‘The Red Scare’ in Yugoslavia: The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the Beginning of Yugoslav Anti-Communism 1919-1921

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Introduction

‘Austria-Hungary also has become a nest of revolutionary infection’, wrote Béla Kun (1886-1938) in April 1918.[1] He was right, of course. He and his fellow Bolsheviks had succeeded in bringing their ‘infectious’ ideas home. After the resignation of Mihály Károlyi’s (1875-1955) government, the Hungarian Soviet Republic (HSR) was created. At the same time, a new state was being formed on its southern border: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (KSCS). Yugoslav/Serbian historiographers have by no means neglected the relations between the Yugoslav communists and the HSR,[2] the early history of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY)[3] or the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary in this period.[4] However, they have placed little emphasis on the nature of Yugoslav anti-communism, its reasons and its language, since Marxist historians usually understood it as a foundation of ‘bourgeois society’ and took it for granted. Indeed, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was fiercely anti-communist and refused to recognise the Soviet Union until 1940. However, that does not mean that it was always *equally* anti-communist, or that anti-communism was always expressed in the same way. In this paper, I aim to describe the influence of the HSR in the formation of the first phase of Yugoslav anti-communism (1919-1921), and to highlight what differentiated it from later phases.

Fig. 1: Emblem of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1920-1952.

The Hungarian Soviet Republic and the Communist Revolution in Yugoslavia

Although the Yugoslav and Hungarian communists had earlier established lasting connections,[5] the first concrete discussions were held in Budapest in February 1919. An agreement was reached for the Yugoslavs to support the communist takeover in Hungary, and in return for logistical and financial assistance in the future.[6] Soon after the talks, couriers carrying money began to cross the Drava River and enter Yugoslavia.[7] The most notable amongst the Yugoslav communists in Hungary, Ivan Matuzović (1886-1938), was responsible for the creation of the Yugoslav Communist Fraction (YCF) in Hungary, which was the main body of Yugoslavs in the HSR.[8]



Fig. 2: Yugoslav communist revolutionary and politician Ivan Matuzović.

Although there is some dispute regarding the exact date of its creation, the YCF was most probably formed in late March 1919.[9] It was (generously) financed by the Hungarians, and governed by a Directorate of 12.[10] Initially consisting of 60 members, it later expanded. It published its own newspaper, *Crvena zastava* (The Red Flag). It was formed on the same principle as the Hungarian party, by the merging of social democrats and communists.[11] Despite the proclaimed unity, differences between the two fractions were still evident. The main point of dispute was whether the YCF should focus on the revolution in Yugoslavia (communists), or on organising and educating the Yugoslav minority in Hungary (social democrats). The Hungarian leadership correctly assessed that Yugoslavia was not set on attacking them, and decided on formally declaring peaceful intentions whilst covertly supporting the communist insurgency. The Hungarian 'comrades' therefore supported the communist point of view within the YCF.[12] The main aims of the YCF were the mobilisation of Yugoslavs (mostly ex-prisoners of war) for the Red Guard and propaganda towards the Yugoslav military and civilian populace. According to some sources, the YCF created around 50 different leaflets and 10 brochures during its existence.[13] Members were encouraged to accept the HSR as their own country and to support it wholeheartedly. 'We, Yugoslav socialists, will defend the Hungarian proletarian republic with our lives against any reaction, since in the triumph of the Hungarian proletariat we see the victory of the Yugoslav workers!', the first issue of *Crvena zastava* proclaimed.[14]

Yugoslavs were involved in the HSR's armed forces from its inception. After their number grew, however, they were organised in a special military unit.

Fig. 3: The notable Communist journal, *Plamen* [The Flame].

