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Text and Paratext in Fifteenth-Century Manuscripts?

The Example of the Commentaries on Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscencia*

Introduction

What is a memory of? If memory allows us to relate to the past, how are we able to do so? These are some of the questions that Aristotle addresses in the *De memoria et reminiscencia*.¹ Part of the *Parva naturalia*, Aristotle's short treatise on memory and recollection was studied in the academic context of the Middle Ages, up to Albert the Great, in the *translatio vetus*, by James of Venice, and then, since Aquinas' *Sententia De memoria et reminiscencia*, in the *translatio nova* by William of Moerbeke. The corpus of commentaries to which the *Parva naturalia* gave rise has been the subject of several recent studies, particularly the part concerning memory.² This interest

1 Aristotle also indicates the temperaments that favour memory or reminiscence, as well as the habits that should be developed to improve memory. I will mention two studies proposing alternative interpretations of Aristotle's treatise. See Richard Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004; David Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection*, Leiden: Brill, 2007.

2 Between the many recent editions of medieval commentaries on *De memoria et reminiscencia*, there have recently appeared the critical editions of the commentaries of Peter of Auvergne, of Adam of Bockenfield and the thinkers of his circle and numerous editions by Sten Ebbesen. See notably Julie Brumberg-Chaumont and Dominique Poirel (eds.), *Adam of Bockenfield and his Circle on De memoria et reminiscencia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022; David Bloch, Peter of Auvergne on Memory, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 78 (2008): 51–110; Sten Ebbesen, Radulphus Brito on Memory and Dreams: An Edition, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 85 (2016): 11–86; Sten Ebbesen, Anonymus Orielensis 33 on “De memoria”: An Edition, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 85 (2016): 128–161; Sten Ebbesen, Anonymus Parisini 16160 on Memory: An Edition, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 85 (2016): 162–217; Sten Ebbesen, Anonymus Vaticani 3061 and Anonymus Vaticani 2170 on Aristotle's “Parva naturalia”: An Edition of Selected Questions, *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge grec et latin* 86 (2017): 217–312; Véronique Decaix, Sten Ebbesen, and Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist, Questions on “De sensu et sensato”, “De memoria” and “De somno et vigilia”: A Catalogue, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 57 (2017): 59–115. Other editions are due to appear shortly, including one by Maciej Stanek devoted to the commentaries of Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen. Among the studies, I will limit myself to mentioning David Bloch's important work, already quoted, which covers Aristotle's treatise and its

in memory is keen in philosophy, psychology, and history alike. This interest aside, late medieval commentaries on *De memoria et reminiscencia* remain largely under-studied. In this contribution, I propose to approach fifteenth-century commentaries by means of two texts associated with two different doctrinal tendencies framed in the realist school or *via antiqua*.³ In addition to the subject of memory, I propose to deal with this century and the debated question of doctrinal schools that it raises, by examining the texts and the marginal notes found in the commentaries. My question throughout this chapter will be how to describe the interaction between the text (i.e. the commentary attributable to the author) and the paratext (i.e. everything that accompanies the text, especially the marginal notes or *marginalia*,⁴ presumably by readers other than the author himself). My analysis will suggest paying attention to the hierarchical relationship of these texts. To put it in another way, I propose to observe these relationships using a musical metaphor: I will consider if this relationship is rather to be seen as the one that characterises that between the principal voice and the accompaniment or if it is rather to be seen on a more equitable polyphonic ground. A contemporary musical genre could even mirror what we observe

Latin reception up to Duns Scotus, via the Arab commentators, and Carla Di Martino's study on the internal senses, as well as various articles, including some devoted to Ockham and Buridan. This field of study is expanding rapidly. See notably Véronique Decaix and Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (eds.), *Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2021; Carla Di Martino, *Ratio particularis: La doctrine des sens internes d'Avicenne à Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris: J. Vrin, 2008; Dominik Perler, Ockham on Memory and Double Intentionality, *Topoi* 41 (2022): 133–142.

³ In the fifteenth century, authors divide in two groups, *via antiqua* and *via moderna*, according to two opposing ways of understanding the nature of universals. The first group is realist, whereas the second is nominalist and maintains that universals do not exist outside the language or the mind. Despite this quick definition, nevertheless, the concurrent views are numerous, above all on the realist camp. Followers of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome or John Duns Scotus are all realists. On the *via moderna* and *via antiqua*, see notably Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, "Via antiqua" and "Via moderna" in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the "Wegestreit", in: *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700*, Russell Friedman and Lauge Nielsen (eds.), 9–36, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. On the multiplicity of realist perspectives, see Pepijn Rutten, "Duae opiniones probabiles": Der Kölner Wegestreit und seine Verbreitung an den Universitäten des 15. Jahrhunderts, in: *University, Council, City: Intellectual Culture on the Rhine (1300–1550)*, Laurent Cesalli, Nadja Germann, and Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen (eds.), 113–136, Turnhout: Brepols, 2007.

⁴ On this term and its origins in the seventeenth century, see Jacqueline Hamesse, Les marginalia dans les textes philosophiques universitaires médiévaux, in: *Talking to the Text: Marginalia from Papyri to Print: Proceedings of a Conference Held at Erice, 26 September – 3 October 1998, as the 12th Course of International School for the Study of Written Records*, vol. 1, Vincenzo Fera, Giacomo Ferràu, and Silvia Rizzo (eds.), 301–321, Messina: Centro Interdipartimentale di Studi Umanistici, 2002, 308.

in the case of glossed commentaries: the pluritextual motet.⁵ This genre offered a different text to each voice giving rise to overlapping texts that blurred the meaning of the whole. To provide an initial answer, I will focus on three case studies from two commentaries: the commentary by Johannes de Caulaincourt (labelled as “Scotist” and associated with the *via antiqua*) as transmitted in the Turin manuscript BN H III 13 and the commentary by Johannes Vescovis (associated with Thomism or Albertism and the *via antiqua*) as transmitted in the manuscripts Pamplona Bibl. Cath. 24 and Oxford BodL Canon Misc. 211.

1 A Note on Paratext and Marginalia

As the present volume shows, there are various types of marginal notes (*marginalia*) that “frame” the main text. These range from additions of various types: numbering of the arguments, corrections, comments, hands designed in the margins to indicate a definition or a particular important point, tree diagrams, which serve as summaries, etc. These marks underline a particular point of the text, serve the reader as a memo, add something to the main text (as a kind of footnote), or correct some errors, such as words difficult to read, unclear (or wrong) abbreviations, homoioteleuta or eye-skip. My partial study of the fifteenth-century corpus, largely made in the context of proposing an edition of Vescovis’ Commentary on the *De memoria et reminiscencia*, revealed *marginalia* of various types in these manuscripts:

Corrections, reading marks (hands or numbering of the arguments), and minor explanatory marginal notes:

- Bibliothèques d’Amiens-Métropole: ms. 402, fols. 285r–288r (numbering)
- Universitätsbibliothek Basel: UB F III 10, fols. 274r–277v (corrections, small additions)
- Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin: SPBK lat. fol. 402, fols. 257r–265v
- Real Biblioteca de El Escorial: BReal m.II.1, fols. 322r–326v
- Biblioteca Nacional de España: Madrid BN 9018, fols. 137v–139r
- Mende, Bibliothèque municipale: ms. 40, fols. 175r–177v
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK I E 38, fols. 351r–355r

⁵ As an example of a pluritextual motet, I propose the incipit of a motet by Nicholas Grenon (c. 1375–1456), a French composer working in Paris. It reads as follows: “Ave virtus virtutum caritas / Prophetarum fulti suffragio / Infelix, propera”.

- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK IV G 18, fols. 311v–315r (red notes in the margin)
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK V E 8, fols. 171v–175r
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK V E 9, fols. 266v–270v
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK V E 12, fols. 90r–93v (corrections, fols. 91r, 92v)
- Poitiers, Médiathèque François-Mitterrand: BV 138, fols. 346r–350r
- St-Quentin, Médiathèque Guy de Maupassant: BV123, item 7, (reading marks)

Diagrams added as memos/summary (and reading marks):

- Universitätsbibliothek Basel: UB F VII 11, fol. 349r
- Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin: SPBK lat. fol. 402, fols. 257r–265v
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK V E 8, fol. 174r
- Prague, Národní knihovna: NK V E 9, fol. 266v (scheme); fols. 267v, 269r (comment)

Important marginal notes that add something to the general text:

- Oxford, Bodleian Library: Can. Misc. 211, fols. 247r–248v
- Archivo Catedral Pamplona: còd. 24, fols. 192v–196r
- Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria: BN H III 13, fol. 284r

All these manuscripts, apart from Turin and Mende, concern the commentary by Johannes Vensoris. This is both the commentary that is most widely disseminated and most affected by the manuscript tradition. It is also the commentary that I have studied the most, with a view to proposing an edition. The manuscripts Turin BN H III 13 and Mende, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 40 contain Caulaincourt's commentary.⁶ This list does not show, however, all the manuscript commentaries circulating without marginal notes, and there are many of these.⁷ In short, it is rare for

⁶ The case study proposed in this chapter will be restricted to these commentaries. However, Caulaincourt and Vensoris are not the only fifteenth-century Parisian commentators on the *De memoria et reminiscencia*. One could notably mention Johannes Hennon, Johannes le Damoisiau, Georges of Bruxelles and Peter Tartaret. Part of these, i.e. Tartaret's and Bruxelles' commentaries circulated mainly in printed version. The manuscripts so far considered do not include any significant marginal note. However, it would be interesting to look at the marginal notes of the printed editions, but at this stage I have not been able to carry out such research. On these commentaries, see Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 1.1: *Medieval Authors: A–L*, Florence: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2013; Olga Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: Textes et maîtres (ca. 1200–1500)*, vol. 5: *Répertoire des noms commençant par J (suite: à partir de Johannes D.)*, Turnhout: Brepols, 2003.

⁷ This list of surveyed manuscripts should not induce the idea that *marginalia* are highly disseminated. In these manuscripts, which contain the commentary on *De memoria et reminiscencia* by Johannes Vensoris, I have found no *marginalia*, i.e. no paratext. It is notably the case in Amiens

a commentary to circulate with marginal notes concerning the doctrinal content. In a review of some thirty manuscripts, I found three notable examples: the folios concerning the Caulaincourt commentary, and those of the Pamplona and Oxford manuscripts concerning Versonoris.

2 First Case of Analysis: A Text and a Paratext? A Two-Part Commentary: Johannes de Caulaincourt(/John Buridan) and John Duns Scotus

Little is known about the Parisian Master of Arts Johannes de Caulaincourt.⁸ His name appears several times in the *Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis* concerning the first half of the fifteenth century.⁹ Olga Weijers mentions that he studied at the Collège d'Harcourt and was probably not a member of any order. Charles Lohr is more cautious. His name ("de Magistri" or "de Magistris") makes it difficult to identify him.¹⁰ Studies of him are scarce to say the least. Although his

Bibliothèque Métropole, ms. 402, fols. 285r–288r; Universitätsbibliothek Basel F I 13, fols. 210r–214r; Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig 1419, fols. 204r–206v; Bibliothèque Nationale du Luxembourg NB53, fols. 229r–251r; Biblioteca Comunale Teresiana Mantova BC F. IV–9, fols. 254v–257v; Schlägl Prämonstratenserstift 119 Cpl. 169, fols. 272r–275r; St. Gallen Kantonsbibliothek. (Vadiana) 839, fols. 311rb–314rb; Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Pal. Lat. 1050, fols. 314r–318r. At this point in my research of the Versonian corpus, these are the manuscripts I could study. This list does not cover all manuscripts mentioned by Charles Lohr or Olga Weijers in their respective catalogues. See Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol 1.1; Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 1.2: *Medieval Authors: M–Z*, Florence: Sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2010; Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*. In addition, the manuscript Colmar, Bibliothèque des Dominicains (Bibliothèque municipale) BD 223, fols. 292r–297r, which contains Caulaincourt's commentary does not include any marginal notes.

⁸ Note that in some printed editions Johannes de Caulaincourt is called Johannes de Magistris. On the question of attribution, see in particular Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 1.1, 269 and 311.

⁹ Charles Samaran and Émile Aurèle Van Moé (eds.), *Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 4: *Liber Procuratorum Nationis Picardiae in Universitate Parisiensi*, Parisiis: Henri Didier, 1938, 95.16–17, 110.22–25, 189.34–36, 201.39–46, 253.21–254.7, 256.20–46, 262.34–37, 330.12. Cited by Paul Bakker, Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Late Fifteenth-Century Paris, III: The Commentaries on Aristotle by Johannes de Caulaincourt (alias Johannes de Magistris), *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 49 (2007): 195–238.

