trafalgári ütközetben a legnagyobb számbavehető vetélytársnak, a franciának

legyőzete után megtudta valósítani és fentartani azt az elvet, hogy hajóhada mindig kétszer akkora legyen, mint az összes tengeri haderővel bíró államok hadi-egységei.

Ezzel kapcsolatosan állandóan fejlesztette kereskedelmi hajóhadát, kihasználva e részben a szövetségesek és a semleges kis államok elszigeteltségét.

A második lépcsőfok - volt a világrészeket és tengereket összekötő legfontosabb szorosoknak és tengeri átjáróknak biztosítása és egymással való összeköttetésük.

A Földközi tengerben megszerezte magának a nyílt erőszak és a titkos diplomácia minden eszközével a spanyol Gibraltárt és vele szemben Tangert és Ceutát. Mindkettőt félelmesen megerősítve uralja a Földközi tenger és az Atlanti óceán kijáratát és bejáratát. Mint támaszpontokat félelmetes erősségé építette ki Maltát és s syriai támaszpontokat.

Mikor Lesseps genialitása megteremtte a Suez csatornát és ez által 2000 km-rel megrövidítette az Indiába-való átjutást, Anglia volt az, mely nagy titok-

Fig. 5: Title page of the newspaper *Kassai Munkás* (The Worker of Košice).

city's top governance level (the government commissioner, mayor, chief police captain, postmaster and railroad director) with their own appointees, they left lower-level posts in place for those not openly hostile to the new state. The city's police force is a good example: apart from the replacement of the police captain, it continued to operate as before, even though the police were unsympathetic to the Czechoslovak state, and as one Czechoslovak report stated, 'the police team had to be disarmed in more serious situations'.¹⁷

Yet this fragile peace was short-lived; from mid-February 1919 onwards, it was followed by a period of conflict and violence between the Košice population and the new power. During this time, social democrats played a crucial role by leading a functional city council, which – as the original city authorities were suspended and inoperable – was the key mouthpiece for the Košice population.

The conflict peaked in a city-wide general strike from 14 to 18 February 1919.¹⁸ The workers' council declared the strike in response to increased frustration with high unemployment, low state-sector salaries, and poor food supply. The strike was widespread, involving blue collar workers, city officials, and rail workers, and included shuttered shops and restaurants. Critical work was performed by Czech employees and the army. Although the nine-point memorandum the workers' council sent to the government included economic and social demands, and residents of Slovak nationality also laid down their tools, most Košice inhabitants regarded the strike as a political act against Czechoslovakia and a 'quiet' demonstration for Hungarian statehood.

The Slovak political elite, including left-wing politicians, viewed the strike as an act of irredentism orchestrated from Budapest.¹⁹ Ivan Dérer, the Slovak social democratic leader, expressed support for the



Fig. 6: Social democrats from Košice in the internment camp in Ilava. : 1. Lajos Surányi, editor of the newspaper Kassai Munkás; 2. Béla Stier, typographer; 3. Sándor Drab, typographer; 4. Béla Aranyosi, shop owner's assistant; 5. Jenő Stein, shop owner's assistant; 6. Géza Borovszky, water pipe installer; 7. György Banekovics, typographer; 8. Zoltán Kendi, lawyer; 9. József Bukovinszky, carpenter; 10. Lipót Feinsilber, painter; 15. Katalin Molnár, wife of government commissioner Miklós Molnár; 16. Jakub Bomba, baker.

government's tough approach to the strike as follows: 'There could be no other response to this Budapest-arranged political act than to sack all those who participated.'²⁰ Even though the strike had a political background, Košice social democracy did not need help from Budapest, for it had organised the strike itself.

The strike was further aggravated by the poor relationship between the Slovak and Hungarian social democrats. The Slovaks saw the Hungarians as irredentists, while the Hungarians regarded Slovak politicians as being in subjection to Czech nationalism and imperialism. Yet the strike representing only the beginning of open confrontation, which escalated when Czechoslovak soldiers shot at demonstrators, killing two women, less than a month later.

The Hungarian Republic was declared on 21 March 1919 in Budapest, which directly impacted Czechoslovakia's internal policy. The Prague government

viewed the Hungarian Bolsheviks' attempt to involve neighbouring countries in the revolution as a threat – hence it imposed martial law in southern Slovakia, banned public gatherings, and interned workers' leaders, especially Hungarians and Germans.

