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Compromise in Deliberative Democracy and Civic Education

1 Introduction: The Significance of Exploring Compromise in a Contemporary Context

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the contemporary value of compromise in relation to deliberative democracy.[1] It also aims to identify the possibilities and challenges that digital technology and education pose to realizing deliberative democracy and cultivating a culture of compromise.

Modern pluralistic societies are conflict-ridden. The parties to conflict vary in level and scale: individuals versus individuals, individuals versus groups, groups versus groups, society versus society, state versus state, and so on. We are expected not to overlook these conflicts but instead to try to resolve them. One of the ways to resolve a dispute is through compromise, which is a form of communication through discussion, where the parties to a conflict reduce their own demands and make concessions to each other. In a democratic polity that aggregates the multiple interests of diverse people in public decision-making, it is common for values to come into conflict. Compromise is therefore a valuable principle for reconciling conflicting views. The possibility of compromise has recently been explored not only in the context of conflict resolution but also in discussions about the ideal democracy (e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 2012; Knight 2018).

In Anglo-American political philosophy, compromise as a principle has been examined since the 2010s in the context of normative deliberative democracy theory. For example, the fact that Amy Gutmann, a leading proponent of deliberative democracy theory, has shifted from emphasizing the need for deliberation (or reciprocity and mutual respect as virtues) to emphasizing the need for "compromise" in the 2012 book that she coauthored with Dennis Thompson, *The Spirit of Compromise*, is symbolic. In their book, Gutmann and Thompson analyze and compare the compromises that led to the passage of legislation in two cases of comprehensive reform relating to major issues in the American political system: tax reform under Reagan in 1986 and health care reform under Obama in 2010.

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Comparing the two reveals the kind of compromising mindset required to pass legislation. Gutmann and Thompson see the compromising mindset as appropriate for governing and assert that it is constituted by "principled prudence (adapting one's principles) and mutual respect (valuing one's opponents)" (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 16–17). In contrast, the uncompromising mindset "manifests principled tenacity (standing on principle) and mutual mistrust (suspecting opponents)" (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 16–17). Gutmann and Thompson argue that, while an uncompromising mindset is necessary during campaigning, principled prudence and mutual respect are necessary to govern. Their exploration of the principled value of compromise in the political process can be interpreted as being based on their awareness of the challenges involved in consensus-building in 2010s society, which was marked by a plurality of values.

Several recent studies have focused on the place of compromise in democracy and pluralistic societies. Daniel Weinstock (2017) argues that compromise should be seen as a goal of democratic decision-making and political deliberation in contemporary pluralistic liberal democracies. Weinstock conceptually distinguishes between compromise, *modus vivendi*, and consensus as possible outcomes of collective decision-making, and argues that citizens and their political agents may choose any one of these paths to resolve disagreements in public policy. He then says that *modus vivendi* should be limited as much as possible, as it results "not from the operation of deliberative practices embodying a moral concern with one's fellow citizens, but from the relative power that each side has to bend the others to its will" (Weinstock 2017: 647). Moreover, he also argues that, "given the assumption that modern societies are marked by significant value disagreements," compromise is a more plausible goal than consensus because "the attempt to achieve consensus seems doomed to failure" (Weinstock 2017: 648). Indeed, Weinstock does not deny the goal of consensus or deliberations aimed at consensus, but rather attempts to paint a new picture of deliberation that incorporates the concept of mutual concession that is central to the search for compromise (2017: 650). His normative argument for the desirability of compromise to enhance the effectiveness of deliberative democracy is further intensified by his exploration of how to resolve the moral risk of strategic misstatement, a challenge that substantially arises in deliberative procedures aimed at reaching mutually acceptable compromises (Weinstock 2018).

Defending the status of compromise as a normative idea in political science, Manon Westphal (2018: 80) also seeks to advance the debate by exploring the nature and procedural requirements of the political processes that are conducive to the formation of compromises, critically analyzing James Tully's model of pluralistic dialogue in the course of her explorations. Tully's model is one mode of political interaction between the parties to a conflict based on moral disagreement

and an idea that is embodied as "a *dialogical form of negotiation* that is expressive of *reciprocity*" (Westphal 2008: 88). While Westphal evaluates Tully's model as the mode of interaction most suitable for political compromise, she is highly critical of his view that "the reciprocal nature of dialogical negotiation relies on an attitude of openness on the part of the actors involved" and argues that the political process should be organized in ways that motivate the parties to achieve reciprocity in negotiations, even in the absence of such attitudes (Westphal 2018: 88).

Within the context of political philosophy, both Weinstock and Westphal highlight the relevance and necessity of compromise as a normative principle in a pluralistic society. Weinstock's study can be seen as updating the theory of deliberative democracy, while Westphal's study can be regarded as providing directions for the design of democratic institutions that allow for compromise. Both authors' studies are strongly oriented toward realizing a healthy or deliberative democracy. The attempt to theorize compromise as a key concept in deliberative democracy has practical significance as an integrative theory of contemporary society. In keeping with these scholarly trends, this chapter will also explore the value of compromise in relation to deliberative democratic theory from the perspective of both the "practical feasibility and realization of a core normative ideals" (Westphal 2018: 84). In doing so, it is particularly important to carefully consider the value of compromise in the context of the development of deliberative democracy as explored and developed by deliberative democracy theorists since the 1990s.[2]

Deliberative democratic theory is now moving the discussion toward realization. According to Elstub et al. (2018: 3–5), the debate on deliberative democracy has now entered its fourth generation. Following the first generation, which was aimed at normative theorizing, the second generation attempted to modify the theory by looking at deliberative democracy's capacity to accommodate diversity and plurality, while the third generation aimed to strengthen the theory by designing deliberative democratic institutions and empirical analysis. In contrast,

2 I interpret the turning point in Gutmann's argument to have taken place in the 2010s as a retreat from normative theory (Hirai 2019). It seems to reflect the contemporary situation in which, faced with the reality of a divided society, the possibility of social integration has had to be found through compromises that include perspectives other than deliberation. This may illustrate the difficulty of bridging the gap between ideal/normative theory and political practice. It also shows the limits of a certain kind of rationalism. While acknowledging the value of compromise in politics, this chapter will also examine the challenges of compromise in contrast to the argument of deliberative democracy. It seems necessary to return to and compare the discussions of the 1990s, when normative values were being explored for deliberative democracy, in order to clarify the principle value of their compromise theory.

the fourth generation is now advancing the debate on how to realize deliberative democracy by exploring the construction of deliberative systems.