¹⁰ He mentions at least four Johannes de Magistris. See Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries*, vol. 1.1, 311. For the bibliography concerning Johannes de Caulaincourt, see also Lohr, *Latin Aristotle*

name is mentioned in the catalogue of Olga Weijers and Charles Lohr, he has been the subject of little research.¹¹ Johannes de Caulaincourt was the author of several commentaries used for teaching at the Arts faculty and compiled in collections. These include the *Questiones (perutiles) super tota philosophia naturali cum explanatione textus secundum mentem Doctoris subtilis Scoti*, published in Parma (1481), in Basel (before May 1490) and in Venice (1487 and 1490),¹² and handed down in three manuscripts, the ms. Turin BN H III 13,¹³ Mende, Bibliothèque municipale ms. 40 and Colmar, Bibliothèque des Dominicains (Bibliothèque municipale) BD 223. These *Questiones* include the commentary on *De memoria*. The Turin manuscript will be the focus of this analysis, as – to my knowledge – the only witness with an important marginal note.¹⁴ As Paul Bakker points out in his article, Johannes de Caulaincourt was described as a Scotist, according to his editors, but in his monumental study on the history of science, Pierre Duhem states that Caulaincourt also owes a debt to Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Nicolaus d'Orbellis, and Johannes Hennon.¹⁵ I intend here to study the interaction between text and paratext in order to explore the qualifiers applicable to Caulaincourt on questions relating to memory: is he a Scotist or a Buridanist?¹⁶ Before examining this question in detail, as well as the

Commentaries, vol 1.1.

¹¹ Weijers, *Le travail intellectuel*, 116–117. For more information on the biography of Johannes de Caulaincourt, see this recent article by Paul Bakker concerning him: Bakker, *Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics*.

¹² See Bakker, *Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics*, 197.

¹³ I would like to thank Kamil Majcherek for this identification.

¹⁴ Almost nothing is known about this manuscript. It is mentioned in Pasini's catalogue at number 457, but there we only learn that the manuscript dates from the fifteenth century and that it contains questions on *Physics*, *De caelo et mundo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, *Meteororum*, *De anima*, *De sensu et sensibili*, *De somno et vigilia* and *De memoria et reminiscencia*, without any mention of authors' names. See Giuseppe Pasini, *Manuscriptorum Codicum Bibliothecae Regii Taurinensis Athenaei, Pars Altera*, Taurini: Ex Typographia regia, 1747, 107.

¹⁵ See Bakker, *Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics*, 197–198. For Pierre Duhem, see Pierre Duhem, *Le système du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic*, vol. 10, Paris: Hermann, 1959, 105–111.

¹⁶ Regarding memory, I identify as a Buridanist an author who proposes an analysis of memory close to his. The most salient points of Buridan's analysis of memory are firstly his reduction of the Avicennian five internal sense to two, i.e. a cognitive faculty (common sense) and a conservative one (memory or imagination). Secondly, Buridan defends a view according to which the object of memory is a proposition, containing an act of knowledge, the object of this act and the time at which the cognitive act occurred. Moreover, Buridan understands memory and remembering as part of the sensitive process. For a Scotist, however, remembering is an act of the intellect: only human beings can know the past as past. In his account, Scotus identifies two objects of memory: an act and the object of that act. At this stage of my research, I cannot yet identify any similarities

interaction between the text and the paratext or *marginalia*, we need to say a few words about the question as a whole.

Johannes de Caulaincourt devotes a single question to *De memoria et reminiscencia*. Entitled “Utrum iuvenes et senes sint bene memorativi” (‘Do the young and the old have a good memory?’),¹⁷ the *quaestio* covers all the main issues traditionally raised in the context of the reception of the Aristotelian treatise. After a few arguments claiming that young and old have a good memory and opposite arguments, our commentator announces the structure of the Aristotelian treatise and begins by contextualising Aristotle’s definition of memory. As explained in conclusion no. 6, this involves (a) the reference to the past – as opposed to the present and the future, which fall respectively under sense and opinion or hope (cf. *conclusiones* 2–6) – and (b) the definition of memory as the affection (*passio*) of a part of the soul (*conclusiones* 1 and 6–7). It remains to be seen which part of the soul is affected by the *passio* that memory is. In *conclusio* 8, Caulaincourt asserts that memory is an affection of the primary faculty of sense, the common sense, in accordance with the Aristotelian definition. It should be noted that, unlike many commentators before him, Johannes de Caulaincourt does not describe memory as a *virtus*, i.e. a faculty, located in a cerebral ventricle according to the definition proposed by Avicenna’s influential *De anima*.¹⁸ Rather, he is following in the footsteps of *De memoria et reminiscencia*. In other words, unlike many of his predecessors, Caulaincourt resists the temptation to describe memory as a faculty.¹⁹ It is merely an affection of a faculty. In this, he is close to John Buridan, for example, but also to Aristotle, for whom memory is an affection or a disposition of the primary faculty of sense, i.e. the common sense. Caulaincourt simplifies the whole scheme. He maintains that two faculties are sufficient to explain memory and remembering, namely common sense and imagination. As for Buridan, his account delimitates precisely the relationship between memory and the two left faculties, i.e.

between Caulaincourt and Johannes Hennon or Albert of Saxony. As Nicolaus d’Orbellis did not write on *De memoria*, I can exclude him from the list of possible influences.

17 In the ms. Turin B, we read: “utrum iuveniores et seniores sint melius memorativi?” (Turin, BN H III 13, fol. 281vb).

18 Avicenna writes: “Thesaurus vero apprehendentis intentionem est virtus custoditiva, cuius locus est posterior pars cerebri ... Quae virtus vocatur etiam memorialis ...” (Avicenna, *De anima*, IV, I, Simone van Riet (ed.), Leiden: Brill, 1968, 9).

19 Before Buridan, many commentators of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries proposed a synthesis of Avicenna’s and Aristotle’s accounts of memory. This is at least the case of Adam of Bockenfield, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Matteo Mei de Gubbio, or Walter Burley.

common sense and imagination.²⁰ In addition, Caulaincourt (like Buridan) claims that the philosophical perspective should be distinguished from the medical one, which entails five internal senses.²¹ To put it in another way, Caulaincourt does not reject Avicenna's theory of internal senses, but he distinguishes it from the analysis of memory and remembering proper, which requires only two principles, i.e. an apprehensive power (common sense) and a conservative one (imagination). This reduction permits to claim that the faculty that perceives time is also the one that assembles the three representations that are relevant in remembering, producing an act of memory.

After explaining the definition of memory, Johannes turns to the famous paradox of memory as presented by Aristotle in *De Memoria* 450a26:²² how can

²⁰ This is confirmed in a later section of Johannes de Caulaincourt's commentary. Before dealing with recollection, he raises three difficulties – all stemming directly from Buridan's commentary, as we shall see below. In the second of these, he takes this point further by explicitly opposing the medical (and Avicennian) position, which posits in the soul a plurality of sensory faculties, distinct *loco et subiecto*. With Aristotle (and Buridan in particular), he defends the existence of two internal faculties: the common sense and *fantasia*, the imagination. For both Buridan and Johannes de Caulaincourt, these two faculties are responsible for the reception and conservation of sensory data. For Johannes de Caulaincourt, see Turin, BN H III 13, fols. 283ra–b. It reads: “... si memoria capiatur pro actu cognoscitivo memorativo, sic *memoria est passio primi sensitivi, scilicet ipsius communis, ita quod est una qualitas realiter sibi inherens*. ... si memoria capiatur pro habitu memorativo, scilicet pro specie vel intentione reservativa, tunc memoria est passio secundi [ms. primi] sensitivi, scilicet fantasie, eo quod talis species et talis intentio realiter inherent ille potentie fantastice; ideo sunt passiones fantasie subiect(iv)e; tamen sunt passiones sensus communis obiective ... si capiatur memoria pro potentia memorativa, hoc est dupliciter. Vel capiatur pro potentia receptiva actus memorativi, et sic est realiter ipse sensus communis, vel pro potentia ipsius speciei et intentionis reservate in absentia sensibili; et sic est realiter ipsa fantasie” (fol. 283rb); for John Buridan, see Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones super librum De memoria et reminiscencia*, q. 2, Paris: Lockert, 1516, fols. 161va–b: “... si ergo capitur ‘memoriam’ pro illo actu cognoscitivo memorativo sic *memoria est passio sensus communis, scilicet primi sensitivi; ita quod est accidens illi sensui communii inherens*: cum non ponamus aliam virtutem sensitivam et cognoscitivam interiorem, nisi sensum communem. Si vero memoria capitur pro habitu, scilicet distincto a predicto actu et a virtute anime, ille habitus nihil aliud est quam species et intentiones reservate in fantasie; et ideo sic memoria est passio fantasie subiective, quia inheret fantasie, cum adhuc quodammodo potest dici habitus respectu sensus communis non subiective, sed obiective”.

²¹ The last question of Caulaincourt's commentary on *De anima* II presents Avicenna's scheme in the context of a *dubitatio*. See Johannes de Caulaincourt, *Questiones de anima*, II, fol. 171/y4, Basel, 1490. Talking about internal senses, Caulaincourt refers mainly on their organic characteristics (such as dryness, moisture or hardness) and localisation in the brain.

²² This second stage corresponds to the section beginning with “sciendum est secundo”, Turin, BN H III 13, fol. 282rb.

we relate to the past now?²³ This question is directly linked to that of the proper object of memory: what does it mean to know the past, or to remember? As with the definition of memory, Johannes proceeds step by step. He claims that the absent sensible thing remains in the soul through an image. He writes: "... in anima habente memoriam est passio aliqua representans anime obiectum in absentia eius et habitum illius passionis vocamus memoriam"²⁴ ('in the soul endowed with memory, a certain affection represents the object to the soul while it is absent; and the possession [*habitus*] of this affection we call "memory"'). In so doing, Johannes de Caulaincourt recalls – and completes – the Aristotelian definition of memory as *habitus sive passio*, disposition or affection. Earlier, he explained that memory was the affection of common sense; here, he describes how memory understood as an affection (*passio*) relates to memory described as a disposition (*habitus*). The *passio* refers to a memory act, effective, and the *habitus* to the latent possession that enables the formation of an effective memory.²⁵ Finally, Johannes takes the opportunity to recall the physiological considerations still at work in the context of the *Parva naturalia* and, consequently, of the *De memoria* (cf. *conclusio 3*): dry temperaments retain better, but moist temperaments allow themselves to be affected stronger; they receive sensible impressions in a finer way. Youth and old age are characterised respectively by too much humidity and too much dryness, two states that are not conducive to a good memory.

As with Aristotle, the question of the nature of the object of memory remains. Is it the past thing? But if so, how can this be, since the past thing is no longer there? Or are we remembering the present affection, that is, the preserved trace of the absent thing, considered in the present? Like Aristotle, Johannes de Caulaincourt distinguishes two ways of relating to the mental trace, the preserved image: the mode of imagination, which considers the image as an image, and the mode of

23 In contemporary philosophy of memory, this problem is called the problem of "co-temporality". See, for example, André Sant'Anna, The Hybrid Content of Memory, *Synthese* 197, (2020): 1263–1290.

24 Turin BN H III 13, fol. 282va.

25 See the excerpt quoted in note 20: "... si memoria capiatur pro actu cognoscitivo memorativo, sic memoria est passio primi sensitivi, scilicet ipsius communis, ita quod est una qualitas realiter sibi inherens. ... si memoria capiatur pro habitu memorativo, scilicet pro specie vel intentione reservativa, tunc memoria est passio secundi [ms. primi] sensitivi, scilicet fantasie, eo quod talis species et talis intentio realiter inherent ille potentie fantastice", Johannes de Caulaincourt, *Questiones de memoria et reminiscencia*, ms. Turin, BN H III 13, fols. 283ra–b. As strange as it may appear, this explicit identification of *passio* with an act of memory certainly results from the need to find an act of memory in Aristotle's commentary. As Aristotle speaks of "memoria et memorari", understood as a "passio sive habitus", the couple of terms appear to be equated in some manner. However, this frequent solution seems fragile. On the absence of a proper act of memory in Aristotle's *De memoria et reminiscencia*, see David Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection*, especially 95–109.

memory, which considers the image as a copy referring to a precise thing, i.e. what caused the image.²⁶

Until now, as in an *expositio*-section, Johannes de Caulaincourt has followed Aristotle's text and its structure with great attention. The specificity of his position is particularly evident in his treatment of the following three difficulties,²⁷ which call into question the limits of the Aristotelian perspective:

1. Is memory only about the past?
2. Is memory really the *habitus* or *passio* of the primary faculty of sense (common sense)?
3. Is it necessary to posit an intellective memory that is truly distinct from its sensory counterpart?

It is here that the proximity of Caulaincourt's commentary to Buridan's is most apparent. Indeed, these three questions correspond exactly to questions one to three in Buridan's commentary on *De memoria*. For the sake of brevity, I will concentrate on Caulaincourt's answer to the first question. Here, Caulaincourt departs from the purely Aristotelian line. He begins by talking about the act of remembering (instead of just remembering).²⁸ Who, in the medieval philosophy of memory, focuses more on acts than on memory as a faculty, affection or disposition? John Duns Scotus and, after him, William of Ockham, Walter Burley (to a certain extent), and John Buridan.²⁹ Like Scotus and Ockham, Johannes de Caulaincourt specifies that, for there to be an act of memory, a cognitive act must have taken place previ-

26 As Turin BN H III 13, fol. 282vb testifies: “illa passio est aliud secundum se et est fantasma, id est similitudo alterius; ideo cum memoratur non speculetur eam secundum seipsam, sed secundum quod est fantasma, scilicet in quantum est alterius id est memorabilis”.

