

Jiří Vyčichlo

Palmerston and Metternich's Austria, 1830–1841

Jiří Vyčichlo

Palmerston and Metternich's Austria, 1830–1841



Clash of Ideas in the Balance of Power

DE GRUYTER
OLDENBOURG

Free access to the e-book version of this publication was made possible by the 34 academic libraries and initiatives that supported the open access transformation project in History.

ISBN 978-3-11-154828-9

e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-155626-0

e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-155643-7

DOI <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111556260>



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
For details go to <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2024948211

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at <http://dnb.dnb.de>.

This book is a revised translation from the Czech original: Jiří Vyčichlo, Palmerston a Metternichovo Rakousko v letech 1830–1841, Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, Plzeň 2019.

© 2019 Západočeská univerzita v Plzni.

© 2025 the author(s), published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston, Genthiner Straße 13, 10785 Berlin

The book is published open access at www.degruyter.com.

Cover image: Palmerston and Metternich, © Kateřina Vyčichlová

Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck

www.degruyter.com

Questions about General Product Safety Regulation:
productsafety@degruyterbrill.com

Contents

- 1 Introduction — 1**
- 2 The July Revolution and the Structure of British and Austrian Foreign Policy — 12**
- 3 The Establishment of an Independent Belgium — 26**
- 4 British Policy in Central and Eastern Europe — 57**
- 5 Crisis on the Italian Peninsula and a Final Split — 87**
- 6 The Eastern Question and the First Turko-Egyptian Conflict — 111**
- 7 Civil War in Portugal and Spain, and the Quadruple Alliance — 136**
- 8 Escalation of the Eastern Question and the Path to Its Culmination — 171**
- 9 Conclusion — 217**
- 10 Summary — 223**
- 11 Bibliography — 227**
- Index — 237**

1 Introduction

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, representatives of the Great Powers agreed on a new order in post-war Europe. They created a new system of international relations to work together to prevent revolutions and preserve peace between European states. Over the subsequent years, this idea transformed, and by 1830, it had taken on an entirely different character. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, was a key figure in this transformation. His actions and decisions were crucial in reshaping the international relations system. The British Isles' primary diplomatic interest in the 1830s was to promote their national and political objectives, which hindered general cooperation. Klemens Wenzel Nepomuk Lothar, Prince of Metternich-Winneburg zu Beilstein, represented Austria at the opposite end of the spectrum of opinions. He played a crucial role in creating the Congress of Vienna framework and was regarded as its principal advocate. He believed this arrangement was the only possible guarantee for general peace and order in Europe. While the new order established by the Congress of Vienna persisted, the interests of both men clashed in both ideological and foreign policy spheres.

This book aims to refute the still prevalent claim that Great Britain was a “champion” of European liberalism and that its foreign policy reflected this principle. In contrast, many view Austria as a conservative, “despotic” state that actively suppresses the rights of smaller states and imposes its worldview upon them. Nonetheless, considering international relations in the 1830s, this claim requires revision. Diplomacy during this period was not straightforward. Great Britain acted based on its national interests, selectively choosing which states to support and which to distance itself from. Austria, on the other hand, played a crucial role in maintaining the balance of power and peace in Europe. Its geopolitical role and economic and military situation demanded stable cooperation with states that shared similar interests. This cooperation ensured the stability of Europe, upon which Austria's existence and survival as a power depended.

The study examines Palmerston and Metternich's relations between 1830 and 1841, a period during which these two prominent figures of nineteenth-century European history were responsible for the foreign policies of Great Britain and Austria. The focus is on the period when Palmerston served as Britain's Foreign Secretary, with a brief interruption during his time in opposition. The main objective is to analyse the approach of both statesmen to resolving international problems and, in this regard, to review the generally accepted, and according to the author, one-sided view of Palmerston. From the perspective of traditional Anglo-Saxon historiography, the Foreign Secretary is considered a progressive figure

who acted not just in the interests of his own country but also in the interests of European liberalism. In contrast, Metternich is portrayed as Palmerston's antithesis: a reactionary who actively prevents the modernisation of European society. Nevertheless, this study aims to demonstrate that such a black-and-white perspective is untenable.

Both statesmen championed different concepts of the Concert of Europe and frequently clashed over their political principles and approaches to international issues. While both aimed to preserve peace and maintain Europe's balance of power, they pursued these goals through different methods. From 1830 to 1841, European history saw significant developments, including changes in the post-Vienna order, revolutions, restrictions on cooperation between Powers, and critical issues such as the Eastern Question and the future of the Ottoman Empire.

Metternich clearly endeavoured to secure cooperation with London throughout the period under investigation. However, Palmerston's perception of Austria as an unstable partner led to a logical shift in alliances, prompting the Ballhausplatz¹ to seek a new ally in Russia. For Britain's Foreign Secretary, France emerged as the primary ally, often pursuing its interests to the detriment of Austria. Palmerston's rejection of Britain's traditional cooperation with the Habsburg Monarchy caused a significant disruption in the Concert of Europe.

The author analyses this issue primarily from the British perspective, which mirrors Palmerston's positions and diplomacy through Metternich's opinions and policies. To some extent, it adopts British historian Sir Charles Kingsley Webster's approach, as seen in his pivotal monograph, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841: Britain, The Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question* (1951),² but with a different overall tenor. While Webster's comparison of the two statesmen gives a positive impression of the British Foreign Secretary, this assessment requires revision based on the primary and secondary sources examined, and Webster's apotheosis of Palmerston should be reconsidered. The relationship between both men and, thus, between the Powers whose interests they defended is placed within the broader context of international political developments during the period, particularly regarding the most significant crises in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The domestic political limits of Palmerston's diplomacy are also logically considered, i.e., to what extent he was limited or spurred on in his actions by the British Parliament and public opinion.

¹ The Ballhausplatz was the seat of the Austrian Chancellery.

² WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question*, vol. I–II, London 1951.

The book is divided into seven chapters, which focus on key events and are set out based on merit and chronology. The author focuses on regions where the period's international crises and fundamental problems were examined and progressively played out. Matters regarding the United States of America, the slave trade, and the Far East are disregarded to focus on the matter investigated; these issues are only mentioned where they impacted Palmerston's European or Near East policies. The book focuses strictly on the international politics between Great Britain and Austria during the specified period. It avoids addressing other era-related issues, such as social matters, women's rights, or economic factors. It also does not introduce new theoretical perspectives on diplomatic frameworks, as historians like Paul Schroeder, Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, Glenda Sluga, and Matthias Schulz have explored. Nevertheless, the book considers their perspectives and findings. Instead, it provides deeper context and analysis of the examined issues, aiming to correct certain deeply ingrained myths and misconceptions about British and Austrian diplomacy. At the same time, the book does not glorify either statesman or adopt a revisionist stance. Instead, it places Palmerston's policies within a broader framework, drawing on recent insights from historians such as Miroslav Šedivý, Wolfram Siemann, and Wolf Dietrich Gruner.

The first section examines the July Revolution in France and its impact on Great Britain's foreign policy. The chapter also explores Metternich's stance on these events and the principles and objectives of Austrian diplomacy. Additionally, it delves into Britain's international interests and Palmerston's political ideas. Circumstances and relations with different rulers and key diplomats serving both states are also described. The revolution in France in 1830 had a fundamental impact on how the Concert of Europe operated, and it saw changes in the system of alliances that were then in place. London found its principal partner in Paris, while Vienna, following a period of cooling in relations with Britain, now turned its attention to St Petersburg. Palmerston welcomed Louis Philippe's accession to the French throne and hoped that liberalism would also spread to the east of the Rhine.

The second chapter analyses the Belgian Revolution as a direct consequence of the July events in France. This section includes discussions at the London Conference to decide on the fate of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, alongside all the machinations at the meeting of Powers. The Belgian Revolution is also linked to Britain's non-intervention policy. The diplomatic stalemate meant Great Britain and France were forced to intervene militarily against King William I of the Netherlands. The problem of Belgium's international position dragged on over the entire 1830s. Two military interventions and over nine years of negotiation were required to conclude the matter. Establishing an independent Belgium was Palmerston's first task as Foreign Secretary, and it is considered one of the

greatest successes of his diplomatic career. The drawback of his involvement in matters across the English Channel was that Palmerston's attention was turned away from the much more dangerous situation emerging at the time in the Near East. At the same time, the process of rapprochement with the government in Paris had begun, with London using France's military intervention to pursue its interests in Belgium. The desire to be aligned with France was dangerously reflected in Anglo-Austrian relationships, and efforts to preserve the partnership led Palmerston to support Paris, to the detriment of Vienna, in the Italian states.

In the subsequent section, the author looks at the revolution in Congress Poland and events in the German Confederation. Great Britain and Austria also found themselves in diametrically opposed positions. Metternich endeavoured to support Tsar Nicholas I in his efforts to defeat the revolutionaries in Poland as soon as possible, while Palmerston supported the Poles. The British Foreign Secretary encouraged opponents in their fight against Metternich within the German Confederation. Even though Palmerston's positions resonated with European liberals and across British society, his policy in these matters was markedly limited. He was responsive to the voices of public opinion and did not consider Austrian arguments. The revolutionary events in Congress Poland were a direct threat to Vienna, especially at a time of discontent in central parts of Italy, where the Danube Monarchy had its primary sphere of influence. The British government's engagement in Central and Eastern Europe was designed to impress potential voters in order to consolidate the party's current domestic political dominance.

The developments in the Italian states were a natural continuation of the events in Poland and the German Confederation. In his efforts to stabilise the regions impacted by the revolution, particularly the Papal States, Metternich faced France's ambitions to expand its influence in Italy. This rift between the two Powers led to France's occupation of Ancona and an international crisis. Palmerston's stance in this conflict was strictly anti-Austrian. While he urged moderation from France, he viewed Vienna's policy as ultraconservative and anti-reformist, despite this not being the case. Fearing the loss of the alliance with the Orléans regime, he refrained from publicly opposing the breach of international law in Ancona and withheld support for Metternich's efforts to resolve matters in central Italy. These efforts, including implementing reforms actively supported by Austria, aimed to pacify the majority of the population.

The Eastern Question was an essential issue within European politics throughout the 1830s, initially concerning discussions on creating an independent Greek state, and from 1831 because of the First Egyptian-Ottoman War. This part of the study analyses Palmerston's relations with Constantinople, his opinion on Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali, and British fears of Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire. One key aspect of this section is Metternich's approach to the

Middle East problem and his proposals for resolving the Ottoman-Egyptian crisis. The outcome of the first phase of dealing with the Eastern Question was the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi, which was considered a political failure for Palmerston. For the remainder of his tenure as Foreign Secretary, he endeavoured to revise this treaty. His efforts resulted in a deterioration in relations with St Petersburg and anti-Russian sentiment beginning to resonate with the British public. This chapter also analyses the consolidation of relationships between the Eastern Powers, culminating in the Münchengrätz (Mnichovo Hradiště) treaty and, subsequently, the Berlin Convention as a direct consequence of British foreign policy.

Chapter Six examines the division of the civil war in Portugal, Spain, and Europe into two political camps: The Quadruple Alliance,³ comprising Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain, was on one side, and the conservative grouping of Austria, Prussia, and Russia was on the other side. From 1832, Palmerston began to be considered the leading exponent of European liberalism and was convinced of the need to support Queen Regent Maria Christina of the Two Sicilies in Spain and Maria da Glória in Portugal. Support for the liberal regimes across the Pyrenees was a crucial aspect of London's international strategy. The Foreign Secretary followed this region from his appointment to the office, and by the mid-1830s, the future of both Iberian kingdoms became the most crucial piece of his agenda. In executing national policy, Palmerston was compelled to violate Britain's declared non-intervention doctrine and resort to military force once again. The primary motivation of the government in London remained to consolidate its influence on the Iberian Peninsula as a traditional political sphere of interest. Metternich attempted to exploit the problems in Madrid and Lisbon as a counterbalance to British engagement in Central Europe. For the Austrian Chancellor, the problem represented a Legitimist conflict, which contrasted naturally with London's policy. Vienna used its traditional historical influence on the Iberian Peninsula to reduce British influence while endeavouring to counterbalance Palmerston's diplomacy in Central and Southern Europe.

The final, seventh chapter looks at the second crisis in the Near East at the turn of the 1830s and 1840s, which overlaps with the final years of Palmerston's second term as Foreign Secretary. This crisis was much more severe than the first one because, besides the Ottoman Empire, it also impacted Europe through the Rhine Crisis. The conflict between Muhammad Ali and the Ottoman Sultan represented the final period of the dying Anglo-French *entente*. Throughout the conflict, differences

³ This alliance of four Powers shares its name with the Quadruple Alliance formed against Napoleon in 1813.

between the objectives of London and Paris deepened, leading Palmerston to seek a new political partner among the Eastern Powers, particularly focusing on Austria. Even though London and Vienna attempted to take the lead in resolving the crisis, an agreement was ultimately reached, and the desired outcome was achieved. This apparent Anglo-Austrian friendship stopped as soon as the crisis had ended. The Straits Convention is considered Palmerston's success, but in fact, Austrian diplomacy played a large part in it. Britain's Foreign Secretary did not change his distrustful attitude towards Metternich, so broader cooperation remained impossible. The outcome of this approach was also reflected in the subsequent period of the 1840s.

Relationships between Palmerston and Metternich are only peripherally looked at within global historiography. The only exception here is Webster's *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System 1830–1841* (1934),⁴ which unfortunately bolstered the traditionally one-sided perception of the two men. The study has several areas for improvement. The first of these is its content. It is a study more than a monograph, and this is also reflected in Webster's tendency to come to general, unspecific conclusions. The second, more fundamental, shortcoming is its anti-Austrian attitude and excessive, almost biased, adoration of Palmerston's policies. Therefore, no specialist monograph still considers previously unstudied archival sources and the latest viewpoints that change our perspectives on the two politicians. Another exception is a 2020 study by Wolf D. Gruner, (*Metternich, Palmerston, the German Confederation, and Europe 1830–1834: Ideology and National Interest*)⁵ which primarily focuses on the policies of both men within the German Confederation but also extends into other European issues of that period. New revisionist works looking at the figure of the Austrian Chancellor, such as Czech historian Miroslav Šedivý's *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (2013)⁶ and German historian Wolfram Siemann's *Metternich Strategie und Visionär. Eine Biografie* (2016),⁷ have opened up space for a revisionist perspective of Anglo-Austrian relations in the 1830s. In his extensive work, Šedivý looks at relations between Austria and Great Britain regarding the Eastern Question. He confronts Webster's view of Metternich with the context of his policy in

4 WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *Palmerston, the Metternich and the European System 1830–1841*, London 1934.

5 GRUNER, Wolf, Dietrich, *Metternich, Palmerston, the German Confederation, and Europe – 1830–1834: Ideology and National Interest*. In: *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire/Romanian Journal of History* 1, 2022, 4, p. 13–56.

6 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, Plzeň 2013.

7 SIEMANN, Wolfram, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär. Eine Biografie*, München 2016.

the Ottoman Empire and notes its dangerous nature, which might, as a result, negatively impact the maintenance of peace in Europe.

This book heavily relies on research, primarily on analysing unpublished sources from *The National Archives* in London and the *Österreichisches Staatsarchiv* in Vienna. At these archives, the author has read through all written documents sent between the two capitals between 1830 and 1841, and also, for example, between London on the one side and Berlin, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid, Constantinople, and St Petersburg on the other. The British archives contain a vast number of sources which are indispensable for researching relations between Palmerston and Metternich. The author first focused on diplomatic correspondence between Vienna and London in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv section of the Austrian State Archives. Besides the mentioned written correspondence with the British capital, correspondence with Austrian diplomats in Paris, Constantinople, and St Petersburg was also used. In this regard, Vienna provides a significant and essential source of information for writing a work looking at Austria's international policy.

Of published sources related to British policy, the work of Henry Lytton Bulwer, who published some of Palmerston's correspondence with leading European politicians, is particularly relevant.⁸ His book is also the first biographical work on the Viscount. Bulwer, who worked under Palmerston as a diplomat, loyally defends his Foreign Secretary's policies in his book. Another source is the *British and Foreign State Papers*, specifically volumes XVIII–XXII. This features many important documents, not just from Palmerston's pen but also written by other British politicians, alongside transcriptions of treaties and conventions in which Great Britain participated. The Duke of Wellington's son published some of the documents in his father's estate under the title *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington* (1878),⁹ which is a crucial source telling of the opposing side of the British political spectrum. Correspondence between Charles Grey, Palmerston, and Princess Dorothea Lieven is also a valuable source of information for the period investigated.¹⁰ Regarding the Eastern Question, the three-volume publication *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant* proved vital. Of the published sources on Metternich, mention should be made of

8 BULWER, Henry Lytton (ed.): *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. With Selection from His Diaries and Correspondence*, vol. I–II, Leipzig 1871.

9 WELLINGTON, Arthur (ed.), *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington*, vol. I–VIII, London 1878.

10 STRANGE, Guy Le (ed.), *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*, vol. I–II, London 1890.

a book by his son, Richard, entitled *Aus Metternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren* (translated into English as *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*).¹¹

Another biographical work on Palmerston took shape shortly after his death. Evelyn Ashley completed Bulwer's work and published it in 1870.¹² Ten years later, another biography entitled *Lord Palmerston* (1880) was published, written by British novelist Anthony Trollope.¹³ In this, Trollope portrays the British statesman, traditionally in the best light, as a figure fighting for the values of liberalism. Philip Guedalla provides the same picture in his 1926 book, *Palmerston 1784–1865*.¹⁴ For a historian, both these works are highly subjective and set up the conventional historiographical image of the man. A revisionist perspective came in 1936 with Herbert C. F. Bell's work, *Lord Palmerston*.¹⁵ This British historian's work describes Palmerston as a nationalist striving above all for the welfare of his own country. His book was published during a collapse in the international community and was meant to serve as a historical parallel to the rise of radical nationalist movements in Europe.

In 1951, Webster produced *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841*. The British professor of history focused above all on international relations in the first half of the nineteenth century and defended the idea of international conferences and congresses. His works were mainly produced in the 1930s and opposed the British policy of appeasement. Webster was also the first historian to make full use of unpublished sources at the University of Southampton. One unique feature of his research was the use of sources kept at the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, a resource that nobody had previously used to such an extent regarding Palmerston. This work is a pivotal and unsurpassed document that influenced subsequent historians. It does suffer from the ailment mentioned above of showing excessive admiration for Palmerston and being overly critical of Metternich.

In the 1960s, Donald Southgate published *The Most English Minister . . . The Policies and Politics of Palmerston* (1966).¹⁶ He charted the life of the Foreign Secretary from 1826 until his death. His work is a fascinating book in which two schools of thought conflict: one critical of Palmerston and the other admiring

11 METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, Richard (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, vol. I–V, London 1882.

12 ASHLEY, Evelyn (ed.), *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, vol. I–II, London 1879.

13 TROLLOPE, Anthony, *Lord Palmerston*, London 1882.

14 GUEDALLA, Philip, *Palmerston*, London 1926.

15 BELL, Clifford Francis Herbert, *Lord Palmerston*, vol. I–II, London 1936.

16 SOUTHGATE, Donald, *The Most English Minister . . . The Policies and Politics of Palmerston*, London 1966.

him. According to Southgate, the Foreign Secretary was in firm control of Britain's diplomacy, running the office following public wishes. Jasper Godwin Ridley came to a similar conclusion in his publication, *Lord Palmerston* (1970); he believed that the British Foreign Office, headed by the Foreign Secretary, merely adapted its policies to international diplomacy, responding to outside stimuli. Shortly after this book, *Palmerston* by Denis Judd (1975) was published.¹⁷ This work, in contrast, takes a more critical approach, siding with historians who considered Palmerston a nationalist. A significant milestone was the publication of the book *Palmerston: The Early Years 1784–1841* by Kenneth Bourne in 1982.¹⁸ In his research, Bourne came across private correspondence not previously studied in Kew and uncovered details of Palmerston's politics that Trollope, Guedalla, and Webster had not incorporated into their works. In his view, the actions of the British Foreign Secretary were significantly constrained, and his intentions were never as noble as previous authors had portrayed. Much of this book looks at the domestic political situation in Great Britain and gives a somewhat chaotic impression from a chronological perspective. Following Bourne, Muriel Chamberlain wrote a short biography primarily based on his and Guedalla's ideas.¹⁹

At the start of the twenty-first century, several publications came out looking at the life of Viscount Palmerston, notable among which, for example, is 2004's *Palmerston: 'The People's Darling'* by James Chambers, which returns to the old clichés about Palmerston. Chambers admires his politics and presents him as a focused and crucial actor in British history.²⁰ Today, English historian David Brown is the leading expert on Palmerston's political career, having written 2010's *Palmerston: A Biography*.²¹ This monograph is mainly based on already published works and archival collections previously investigated by Webster. His analysis of 1830s politics gives an overview rather than a detailed investigation. Brown is also the author of the study *Palmerston and Austria* (2010),²² which summarises his findings in his biography of Palmerston. Despite persistent criticism of Metternich, both works are more critical in their conclusions, in which the British Foreign Secretary emerges as a political opportunist. For the submitted study, the core secondary sources were, in addition to Brown, especially the works of

17 JUDD, Denis, *Palmerston*, London 1975.

18 BOURNE, Kenneth, *Palmerston: The Early Years 1784–1841*, New York 1982.

19 CHAMBERLAIN, Muriel Evelyn, *Lord Palmerston*, Cardiff 1987.

20 CHAMBERS, James, *Palmerston: 'The People's Darling'*, London 2004.

21 BROWN, David, *Palmerston: A Biography*, London 2010.

22 BROWN, David, *Palmerston and Austria*. In: HÖBELT, Lothar (ed.), *A Living Anachronism? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy*, Festschrift für Francis Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag, Wien 2010, p. 29–48.

Bell, Webster, Southgate, and Bourne. All the books mentioned give an overly simplified viewpoint of the Austrian Chancellor, portraying him as a negative figure in European history.

There are significant differences in opinions on the Danube Monarchy Chancellor's policies. An extensive study entitled *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch* was written in 1925 by Heinrich Ritter von Srbik.²³ This is the most comprehensive biography yet produced, and many authors have used the book, with its opinions still often adopted. English historian Alan Sked came up with new ideas, first of all in his study *The Metternich System 1815–48* (1979),²⁴ and subsequently, in his book *Metternich and Austria: An Evaluation*²⁵ from 2007. This work gives new insight into the figure of Metternich and reassesses the deeply-rooted clichés and ideas represented by other historians. A significant work focused on the Chancellor's life is a new publication from the above-mentioned Wolfram Siemann, *Metternich. Stratege und Visionär* from 2016. In this book, the author uses unexploited sources to provide an extensive analysis of the structure of Metternich's politics, and he comes to entirely new conclusions. His arguments affirm historians who proclaim Metternich's desire for reforms both within and outside the Empire. As a result, the Austrian Chancellor is not evaluated as a regressive despot but rather as a European politician of the highest order. Šedivý comes to similar conclusions in the works mentioned above.