Following this trend, two themes can be identified that should be considered as contemporary issues. The first is the positioning of discussions about expanding the deliberative space as an extension of the practical development of deliberative democracy and considering how new digital technologies may or may not contribute to the realization of deliberative democracy. In light of discussions about how to build a deliberative system, the other considers how civic education can contribute to the realization of deliberative democracy. My exploration of these two themes in this chapter will broaden the field in which compromises that have been discussed in political science can be applied and will relocate them as issues more familiar to us. By focusing the discussion on these questions, I believe that I can present an important argument that differs from Weinstock's and Westphal's in terms of how it views the effective realization of deliberative democracy in a value-pluralistic society.

In section 2 of this chapter, I will review the basic issues of compromise theory, as well as the principle of how compromise is discussed in relation to deliberative democracy theory. In doing so, I will examine whether compromise can be given an important place in deliberative democracy. In section 3, I will explore the influence of the development of digital technology, which cannot be overlooked in the expansion of the deliberative space, as part of the process of realizing deliberative democracy. While acknowledging the potential of technology to level differences in the abilities of deliberative participants and to reduce bias, I will argue that there is a risk that technology could have a negative impact on the deliberative abilities of citizens and that, in order to improve the health of deliberative democracy, we need to think further about how to foster citizens' civic qualities and capacity for compromise. Section 4 will then discuss whether compromise can be a goal of civic education. Even if compromise can be localized as a new goal to be achieved in civic education, there is a need to further explore how to foster it. I will examine education in Japan as an example of how to address this issue. In a culture like Japan's, which is not argument-centered, this has not been as widely explored as it has been in Europe and the English-speaking world. In Japan, education aims to perfect students' character and form them into citizens who can build a peaceful nation and society. In order to promote the development of autonomous citizens, school education encourages political education and the cultivation of qualities and abilities that will allow students to think publicly and participate in politics based on the *Courses of Study*, the government's curriculum guidelines for basic education standards. However, "compromise" is rarely emphasized as a value in education. Instead, priority is given to developing the right mentality and attitude toward interpersonal relationships,

such as empathy and mutual respect. This is a Japanese cultural trait.[3] I will present an example of how Japanese civic education attempts to teach students to cooperate with others. At the same time, I will also consider how education relating to "compromise" can be positioned within civic education.

2 A Principled Exploration of Compromise in Relation to Deliberative Democracy

Let us begin by asking how "compromise" is defined. Cecil Anthony John Coady, a prominent scholar working on the epistemological problems of testimony in the fields of political and applied philosophy, has said the following about compromise:

> Problems of compromise are endemic to political life and, indeed, to all collaborative activities, for they allow joint enterprises to proceed, in spite of the conflicting goals, values and ideals of the participants. They do this because a compromise is a sort of bargain in which people who see advantages in cooperation for certain ends sacrifice other objectives, temporarily or permanently, in order to gain the ends that they believe only achievable by cooperation. Compromise is not inherently immoral and it often has little to do with morality, but the losses may have a moral flavor about them, as when someone abandons certain ideals or sacrifices the hope of achieving certain valuable outcomes. (Coady 2012: 537)

According to Coady's views on compromise as a form of bargaining,[4] we should think of conflict resolution as a tactic that separates compromise from moral judgment.

In contrast, Peter Jones and Ian O'Flynn view compromise in relation to morality, writing, "In one case, there is no moral norm we can use for scrutiny and, in the other, it is the very absence of an agreed norm that makes compromise necessary. The more skeptical we are about the capacity of morality to yield

3 Article 21(i) of Japan's School Education Act 1947 (last version: 2019) sets the following goals for compulsory education: "promoting social activities inside and outside the school, and fostering an attitude of proactive participation in shaping society and contribution towards the development of it based on a spirit of autonomy, independence and cooperation, normative consciousness fair judgment, and a public spirit." Trying to cultivate the ability and mentality of cooperation in collaborative activities within schools is a major characteristic of Japanese education. < https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/4573/en > (accessed 31 October 2024).

4 Baume and Novak say that compromise should be distinguished from bargaining. Bargaining does not involve each party agreeing to lose something, meaning that the parties can attempt to maximize their self-interest and contend without yielding (Baume and Novak 2020: 7).

agreed answers or any answers at all, the more we shall find a role for compromise" (Jones and O'Flynn 2012: 118). That is, compromise is the best option when a conflict cannot be resolved by recourse to morality or when there is no right answer. Going further, they believe that, even when people morally believe there is a right answer but have different views of what the right answer is, they choose compromise because moral views exacerbate the conflict.

The tactic of compromise is sometimes viewed negatively in the context of democratic values. Sandrine Baume and Stéphanie Novak, referring to criticisms of compromise theory, believe this is the case for five reasons (2020: 2). First, compromises can be inherently nihilistic if they are reached at the expense of essential (universal) values (Hallowell 1944). Second, when political actors regulate political differences by treating similar situations differently without any principled justification, compromise is seen as a violation of principled coherence (Dworkin 1986). Third, compromises might create, reveal, or exacerbate inequalities because compromisers might have different and unequal bargaining power (Ruser and Machin 2017). Fourth, as the practice of compromise becomes widespread, the quality of political debate declines because fewer political voices are heard (Ruser and Machin 2017). Finally, compromise can erase the oppositional dimension of politics (Mouffe 1998). While accepting these negative criticisms of compromise, we must consider how to overcome them. To do so, I will now analyze the principled studies that find that compromise has positive significance from several perspectives.