27 These three difficulties (*difficultas*) look like standard questions (*quaestiones*). Caulaincourt's commentary seems to be made of a unique question (i.e. Do the young and the old have a good memory?). However, it entails two *expositiones* (one on the chapter on memory, the second on recollection). These so-called difficulties end the *expositio*-section of the first chapter of Aristotle's treatise.

28 On the debate about the existence of memory acts in Aristotle, see Richard Sorabji, who posits them, and David Bloch, who rejects them: Sorabji, *Aristotle on Memory*; Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection*.

29 In the first question of his commentary on *De memoria et reminiscencia*, John Buridan writes: “Ex hac suppositione concluditur quod ad actum memorandi requiritur actus cognoscendi preteritus de quo dicimus habere memoriam” (Buridan, *Questiones*, fol. XLIIa). On Scotus and Ockham, see notably Dominik Perler, *Eine Person sein: Philosophische Debatten im Spätmittelalter*, Frankfurt a. M.: Vittorio Klostermann, 2020, 261–289.

ously, which becomes the object of the act of memory.³⁰ In short, when I remember my birthday, I remember having invited this or that person. Above all, I remember a previous act, an act that is specific to me. What is specifically Buridian about this answer?³¹ The characterisation of three intentional mental objects (or “representational” objects in Johannes de Caulaincourt’s terms): the sensitive *species*, the *intentio*, and what represents past time. This trio comes from Buridan’s Commentary on *De memoria*.³² The *species* is what makes it possible to refer to a perceived sensible object; the *intentio* refers to the cognitive act that made it possible to grasp this sensible object; and the temporal gap between the act of remembering and the past to which it refers is represented by another mental object.³³ Caulaincourt distinguishes between different ways of talking about memory so as not to limit it to the past: if, by “memory”, we mean the three intentional mental objects, then these are considered in the present; the soul possesses them when it performs the act of remembering. Memory remains past by its reference to a previous cognitive act, but it can be present, past or future depending on the object to which it refers, since I can just as easily remember my deceased grandfather as my grandmother who is still living or the plans for my (future) house. Here, the Buridian kinship of this passage is obvious. Buridan expanded the spectrum of memory in this way. Johannes de Caulaincourt goes so far as to use Buridan’s example of a future object that one could remember: the antichrist. The following table gives a hint of the way Caulaincourt uses Buridan’s commentary.

30 See Turin BN H III 13, fol. 282va: “Prima ad actum memorandi requiritur quod aliquis actus cognoscendo [sic] sit preteritus et talis actus cum eius obiecto dicitur obiectum memorie”.

31 On Buridan’s Commentary on *De memoria*, see Véronique Decaix, La conception buridianne de la mémoire dans les “Parva naturalia”, in: *Miroir de l’amitié: Mélanges offerts à Joël Biard*, Christophe Grellard (ed.), 309–327, Paris: J. Vrin, 2017.

32 Note that it is also found in Marsilius of Inghen. It reads: “Secundo notandum quod de aliquo potest intelligi aut dici memoria tribus modis: primo modo de re alias cognita, secundo modo [seu] in specie seu phantasmate representante rem alias cognitam, tertio modo tamquam de actu memorandi mediante quo res alias cognoscatur et tamquam de tempore in quo res talis cognoscetur” (Uppsala C624 fol. 127va). I would like to thank Sten Ebbesen for providing me with his transcription of part of the first question in Marsilius’ commentary.

33 This is not specified directly, but a few lines below we read: “secunda distinctio: memoria est representativum et sic est species sensibilis obiecti et temporis et ipsius intentionis” (Turin BN H III 13, fol. 283ra).

Johannes de Caulaincourt, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, Turin BN H III 13, fols. 282vb–283ra.³⁴

fol. 282vb ... utrum memoria sit solum preteritorum.
... in memoria debent esse tria representativa:

Primum debet esse representativum rei alias cognite et illud vocatur species sensibilis.

Secundum representativum est intentio que representat ipsum actum cognoscendi preteritum.

*Et tertium est representativum temporis in quo illam rem cognoscimus; ideo sunt etiam tria representata, scilicet res alias cognita, actus cognoscendi illius rei alias cognite et tempus in quo illa res cognoscatur ... memoria est presentium cum omnia illa tria sint presentialiter in memoria; alio modo est aliquorum tanquam representatorum [corr. in marg.] et sic est alicuius quod est ipsius temporis et ipsius actus preteriti tanquam preteritorum quia ille actus quem memoramus et similiter illud tempus sunt preterita; aliorum res [tamen res, *scrips sed eras*] est presens, et tamen memoramus alias vidisse illam quem nunc videmus; aliquando futura, ut cum memoramus nos cognovisse *antichristum*; aliquando est preterita ut cum memoramus nos cognovisse hominem, qui nunc mortuus est.*

Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones de memoria et reminiscencia*, q. 1, “Utrum memoria sit solum preteritorum an etiam presentium?”, Parisiis: Lockert, 1516, fol. XLIr.

fol. XLIr Tertio concluditur quod in virtute memorativa reservativa que potest vocari memoria: sive in organo illius virtutis oportet esse certa reservata.

Primo quidem representativum rei alias cognite, et hoc solet vocari species sensibilis vel intelligibilis.

Secundo representativum actus cognoscendi quo illam rem alias cognovimus, et hoc solet vocari intentio.

Tertio representativum temporis in quo illam rem cognovimus.

... Quarto concluditur quod ad actum memoriandi sex concurrunt, scilicet *tria representata*. Puta res alias cognita, actus quo ipsa cognoscatur, tempus in quo illa res cognoscatur et alt(er)a tria representativa, scilicet species rei alias cognite, intentio actus cognoscendi et intentio vel species temporis.

Tunc istis suppositis, questio solvitur secundum formam eius. Et erit prima conclusio quod *si memoria dicatur esse representativorum, ipsa est presentium; quoniam illa representativa sunt principaliter in fantasia, vel in virtute memorativa, aliter non duceret ad aliquem actum cognoscendi*. Sed de representatis ponitur secunda conclusio, scilicet quod unum representatum, scilicet res alias cognita forte est preterita et corrupta, forte est presens, et forte nunquam fuit. Sed adhuc est futura, verbi gratia forte nunc sum, memor quod heri cogitavi vel locutus fui de *antichristo* et de hoc habeo memoria, scilicet quod heri de eo cogitavi et sic memoriam habeo de antichristo tanquam de illa rem quam memor alias cognovisse; ita memor alias vidisse solem vel lunam que tamen sunt presentes.

34 Unless otherwise stated, all transcriptions are mine.

In the following text, Johannes de Caulaincourt demonstrates his attentive reading of Buridan's commentary. This applies both to the (re)reading of the Aristotelian definition of memory and to the recognition of an intellective memory. Another important aspect of Buridan's conception of memory, as well as that of Caulaincourt, is the question of intellectual memory. To this question, which falls outside the scope of Aristotle's *De memoria*, Johannes answers in the affirmative, identifying it with the cognitive faculty itself. In other words, memory should not be distinguished within the intellect, as a part distinct from the others: memory is simply a characteristic of the intellect.³⁵ After this overview of memory (*memoria*) and recollection (*memorari*), Johannes de Caulaincourt resolves the initial question concerning the good or bad memory of young and old, and goes on to present recollection.

It is now time to turn to the marginal notes. At the end of the commentary, the Turin manuscript BN, H III 13 offers a long marginal note (see Figure 1), which comes straight from Scotus' *Ordinatio*. The table below shows the note and its model.

³⁵ He writes: "memoria intellectiva non distinguitur a virtute sua cognoscitiva [ed. Basel 1490: a virtute cognitiva]; sed memoria sensitiva distinguitur a sua virtute cognoscitiva" (Turin BN H III 13, fol. 283rb). A similar position is taken by Buridan, who writes: "in parte intellectuali non differt virtus memorativa, scilicet reservativa, a virtute cognoscitiva" (Buridan, *Questiones*, fol. XLIIra).




Figure 1: Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria H III 13, fol. 284rb.

Johannes de Caulaincourt, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, Turin BN H III 13.

Nota: rationes quas ponit doctor subtilis in distinctione XLV^a quaestio tertia.

Ad probandum quod non sit ponenda memoria sensitiva prout³⁷ intellectiva sunt quattor.

Prima: quia in illa potentia non est ponenda memoriam que non est intellectiva, sed sensus non est potentia collativa, ergo. Maior patet quia memoria habet cognoscere tempus; “tempus autem est numerus motus secundum prius et posterius”, hoc autem non potest cognosci sine collatione posterioris ad presens; minor patet quia hoc est proprium intellectus;

Igitur *oportet ponere recordativam percipere actum suum dum est presens, sed potentia sensitiva non potest recipere actum sentiendi dum est presens* saltem non videtur *quia actus supreme sensitive non potest percipi ab aliquo sensu non respectu³⁹ a sensu inferiori ut notum est*; nec a se quia non est potentia supra se vel actus sive reflexiva et *tamen cuiuslibet sensationis in nobis potest esse recordatio ut experimur*; ergo ista recordatio non est actus potentie sensitive. *Tertia conclusio: sensus non tantum non percipit primo nisi qualitatem sensibili, sed nec recipit speciem propriam, nec alicuius talis qualitatis sed sensatio illa cuius est recordatio; non potest poni in aliquo qualitas sensibilis quia quedam sensatio, ut coloris vel soni vel saporis eque potest esse recordata.* Ergo: *ista species requisita ad recordatione non est [recordatio seu memoria, scrips sed eras] sensus actus ut potentie recordative.*

Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio IV, dist. 45*, q. 3.³⁶

Primo, ex illa conditione quae est percipere tempus: “Tempus autem non est nisi numerus motus secundum prius et posterius”, IV Physicorum.³⁸ Hoc autem percipi non potest sine collatione posterioris ad prius. Collationem autem sensuum habere non potest, quia hoc est proprium intellectus.

Item ... *oportet potentiam recordantem percipere actum dum est praesens; sed non potest sensitiva percipere actum sentiendi*, saltem non universaliter, *quia actus supremae sensitiae non potest percipi ab aliquo sensu, nec ab inferiori, nec a superiori, patet.* Nec a seipsa, quia non est potentia illa super se vel actum suum conversiva. Et tamen *cuiuslibet sensationis in nobis potest esse recordatio, ut experimur.* Ergo non est ista recordatio generaliter alicuius sensitiae. – Sed quia hic arguitur ex quodam quod prius dictum fuit esse dubium, ideo arguatur ex aliquo tamquam certo sic: *sensitiva non tantum non percipit primo nisi qualitatem aliquam sensibilem ...*, sed nec recipit speciem ipsam propriam, nisi alicuius talis qualitatis. *Sed sensatio illa cuius est recordatio, non potest poni aliquo modo qualitas sensibilis, quia quaecumque sensatio, vel coloris, vel soni vel saporis, aequa posset esse recordata.* Ergo *ista species requisita ad recordationem non est sensus alicuius potentiae receptivae.*

³⁶ Allan Wolter and Marilyn McCord Adams, John Duns Scotus: A Treatise on Memory and Intuition: From Codex A of Ordination IV, Distinctio 45, Question 3, *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993): 193–230.

³⁷ Dubious transcription.

³⁸ Aristotle, *Physics* IV, 11 219b 1–2, quoted in: Wolter and McCord Adams, *John Duns Scotus*, 197.

³⁹ Dubious transcription.

Quarta ratio: *non oportet ponere in parte sensitiva aliquam operationem sensitivam, que non possit concludi esse in bruto*, sed ista recordatio seu memoria non potest concludi esse in bruto ex eius actibus. Concluditur auctor: patet quia in bruto potest esse excellens sensitiva quantum ad omnes actus illos sensitive quos exprimitur in nobis; minor patet quia maxime esset propter hoc quod nos videmus *formicam colligere grana* hindicare aliam sibi nocentem; videmus etiam aves nidificare et quedam bruta discibilia; hec⁴⁰ aut omnia possunt sustineri sine recordatione precedenti, ut precedenti dicendo quod bruta hoc faciunt *ex quidam instinctu nature vel ex recentione alicuius species delectabilis aut tristabilis sine apprehensione preteriti, vel preteritum.*

Item, *non oportet ponere in parte sensitiva aliquam operationem sensitivam quae non potest concludi esse in bruto*. Hoc probatur, quia in aliquo bruto potest esse excellens sensitiva quantum ad omnes illos actus sensitivae quos experimur in nobis. Sed ista recordatio non potest concludi esse in bruto ex actibus eius. Probatio minoris: videmus omnes actus brutorum ex quibus posset magis concludi, utpote qui videntur esse actus prudentiae vel providentiae, ut de *formica colligente grana* ad eumdem locum et tempore determinato, ut in aestate. Similiter, actus vindicandi vel quasi iustitiae retributivae, puta obsequendi benefacientibus et puniendi offendentes, videntur in brutis competere eis in quantum cognoscunt praeteritum ...

De uniformitatem enim quantum ad locum et tempus, ut patet in *formica*, *potest salvari per solam apprehensionem et retentionem speciei eius quod est delectabile sine apprehensione praeteriti ut praeteriti.*

To the question of the *raison d'être* of such an addition, several hypotheses can be considered. A Scotist, reading Johannes de Caulaincourt's commentary, might feel the need to complete it by adding a key point of the Scotist definition of memory: the restriction of memory and recollection proper to rational beings.