This work draws on essential historical works to provide a fresh perspective on the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Austria during the specified period. Engaging with various analyses aims to correct long-held misconceptions about the nature of their diplomacy. For instance, recent research, particularly Wolfram Siemann's study, has shaped the exploration of British and Austrian foreign policies during the July Revolution. Insights into the limitations and advantages of Anglo-French cooperation and the diverging strategies of Palmerston and Metternich form a significant part of the narrative, challenging previously one-sided views of both figures.

One key element in this book is the evolving momentum of British foreign policy, primarily driven by Palmerston and his European ambassadors. It examines how these shifts impacted European stability and the balance of power, drawing on modern interpretations of non-intervention doctrines and their application to key international issues. The analysis of Belgium, Poland, and Russia

²³ SRBIK, Heinrich Ritter von, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, Band I–II, München 1925.

²⁴ SKED, Alan, *The Metternich System 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, p. 98–121.

²⁵ SKED, Alan, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation*, Basingstoke 2007.

during the 1830s, especially regarding the impact of Russian policy in Europe, provides a broader context for understanding Vienna's relations with other Powers and illustrates the dynamics of cooperation between Austria and St Petersburg.

The section on Italy delves deeper into the complexities of Metternich's policies, now seen as more reformist than previously thought. This re-evaluation presents Metternich as a more progressive force in Central Italy, working to restore order through reformist measures rather than reactionary ones. Recent findings also re-examine Palmerston's motivations, suggesting that he often prioritised British interests over broader European stability, particularly in his dealings with France.

The book addresses the Eastern Question and its significance in shaping British and Austrian diplomacy. It situates this issue within the broader European context, reconsidering the intentions and actions of both Metternich and Palmerston. The challenges of cooperation and competition among the Great Powers are explored, especially in relation to their approaches to the Ottoman Empire and their efforts to preserve peace in Europe. Recent studies have emphasised Metternich's commitment to consensus within the Concert of Europe and his focus on maintaining the stability of the Ottoman Empire. The book integrates this perspective into its analysis of diplomatic strategy and foreign policy decisions.

Ultimately, this work reinterprets the roles of Metternich and Palmerston, moving away from traditional views that depict one as a reactionary and the other as a mere opportunist. Instead, it offers a more nuanced understanding of their respective diplomatic strategies, supported by a broader analysis of nineteenth-century European politics. The book contributes significantly to ongoing debates by challenging deeply entrenched myths and offering a more balanced view of the period's international relations.

Finally, the author considers it essential to explain the use of specific terms or names. The book does not use the word Germany, with the term "German states" and the German Confederation used for this region. Similarly, Turkey is referred to as the Ottoman Empire. The author refers to Italy as the "Italian states" or the official names used at the time by the states in that space.

Here, it would be wise to thank my friends and colleagues, without whom this book would never have come to fruition. Specifically, I would like to thank Miroslav Šedivý, in particular, who read through the original Czech version of the text patiently multiple times. Also, Lukáš Novotný supported this work and thoroughly commented on various passages. I would further like to thank Martin Boček for his helpful, valuable, and steadfast advice.

2 The July Revolution and the Structure of British and Austrian Foreign Policy

The summer of 1830 bore witness to many significant events whose consequences impacted politics in Britain and across Europe. The British king George IV died on 26 June 1830. He was succeeded by his younger brother, William IV. At the time, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, led a weak government that was reliant on the monarch's support. Despite this backing, it had to deal with several domestic, political, and international problems.¹ The Prime Minister was aware that the change of sovereignty meant that opposition voices were more powerful, but he continued to believe that his position was steadfast. In a letter to Robert Peel, 2nd Baronet, he wrote: "I should think that we do enjoy the respect and confidence of the country and that after the general election, we should have numbers."² This proved not to be the case. The government was markedly unpopular amongst the public, and it had many political opponents. The domestic political scene was divided into four main factions. Alongside the traditional Whigs and Tories, these were the group of Ultra-Tories and the so-called Canningites, of whom Palmerston was a member.³ By 1830, Palmerston was a somewhat secondary figure in British politics, despite having been a long-standing player on the scene and serving as Secretary at War from 1809 to 1828. The final phase of this period, during which he was a minister under George Canning in 1827, was significant in shaping his career.⁴ Although this government lasted only five months, Palmerston's handling of foreign affairs had a lasting impact on his future perspective on the European international environment.⁵

He had appreciated two things in particular about his predecessor. First, he dealt with foreign policy by differentiating between British interests and offering "inspiration" for other states through economic and military force. Second, he valued his vision, including courage and a new direction for British politics.⁶ He knew the need for cooperation with other Powers, keeping London a key player

1 STAHL, Andrea, *Metternich und Wellington. Eine Beziehungsgeschichte*, München 2013, p. 280.

2 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 107.

3 Although Palmerston was never truly a Canningite in the strict sense of the word. GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 25.

4 TEMPERLEY, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827. England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World*, London 1966, p. 231.

5 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 16.

6 BULLEN, Roger, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale*, London 1974, p. 1.

in European politics.⁷ He was inspired by Canning's speech in the British parliament, during which he had stated: "The Idea of establishing it [Constitutional government] in other countries by the force of the sword was too chimerical to be entertained. [. . .] Let us not, in the foolish spirit of romance, suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe. To those struggles it is not our duty to be parties."⁸ Some historiographers describe Palmerston as a pupil of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, but this needs to be corrected.⁹ Unlike his successor, this British Foreign Secretary respected the international order, played a significant role in its formation, and aimed to achieve a general understanding within the Concert of Europe. On the other hand, in his efforts to pursue his objectives, Palmerston did not hesitate to go against this system, even at the cost of its dissolution.¹⁰ Regarding political character, he was an opportunist and had an excellent sense of what the British public desired.¹¹

Following Canning's death, the Tory Party became deeply divided into a faction supporting a continuation of current policy and a faction opposing this. The latter group became dominant, and as such, the establishment of the Duke of Wellington's government in 1827 was followed by radical changes in British diplomacy.¹² London reassessed its position on the newly emerging Greece and the continuing Portuguese succession dispute. Palmerston strongly opposed the government's course, which resulted in his resignation and move to the opposition.¹³ In 1828–1830, he began to show more interest in international problems, and his opinion shifted to a more liberal political camp.¹⁴ A year before becoming Foreign Secretary, he gave a speech to the British Parliament in which he criticised the government's approach to internal political arrangements on the Iberian Peninsula. Although only a few members of Parliament listened to him, his speech resonated across the political spectrum in the British Isles.¹⁵ Not only did he call for

7 HANSARD, Thomas Curson (ed.), *The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time*, vol. XXII, London 1834, p. 80.

8 DIPPEL, Horst, *A Nineteenth-Century "Truman Doctrine" avant la lettre? Constitutional Liberty Abroad and the Parliamentary Debate about British Foreign Policy from Castlereagh to Palmerston*. In: GROTKÉ, Kelly, *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power*, Oxford 2014, p. 27.

9 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 10; SEAMAN, Lewis, *From Vienna to Versailles*, London 1955, p. 18.

10 DIPPEL, p. 47.

11 JUDD, *Palmerston*, p. 38.

12 STAHL, p. 278, GRÜNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 22.

13 BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 1.

14 Despite being considered a future minister, Palmerston had been primarily associated with roles related to financial matters rather than foreign policy until 1828.

15 SOUTHGATE, p. 2.

London's active involvement in Portugal and Greece, but he also accused the cabinet of supporting autocratic regimes across the English Channel.¹⁶

In terms of political affinity, Palmerston was a pragmatic Tory. In terms of diplomacy, he believed Great Britain should encourage constitutional regimes in Europe, bringing advantages to the countries and the whole continent. He claimed that conservative states suppressing natural developments in terms of liberal reforms were in danger of a permanent risk of revolution. The natural solution to deal with this threat was military intervention from outside. Not only did foreign intervention threaten British goals, but it also disturbed the European balance of power and lasting peace. In Palmerston's view of the world, reforms brought freedom and greater wealth, providing Great Britain, the most developed nation, with significant profit in the form of an increase in the trade balance. These opinions shifted Palmerston ideologically from the Tory camp to the Whigs.¹⁷

The stability of the various governments of the British Isles often depended on the political situation in Europe, which was also seen in the second half of 1830. As a result of the revolutionary battles taking place on 26–28 July in the Paris streets, Charles X's ultraconservative government, as represented by Prime Minister Jules Auguste Armand Marie, Count of Polignac, ended.¹⁸ These events went down in history as the July Revolution. The fate of the King of France's unpopular government was sealed upon issuing the Four Ordinances of Saint-Cloud. These decrees affected the rights of French citizens guaranteed by the Charter of 1814.¹⁹ His actions as head of the French government were a thorn in the side of the remaining Great Powers. According to many contemporaries, the revolution was the logical and inevitable outcome. Palmerston was also of this opinion. A year before the July events, he had visited France and concluded that if Polignac's policies did not change radically, the only possible solution was a change of the ruling system.²⁰

Reports of the outbreak of revolution in France nevertheless shocked Europe's courts. All of the Great Powers hesitated to take a clear position. Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were bound by international treaties arising from the 1815 Congress of Vienna and subsequently of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.²¹

¹⁶ BELL, vol. I, p. 84.

¹⁷ BULLEN, *Palmerston*, Guizot, p. 2.

¹⁸ FORTESCUE, William, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in France 1815–1852*, Oxford 1988, p. 34.

¹⁹ HONE, William (ed.), *Full Annals of the Revolution in France 1830*, London 1830, p. 9.

²⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 78.

²¹ NICOLSON, Harold, *The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity*, London 1946, p. 266.

These treaties declared that if a revolution occurred in France, the signatory countries should meet to agree on what to do next. It was a fact that none of the Powers wanted to get involved in a war with France. Russia's political representatives were divided in opinion. Emperor Nicholas I was discouraged by his diplomats from taking rash military action without securing support from the other participants in the Concert of Europe. Prussia responded by increasing its military readiness in the border regions and carefully monitoring how the situation in France developed. Nevertheless, it was not prepared to intervene alone. Austria contemplated intervention, but its economic situation prevented it from undertaking unilateral action.²²

The main decision lay on the shoulders of Great Britain. Despite the Duke of Wellington's government being generally seen as sympathetic to Polignac's regime, a schism developed in the cabinet, mainly due to Paris's foreign policy activities. Charles X trusted that success on the international scene would return to his government the popularity it had lost. As such, he decided to launch military operations on the Algerian coast, which led to the country's gradual occupation. The idea of a permanent French military base on the African coast was challenging for Great Britain to accept since the entire Mediterranean fell within the orbit of its primary interest.²³ Furthermore, the colonisation of Algeria disturbed the status quo, considering that France was the only country that could threaten Britain's naval dominance in the region.²⁴

Tense relations between London and Paris were further undermined by French diplomacy, which could not give an official reason for its military operation.²⁵ In a memorandum to Foreign Secretary George Hamilton-Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington wrote clear instructions:

We have demanded an official explanation. We have received a verbal one, which upon one point is so far unsatisfactory as that it states the intention of the French government to alter the nature of the tenure of its possession on the coast of Africa from being as heretofore a commercial factory to being hereafter a fortified post.²⁶

²² SKED, Alan, *Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918*, London 2001, p. 26.

²³ Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay, London, 31 May 1830, The National Archives (hereinafter referred to as TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter referred to as FO) 120/110.

²⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna 4 January 1830, Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter referred to as AT-OeStA/HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (hereinafter referred to as StAbt), England 191; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 424.

²⁵ WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 25.

²⁶ WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 25.

Threats from London did no good, with an expeditionary force disembarking in Algeria on 14 June 1830. British diplomacy came to terms with the occupation and did not undertake any counteraction.²⁷ Another unfortunate coincidence for London was the dangerous rapprochement between St Petersburg and Paris. The spectre of a Russo-French alliance represented a worst-case scenario for the Foreign Office.²⁸ Britain's response to the July Revolution reflected the French army's operation on the North African coast. Wellington's government was unwilling to intervene in support of Charles X and made its disinterest in French affairs very clear.²⁹ The Prime Minister wrote to his friend, Hugh Percy, Duke of Northumberland, about the revolution: "I confess that I cannot understand how an army of twenty thousand men [in arms] could have been beaten out of Paris, if disposed to do its duty."³⁰ The British government's hesitant and ambiguous policy regarding the July Revolution and Algerian occupation resulted in a domestic political schism, providing space for future reorganisation.

Palmerston was one of the greatest sympathisers of France's newly established July regime.³¹ He was convinced that the new king, Louis Philippe of Orléans, from a cadet branch of the House of Bourbon, would seek peace in Europe and national prosperity. The British politician did not doubt the necessity of establishing friendly relations between Paris and London as soon as possible. Furthermore, he believed that the revolution should not just break out in France but should be progressively reflected in the German Confederation, Italy, and Spain. His opinion is evidenced in the following words: "We shall drink to the cause of Liberalism all over the world. [. . .] Let Spain & Austria & Italy & Portugal & parts of Germany will sooner or later be affected. [. . .] The reign of Metternich is over."³² According to Palmerston, the July Revolution not only changed the ruling dynasty but also brought new opportunities for the entire Continent. Despite considering Charles X's foreign policy dangerous, he was naively convinced that the new French government would change its course.³³

27 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Rakousko a Východní otázka 1829–1841*, unpublished dissertation, Praha 2008, p. 62.

28 During this period, Russia and France negotiated to achieve a new international order in Europe. Revisionist desires in Paris were reflected in Polignac's memorandum, which included the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, this project was abandoned due to a lack of interest from Russia.

29 SVOBODA, Karel, *Autokrat a jeho doba. Rusko a revoluce v letech 1830–1831*, Praha 2016, p. 22.

30 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 137.

31 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

32 BROWN, Palmerston. *A Biography*, p. 143.

33 BELL, vol. I, p. 86.

As political circumstances indicated, the July Revolution directly resulted in the fall of the Duke of Wellington's government, which occurred in October 1830. The "Iron Duke" himself said of the matter: "However, we should still have been too strong for them if the French Revolution had not occurred at the very moment of the dissolution of Parliament."³⁴ In the autumn of 1830, Wellington was still trying to form a new government. He nominated Palmerston for a ministerial position, which he rejected.³⁵ Once the government failed to receive a vote of confidence, Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey, was tasked with appointing a new government. This represented a milestone in British politics. After more than twenty years, the Tories' political dominance was over. Grey initially offered Palmerston the post of Home Secretary, but in the end, Henry Vassall-Fox, Baron Holland, recommended him for the position of Foreign Secretary.³⁶ Britain's new Prime Minister agreed, and Palmerston greatly appreciated his nomination. He took up his new role on 22 November 1830. Aberdeen assured the Austrian ambassador in London, Pál Antal, Prince Esterházy, that "under the circumstances, the choice of Lord Palmerston for the portfolio of foreign affairs was the most favourable one we could expect."³⁷ Government cooperation between the Canningites and the Whigs was the logical outcome of the changes in British politics since the mid-1820s. They had more opinions in common than they had differences. Even so, areas of friction later surfaced, threatening Palmerston's government role.³⁸ During his active government period, the Foreign Secretary never became a full Whig member. In international matters, he was often criticised by the cabinet, and after an entire decade in office, a strong opposition built up against him, disagreeing with how he managed his position.³⁹

During his time in government in 1830–1841 (with a brief interlude during the winter of 1834–1835), Palmerston was surrounded by many able diplomats who made an indelible mark on British and global history of international relations. One of his key advisors was the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Backhouse. Another Under-Secretary was Sir George Shee, 2nd Baronet, who held the role between 1830 and 1834. When Palmerston returned to his role in 1835, the position was taken on by William Fox-Strangways, 4th Earl of Ilchester. In 1840, he was replaced by Granville Leveson-Gower, 2nd

34 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 383.

35 SUDLEY, Arthur Paul John (ed.), *The Lieven-Palmerston Correspondence 1828–1856*, London 1943, p. 19.

36 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 21.

37 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

38 BULLEN, *Palmerston*, Guizot, p. 3.

39 BELL, vol. I, p. 97.

Earl Granville, who later became Foreign Secretary. One of the most important ambassadors of this era was John Ponsonby, Great Britain's representative in the Ottoman Empire. He replaced Robert Gordon in 1831 and remained in the role until 1841. His First Secretary from 1835 was the infamous David Urquhart, and together with Ponsonby, they had a significant influence on British policy in the Eastern Question. When Palmerston took up his role, the 2nd Earl Granville's father, Granville Leveson-Gower, 1st Earl Granville, was the ambassador to France. Arthur Aston became Secretary to the Embassy in Paris in 1833 and replaced in 1839 by Palmerston's biographer, Henry Lytton Bulwer. William Russell was in Berlin. The diplomatic mission in St Petersburg was problematic. After 1832, Palmerston could not find a suitable replacement for the Tory William à Court, 1st Baron Heytesbury. His nomination of the leading nineteenth century British diplomat, Stratford Canning, was rejected by the Emperor, and as such, he eventually appointed John Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham, to the open position.⁴⁰

In Vienna, Frederick Lamb, Baron Beauvale (from 1839), served as the British ambassador between 1832 and 1841.⁴¹ Lamb was one of the ablest diplomats of his time. As is evidenced in his private correspondence, he had a close relationship with Palmerston. He was the brother of Lady Emily Cowper, Palmerston's romantic partner of many years and later his wife, and the brother of the future British Prime Minister, William Lamb, Viscount Melbourne. His good relations with Metternich, whom he admired, were important in terms of Anglo-Austrian diplomacy.⁴² He used his position to strive for the warmest possible relations between London and Vienna.⁴³ He did not always receive Palmerston's or Metternich's unconditional diplomatic support and often conflicted with both men. From a political perspective, he could interpret and explain the Austrian Chancellor's positions to the British Foreign Secretary and highlight both states' shared international political interests. Over his entire career, he strived to break down the Foreign Secretary's distrust of the Austrian Chancellor and establish closer Anglo-Austrian relations.⁴⁴

At the start of Palmerston's tenure as Foreign Secretary, the main guarantee of European security was the cooperation of all Great Powers. However, during his time in the cabinet, this idea faded away, with acting in one's own interest and calculating cooperation with France taking precedence for him.⁴⁵ Thus, Great

40 RAYMON, Jones, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1815–1914*, Waterloo 1983, p. 42.

41 Following the death of his brother, he became 3rd Viscount Melbourne in 1848.

42 WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 7.

43 GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 21.

44 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 September 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

45 SKED, Alan, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation*, Basingstoke 2007, p. 67.

Britain pursued its national interests and sought support from foreign powers only when it could derive tangible benefits from such an alliance.⁴⁶ The British Foreign Secretary was steadfast in this policy. Although many have called him a leading figure of European liberalism, he often acted out of self-interest and offensively, regardless of whether it involved a constitutional or absolutist state. He advocated for a balance of power and peace, but to achieve this, he acted selfishly and contrary to his beliefs. Where he could not achieve his goals through diplomatic means, using force was an alternative solution for him, as his following words confirm: “Diplomats and protocols are very good things, but there are no better peace-keepers than well-appointed three-deckers.”⁴⁷ Even so, such a policy could not be pursued alone, and as such, Great Britain saw France as its main partner since the two states were closest ideologically.

The newly elected Whig cabinet was immediately aware of these facts and began diplomatic discussions with Paris. The expression “*entente cordiale*” is used for this period of Anglo-French rapprochement, and Palmerston was one of the first to use it.⁴⁸ From an ideological perspective France was the ideal partner for Great Britain, as similar political regimes determined their moral positions. As in London, public opinion played a crucial role in Paris, being a “hidden” driver in both countries. Even with the new liberal regime, the still strong revisionist sentiment did not change in France. This factor was also reflected in its foreign policy objectives and clashed with British and Austrian plans. Although relations with Paris were warm, London’s international policy still focused on containing France, with mutual cooperation seen as the best way to achieve this. At the same time, the two states competed for spheres of influence worldwide, and their relations were far from ideal.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, London and Paris reached an agreement in terms of international law. A non-intervention policy represented the cornerstone of diplomacy for both powers. This ideology was based on the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Canning came up with this claim as Foreign Secretary, and Palmerston took over where he left off. Eight months before joining the government, in March 1830, he had made a speech in the British Parliament about the matter. In it, he had declared the use of force as the only unacceptable form of intervention. Any other form, such as diplomatic assistance, was not against British principles. In fact, the line between intervention and non-

46 BULLEN, Roger, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, p. 123.

47 JUDD, Palmerston, p. 45.

48 WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 4.

49 EDWARDS, William, *British Foreign Policy 1815–1933*, London 1934, p. 3.

intervention was so slim that there were regular clashes in the British Parliament over what these terms actually meant. The Foreign Secretary later declared: "I maintain, on the contrary, that their alleged principle of neutrality and non-interference has only been a cloak, under cover of which they have given effectual assistance to that party, whom they secretly favoured."⁵⁰ During the 1830s, this doctrine of Great Britain was bent several times, and its interpretation was far from clear.⁵¹ There were even differences of opinion within the British cabinet on its interpretation. In diplomatic practice, Palmerston exploited this principle to pursue his objectives of power and implemented it as he saw fit on some international issues.⁵² France took a similar approach. Louis Philippe's government did not hesitate to breach the "European legal order" to achieve its national interests, and like London, it utilised its interpretation for its benefit.⁵³

Austria had different political motives than Britain. Metternich had held the post of Foreign Minister since 1809 and was appointed Chancellor in 1821 by Emperor Francis I. Following Napoleon's defeat, Great Britain was Austria's principal partner, and they pursued shared objectives. It was only when Canning arrived as Foreign Secretary in 1822 that a fundamental schism appeared between the two powers.⁵⁴ Metternich said the following:

Mr Canning's administration has gone down in the history of England and Europe. We must consider the short duration of [Canning's] government as equivalent to the league which drew us away from the right and practical old order to the politics of fantasy, which shall bring France to 1789 in a few years.⁵⁵

The Ballhausplatz's foreign policy was based on eliminating conspiratorial movements on the Continent, which the Prince saw as a means of disturbing the peace and causing permanent instability.⁵⁶ He believed that only a working international system would protect all governments against the common enemy, revolution, which could only result in chaos.⁵⁷ For Metternich, Europe was the embodi-

50 Palmerston's speech at the British Parliament, London, 10 March 1830, HANSARD, vol. XXII, pp. 80–81.

51 DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, Anselm, *Von Wiener Kongress zur Pariser Konferenz. England, die deutsche Frage und das Mächtesystem 1815–1856*, Göttingen 1991, p. 68.