It is instructive to consider Gutmann and Thompson's *The Spirit of Compromise* (2012) as a principled theory of compromise in democratic politics and to consider the issue of social integration in contemporary liberal democracies. The main points of their principled argument can be outlined as follows:[5] Gutmann and Thompson start from the premise that compromise is sometimes inevitable in political decision-making related to governing in a democracy. Nevertheless, the spirit of compromise is lacking in contemporary US politics, and resistance to compromise, even when it is necessary, makes compromise difficult to achieve. Resistance to compromise is based on an uncompromising mindset characterized by a state of permanent campaigning. Gutmann and Thompson explore the question of what compromises are necessary for desirable governance in these circumstances and what changes are needed to make them possible.

Uncompromising attitudes characterized by principled tenacity and mutual suspicion are desirable during a political campaign, but they can impede the leg-

5 In this section, in line with what I have identified in a previous article, I will review the main points of the principle of compromise (Hirai 2019).

islative and political processes required to govern. Gutmann and Thompson argue that mutual sacrifice and willful opposition are crucial features of political compromise, and that a compromising mindset steers both features in a more constructive than uncompromising direction (2012: 100). The compromising mindset "regards mutual sacrifice as an opportunity to adjust principles to improve on the status quo" and finds willful opposition "a resource for promoting greater understanding and accommodation" (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 100). This is because the compromising mindset has two principles: principled prudence and mutual respect.

"Principled prudence" means that the politician "begins with the pragmatic recognition that compromise is usually necessary in a democracy to accomplish anything of significance," but it is grounded in the moral consideration that "to fail to compromise in politics is to privilege the status quo" (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 101). In other words, political prudence is based on the recognition that a compromising mindset opens up opportunities to promote greater justice.

Mutual respect, another characteristic of the compromising mindset, is the principle that justifies politicians' demands that their opponents approach negotiations in good faith when faced with willful opposition and that they mutually restrain their suspicions about each other's hidden motives. Mutual respect "expresses an orientation toward the political process that sees politicians as colleagues who can work together in the enterprise of governing, and more generally as citizens bound together under a common constitution" (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 109). Political adversaries who respect each other can argue and negotiate in the belief that they will jointly support a particular compromise that is balanced, even if that compromise does not result in the law they think it should, or if it is far from perfect.

Such an account of compromising attitudes is highly idealistic and normative. Gutmann and Thompson present these norms in order to highlight the differences between the principles of electoral activism and the governing process. Electoral activities are competitive, zero-sum activities. Defeating one's opponent is a legitimate motive and does not require mutual respect. Governing, however, is different. The more campaign attitudes permeate the legislative process, the less room there is for mutual respect. Moreover, in a politics of uncertainty, a zero-sum logic may not always lead to a desired outcome. Here, Gutmann and Thompson show why we should distinguish between the principles of electoral politics and those of governing politics.

However, their arguments in pursuit of a desirable compromise in the 2010s were more realistic than their discussions of political philosophy up to the 2000s (Hirai 2019: 44). The rationale for such an interpretation is that, in *The Spirit of Compromise*, Gutmann and Thompson actively seek to employ a principle that

was criticized in the 1990s. It is prudence, which in *Democracy and Disagreement* (1996) was contrasted with reciprocity as the principle of deliberation, i.e., the principle that is motivated by the pursuit of self-interest, that seeks legitimacy in mutually beneficial outcomes and that supports bargaining, where the ultimate goal is a *modus vivendi* (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 53).

Gutmann and Thompson developed the theory of deliberative democracy as an alternative democratic concept to aggregative democracy and as a normative theory in the 1990s. They found that there were four salient qualities of deliberative democracy: 1. *reason-giving* in order to ensure the legitimacy of collective decision-making; 2. *accessible* to all citizens to reasoning in the decision-making process; 3. *binding* in the sense that the decision-making process aims to produce a decision that is binding for a certain period of time; 4. *dynamic* in the sense that it is aimed at a just decision, but leaves open the possibility of an ongoing dialogue in order to question the decision-making process itself (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 3–7). Based on this, Gutmann and Thompson define deliberative democracy as "a form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future" (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 7).[6]

The general understanding of the characteristics of deliberative democracy, according to Hélène Landemore, are as follows:

> Deliberative democracy, in a nutshell, posits that only laws and policies passed through the filter of a public exchange of arguments among free and equal citizens are legitimate. On deliberative democrats' view, policies and laws are supposed to result from processes yielding to the "unforced force of the better argument" in Habermas's famous phrase, rather than the result of compromises, bargaining, coercion, or a by-product of elite competition. (Landemore 2020: 36–37)

Landemore also lists the following five points in favor of deliberative democracy in her attempt to modify preference-aggregative democracy:

1. Deliberative democracy allows laws and policies resulting from it to be supported by public reasons and justifications, rather than mere numbers.

6 Joshua Cohen defines deliberative democracy as follows: "The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens. Citizen in such an order share a commitment to the resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the framework for free and public deliberation" (Cohen 1989: 21).

2. Deliberative democracy allows all citizens to exercise their voices and be heard.
3. Deliberative democracy has beneficial side effects, such as educating citizens, building a sense of community, and promoting civic engagement.
4. Deliberative democracy generalizes interests.
5. Deliberative democracy increases the group's chance to solve collective problems successfully. (Landemore 2020: 37)

According to the theory of deliberative democracy, participants' preferences are expected to potentially change as they discuss issues related to the public interest, including moral conflicts, with stakeholders providing each other with reasons for their arguments. It therefore emphasizes the ongoing deliberative process rather than discrete decision-making.