To explain the shift between Aristotle and Scotus, we should remember that Scotus did not write a commentary on *De memoria et reminiscencia*. His argument is rooted in a theological work. Scotus focuses here on the memory of the separated soul. His interest in memory and remembering one's own acts thus stems from this context, even if it also concerns our present life. The excerpt quoted in the final note stems from a *quaestio* entitled "Utrum anima separata possit recordari preteritorum que ipsa novit coniuncta".⁴¹ By discussing this question in his commentary, Scotus proposes an analysis of human personal memory. This memory is centered on our previous *acts*. By making memory a capacity to reflect on one's own actions by going back to them, Scotus places it firmly on the side of the rational faculty, the only one capable of such reflexivity.

40 Dubious transcription.

41 Wolter and McCord Adams, *John Duns Scotus*, 193.

The reader who wrote this note might have felt that the specifically human character of memory was not sufficiently apparent from the text itself. Following Buridan's commentary, Caulaincourt attributes memory acts to the common sense. He does not claim that animals could possess such a reflexivity, namely the possibility to attribute to oneself previous acts of perception. A Scotist reader might have felt the need to prevent a misunderstanding concerning animal memory: we do not need to posit such a reflexivity and memory in animals to explain their behaviour that seems to be rational. This reflexivity is properly human. But the addition is not a mere precision: it somewhat contradicts the main text, since it seems to deny the thesis according to which memory acts inhere within the common sense. As they manifest a capacity to reflect one's own acts, memory acts should instead be attributed to the intellect.⁴²

By adding this note, Caulaincourt's reader could have highlighted a latent tension inhering within Caulaincourt's commentary. The text reminds us that memory is not the prerogative of rational beings, while at the same time specifying on several occasions that the object of memory is a past act. How is this grasp of a past act to be understood? Should we, according to the Scotist reading, see it as reflexivity on our own acts, in which case memory cannot be a sensitive faculty, since sensitivity excludes this reflexive capacity? Or should it be understood in a broader sense, i.e. simply that we remember the past in so far as we remember the object of a past apprehension (rather than the apprehension itself)?⁴³ This interpretative tension also brings us back to our question: is Johannes de Caulaincourt a Scotist on the question of memory? Looking at the text, we must give a negative answer. Even if Caulaincourt considers that a previous act is part of the object of remembering, he explicitly attributes this act to the common sense. Were he following Scotus' account of memory, he would nuance his claim. Do we have to conclude that he attributes a propositional act to animals? Contrarily to Buridan, Johannes de Caulaincourt does not stress the propositional nature of the object of memory and does not qualify it as a kind of judgement. Nevertheless, if this is not formalised explicitly in terms of judgement, memory as an act probably cannot

⁴² Caulaincourt claims that there is an intellective memory distinguished from the sensitive one. However, he does not say much about its object. See, ms. Turin, fol. 283rb.

⁴³ This broad meaning would fit with Aristotle's text, notably this highly debated section: "However, when one has knowledge and sensation without performing these actions, then he recalls, in the case of knowledge because he has learned it or contemplated it, in the case of sensation because he has heard or seen it or sensed it in some other way; for it is always the case that when a person actualises as regards his memory, what he does is to say in his soul that he has previously heard, sensed or thought about this". See Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*, in: Bloch, *Aristotle on Memory and Recollection*, 25–27.

escape this qualification. I suggest qualifying Caulaincourt's account of memory as a kind of tempered Buridanism. He follows Buridan's analysis and develops it towards a common account of memory for human beings and beasts. At the same time, he reduces Buridan's position by undermining the propositional character of remembering.

The final marginal note does not cancel out the meaning of the text. It establishes a dialogue between two distinct, albeit somewhat related, doctrinal contexts. These are related in that they both treat the previous act as the primary object of an act of memory. As in the context of the polytextual motets, it is difficult to establish a clear hierarchy between the text itself and the concluding note, between Caulaincourt's (and Buridan's) commentary and the specificity of Scotus' text. All things considered, this note can hardly be reduced to the commentary it accompanies and introduces a form of duality. Should we consider that these two perspectives describe two types of memory that are not mutually exclusive, but complementary? If it was the case, it would mean that the intellectual level duplicates in a probably better way what the sensitive level achieves. As in the case of multi-text motets, the solution to the meaning of this combination of texts remains open. Among the cases studied in this article, this is the one most marked with tension between text and paratext. Let's have a look at the margins of Vensoris' commentary.

3 Second Case Study: Polyphonic Play in the Pamplona Manuscript

The second case I propose for this study is to be found in fols. 192vb–196rb of the Pamplona Bibl. Cathedral 24 manuscript containing the commentary on *De memoria et reminiscentia* by Johannes Vensoris.⁴⁴ Before going into the study of this peculiar case, I would like to say a few words about this Parisian master.

A celebrated commentator of the Aristotelian corpus in the Thomistico-Albertist reading (*via antiqua*), his commentaries have circulated all over Europe.⁴⁵ Despite this success, we do not know much about this figure. He was active as a

⁴⁴ On this manuscript, see Monika Mansfeld, *Descriptio Codicis 24*, qui in Bibliotheca Cathedrali Pamplonensis Asservatur, *Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne* 61 [51] (2018): 97–114. Mansfeld dates the manuscript from the second part of the fifteenth century. She posits a terminus post quem for the part that interests us (i.e. fols. 1–209) after 1450–1451. See Mansfeld, *Descriptio Codicis 24*, 98.

⁴⁵ On Vensoris' association with schools of thought, see notably Pelpijn Rutten, "Secundum processum et mentem Vensoris": John Vensor and His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered, *Vivarium* 43 (2005): 292–336.

magister at the University of Paris between 1435 and 1482.⁴⁶ He also studied theology and, according to Charles Lohr, received his PhD in 1458. However, we possess scarce evidence of what he did – even of his grade of *doctor theologiae*.⁴⁷

3.1 Some General Remarks on the Content

The indicated folios of the Pamplona manuscript contain Vensoris' commentary on *De memoria et reminiscentia*. Divided into four questions, it follows the symmetry of the Aristotelian treatise. Two questions on memory proper and two others on recollection are dedicated to the book on memory and the one on recollection: “Utrum memoria sit solum preteritorum” (‘Is memory only of the past?’); “Utrum memoria sit passio primi sensitivi” (‘Is memory an affection of the first sensible?’); “Utrum reminiscentia sit resumptio noticie elapse a memoria ex aliquo principio in memoria retento” (‘Is recollection the recovery of a partly forgotten memory?’);

⁴⁶ Consulting the *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, edited by Denifle and Châtelain, the first occurrence of his name dates from 1435, where he is mentioned as part of the Norman Nation. See Henri Denifle and Emile Châtelain (eds.), *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 4, Paris: Delalain, 1897, 565, note 2458. Then, we learn that he was magister of the Norman Nation in 1449 and that he declined the rectorship, but that he accepted it in 1458. He is also mentioned as magister regens in 1478, 1479, and 1482. Apart from the *Chartularium*, his name appears in a collection of quittances belonging to the College of Autun; in 1467, he sells some books by Thomas Aquinas to the College of Autun, including the first part of the *Summa theologiae*. He presents himself as a priest of the diocese of Séez in France. I thank Jérémie Foa who pointed my attention to this document in a workshop we attended in Geneva in May 2023. For this archive, see Archives nationales, Université de Paris et collèges, Université et collège, Collège d'Autun, Pièce n°31. As some of Vensoris' treatises were translated in Hebrew in Spain, Jean-Pierre Rothschild suggested he could have spent some time there – but there is no evidence of this. See Jean-Pierre Rothschild, Johannes Vensoris: Les deux portraits d'un maître latin dans la littérature hébraïque: Johannes Vensoris (Jean Le Tourneur), son œuvre traduite par 'Eli Habilio (Aragon, années 1470) et son personnage (imaginaire?) chez Salomon Ibn Verga (av. 1508/1520), in: *Portraits de maîtres offerts à Olga Weijers*, Claire Angotti, Monica Brînzei, and Mariken Teeuwen (eds.), 309–324, Turnhout: Brepols, 2013. Aurora Panzica refutes this hypothesis in a recent article: Aurora Panzica, Fifteenth-Century Textbooks: John Vensoris's Commentaries, Their Dissemination and Reworking in Central and Eastern Europe, in: *Studying the Arts in Late Medieval Bohemia*, vol. 2, Ota Pavláček (ed.), forthcoming. Using the same logic, Joseph Hartzheim in his *Biblioteca Coloniensis* made Vensoris travel to Cologne (to the Bursa Montana and the Bursa Corneliana) because his works were largely spread there. But, as for the Spanish hypothesis, there is no strong reason to link the success of Vensoris' works to a travel or a stay he could have made in a particular place. See Joseph Hartzheim, *Bibliotheca Coloniensis*, Coloniæ Augstæ Agrippinensis: Thomas Odendall, 1747, 206, quoted by Panzica, *Fifteenth-Century Textbooks*.

⁴⁷ As Aurora Panzica noted, there is no mention of his doctorate in theology in the *Chartularium*, even if it is Lohr's source for this information. I thank her for this information.

“Utrum reminiscentia insit solum hominibus” (‘Is recollection exclusive to human beings?’).

This testimony of Versonis’ commentary is of special importance to our study, as it contains many marginal notes.

In addition to the layout elements, the paratext of these folios includes significant *marginalia* which can be classified into three categories.⁴⁸

- (a) Notes that provide answers to additional questions:
 - a. fol. 192vb: (A) *Utrum hec scientia, scilicet de memoria et reminiscentia sit distincta a scientia de anima.*
 - b. fol. 193ra: (A) *Utrum scientia de memoria et reminiscentia sit distincta a scientia de sensu et sensato.*
 - c. fol. 193va: (B) *Utrum memoria sit in anima separata.*
 - d. fol. 194rb: (A) *Utrum oblivio sit ipsius memorie.*
 - e. fols. 195va–b: (B) *Utrum reminiscentia insit nobis a natura.*
- (b) Additions useful to understand the text:
 - a. fol. 193rb: (A) *Sciendum quod preteritum dicitur dupliciter.*
 - b. fol. 193v: (C) *Memoria potest sumi dupliciter; (C) Non contingit aliquem intelligere sine fantasmate; (C) Frequentes meditatio memoriam servant.*
 - c. fol. 194ra: (A) *Memoria nobilior est in hominibus quam in animalibus et brutis; (B) quia habent; (A) Sicut intellectus aliquando nominat substantiam vel potentiam.*
 - d. fol. 194rb: (B) *Secunda causa potest esse.*
 - e. fol. 194va: (A) *Item, quia non est idem p(ri)mititudo ad memorandi et reminiscendi; (A) Item, memoria invenitur in brutis et in hominibus; (A) item memoria uno modo precedit reminiscentia; (B) Utrum reminiscentia dicitur virtus conservans.*
 - f. fols. 195ra–b: (A) *Reminiscentia est passio corporalis; (ra) (D) nondum quod licet collatio alcuius cogniti; rb (D) Nota quod secundum sanctum doctorem.*
 - g. fol. 195va: (A) *differunt conservanti ista; (B) Anima nostra omnes rerum convenit.*
- (c) Summaries, including diagrams or lists of what is known about memory:
 - a. fol. 193va: (B) *Commentarium: ad hoc quod fiat actu memoria quinta requiruntur.*
 - b. fol. 193vb: (A) *Memoria potest accipi in comparatione.*

⁴⁸ These include highlighting important definitions, underlining, and mentioning conclusions in the side margins. The following list divides the notes into three groups and indicates the incipit of each, as well as the folio concerned.

- c. fol. 194r: (D) *Quattuor sunt cause requisite ad memorie bonitatem.*
- d. fol. 194rb: (B) *(Q)u(ale)s sunt cause que impediunt memoriam vel bonitatem memorie; (B) Algazel dicit.*
- e. fol. 195vb: (B) *Ad hoc quod fiat actu reminiscentia quattuor concurrunt.*

The letters ("A"–"D") used in the list refer to different hands and, correlative, to different readers. There are at least three hands involved. Note that this threefold division does not correspond to the typology relating to the content of these notes. According to the current state of my research, none of the manuscripts concerned with Vensoris' commentaries on *De memoria* is as annotated as this one. Given the large number of additions, I will propose an analysis of a selection of notes. I will deal with the notes present in the first *quaestio* ("Utrum memoria sit solum pretoritorum" / 'Is memory only of the past?'). In addition to defining memory and its object, the question here, as above, will be to establish the relationship between the voices present, in the text and in the *marginalia*, and so to ask how the addition of different readers enriches Vensoris' text.

To answer this question, I propose to focus on the first *quaestio* and the marginal notes that accompany it.⁴⁹ Let us focus first on the text and its general structure.

Vensoris raises the classic question of the object of memory: is it only of the past?

His *quaestio* is made up of two objections, both of which put forward the idea that memory relates to the present, (a) because we can remember something that always exists, (b) because memory is based on a preserved *species* – which is therefore currently available to us. Vensoris set out to counter these two objections, asserting that memory relates only to the past – in contrast with what Buridan or Caulaincourt, for example, asserted.