In May 1919, the First Yugoslav (Balkan) Red Battalion was formed and deployed on the Yugoslav border with hopes that their presence would demoralise the Yugoslav troops and hasten the impending revolution.[15] The battalion was also tasked with providing food to Budapest, and bypassing the trade embargo imposed on the HSR.[16] Soon after in July, another Yugoslav unit, the Second Yugoslav (Balkan) Red Battalion was created and deployed on the Romanian front. However, the unit was ill prepared and quickly decimated by advancing Romanians. After the initial clashes, it had lost 56% of its men. Communist historians attributed its failure to treason among the Hungarian officer cadre.[17]

In contrast to these military endeavours, propaganda efforts were proving to be very effective. Leaflets in Serbo-Croatian, which appeared as early as January 1919, were systematically disseminated across Yugoslavia. With the communist takeover, Hungarian airplanes began crossing the border and dropping them over Yugoslav cities.[18] The Hungarian press constantly produced sensational reports about class turmoil and revolution in Yugoslavia. Those reports, which were often reprinted in the foreign (mostly Italian) press, were damning to the international reputation of the young Yugoslav state.[19] Dozens of communist agitators poured over the border and successfully caused a stir amongst the tired and homesick troops. Some deserted and crossed over to the Red Guard. A special publication aimed at them, *Crveni vojnik* (The Red Soldier), was printed in Kaposvár.[20] However, convinced by the initial successes, the Hungarian government decided to support the impending revolution in Yugoslavia with force. Nationalists such as Gyula Hajdu (1886-1973) demanded a military campaign against Yugoslavia in order to retake lost 'Hungarian soil'.[21]

The orders for revolution were carried to Zagreb by Béla Kun's emissary, Alfred Diamantstein (1896-1941). Despite the fact that he was not completely trusted by local communists, he quickly established contact with Josip Metzger (1883-1945), an ex-Austro-Hungarian officer and a Croat separatist.[23] The two plotted to organise a coup within the army, and used the money Diamantstein had brought with him from Hungary to convince dissatisfied soldiers. The revolt was supposed to spread all across Croatia and Slovenia, and was planned for 21 July 1919. On that



Fig. 4: Delegates at the First Congress of the Socialist Labour Party Yugoslavia (of Communists), Belgrade, 20-23 April 1919.[22]

date, a nation-wide strike in solidarity with the HSR was scheduled. After the initial shots, the Hungarian Red Guard was supposed to cross the border and invade Yugoslavia.[24] A key role in the attack was given to the Yugoslav units of the Red Guard. They were ordered as follows: 'Keep on Serbian hats and coats during the attack to convince the Serbs that there is mutiny in their own army.'[25] The strike, promptly forbidden by the authorities, was indeed carried out, but the revolution amounted to no more than sporadic unrest. The authorities' efficient response quickly quelled the unrests in Ljubljana, Osijek and Zagreb, and after some bloodshed in Varaždin and Maribor. The Red Guard never came.[26]

The First Phase of Yugoslav Anti-Communism

In Yugoslavia, the HSR's proclamation was met without panic. The press reported on the communist takeover very casually, whilst the government remained convinced that little changes were happening in Hungary. The revolution was seen as a nationalist Hungarian revolt, caused by the territorial demands of the Entente, whose socialist nature was purely a facade.[27] The press reported with the same view: socialism was simply a tool to 'preserve Hungarian imperialism', claimed the Belgrade journal *Pravda*.[28] The Minister of Internal Affairs, Svetozar Pribićević (1875-1936), referred to the communist takeover as an 'operetta revolution'.[29]

The KSCS was not interested in the overthrow of the Hungarian government. It was well aware of the fragility of both the internal and the international situation, and had no intention of waging an unpopular war for the sake of others. The leader of the Yugoslav deputation at the Paris Peace Conference, Nikola Pašić (1845-1926), was clear in a report to Belgrade: 'We are more threatened by Bulgarians, Albanians and even Italy! and even Italy, than Hungarian Bolshevism!'[30] The KSCS therefore rejected French pressure to attack Hungary in April 1919.[31] The Hungarian-Yugoslav border remained peaceful, despite some small clashes, which were sporadically mentioned in the Yugoslav press as attacks by the HSR.[32] When the successes of the Romanian army became more and more apparent, the Yugoslavs became worried that a triumphant Romania would be rewarded with disputed land in the Banat. In July 1919, the Yugoslav government therefore became more interested in intervening against the HSR. However, Yugoslav documents reveal just how small a role the communist nature of Hungary played in decision-making. Out of the 17 key documents regarding the possible intervention, 16 make no mention of communism. The war is simply regarded as a war against Hungary.[33] The Yugoslavs made their involvement in the war conditional on an assurance of protection by the Great Powers from Italian aspirations, and promised only 8,000 troops for the intervention corps. The Entente was displeased with the Yugoslav demands, and ultimately the war was over before Yugoslavia had time to intervene.