Until the 2000s, Gutmann and Thompson emphasized the gradual resolution of the issues faced by participants in ongoing deliberations, as well as the parties' diverse views, especially minorities' views, which were reflected in the decision-making process. Indeed, deliberative democracy was expected to be normative in nature, creating opportunities for minority views to be reflected in decision-making. However, the renewed emphasis on principled prudence in relation to governance in *The Spirit of Compromise* demonstrates Gutmann and Thompson's recognition that politics requires outcomes, which are achieved through negotiation. Although the focus of the debate has narrowed from the ideal of democracy as a polity to parliamentary politics and governance, the development of the argument diminishes the normativity of deliberative democratic theory, that is, the normativity of democratic politics seeking social equality, by emphasizing the continuity of deliberation and how preferences transform in the process, rather than seeking hasty agreement.

Nevertheless, compromise is not incompatible with deliberation in the search for consensus. Indeed, in their description of principled prudence as a component of a compromising mindset, Gutmann and Thompson note that, like deliberation theory, it aims at moral progress:

> [P]rincipled prudence amounts to more than making a virtue out of necessity. It has a moral component: to fail to compromise in politics is to privilege the status quo. If a compromise is likely to be an improvement, then a compromising mindset opens up opportunities to promote greater justice. (Gutmann and Thompson 2012: 101)

It is appropriate to understand the theory of compromise as complementary to, rather than in opposition to, deliberative democratic theory.[7] Compromise has value as a tactic to preserve the possibility of continuing deliberations, even when rationalistic deliberation fails to resolve disagreement. In any case, in deliberative situations, it is sometimes necessary to allow for irrationality as opposed to rationality, and it is the mindset of compromise that allows for this. In the context of questioning rationalism, the theory of compromise has value in principle.

Now, the macroscopic view that compromise leaves room for continued deliberation on public issues that I have illustrated so far means that deliberating participants must share a sense that they are exploring such issues together in order to better coexist with others in society. Moreover, they must share a strategic view and behavior so that the discussion does not end in disagreement. Even if, as Landemore points out above, "deliberative democracy has beneficial side effects, such as educating citizens, building a sense of community, and promoting civic engagement" (2020: 37), it is essential that deliberative democracy continues to produce such effects. For citizens to create a culture of deliberation, a culture of compromise must also be fostered. The discussion in this chapter will now shift from a normative theory of compromise and deliberation to the practical theory of fostering them as a culture. In the next section, I will examine the argument in favor of enlarging the space for deliberation, with the aim of expanding the culture of deliberation and compromise, and I will consider the relevance of technology as a means of such expansion.

3 The Potential and Challenges of Digital Technology for the Expansion and Cultivation of a Culture of Deliberation and Compromise

Deliberative democracy, which seeks to ensure the legitimacy of democratic decision-making, has developed not only as a normative theory but also as a practical

7 The view that "deliberation" and "compromise" are opposites indeed seems to be inappropriate. In an article critical of one of my articles, Shigeki Izawa points out the following: "'Deliberation' includes some kind of 'compromise' along with the opportunity for 'disagreement.' It involves 'irrationality' that cannot be divided by the rationality of the discussion. Therefore, 'compromise' is not an alternative to 'deliberation,' nor is 'deliberation' necessarily an alternative to 'compromise'" (Izawa 2019: 57). He also notes that, in order to raise fundamental objections to the realities of today's divided society and change it, it may sometimes be beneficial to engage in political activities that do not involve either "deliberation" or "compromise" (Izawa 2019: 58).

theory. For example, a growing body of research focuses on the design and implementation of mini-publics, in which randomly selected citizens deliberate on public issues and attempt to find a direction for decision making. These practices are also concrete attempts to realize deliberative democracy based on Jürgen Habermas's two-circuit model of democracy, which assigns different roles to the public and political spheres, and links public citizens' debate and collective decision-making with the core of the legal system. Research on deliberative democracy since the 2010s has been moving toward the construction of a deliberative system theory by further advancing practical and empirical research. According to Tetsuki Tamura (2017), the key points can be expressed in three ways. First, "rather than looking at deliberation as a single institution or practice, research on deliberative democracy seeks to look at the linkage (system) of multiple institutions and practices related to deliberation." Second, it "discusses institutions and practices that have not necessarily been regarded as 'deliberative' in the past from the viewpoint that they are components of the 'deliberative system.'" And, third, it "makes it possible to think of deliberative democracy once separate from the political system of liberal democracy" (Tamura 2017: iii–iv). The trend in current research is to explore the possibilities of creating or expanding the deliberative spaces and the interconnectedness of those numerous spaces.

The research trend toward expanding the space for deliberation can be seen as one step toward the realization of the idea of deliberative democracy. In this context, the recent move toward considering the use of technology, especially online communication technology, in order to expand deliberative forums is a reasonable shift in the response to the demands of our times. As Weiyu Zhang et al. point out, the terms "civic technology" or "civic tech" and "digital civics" are now frequently used to refer to technological innovations aimed at the public good (2021: 76; Stempeck et al. 2016). Discussions of the topic of online deliberation as an example of civic tech have also become more common. Since a meeting at Carnegie Mellon University in 2003, a number of international conferences, workshops, and seminars have been held. The proceedings of an international conference held in Singapore in 2017, "Deliberation and Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Civic Tech," can also be found in the *Journal of Deliberative Democracy* (Zhang et al. 2021: 76).

What is the aim of debates about the use of online communication technologies in traditional face-to-face deliberations? It is to build a system that allows more citizens' voices to be reflected in decision-making processes in order to ensure the legitimacy of democratic decision-making. The scale of such a system could range from aggregating citizens' voices in policymaking through an online platform at the municipal or national level to devising solutions to global-scale issues.