Before answering the question – in the *conclusions* – he puts forward several elements corresponding to the three *sciendum* of the text. The first situates memory and recollection in nature, distinguishing between beings endowed with memory and recollection and those without: memory, like prudence, is found in certain animals, while recollection is unique to man. This makes it possible, correlative, to place *De memoria et reminiscentia* in the context of the Aristotelian corpus: this treatise comes after *De sensu*, insofar as all animals are endowed with sensation, whereas only some of them are endowed with memory, and recollection is peculiar

⁴⁹ Focusing on this question has another advantage. In fact, in the section that follows, which consists of analysing fols. 246r–247r of the Oxford Bodleian Library Canon Misc. 211, the interesting marginal notes mostly accompany the first of the four *quaestiones* of Vensoris' commentary.

to man.⁵⁰ The second preliminary assertion is that beings endowed with memory have varying aptitudes in terms of memory and recollection, depending on their complexion: dry beings retain better than wet ones. Finally, the third remark presents the course of the Aristotelian argument in *De memoria et reminiscencia*.

Vesoris then sets out three conclusions that synthetically answer the question:

1. The future is not the object of memory, but of opinion or hope.
2. The present is not the object of memory, but of sensation.
3. The past is therefore the only object of memory.

Vesoris does not develop the question any further, except to say that, like Aristotle, he appeals to the common meaning of the terms “memory” and “recollection” to support the assertion that it is the past alone that is the object of memory. He also points out that “past” means the past according to apprehension, not the past according to being. Thus, we can remember objects that still exist, provided we have perceived them previously. This is followed by a concluding synthesis in which Vesoris presents the definition of memory – underlined in the manuscript in question: “*Memoria est passio vel habitus anime de prius sensatis cum factum fuerit tempus*”. He concludes his answer by specifying that there is a certain lapse of time between the first apprehension and recollection, and he also states that animals capable of perceiving time are endowed with memory.

Vesoris is extremely brief on the object of memory; he does not enter the existing debates on how it can be said that there is memory of the past in the present time and on the apparent paradox of this assertion but instead limits himself to summarising succinctly Aristotle’s text. Moreover, he synthesises Aquinas’ teaching of the *Sententia De memoria et reminiscencia*. Vesoris uses the *Sententia* by selecting the most important passages and compiles them in the following way:

⁵⁰ On the structure of the *Parva naturalia* and especially on the order of the two first treatises, which was debated at the beginning of the tradition of commentaries on *De memoria*, see notably Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, Introduction, in: *Adam of Bockenfield and his Circle*, Julie Brumberg-Chaumont and Dominique Poirel (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 23–24. This structure is clarified in the *explicit* of the translated version of the *De sensu* by Moerbeke. The argument here used by Vesoris is really similar to the one by Aquinas in his own commentary. For the reference, see the comparison between Vesoris and Aquinas below.

Johannes Vensoris, *Questiones de memoria et reminiscencia*, q. 1, Pamplona, Bibl. Cath. 24, fol. 192vb.

Pro quesito est sciendum quod *prudencia est virtus propria homini, quia est recta ratio agibilium*. Unde *inveniuntur quedam animalium quadam prudentia participare, non quia rationem habeant, set quia per instinctum nature ad quedam opera vere prudencie similia*.⁵² Ad prudenciam autem pertinet ut *prudens per eam dirigatur in ea que sibi videntur agenda non solum ex cognitione presentium, sed etiam preteritorum*. Ideo memoria, qua preterita comprehenduntur, a Tullio pars prudentie ponitur. Ideo in animalibus in quibus reperitur quedam similitudo prudencie reperitur etiam quedam memoria. *Set tamen sicut habent imperfecta respectu hominis ita et memoria imperfectam*.

Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia De memoria et reminiscencia*, I.⁵¹

Sicut Philosophus dicit in VII De historiis animalium, *natura ex inanimatis ad animalia pauperrima procedit ... Ita etiam et in progressu ab animalibus ad homines quedam inveniuntur in quibus aliqua similitudo rationis appareat: cum enim prudencia sit propria virtus hominis* (est enim prudencia *recta ratio agibilium*, ut dicitur in VI Ethicorum, *inveniuntur quedam animalia quadam prudenciam participare, non ex eo quod habeant rationem, set eo quod instinctu nature moventur per apprehensionem sensitive partis ad quedam opera facienda ac si ex ratione operarentur*. Pertinet autem ad prudenciam ut *prudens dirigatur per eam in hiis que imminent sibi agenda ex consideratione non solum presentium, sed etiam preteritorum*; ... Unde et in animalibus in quibus invenitur prudencia similitudo participata, necesse est esse non solum sensum presentium, set etiam memoriam preteritorum, et ideo Philosophus dicit in principio *Metaphysice* quod quibusdam animalibus ex (sensu) memoria fit, et propter hoc prudencia sunt; *set, sicut prudenciam imperfectam habent respectu hominis, ita etiam et memoriam*: nam alia animalia memorantur tantum, homines autem et memorantur et reminiscuntur.⁵³

Vensoris cuts through Aquinas' references to retain only the core of his argument. In this case, it consists of showing that Aristotle deals with memory after having dealt with sensation and the soul in general, because not all living beings are endowed with memory. Only certain animals, those whose actions are characterised by a form of prudence – however imperfect – have some knowledge of the past. Finally, only human beings are capable of recollection (*reminiscencia*), i.e. able to retrieve information momentarily forgotten from knowledge currently in their possession.

51 Thomas de Aquino, *Opera Omnia*, vol. 45.2: *Sententia libri De sensu et sensato cuius secundus tractatus est De memoria et reminiscencia*, René-Antoine Gauthier (ed.), Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: J. Vrin, 1985.

52 As in the manuscript, a verb is missing.

53 Thomas de Aquino, *Sententia De memoria et reminiscencia*, 103–104.

However, although a large part of Vensoris' text can already be retraced in Aquinas' ideas, there is one section that escapes this connection. This is the last part of each *quaestio*, the part that precedes the answers to the objections: the *dubitaciones*. These have the peculiarity of making the subject of memory very concrete, anchoring it in physicality and the tics that characterise us when we want to remember something.⁵⁴ In this context, he asks: why do we tie something (a handkerchief, for example) to remember something we need to do? Why do we remember better in the dark than in the light? Why do we remember things when we do not want to, and when we do want to, we have the hardest time remembering them? These practical questions interest Vensoris in the penultimate section of his *quaestio*.

3.2 The Marginal Notes of the First *Quaestio*

How do the marginal notes in this Pamplona manuscript contribute to Vensoris' argument? The first *quaestio* is accompanied by several notes that fall into the three above-mentioned categories. There are questions, notes of clarification, and lists or summaries in the margins of the folios under review. There are two additional questions: is the science of memory (and *reminiscentia*) distinct from the science of the soul (*De anima*)? And is it distinct from the science of sensation (*de sensu et sensato*)? These questions echo in the first *sciendum* of Vensoris' text. In both cases, the aim is to situate memory in living beings and to show the theoretical congruence and the tight relationship of *De memoria* with other Aristotelian works (especially *De anima*). However, the first question adds a distinction absent from the text itself: both the science of memory and the science of the soul can deal with memory, but they are distinguished by the point of view they adopt. The science of the soul considers memory abstractly, whereas the science of memory considers this same power of the soul in relation to a bodily organ.⁵⁵ In other words, there is

⁵⁴ These concrete topics inserted into the scholastic questions are quite standard. On this point, see the Problemata tradition. See, for example, Maciej Stanek, "Problemata Parvorum naturalium": An Anonymous Supplement to John Buridan's Commentary on the "Parva naturalia", *Przeglad Tomistyczny* 27 (2021): 61–105.

⁵⁵ The note reads as follows: "Dicendum quod ad distinctionem scientie non requiritur diversitas sci(bi)l(is) secundum essentiam, sed secundum rationem, ut de memoria secundum quod potest esse subiectum transmutationis consideratur in *scientia naturali*, sed de eadem prout est d(i)v(ers) a entis consideratur in *metaphysica*; memoria autem potest attingi secundum quod est potentia anime, vel secundum quod refertur ad organum cuius est perfectio; secundum hoc habet diversas habitudines et diversas rationes, quia prout refertur ad animam cuius est potentia habet unam rationem et consideratur de ea secundum hoc in libro *De anima*; prout autem habet habitudinem

a legitimate perspective on memory that considers it without its corporeal anchoring, with the tools of the metaphysician, so to say. This question was quite standard at the end of the thirteenth century. It can be found in commentaries on *De memoria et reminiscencia* by Peter of Auvergne and Radulphus Brito for instance.⁵⁶ To my knowledge, it is absent from many fifteenth-century commentaries, notably Johannes de Caulaincourt's, Georges of Bruxelles', and Peter Tartaret's. Nevertheless, these authors seem to keep the perspective of the metaphysician in mind when they deal with intellectual memory in their commentaries or even when they analyse the act of memory as a complex of three kinds of representations: these analyses do not refer to the organs they may involve. On the other hand, the mentioned commentators keep using the point of view of the physician when they refer to the organic dispositions required to safely store representations or to be quick-witted. Versonis also embraces each perspective. However, his metaphysical perspective on memory is also to be seen in his commentary on *De anima*, while his position on the intellective memory is to be found in a *dubitatio* of his commentary on *De anima* III.⁵⁷

Which bodily organ? If we follow Aristotle, memory is to be attributed to the common sense, located in the heart. But if we follow Avicenna, Averroes, and the Latins after them, memory is to be found in one of the cerebral ventricles, like common sense, imagination, and other faculties, such as the estimative. We will say more about these faculties shortly. They do not feature in Versonis' text, which remains close to Aristotle, partly as an *expositio*, and limits itself to talking about the relationship between memory and imagination or common sense. However, these internal senses are mentioned in one of the notes at the end of the *quaestio*. The second marginal additional question is closer to Versonis' text, comparing beings endowed with sensation with beings endowed with memory: like the text, it asserts that all animals are endowed with sensation, while only some of them are capable of memory.⁵⁸

ad organum cuius est perfectio, consideratur in hoc libro [i.e. *De memoria*]” (Pamplona, Bibl. Cath., 24, fol. 192vb).

56 See these commentaries: Bloch, *Peter of Auvergne on Memory*, 60–62; Ebbesen, *Radulphus Brito on Memory and Dreams*, 24–26; Ebbesen, *Anonymous Orielensis 33 on “De memoria”*, 135–137; Ebbesen, *Anonymous Parisini 16160 on Memory*, 172–173; Ebbesen, *Anonymous Vaticani 3061 and Anonymous Vaticani 2170 on Aristotle’s “Parva Naturalia”*, 244–246.

57 For instance, to quote a manuscript mentioned in this chapter, this point is to be found in the Oxford manuscript: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon misc. 211, fols. 228v–229r.

58 “... Sed sciendum quod de memoria et reminiscencia est distincta scientia ad scientia de sensu et sensato, quia in libro *De sensu et sensato* determinatur de sensu qui convenit omnibus animalibus, sive de potentiori exterioribus sensitivis et de sensibilibus, sed in hoc libro solum determinatur de

Turning then to the heart of Vensoris' answer – that memory is of a past apprehension rather than an extramental object that no longer exists but existed in the past – the same annotator adds a clarification on two ways of understanding the past: (a) the past according to existence and (b) the past according to apprehension. This reader places the memorable in the second category. This note duplicates the text, but it also refers both to one of the objections (i.e. we remember only by means of a preserved and presently available *species*) and to the paradox identified by Aristotle in *De memoria* 450a26. However, there is a difference between the text and the note: Vensoris distinguishes the past as the object of memory (the object of past apprehension – for example, my sister on her wedding day) from the present existence of the extramental object (here, that of my sister), whereas his reader distinguishes the object of memory from the mean of knowing (the preserved image that allows me to remember my sister on her wedding day). Why did the annotator add this note? It is meant to clarify the difference between (a) the object of memory and (b) the mean of remembering (memory trace). The three marginal notes studied in this manuscript illustrate a different type of relationship to the text from that in the Turin manuscript BN H III 13: here, the notes are more easily aligned with the text. The annotators undoubtedly felt that Vensoris was too synthetic on the question of memory, and that he left out certain points. These additions could have been parts of an evaluation in the university curriculum in which this manuscript was used. Were these additions made by teachers who had taken Vensoris' commentary as the basis for their course? These questions remain unanswered, at least in the present state of my research.

The two important marginal notes, which I have classified as “summary”, are at the end of the *quaestio*. They are additions with no direct link to the text itself. Close to the Arabic authors, they are also close to Albert the Great's Commentary on *De memoria*.⁵⁹ The annotator in question probably owes these references to the Dominican. This is quite interesting in that it re-Albertises Vensoris' commentary which largely follows Aquinas'.⁶⁰ We can link this strategy with the one described

quibusdam potentis exterioribus que vero non insunt omni animali, sed solum perfectis ut de memoria que solum animalibus perfectis inest et de reminiscentia, que solum in hominibus inventitur” (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon misc. 211, fol. 193ra).

⁵⁹ Albert the Great synthesises Averroes' and Avicenna's positions on the internal senses in the *digressiones*, i.e. the beginning of his commentary on the first chapter of Aristotle's treatise. See notably Donati's edition: Albertus Magnus, *Opera Omnia VIII, IIA*, 113–115. See also Dag Nikolaus Hasse, Avicenna's “*De anima*” in the Latin West: *The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*, London: Warburg Institute, 2000, 60–69 and 127–153.