52 SATTLER, Gertrude, *Lord Palmerston und Österreich*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1949, p. 3.

53 DIPPEL, p. 36.

54 SKED, *Decline*, p. 28.

55 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 August 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

56 ROHL, Eva-Renate, *Metternich und England: Studien zum Urteil des Staatskanzlers über eine konstitutionelle Monarchie*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1973, p. 141.

57 HALL, John Major, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, London 1916, p. 19.

ment of a social and political order that needed to be defended by shared forces.⁵⁸ The Great Powers represented protectors of general security, and their task was to suppress any threats to the prevailing international system without compromise.⁵⁹ During his time in diplomatic service, the Austrian Chancellor was consistent in his opinions and, in contrast to Palmerston, sought cooperation on a Europe-wide basis. He aimed for the fruit of his policy to be not just stability for Austria but stability for the entire Continent.

The policy of non-intervention, in Metternich's view, represented a disruption to the system that ensured the preservation of European order. If any of the smaller states asked via its legitimate representative for help from one of the Great Powers, it was the duty of every member of the Concert to offer their support.⁶⁰ This differing understanding of this core international political problem between Austria and Great Britain was significant throughout the 1830s and shaped their distinct approaches to the issues of the time. The British Foreign Secretary and the Austrian Chancellor were representatives of different ideological schools, and they differed in their understanding and pursuit of European diplomacy.⁶¹ Metternich considered Palmerston a: "Mouthpiece of the revolutionary propaganda."⁶² In his opinion, his policies were responsible for the destruction of the continental law. Under his leadership, British diplomacy acted only out of calculation and did not respect the social order.⁶³ The two politicians agreed that the system of the Concert of Europe should be preserved by holding international conferences. Despite this, they differed in their perception of what these meetings should be for and where they should be centred. For Metternich, Vienna was the natural centre, and this related to his desire to return Austria to the prestige it lost after 1822.⁶⁴ Palmerston proposed London for this purpose.⁶⁵ This rivalry was just one more point of friction that became apparent between the two statesmen.

Although only thirteen years apart, both diplomats reflected different eras. Metternich's opinions were influenced by the 1789 revolutionary events in France and the later Jacobin Reign of Terror.⁶⁶ Palmerston was nine years old at the time and lived in the relatively peaceful British Isles. The Austrian Chancellor played a

⁵⁸ DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, p. 66.

⁵⁹ SKED, *Decline*, p. 28.

⁶⁰ SKED, *Metternich and Austria*, p. 88.

⁶¹ ROHL, p. 140.

⁶² SIEMANN, Wolfram, *Metternich's Britain*. In: GESTRICH, Andreas (ed.), German Historical Institute. The 2011 Annual Lecture, London 2012, p. 23.

⁶³ SIEMANN, *Metternich's Britain*, p. 24.

⁶⁴ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 April 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

⁶⁵ WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ ROHL, p. 141.

crucial role at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, while Palmerston was more of a marginal figure in British politics. These facts painted different pictures for these two key figures of European policy in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁶⁷

The Austrian Chancellor's view of the British Isles was far less critical prior to 1830 than afterwards. The experience of the British political regime was essential for forming his political opinions. A young Metternich undertook his first visit to the British Isles in 1794. He regularly attended sessions of the British Parliament, making contact with leading political figures of the time, such as William Pitt the Younger. British politician and philosopher Edmund Burke markedly influenced his opinions, Metternich having come across his ideas in London. According to him, the ideal system of government was one in which the sovereign held all power and was surrounded only by advisors. He did not believe in the concept of a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy, with Great Britain the only exception. He also supposed that the British political system, having been tested over centuries, provided a guarantee of internal stability. This opinion led to his stance on Europe's newly emerging constitutional regimes.⁶⁸ For Metternich, Britain represented a guarantee of a lasting balance of power, and he believed that its political motives prior to 1830 aligned closely with those of Austria.⁶⁹

Even at the start of the 1830s, relations between London and Vienna were relatively good. Both states were distrustful of France for different reasons.⁷⁰ Metternich tried to discourage Polignac from his Algerian campaign in the interest of preserving the status quo.⁷¹ He realised that the project would lead to the disruption of already fragile relations between Great Britain and France, and he also foresaw a deteriorating domestic political situation within France if the campaign were to fail. Although the French presence did not fundamentally impact Austrian interests in North Africa, the intervention was against Metternich's interna-

⁶⁷ SIEMANN, *Metternich's Britain*, p. 25.

⁶⁸ On the other hand, Metternich demonstrated a degree of tolerance for constitutional monarchies beyond Austria accepted constitutional systems in certain cases, particularly in France, Norway-Sweden after 1814, and some German states. Metternich's acceptance of these systems largely depended on how restrictive their constitutions were rather than opposition to constitutional monarchy itself. However, Britain stood as a significant exception to his general aversion to parliamentary rule, illustrating a nuanced approach to different forms of governance within Europe. He harboured a general suspicion of parliamentary systems, particularly those that could foster increased democratic participation and potentially destabilise the established political order.

⁶⁹ SIEMANN, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär*, p. 132.

⁷⁰ BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 4.

⁷¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 10 June 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 272.

tional political principles since it affected the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. It could also arouse a serious quarrel, especially between Great Britain and France, that would lead to increased tensions within Europe. The Austrian Chancellor hoped for a traditional resolution of the situation via diplomacy, with cooperation with London.⁷² Once it was evident that French intervention was inevitable, Vienna began actively supporting Britain. The only agent with the means to prevent the French expedition was the government in London. But Wellington's cabinet policy lacked strength in this case. Despite Austrian help, it was the passive approach of Aberdeen and Wellington that enabled France to occupy Algeria.⁷³

When the revolution broke out in Paris, Metternich was at his summer residence in Königswart (Kynžvart), West Bohemia. By chance, Russian Vice-Chancellor Karl Robert, Count von Nesselrode, was staying in Carlsbad (Karlový Vary) for his health. At a joint meeting on 5 August 1830, the two statesmen agreed not to interfere in Paris's domestic political affairs on the condition that the revolution did not spread beyond the French borders.⁷⁴ They are reported to have acknowledged Louis Philippe's legitimacy if he undertook to maintain the order set out at the Congress of Vienna.⁷⁵ Nesselrode acted of his own volition in this regard since he had not received any official instructions from St Petersburg.⁷⁶

Austro-Russian relations were tense at that time, and Metternich attempted to exploit his meeting with Nesselrode to restore the long history of cooperation between the two Eastern Powers. Russia's Vice-Chancellor was more cautious. One of the Austrian Chancellor's ideas, for example, was that a joint diplomatic centre be established in Berlin in case the revolution spread across the Continent. Nesselrode rejected the idea. His rational arguments were first that it was illogical to arrange a diplomatic gathering whose objective was to wait and see whether the disorder would spread through Europe. Secondly, he disagreed that the centre of discussions should be in the alternatively suggested Vienna. He thought the ideal venue for such an event was London.⁷⁷ Despite this, the meeting in Carlsbad

72 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 January 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 189.

73 TEMPERLEY, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 61.

74 SIEMANN, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär*, p. 769.

75 Cowley to Palmerston, 19 December 1830, TNA, FO 7/223.

76 Metternich to Nesselrode, Vienna, 11 August 1830, NESSELRODE, Anatole (ed.), *Lettres et papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850*, vol. VII, Paris 1908, p. 147; SVOBODA, p. 27.

77 SVOBODA, p. 28.

sketched out the future direction of cooperation between Vienna and St Petersburg for the entire subsequent decade.⁷⁸

In reality, Metternich was the only statesman who responded swiftly to the revolutionary situation and did not remain a passive observer. He travelled from Carlsbad to the Austrian capital to inform Emperor Francis I of the discussion. Louis Philippe's envoy, General Augustin Daniel Belliard, was awaiting him in the Hofburg, his mission being to inform the Austrian monarch of the new King of the French's interests. His letter to Francis I stated that Louis Philippe would strive to achieve peace both at home and beyond France's borders. In his response, the Austrian Emperor assured the French King that he did not want to take any action against a country which sought peace in Europe.⁷⁹

Metternich was not particularly enthusiastic about the situation. In his opinion, the Orléans regime was not likely to last for long and was doomed to collapse. He was also convinced of the end of the old Europe, which would be racked with rebellion.⁸⁰ The centre of revolution would be Paris, from where the entire network of insurgency would be directed. The Chancellor remained convinced throughout his political career that the French capital was a haven for all conspirators across Europe.⁸¹ His greatest concern was the collapse of the monarchy and the spread of revolution across Europe. Metternich did not think Charles X's resignation was a disaster, but the election of Louis Philippe only increased his consistent animosity towards France.⁸² Nonetheless, Metternich had certain diplomatic levers he could use against Louis Philippe in an emergency. Wolfram Siemann made this clear by finding that Metternich had copies of a letter incriminating Louis Philippe for wanting to join the Austrian side in the fight against revolutionary France and Napoleon.⁸³

Despite Tsar Nicholas I's stubborn refusal to recognise Louis Philippe as King, the desire to maintain peace and the current international order prevailed in Europe. As a result, other countries quickly moved to recognise the new regime. This conviction was supported by the French King's declaration, in which he portrayed himself as an ardent conservative and supporter of the Vienna order. Great Britain was the first to officially recognise Louis Philippe's regime, with

78 SIEMANN, *Metternich. Stratege und Visionär*, p. 766; BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Peace, War and the European Powers 1814–1914*, London 1996, p. 30.

79 HALL, p. 21.

80 Metternich to Emperor Francis I, Königswart, 31 July 1831, METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 18.

81 SVOBODA, p. 33.

82 ŠEDIVÝ, *Rakousko a Východní otázka*, p. 73.

83 SIEMANN, *Metternich. Stratege und Visionär*, s. 661.

other Powers following later. Russia formally (*de jure*) acknowledged the regime on 18 September 1831.⁸⁴ However, the persistent tension between St Petersburg and Paris continued throughout the 1830s, affecting the workings of the Concert of Europe.

The Austrian Chancellor had the final word on the conduct of the Habsburg Monarchy's foreign policy. He said of cooperation with the Emperor: "Heaven has placed me next to a man who might have been created for me as I for him. The Emperor Francis knows what he wants, which never differs from what I want most."⁸⁵ In fact, he was almost unrestricted in diplomatic matters and had the Emperor's full support. However, from a domestic political perspective, Franz Anton von Kolowrat, who held significant influence over the Empire's financial affairs, was a formidable rival. As a result, Metternich often had to seek compromises to appease the court chamberlain and align his international political interests with internal pressures. Like Palmerston, Metternich could rely on experienced diplomats. Pál Antal, Prince Esterházy, was the Austrian ambassador in London, but due to various political and personal difficulties, he was often outside Great Britain. Like Lamb, he endeavoured to bring his Foreign Secretary's stances closer to his British counterpart. Baron Philipp von Neumann and Baron Karl von Hummelauer were subordinates who had far less influence on Metternich and foreign affairs than their superiors.⁸⁶ Since London often played a crucial role in European matters during the 1830s, the Austrian Chancellor instead had to rely on the reports of his diplomats. The actual state of affairs or the interpretation itself was often misinterpreted, limiting him in making important decisions.

Metternich's concern regarding the spread of revolution and Palmerston's conviction that events in France would impact surrounding European countries soon proved justified. A month after the July events, Belgian citizens in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands took to the streets to express their disagreement with the rule of King William I. Thus, Europe found itself again facing a revolution, and it was up to the Powers, headed by the new British Foreign Secretary, to take up a stance and try to maintain peace on the Continent. In the following diplomatic battle, both politicians found themselves with opposing positions and advocating different approaches.

⁸⁴ SVOBODA, p. 29.

⁸⁵ SKED, *Decline*, p. 23.

⁸⁶ Although Neumann's diplomatic role increased significantly during the 1830s.

3 The Establishment of an Independent Belgium

The United Kingdom of the Netherlands had established itself as a new country in 1815. At the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain promoted the creation of a buffer state between France and Prussia.¹ Unifying the Netherlands and Belgium was the ideal solution. As Castlereagh said to the Belgians during the Congress of Vienna: “In order to be free, you must be strong. In order to be strong, you must be part of a larger system. That system shall be union with Holland.”² Britain’s main intention in 1814 was to create an effective barrier against France. The new kingdom was to be strong enough to resist aggression from Paris. Thus, the permanent union of this territory represented the cornerstone of British diplomacy. This political doctrine lasted until Palmerston became Foreign Secretary.³

The causes of the Belgian Revolution of 1830 can be found in the origins of the emerging union of the two states.⁴ Prince William of the House of Orange-Nassau was the head of the union, ruling as William I. European historiography often differs in perspective on the first and only King of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.⁵ In his uncompromising pursuit of policies, he often acted like a typical absolutist monarch, disregarding his subjects’ social and political appeals.⁶

The new state’s constitution involved the establishment of the States General, which comprised two chambers. The first chamber consisted of representatives appointed by the king with a life mandate. Members of regional states were elected to the second chamber. The main problem here was the division of seats, with two and a half million Dutch having the same number of seats as three and a half million Belgians. Another contentious issue was the division of the national debt on a one-to-one basis because the Dutch debt was 12 times higher than the Belgian debt before 1815. William I could only push through the adoption of the constitution through vote manipulation and the violation of voting rights.⁷ A backlash arose against the King’s actions, mainly from Belgian city dwellers and members of the Church. Catholic priests refused to give communion to officials who agreed with the new constitution. Another demand was unlimited control of

1 NICOLSON, p. 208.

2 HULICIUS, Eduard, *Belgie*, Prague 2006, p. 115.

3 CHURCH, Clive, *Europe in 1830. Revolution and Political Change*, London 1983, p. 183.

4 VANDERBOSCH, Amry, *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815. A Study in Small Power Politics*, The Hague 1959, p. 54.

5 SCHROEDER, Paul W., *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, Oxford 1994, p. 671.

6 CHAMBERLAIN, p. 46.

7 The Belgians rejected the draft constitution at 796 to 527 votes.

the Belgian education system.⁸ In response, the King reduced the number of Church schools in 1824. Tensions between the King and the government, on the one hand, and the Belgian clergy, on the other, persisted throughout the union's existence.⁹

In addition to the Dutch advantage in the States General, they also had more people in the state administration, diplomatic service, and army.¹⁰ Dutch was to be the only official language of the new union.¹¹ William's measures united Belgian opposition groupings into a shared camp. The objective of the union of liberals and conservatives represented by the clergy was the abolition of censorship, equal rights for Belgians, and the adoption of liberal reforms. The united movement was set up in 1828 and was named Unionism.¹²

In addition to the dissatisfaction of the Belgians with their disadvantageous status within the shared state, the great crop failure of 1829–1830 caused by severe frost also played a role in the start of the uprising. A lack of food manifested in the growing radicalisation of the population. However, the immediate trigger for the revolt was the July Revolution. When civil servants travelled to Brussels in August 1830 for William I's birthday celebrations, they saw posters on the walls stating: "Monday: Fireworks. Tuesday: Illuminations. Wednesday: Revolution."¹³ A day later, the Belgians took to the streets and began the revolution to liberate themselves from Dutch rule. Although initially it was a rebellion mainly of the working class, the revolutionary movement progressively spread throughout Belgian society.¹⁴ The Belgians' primary goal was administrative autonomy, but the insurmountable differences between the two nations meant they eventually needed their own state.¹⁵

In Great Britain, the events in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands were taken relatively calmly. Wellington's cabinet did not hide its sympathy for William I and trusted that the situation would soon settle down for him. Metternich was naturally on the side of the Dutch. For him, it was a rebellion against the

8 SCHROEDER, Paul, *Systems, Stability, Statecraft*, New York 2004, p. 47.

9 ARBLASTER, Paul, *A History of Low Countries*, Houndmills 2006, p. 178.

10 DEMOULIN, Robert, *Guillaume Ier et la transformation économique des Provinces Belges*, Liege 1938, p. 358.

11 CRAIG, Gordon Alexander, *Geschichte Europas 1815–1980. Vom Wiener Kongreß bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1995, p. 35.

12 HULICIUS, p. 125.

13 ŠUSTA, Josef, *Dějiny Evropy v letech 1812–1870*, vol. I, Prague 1922, p. 221.

14 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 27 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

15 SCHROEDER, *The Transformation*, p. 672.

legitimate ruler and a disturbance to the prevailing international order.¹⁶ London and Vienna turned their gaze uneasily to France.¹⁷ France perceived the events in their neighbouring country as the first step towards destroying the European system of 1815.¹⁸ The collapse of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands would mean the breach of the buffer zone around France and a significant tear in the post-Napoleonic international system.¹⁹

Another player whose situation was directly affected was Prussia. Fearing the discontent might spread to his land, King Frederick William III moved his troops to the border with Belgium. William I even asked the Prussian King for military help, but Frederick William III waited for London to grant its approval.²⁰ Fear of Prussian intervention aroused a response in Paris.²¹ French Foreign Minister Louis-Mathieu Molé cited the non-intervention policy.²² The proclamation of this principle, in fact, meant the French would retaliate in the event of Prussian intervention in favour of William I.²³ Nevertheless, Great Britain would have the final word, mainly because the rest of the Great Powers, namely Russia and Austria, had no direct ambitions regarding the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and their roles in this case were limited.²⁴ Over this entire period, Metternich exploited the Belgian Question to put pressure on Great Britain to pursue its policy in the Papal States, which will be examined in Chapter 5, “*Crisis on the Italian Peninsula and the Final Split*.” By contrast, Russia was fully committed to suppressing the uprising in Congress Poland from December 1830. Although Nicholas’s animosity towards the Orléans regime continued to grow, without Prussian support, he had limited options, and essentially none following the outbreak of the November Uprising.²⁵

16 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 26 October 1830 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

17 VANDERBOSCH, p. 55.

18 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 26 October 1830 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

19 PRICE, Munro, *The Perilous Crown. France Between Revolutions 1814–1848*, Oxford 2007, p. 215.

20 SETON-WATSON, Robert William, *Britain in Europe 1789–1914*, Cambridge 1937, p. 156.

21 PINKNEY, David, *The French Revolution of 1830*, Princeton 1972, p. 334.

22 RENDALL, Matthew, *A Qualified Success for Collective Security: The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis 1831*. In: *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18, 2007, p. 275.

23 MOWAT, Robert, *A History of European Diplomacy 1815–1914*, New York 1931, p. 71.

24 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 97.

25 Memorandum Upon the Proposed Conference Upon the Affairs of Belgium, WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 385.

Meanwhile, the situation in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands advanced rapidly. By 27 October 1830, the Belgians controlled all of Belgium except for the fortresses of Maastricht, Luxembourg, and Antwerp.²⁶ Displeased with the situation, William I called for the Powers to intervene in his favour. Yet, none of the Powers dared to act, and together, they rejected the option. Instead, they agreed upon a diplomatic solution. The outcome was the convening of an international conference in London.²⁷ As in the case of the July Revolution, Nicholas I aimed for a diplomatic meeting in London. Metternich welcomed his proposal, but he continued to believe that Vienna should be the venue. Over time, the Austrian Chancellor's opinion on the conference changed.²⁸ He did not understand the objective of the London discussions: whether it was to legitimise a policy of intervention, act as a mediator between two parties in conflict, or perhaps withdraw from the position of arbitrator.²⁹

Palmerston, as a representative of the organising state, chaired the conference. Regarding the other participants, Russia sent its representatives to London, including Ambassador Khristofor Andreyevich von Lieven and Ambassador Plenipotentiary Adam Matuszewicz.³⁰ Heinrich von Bülow represented Prussia, while Johann von Wessenberg and Pál Esterházy represented Austria. Metternich had a rather complicated relationship with Wessenberg.³¹ The Austrian envoy often did not respect Metternich's instructions from Vienna, which the Chancellor naturally took badly. In mid-1831, Metternich threatened him with dismissal, a move only halted through British intervention. France was represented by its ambassador, the experienced diplomat and former Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord.³²

Palmerston's aim was not to undermine the Vienna system. Like his predecessors, his initial primary objective was to preserve the peace. He knew that should Prussia or France intervene, Europe would once again stand on the brink of a

26 WARD, Adolphus William, GOOCH, George Peabody, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919*, Cambridge 1923, p. 125.

27 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 October 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190; WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 9.

28 BARTLETT, *Peace, War*, p. 31.

29 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 107.

30 MOWAT, p. 71.

31 HELMREICH, Jonathan, *Belgium and Europe. A Study in Small Power Diplomacy*, The Hague 1976, p. 15.

32 LINGELBACH, Erza William, *Belgian Neutrality. Its Origin and Interpretation*. In: *The American Historical Review* 39, 1933, 1, p. 50.

general war. Ponsonby,³³ who was envoy in Brussels from December 1830, warned of Paris's warmongering:

The French democratic party may have more direct force than the republicans and will certainly be ready to join with them in any attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the country. That party looks to war as the means through which to attain its end: an integration [of Belgium] with France. It depends mainly upon the possible success of the position in France as opposed to Louis Philippe for the gratification of its wishes and this connection of interest.³⁴

London's political interest in the case of Belgium was equal to that of the European level. What Palmerston did for the Belgians, he also did for Great Britain. The effort to achieve an independent Belgium also meant guaranteeing security for the British.³⁵ Last but not least, the driving force was not a desire to pursue the values of liberalism but rather to keep France contained. For Metternich, the main enemy was the revolution itself. In his opinion, peace in Europe could only be secured when the balance of power and the current order were preserved. Since the Belgians opposed the legitimate monarch, the Austrian Chancellor did not doubt that the Dutch King was on the right side. Clearly, he was unable to agree to anything forced through by revolution.³⁶

Problems with the conference manifested themselves right from the beginning. William I had hoped that he would be sitting at the negotiating table as an equal member alongside representatives of the European Powers, but this did not occur. Instead, he had very limited opportunities to take part in discussions. The conference shortly declared that both parties to the conflict should end hostilities and preserve the status quo. This was positive news for the Belgians, as it effectively acknowledged them as a warring party. The Belgian delegation had thus acquired equal status at the negotiations. Full of confidence, on 22 November 1830, they announced to the National Congress the end of the rule of the House of Orange-Nassau on the Belgian throne. William's conviction that the crisis would resolve itself quickly faded. From a British perspective, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands had not been created as a reward for the House of Orange, as the

³³ Ponsonby was in Belgium from 7 December 1830, to 11 June 1831. BINDOFF, Stanley Thomas, SMITH, Malcom, WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1789–1852*, London 1934, p. 137.

³⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, a copy of a dispatch from Ponsonby to Palmerston, London, 30 November 1830, 2 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

³⁵ DUMONT, Georges-Henry, *Histoire des Belges. Des Origines à la Dislocation des 17 Provinces*, Bruxelles 1954, p. 32.

³⁶ SOUTHGATE, p. 28.

Dutch King believed, but from a higher principle: to ensure war with France was not repeated by surrounding it with strong sovereign states.³⁷

Metternich considered William I's dethronement to be a major rift in the European system of the time and a challenge to the Vienna Treaties.³⁸ The Eastern courts began justifiably to suspect Paris of intending to intervene in Belgium's favour and attempting to expand its territory. The French press spoke of war with Russia, and the government voted to increase the size of its armed forces.³⁹ The situation reached a head. A sudden turning point in events came with the previously mentioned uprising of the Poles against the Tsar's rule, which occurred on 29 November 1830. Nicholas I's hands were suddenly tied regarding Belgium. Russian policy was constrained by the strict mandate given to its representatives at the conference, who had to follow their Emperor's instructions closely.⁴⁰ The events in Poland, which restricted his ability to act, directly impacted Metternich, leaving him isolated on the Belgian issue and no longer able to rely on Russian support in pursuing a shared policy.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Palmerston's vigilance concerning France increased.⁴² Reports on the expansion of the French army, alongside the weakness of the Eastern Powers and the hopeless situation for the Dutch King, led the British Foreign Secretary to take action to prevent Belgium from falling into French hands.⁴³ On 20 December 1830, a protocol was signed at the conference approving the division of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and declaring its interest in forming an independent Belgium.⁴⁴ Brussels was to send its representative, Sylvain Van de Weyer, to the conference. In addition to keeping the peace in Europe, Belgian independence was crucial for stabilising the situation in France. If Palmerston had not taken such a straightforward step, the prevailing situation might have radicalised the situation in Paris, only contributing towards a higher risk of war. European conflict gave France space to revise the Vienna arrangements. As such, Palmerston's principal motivation was to secure Belgium's stability and independence while also pursuing British national interests.⁴⁵ The spirit of the Vienna system was

³⁷ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 148.

³⁸ SCHROEDER, *Systems, Stability, Statecraft*, p. 50.

³⁹ WARD, GOOCH, p. 131.

⁴⁰ SVOBODA, p. 54.

⁴¹ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 158.

⁴² TROLLOPE, p. 51.

⁴³ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 151.

⁴⁴ Protocol No. 7, *Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics and the Literature for the Years 1831*, London 1832, p. 361.

⁴⁵ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 148.

to be preserved in general guarantees for the newly established state.⁴⁶ For Metternich, creating an independent Belgium was a significant diplomatic error. During the entire conference, he tried to exploit distrust between Great Britain and France to disrupt their cooperation. An isolated France would not be able to pursue its aggressive policy, and Great Britain would have to focus more on Austria, bringing support for Habsburg interests in Europe.⁴⁷

The 20 December 1830 Protocol did not mark the end of the Belgian Question but rather its beginning. Palmerston was confronted with various issues emerging from Belgian independence, such as establishing new borders, installing a new ruling dynasty, dividing up shared debt, free trade, and the fate of military fortresses.⁴⁸ Luxembourg's future was a separate chapter. Since the Congress of Vienna, it had been the private property of the Dutch King and a member of the German Confederation.⁴⁹ Palmerston assigned this task to Ponsonby, who informed London that a large section of the Belgian public was still calling for the selection of the young Prince of Orange. The British Foreign Secretary was concerned that France might come up with its own candidate. In an attempt to secure the Prince's support, he agreed to the Grand Duchy's transfer to Belgian administration. Ponsonby urged the Prince to get his father's consent and secure his enthronement.⁵⁰

Talleyrand found out about Britain's intentions towards Luxembourg and condemned them harshly. He even proposed that the region come under French rule or that France be compensated with Belgian territory. Talleyrand's ideas forced Palmerston to declare Belgium a neutral state under international law so that it could remain outside Paris's influence as a sovereign state.⁵¹ He presented this proposal at a conference session on 20 January 1831. Discussions on Belgian neutrality stretched into the late night. The principal critic, predictably, was the French representative, who demanded that Belgium first be formed on a confederation basis, after which territorial compensation could be claimed for France in exchange for agreement to Palmerston's proposal.⁵² According to Talleyrand, compensation for Belgium's lost territory could be found on the Rhine. Palmerston explained to him, without commitment, that Anglo-French relations were not based on conquest and interventions. London could not allow the expansion

⁴⁶ SOUTHGATE, p. 32.

⁴⁷ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 154.

⁴⁸ TROLLOPE, p. 50.

⁴⁹ RIDLEY, p. 128.

⁵⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 123.

⁵¹ LINGELBACH, p. 51.

⁵² DUMONT, p. 34.

of Louis Philippe's territory towards the English Channel, as this would threaten Britain's trade interests and dangerously enhance France's position as a Great Power.⁵³

In the end, the Foreign Secretary's intransigence won out. He knew that Louis Philippe's foreign policy depended on good relations with Great Britain, so France had no option but to accede to London's conditions.⁵⁴ The Orléans regime would be isolated internationally if Great Britain stopped cooperating with France. Palmerston's tactic – limiting through cooperation – was to become typical for his entire period at the Foreign Office. At various points, both the government in Paris and the Eastern Powers entertained the idea of dividing up Belgian territory. Hence, the Foreign Secretary exploited their conflicts and kept all the players in check. Britain itself was not interested in dividing up the land, and from a national political perspective, a status of independence suited it. Strategically, the land was crucially important, as Antwerp was "the pistol pointed at the heart of Britain."⁵⁵ For this geopolitical reason, Belgium's future arrangements were to play a security role for London.

French aggression was leverage on the Dutch, and the antipathy between the Orléans regime and the Eastern Powers was a means to gain Louis Philippe's support. Austria would not tolerate Paris gaining even an inch of Belgian land, and the other two Eastern courts shared this view.⁵⁶ These facts gave Palmerston an enormous diplomatic advantage.⁵⁷ Rather than being a staunch idealist and convinced pioneer of liberalism, Palmerston was more of a pragmatic politician who cared about the prosperity and success of his own country, which depended on maintaining international order and European peace so Great Britain could benefit the most.⁵⁸

A plan of Eighteen Articles entitled Bases of Separation (*Bases de Séparation*) was approved at the conference on 20 January 1831. These articles defined the method of Dutch-Belgian separation. It was a de facto expansion of the previously adopted Protocol No. 7, approved in November 1830.⁵⁹ One crucial point was the article on the future border between the two states, which was drawn to be more

53 SOUTHGATE, p. 30; ABBENHUIS, Maartje, *An Age of Neutrals 1815–1914*, Cambridge 2014, p. 55.

54 No. 11, Protocole de la Conference Tenue au Foreign Office, le 20 Janvier 1830, *Protocols of Conferences of London. Relative to Affairs of Belgium 1830–1831*, London 1832, p. 39.

55 SOUTHGATE, p. 30.

56 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 14 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 193.

57 SOUTHGATE, p. 31.

58 BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 153.

59 Ibid., p. 150.

advantageous for William I. According to the proposal, Maastricht and Luxembourg were to go to the Dutch King.⁶⁰ Belgium was to be compensated through a modification to the clause on the free use of international rivers of 1815.⁶¹ The protocol consequently outlined principles of self-determination and opened the path to international guarantees. France was the focus of the protocol, as evidenced by Palmerston's words: "France was not to get even a cabbage garden or a vineyard."⁶² While the conference discussed settling new borders, dividing up shared debt, and the future of fortresses, the question of what status France was to hold in the Concert of Europe remained in the background.⁶³

At this time, Metternich continued to pressure his ambassador to defend William I's interests as forthrightly as possible. Wessenberg's hands were tied, and he hoped the conference would at least find a compromise and break the deadlock.⁶⁴ In his haste, Palmerston accepted that the protocol contained many hidden problems. His actions resulted from recent events in Belgium, where the crisis over the unresolved succession had escalated. Britain's candidate, the Prince of Orange, had failed to gain broader support from the Belgian public, and the Belgians themselves began to seek their own candidate. In the end, even Metternich agreed to a situation in which William I's son would not sit on the Belgian throne. He was surprisingly open to another option, which the Powers agreed to. During this phase, the Austrian politician endeavoured to accommodate Palmerston and receive British support to consolidate the situation in northern Italy.⁶⁵ Other candidates included Otto of Bavaria, Austrian Archduke Karl, and the young Prince of Naples, Louis Philippe's favourite.⁶⁶ Several princes from the states of the German Confederation were also considered, but their candidacies were in significant conflict with French interests.⁶⁷

The results of the negotiations of 20 January 1831 were received positively by the Dutch, but they caused an uproar in Belgium's National Congress. The Belgians did not intend to accept them.⁶⁸ As such, they turned to France about the fate of their country. In particular, the French radical Progress Party called for support for Belgium at any cost. Thus, full of confidence, the National Congress

60 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 127; DUNK, von der Hermann, *Der Deutsche Vormärz und Belgien 1830/48*, Main 1966, p. 93.

61 PROTHERO, George Walter, *Question of the Scheldt*, London 1920, p. 5.

62 SOUTHGATE, p. 33.

63 BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 151.

64 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 7 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

65 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 8 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

66 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 26 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/125.

67 PRICE, p. 222.

68 HELMREICH, p. 18.

appointed Louis of Orléans, Duke of Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, to the Belgian throne.⁶⁹ Palmerston said the following about this proposal: "I must say that if the choice falls on Nemours, and the King of the French accepts, it will be proof that the policy of France is like an infection clinging to the walls of the dwelling and breaking out in every successive occupant who comes within their influence."⁷⁰ The situation, therefore, called for swift British intervention in Brussels. Ponsonby's task was to prevent the Duke of Nemours from becoming a candidate for the Belgian throne. This was not an easy task for the British diplomat. He spent many hours negotiating with Belgian representatives, trying to convince them that selecting Louis Philippe's son would lead to a general war.⁷¹ In this matter, he also concurred with the Austrian representative:

The Belgians had been led to believe that the Allied Powers would never consent to their separation from Holland, and that they could expect their independence only with the support of the French government. It was therefore important both to turn them away from France and to make them realise that their fate could not be decided without the consent of the Powers represented at the London Conference.⁷²

And so it happened. Palmerston repeated to Talleyrand that the selection of the French candidate would be considered a *casus belli* and that any such proposal must be discussed by all Powers at the upcoming conference. Metternich shared a similar opinion on France's policies, particularly worried about the impact they could have on the stability of Europe:

One must be informed in London, as we are here, of the tortuous course that King Louis-Philippe continues to pursue in the matter of the Duke of Nemours. It is beyond doubt that it is the King himself, who, until the very last moment, has conducted the intrigue concerning the election of his son. In the character of this Prince, an unbounded ambition is allied with a penchant for the most abject popularity; he sacrifices alternately these two passions by means of active intrigues.⁷³

The French envoy awaited instructions from his government, which ultimately withdrew its support for its candidate under pressure from Louis Philippe.⁷⁴

Even so, not all circumstances were demonstrably favourable. The Belgians refused to recognise the Bases of Separation due to concerns over the border and

⁶⁹ ARBLASTER, p. 179.

⁷⁰ Palmerston to Granville, London, 1 February 1831, BULWER, vol. II, p. 38.

⁷¹ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 129.

⁷² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 22 January, 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 193.

⁷³ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 19 February, 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 192.

⁷⁴ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 160.

the equal division of the shared debt, which they found disadvantageous. As such, they refused to accept any candidate from Great Britain or France for their throne. Palmerston remained adamant that the protocol be recognised. The signing of the Declaration of 17 February 1831, binding the Powers to protect European peace, demonstrated the unity of the conference representatives.⁷⁵ Talleyrand also added his signature, in complete contravention of official French policy.⁷⁶ The French government found itself in crisis. There were calls for war again, and National Guard units began to gather at the border with Belgium.⁷⁷ Louis Philippe had no choice but to dismiss Jacques Laffitte's government in mid-March 1831, replacing him with Jean Casimir Périer.⁷⁸ France's new leader was a pragmatic politician convinced that French foreign policy should be based not merely on loud slogans but primarily on national interests.⁷⁹ Palmerston commented on Périer's selection: "Pray and cultivate him and make him understand that the English government place great confidence in him, and consider his appointment as the strongest pledge and security for peace."⁸⁰ This change of government was a clear signal for London to continue cooperating and reaching a common consensus on this issue.

Similar changes were occurring in Belgium itself, where the capable politician Jean Louis Joseph Lebeau became Foreign Minister. These events eventually resulted in Leopold of Saxe-Coburg's name appearing among the list of candidates.⁸¹ For the British government, he was the ideal choice. Leopold had previously been a candidate for the Greek throne but had rejected it. He was related to

75 Protocol of February 19th, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, London 1833, p. 781.

76 Esterházy had previously informed Metternich that criticism of Talleyrand had been present in Paris from the very beginning of the conference:

The main objection raised against the establishment of a conference in London related to the lack of popularity and general confidence that surrounds the person of Prince Talleyrand in France. The British cabinet has responded that not only does it not admit this reasoning, which it regards only as a petty difficulty, but that it even wishes to put the Ambassador Rayneval on guard against what is considered as the essential.

Esterházy to Metternich, London, 26 October 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 190.

77 Palmerston to Granville, London, 18 February 1831, TNA, FO 27/424; Palmerston to Cowley, London, 24 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/111.

78 SCHROEDER, *The Transformation*, p. 602.

79 PRICE, p. 246.

80 Palmerston to Granville, London, 15 March 1831, TNA, FO 27/424.

81 RIDLEY, p. 131.

the British ruling family and had received an English education in his youth.⁸² Thus, the question was not who the candidate would be but how and under what conditions he would sit on the throne.⁸³ Despite Metternich's claims to the British Ambassador in Vienna, Henry Wellesley, Baron Cowley, about the significance of the Belgian question, the Austrian Chancellor became so preoccupied with issues in the Papal States from February 1831 onwards that the London conference lost its priority.⁸⁴

One issue remained between the Powers and France: the future of the Belgian fortresses. Périer's government insisted on their destruction.⁸⁵ Palmerston held the opinion that the Belgian government should decide on the fortresses' fate, and France did not have the right to interfere in the matter. In the end, he proposed dismantling certain fortresses if the other Powers agreed to accept Belgian neutrality.⁸⁶ Throughout May 1831, another crisis began to unfold. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg declared that he would accept the throne only if the Belgians accepted the Bases of Separation.⁸⁷ Palmerston once again entrusted Ponsonby with negotiating the conditions for accepting the plan, but he was unsuccessful. In his letter to the Belgian envoy, he wrote:

They must understand [the Belgians] that Holland will and must have in Limburg what belonged to her in 1790 and that the compensation for Luxembourg must be partly in the territory. It may not be amiss to let Lebeau know that [the] King of Holland, enraged at the unreasonableness of the Belgians, has proposed to the French government to partition Belgium between them; I have no reason to suppose that France is at present inclined to accept the proposition.⁸⁸

It was evident that Great Britain would never agree to such a solution, but the idea began to take hold among the other Powers due to Leopold's rejection of the throne. Nevertheless, Palmerston's declaration fell on fertile ground.

In the second half of May 1831, British and Belgian representatives began intensive discussions. During a seven-hour negotiation at Marlborough House, Pal-

⁸² TREVELYAN, George Macaulay, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill. Being the Life of Charles, Second Earl Grey*, London, New York, Toronto 1929, p. 352.

⁸³ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 135.

⁸⁴ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 15 February 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193; Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

⁸⁵ Palmerston to Granville, London, 18 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/111.

⁸⁶ From Palmerston's point of view, the neutralisation of Belgium was a shrewd diplomatic strategy, primarily motivated by Britain's desire to uphold the balance of power in Europe and to curb any potential hegemony by a single nation, particularly France. Belgium's strategic location made it a crucial point of interest, and ensuring its neutrality was key to preventing its use as a base for military operations by any major Power, thereby safeguarding British interests against domination by France or other Powers. ABBENHUIS, p. 56.

⁸⁷ Estreházy to Metternich, 17 May 1831, London, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 194.

⁸⁸ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 135.

merston took part for Britain and Leopold, Paul Devaux, and Jean Baptiste Nothomb for Belgium. A draft treaty proposal was put together.⁸⁹ The outcome of the discussions was submitted at the subsequent conference session under The Eighteen Articles. This new treaty bound the Powers to commit to revising borders, according to which Luxembourg would come under Belgium.⁹⁰ Dividing up the debt and navigation on the River Scheldt was now more advantageous for Belgium.⁹¹ The Netherlands' envoy, Baron Van Zuylen van Nyevelt, protested against the new treaty immediately.⁹² When reports of the outcome of the conference negotiations arrived in The Hague, the Dutch King was scathing and demanded his right to territory acquired between 1790 and 1814.⁹³ Austria, Russia, and Prussia supported William I and protested to the Belgian and British representatives:

We stood firm against the dangers of a separation of the Five Powers at such a grave moment, and focused our efforts on making our conduct as least unfavourable as possible to the interests of His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. [. . .] The question of Luxembourg, to which the Belgians, supported by the French government and the London cabinet, have attached a sine qua non condition, was dealt with all the compromises and reservations that could be obtained.⁹⁴

It was one of the first signs of the forthcoming political strategy. In this case, Palmerston did not hesitate to negotiate this proposal behind the back of the Dutch king and the representatives of the Eastern Powers.

Meanwhile, the new proposal changed Leopold's position. He ultimately accepted the Belgian crown on 26 June 1831.⁹⁵ The newly selected Belgian King swore an oath to the new constitution approved by Congress based on the express sovereignty of the nation.⁹⁶ The constitution guaranteed complete freedom of the press and education and made the government responsible to parliament. In character, it was one of the most liberal constitutions in Europe at that time.⁹⁷

William I refused to accept the situation and decided to take military action. His breach of the truce was a hasty act, and it was not long before the Powers

⁸⁹ HELMREICH, p. 49.

⁹⁰ Protocol of 21 May 1831, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 798.

⁹¹ SCHROEDER, *The Transformation*, p. 686.

⁹² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 21 May 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

⁹³ MOWAT, p. 72.

⁹⁴ Esterházy, Wessenberg to Metternich, London, 27 June 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

⁹⁵ SVOBODA, p. 61.

⁹⁶ ASHLEY, vol. I, p. 260.

⁹⁷ ARBLASTER, p. 180.

responded.⁹⁸ Palmerston was ready to defend Belgium even without allies. The resolve to use military power against the Netherlands contravened his previous, and progressively ever more contradictory, claim that non-intervention was a guarantee of peace. Less than nine months after being appointed Foreign Secretary, he was willing to dispense with the doctrine he had firmly supported to pursue British interests. The Belgian Question was the first time Palmerston was prepared to take this step. In France, reports of the occupation led to a flood of outrage. The French army was immediately mobilised and ready to march to the Belgian border. In the meantime, troops led by the Prince of Orange defeated the poorly equipped Belgian army and occupied almost the entire territory lost in 1830. Great Britain agreed with Paris's intervention to support the Belgians, regardless of the possible consequences of French occupation.⁹⁹ This was, to some extent, also because of the poor state of the British ground troops.¹⁰⁰ The renewed conflict energised Talleyrand, who told Palmerston what mistakes had been made regarding Belgium. At that time, the French troops crossed the Belgian border and headed for Brussels.¹⁰¹ The spectre of an evident defeat, alongside the advice of a British diplomat in Belgium, Robert Adair, led William I to withdraw his troops.¹⁰² Through this risky action, the Dutch King tried to secure support from the Austrian Emperor. However, Francis I and Metternich began to lose patience with William I, and the Dutch king received no official support.¹⁰³

For the British government, the French army needed to remain on Belgian territory only for as long as necessary. If their army refused to withdraw, Great Britain would not hesitate to force France to do so, even if it meant using its forces. Paris sensed the opportunity to receive certain benefits from the situation. France's Foreign Minister, Horace François Bastien Sébastiani de La Porta, urged Leopold I to give up some of his territories to France as compensation for French assistance. The French minister was a radical who wanted to return the political power it had lost to his country. He believed it would be better to fight for a renewed status than live in permanent humiliation.¹⁰⁴ The Belgian King firmly rejected Sébastiani's suggestion. A second request was to destroy the fortresses before the French soldiers left. Palmerston had no interest in hearing such ideas and sent a harsh note to Paris, rejecting French claims against Belgium. In re-

⁹⁸ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 1 August 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

⁹⁹ RENDALL, *A Qualified Success*, p. 282.

¹⁰⁰ SOUTHGATE, p. 34.

¹⁰¹ HARRIS, Robin, *Talleyrand. Betrayer and Saviour of France*, London 2007, p. 300.

¹⁰² SKED, *Metternich and Austria*, p. 139.

¹⁰³ SOUTHGATE, p. 36.

¹⁰⁴ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 160.

sponse, Sébastiani asserted the right to sign bilateral agreements between Belgium and France. Leopold I was presented with the French proposal to adopt the Eighteen Articles on the condition that the chain of fortresses be destroyed.¹⁰⁵ Ultimately, the Belgian King freed himself from French pressure in a letter, leaving the final word on thorny issues to London, where Palmerston played the decisive role.¹⁰⁶

Following William's army's invasion, the conference's situation changed radically. While Great Britain and France were adamantly on the Belgians' side, the Dutch King was becoming popular again among the Eastern Powers. Suppression of the Polish Uprising allowed the Tsar to take a more forceful position on the Belgian Question. The Eastern courts increasingly called on William I to stand firm in his demands.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, public opinion in Great Britain had begun shifting away from support for the Belgians. It was, therefore, evident that the Eighteen Articles could not be defended. The only possible solution was to find a compromise between the Bases of Separation and the Articles. The first task was to secure a truce between the two sides and begin negotiations. The focal point was the issue of rearrangement of the border. According to the new proposal, the Belgian would have to give up much of Limburg and Maastricht, including a line along the River Meuse.¹⁰⁸ According to Palmerston, this change was inevitable. Under his leadership, the Twenty-Four Articles were proposed at the conference on 15 October 1831.¹⁰⁹

The British Foreign Secretary had to vigorously defend his position in front of representatives of the Eastern courts, who were steadfastly on the side of the Dutch King. Metternich was clear on this matter and reassured Esterházy of the correct course of his policy:

It is not you, nor one of your colleagues, nor even Mr de Talleyrand and Lord Palmerston, who must be held responsible; it is the poor France and England gone mad who must bear the blame. Men individually can only diminish the consequences of misplaced evils beyond their reach.¹¹⁰

It was all the harder to pursue his proposals when Talleyrand had to await instructions from Paris, without which he could not sign anything. Palmerston later said of the French ambassador:

¹⁰⁵ Palmerston to Granville, London, 5 August 1831, TNA, FO 120/113; ASHLEY, vol. I, p. 261.