Ian O'Flynn (2022) refers to the issue of the scale of the deliberative forum in the context of discussing the development of mini-publics. He quotes Robert Goodin, who says that the deliberative ideal "seems eminently feasible in small-scale societies where face-to-face interactions are the norm. In large-scale mass societies, they are not and cannot be" (Goodin 2000: 82). O'Flynn then notes that, "(e)ven if large numbers of people could gather together in a single place, the time constraints under which political decisions often need to be made would make it impossible for everyone to have their say" (2022: 53). Online deliberation has the potential to break through such limitations.[8] However, exploring not only the possibilities but also the effectiveness and problems of online deliberation as a mechanism for incorporating citizens' voices into collective decision-making will be necessary to determine the direction it will take in the midst of change.

In the context of the application of systems theory to deliberative democracy, a number of recent studies have explored the potential of communication technologies and articulated their advantages. For example, an empirical study on Brazil by Patricia Rossini and her colleagues at the University of Liverpool examines how people engage in political discussions triggered by their exposure to political news on different online platforms – Facebook and news sites. This study suggests that access to information about online debates may promote citizens' political participation. The findings show that there is not only a positive correlation between exposure to online disagreement and effects on deliberative characteristics such as the legitimate expression of opinion but also a positive correlation with effects on non-deliberative characteristics. The results also reveal that the impact of exposure to online disagreement on non-deliberative characteristics does not lead people to reject the value of political debate (Rossini and Maia 2021).[9] Rossini and Maia note that "online platforms may fulfill an important role in the deliberative system by fostering the types of heated debates that citizens may refrain from engaging in offline" (2021: 98). Their findings suggest that online discussions can generate in-depth discussions and thereby positively influence

8 On the question of the scale involved in the realization of deliberative democracy, Goodin himself emphasizes the value of "deliberation within." Goodin stresses that deliberation is usually intersubjective and that political thinking, which mostly takes place in one's own mind, is based on putting oneself in the positions of others. He then explains the need to build a form of democracy that "make[s] everyone else 'imaginatively present' in the minds of each of the deliberators" and that allows introspective deliberation to inform external collective deliberation (Goodin 2000: 98; O'Flynn 2022: 53–54).

9 Rossini and Maia (2021) test the hypothesis that those who comment on news posts on Facebook – a platform with functional user identification, social cues, and network effects – may be less likely to engage in disagreement than those who comment on news websites. Rossini and Maia's results support their hypothesis.

participants' deliberative abilities and qualities, whereas in-person deliberative situations do not realistically generate in-depth discussions.

In their study, Ryan Kennedy et al. (2021) suggest that online deliberation may ameliorate the problem of imbalances in the collective characteristics of the participants to deliberations and the resulting inequalities. The study analyzes three years of data (pertaining to over 1,600 individuals) collected via the online deliberation system Common Ground for Action to examine how the frequency and nature of participation in online deliberation sessions varies by demographic group. It also investigates whether the outcomes themselves depend on session-level characteristics, such as the presence of female group discussion moderators. The results show that only minor class-, race-, and gender-related differences can be found in online deliberations and that online forums may mitigate the severe gender asymmetry often reported in face-to-face forums. Kennedy et al. found that "to the extent that there are differences in in-person deliberation, online deliberation may help to erase some of those differences" and that, "with further design enhancements, broadened access to online participation, and increasing public familiarity with various interfaces, online deliberation could reduce societal inequities further" (2021: 82–83).

Alice Siu, who (as of 2024) serves as Associate Director of the Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University, also presents positive empirical findings on the issue of deliberative imbalances. Using quantitative and qualitative correlational data from five nationally representative "deliberative polling" projects (one in-person and four online deliberative polls conducted between 2002 and 2005, with a total of 1,474 participants and ninety-nine small groups studied), Siu (2017) surveyed and analyzed the number of statements posted, minutes used, and content of the statements made by each participant in small group discussions. The results of the study show that there were no statistically significant differences in the participation levels of men and women in these discussion-based polls in terms of total time spent, total number of speaking opportunities, or total number of words spoken. The study also found that there were statistically significant differences in income, age, and race, but no consistent pattern of dominance. Comparing participants over and under 50 years of age, statistically significant differences were only found on the topics of health care and education, and even then, participants aged 50 or above were more likely to say more and spend more time in the discussion, but did not use more words. This was also true for the results of racial (white, non-white) differences (Siu 2017: 122). In her findings, Siu suggests that, in a well-structured deliberation, the influence of privileged status is not overstated (Siu 2017: 125).

Thus, in the context of the system-theoretical expansion of the theory of deliberative democracy, a body of research is accumulating that explores the potential

of digital communication technology and articulates its advantages over face-to-face deliberation. However, we must be cautious in our evaluations of this accumulated research. People who are skeptical of online deliberations within the scope of deliberative democracy are concerned that online communication will lead to the formation of small groups with high partisan affinities and promote the development of "enclave publics." Some empirical studies have shown that such enclave publics "not only suppress citizens' motivations for 'reasoning together' in order to process conflicts and moral disagreements, but also because they reinforce preconceived ideas and promote intolerance" (Maia 2018: 355; see also Dahlberg 2007; Sunstein 2001; 2017; Mutz 2006; Smith et al. 2014; Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009).