Although the KSCS was not ready to intervene in Hungary, it was also not ready to idly watch the communist takeover. The Socialist Workers' Party of Yugoslavia (Communists) was formed in April 1919, and boasted a vast membership. Alongside their legal activities, communists were engaged in planning a revolution. The HSR's involvement is mentioned above. The illegal activities were the reason for a series of raids and imprisonments of the communists in April 1919.[34] Those were followed by the arrest of Kun's courier Diamantstein in July 1919, and the subsequent highly publicised trial.[35] The 'Diamantstein affair' was the first big anti-communist trial, which lasted for almost a year, and ended in April 1920 with Diamantstein's sentencing to three months in jail.[36] As early as July 1919, the police and the authorities were aware that the revolution was scheduled to coincide with the general strike. The press therefore called on the workers not to strike in support of the HSR. 'Although it is clear as day that we are still at war with *the Hungarians...* some of our workers, misinformed by their leaders, wish to join the strike.' Those 'treacherous' workers should leave for Hungary, the articles read, as they were so eager to support it.[37] Participation in the communist strike was framed as treason to the national interest in a time of war.

The leadership of the Communist Party denied any involvement in the planning of a revolution and proceeded to win around 198,000 votes in the 1920 elections. However, the government decided to stop tolerating the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's subversive actions and outlawed it in December 1920.[38] This prohibition was not done via legal means, but was simply proclaimed as a governmental decision without due process. The legal irregularities were presented as a necessity, due to the dire danger to the State. The document outlawing the CPY read: 'Many open and secret enemies of our state and people have cunningly joined the communist movement. Those defeated in war aim to take revenge on this country by instigating and supporting the unrest,'[39] Communists and many liberals, however, opposed the measure. Foreign diplomats noticed the explosive atmosphere in Belgrade as well. The German envoy in Belgrade notified his government that due to 'imminent communist attack', the Yugoslav authorities had outlawed the CPY. He mentioned the unusual nature of the ban, since it was done, as he put it, 'via poster'.[40] A bitter war broke out between the CPY and police and military authorities. Although the attempted assassination of Regent Alexander was unsuccessful, the war claimed the life of Minister of Internal Affairs Milorad Drašković (1873-1921), the politician responsible for outlawing the CPY, in July 1921. The fact that such a high-profile victim fell to the communists, as well as the brutal nature of his assassination (he was shot while playing with his children),[41] solicited a strong response. The events of early 1921 were the point of no return for the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party, and they mark the end of the first phase of Yugoslav anti-communism.

What defined the first phase of Yugoslav anti-communism was the depiction of communism as hostile

Fig. 5: Minister of Internal Affairs Milorad Drašković.

to Yugoslavia, not because it was a nation state, but because communism was against the Entente. It was not portrayed as hostile towards all nationalism, but rather as a vessel of some nationalism – in other words, as synonymous with revisionism. This does not mean that communism was not branded as a fundamentally mistaken ideology. It certainly was. However, the anti-communist discourse was quite vague; it lacked the damning accusations and colourful examples of a later time. Communism was labelled in 19th-century terms, such as nihilism, defeatism, anarchism and terrorism. The policies of the HSR were constantly described as 'cunning', 'deceitful' and 'twofaced', since it publicly advocated for peace, but actually strove for revolution and the renewal of Great Hungary.[42] The revolution was presented not so much as a triumph of evil, but of chaos.[43] There is a clear absence of the anti-Semitism[44] and vague notions of conspiracy that became so prevalent later. The 'morally decadent' and 'sexually perverse' nature of communism was rarely highlighted. Another distinction between this and later stages of Yugoslav anti-communism is the fact that there was no mass anti-communist organisation capable or willing to fight the Communists in the streets. Whilst hundreds of thousands joined anti-communist paramilitaryorganisations in Germany, Hungary and Austria,[45] Yugoslavia did not have its 'Freikorps' or 'White Guard'. A first similar organisation, the Organisation of Yugoslav Nationalists, was created in March 1921, and it ignited its anti-communist activities, which involved violent clashes, after Drašković's assassination.[46]

The Evolving Image of the Hungarian Revolution and the Later Phases of Anti-Communism

During the following years, the image of the HSR and communism in general changed substantially in the Yugoslav public sphere. A great example of the new and changing stance towards the Hungarian revolution is the series of articles in the main pro-government journal *Vreme*, which commemorated the 10th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. Despite stating the already established 'revisionist' and 'anti-Entente' attitude of the revolutionaries, and the German support for it, the writers presented the revolution more and more as 'international' and guided

Fig. 6: Members of the 'Red Justice' terrorist cell Alija Alijagić, which assassinated the minister Milorad Drašković in 1921: Nikola Petrović, Rodoljub Čolaković, Stevo Ivanović and Dinko Lopandić (from left to right).