¹⁰⁶ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 140.

¹⁰⁷ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 24 August 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

¹⁰⁸ Protocol of 14 October 1831, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 893.

¹⁰⁹ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 142.

¹¹⁰ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 17 October 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

He never wished to make Belgium independent . . . This was remarkably shown during our last discussions in Conference upon the 24 Articles before we finally settled them. Under the pretence that his mouth was closed by Sébastiani's order to sign nothing without previous reference to Paris for instructions, he was literally silent in all my battles with the other three Powers and never gave me the slightest assistance in my efforts to procure for Belgium the compensations which the Articles afford her for the sacrifices she makes in territory and debt.¹¹¹

Palmerston further stated that he wished "the French would make up their minds to act with good faith about Belgium, and we should settle the matter in three weeks."¹¹²

Leopold I took issue with the new treaty. He complained that he had become the King of Belgium based on the Eighteen Articles and even considered abdicating.¹¹³ Palmerston said that if he were to do that, then he would be Europe's "lost man for ever,"¹¹⁴ and he would furthermore threaten Belgium's very existence. On the other hand, the British Foreign Secretary had to convince the Dutch representative that the revised treaty was more advantageous for him than the Eighteen Articles and that he anticipated their support.¹¹⁵ Even so, William I was unwilling to accept even this proposal.¹¹⁶ Esterházy commented on the hopeless situation of the King of the Netherlands in his report to Vienna: "His desire would be to postpone the issue further in the hope of finding a more favourable acceptance of his propositions. This would be difficult to achieve, as it is no longer in his power to bring about the desired result."¹¹⁷ He did not even want to accept an extended truce. Palmerston informed the Netherlands via Bagot: "The first Dutchman who steps across the frontier will cost Amsterdam and Rotterdam pretty dearly."¹¹⁸ Thus, British diplomacy was busy with the tricky task of convincing both parties to accept the newly laid out conditions.

Under the influence of events unfolding, all that Leopold I could do was accept the proposal. He was also forced to do so because he was de facto recognised only by Great Britain and France. Palmerston convinced Van de Weyer that adopting the Articles would automatically mean Leopold was also recognised de

111 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, pp. 142–143.

112 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 161.

113 RIDLEY, p. 137.

114 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 143.

115 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

116 SCHELTEMA, Johann Friedrich, *Holland and Belgium*. In: *The North American Review* 210, 1919, 769, p. 771.

117 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

118 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 144.

jure. Negotiations again went into the early hours, but an agreement was reached in the end.¹¹⁹ The treaty was signed in November 1831, and Palmerston said of the negotiations: "It is an immense thing to have got Austria, Russia, and Prussia to sign a formal treaty of friendship and guarantee with Leopold. Belgium is thus placed out of all danger, and the sulky silence of the Dutch King becomes at once a matter of little or no importance to anybody but himself."¹²⁰ Despite this, Austrian representatives signed the protocol primarily to prevent Great Britain and France from unilaterally deciding the fate of Western Europe.¹²¹ Esterházy informed Metternich that, given the developments of the events, the Eastern Powers had no choice but to yield to British pressure:

The Prussian and Russian envoys have already informed their Courts that, considering the progress of events and the dangers that might result for the peace of Europe from a longer procrastination of a definitive arrangement, they might find themselves in the case of signing a convention with the Plenipotentiaries of Belgium without waiting for the adhesion of the Dutch government, foreseeing that they would be vigorously supported in this regard by the British Cabinet, which is keen to ensure that the establishment of Prince Leopold in Belgium is no longer a problem.¹²²

Palmerston's policy was a partial success in this regard, but optimism would soon end.

The treaty did not address all the fundamental problems; William I did not even want to discuss it, and the Eastern courts refused to ratify it. Meanwhile, French diplomats came up with a curious proposal, requesting that the fortresses in Philippeville and Marienburg be kept.¹²³ In Palmerston's eyes, this meant nothing less than an attempt to get these fortresses under French government administration in the future. From a security standpoint, the fortresses would then not form a barrier against France but a French barrier against Europe.¹²⁴ When the Foreign Secretary rejected these proposals, Sébastiani turned his pressure on Leopold I, attempting to force him to align with his government's stance. Leopold I then complained to Palmerston of his difficult position and threatened partial concessions to France. The only thing he could do was postpone the signature of

¹¹⁹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 15 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195, Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, and Belgium, Relative to the Separation of Belgium from Holland, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 645.

¹²⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 145.

¹²¹ Chad to Palmerston, Berlin, 12 January 1832, TNA, FO 64/181; SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 166.

¹²² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November, 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹²³ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 152.

¹²⁴ SCHROEDER, *The Transformation*, p. 688.

the submitted treaty. After lengthy negotiations, the situation calmed down, and it was agreed that the fortresses in question should be dismantled. The 14 December 1831 convention states:

In consequence of the changes which the independence and neutrality of Belgium have effected in the military situation of that Country, as well as in its disposable means of defence, the High Contracting Parties agree to cause to be dismantled such of the Fortresses constructed, repaired, or enlarged in Belgium, since Year 1815, either wholly or partly at the cost of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, of which the maintenance would henceforward only become useless charge.¹²⁵

The French government was also assured that Belgium's independence would remain intact, and Paris would have the same negotiating position as the other Powers. The conference still had crucial tasks to complete, such as securing the treaty's ratification by the remaining Powers and obtaining William I's consent. In the upcoming discussions, the consequences of the quickly adopted Protocol of November 1830 were evident, mainly in the reassessment of free trade on the Scheldt and the shared debt.¹²⁶ It took almost a year for the Conference to come to an agreement on these issues.¹²⁷

At the end of 1831, the final agreement was reached on political matters. The progressive revision of the treaties successfully set out the border, resolved the succession issue, and clarified the political status of the Belgian state. As such, Palmerston could celebrate a triumph. Nevertheless, in order for the new state to be able to operate, the remaining problems needed to be resolved. One crucial point was the mentioned ratification of the November 1831 treaty by the Eastern Powers and the Dutch King. The Foreign Secretary hoped for a rapid approval process. In this, he was mistaken. A unified approach from all the European Powers was required to force the Dutch King to sign. In this context, Austrian diplomats were aligned with the effort to convince William I of the necessity of signing the revised treaty. The representatives from Vienna prioritised the interests of peace in Europe over the preferences of the conservative monarch:

A whole month has passed since the communication of the 24 Articles established by the Conference, without our being able to obtain a positive response from His Majesty. He, however, cannot remain silent any longer on the determination of the Five Courts, eager to ensure the peace of Europe. His desire to govern again in favourable terms the question of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Duchy of Limburg has led him to refer to the Berlin

¹²⁵ Convention Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, and Belgium, Relative to the Belgic Fortresses, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 667.

¹²⁶ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹²⁷ WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 10.

Cabinet, while the Plenipotentiaries attached to the Hague continue to observe the state of things without being able to take any action.¹²⁸

The resolution of this issue did not depend solely on Palmerston's diplomatic efforts but on reaching an agreement among all the Great Powers to force William I to accept the terms established at the London Conference.¹²⁹

The treaty's most significant opponent was the Russian Tsar. Nicholas I thought that in approving the document, his representatives were overstepping their mandate. In his subsequent letter to The Hague, he assured William I that he would not allow the treaty to be ratified under any circumstances.¹³⁰ Both Russian representatives strongly objected to the Emperor's protest. According to Matuszewicz, adopting the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles was the only correct option, considering both the unpredictable actions of the Dutch sovereign and Russian foreign policy. He believed it was not possible to approach the Belgian question from an absolutist principle but rather to adapt a resolution to the problem to actual conditions, such as to preserve good relations with Great Britain while also focusing on the country's political interests.¹³¹ Vienna and Berlin had significant reservations.¹³² In an attempt to take as little initiative as possible, the two courts referred to St Petersburg's position.¹³³ Another pretext for postponing ratification was the dispute between Great Britain and France over the fortresses.¹³⁴ According to the Austrian Chancellor, this time it was directly Palmerston, and not his or the French government, who was responsible for the split between the two countries.¹³⁵ The situation was not favourable for the British Foreign Secretary domestically either. Issues related to electoral reform had aroused concerns of the Tories returning to power.¹³⁶ A Tory victory would immediately end support for Belgium.¹³⁷ Wellington had strongly protested the treaty's adop-

128 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

129 CORY, William, *A Guide to Modern English History*, vol. II, New York 1882, p. 265.

130 The primary reason for his reluctance stemmed from his aversion to the Orléanist regime and French politics in general. Metternich to Wessenberg, 21 March, 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

131 SVOBODA, p. 64.

132 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 29 February 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

133 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 11 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

134 WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 10.

135 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 16 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200; METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 229.

136 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 26 February 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196; BRIGGS, Asa, *The Age of Improvement*, London 1958, p. 256.

137 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 15 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

tion in the House of Lords.¹³⁸ These circumstances compelled Palmerston to expedite the entire process as much as possible.¹³⁹

It was evident that everything hinged on Russia's position. In the end, under pressure from his diplomats, the Tsar decided to send a confidante, diplomat Alexey Fyodorovich Orlov, to the Netherlands. His objective was to find a diplomatic route to force the Dutch King to agree to adopt the treaty's conditions.¹⁴⁰ Palmerston was hopeful of his mission and was informed of Russian intentions by Heytesbury:

I have very sanguine hopes of seeing the question of ratification very shortly brought to satisfactory settlement a great deal will of course depend upon the result of Count Orloff's Mission, and it will be through him that Your Lordship will probably learn the final decision of this government.¹⁴¹

To Orlov's disappointment, he was unable to convince William I to make any concessions. The only thing the Dutch King was willing to accept was recognition of Leopold I as Belgium's legitimate sovereign. The Tsar's patience with the Netherlands seemed to be at its end. This was due to both William's intransigence and Great Britain's expression of goodwill towards St Petersburg. During the 1815 negotiations in Vienna, Castlereagh secured subsidies to Russia in exchange for support for his proposal to establish the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.¹⁴² These payments depended on the union's existence, and with the dissolution of the formation, this agreement also ended.¹⁴³ Palmerston succeeded in extending the agreement so that the money would now be paid if there was a Tsar's guarantee of Belgian independence.¹⁴⁴ This positive step for Russia made a big impression on the Nicholas I, but it did not yet guarantee ratification.¹⁴⁵

In the meantime, Palmerston endeavoured to focus on the other two Eastern courts. He charged Lamb, the newly appointed ambassador to Austria, with the

138 Grey to Lieven, London, 6 February 1832, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 441.

139 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 149.

140 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 19 February, TNA, FO 65/199.

141 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 27 February 1832, TNA, FO 65/199.

142 NICOLSON, p. 209.

143 More about financial matters and their influence on foreign policy after the Congress of Vienna can be found in: SLUGA, Glenda, *Who Hold the Balance of the World? Bankers at the Congress of Vienna and in International History*. In: *American Historical Review*, Oxford, 122, 2017, 5, p. 1403–1430. SLUGA, Glenda, *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon*, New Jersey, 2021.

144 Convention between Great Britain and Russia, Relative to the Russian Dutch Loan, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 928.

145 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 150.

task of getting Vienna to ratify the treaty.¹⁴⁶ A day after his appointment, Palmerston instructed him on what approach to take towards Metternich. These instructions stated:

The matter of the most urgent importance at the present moment, and to which Your Excellency will immediately request the attention of the Austrian Cabinet, is the Treaty of the November 15th for the separation of Holland and Belgium, and if you should find upon arrival at Vienna, that the Austrian government has not sent off their Ratification of that Treaty, your utmost intentions should be directed to induce them to do so without any further delay.¹⁴⁷

Lamb submitted a proposal to Metternich that included British support for Austrian matters in the Italian states in exchange for adopting the treaty. Initially, the offer seemed to induce the Austrian Chancellor to the ratification. Subsequently, it became evident that Vienna's stance relied on Berlin's position, which again referred to St Petersburg's position.¹⁴⁸ Negotiations were again at an impasse. Austria's move was intelligent because Russian opinion on the matter remained negative. The Tsar did not want to ratify until the Dutch King agreed.¹⁴⁹ Metternich also believed that the Treaty of 15 November 1831 was written to benefit Britain and France.¹⁵⁰ In a letter to Wessenberg, he wrote: "We have doubts that the current complication, a result of the French proposal flattering the British government, shall bear fruit only for these two governments."¹⁵¹ The British Foreign Secretary interpreted these words as meaning that Vienna's policy of opposition was pushing London towards closer cooperation with Paris.¹⁵²

Nevertheless, Palmerston could not rely on French assistance either.¹⁵³ He informed the British ambassador in Paris, Granville, of his doubts about Talleyrand's position: "He was ready to agree to almost anything because he had no real desire that Belgium should become a prosperous and independent state."¹⁵⁴ The resolution of the situation was another crisis in the French government, which arose in the spring of 1832. Due to domestic political circumstances, Talleyrand

146 Wilhelm IV to Francis I, London, 14 May 1832, TNA, FO 120/114.

147 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 28 January 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

148 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 7 January 1832, TNA, FO 65/199.

149 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 28 January 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

150 Protocole de la Conférence tenue au Foreign Office, le 18 Avril 1832, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, London 1834, p. 98.

151 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

152 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 30 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

153 COLBY, Charles William, *The Earlier Relations of England and Belgium*. In: *The American Historical Review* 21, 1915, 1, p. 69.

154 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 153.

was forced to return to Paris, and his role was taken over by the ambassador at The Hague, Rohan Mareuil. In him, Palmerston found a much better negotiating partner than his predecessor. At the same time, he began to see the central axis of his policy in cooperating with France. His main intention was to maintain control over Paris while securing the most favourable national political conditions for Britain's prosperity. This could only be achieved if France followed Great Britain's policy.¹⁵⁵

The stalemate continued during June and July 1832. The British did not let up in their efforts to find a consensus with the Dutch King. A solution for further negotiations was the unconditional withdrawal of the Dutch army from Antwerp fortifications. William I was willing to concede to territorial changes and give up some of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Limburg. Nevertheless, he was not open to discussing the division of the debt and trade on the Scheldt.¹⁵⁶ Brussels referred to the continuing Dutch occupation, stating that if their troops did not withdraw and free passage of the Scheldt was not allowed, Belgian independence was impossible. Palmerston realised that the resolution of the Scheldt was the key to cutting through this Gordian knot. In order to resolve the problem, he invited representatives of Belgian and Dutch trade to grasp the entire breadth of the matter. The issue of the Scheldt incorporated other specific challenges, such as problems with pilots, fishing, fishing rights and control of weirs. The focus was primarily on three points: duties to be imposed on ships, the passage of Belgian goods through the canal, and the financial institution *Syndicat d'Amortissement's* asset problems.¹⁵⁷ Palmerston developed a basic tariff of 1 florin per ton of Belgian goods for the Netherlands, which was eventually changed to a fixed annual fee of 150,000 florins.¹⁵⁸ The Dutch King's representatives vehemently rejected this solution.¹⁵⁹

The second point did not just apply to the Netherlands and Belgium. Since Belgian goods were mainly sold in the German Confederation, Prussian diplomats became involved in the discussions.¹⁶⁰ One of the proposals was to construct a railway line from Belgium to the Rhineland to transport goods, taking over the

¹⁵⁵ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 169.

¹⁵⁶ Lé Plénipotentiaire des Pays Bas á la Conférence, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, p. 124.

¹⁵⁷ PROTHERO, p. 8.

¹⁵⁸ Loi de la Belgique, qui arrête le Budget de Ministère des Finances pour 1833, *British and Foreign State Papers 1832–1833*, vol. XX, London 1835, p. 759.

¹⁵⁹ Palmerston to Ferguson, London, 8 July 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

¹⁶⁰ Even though the matter also affected the other states of the German Confederation, only the Prussians were invited to the discussions.

role previously held by shipping. This would represent a provisional solution to the problem, but the Foreign Secretary opposed the idea and demanded the unconditional opening of international canals as soon as possible. He was supported in this by some German Confederation states, which profited from traditional trade. In exchange for the free passage of Belgian goods, some territory was to be awarded to the Netherlands, which had not been part of the country before 1790 but was of significant strategic importance. The Belgians were to be charged an annual fee of 600,000 florins for using Dutch canals, rivers, and roads.¹⁶¹

The third point involved the shared debt. According to the Bases of Separation, Belgium was to take on that part of the debt based on the total sum from the period when Belgium was not even part of the union. The Dutch demanded this amount as a charge from the period of wars against Louis XIV. In the end, the total sum rose to 9,000,000 florins annually, including the charge for using canals.¹⁶² The Belgians also sought money hidden in the *Syndicat d'Amortissement*, an institution actually involved in financial speculation. Palmerston, aware of this fact, pressured William I to publish this organisation's documents, which was intended to pressure him to ratify the treaty earlier. He was nevertheless unsuccessful, and the entire matter ended. The Dutch ignored all the British proposals. Palmerston realised that Amsterdam must be forced to change its stance through other means than diplomacy.¹⁶³

The imposition of sanctions on the Netherlands represented a problematic and dangerous way out of the complex international situation. The British Foreign Secretary had long been reluctant to take this approach. The events that elicited the issue within British politics caused a major crisis. Nor were the public in favour of such a solution.¹⁶⁴ Even King William IV opposed his country siding with France, enforcing its demands through a military solution. Internationally, Palmerston had to reckon with a negative response from Austria, Russia, and Prussia. As such, he endeavoured to negotiate conditions which all the Powers would agree to. In early June 1832, he sent a letter to the envoys of the Eastern Powers informing them of Britain's intentions to intervene by force against the Dutch King.¹⁶⁵ In instructions for the embassy in Vienna, he urged Austria and

¹⁶¹ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 161.

¹⁶² The British Plenipotentiary to the Conference September 24th 1832, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, p. 153.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Aberdeen to Wellington, London, 4 November 1832, WELLINGTON, vol. VIII, p. 433.

¹⁶⁵ Les Plénipotentiaires Français et Anglais aux Plénipotentiaires de Prusse et de Russie, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, p. 718.

the other Powers to cooperate.¹⁶⁶ He noted the threat of continental war without an immediate resolution to the Belgian Question.¹⁶⁷

During diplomatic negotiations, Palmerston and Sébastiani began discussing coercive measures. Although the Belgians wanted the French army to intervene, the British Foreign Secretary had many reservations about this idea. He entertained the notion that the Anglo-French navy should be used to blockade the Dutch coast.¹⁶⁸ Ultimately, Grey and the British King agreed with this plan. Nevertheless, the consent of the actual British government was still lacking.¹⁶⁹

It was also at this time that the Austrian Chancellor proposed a new solution: financial sanctions on the Netherlands instead of a military solution.¹⁷⁰ During September 1832, it seemed that the other two Eastern Powers would also agree to Metternich's plan. The new Prussian Foreign Minister, Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, had pledged to support Metternich in his plans. But this all collapsed after Matuszewicz returned from St Petersburg with instructions from the Tsar.¹⁷¹ Nicholas refused to approve a proposal which damaged the Dutch King in any way.¹⁷² Palmerston saw these conclusions as a partial betrayal. As a result, the Tsar's declaration led to closer cooperation between Great Britain and France. The government in London began to lean towards military intervention. Palmerston considered using the French army to push the Dutch forces out of the fortress in Antwerp.¹⁷³ Bülow, on behalf of the Prussian side, opposed this proposal and issued a sharp statement condemning the possible Anglo-French intervention.¹⁷⁴ Palmerston showed his renowned tenacity and responded that Great Britain and France would occupy the fortress together regardless of the opinions of the Eastern Powers. It was Palmerston's pragmatism that lay behind this statement. He was convinced that Prussia would not embark on an open war against Great Britain and France because of the Netherlands.¹⁷⁵

166 Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

167 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 30 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

168 Neumann to Metternich, London, 6 November, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

169 More on the agreement regarding the French intervention in Belgium can be found in: *Convention conclue entre la France et la Belgique, pour l'entrée d'une Armée Française en Belgique, British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, p. 1417.

170 Metternich to Schwarzenberg, Berlin, 13 October 1832, METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 275.

171 SVOBODA, p. 65.

172 Lieven to Cowper, Richmond, 9 October 1832, SUDLEY, p. 44.

173 Lieven to Cowper, Richmond, 15 October 1832, SUDLEY, p. 36.

174 Neumann to Metternich, London, 9 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

175 BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 160.

An important impetus for the British government's decision to agree to impose sanctions paradoxically came from France. On 11 October 1832, a new government was established in Paris, leading to a closer Anglo-French *entente*.¹⁷⁶ For Palmerston, this alliance also represented a powerful barrier against Russian domination on the Continent.¹⁷⁷ The new Foreign Minister was Duke Victor de Broglie, who was sympathetic towards Britain.¹⁷⁸ That day, the British government voted in favour of military intervention against Amsterdam.¹⁷⁹ Considering the authority of the Russian representatives at the London conference, St Petersburg could not respond suitably to the developments.¹⁸⁰ In the end, Nicholas I decided to withdraw his diplomatic representatives, and Russia de facto left Prussia in charge of defending its interests in the Belgian question.¹⁸¹ Discussions between Palmerston and Ancillon took place on 30 October 1832. The Prussian minister attempted to obtain consent for parallel Prussian action in Limburg. The withdrawal of Russian representatives left Berlin's delegation without support, making it impossible for Prussia to advance any proposals.¹⁸²

The military action itself began on 15 November 1832 and lasted until the end of the year. Under the command of General Étienne Maurice Gérard, the French army captured the Antwerp fortress on 22 December 1832. The Anglo-French naval blockade led to millions of pounds in losses for Dutch traders and adversely affected British trade as well.¹⁸³ Neumann reported on the complex position of Prussian diplomacy, which was striving to secure better conditions for Wilhelm I: "Baron de Bülow finds himself in a completely different position than us, with his hands tied just as ours are regarding action – his cabinet, though, does not hide how much it would like the negotiations on this unfortunate matter to resume."¹⁸⁴ The Austrian ambassador did not remain passive and actively sought to

176 GRÜNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 22.

177 Neumann to Metternich, London, 16 October, 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197; BITTIS, Alexander, *Russia and The Eastern Question. Army, Government, and Society 1815–1833*, Oxford 2006, p. 482.

178 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 165.

179 British Orders in Council, Prohibiting Trade with the Netherlands, and Laying an Embargo Upon Netherland Vessels in British Ports, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, p. 1420.