On 22 March a report of the Bolshevik power grab in Hungary arrived in Košice. The next day, the chief police captain Josef Kohout (1875–1952) suspended the Social Democratic Party's activities, closed the Workers' House and forbade publication of the *Kassai Munkás* [Košice Workers] weekly newspaper. From 28 March, leading officials from Hungarian public life – including social democratic leaders – began to be interned at Ilava and Terezín prisons.²¹ In April and May, the leadership of the social democratic movement for Slovakia was interned at Ilava camp. Newspapers reported that a congress of left-wing groups was organised in the camp, which proceeded in accordance with statutes (elected congress chairman



Fig. 7: The main street of Košice shortly before the invasion of the Hungarian Red Army in June 1919.

and minutes taken) and discussed post-internment steps.²²

However, Prague perceived the Hungarian Republic as a threat but also an opportunity to further enlarge Slovakia's borders. Czechoslovak troops accordingly began to attack Hungary on 27 April, but success proved elusive in the first weeks of the war as the soldiers held the 'second demarcation line'. The Hungarian Red Army launched a counter-attack on 27 May, however, and in subsequent days occupied a significant part of Slovakia, including Košice, on 5 June.

This military conflict represented another critical point in the gradual alienation of Košice social democracy from the Czechoslovak social democrats. While the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party and its Slovak counterpart resolved to defend Slovak territory, Košice's population warmly welcomed the Red Army with Hungarian flags – although who they were

honouring only became apparent when the Bolsheviks demanded that the red-white-green tricolours be replaced by red flags²³ and when the new power inundated the city with countless decrees.

During the Hungarian Republic period, the gap widened between (Czecho)Slovak and Košice (Hungarian) social democrats. Already political opponents, they now also held opposite positions in the military conflict. The schism between former comrades was also demonstrated by the fact that while Slovak social democrats held positions in the Czechoslovak government, leaders of the Košice left-wingers found themselves interned at Czechoslovak prisons.

The decision of the Peace Conference's Supreme Allied Council on 12 June 1919 forced the Hungarian army to withdraw to its new national borders, which represented the beginning of a consolidation process in Slovakia. After the border's stabilisation, Košice



Fig. 8: French General Edmond Charles Adolphe Hennocque (1860–1933) with other officers in Košice 1919. From 1919 to 1922 General Hennocque ruled Subcarpathian Ruthenia as a military governor and also commanded the Czechoslovak units there. The French military mission built up the Czechoslovak army in those years.

social democrats had to come to terms with the finality of Hungary's break-up and prepare for life in Czechoslovakia.²⁴ Košice social democracy and Hungarian social democrats in Slovakia faced two alternatives: they could either create a separate and independent movement against Czechoslovak social democracy that defined a Hungarian – specifically Hungarian-German – Social Democratic party; or they could join Slovak and Czech comrades. While the social democratic tradition of internationalism supported the second option, the experience of the first months of 1919 told the opposite story. Czechoslovak social democracy chose to turn away from the social democratic path towards far-right politics and – even more gravely – nationalism. A Bratislava-based Hungarian left-wing weekly stated the following about the Czech Social Democrats: 'They are strong nationalists and chauvinists, and their policies are directed not against capitalism but towards other nationalities. They stand in the service of imperialism.'²⁵

Despite their extreme position, leaders of the Hungarian social democrats were interested in cooperation and, in the long-term, in organisational union with the Czechoslovak party. Their vision was to create a party where all three nationalities (Czechoslovaks, Hungarians and Germans) would have equal rights and influence, as reflected in the proposed new party name (Internationalist Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia).²⁶ The vision was unrealistic in the circumstances, and Prague was not involved in the party's internationalisation.

Rapprochement between Hungarian and Czechoslovak socialists was complicated by the struggle between right and left. While Slovak social democrats mostly chose the Second International, Hungarian workers – dissatisfied with Prague's government policy – were largely drawn towards the Communist International (Comintern) vision. This development was also related to the failure of social democracy's internationalisation in Czechoslovakia and the emergence of the international left as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. But that's another story.

Endnotes

* This study was produced as part of the research project *Tranon 100 HAS-Momentum Research Group*.