Although not a direct critique of online deliberation, our evaluation should also include the perspective that Arthur Lupia and Anne Norton take in their discussion of the legitimacy of collective decision-making, in which they mention the issue of the imbalance in participants' linguistic communication skills. In exploring the underlying principle of the legitimacy of collective decision-making in deliberative democracy, Lupia and Norton (2017) point out that, even if procedural equality is ensured, power asymmetries (in linguistic communication) in deliberative democracy threaten to lead to unjustifiable collective decisions. This is because the communicative act that precedes the outcome takes place through language. Language is one means of acquiring power, but if the participants in a deliberation are not aware of the imbalance in language skills among the participants, or if rules are not set up to mitigate the disadvantages caused by this imbalance, the participants are likely to be swayed by the opinions of those who are more linguistically proficient. While we will have to await further analysis to validate the study's finding that online deliberations have the potential to redress power imbalance among participants, the following suggestions by Lupia and Norton should be taken as essential in order to avoid biased results:

> To take such concerns seriously, a sufficient number of deliberative participants must share a set of values that induce them to be aware of the imbalances, to try to mitigate them procedurally, and to seek measures of progress that the affected participants would recognize as valid. If there is not a sufficient values consensus on the need to protect a particular population or point of view, there will be little or no motive to pursue procedural change or to measure the effect of these procedures on the affected. (Lupia and Norton 2017: 75)

In attempts to extend the scope of deliberative democracy's realization to the large field of the whole system of deliberative democracy, rather than limiting it to the highly anonymous space of online deliberation, there is a danger that simply extrapolating the logic and research results of a limited field will lead to oversights. In order to implement deliberative democracy, it is important that deliber-

ation proceeds from the point where the participants to the discussion are aware of each other's differences. The dispositions of the participants in the deliberations also need to be discussed.

One criticism of deliberative system theory from Kathryn Holst and Harvard Moe is that, "as for the mediated public communication, including the use of online media, the third phase has inadequately acknowledged how such media is used for multiple purposes and prematurely ranked 'speaking' above 'listening', and participation above information-seeking" (2021: 134). This is also an important point of view in light of the nature of deliberation. Deliberation requires the ability to listen to the opinions of others and to consider the whole issue from a public perspective. And, as we saw in the previous section, a mindset of compromise is also necessary to avoid the disadvantage of disagreements during deliberations, which can result in greater conflicts and the end of deliberations.

Since compromise is a means of reconciling conflicting parties of equal standing, it is assumed that there will be equality with others in deliberation. While the current state of the debate about online communication technologies is focused solely on creating conditions that level out differences in the capabilities and biases of participants in deliberations, the ability of technology to support deliberative capabilities and qualities, including compromise, needs to be further explored. To the extent that the potential of technology to support the capacities and dispositions of participants has not yet been fully articulated, there may be a role for civic education to play in ensuring these capacities.

4 The Compromising Mindset and Democratic Civic Education

Even if compromise is valuable in a democracy, if we expect compromise to be effective, we need to think about how to educate democratic citizens. Just as Gutmann and Thompson do not actively discuss education theory in their works, despite considering the expansion of the culture of deliberation (Hirai 2019: 43–44), it is difficult to say whether there has been sufficient discussion of civic education theory in relation to the theory of compromise. Having assessed compromise in relation to democracy in section 1 of this chapter, I will now consider the civic education required today and its relationship with compromise in line with the theoretical development of deliberative democracy as a democratic theory.

As Nishiyama points out, democratic education theory needs to advance based on the systemic development of deliberative democracy (2021: 114–116). This is a realistic extension of democratic education theory grounded in the rec-

ognition of multiple sites and agents of deliberation, the division of labor between different sites and different deliberative acts, and the interconnection between multiple sites of deliberation. However, in a different phase of such discussions, the issue of how to foster in children the civic virtues required for the healthy functioning of democracy should be discussed – but it is not discussed enough. It is therefore necessary to examine the content of the democratic education required.

In addition, skepticism about the educational function of deliberative democracy needs to be explored. Assessing a wide range of empirical studies, Jason Brennan (2017, Ch. 3) argues that the ideal theory of deliberation is unrealistic. For example, public deliberation results in disagreement and the development of ingroup and outgroup disagreements, rather than consensus; it can even lead to violence (Brennan 2017: 65). "Citizens prefer not to engage in deliberative modes of reasoning and prefer that deliberation not last long" (Brennan 2017: 66). Thus, empirically, the validity of the arguments made by deliberative democracy theorists that deliberation affects civic education are shaky. How can we speak of civic education in the context of deliberative democracy in response to Brennan's non-idealist argument that epistocracy, not democracy, is necessary?

Ian O'Flynn emphasizes the importance of exchanging reasons (2022: 37), drawing on the following reference in Robert Goodin's article, which discusses the development of deliberative democracy theory:

> The original deliberative democratic vision was of a consensus that is "rationally motivated" and shaped by the exchange of reasons. That now goes out the window, to be replaced by a pragmatic agreement on "what to do" without any agreement on "why." You agree to the course of action for your reasons, and I for mine, end of story; the brute fact that we all agree on what to do suffices for an "incompletely theorized agreement." But if agreement on "why" is not needed, it is unclear what purpose is served by telling one another our reasons at all. (Goodin 2018: 887)

O'Flynn views compromise as the quintessential workable agreement that is indispensable to democratic politics. However, his suggestion that "a compromise is not a synthesis that everyone regards as superior to their previous position" implies that it is desirable to seek genuine consensus through the exchange of ideas (O'Flynn 2022: 39).

However, the theory of deliberative democracy has been criticized for its rationalist nature, which risks creating decision-making bias, depending on the level of deliberative capacity, and for the danger it poses of excluding certain people and their voices from deliberation. Michael E. Morrell (2010) criticizes the rationalist tendencies in theories of deliberative democracy for their exclusionary nature and attempts to supplement deliberative democracy theory by identifying

emotions in the deliberative process. Drawing on neuroscience and cognitive science, Morrell emphasizes the involvement of emotions in human cognition and judgment. On the basis of findings from social and developmental psychology – in particular Mark H. Davis's organizational model of empathy (which considers the affective and cognitive components of empathic responses in multiple dimensions) – he also argues that including empathy as a process in the deliberative process ensures that deliberation is carried out appropriately (Morrell 2010, Ch. 3). Morrell states:

> The empirical research I have surveyed supports several conclusions about the effects of empathy on deliberative democracy. Most importantly, it appears highly likely that we need citizens to engage in empathy if deliberative democracy is to function properly. In order to decrease biases and polarization, and increase cooperation and reciprocity, deliberators must demonstrate predispositions to both perspective taking and empathic concern, and the deliberative democratic system must somehow encourage citizens to act on those predispositions. Without the process of empathy, deliberation is highly unlikely to embody the equal consideration necessary for legitimate democratic decision-making. (Morrell 2010: 126–127)

For Morrel, ensuring the good health of deliberative democracy requires that citizens develop a "predisposition to both perspective taking and empathic concern." This suggests a need to educate the mindset, as distinct from training reason.