180 "Lord Grey strongly condemns the Russian declaration and blames Count Matusevich. He told me that it was of the utmost importance that the Powers appear to remain united." Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

181 SVOBODA, p. 65.

182 RENDALL, *A Qualified Success*, p. 285.

183 Neumann to Metternich, London, 4 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

184 Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 January 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

persuade Palmerston to find a compromise that would satisfy both opposing parties. Yet, this effort turned out to be an exceedingly complex challenge:

Lord Palmerston raises false hopes for this cabinet; I know him too well to attribute to him the intention of accusing our cabinet of a fault it did not commit when he attempted to place on us a lack of good faith which could improve his parliamentary position. [. . .] The Principal Secretary of State avoided mentioning this matter because it was not to his advantage. It is needless for me to inform Your Excellency how concerned I was about this whole affair. Since the discussion at the conference, I have seen that there were more opportunities for compromises to be made than advantages to be gained.¹⁸⁵

The Dutch King's only hope lay in the potential collapse of Grey's government due to electoral reform. Once this plan had fallen apart, William I was forced to restart negotiations.¹⁸⁶

In the end, the Dutch diplomats agreed to the conditions submitted to them on 21 May 1833, even though they were not as advantageous as those declared at the London Conference in 1832. They opened the Scheldt and Meuse rivers to the Belgians, including paths and canals, and all customs duties were also removed. Belgium ignored the payment of the shared debt, and it occupied a part of Limburg and Luxembourg, which were meant to come under the Netherlands. The Dutch King did not want to accept the terms, and it would take another five years to achieve a *modus vivendi*. The Austrian representatives were also not fully satisfied with these conditions.¹⁸⁷ Neumann conveyed that Palmerston's distrust towards Metternich had taken on a personal dimension:

I do not understand how a man of his wisdom and one so highly respected could have made such an unfortunate mistake in assessing the confidence Your Excellency demonstrated to him on this occasion. He should have foreseen the regrettable effect it would have on the Principal Secretary of State's opinion, which I had formed in this report; it was the subject of his envy, and he completely succeeded – but I do not see what advantage could result from this manoeuvre.¹⁸⁸

185 Neumann to Metternich, London, 15 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

186 The problematic situation in which the current British cabinet found itself also limited Palmerston's ability to manoeuvre regarding the settlement between Belgium and the Netherlands. He also avoided discussing specific strategic issues with the British cabinet, possibly to protect his political position. This is evident in the correspondence between Neumann and Esterházy. Esterházy to Metternich, 15 March 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

187 Grey to Lieven, East Sheen, 1 January 1833, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 434.

188 Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 July 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

The present circumstances provide only a partial resolution, while more significant issues in international politics have relegated the previous problem to a secondary position.

The political situation in Europe changed noticeably between 1833 and 1838. The division between the Western and Eastern Powers deepened considerably. Palmerston's approach to international issues reflected the revolutions that shook almost the entire Continent in the 1830s, the Eastern Question, and problems within British politics. During this period, Belgium took advantage of Amsterdam's intransigence. The British Foreign Secretary remained in diplomatic contact with King Leopold I for the entire period, and his territory became an integral part of the liberal bloc in Europe. The British government supported Brussels in fortifying the eastern border against Prussia. Over this entire period, Russia did not even receive Belgian consuls.¹⁸⁹

March 1838 saw an unexpected change to the situation when the Dutch envoy in London submitted a request to the British Foreign Secretary asking for the re-opening of the London Conference.¹⁹⁰ His proposal also included acceptance of the conditions stated in the 1831 treaty.¹⁹¹ This was William I requesting something he had previously adamantly rejected. He mainly aimed to return Limburg and Luxembourg under Dutch control through diplomatic means. This request led to an outcry among the Belgians. According to Leopold I, William I could not request the conditions submitted seven years ago – a new proposal needed to be created. France's government and the public supported Leopold in this regard. Palmerston took a position similar to the one in previous years. He made every effort to limit the advantages gained by France through Belgian support while simultaneously advocating for conditions most favourable to his own government. According to him, keeping the borders as proposed in the 1831 treaty was essential, but he remained open to changes if both parties agreed to them.¹⁹² The Conference was once again plunged into long diplomatic negotiations.¹⁹³

189 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Crisis Among the Great Powers. The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question*, London 2017, p. 189.

190 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 20 March 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 220.

191 This step was preceded by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1837. Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Her Majesty, and the King of the Netherlands (27 October 1837) in: Esterházy to Metternich, Vienna, 11 February 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 220.

192 BROWN, David, *Lord Palmerston and Parliamentary Representation 1830–1865*. In: 57th Conference of the ICHRP: Representative and Parliamentary Institutions from Middle Age to Present Times 2010, p. 49.

193 BELL, vol. I, p. 222.

The delegations of the different Powers had also changed. Matuszewicz was replaced in London by Carlo Andrea Pozzo di Borgo. Ludwig Senfft von Pilsach took Wessenberg's place at the conference. Former Foreign Minister Sébastiani took part in discussions for France. Van de Weyer again defended Brussels' position. It was clear from the outset that the prevailing situation was beneficial to Belgium. Leopold I desired nothing more than to gain control of Luxembourg and Limburg. In these circumstances, the Belgians launched a fierce campaign against the British government, specifically targeting Palmerston. Leopold I visited France and attempted to secure its support. The Foreign Secretary kept a cool head again and remained indifferent to France's positions, which were hostile to his politics, and acquired an unexpected ally in the form of Van de Weyer, who ignored the instructions of his government.¹⁹⁴ In the short term, his opposition to Austria had notably diminished.¹⁹⁵

The issue of the shared debt became the primary focus, with the Belgians not having even begun to repay it. Van de Weyer rejected the first proposal that Belgium pay the sum of 8,400,000 florins annually, i.e., the sum required in the 15 November 1831 treaty.¹⁹⁶ In its negotiations, Brussels once again relied on the renowned *Syndicat d'Amortissement* and demanded that the Netherlands disclose the full accounts of this authority. Palmerston, on the other hand, did not want to delay the signing of the treaty, especially at a time when the situation in the Near East had again begun to heat up, and so he dismissed this demand outright. Although *Syndicat d'Amortissement* was not mentioned in the final treaty, Belgium was imposed with an annual repayment of 5,000,000 florins.¹⁹⁷

Another issue was to resolve merchant fees on the River Scheldt. Pressured by Palmerston, the Dutch agreed to a rate of one and a half florins per ton of cargo, which had been part of the 1833 proposal.¹⁹⁸ The British Foreign Secretary secured agreement with the provisions from the Eastern Powers and had a favourable position in negotiations with France.¹⁹⁹ Émile Desages, a leading figure

194 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 517.

195 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 25 June 1838 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

196 Treaty Between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, and Belgium, Relative to the Separation of Belgium from Holland, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, p. 656.

197 BUCHAN, John, *The Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg*, London 1923, p. 54.

198 Palmerston also considered British trade interests in discussions, which is why British vessels paid the same fees as Belgian vessels.

199 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 1 December 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 221.

in French politics, went to London to agree on a joint stance. Following several meetings with Palmerston and Melbourne, he concluded that all the provisions agreed upon at the conference should be adopted. Despite Leopold I's efforts to modify some arrangements to his advantage, it became clear that he had no leverage. The last of his attempts was to get British public opinion on his side. One of the letters he sent to Palmerston states:

Eight years have strengthened the young plant beyond what its most sanguine well-wishers could have expected, and now it is to be sacrificed without pity, to considerations of most secondary importance for the other states concerned. The Dutch have but little interest in the greater part of the territories. The Prussians wish to get rid of our neighbourhood, but if they do not change their system, they will themselves be their worst enemies. Let me, for the last time, appeal to England to consider how far its mediation can take care of the rights and interests of the other states without ruining our future prospects.²⁰⁰

It is doubtful whether this emotive message made any actual impact.

Palmerston based his reply on the claim of the British government that it was forced to negotiate based on a fair assessment of law, and it could not act in any other way in this matter. He added that the territory requested by Belgium was part of another state according to international agreements, and Great Britain intended to respect these agreements.²⁰¹ Yet, if the Belgian sovereign were to reject these provisions, it would be dangerous not just for Belgium but for the whole of Europe. In conclusion, he added that Brussels had received significant concessions, both in debt repayment with the total sum reduced to a third of the original value and regarding the Scheldt, where the Belgians had got everything they requested.²⁰² Palmerston's reply was effective, and Leopold had no choice but to concur.²⁰³

The treaty itself was signed on 19 April 1839, the result of almost nine years of negotiation. The establishment of Belgium had required two armed interventions, which invoked the threat of continent-wide war.²⁰⁴ Palmerston undoubtedly played a crucial role in the affair.²⁰⁵ For the history of Benelux and Europe, the core outcome was a neutral statute guaranteed by the Powers.²⁰⁶ In this matter, it was

²⁰⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 519.

²⁰¹ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 13 April 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 222.

²⁰² Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 11 May 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 222.

²⁰³ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 520.

²⁰⁴ COLBY, p. 70.

²⁰⁵ BROWN, David, *Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846–1855*, Southampton 1998, p. 328.

²⁰⁶ VANDERBOSCH, p. 56.

clearly a step towards preserving the balance of power. The idea of the Great Powers cooperating based on mutual understanding and compromise proved somewhat outdated, revealing significant, and to some extent, insurmountable, differences between them. The Belgian-Dutch dispute soon became a proxy conflict, with the two Maritime Powers facing off against the three Continental ones. This tension was further fuelled by Anglo-French suspicion. Palmerston sought to maintain close ties with France while closely monitoring and sometimes directly challenging its policies whenever they threatened British interests. The Belgian-Dutch conflict, therefore, was more than just a regional issue; it highlighted a complex diplomatic landscape where Austria promoted their legal interpretations and international principles. In this context, Palmerston began to see the three Eastern courts as direct opponents to his foreign policy, which focused on advancing the interests of the United Kingdom. Palmerston's interest in Belgium was not about purely supporting liberal desires, but rather, the interests of the new state overlapped with British policy on the Continent. In pursuing national objectives, Palmerston was prepared to sacrifice his declared non-intervention policy and the co-operation of all five Powers.

For Metternich, on the other hand, the issues surrounding Belgium were of secondary importance. During the conference, more significant foreign policy problems arose, whether on the Italian Peninsula, in the German Confederation, the Near East, or along Austria's borders during the Polish uprising. Metternich often viewed the Belgian question within a broader diplomatic context rather than as an isolated issue. He was rightly convinced that French policy in the Italian region directly impacted the negotiations over Belgium.²⁰⁷ Another significant shift occurred after the withdrawal of Russian representatives from the conference, as the burden of the negotiations fell primarily on Prussia and Austria, which aimed to counter British-French cooperation in advancing the interests of the Belgian king. Still, Metternich did not see the post-revolutionary arrangement of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as merely favouring a conservative monarch and his political direction. Instead, his perspective was rooted in the interpretation of law, legitimate claims, and the maintenance of the balance of power. He believed that shaping Belgium according to the French model would threaten the security of the German Confederation. While Palmerston advocated for Belgian neutrality as a means to protect Britain from potential French expansion, Metternich's policy was driven by the same principle. Yet, Palmerston's re-

207 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

luctance to collaborate with Austria and the remaining Eastern courts hindered the potential for closer cooperation. Moreover, the meetings in the British capital had demonstrated a growing rift between the Eastern and Western Powers, which was beginning to accelerate. Austria and Great Britain stood on opposite sides of the barricade in this struggle.

4 British Policy in Central and Eastern Europe

The course of negotiations at the London Conference developed from the overall international situation in 1830–1833. Other events in Europe affected the diplomatic representatives' different steps. One of these was the uprising in Congress Poland against the rule of Nicholas I.¹ Since the revolution broke out on 29 November 1830, it is commonly referred to as the November Uprising. In essence, the revolt was more a series of actions by young noblemen and officers rather than an organised act of the broader Polish public. As in the case of Belgium, they had been inspired by the July Revolution, which Francis I had warned of when he declared to the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Dmitry Pavlovich Tatischev, that the Poles “like to repeat everything that happens in Paris.”² The revolutionary battle began in Warsaw with the murder of a number of Russian officers and leading government officials. Their objective, which was the killing of the Tsar's brother, Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, failed. Initially, it was not clear what the political motivation of the Polish rebels was. Increasing numbers of dissatisfied city dwellers, soldiers, and noblemen began to join them, and Nicholas I was forced to respond to the situation urgently.³

Although the events surprised St Petersburg, the escalation of tense relations had been ongoing for several years. Through Tsar Alexander I, the Polish Kingdom gained an exceptional status within the Russian Empire at the Congress of Vienna.⁴ The key element of Poland's “exclusive nature” was the declared constitution, which the Tsar promised would deliver peace to the kingdom.⁵ A fundamental factor was the implementation of the constitution within the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, which secured the Poles' international guarantees.⁶ Metternich considered this the product of the Tsar's folly, with Great Britain positively responding to the step. In Russia itself, there were critics of the proposal.⁷

1 EGERTON, Hugh Edward, *British Foreign Policy in Europe. To the End of the nineteenth Century*, London 1917, p. 181.

2 SVOBODA, p. 80.

3 LINCOLN, William Bruce, *Nicholas I Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias*, Portland 1978, p. 140.

4 Text of the whole constitution in: *British Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIX, p. 971; GRIMSTED, Patricia Kennedy, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy 1801–1825*, Berkeley 1969, p. 288.

5 *British Foreign State Papers*, vol. XIX, p. 971; GRIMSTED, Patricia Kennedy, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy 1801–1825*, Berkeley 1969, p. 288.

6 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 May 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

7 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 14 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

Considering domestic, political, and international circumstances, the Russians breached these freedoms during the 1820s, increasing dissatisfaction amongst the Polish intelligentsia and resulting in the subsequent fight against Russian rule.⁸

Nicholas I immediately adopted several measures to calm the situation. He promised amnesty to the revolutionaries if they surrendered to the Russian army and gave up their weapons immediately. But this call was met with no response.⁹ He also informed the Powers through his ambassadors that this was an internal political conflict and that only he should deal with it. As in Austria and Great Britain, hardly anybody doubted that the Tsar's massive army would win decisively and that the Poles had limited options. The conflict demonstrated the Russian command's significant weakness in planning and military supplies.¹⁰ Konstantin Pavlovich made crucial errors right at the outset of the uprising when he, alongside his loyal troops, including the crucial artillery forces available to him, senselessly withdrew to the border with Russia.¹¹ This misstep gave the Polish soldiers the chance to reform and reorganise.¹²

The Poles themselves were responsible for the uprising's failure. They could not establish a unified command throughout the fight and remained divided into several independent groups that could not coordinate effectively.¹³ They were aware, though, that the success of their campaign depended, above all, on international support. With this in mind, they wrote a manifesto directed particularly at the British and French public, which included the following words:

If in this last struggle, the liberty of Poland must sink under the ruins of her cities and the corpses of her defenders, our enemy shall reign only over deserts; and every good Pole will have this consolation in his dying moments, that in this battle to the death he has for a moment shielded the threatened liberty of Europe.¹⁴

Notable figures of the time, including Józef Grzegorz Chłopicki, a general in the Napoleonic Wars, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, former Russian Foreign Minister, his-

⁸ Manifesto of the Polish Estates, *Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics and the Literature for the Years 1831*, p. 407.

⁹ LINCOLN, p. 141.

¹⁰ BITIS, Alexander, *Reserves under Selfdom? Nicolas I's Attempts to Solve the Russian Army's Manpower Crisis of 1831–1832*. In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51, 2003, 2, p. 186.

¹¹ Nicholas's brother demonstrated poor strategic thinking several times while commanding the battles. In the end, he died of a cholera infection in June 1831. LINCOLN, p. 139.

¹² SETON-WATSON, Hugh, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917*, Oxford 1967, p. 287.

¹³ CHURCH, p. 175.

¹⁴ BLANC, Louis, *History of Ten Years*, London 1844, p. 376.

torian Joachim Lelewel, and poet Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, made this Polish declaration.¹⁵

The Polish Manifesto did not arouse much interest within British political circles. The core issue of the day remained Belgium. Furthermore, the new government had only been set up a few days before the beginning of the November Uprising. As such, any intervention in the Poles' favour by London was impossible and undesirable. Britain's primary objective remained the containment of France. The last thing Palmerston wanted was to see a more severe conflict in Eastern Europe, preventing the Eastern Powers from intervening against France.¹⁶ In this regard, he had the impact of the Second and Third Partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795 on the international situation during the French Revolution on his mind. It was in Britain's interests, then, that the rebellion be suppressed as quickly as possible, despite some personal sympathy that Palmerston and Grey had for the Poles.¹⁷ Heytesbury received instructions from the British Foreign Secretary on what diplomatic goals should be achieved: preventing Austria and Prussia, or France, from getting drawn into the conflict, supporting Polish civil and military refugees, allowing British subjects to contact the Poles, and ensuring the Russians kept to the Vienna agreements guaranteeing the Polish Constitution.¹⁸

Anglo-Russian relations had been fraught in the second half of the 1820s, something that France could exploit the most. This changed after Louis Philippe acceded to the throne. Nicholas's deep dislike for the Orléans regime was reflected in its relations with Great Britain. In October 1830, Heytesbury wrote to London about Russian endeavours to cooperate with the British government as much as possible.¹⁹ Matuszewicz received instructions to ensure that he proceeded in accordance with British diplomacy. This was also when the Russian Tsar agreed unequivocally to hold the London Conference on the Belgian Revolution.²⁰ Prospects for closer cooperation ended with the November Uprising and the accession of Grey's government. The Russians perceived the change in government positively overall. The new British Prime Minister was a close friend of Dorothea Lieven, the wife of Russia's ambassador, who had significant diplomatic clout in Great Britain.²¹ Paradoxically, she recommended Palmerston as British

15 SETON-WATSON, *The Russian Empire*, p. 283.

16 RIDLEY, p. 142.

17 BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 154.

18 SOUTHGATE, p. 44.

19 Heytesbury to Aberdeen, St Petersburg, 2 October 1830, TNA, FO 65/187.

20 GLEASON, John Howes, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, London 1950, p. 108.

21 According to historian Glenda Sluga: Dorothea Lieven consistently wielded her influence over both British and Russian Foreign Ministers and statesmen in favour of intervention on be-

Foreign Secretary to Grey.²² Despite these apparent close relations, Anglo-Russian relations soon deteriorated.²³

Metternich had predicted possible problems in Poland as early as the end of 1829. When he received reports of the November Uprising, he secured the monarchy's borders to prevent the revolutionary movement from moving to Austrian territory.²⁴ Fifty thousand soldiers were put in combat readiness. He did not, of course, have any sympathy for the Polish campaign.²⁵ It was an uprising against a legitimate ruler, who had furthermore been crowned King of Poland.²⁶ On the other hand, he did not perceive the presence of the Russian army near the monarchy's borders as positive. Like Great Britain, the Austrian Chancellor wanted the problem resolved quickly, especially once the situation on the Italian Peninsula worsened, a region where Austria needed a free hand.²⁷ From the outset, the Russian Tsar tried to appeal to Vienna and Berlin to provide active support. Metternich was lukewarm to the request. There was a simple reason for this. The French would perceive the active involvement of the Habsburg Monarchy in suppressing the revolution as an intervention, prompting them to get involved in the conflict. The outcome could be a general war.²⁸

The Poles focused their hopes on France, but the French consul in Poland, Louis Marie Raymond Durand, rejected any support from Paris.²⁹ The Polish revolutionaries could only play for time. Russia followed French politics with suspicion. But via Pozzo di Borgo, Louis Philippe assured Nesselrode that his country wanted to keep the peace in Europe. In contrast, Paris was suspicious of Russian policy in Belgium and feared St Petersburg might intervene to support William I.³⁰ The French public and the German Confederation had the greatest sympathy for the Poles. Similarly, in Great Britain, public opinion and the press opposed the

half of Greek independence and against the Turks. She continued to pursue this interventionist policy well into the mid-1830s. SLUGA, Glenda, *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics, before and after the Congress of Vienna*. In: SLUGA, Glenda (ed.), JAMES, Carolyn (ed.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500*, New York, 2016, p. 121.

22 JUDD, *Palmerston*, p. 40.

23 BELL, vol. I, p. 174.

24 JELAVICH, Barbara, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs. 1814–1918*, Chicago 1969, p. 38.

25 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

26 Nicholas I was crowned King of Poland in 1829.

27 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 1 March 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

28 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 179.

29 BETLEY, Jan Andrzej, *Belgium and Poland in International Relations 1830–1831*, Mouton 1960, p. 143.

30 SVOBODA, p. 86.

Tsar.³¹ Only a small fraction of political representatives called for more active engagement, paradoxically also advocating for larger cuts to the military budget.³²

The situation in France changed at the end of 1830 when the government found itself in crisis and sought the traditional way out through foreign policy. Laffitte took a more active approach to Poland and attempted to calm the situation down to satisfy public opinion. At the same time, he called for coordinated action with the British cabinet. In real terms, the French government endeavoured to mediate between the Poles and Russia, which was impossible without British consent.³³ Palmerston rejected Laffitte's proposal. Great Britain did not want to embarrass Russia, and maintaining good relations with the country was important from a political viewpoint to ensure a smooth approach to the question of Belgium.³⁴

The Tsar was outraged by the French proposal and, as such, asked Austria and Prussia for greater cooperation. The Prussian King tried to offer Nicholas I a helping hand by having the army guard the border, similar to what was done in Austria.³⁵ He also agreed to Russia's request that they use supply routes crossing Prussian territory. Metternich defined the Habsburg Monarchy's position as a non-participating actor.³⁶ It would also tolerate the Russian army crossing its border, which aroused protests from Britain. The Austrians even had observers in the Russian military who were well-informed about the course of military operations.³⁷ Metternich disregarded British protests. He argued that the Poles were not a party to the conflict, so the Ballhausplatz's policy could not be strictly neutral. In order to support his stance, the Austrian Chancellor increased the numbers of the military corps in Galicia. The November Uprising, for him, was the logical result of the July Revolution, and he had no interest in the Poles receiving any kind of concession.³⁸

31 *The Times*, 3 April 1831, enclosed in the letter to: Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

32 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 183.