Fig. 7: Hungarian communist revolutionary and politician Béla Kun, the de facto leader of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919.

from Moscow. Therefore, they began to label Béla Kun as a Jew.[47] Revolutionaries were Hungarian nationalists no more, but puppets of Moscow. 'Budapest awoke on March 21 under the terrorist regime. Red flags were hung. Red stripes were spread across the streets, and busts of *Russian* Bolsheviks on top of red pedestals looked as if they had grown out of the soil overnight.'[48] A clear pattern can be seen here: the flags were not Hungarian but red, the leaders were not Hungarians but Russians, etc. The trend of focusing on the communist/foreign nature of the revolution is evident throughout the existence of the KSCS.[49] The defeat of the Bolsheviks was presented as a great victory, and the 'red regime' was further delegitimised by claims that it had stolen more than two billion kronas from the Budapest banks.[50]

Simultaneously, Béla Kun was presented to the Yugoslav public as the main communist conspirator who might ignite a revolution at any moment. It was claimed that he was still connected with Yugoslav communists and still tasked with carrying out the revolution in the Balkans.[51] His fingerprints were seen in every communist plot, from Denmark to Brazil.[52] Attempts were made to discredit him as a 'madman', a 'morphine addict' and even as unpopular amongst his fellow communists.[53]

A great example for the new type of Yugoslav anti-communism in the 'non-government sphere' can be found in the most notable Yugoslav fascist politician, Dimitrije Ljotić (1891-1945). He had a personal connection with the HSR and the revolutionary turmoil rooted in 1919. While serving as a Serbian officer in northern Dalmatia, he was entrusted with safeguarding the railway from Delnice to Bakar. In his 1938 autobiography, he proudly recalled that he crushed the general strike by arresting 36 rebellious railway workers. He claimed that the 'strike was purely communist in nature', and intended to ignite a communist revolution – a clear distinction from the 1919 description of the strike as pro-Hungarian.[54] However, true to his radical notions of the complete rebirth of a nation, he was unsatisfied with the 'white' regime in Budapest, which he saw as insufficiently revolutionary, and nothing more than a triumph of the capitalists, who succeeded in defeating the communists but prolonged the 'dying order'.[55] A convinced anti-Semite, Ljotić continued to paint an image of the HSR as a plot of the internationalist 'Judeo Bolsheviks'. During the on-going Spanish civil war, his journal *Otadžbina* (Fatherland) sarcastically commented that Spain was defended by 'such Spaniards' as Béla Kun and Georgi Dimitrov (1882-1949), mimicking his depiction of the HSR.[56] Indeed, Kun's Jewish origin served as an additional argument for the new explanation of the Hungarian revolution. Ljotić warned the Yugoslav public: 'In every Jew lies the bloodthirsty Béla Kun.'[57]

Conclusion

In conclusion, the period between 1919 and 1921 ultimately decided the relations between the Communist Party and the governing elites of the Kingdom. The mutual decision that no coexistence was possible, and that only struggle would determine the winner, shaped the Yugoslav 20th century. It seems clear that

the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic played a key role in this decision. Communism went from being an exotic and far-away enemy to an imminent danger to the state. Equally, it became interwoven with Hungarian nationalism and revisionist claims. The attempted revolution, the outlawing of the CPY and ultimately the assassination of a Minister of the Interior Milorad Drašković were key steps along the path of radicalisation. On the other hand, the anti-communist propaganda during that period was very different from the propaganda of the mid-1920s and especially 1930s. As underlined above, the anti-communist discourse of 1919-1921 was almost entirely devoid of anti-Semitism and notions of a world conspiracy. The depiction of communism as a vessel of revisionism quickly made way for a new and more potent description, which became normative.