⁶⁰ On the association of Vensoris' position to Thomistico-Albertinian perspective, see Rutten, *Secundum mentem et processum Vensoris*.




Figure 2: Archivio Catedral Pamplona, Cód. 24, fol. 183v.

above, Scoticising a commentary close to Buridan's. Let us look at these two notes in detail.

The first (see Figure 2) lists five elements necessary to the act of remembering:

1. the reception of a *species* (image), which is a matter for the senses and the intellect;⁶¹
2. preserving this *species*, which is a question of memory in the strict sense of the term;

61 This parallel treatment of intelligible and sensible *species* is not common at all in that such different *species* are strictly distinguished. However, in the context of this commentary, it is an interesting addition to what Vorsoris' writes. This parallel treatment seems to be implicit in Vorsoris' text which reads as follow: "sed debet intelligi quod memoria est preteritorum quantum ad nostram apprehensionem, ita quod dum memoramus aliqua sensisse vel intellexisse sive illa sint in presenti, sive non, tunc ibi est memoria. ... Cum enim intervenerit aliquod tempus medium inter priorem apprehensionem *sensus* vel *intellectus* et apprehensionem sequentem, sic est memoria et sic memoria est respectu preterite apprehensionis". See ms. Pamplona, Bibl. Cab. 24, fol. 183rb. Intelligible and sensible *species* would certainly not be equated in Caulaincourt's treatment of memory and its object. On *species*, see Leen Spruit, *Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge*, vol. 1: *Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions*, Leiden: Brill, 1993.

3. the abstraction of *intentio* from the *species* due to the estimative – and our annotator specifies that the function of the estimative is to perceive emotional data such as enmity or friendship;
4. the association (*collatio*) of *species* with *intentio*, a matter for the cognitive (in humans) and the estimative (in non-rational animals);
5. consideration for time spent.

This note is particularly interesting because it revives the tradition of the internal senses, which can be traced back to Avicenna. At first glance, it may seem that it owes more to Averroes except that the commentator distinguishes three (and not five) operations necessary for recollection.⁶² Moreover, in the second point of his list, the annotator links memory with the function that Avicenna and Averroes attribute to imagination, namely the conservation of *species*. The annotator then merges Avicenna's estimative, which can perceive the *intentiones* present in the object perceived, with Averroes' memory, which captures the *intentiones* by abstracting them from the *species*. Furthermore, if we take seriously the third element of his enumeration, *intentio* is to be understood (a) as data of the emotional order, (b) which comes from the *species*, in other words from the data of the five senses. The harmful or positive character of an object – a mushroom, for example – can be abstracted from the sensory data we have gleaned about it (its smell, colour, taste, etc.). However, this definition of *intentio* is different both from what we find in Avicenna, since the estimative is capable of perceiving its potential danger directly, without going through the *species*, and from what we find in Averroes, where *intentio* designates the singularity of an object, without necessarily referring to emotional data.⁶³ If the content of the note seems close to the Arab doctrines of the internal senses, insofar as it recovers their vocabulary, this closeness must be understood in a rather broad

⁶² In the compendium of *Parva naturalia*, or, more precisely, in the Epitome devoted to memory, we read the following: “Et cum virtus rememorativa fecerit illam presentari, ymaginans faciet presentari formam illius rei et distinguens componet intentionem quam distinxit et divisit, quoniam ex intentionibus in quas forma dividitur componitur. [a] Intentio igitur forme presentatur a rememorativa; [b] descriptio eius presentatur ab ymaginativa; [c] et compositio intentionis cum descriptione fit a distinctiva; et per congregationem istarum trium virtutum presentatur res oblitera apud investigationem remorationis” (Averroes, *Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur*, Emily Shields (ed.), Cambridge (MA): The Medieval Academy of America, 1949, 60–61, 1.8–15).

⁶³ On this point, see in particular the specificity that Averroes assigns to memory, the faculty capable of grasping intentions: “Et manifestum quod [ista virtus, i.e. *virtus rememorativa*] est de virtutibus comprehendentibus res particulares individuas” (Averroes, *Compendium libri Aristotelis*, 49–50).

sense: the details of this position cannot be traced back to either Avicenna or Averroes. Nevertheless, the fourth element of the enumeration belongs to the two Arab commentators. For Avicenna, it is the estimative that takes on the task of assembling *intentio* and *species* by means of memory and imagination. For Averroes, for whom there is no estimative, *collatio* is performed by the cogitative faculty (in human beings) or instinct (in non-rational animals). Finally, the fifth and last item in the list cannot be directly reconciled with any of the Arab theories. The Arabs read a version of *De memoria* that is unknown to us, but which differed substantially from the one available to the Latins:⁶⁴ it apparently placed less emphasis on past time – which is why this dimension is not so prominent in the theories of Avicenna and Averroes, even though it is not entirely absent. To this list, the annotator adds an example that illustrates the process of recollection that takes place through the association of *intentiones* with objects endowed with these characteristics: the preservation of a *species* via memory – for example, of the master's *species* – makes it possible to conceive of the master's goodness, that is, an *intentio*; once the *intentio* of the good has been conceived, it is possible to refer to the *species* that is associated with the master.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Several studies have been published on this corpus. I will limit myself to mentioning two publications: Deborah Louise Black, Memory, Individuals, and the Past in Averroes's Psychology, *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996): 191–197; Carla Di Martino, Mémoire, représentation et signification chez Averroès: Une proposition de lecture, in: *Memory and Recollection in the Aristotelian Tradition: Essays on the Reception of Aristotle's "De memoria et reminiscentia"*, Véronique Decaix and Christina Thomsen Thörnqvist (eds.), 93–105, Turnhout: Brepols, 2021.

⁶⁵ The example is as follows: "Exemplum huius habemus quod si discipulus vult habere memoriam de magistro speciem magistri retinet, ex specie concipit bonum et proficuum quod sibi accipit amitto et tunc concepta intentione proficuum ad speciem magistri tamen consideratione temporis preteriti habet memoria de magistro" (Pamplona, Bibl. Cath. 24, fol. 183va (see Figure 2)). This seems to correspond to the process of recollection as set out by Avicenna in his *De anima*, IV, I, except that Avicenna mentions *intentio*, but also *species* and the combination of the two to obtain a memory. See the following passage: "Cum vero ostensa fuerit forma qua apprehendit intentionem quae deleta erat, apparebit et intentio sicut apparueat extra et stabiliet eam virtus memorialis in se sicut stabilierat prius, et fiet memoria. Et aliquando perveniet ab intentione ad formam, et memoria habita non habebit comparationem ad id quod est in thesauro retinendi, sed ad id quod est in thesauro imaginandi; et erit eius conversio, aut ex hoc quod convertitur ad intentiones quae sunt in retentione, ita ut intentio faciat formam necessario apparere et convertetur iterum comparatio ad id quod est in imaginatione, aut propter conversionem ad sensum" (Avicenna, *De anima*, IV, I, 9–10). Another example, always by Avicenna, can be mentioned here, although it differs in that Avicenna refers to a process operating by the association of ideas: "... sicut ille cuius mentem subit liber aliquis per quem recordatur magistri qui se docuit eum, non tamen est necesse ut cum recordatur libri et intentionis eius, recordetur etiam magistri sui omnis homo" (Avicenna, *De anima*, IV, III, 41).

Finally, after listing the elements necessary for the act of remembering in the form of a summary or *aide-mémoire*, our annotator defines memory as a preserving faculty and specifies that the act of remembering – what he calls its “second operation” – is not solely a matter for this faculty, but that it involves a combination of operations of the faculties listed, and in particular of the imagination (*fantasia*).⁶⁶ Despite his reading and knowledge of the Arab authors, he distances himself from them – consciously or not – by making memory a capacity for conserving *species*. According to Avicenna, memory preserves the *intentiones*, understood as elements that are not perceived by the five senses, in the manner of the harmfulness of an individual, whereas for Averroes it captures what makes an individual special (via *intentio*, abstracted from other sensible data). As far as I know, the position presented in this note is unprecedented, even if it owes a debt to Aristotle, but above all to Avicenna and Averroes, perhaps through the intermediary of Albert the Great. Comprising a *fenestra* of a few words, it is probably a note copied from a model which, at this stage of my research, is still unknown to me. This model incorporated into the theory of memory the Aristotelian argument on time, set out in *Physics* IV, with the example of the tales of the heroes of Sardinia, in relation to point 4.⁶⁷ This example, which refers to the difficulty of defining time and to the fact that we are sometimes unaware of the passage of time, is to my knowledge a first in the commentaries on *De memoria*. It does not come from Albert, Aquinas, or any other known commentator of the *De memoria*. It remains difficult to grasp its function in relation to point 4 because of the missing terms.

In short, this note presents a vocabulary derived from the Arabic and Latin reception – notably Albertinian⁶⁸ – of *De memoria*, even if the details of the con-

⁶⁶ He concludes his note by writing: “Et sic memoria quantum est de se virtus conservativa est. Ad hoc tamen quod compleatur eius actio necesse est alias virtutes anime esse. Unde secunda operatio non debetur api verum et formice in quibus non est fantasia ut dicitur in tertio *De anima*” (Pamplona, Bibl. Cath. 24, fol. 183va (see Figure 2)).

⁶⁷ The annotator writes: “quartum est intentionis ad speciem et speciei ad rem exteriorem collatio et istud fit per virtutem rationis in hominibus, per extimationem in brutis; [fenestra: 2–3 voces] quia dormientes in Sardo non differunt propter debilitatem virtutum apprehensarum” (Pamplona, Bibl. Cath. 24, fol. 183va (see Figure 2)).

⁶⁸ Albert the Great was fond of Arabic peripatetic interpretations, and this also applies to his paraphrase of *De memoria*. At the beginning of his commentary, he draws up a list partly like this one. He writes: “Revoventur igitur ad memoriam ea quae de virtutibus apprehensivis sensibilius dicta sunt, et inveniemus quod quattuor sunt in quibus memoriae perficitur operatio. ... Cum autem dicimus quod rememoramus ex eo quod est apud animam, oportet necessario duas praecedere operationes. [i] Quarum una est esse receptum hoc a quo memoria incipit; et haec est operatio sensus communis. [ii] Secunda autem est esse conservatum apud nos ex praesenti accepto in praeterito. Et ostendimus in libro *De anima* impossibile esse quod eiusdem potentiae organicae

veyed position make it a novelty, which is rather unexpected from a synthesis situated at the end of the *quaestio*. The elements it refers to are absent from Vensoris' commentary. Vensoris' method, as deduced from a reading of his commentaries, will be discussed below. One of the characteristics of the style of Vensoris' commentaries is that they rework material coming from Aquinas' *Sententia* that is directly useful for understanding and learning the Aristotelian purpose of *De memoria*. Since there is never any mention of *intentio*, a notion introduced in this context by Avicenna, it is not surprising that Vensoris does not mention it. By the same token, Vensoris does not mention the association (*collatio*) between *species* and *intentiones*, which is characteristic of recollection as envisaged by Avicenna and Averroes.

What more can we know about this approach to memory? The same hand has copied another note on this folio. Of the same type, this one considers different ways of defining memory in relation to the other faculties:

- A definition in relation to the object: as such, memory differs from knowledge of the sensible or the intelligible in that these allow us to know in the present and without the need for an intermediate lapse of time between apprehension and recollection.
- A definition in relation to the other faculties, which involves listing the operations specific to memory.

The first definition of memory allows the annotator to stipulate in Aristotelian terms that memory is an affection and a disposition (*passio et habitus*), but he adds

sit bene recipere et bene conservare. Hanc conservantem Avicenna quidem vocat formalem vel imaginativam. Averroes autem in huius libri commento vocat eam conservantem ... Patet igitur ex his necessario probatum esse quod quoad hanc partem memoriae, quae scilicet procedit et incipit ex eo quod habemus apud nos, duae vires ante eam esse exiguntur ... Sed distinctam rei cognitio nem operatur in anima quando cognoscitur quod haec figura huius rei et non alterius intentio est. [iii] Oportet igitur quod ante memoriam quedam virtus operetur quae ex ipsa figura elicit rerum intentiones singulares. Et hanc quidem bene et proprie vocavit Avicenna aestimationem. Averroes autem improprie vocat cogitativam animalium brutorum, per quam fugiunt nociva et prosequuntur convenientia. [iv] Cum igitur memoria habeat utrumque horum, oportet in ipsa esse depictas figurae et intentiones; completur enim actus memoriae ex compositione horum duorum" (Albertus Magnus, *De sensu et sensato cuius secundus liber est de memoria et reminiscencia*, Silvia Donati (ed.), Münster: Aschendorff, 2017, 113–114). This list thus includes four elements: (i) the reception of a (sensible) form attributed to the common sense; (ii) the conservation of this form, attributed in Avicenna to the *virtus formans* or *imaginativa* and, in Averroes, to the *virtus conservans*; (iii) the faculty of singular *intentiones*, i.e. the Avicennian estimative and the Averroes cogitative. This faculty is necessary because, without connecting a sensible form to its *intentio*, we cannot return to a precise thing and remember it; (iv) memory, which acts by combining *intentio* and *forma* in the act of recollection.

that this can be understood in relation to the sense or the intellect. Now, Aristotle limits himself to saying that memory is an affection or disposition of the sense – and not of the intellect. Memory belongs to the intellect only by accident in so far as I can remember having learnt the definition of a triangle in such-and-such a year and on such-and-such an occasion.