33 BETLEY, p. 149.

34 BELL, vol. I, p. 166.

35 Chad to Palmerston, Berlin, 5 January 1832, TNA, FO 64/181.

36 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

37 Unlike the military attachés, the Austrian embassy in London complained about not being sufficiently informed by the Russian side regarding the events. Esterházy mentioned that even Nesselrode himself lacked adequate reports from St Petersburg and viewed the uprising as an act of ingratitude on the part of the Poles. Esterházy to Metternich, London, 14 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

38 HERRE, Franz, *Metternich*, Praha 1996, p. 341.

In December 1830, Palmerston was still convinced that the conflict could be resolved without armed confrontation, referring to St Petersburg and reports from Berlin, where George William Chad was ambassador. Both ambassadors at these courts were far from favourable in their statements about the Poles. As such, the British Foreign Secretary did not receive entirely objective information. Chad saw France as the main enemy and shared Prussian concerns about French territorial aspirations for the Rhine. Heytesbury's steps, in contrast, were focused on cooperating as closely as possible with Russia. Before the outbreak of the November Uprising, there had been negotiations on replacing him in his role, but considering the circumstances, this had to be put on hold. In his diplomatic approach towards Russia, he was cautious and preferred to send reports to London regarding the danger of French liberals rather than the situation in Poland.³⁹

In the meantime, the Lievens tried to gain the British government's favour. Dorothea Lieven attempted to exploit her very good connections with Grey and Palmerston to convince them to agree to the Tsar's plans. In early 1831, the Russian Princess wrote of the British Foreign Secretary: "Palmerston is adorable, controlling foreign affairs in every sense of the word."⁴⁰ In her correspondence, she continuously compared the Polish case to the British government's relationship with the problems in Ireland.⁴¹ In her opinion, the official reception of Polish representatives in London was like receiving Daniel O'Connell in St Petersburg.⁴² She also expressed her deep wish that Palmerston should not be interested in the fate of the Poles and instead concentrate only on the Austrian and Prussian stances on the uprising.⁴³ In his letters to Lieven, Grey acknowledged the Tsar's right to suppress the revolution, but he also hoped that St Petersburg would side more with them in the matter of Belgium.⁴⁴ Lieven was somewhat mistaken in her conclusions. Palmerston took advantage of the situation, and on the pretext of observing the Vienna agreements, he put counterpressure on Russia to disengage from Western Europe. The longer the conflict between the Tsar and his subjects lasted, the longer the British Foreign Secretary could take advantage of their domination at the conference taking place in London.⁴⁵

39 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 185.

40 Lieven to Cowper, London, 10 January 1831, SUDLEY, p. 24.

41 Lieven to Cowper, London, 8 January 1831, SUDLEY, p. 23.

42 O'Connell was an Irish political leader who fought for Irish emancipation.

43 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 184.

44 Grey to Lieven, London, 29 December 1830, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 39.

45 HAHN, Hans Heinrich, *Außenpolitik in der Emigration. Die Exildiplomatie Adam Jerzy Czartoryskis 1830–1840*, Oldenburg 1978, p. 47.

A fundamental change to the Russian Tsar's stance came after 25 January 1831. That day, Nicholas I was dethroned by Revolutionary Poland's Sejm, and the Romanov dynasty was removed from the Polish Kingdom. The revolutionaries hoped they would achieve the same as the Belgians in their fight for independence, but this step only led to closer cooperation between the Eastern Powers and prevented the opportunity for a peaceful resolution to the situation. The Tsar's army immediately went on the march. In a letter to Grey, Lieven noted the smooth progress of Nicholas's army and the support of Polish farmers for Russia.⁴⁶ Even so, Russia's progress stalled during March 1831. The army's poor condition, lack of preparedness, and supply problems became evident.⁴⁷ This was all underscored by a cholera epidemic which broke out in the Russian camp, decimating its troops. This halt to the Tsar's soldiers' progress appeared to offer the Poles hope for success. They began negotiating with Austria, hoping to get their support. They offered the vacant royal throne to Habsburg Archduke Karl Ludwig, but Metternich resolutely rejected the proposal. Accepting it would have meant both a deterioration in relations with Russia and many potential future threats.⁴⁸ For Metternich, the Polish Kingdom was an area with several problems, and any incorporation into the Monarchy would result in an undesirable increase in the Slavic population. Thus, the Austrian Chancellor wanted Poland's role as a buffer state to remain.⁴⁹

Vienna's policy became much more active after the dethroning of the Romanovs was announced. Until that time, the Emperor's troops had essentially ignored the movement of Polish volunteers across the Austrian border. But this now changed, and the army began to arrest the leaders of the Polish Uprising, such as Czartoryski and General Józef Dwernicki. The former received an offer from the Austrian consul in Warsaw to give up all roles in the rebel government in exchange for being given a passport under any name he wished.⁵⁰ The agreement also involved police surveillance. The Tsar was angered by the proposal and demanded the immediate surrender of all prisoners, which Metternich refused to do.⁵¹

⁴⁶ Lieven to Grey, London, 19 February 1831, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 170.

⁴⁷ Wellington to Lieven, London, 1 May 1831, ROBINSON, Lionel (ed.), *Letters of Dorothea, Princess Lieven. During her Residence in London, 1812–1834*, London, New York, Bombay 1902, p. 300.

⁴⁸ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁴⁹ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, René, *A Diplomatic History since the Congress of Vienna*, London 1958, p. 36.

⁵⁰ With Metternich's agreement, he was issued a passport under the name George Hoffman, which allowed him to travel to the British Isles.

⁵¹ SVOBODA, p. 95.

The Polish government was not focused only on Austria; it also sent emissaries to many countries, including Great Britain. The task of bringing the British government on their side was assigned to Marquis Alexandre Colonna Walewski, Napoleon Bonaparte's illegitimate son. Later, the poet Niemcewicz joined him. To their surprise, Palmerston refused to meet with them, and his reason for this was evident: he did not want to provoke St Petersburg unnecessarily. Although his and Grey's correspondence included many statements of sympathy for the Poles, supporting Polish independence was not a top priority.⁵² Metternich's main focus remained on international policy and the effort to avoid involvement in the conflict in Poland.⁵³ At the same time, he stressed that the political freedom previously enjoyed in Poland should remain in place even after the suppression of the uprising.⁵⁴

The only period during which Palmerston believed that hope was not lost for Warsaw was April 1831. Reports of the Polish army's unexpected successes and the spread of the revolution to Lithuania led British diplomacy to take a tougher stance against Russia and demand the strict observance of the Vienna agreements for the upcoming Polish-Russian negotiations.⁵⁵ In his letter to Lieven, Grey wrote about Russian defeat:

The advance of the Polish army to Minsk, and even, as some of the accounts state, to Siedlec, would indicate a success of a very decisive nature; were it not for the possibility that flushed by a first advantage, the Polish general may have been hurried on too far, and may, in his turn, afford to Diebitsch an opportunity of retrieving his losses. But where is Diebitsch? The whole operation seems to me nearly incomprehensible, except on the ground of his having mismanaged matters to a degree which his Turkish campaign gave no reason to expect.⁵⁶

Despite a certain change in his position, Palmerston was not entirely sure what policy to expound externally. In diplomatic correspondence, he described the Poles' fight as a civil war and expressed his concerns over the Russian army's weakness.⁵⁷

Similar messages began to turn up in correspondence with St Petersburg. Heytesbury wrote of the impact of conflict on the Russian government: "Her military means will be seriously crippled, and her finances entirely exhausted."⁵⁸

⁵² BETLEY, p. 165.

⁵³ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 19 June 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁵⁴ HAHN, p. 49.

⁵⁵ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 May 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

⁵⁶ Hans Karl Friedrich Anton Graf von Diebitsch was a Russian general. Grey to Lieven, London, 13 April 1831, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 209.

⁵⁷ Palmerston to Cowley, London, 20 April 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

⁵⁸ GLEASON, p. 112.

Under the pressure of bad news from the front, Nicholas I began considering dividing Poland between Austria and Prussia.⁵⁹ But neither Eastern Power was interested in taking him up on the offer.⁶⁰ Cowley laid out Metternich's opinion on future arrangements for the territory in a note to London. Poland would keep its status as a divided kingdom, which the Austrian Chancellor perceived as the best guarantee for peace to be preserved in Europe. But he also added that "any of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna would warrant the interference of Austria in the arrangements which Emperor of Russia may think proper to make for the future Govt. of that country."⁶¹ These words confirmed the Chancellor's vision, which reflected a desire for the preservation of the balance of power, respect for the Vienna agreements and the legitimate right to intervene against revolutionary events on the Continent.

In contrast to Palmerston, Metternich viewed the current events in Poland from an entirely different perspective:

The complications in Poland, which I had hoped to see resolved in the best possible terms, have taken a rather regrettable turn. Whether it is due to the military operations of Marshal Diebitsch, who is considered a true phantom of terror, or because the lack of foresight that he demonstrated in his initial movements has deeply compromised success, the delay between the first and second operations has greatly undermined the forces that had been collected. The Poles have been emboldened, and the offensive operations they have launched have been crowned with success, continually challenging the brave inhabitants.⁶²

Metternich was firmly against the idea of partitioning Poland. He was keen on maintaining strong relations with St Petersburg. Equally, he aimed to prevent any pro-revolutionary movements within Austria that could potentially ignite future rebellions in pursuit of reunification.

With Polish successes, the French government began to change its approach. Beginning in March 1831, Périer's moderate cabinet came into power and refused to engage in the conflict. However, in June, Sébastiani submitted a proposal for joint mediation to Palmerston, making the same offer to Austria. Neither country agreed.⁶³ In July, the British Foreign Secretary described the Poles as subjects fighting against their legitimate ruler in a speech in the House of Commons. However, given the political system in the British Isles, Palmerston could not ignore

⁵⁹ SVOBODA, p. 101.

⁶⁰ According to Cowley, Metternich proposed in June guaranteeing Poland's independence, which the Austrian Chancellor later denied.

⁶¹ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 May 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

⁶² Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁶³ RIDLEY, p. 143.

public opinion, which was strongly in favour of the Poles.⁶⁴ His position remained one of distrust towards Paris. He was convinced that France was waiting for the opportunity to claim international success and consolidate its new political regime. On the other hand, Austria distrusted British policy.⁶⁵ This stance was also supported by Esterházy's correspondence with Metternich. He wrote about Great Britain that "it seeks to maintain good relations with all Powers, but it is most friendly and intimate with France, as a result of the current analogy in their positions and political institutions."⁶⁶ London, in an effort to maintain cordial ties with St Petersburg, assured Russia via Heytesbury of its intentions not to cooperate with France in Polish affairs.⁶⁷

The only possible solution for Metternich was the unconditional capitulation of the rebels.⁶⁸ He responded to French calls for a more active anti-Russian policy by stating that the Austrian Emperor was not in a position to order the Tsar to do anything.⁶⁹ But neither did Metternich have everything under complete control. His greatest domestic political rival, Franz Anton von Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, did not agree with the idea of giving Russia greater assistance and suppressing the uprising quickly.⁷⁰ Kolowrat's concerns about the government budget forced the Prince to withdraw his claim.⁷¹ Metternich's approach also directly affected British interests, with Palmerston openly protesting against the holding of British goods at Austrian borders. This help, officially claimed by London, went to the Polish revolutionaries. In contrast, Vienna saw this as direct support for the revolution, which was in conflict with its policy.⁷² At the same time, Austrian assistance to St Petersburg was not entirely open either. This is evidenced by the fact that over the entire period, no political prisoners were handed over to the Russians.⁷³

64 GLEASON, p. 124.

65 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 21 March 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193.

66 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 24 July 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

67 BELL, vol. I, p. 168.

68 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 20 July 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

69 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 19 June 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

70 SWEET, Paul Robinson, *Friedrich von Gentz. Defender of the Old Order*, Madison 1941, p. 297.

71 Esterházy was aware of these facts during his negotiations with Palmerston: "Today, we find ourselves in a situation where our government's position is increasingly precarious. Any decisions made without careful consideration of their consequences could lead to unpredictable and possibly negative results." Esterházy to Metternich, 24 July 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

72 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 19 June 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

73 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 September 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

In his dispatch to London, Metternich explained the complex position Austria found itself in regarding the November Uprising. He stressed that neutrality could not be absolute, as doing so would endanger regional stability and risk exploitation by military units seeking refuge on Austrian soil. According to the Chancellor, Vienna needed to respond prudently to avoid legitimising Russian military actions and to prevent the Poles from taking advantage of Austria's extensive borders. At the same time, he criticised the British government for the pressure it placed on Vienna, pointing out that Great Britain would face a similar dilemma if it were in Austria's position. Metternich further asserted that the monarchy could not allow its territory to be used for the renewal of hostile actions:

We do not consider ourselves neutral in the legal sense regarding the conflict in Poland. However, even if we had declared neutrality, should we not still act as we are acting? Could we, with a clear conscience, refuse Russia the extradition of several thousand men who sought refuge on our territory, and allow them to return to their country through ours to renew hostilities?

Regarding the presence of Polish military units on Austrian soil, he added:

Neutrality can never extend to the subjects of one of the belligerent Powers, and by allowing them on its territory, the neutral state authorises the opposing party to attack them, justifying an attack on their enemy wherever they may be found.⁷⁴

From mid-June 1831, the Russian army began to recover from the crisis. The turnaround in the Polish-Russian conflict came after 8 September 1831, when the newly appointed General, Ivan Paskevich, managed to capture Warsaw and put down the uprising for good.⁷⁵

Polish defeat did not end the matter of Congress Poland and relations with St Petersburg for Palmerston. Esterházy was even doubtful that London would be able to maintain a passive policy under the weight of public opinion.⁷⁶ The British Foreign Secretary perceived the end of the conflict as a positive thing.⁷⁷ Russia was not tied down in the East with the other Powers, and it could take a more active role against France should the situation require it. The issue of keeping Poland's Constitution and status within the Russian Empire came to the diplomatic fore. This was not so much a response to the revolutionaries' requests as it was

⁷⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 September 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁷⁵ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, p. 37.

⁷⁶ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 24 July 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

⁷⁷ Even in Parliament, the Polish defeat did not generate much response. TWAMLEY, Zachary, *'A Fine Subject to Expatiate Upon.'* *British Foreign Policy and the Rhetoric of National Honour, 1830–1880*, unpublished dissertation, Dublin, 2024, p. 43.

an effort to maintain the Vienna arrangements and balance of power. During a discussion, Palmerston told Holland: “[Poland is] the great security of Europe against the inveterately encroaching spirit of France.”⁷⁸ He was of the opinion that it was not just a barrier to Russian expansion to the West but also a barrier in the opposite direction.

During August 1831, the Tsar became increasingly convinced that he should abolish the Polish Constitution. To this end, he sent his plan for the future of the kingdom to the British Embassy. Reports of Nicholas I's intentions began reaching London as early as March 1831.⁷⁹ Lieven preferred to inform Grey first of Russian objectives. When the Prime Minister was unequivocally opposed to this plan, he did not show Palmerston the letter at all.⁸⁰ London officially instructed the embassy in St Petersburg to make the Russians keep the constitution.⁸¹ But Nicholas I was adamant, and surprisingly, Russian public opinion also played a role here.⁸² The Russian public naturally sided with the Tsar and demanded due punishment for the rebels. Heytesbury informed Palmerston that it was “the question of life or death to this [Russian] government. It feels it to be so, the public at large, feel it to be so – and the refusal will, I fear, be steadily persisted in, let the consequences be what they may.”⁸³ In early 1832, Metternich rejected his previous opinion that the Vienna agreements should be maintained. He was now of the opinion that, with respect to Poland, St Petersburg was not limited by any international guarantees. Thus, nothing stood in the Russian Emperor's way to prevent him from freely changing the state of affairs in the kingdom as he saw fit.⁸⁴ British policy was ineffective in countering this idea.⁸⁵

Despite the unfavourable circumstances, the Poles did not give up their struggle. After his release from Austrian internment, Czartoryski arrived in London in 1831. Grey invited him to an unofficial dinner, at which Palmerston also appeared “by chance.”⁸⁶ The Lievens later heard about this meeting, sparking a wave of protests. The dispute between the British government and the Russian embassy made mutual cooperation even harder, as can be seen in the correspondence be-

78 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 352.

79 GLEASON, p. 111.

80 WESBTER, *The Foreign*, p. 189.

81 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 24 July 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

82 Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 9 April 1833, TNA, FO 65/207.

83 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 7 January 1832, TNA, FO 65/199.

84 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

85 RIDLEY, p. 144.

86 GIELGUD, p. 327.

tween the Princess and Grey.⁸⁷ Surprisingly, her reproaches were primarily directed against Palmerston. The Lievens' approach began to change in mid-1831. The British Foreign Secretary became a target of criticism both domestically and internationally. He was called a tool of Russia in Parliament, and for the Russians, he was the Tsar's enemy. The crisis over electoral reform reached a culmination point within the British Parliament, forcing Palmerston to act in line with public opinion. Everything came to a head in June 1831 when he had to account for himself in the House of Commons. In his speeches, he once again appealed to public opinion. Although he did not openly support the Poles in their struggle, he sharply criticised Russian policy, expressing his disapproval of Nicholas I's actions.⁸⁸ One of the addresses was conveyed by Neumann to Vienna, indicating that Palmerston: "Took the opportunity [. . .] to pronounce, in vigorous terms, against the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas, accusing him of having violated, in the most outrageous manner, the rights of the people of Poland and the obligations he had assumed towards them."⁸⁹ The Russian Emperor was criticised by all sides in Great Britain, and one member of Parliament even called him a "villain" and a "monster in human form."⁹⁰

Diplomatic relations in St Petersburg also impacted the deterioration of Anglo-Russian political cooperation. From 1831, Heytesbury pressed for his removal from the post, apparently for medical reasons.⁹¹ One of the first nominated for the position was Stratford Canning, but the Tsar strongly opposed this choice.⁹² Canning's political opinions were anti-Russian, something well-known in St Petersburg. The Russians even suspected him of being involved in the December and November Uprisings.⁹³ Thus, his potential appointment exacerbated the already tense Anglo-Russian relations. Metternich also opposed Canning, stating that he "could never agree to his nomination."⁹⁴ Since Heytesbury's replacement was urgent, Palmerston temporarily appointed John Lambton, Earl of Durham, as ambassador. It was not so much Durham's diplomatic skills that earned him the position, but rather the Foreign Secretary's attempt to sideline him so he would not negatively impact do-

87 Lieven to Grey, London, 2 January 1832 and Grey to Lieven, London, 4 January 1832, STRANGE, vol. II, pp. 311 – 312.

88 Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 28 July 1832, *Poland HC Deb 28 June 1832 vol 13 cc1115-52* [online], [quoted 2019-04–27]. Available on: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1832/jun/28/poland#S3V0013P0_18320628_HOC_31.

89 Neumann to Metternich, London, 24 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

90 SETON-WATSON, *The Russian Empire*, p. 180.

91 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 8 April 1832, TNA, FO 65/199.

92 Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 2 March 1832, TNA, FO 65/199.

93 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 362.

94 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 12 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

mestic politics.⁹⁵ Dorothea Lieven did her best to influence him before his departure to St Petersburg. She wrote to Grey about him: "I had Lord Durham with me for a long time this morning, and each time I see him, I like him the more."⁹⁶ The whole situation seemed somewhat paradoxical because Durham was considered one of the most pro-Polish radicals in British politics. Yet, upon the announcement of his nomination, his stance changed. Neumann wrote to Vienna that the Earl was seeking Palmerston's post.⁹⁷ The Russian Princess would also favour this idea because their mutual relations were now very hostile and were unlikely to improve in the future.⁹⁸

Durham eventually went to St Petersburg in 1832. During his mission, he went beyond the instructions he had been given several times. In conversation with the Tsar, for example, he said that Great Britain in no way agreed with the revolutions in Europe.⁹⁹ His acts drew ridicule from many European diplomats. According to Palmerston, he was duped by the Tsar and Nesselrode.¹⁰⁰ He failed to achieve anything regarding the Polish question, but he did begin to perceive himself as an important figure in European politics. The Russian Foreign Minister advised him that he stop in Vienna and Berlin on his return journey to London. Durham was enthused by this idea, something that could not be said for Lamb or the Chancellor. Metternich did not like him, and according to the British representative, his visit could do more harm than good.¹⁰¹ Grey also recommended that he visit both capitals.¹⁰² The Austrian Prince thought that it was Palmerston's decision and declared: "Something has happened to Palmerston: he's not the same man anymore."¹⁰³ In the end, though, Durham surprisingly decided not to visit Vienna.¹⁰⁴

Following a short interlude, Canning's name reappeared regarding the post of official ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary insisted on his proposal and

95 MILTON-SMITH, John, *Earl Grey's Cabinet and the Object of Parliamentary Reform*. In: *The Historical Journal*, 1, 1972, 15, p. 68.

96 Lieven to Grey, London, 19 October 1832, STRANGE, vol. II, p. 407.

97 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 193. Neumann to Metternich, London, 2 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

98 BELL, vol. I, p. 177.

99 NEW, Chester William, *Lord Durham. A Biography of John Lambton, first Earl of Durham*, Oxford 1929, p. 206.

100 Palmerston to Granville, London, 23 November 1832, TNA, FO 27/471.

101 NEW, p. 208.

102 Durham was Grey's illegitimate son.

103 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 195. Metternich specifically wrote: "*Il est arrivé qu'elque chose à Palmerston, ce n'est plus le même homme.*"

104 NEW, p. 212.

continued to defend him: "Canning was the ablest diplomat we had, and as a cousin of the great Canning, he had to be provided with a suitable post."¹⁰⁵ Durham, convinced of his own importance, promised Nesselrode that Canning's nomination would be withdrawn.¹⁰⁶ This naturally led to conflict with Palmerston. Dorothea Lieven tried to exploit the difficult situation and sow division between Durham and his Foreign Secretary. In letters, she described the relationship between the two men as full of hatred. She claimed Palmerston was not open to the ideas of others and sought to undermine King William IV's trust in him. She continued to speculate that following the resignation of the current Foreign Secretary, Durham – promoted by St Petersburg – should take his place. Neumann informed Vienna of this plot. Even Metternich did not hold a high opinion of the Princess. It is not clear how Palmerston found out about the conspiracy, but after it surfaced, it was evident that her days in London were numbered.¹⁰⁷

Lamb's sister, Emily Clavering, Countess Cowper, also mentioned Lieven in her correspondence:

Emilie [Lieven's nickname] is a dear good soul, but very like a spoilt child, cannot bear contradiction and has no temper to stand things turning out differently from her wishes. They live on the hope of a revolution in France and say we do all sorts of things to bolster the state of things there, which cannot last. The fact is that they are in a very uncomfortable position. They act from the Orders of their Court and are therefore not responsible . . . they have forced us into a close alliance with France, which it has always been their object to prevent.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, Russian diplomatic representatives were attempting to destabilise domestic political relations within the British cabinet, using their influence to sway individual politicians to their side.

By the end of 1832, relations between St Petersburg and London were extremely tense. Palmerston's attempt to reverse the fate of Congress Poland had failed.¹⁰⁹ In his Organic Statute of 26 February 1832, Nicholas I abolished the Polish Constitution, restricted the country's autonomy, closed the university in Warsaw, declared Russian the official language, and put the Sejm under Russian control.¹¹⁰ This marked the beginning of the process of unification with the rest of

¹⁰⁵ LEVER, Tresham (ed.), *The Letters of Lady Palmerston: Selected and Edited from the Originals. At Broadlands and Elsewhere*, London 1957, p. 203.