Endnotes

1. Béla Kun, *Revolutionary Essays* (London: Carl Silenger, 1977), 5.
2. On the Yugoslav involvement in the HSR, see: Vujica Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom frontu revolucije* [On the Common Revolutionary Front] (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1987); Ivan Očak, *U borbi za ideje Oktobra* [Fighting for the Ideas of October] (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1976); Toma Milenković, 'Međusobne veze i uticaj Mađarske Sovjetske Republike na radnički pokret u Vojvodini [Mutual connections and the influence of the HSR on the worker`s movement in Vojvodina],' *Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma* 4 (1967): 1-57; Toma Milenković, 'Nekoliko dokumenata o delatnosti jugoslovenskih internacionalista u Mađarskoj Sovjetskoj Republici 1919. godine [Some Documents on the Activities of Yugoslav Internationalists in the HSR 1919]', *Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma*, 6 (1969) 331-355.
3. On the early history of the CPY, see: Vladimir Ćopić, *život i djelo* [Vladimir Ćopić, Life and Work] (Rijeka: CHRP, 1978); Zorica Stipetić, *Argumenti za revoluciju-August Cesarec* [Arguments for Revolution-August Cesarec], (Zagreb: CDD, 1982); Коста Николић, *Бољшевизација КПЈ 1919-1929* [Bolshevization of CPY 1919-1929], (Београд: Институт за савремену историју, 1994); Toma Milenković, 'Doprinos Filipa Filipovića stvaranju KPJ [Filip Filipović`s Contribution to the Creation of the CPY],' *Socijalizam* 1 (1979) 155-178. On the police repressions against the communists during that period, see: Ljubomir Milin, *Beli teror* [White Terror] (Novi Sad: Progres, 1959); Горан Милорадовић, *Карантин за идеје* [Quarantine for Ideas] (Београд: Институт за савремену историју, 2004).
4. See: Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska* 1918-1933 [Yugoslavia and Hungary 1918-1933] (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1971); Andrej Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira 1919-1920* [Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference 1919-1920] (Beograd: Zavod za izdavanje udžbenika SRS, 1969); Andrej Mitrović, *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom i Rumunijom 1919-1920* [Delimitation between Yugoslavia and Hungary and Romania 1919-1920] (Novi Sad: Institut za izučavanje istorije Vojvodine, 1975).
5. Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 25-47; 57-70.
6. Stipetić, Argumenti, 110; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 90.
7. Milenković, *Doprinos*, 165.
8. A rival Slovene Communist Fraction, formed by some Slovene communists, was destroyed and integrated into the YCF, after an unsuccessful attempt to secede from the HSR and to form the 'Mur republic' (Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 108-109).
9. See: Николић, Бољшевизација, 38; Danilo Kecić, 'Mađarska Sovjetska Republika i radništvo Vojvodine [HSR and the workers of Vojvodina]', *Polja* 243 (1979) 1.
10. Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 139-142.
11. Milenković, *Nekoliko*, 332; Николић, *Бољшевизација*, 38; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 102-104.
12. Stipetić, *Argumenti*, 110-112; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 120-121. The relations between Hungarian and Yugoslav communists were not always as cordial. Yugoslavs complained that 'Hungarians trust no one. They use any opportunity to hinder other nations' (Milenković, *Nekoliko*, 346).
13. Kecić, *Mađarska*, 2. In addition, the HSR financially supported Yugoslav communist journals, the most notable being Plamen [The Flame], a Zagreb-based journal edited by two Croatian communist writers, August Cesarec and Miroslav Krleža. Although the editors denied the financial ties, the journal was committed to supporting the revolution and called 'to storm the modern European Bastille!' (Plamen, 2, 1919).
14. *Црвена застава*, 5.4.1919.
15. Milenković, *Nekoliko,* 333-334; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 198-199; 203-204.
16. Očak, *U borbi*, 273.
17. Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 215-219.
18. *Време*, 31.7.1929; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija*, 58.
19. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija*, 59.
20. Milenković, *Nekoliko*, 347.
21. Očak, *U borbi*, 274; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 127.
22. On the 2nd party congress, held in June 1920 in Vukovar, the party changed its name to Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
23. This was the first but not the last case of cooperation between the CPY and various separatist movements. The communists championed both social and national liberation of 'oppressed' peoples within the KSCS. Therefore, they established contacts with Croat and Bulgarian separatists as well as with Montenegrin federalists. For a more detailed overview of the cooperation between communists and various separatist movements, see: Николић, *Бољшевизација.*
24. Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom,* 135-136, 146-147; Milenković, *Vladimir*, 112-113.
25. Milenković, *Nekoliko*, 342.
26. Milenković, *Vladimir*, 114; Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 147-153; Stanislava Koprivica Oštrić, 'Vojnička pobuna u Varaždinu 23.7.1919 [Military Rebellion in Varaždin 23.7.1919],' *Povijesni prilozi* 1 (1983) 65-94.