1. In connection with the new post-Versailles Agreement situation in Central Europe, see Ignác Romsics, *Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században* (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1998).
2. Juraj Benko, 'The National Question in the Central European Socialist Movement and the Emergence of Czechoslovakia,' in *Slovenské dejiny v dejinách Európy: vybrané kapitoly*, ed. Dušan Kováč (Bratislava: Veda, 2015), 375.
3. Marián Hronský, 'Workers' Movement in Slovakia up to 1918,' in *Kapitoly z dejín sociálnej demokracie na Slovensku*, ed. Stanislav Sikora (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo T.R.I.Médium, 1996) 43.
4. For an overview of Hungarian Social Democratic Party policy during the First World War, see Lajos Varga, *Háború, forradalom, szociáldemokrácia Magyarországon: 1914. július–1919. március* (Budapest: Napvilág, 2010).
5. It should be noted that several Hungarian social democracy leaders, in parallel with those supporting the integrity of Hungary, recognise the right of nations to self-determination. See Péter Sipos, 'A szociáldemokrácia és a nemzeti sorskérdések,' in *Útkeresések. A magyar szociáldemokrácia tegnap és ma*, ed. István Feitl, György Földes and László Hubai (Budapest: Napvilág, 2004), 326.
6. According to censuses from 1880, 1910, 1930 and 1938, the ratio of Hungarians and Slovaks in Košice was as follows: Hungarians: 38.3%, 75.4%, 16.4%, 76.6%, Slovaks: 39.5%, 14.8%, 60.2%, 16.3%. Forum Institute for Minority Research. Database of Hungarians in Slovakia. <<http://telepulesek.adatbank.sk/telepules/kassa-kosice/>> (accessed 11 December 2017).
7. For an overview of Košice inhabitants' ethnicity, see Ondrej Ficeri, *Etnické identity obyvateľov Košíc v medzivojnovom Československu*, dissertation thesis (Banská Bystrica: Matej Bel University, 2017).
8. Ficeri, *Etnické identity*, 59.
9. Of course, Slovak sources also recall that this is a Magyarised city, where the original Slovak city is hidden under the Hungarian surface. National Archives of the Czech Republic, Prague (NA CR), Fund Presidium of the Ministry of the Interior, AMV 225 (f. AMV-PMV 225), Box 1455, 225-1455-3b.
10. In 1896, on the occasion of 1000 years of statehood, Košice social democrats printed statements in Hungarian, German and Slovak. Frank Henschel, 'Das Fluidum der Stadt ...': *Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Košice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867-1918* (München: Collegium Carolinum, 2017), 236-237.
11. For a list of Assembly participants who received the Martin Declaration, see Xénia Šuchová, *Annex II – Political system in Slovensko v Československu (1918-1939)*, eds. Milan Zemko and Valerián Bystrický (Bratislava: Veda, 2004), 547.

12. For an overview of Slovak social democrats' activities, see Xénia Šuchová, 'Sociálna demokracia na Slovensku v prvých rokoch Československa (1918-1920),' in *Kapitoly z dejín sociálnej demokracie na Slovensku*, ed. Stanislav Sikora (Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo T.R.I.Médium, 1996), 109-145.
13. *Felsőmagyarország*, 31 October 1918, 2.
14. Miklós Molnár, *Kassától Košicéig: Történelmi adatgyűjtemény az 1918-19 évi forradalom, vörösuralom és a csehszlovák köztársaság megalakulása idejéből. II.* (Kassa: 1942), 449.
15. *Kassai Hírlap*, 28 December 1918, 2-3.
16. Although Hodža had initially accepted Molnár's conditions, the agreement was ultimately not signed. Molnár, *Kassától II*, 401-405.
17. NA CR, f. AMV-PMV 225, kart. 1455, 225-1455-3b.
18. For an overview of the strike, see *Kassai Munkás*, 22 February 1919, 1-4.
19. Josef V. Kohout, the first Czechoslovak police captain of Košice, recalls the strike and the role of social democracy as follows: 'The Bolshevised Košice Social Democratic Party with its Hungarian-Jewish leadership played a dual role. The Košice Workers Council had the main role in calling and enforcing a general strike – doubters were forced to lay down their tools with threats. Hence, the Košice Social Democratic Party expressed its loyalty to the Hungarian government and continued working against the Czechoslovakian regime in Slovakia.' Jozef V. Kohout, 'Occupation of Košice by the Czechoslovak army on 29 December 1918 – Events in January & February 1919,' in *Slovenský prevrat. sv. IV.*, ed. Karol A. Medvecký (Bratislava: Komenský, vydavateľská a literárna spol. s r.o., 1931), 297, 288-299.
20. Šuchová, *Sociálna*, 117.
21. Although the issue of internment is yet to be fully explored, useful information is provided by Todd Huebner in 'The Internment Camp at Terezín, 1919,' *Austrian History Yearbook XXVII* (1996), 199-211. Tamás Gusztáv Filep writes about certain aspects of Hungarians' interment in *Főhatalomváltás Pozsonyban 1918-1920* (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2011), 91-109.
22. *Kassai Munkás*, 30 August 1919, 7.
23. Faragó, *A szlovenszkói*, 48.
24. The political situation in Hungary also played a role in the acceptance of the new situation, where the fall of Bolshevism was followed by white terror and a strict right-wing regime.
25. *Népszava*, 31 August 1919, 2.
26. *Kassai Munkás*, 17 March 1920, 3.