However, Mary F. Scudder adds her critique to the theory of deliberative democracy with empathy at its core, explaining why the practice of empathy is ultimately inappropriate for democratic deliberation (2020: 15): empirical evidence from the field of psychology suggests that we are actually bad at accurately imagining other people's perspectives, meaning that the outcome of the process of empathy is realized selectively and unevenly, depending on the relationship between the observer and the object. Relying on imagination instead of communication is at odds with the normative core of deliberative democracy because it is premised on a kind of spurious uptake of other perspectives. Moreover, even if we could accurately imagine the perspectives of others, it would undermine deliberation by distracting us from the need to engage in the difficult task of democratic listening. Indeed, listening is what Scudder sees as the key to a healthy deliberative democracy.

Why is listening the essence of achieving deliberative democracy? Scudder responds with the following:

> The democratic power of the ilauditory listening act comes from the expectation that what is heard will be incorporated into the process through which we make collective decisions. If, in deliberation, listeners simply go through the motions, refusing to take on and deal with what their fellow citizens are saying, their listening cannot move us toward democracy. After all, [. . .] it is having one's inputs considered (and not just heard) in the course of

> a decision-making process that ensures democratically legitimate outcomes. (Scudder 2020: 110–111)

What is required in deliberation is not an empathetic understanding of the other party, but an assurance to the speaker of the perception that his or her views are accepted. This ensures that the deliberation is perceived by its participants as having been conducted in a fair manner. For deliberation to take place as a space for mutual listening, participants must have the capacity to listen to each other.

An education theory for deliberative democracy can be adapted to a compromise-oriented education theory. Suppose compromise is achieved by limiting one's arguments and yielding to those of the other party in a certain relationship. In that case, there will inevitably be an empathic understanding of the other party, and listening to the other party will be necessary. In the context of civic education, the cultivation of empathy as a capacity and an attitude of listening, rather than reason, is also required.

I would now like to consider the application of the theoretical explorations above to education practice. The possibility of compromise is also explored in discussions about the health of democracy. However, in a culture such as Japan's, which is not argument-centered, compromise has not been as widely explored as it has been in Europe and the English-speaking world. In the remainder of this section, I will introduce contemporary trends in Japanese education practice and examine desirable forms of education that support a healthy democracy.

Today, education in Japan is based on the Basic Act on Education 1947 and is governed by the new Basic Act on Education, which was revised in 2006. The Basic Act on Education outlines the role of education in realizing the ideals of the Constitution of Japan, clearly defines the state's education responsibilities, and limits the state's power. Article 1 defines the purpose of education: "Education must be provided with the aim of fully developing the individual character, as we endeavor to cultivate a people that is sound in mind and body and imbued with the qualities that are necessary in the people who make up a peaceful and democratic nation and society."[10] To achieve the twin goals of perfecting character and fostering sound citizenship, Article 2 outlines a set of five goals. Paragraph (iii) states that the goal is "fostering the values of respect for justice, responsibility, equality between men and women, and mutual respect and cooperation, as well as the value of actively participating in building our society and contributing to its development, in the public spirit." Article 17(1) states, "In order to facilitate the comprehensive and systematic implementation of policies that promote education, the government shall formulate a basic plan covering basic principles, meas-

10 https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/2442/en (accessed 31 October 2024).

ures that must be taken, and any other necessary particulars of its policies to promote education, and shall report this plan to the Diet as well as making it public." Education reform based on the Basic Plan for the Promotion of Education began in 2008, and the fourth phase of the plan was released in 2023, setting a new direction for education.

Based on the Basic Act on Education, the legal system is in place in order to pass various education laws, and the national curriculum is implemented based on the *Courses of Study*, the government curriculum guidelines. Compulsory school education in Japan is unique compared to other countries because it adopts a holistic approach to education, teaching through extracurricular education[11] in addition to a subject-based curriculum. Holistic education in Japan has three components:[12] fostering solid academic ability, "rich humanity,"[13] and a healthy body. Rich humanity encompasses self-discipline, cooperation, kindness to others, and the ability to be moved emotionally. Students develop cooperativeness and kindness by engaging in collaborative everyday activities in the classroom (e.g., cleaning). Alongside extracurricular programs and special activities, moral education is also seen as a means of nurturing rich humanity.

Developing democratic citizens is an education goal that has long been carried out in social studies classes. However, from the late 2000s through the 2010s, there was a growing interest in civic education. There has been a growing trend toward actively incorporating civic education into education practice in response to the need to address contemporary issues such as the younger generation's growing disillusionment with politics, economic stagnation, and a weakening sense of social norms. A 2015 act that partially amended the Public Offices Election Act 1950 and other laws lowered the voting age to 18.

11 In Japan, extracurricular education is called *Tokkatsu* (an abbreviation for *Tokubetsu-Katsudo*). Ryoko Tsuneyoshi describes its characteristics using the following eight concepts: 1. learning by doing; 2. child-initiated activities; 3. self-motivated, inner-motivated action; 4. cooperative learning; 5. integration; 6. collaborative problem-solving outside the classroom; 7. egalitarianism; and 8. education for life. Its general goals in elementary schools are stated in the *Courses of Study* as follows: "Effective group activities aim at the well-balanced development of mind and body and the encouragement of individuality. Participation in the group helps build an active, positive attitude toward improving life and personal relations. At the same time, it should deepen each child's attitude toward life and the ability to do his/her very best" (Tsuneyoshi 2020). *Tokkatsu* is currently attracting attention overseas as one of Japan's distinctive educational programs.