27. Mitrović, *Jugoslavija*, 177-178; Mitrović. *Razgraničenje*, 158.
28. *Правда*, 4.4.1919.
29. Милорадовић, *Карантин*, 91.
30. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija*, 55.
31. Vinaver, *Jugoslavija*, 50; 56-57; 61.
32. *Правда*, 2.8.1919.
33. Mitrović, *Jugoslavija*, 181.
34. Kovačev, *Na zajedničkom*, 132-133.
35. Николић, *Бољшевизација*, 39.
36. See: Ivan Očak, *Afera Diamantstein: prvi antikomunistički proces u Kraljevstvu SHS* [Diamantstein Affair: the First Anti-Communist Trial in the Kingdom of SCS] (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1988).
37. *Правда*, 20.7.1919.
38. Николић, *Бољшевизација*, 88; Milin, *Beli*, 33-37.
39. Милорад Драшковић, У *одбрану отаџбине* [In Defense of the Fatherland] (Београд: Млада демократија, 1921), 2
40. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, RAV Belgad, 45/1, Keller an AA 30.12.1920.
41. *Политика*, 22.7.1921.
42. *Novosti*, 27.4.1919; *Правда*, 6.7.1919; *Правда*, 11.7.1919; *Правда*, 13.7.1919.
43. *Ptujski* list, 27.7.1919.
44. I do not claim that no connection between Jews and communism was made during that time, but rather that it was not part of the anti-communist mainstream. During that phase, anti-Semitic undertones of anti-communism were most prevalent in ex-Austrian-Hungarian parts of KSCS. A high-ranking official from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Atanasije Šola, internally referred to communism as the 'poison of Jewish demagogy' (Милорадовић, *Карантин*, 131). Additionally, *Crvena Zastava* (9.4.1919) protested against the claims made in the Zagreb journal Novosti that the majority of leaders of HSR were Jewish, claiming that this was a lie and that even if it were not, communists did not recognize differences between nations' and that these accusations were insignificant.
45. See: Robert Gerwarth, 'The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War,' *Past & Present* 200 (2008) 175-209; Bela Bodo, 'Paramilitary Violence in Hungary after the First World War,' East European Quarterly 28 no. 2, (2004) 129-172.
46. See: John Paul Newman, *Yugoslavia in the Shadow of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 150-166.
47. *Време*, 21.3.1929.
48. *Време*, 1.4.1929.
49. See for example: *Правда,* 26.3.1937.
50. *Време*, 26.6.1929; *Време*, 12.8.1929.
51. *Време*, 4.9.1927; *Правда*, 29.4.1928; *Време*, 1.5.1928; *Време*, 6.2.1936.
52. *Правда*, 4.12.1934; *Време* 1.6.1936.
53. *Време*, 11.10.1927; *Правда*, 5.8.1928. On the other hand, Živojin Pavlović, a convinced Yugoslav anti-Stalinist who fled from the USSR, lamented his murder and claimed in 1940 that Kun had been the 'most popular personality'amongst the communist émigrés in Moscow, as well as a 'genius' organiser, who was always given the hardest tasks (Слободан Гавриловић, *Живојин Павловић и Биланс совјетског термидора* [Živojin Pavlović and the The Balance-Sheet of the Soviet Thermidor] (Београд: Evro-Giunti, 2011), 234.
54. ДимитријеЉотић, *Сабрана дела* 11 [Collected Works] (Београд: Задруга, 2001), 47-48.
55. Димитрије Љотић, *Сабрана дела* 2, 49.
56. *Отаџбина*, 11.12.1936.
57. Archives of Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinović collection (37), 21-152, I tebi se obraćamo.