But it is in the context of the second definition that this note proves particularly interesting, especially in its treatment of Arabic sources. The annotator defines memory in terms of its three operations: preservation, reflection, and apprehension (reception). However, this note completely contradicts the previous one, which was written by the same hand. Does this mean that the source copied is different? Certainly, since this time the source seems to be Albert's *De homine*, as can be seen in the table below. In this passage, Albert sets out the different definitions of memory before seeking a concordant solution. Does this mean that our annotator is contradicting himself completely – in relation to what he set out in his earlier note? Not necessarily. Perhaps, like Albert, he is trying to set out different meanings of the term "memory" to arrive at the broadest possible definition. The annotator proposes to define memory – according to Al-Ghazali – as the preservation of *intentiones* grasped by the estimative, whereas the previous note defined it as the preservation of *species*. Then, concerning the second operation, the annotator cites Al-Farabi and his *De anima*. Memory is reflexive in the sense that it thinks its operation. What does this mean? This reflexivity probably refers to the fact that one remembers an act, such as having done something.

Pamplona, Bibl. Cath. 24, 183vb
(see Figure 2).

Prima operatio est conservativa et diffinitur ab Algazali in libro suo *De anima*: "memoria est conservatrix intentionum quas apprehendit extimatim sicut arca et thesaurus"

Albert the Great, *De homine*, 297–301.⁶⁹

Dicit Algazel: "Memoria est conservatrix harum intentionum quas apprehendit aestimativa, et ideo est arca intentionum, sicut imaginativa conservatrix formarum est arca formarum."

Item, Isaac in libro de diffinitionibus: "Memoria est comprehensio rerum existentium in anima cum inquisitione."

...

⁶⁹ Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, Henryk Anzulewicz and Joachim Söder (eds.), Münster: Aschen- dorff, 2008.

Secunda operatio est reflectere et sic diffinitur ab *Al-Farabio* in libro suo *De anima*: “memoria est potentia reflectiva anime supra rem per tres⁷⁰ ymaginationem”

Tertia operatio est recipere et sic diffinitur ab *Isaac*: *memoria est virtus apprehensiva rei cum investigatione et inquisitione*.

Supra dictae autem diffinitiones diversimode tangunt naturam potentiae memorativae. Et *prima* quae est *Algazelis*, datur de potentia in comparatione ad proprium habitum eius. *Habitus enim memoriae constituitur ex intentionibus*, quae prius sunt acceptae per phantasiam et aestimationem, propter quod etiam Aristoteles dicit quod memoria est passio sensus et phantasiae. *Sequens autem diffinitio quae est Isaac*, datur de memoria in comparatione ad proprium obiectum et proprium actum. *Res enim existentes in anima dicuntur ab ipso res existentes in praeterito*. *Inquisitio autem non est inquisitio rationis*, sed illa quae exigitur ad actum recordationis, ad cuius actum secundum *Alfarabium* in suo libro de memoria et reminiscencia quattuor exiguntur; scilicet *imago*, et *intentio illius imaginis elicita per phantasiam*, et *facere illam intentionem praesentem*, et *iudicare illam intentionem esse illius imaginis quae prius sentiebatur*. *Collatio enim quae in his quattuor consistit, ab Isaac inquisitio vocatur*.

With these two notes, our annotator does not seem to be adopting a systematic perspective on memory. He reproduces – at least in one case – a passage from Albert the Great, and in the other case studied, something that could come indirectly from Albert, since the position mobilises several Arab authors. Alongside Versonoris’ text, which is straight to the point in its aim to comment on Aristotle’s *De memoria*, our annotators add references to the Arabic and Latin reception of this treatise; they reproduce the history of the discussions to which it gave rise, a history absent from the text itself (see Figure 3).⁷¹ As we have said, Versonoris’ commentary is intended

70 Undecipherable term.

71 In addition to numerous references to Arabic vocabulary and sources, the *marginalia* also mention Latin sources and theological questions. The annotator behind the two “summary” notes under review shows an encyclopaedic, and very Albertinian, approach. This tendency is further demonstrated when he introduces a question on the memory of the separated soul. At the bottom of fol. 193va, we read: “Utrum memoria sit in anima separata: memoria uno modo dicitur conservativa similitudines partis intellective conservante que impressa est anime a prima sui origine; et sic in anima separata est ponere memoriam; est in apprehensiva partis ut dicit in libro *De anima* Augustinus quantum ad intelligentiam, voluntatem et memoria(m); alio modo dicitur ‘memoria’ virtus conservativa intentionum receptarum in anima mediante fantasmate; et hec est memoria de qua loquitur Philosophus quod … est in anima coniuncta”. This question is also irrelevant to




Figure 3: History of the reception of *De memoria et reminiscencia*.

to be synthetic, straightforward and, by the same token, close to Aristotle's text. So, what can be said about the relationship between the different voices in fols. 192v–193v of the Pamplona manuscript Bibl. Cath. 24? The notes complete the manuscript, adding an Albertine colouring, but their main function is to insert the interpretative tradition of *De memoria*. They reintroduce what has been left out of the text, i.e. the details of the debates within the Aristotelian tradition. They add parameters – notably by considering the relationship between the discussion of the soul and that of memory, or by considering the memory of the separate soul. In short, unlike the above-presented case, with the Scotist note that follows Cau-laincourt's commentary, we are not dealing here with the insertion of a particu-

Versonis. Our annotator mentions two ways of conceiving memory. There is an Aristotelian one, according to which memory requires the *fantasma* or *species* derived from sensible knowledge; the other, being rather Augustinian, claims that memory does not come from the sensitive part of the soul, but from its intellective part. In more Augustinian terms, we would have to say that memory is part of the image of God in man, alongside the intelligence and the will. This memory is innate; it preserves data imprinted in the soul from its origin. The two memories are therefore compatible.

lar doctrine, but with the history of the reception of Aristotle's treatise. Although Albert is undoubtedly a model, the notes studied are not all based directly on his writings. Moreover, the additional questions, in particular the one concerning the relationship between the science of the soul and that of memory, as well as the one concerning the relationship between the science of memory and that of sensation, can be traced back to several commentaries from the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth century, rather than to Albert's writings.⁷² In short, in this commentary, the relationship between text and paratext (*marginalia*) can be schematised as shown in Figure 3. This case of polyphony and polytextuality within the Pamplona manuscript, which brings into play the views of Versonis and Aquinas in the body of the text, and those of Albert and other philosophers in the margins, is also of interest in the discussion of the models of Versonis and his readers from the *via antiqua*, which can oscillate between Thomism and Albertism.⁷³ These two voices, that of Albert and of Aquinas, echo, in their own way, just as Scotus and Buridan did in the previously studied cases. These two dialogues are important testimonies to the reception of Caulaincourt's and Versonis' texts. They show how these commentaries have been read in the context of doctrinal schools. With the addition in Caulaincourt's commentary studied above, Caulaincourt's text becomes more Scotist, whereas in this case Versonis' text, much indebted to Aquinas' *Sententia*, is tainted with Albertism.

4 Third Case Study: One or Two Voices? Johannes Versonis and Thomas Aquinas

The third and final case in our analysis is the Oxford manuscript, Canon Misc. 211, fols. 246r–248v, which also contains the commentary on *De memoria* of Ver-

72 Several readers (at least two) have added five questions to the four Versonian questions, as we have seen. The first two are now classics of thirteenth-century teaching concerning *De memoria* and its link with *De anima* and the rest of the *Parva naturalia*. Why add these questions alongside Versonis' first question? The first *sciendum* of this question situates *De memoria* within the Aristotelian corpus in the manner of Aquinas' *Sententia*. The addition of these questions allows the same observation to be made in other words. Instead of talking about prudence, which is not present in all sentient beings, and which includes memory, these annotators point out that the angle of analysis of the *Parva naturalia* is more organic – insofar as it deals with the soul as it interacts with the body – and more concrete than that of the *De anima*.

73 On this point, see also Rutten, *Secundum processum et mentem Versonis*.

soris.⁷⁴ This French manuscript, which is one of the oldest witnesses to the *De memoria* of Versonis – along with St-Quentin BV123 mentioned above – illustrates a third type of relationship that may exist between the text and the marginal notes. With Caulaincourt, we saw a Scotist note completing a Buridanist commentary; with Versonis' copy in the Pamplona manuscript, we saw a dialogue between the Versonian interpretation of Aristotle's text and the interpretative tradition that preceded it; finally, here we shall see that the boundary between the text itself and the paratext located in the margins is not always as clear-cut as it may appear.

Fols. 246r–247r of the Oxford manuscript, which transmit the first and the beginning of the second *quaestio* of Versonis' commentary, are accompanied by four extensive marginal notes by a hand that also corrected the initial text and that intervened throughout the manuscript to annotate Versonis' commentaries. This is a far cry from the previously discussed Pamplona manuscript, with its extreme number of notes and annotators. However, the notes present in the Oxford manuscript have one specificity: they make transparent the references underlying the text by Versonis and, hence, by Aquinas (Cicero, the *Physics*, the *Metaphysics*, and even Aristotle's *De anima*).⁷⁵ We have already seen the close links between the beginning of the Versonian *quaestio* and Thomas Aquinas' *Sententia De memoria et reminiscencia*. The Oxford annotator obviously completed the commentary based on the *Sententia*, as can be seen in the example below, where the commentary is in Roman script and the marginal additions are in italics in the left column.

⁷⁴ On this manuscript, see Rodney M. Thomson, *Catalogue of Medieval Manuscripts of Latin Commentaries on Aristotle in British Libraries*, vol. 1, Turnhout: Brepols, 2011, 74–76. According to Thomson, the folios concerning the *De memoria* were written by Johannes Run in 1443. He also thinks that the notes, written in a style contemporary with that of the main text, have been written by Johannes de Coromines, who owned and commissioned the manuscript from the University of Paris.

⁷⁵ In the case of two of them, they come from the same source as Versonis' commentary, namely Aquinas' *Sententia*.

Johannes Vensoris, *Questiones de memoria et reminiscientia*, q. 1, Oxford, Bodl., Canon Misc. 211, fol. 246 (see Figure 4).

... Ideo memoria per quam apprehenduntur preterita ponitur pars prudentie; unde etiam in animalibus in quibus invenitur prudentie similitudo participata invenitur etiam memoria preteritorum, sed tamen sicut habent prudentiam imperfectam respectu hominis, ita habent memoriam imperfectam. *Unde et Tullius in sua Rethorica: non solum providentiam que futura disponuntur et intelligentiam per quam presencia considerantur, sed cum hiis ponit memoriam preteritorum esse partem prudentie,* Secundo ideo principio Metaphysice dicitur quod quedam animalia memoriam habent et propter hoc prudentia sunt.

... Prima pars probatur, quia futura cognoscimus per intellectum; ergo, si etiam illa cognoscemus per memoriam, superflueret una istarum potentiarum;
Nota quod Aristoteles ponit quod futurorum quantum ad partem intellectivam est [opinio, scrips sed eras] scientia sperativa aut divinativa; futura sunt contingentia; ergo eorum non est aliqua scientia. Dicitur quod ipsorum secundum se non est scientia, sed bene per habitudinem ad suas causas necessarias in quibus potest videri habitudo effectus ad esse sicut astrologi ex corporibus celestibus indicant multos futuros eventus; non ut contingentes, sed ut sunt in causa necessaria. Non omne futurum est contingens.

Argumentum patet quia de futuris contingentibus secundum quod in suis causis considerantur potest esse aliqua scientia que vocatur sperativa aut divinativa. Et per hoc etiam probatur secunda pars conclusionis.

Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia De memoria et reminiscientia*, 104.

... Pertinet autem ad prudentiam ut prudens dirigatur per eam in hiis que imminent sibi agenda ex consideratione non solum presentium set etiam preteritorum; *unde Tullius in sua Rethorica partes prudentie ponit non solum providenciam per quam futura disponuntur; set etiam intelligenciam per quam considerantur presencia et memoriam per quam apprehenduntur preterita.* Unde et in aliis animalibus in quibus invenitur prudentie similitudo participata, necesse est esse non solum sensum presentium, set etiam memoriam preteritorum, et *ideo Philosophus dicit in principio Metaphysice quod quibusdam animalibus ex (sensu) memoria fit, et propter hoc prudentia sunt*

... Dicit ergo primo quod futura non contingit memorari, set eorum est opinio, ex parte virtutis cognoscitive, dum scilicet aliquis opinatur aliquid esse futurum, et spes, ex parte appetitive, dum scilicet ipse in aliquid futurum sperando tendit.

Dicit autem quod etiam quedam sciencia potest esse futurorum, que potest dici *sperativa sciencia*, quidam autem nominant eam *divinativam*, quia per eam aliqui possunt cognoscere in futurum contingere de quo est spes.