12 https://www.eduport.mext.go.jp/pdf/summary/pamphlet/pamphlet-teachers.pdf (accessed 31 October 2024).

13 https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpac200201/ (accessed 31 October 2024).

This new trend in education was influenced by citizenship education in the Anglo-American context (Hirota 2015). As described by Shigeo Kodama, desirable citizenship education cultivates political literacy and education on controversial issues while fostering the development of "thinking and self-reflective citizens" (Kodama 2015). Citizenship education introduced as an advanced practice is essentially an education curriculum centered on cultivating political literacy based on the *Crick Report*, the final report of the advisory group on citizenship in the UK[14] (Karaki et al. 2015; Hashimoto 2014). It aims to promote rationalist civic education based on the premise that autonomous citizens can solve public problems through debate. In such an approach, no awareness of "compromise"-based argumentation strategies exists.

Civic education in Japan differs significantly from Germany's political education system (*politische Bildung*). According to Japanese comparative education scholar Takahiro Kondō, in recent years, Japanese schools have aimed to develop students' fair judgment when it comes to politics and economics, as well as teach basic knowledge. However, the dominant teaching methodology is a simple one that involves getting students to research, present, and debate. In contrast, German political education attempts to cultivate students' critical judgment by getting them to question the substance of specific political decisions themselves, using real political issues as material, which requires the ability to act politically. Political agency includes "the ability to withstand the tensions of political conflict and, in some cases, compromise" (Kondō 2005: 88).

Japanese civic and political education has a short history and is still considered to be in its infancy. It has been developing since the early 1980s, when the slogan of "internationalization" was adopted. Since the 2000s, awareness of Japan's relations with other countries and the need to consider issues on a global scale due to the advancement of globalization has been promoted. Although citizenship education has progressed, it has not yet matured to the point where it teaches the value of compromise, which is necessary in order to develop solutions to global issues and incorporate diverse interests through discussion. This may be largely due to geographical factors that somewhat buffer tensions with other countries, which have distanced the Japanese from the need to think realistically.

However, there is another viewpoint, which is that the spirit of compromise has long been fostered in Japan through compulsory school education, so there is no need to specifically and explicitly teach the value and techniques of compromise. As mentioned above, Japanese education has long aimed to cultivate rich humanity through its education activities, which comprise the academic curricu-

14 https://dera.ioe.ac.uk/id/eprint/4385/1/crickreport1998.pdf (accessed 31 October 2024).

lum and extracurricular programs. In particular, by integrating special activities as part of education activities, children learn to recognize common goals in group activities (e.g., class meetings, sports meetings, clean-up activities), and even if there are sometimes conflicts, they gain experience in exploring how to work together through trial and error, thus developing a mindset of compromise. Recognizing that such qualities of group cooperation have long been cultivated helps students to understand that the foundation for working with a wide range of people in today's global society has been laid. Building on this foundation, Japanese education is therefore moving in the direction of emphasizing the formation of individual opinions, allowing students to discuss issues with others on an equal footing. Of course, collaborating does not mean limiting one's own ideas, but rather reconciling one's own and others' opinions within an equal relationship. Hence, the direction of education in Japan is compatible with compromise education. Students try to reach tactical, temporary conclusions from an equal standpoint and continue strategic deliberations. Unlike other cultures that emphasize politics and public debates about the health of democracy, the opposite is true in Japanese culture. The challenge in those countries is how to build the principle of cooperation. This, in turn, may mean that Japanese education, which promotes cooperation, can offer some suggestions for Western education.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the value of compromise in the context of democratic politics. Interpreting the theory of compromise in relation to deliberative democracy as a development of democratic theory, compromise can be valued as a principle that challenges the rationalism of deliberation. The need to prevent disagreements from halting deliberation and deepening social divisions is of particular importance in order to realize deliberative democracy, and compromise is also valuable for this purpose. The culture of deliberation and the culture of compromise must be fostered together. The development of digital communication technologies has the potential to expand the deliberative space and to level power relations and remove bias among deliberative participants. However, studies claiming the benefits of technology are yet to address how it can help to resolve the conflicts that arise during deliberations. I have therefore discussed the role of civic education in more detail. In order to resolve conflicts, it is necessary to cultivate not only the ability to deliberate, but also empathy or similar mindsets. This kind of education, which fosters both these abilities and mindsets, suggests similarities with education on compromise, which seeks to cultivate a culture of compromise in pursuit

of strategic solutions. In this chapter, one form of such education was presented by looking at the Japanese education system. The series of discussions in this chapter have attempted to show that harmonizing rational and emotional aspects is the key to resolving political conflicts.

In contrast to Western countries, this has chapter interpreted the lack of emphasis on teaching compromise in the context of Japanese education from two perspectives: one is that political education is not mature enough to recognize the need for compromise in political situations, and the other is that the foundation for compromise has already been laid through schooling. It is on this second aspect that this chapter has shed the most light. Unfortunately, however, some surveys have shown that Japanese citizens are not necessarily cooperative in their current situation. According to Tarōmaru (2016, Ch. 10), the shift that took place in Japanese people's values between 1973 and 2008 reflects a trend toward individualization. The sense of crisis felt in relation to this situation is evident in the Fourth Basic Plan for the Promotion of Education, released in 2023, which aims to "improve well-being rooted in Japanese society" and to include "altruism" and "cooperativeness" as elements of such Japanese-style well-being.[15] The deliberate inclusion of altruism and cooperativeness suggests that Japan will face a situation in the future that will prompt it to provide education that teaches compromise.

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15 https://www.mext.go.jp/content/20230308-mxt_soseisk02-000028073_1.pdf (accessed 31 October 2024).

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