Set, cum spes sit futurorum que ab homine acquiri possunt, huiusmodi autem sunt futura contingencia de quibus non potest esse sciencia, videtur quod nulla sciencia possit esse sperativa futurorum. Dicendum est autem quod de futuris contingentibus secundum se consideratis non potest esse sciencia, set secundum quod in causis suis considerantur potest de eis sciencia esse, prout scilicet aliqua sciencia cognoscunt esse inclinationes quasdam ad tales effectus: sic enim et sciencia naturalis est de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. *Et hoc etiam modo astrologi possunt (per) suam scienciam prenunciare quosdam futuros eventus sperando, puta ubertatem vel sterilitatem, propter dispositionem corporum celestium ad tales effectus.*




Figure 4: Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon misc. 211, fol. 246r.

At this stage, how can we describe the work of the annotator of the Oxford manuscript? Did he have the *Sententia* before him and, seeing the proximity between Vescovis and his model, added to it? Or has Vescovis himself changed his teaching in the meantime and added these examples? In the first case, the additions should be ascribed to a user of the text, and in the second one, to Vescovis' teaching.⁷⁶

76 Vescovis' writing is to be seen in a quittance already mentioned above (note 46). This writing does not look like that of the annotator. The mentioned hypothesis is that these additions could eventually relate to Vescovis' teaching at a later stage of his career. However, I have no evidence for that. See also above (note 74).

These explanations are very appealing. However, when we look at the Prague manuscript tradition concerning Vensoris' *De memoria*, we see that other hypotheses are also worth mentioning. Indeed, some other witnesses to Vensoris' commentary – including several examples from the Central-European family – have, in one way or another, integrated the marginal additions present in the Oxford manuscript into the text itself. To get a clearer idea of the nature of the addition and its relationship to the text, let us look at the way in which the various witnesses behave in the table below.

Oxford Bodleian Library, Canon misc. 211, marginal notes.	Prague, Národní Knihovna I E 38. ⁷⁷	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Sententia De memoria et reminiscentia</i> .
fol. 246r: Unde et Tullius in sua <i>Rhetorica</i> : non solum providentiam qua futura disponuntur et intelligentiam per quam presentia considerantur, sed cum hiis ponit memoriam preteritorum esse partem prudentie,	fol. 351r: Nam Tullius in sua <i>Rhetorica</i> partes prudentie ponit: non solum providenciam per quam disponimus futura sed etiam intelligentiam per quam considerantur presentia et memoriam per quam apprehenduntur preterita. ⁷⁸	L. 24–28, 104.
fol. 246r: Et ideo principio <i>Metaphysice</i> dicitur quod quedam animalia memoriam habent et propter hoc prudentia sunt.	fol. 351r: Et ideo Philosophus dicit in principio <i>Metaphysice</i> quod in quibusdam animalibus ex memoria fit prudentia, sed tamen sicut alia animalia habent imperfectam prudentiam respectu hominis, ita et memoriam;	L. 31–34, 104.

77 This manuscript was chosen as a testimony for the Central-European family.

78 This passage – with minor variants – can be found in the body of the text of the following manuscripts: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin ms. lat. 402, Universitätsbibliothek Basel F VII 11, Real Biblioteca de El Escorial m.II.1, Prague Národní Knihovna I E 38, Prague KMK L37, Prague KMK M75, Prague Národní Knihovna IV G 16, Prague Národní Knihovna IV G 18, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 8, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 9, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 12, Prague Národního Muzea X E 5, Schlägl Prämonstratenserstift 119 Cpl. 169, St. Florian Stiftsbibliothek XI 626, St-Omer 586. By comparison, we find this in Pamplona: “[ideo memoria qua preterita comprehenduntur] a Tullio pars prudentie ponitur” (Pamplona Bibl. Cath. 24 fol. 182vb). The current state of my research on the dissemination of Vensoris' commentary does not allow me to draw up a precise stemma. However, there are at least important differences between the group of manuscripts I will call “A” and “B”. The “A” manuscripts tend to come from Western Europe (Italy, France, Spain, etc.), whereas the “B” manuscripts also originate from Paris (ms. St-Omer, 586) – as noticed by Aurora Panzica – and spread in Central Europe. Pamplona Bibl. Cath. 24 would be placed in the “A” group.

fol. 246v: Nota quod Aristoteles ponit quod futurorum quantum ad partem intellectivam est [opinio, *scrips sed eras*] scientia sperativa aut divinativa; futura sunt contingencia; ergo eorum non est aliqua scientia. Dicitur quod ipsorum secundum se non est scientia, sed bene per habitudinem ad suas causas necessarias in quibus potest videri habitudo effectus ad esse, sicut astrologi ex corporibus celestibus indicant multos futuros eventus, non ut contingentes, sed ut sunt in causa necessaria. Non omnes futurum est contingens.

fol. 247r: Nota quod, cum fantasia aliqua convenientiam habeat cum memoria, ut patet in notabili prout conclusionem, ideo Aristoteles se excusat de determinatione fantasie, dicendo quod in *De anima* determinandum est de ea quomodo pertinet ad partem sensitivam, subsuit tamen maxime intellectu, quoniam non contingit intelligere sine fantasmate et quare intellectus est universalium, fantasia corporalium et materialium; aliquis posset dubitare quomodo non contingit intelligere sine fantasmate; ideo Aristoteles hic dat exemplum de descriptionibus mathematicis etiam gratia illius.

fol. 351v: etiam astrologi considerando vel sperando possunt per suam scientiam preannuciare quosdam futuros eventus puta ubertatem, aut sterilitatem propter dispositionem corporum celestium ad suos effectus.⁷⁹

L. 131–135, 105.

To what extent are the Oxford marginal additions paratextual? Should they not be considered part of the commentary itself? This seems to be the view of the “Prague” witnesses, i.e. the Prague manuscripts, and the witnesses of other prove-

⁷⁹ Similarly, this passage is found in Nürnberg, Staatsbibliothek, Cent V 46 MF, Prague KMK L37, Prague KMK M75, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 8, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 9, Prague Národní Knihovna V E 12, Prague Národní Knihovna IV G 16, Prague Národní Knihovna IV.G.18, Prague Národního Muzea X E 5, Schlägl Prämonstratenserstift 119 Cpl. 169, St. Florian Stiftsbibliothek XI 626, St-Omer 586. This passage is missing from Pamplona Bibl. Cath. 24.

nance sharing their characteristics, i.e. here adding the same portions of text. Three marginal notes in the Oxford manuscript are added to the heart of the commentary itself in the manuscripts that are part of the “B” group.⁸⁰ How can the text be delimited? This question revives that of understanding Vensoris’ authority, a problem mentioned by Christoph Flüeler in an article dedicated to the colophons.⁸¹ The question is especially salient since the author’s work in this context is largely a compilation of extracts from the writings of Aquinas. I do not claim to resolve this question here but simply show that the comparison between the Oxford manuscript and the members of a possible “B” group, widespread in Central Europe, reopens this question of Vensoris’ authority. How should we conceive of authority in this context?⁸²

Vensoris – or the author of the commentary on *De memoria* mentioned above – did not limit himself to compiling extracts from Aquinas’ *Sententia*. As we have said, the *dubitaciones* in his questions to the *De memoria* are certainly of his own making, or from a hitherto unknown source. However, it is interesting to note that these manuscripts from the group widespread in Central Europe do not include these *dubitaciones* for the first *quaestio*. In other words, at this stage of my study, it seems that the Oxford marginal notes – considered *post* additions and corrections – allow us to situate this manuscript at the intersection of two traditions or groups of manuscripts: one, which contains a condensed version of the first *quaestio*, omitting the references to Cicero, to Aristotle’s works other than the *De memoria*, and to

⁸⁰ See above, note 79.

⁸¹ Christoph Flüeler writes: “Zahlreiche Editionen zum ganzen *corpus Aristotelicum* werden eindeutig Johannes Vensor zugeschrieben. Wendet man sich aber der vernachlässigten handschriftlichen Überlieferung zu, erweist sich die klare Zuschreibung in den Editionen als fragwürdig. Die Handschriftenkataloge haben sich meistens auf die Zuschreibung in den alten Drucken gestützt und haben den Kommentar ohne näheren Hinweis dem Pariser Magister Johannes Vensor zugeschrieben, selbst wenn der Kommentar in der Handschrift anonym überliefert ist” (Christoph Flüeler, Die verschiedenen literarischen Gattungen der Aristoteleskommentare: Zur Terminologie der Überschriften und Kolophone, in: *Manuels, Programmes de cours et techniques d’enseignement dans les universités médiévales: Actes du colloque internationale de Louvain-la-Neuve, 9–11 septembre 1993*, Jacqueline Hamesse (ed.), 75–116, Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d’Études Médiévales de l’Université Catholique de Louvain, 1994, 80). Based on the examination of the colophons of some of the oldest manuscripts transmitting Vensoris’ commentaries, Flüeler confirmed that these texts originated in Paris, mostly in the 1440s. Their strong structural similarities seem to indicate that they were conceived as an organic introduction to the different branches of philosophy for Parisian students. It remains unclear whether Vensoris was the author of these commentaries, their compiler, or exactly which role he played.

⁸² Aurora Panzica, to whom this study owes a great deal, is conducting research into this very question.

the question of the astrologers; the other, which contains all of this in the text itself, but omits the final part of the *quaestio*, the *dubitaciones*.⁸³ What connections can be drawn between the Oxford notes and the inserts of the so-called “B” group? Did Vescovis vary his teaching by adding these passages, which would have been found in the B group and which would have been added by the annotator to a pre-existing manuscript? Can we assume that the Oxford annotator was read by a copyist of one of the so-called “B” group manuscripts? Or could it be the other way round? These questions will remain open, especially as both the Oxford manuscript and several members of the Prague family contain idiosyncrasies: (a) Oxford includes a note on *fantasia* that is absent from any other known witness at this stage of my research, and (b) several manuscripts of the “B” group contain the quotation from the *Aeneid*, which is present in Aquinas’ *Sententia*, and is absent, even from the margins, from the witness in the Bodleian Library. While it is not yet possible to define precisely the direction of these influences and of the collective work on this commentary on *De memoria*, it is certain that the solution will involve a study of the *marginalia*.

Concluding Remarks

At the end of this three-stage journey, I hope to have shown that marginal notes are not simply additions to the text or ways of saying the same thing. They are much more: the three manuscripts studied show that the notes can contradict the text – at least in part – as well as complement it by putting forward other data from different doctrinal schools. They can also reference it, by indicating the source of this or that other assertion put forward by the text itself. In this way, the large *marginalia* provide valuable data: for anyone interested in the use of a codex – for teaching, simple reading, scholarship etc.; for anyone wishing to produce a stemma – since the *marginalia* can also be copied, even in the body of the text; and for anyone wishing to examine the reception of a particular commentary. They are also invaluable for those wishing to examine the reception of a particular commentary, which might have been biased – as in the case of the Scotist note in Caulaincourt’s commentary.⁸⁴ In short, marginal notes convey polytextuality.

In the introduction and during the text, I sought to highlight this polytextual character by proposing a comparison between the annotated commentaries under

⁸³ At this stage of my research, I do not know if there is another manuscript that carries the note on the imagination.

⁸⁴ Publishers of Caulaincourt’s commentary refer to it as “secundum mentem Doctoris Subtilis Scoti”. See Bakker, *Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics*, 197.

study and the medieval genre of the motet. It is now time to evaluate this comparison. To what extent can motets and annotated commentaries be compared? From the reader's or listener's perspective, they may appear similar in that they superimpose several voices and texts of different origin and status. Apart from this, the hierarchy of these texts is not always self-evident: who, the *tenor*⁸⁵ or the superior voices, holds the main text? At the same time, who, as commentator or annotator, is at the heart of the discussion of memory? We have seen that there is nothing obvious on this question. However, the comparison does not hold between the composer and the commentator: the polytextual motet is the result of the will of the composer and/or poet alone, whereas the annotated commentary is most often the fruit of a collective effort. The reader – who may be the commentator himself – adds his own touch; he enriches and augments the text to the readers who follow him. In short, the study of marginal notes once again highlights the collective nature of medieval thought.⁸⁶

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⁸⁵ The *tenor* is the lowest voice in a motet. At the origin of the genre in the thirteenth century, the tenor sings in long notes a melody taken from a *cantus firmus*, a Gregorian chant. On the motet, see Catherine Bradley, Peter M. Lefferts, Patrick Macey, Christoph Wolff, Graham Dixon, James R. Anthony, Malcolm Boyd, Jerome Roche, Leeman Lloyd Perkins, and Ernest Helmut Sanders, Motet, *Grove Music Online*, 30 December 2019, <<https://doi.org/10.1093/omo/9781561592630.013.90000369371>>, accessed 5 July 2024.

⁸⁶ I would like to express my sincere thanks to Aurora Panzica, who provided invaluable assistance at every stage of this work, and to Mario Meliàdò for his confidence and accurate reading. I would also like to thank Ascorbe Muruzábal of the Archivo Diocesano de Pamplona, Fabio Uliana of the Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria di Torino, and the members of the Imaging Services Team at the Bodleian Library for their permission to use images of the manuscripts concerned in this publication. Thanks to my proofreaders, Eduardo Saldana and Matthew Shaper, who improved my English. My warmest thanks to all of them.

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