¹⁰⁶ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 197.

¹⁰⁷ BELL, vol. I, p. 177.

¹⁰⁸ Cowper to Grey, London, 19 November 1832, LEVER, p. 202.

¹⁰⁹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹¹⁰ Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 30 March 1832, TNA, FO 65/199; Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 9 April 1833, TNA, FO 65/207.

the Empire.¹¹¹ In early 1833, Nesselrode sent an official letter rejecting Canning as ambassador.¹¹² Lieven wrote to Palmerston that this was the goal of her political life.¹¹³ Palmerston's response has not been found, but in line with diplomatic rules, her husband had to end his post as ambassador and return to Russia in early 1834.¹¹⁴ The British press launched a campaign of attacks and insults against the Princess and her husband.¹¹⁵ Neumann blamed Talleyrand for the entire plot. He reported on his conversation with him in a very interesting dispatch to Vienna:

I asked him what specifically troubled him about Mr de Lieven. He replied that Lord Palmerston had shown an indifferent attitude towards the latest frank and open communications from the Russian cabinet regarding Eastern affairs. Additionally, articles offensive to Russia had appeared the following day in *The Globe*, a ministerial journal, and then two days later in *The Times*. Given the level of influence that the government exerted over the press, these incidents caused considerable unease.

Then he further stated:

He indicated that there had been a noticeable shift in the language used by Lord Palmerston regarding Russia since last Thursday. I had no doubt that Talleyrand had emphasised the shared interest of France and England in not allowing these tensions to escalate, advising that this matter should be resolved in a manner compatible with the dignity and personal sentiments of all involved.¹¹⁶

The rift he caused remained unended, and Pozzo di Borgo was not nominated as the new ambassador until 1835. In the end, Durham became his British counterpart, having previously been pressured to resign from all functions in 1833.¹¹⁷

The November Uprising marked the start of an era of Anglo-Russian distrust, which divided Europe into two political camps.¹¹⁸ Despite the Russians' initial sympathy for Grey's government, the differing international political interests of the two states were evident, and British public opinion perceived the Tsar as a conservative despot much more strongly than it did Metternich, for example.¹¹⁹

111 RICH, Norman, *Great Power Diplomacy 1814–1914*, New York 1992, p. 62.

112 Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 9 January 1833, TNA, FO 65/207.

113 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 182.

114 Neumann to Metternich, London, 26 March, 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

115 Neumann to Metternich, London, 15 March, 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

116 Neumann to Metternich, London, 26 March, 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

117 Neumann to Metternich, London, 15 March 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

118 BAUMGART, Winfried, *Europäisches Konzert und Nationale Bewegung. Internationale Beziehungen 1830–1878*, Paderborn 1999, p. 181.

119 Neumann to Metternich, London, 15 March 1833, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 201.

Great Britain deepened its cooperation with France, while Russia sought allies from amongst its eastern neighbours. Due to the evident British inability to stand up for its interests in Italian politics, Austria began to focus on Russia. For Vienna, cooperation with St Petersburg brought benefits. Nicholas I supported the Habsburg Monarchy's strategy in Italy and in the German Confederation. In contrast, Palmerston saw Metternich's policy in the German states as negatively as he did Russian policy in Poland. The anti-Austrian strategy in Central Europe was further aggravated by Vienna's focus towards the East.¹²⁰

Since its establishment at the Congress of Vienna, the German Confederation had been a vital element for Great Britain in maintaining the balance of power. Austro-Prussian domination served as a safeguard against French expansion into Central Europe.¹²¹ Metternich shared the same view. Cooperation between London and Paris since Grey's government had come into power had significantly diminished British fears in this regard. For Palmerston's policy, this space represented an opportunity to support liberal ideas while also being able to oppose Metternich's policy, which he considered to be purely repressive.¹²² In 1832, the threat to the Confederation came not from outside but from within, as revolutionary events had impacted the union since the start of the 1830s.¹²³

The July Revolution, along with the Belgian struggle for independence, had profound repercussions throughout Central Europe. The upheaval of 1830 served as a catalyst for liberals and radicals across Germany, inspiring them to intensify their demands for constitutional reforms, the creation of a unified German nation-state, and even the establishment of a republic through the overthrow of existing princely rulers. The political atmosphere in the southern constitutional states grew increasingly charged, as liberals within the Second Chambers pressed for significant reforms. These included demands for the military to swear allegiance to the constitution, the introduction of ministerial responsibility, the abolition of press censorship, and the establishment of public trials.¹²⁴

Austria and Prussia, both of which had yet to fulfil the constitutional promises made during the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, observed these developments with growing alarm. The spread of liberalism and political agitation, especially in the southern states where the existing constitutions were perceived as being at odds with the Federal Act, posed a serious challenge to the established

¹²⁰ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 31.

¹²¹ BEALES, Derek, *From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815–1885*, London 1969, p. 167.

¹²² SCHROEDER, *Systems, Stability, Statecraft*, p. 41.

¹²³ BOTZENHART, Manfred, *Reform, Restauration, Krise. Deutschland 1789–1847*, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 111.

¹²⁴ GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 30.

order. Prince Metternich, recognising the liberal movement as a direct threat to the stability of the German Confederation, began to consider drastic measures. Among these were the potential dissolution of the Confederation itself or the neutralisation of smaller German states, drawing parallels to the recent developments in Belgium. This period marked a critical juncture in the struggle between conservative forces determined to preserve the old order and the liberal movement advocating for national unity and constitutional governance.¹²⁵

Furthermore, following the collapse of the November Uprising, a large number of Polish refugees began to turn up within the territory of the German Confederation. Their fight for national liberation roused a flood of solidarity, especially among German liberals.¹²⁶ Revolutionary unrest broke out in the confederate states that still did not have a constitution, such as Saxony, Hessen, and Brunswick-Lüneburg.¹²⁷ There was also dissatisfaction with the political conditions in Hanover, which was linked to its personal union with Great Britain. Here, liberals demanded a change in their governing representatives who were limiting the freedoms of their subjects.¹²⁸

For the Austrian Chancellor, the immediate problem was particularly neighbouring Saxony.¹²⁹ He followed events in the German Confederation with concern. The festival, which took place in May 1832 on the ruins of Hambach Castle near Neustadt in Bavarian Rhineland-Palatinate, provided a pretext for intervention.¹³⁰ The Hambach Festival centred around calls for a united republican Germany.¹³¹ The ambassador in Frankfurt, Thomas Cartwright, wrote in a report to Palmerston on the course of the Hambach gathering:

The Marseillaise was sung, and incessant shouts were heard in praise of liberty . . . The whole mass, however, upon arriving halfway down the hill, halted, and commenced vociferating insults against the King and the troops amidst deafening shouts of 'Liberty for ever'.¹³²

125 Ibid. p. 34.

126 SCHULZE, Hagen, *Der Weg zum Nationalstaat. Die deutsche Nationalbewegung vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Reichsgründung*, München 1997, p. 77.

127 BLACKBOURN, David, *History of Germany 1780–1918. The Long Nineteenth Century*, Oxford 2003, p. 72.

128 After William IV's death, the personal union with Hanover ended, and his brother Ernest Augustus became King, immediately annulling the constitution. Protests erupted across the state, and opinions in Hanover remained divided. PÁSZTOROVÁ, Barbora, *Vliv červencové revoluce ve Francii na německý nacionalismus*. In: *Historický obzor* 28, 2017, č. 3/4, p. 51.

129 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Zrod německého nacionalismu*, Plzeň 2013, p. 141.

130 DESMOND, Seward, *Metternich. Der erste Europäer. Eine Biographie*, Zürich 1993, p. 226.

131 GILDEA, Robert, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800–1914*, Oxford 2003, p. 79.

132 Cartwright to Palmerston, Frankfurt, 8 June 1833, TNA, FO 33/44.

Austria, in cooperation with Prussia, secured the adoption of the so-called Six Articles, which were federal laws.¹³³ Each of its regulations included abolition of a free press, stricter censorship, a ban on political organisations, people's gatherings, festivals, and public political speeches.¹³⁴ One crucial point was the right for Prussia and Austria to intervene militarily in the name of the German Confederation if any of its member states changed the constitution arbitrarily.¹³⁵

In order to incorporate international guarantees within the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, a guarantee of the signatory Powers applied to the German Confederation.¹³⁶ For Palmerston, the clause on intervention against members of the Confederation represented interference in the internal affairs of free states. Although they were members of a single national-political grouping, this did not give Austria or Prussia the right to interfere in the matters of other member states.¹³⁷ In his famous speech, he later stated: "Constitutional states in Europe are natural allies of England."¹³⁸ Lamb conveyed Palmerston's opinion and the stance of his government to Metternich regarding the events in the German Confederation during June 1832:

Great Britain, wrote the Principal Secretary of State, is a contracting party to the Treaty of Vienna, of which the arrangements concerning Germany form one of the principal treaties. The British government is also bound by ties of friendship with the German States; therefore, everything that tends either to disturb these arrangements and thereby endanger the general peace, or specifically harm the welfare of these States, must arouse the deepest interest of His Majesty's Government.¹³⁹

Metternich viewed the matter through a different political lens. From his perspective, the revolution and the related liberal radicalism were a Europe-wide issue, not an isolated phenomenon, but rather something that spread across societies.¹⁴⁰ As he stated in a letter to Paris: "At any rate, there exists in Europe only one affair of any moment, and that is the Revolution."¹⁴¹ He rejected separate spheres of in-

133 The Six Articles was issued on 28 June 1832.

134 The entire wording of the circular to individual German Confederation courts in: METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 244.

135 MÜLLER, Jürgen, *Der Deutsche Bund 1815–1866*, München 2006, p. 17.

136 GRUNER, Wolf Dietrich, *Die deutsche Frage. Ein Problem der europäischen Geschichte seit 1800*, München 1985, p. 80.

137 BAUMGART, p. 279.

138 Neumann to Metternich, London, 7 August, 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

139 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 31 October 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

140 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 28 June 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

141 Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 14 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199; METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 189.

fluence in this matter. For him, revolutionary movements represented a general evil spreading across Europe.¹⁴²

British intervention in conditions in the German states was balanced by Austrian activity during the civil war in Spain, an aspect which Chapter 7, “*Civil War in Portugal and Spain, and the Quadruple Alliance*,” shall discuss. Metternich’s objectives were thus not only focused on defending Austrian interests in the German Confederation but also on taking an active approach against the British in Western Europe. Domestic political affairs within Great Britain also had an important influence on Palmerston’s actions within Central Europe.¹⁴³ He strongly disapproved of Metternich’s policies concerning Germany and Europe and considered them to be reactionary, lacking in sensibility, and ultimately a threat to the peace of Europe.¹⁴⁴ As with the criticism of Russia’s actions in Poland, the current issue of electoral reform and the need to heed the voices of his voters also played a role in this matter.¹⁴⁵ Unexpectedly, it was the domestic press that began to criticise him for taking an overly moderate approach to foreign affairs.¹⁴⁶ He was also accused of making poor choices for diplomatic representatives at European courts.¹⁴⁷ The free British press wanted the influence of French radicals on European politics to be restricted. As such, they supported and urged the British government to ensure active policy, which would become a central voice for all liberals on the Continent.¹⁴⁸

In pursuing British interests in Central Europe, Palmerston relied exclusively on his future brother-in-law, the British ambassador to Vienna, Frederick Lamb.¹⁴⁹ Relations between the two men were not just highly professional but also friendly. Upon his arrival in Vienna, Palmerston wrote:

The King having been graciously pleased to select you to be His Majesty’s ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Emperor of Austria, I have much satisfaction in transmitting to Your Excellency the letter by which the King accredits you in that character to His Imperial Majesty.¹⁵⁰

142 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 24 June 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

143 BROWN, *Lord Palmerston and Parliamentary Representation*, p. 49.

144 GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 6.

145 MILTON-SMITH, p. 70.

146 BROWN, David, *Compelling but not Controlling? Palmerston and the Press 1846–1855*. In: *The Journal of the Historical Association* 86, 2001, 281, p. 45.

147 *Morning Chronicle*, 5 October 1832, enclosed in the letter to: Neumann to Metternich, London, 7 October 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

148 Neumann to Metternich, London, 7 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

149 RIDLEY, p. 112.

150 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 27 January 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

In private correspondence to the ambassador, the Foreign Secretary often openly confided in him in a manner he did to very few of his colleagues. In 1835, he officially praised him for his service to the cabinet and increased his salary, something that did not often occur during his time as Foreign Secretary.¹⁵¹

Although a Whig, Metternich liked Lamb, and this brought the two statesmen closer together. Lamb also had, for a brief period, excellent relations with the Chancellor's advisor, Friedrich von Gentz.¹⁵² He was a proponent of conservative policies and continually attempted to convince Metternich of the need for cooperation with Britain. For him, Austria should be an ally to be used as a counterweight to France or Russia to keep balance on the Continent.¹⁵³ The British constitutional system portrayed him as purely aristocratic.¹⁵⁴ During his time in Vienna, he sent many letters to Palmerston defending Ballhausplatz's policies.¹⁵⁵ He later declared of the Austrian Chancellor: "He was an overly practical man who regulated his behaviour in line with his own doctrines, and intelligent enough to abandon his doctrines to conceal his behaviour."¹⁵⁶ According to him, cooperation with Vienna was a guarantee of the workability of the international order, and Austria should be a reliable partner for Great Britain.

Like other British diplomats in the Eastern Powers, he saw France as the primary danger to peace in Europe. He supported Metternich's vision of an allied Prussian-Austrian army as the best protection against war with their Western neighbour.¹⁵⁷ Following the outbreak of unrest in South-West Germany, he defended the interests of the Monarchy over his own government.¹⁵⁸ Palmerston disagreed with this defence. His main vision was the spread of political freedoms in the German Confederation and the defence of liberal movements across Europe. Lamb argued in line with the Austrian Chancellor that one could not assess the conditions within the German states from the perspective of an Englishman.¹⁵⁹

Even so, Palmerston did not change his opinion on the Habsburg Monarchy's approach in Central Europe. He said that the Six Articles suppressed states' rights

151 Treasury Minute, London, 8 September 1835, TNA, FO 7/255.

152 Gentz died on 9 June 1832. SRBIK, Heinrich Ritter von, *Statesman of Philosophical Principles*. In: KRAEHE, Enno E. (ed.), *The Metternich Controversy*, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Atlanta, Dallas, Montreal, Toronto, London, Sydney 1971, p. 36.

153 SOUTHGATE, p. 54.

154 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 224.

155 SOUTHGATE, p. 55.

156 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 September 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

157 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 31 May 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

158 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 21 September, 1832, FO 120/124.

159 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 35.

to their own political development. In a letter to Vienna, he shared his opinion that if Metternich had granted the citizens of the German Confederation at least a little freedom, then their desire for revolution would immediately dissolve.¹⁶⁰ Over the course of the summer of 1832, he sent a number of other dispatches criticising Vienna's policy. With Lamb's assistance, the Chancellor explained the Austrian perspective on the matter. First of all, he rejected the British government's right to intervene in the affairs of the Confederation. Second, he emphasised that its purpose was not just to defend against an external enemy but also to unite in defending against an internal threat to its integrity, allowing Austria to protect it. According to the Federal Acts, the constitution adopted in each of the states, such as Bavaria, should also be approved by the Federal Diet. If the Diet rejected it and the particular state did not abolish it, Austria then acquired the right to intervene on behalf of the entire Confederation. As he noted at the end of his statement, the threat to the stability of the whole of Europe was German nationalists aligning with French extremists.¹⁶¹ He believed that it was Great Britain that should focus primarily on the balance of power and prevent the threat of a general war.¹⁶² Austrian policy's objective was to maintain order in Central Europe and secure the fulfilment of political obligations by the German courts.¹⁶³

Vienna's arguments fell on deaf ears in Britain. The British press and public opposed the Habsburg Monarchy, describing it as a despotic state that denied its subjects liberty.¹⁶⁴ Palmerston considered Metternich's strategy hopeless. He thought that liberalism could be suppressed in Poland or in the Papal States, but not within a decentralised territory numbering 12 million citizens, which he meant the German states.¹⁶⁵ Despite domestic political pressure, any policy of active intervention by the London government was just as unrealistic as in the case of Poland.¹⁶⁶ During the government discussions, Palmerston strongly opposed the Six Articles. Grey countered with the objection that the situation in the German Confederation was not exclusively a British matter and defended the doctrine of non-intervention.¹⁶⁷

160 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 25 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/137.

161 Heytesbury in St Petersburg also supported these ideas, reinforcing the stance and adding weight to the arguments: Heytesbury to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 6 July 1832, TNA, FO 165/199.

162 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 24 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

163 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 24 June 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

164 *The Globe*, 25 June 1832, enclosed in letter: Neumann to Metternich, London, 27 June 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

165 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 227.

166 BELL, vol. I, p. 157.

167 Neumann to Metternich, London, 27 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

The situation was different in Hanover. Here, the Six Articles had been adopted without previous consultation with Palmerston. Despite his vain protests, William IV affirmed their validity. Thus, in the case of Hanover, British policy was not in accordance with Palmerston's vision, and this led to conflict between him and the King.¹⁶⁸ The British king believed that intervening in the affairs of the Confederation could jeopardise Britain's global interests, particularly during a period characterised by the rise of divergent ideological factions across Europe.¹⁶⁹ This time, the press sided with the Foreign Secretary.¹⁷⁰ In the meantime, Lamb criticised these articles from Vienna and described Britain's newspapers as more radical than the revolutionary press in France.¹⁷¹ Palmerston wrote a letter to William IV, informing him of the necessity of the Hanover government respecting London's policies, especially in regard to the common interests of both states. This "non-observance" of official British policy was to be an exception that was not to be repeated.¹⁷²

Contrary to the opinions of his Foreign Secretary, William IV was determined to support adherence to a monarchist principle as the King of Hanover.¹⁷³ This led Palmerston to discuss with Grey the nature of the personal union with Hanover. They thought a resolution could be found if the two states kept each other better informed without any intervention in their internal affairs.¹⁷⁴ Grey conveyed this vision to the British King: "Our conduct must be regulated by English principles and English interests, and we cannot be diverted from the line prescribed by these because Hanover has taken a different course."¹⁷⁵ Together, they urged William IV to prevent any change to the Hanover Constitution. Should he not do so, Great Britain would not protect the state, and there would be further outbreaks of unrest. The British King objected that in the event of a larger conflict, only Austria or Prussia would be able to provide an adequate defence anyway.¹⁷⁶ Although the Foreign Secretary did not want to accept the King's conclusions, he could not do anything about it.

168 GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 48.

169 *Ibid.*

170 SIMMS, Brendan, RIOTTE, Torsten, *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History 1714–1837*, Cambridge 2010, p. 105.

171 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 229.

172 Palmerston to William IV, London, 5 September 1832, WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 799.

173 Neumann to Metternich, London, 27 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

174 SIMMS, RIOTTE, p. 106.

175 Grey to Palmerston, London, 3 August 1832, WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 830.

176 SIMMS, RIOTTE, p. 108.

Palmerston's approach to Hanover also had another objective in mind. One motive was an attempt to finally refute the accusations of the opposition and some of the public that he supported repressive policies on the Continent. Considering British public opinion and the tense situation in Parliament, he was forced to make a public declaration defending liberal values.¹⁷⁷ Edward Bulwer-Lytton and Scottish radical Joseph Hume supported him. Once he had most of the governing cabinet on his side, he made a speech to the House of Commons primarily focused on the general British public. In his speech on 2 August 1832, he argued that constitutional powers were natural allies for Great Britain.¹⁷⁸ Neumann, who was present at this session, immediately reported everything to Vienna.¹⁷⁹ The next point in his speech was his opinion on interfering in the domestic arrangements of European states:

The principle of interference meant either interference by force of arms, or by friendly counsel and advice. Now, he thought, the principle for this government to proceed upon was that of non-interference by force of arms in the affairs of any other country, but he did not think that we should be precluded where it was expedient for us to do so, from interfering by friendly counsel and advice. When we talked of the principle of non-interference, it meant that it would not be expedient, on the part of this government, to interfere by force of arms to dictate to any other state with respect to its internal affairs.¹⁸⁰

He further added:

That as long as our commerce is of importance to us – as long as Continental armies are in existence – as long as it is possible that a Power in one quarter may become dangerous to a Power in another – so long must England look with interest on the transactions of the Continent, and so long is it proper for this country, in the maintenance of its own independence, not to shut its eyes to anything that threatens the independence of Germany.¹⁸¹

Two hundred copies of this speech were sent to courts around the Confederation, encouraging many liberals across the continent.

¹⁷⁷ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 34.

¹⁷⁸ Neumann to Metternich, London, 2 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁷⁹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 7 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁸⁰ Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 2 August 1832, *Germany – Protocol of Diet HC Deb 02 August 1832 vol 14 cc1030-71* [online], [quote. 2019-22–04]. Available on: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1832/aug/02/germany-protocol-of-the-diet#S3V0014P0_18320802_HOC_38.

¹⁸¹ Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 2 August 1832, *Germany – Protocol of Diet HC Deb 02 August 1832 vol 14 cc1030-71* [online], [quote. 2019-22–04]. Available on: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1832/aug/02/germany-protocol-of-the-diet#S3V0014P0_18320802_HOC_38.

A week later, Neumann had another conversation with Palmerston. He sought to understand the reasons behind Britain's hostility towards Austria and the objectives pursued through distributing pamphlets:

Lord Palmerston, like all those who have no good excuse to give, turned his defence into an attack point, and said: 'You want to destroy the form of their government; it is Austria,' he said, 'that advised Russia to abolish the Constitution in Poland, it is Austria that encouraged the Pope in his resistance, it is Austria that recognised the King of Spain's right to intervene in the affairs of Portugal, it is Austria that sought to draw us into threatening actions against Switzerland, similar to those of the Frankfurt Diet, it is Austria which by its attitude and military position threatens Switzerland and Germany simultaneously, filling the former with anxiety and compelling it to arm thirty thousand men out of fear of an invasion on its part, and requests the Grand Duke of Baden to occupy Constance'.¹⁸²

Palmerston also expressed concern that the proposed resolutions, being too severe, could cause a rift between the people and their sovereigns. He feared that, to avoid the fate of Charles X, the sovereigns might unite with their people and seek external protection, likely from France, which would be eager to provide it and warned that this could lead to a schism in Germany, manifesting within the Diet and potentially causing its dissolution. He further noted that the complications from such a situation would be significant. Metternich was upset after reading Neumann's reports.¹⁸³ Not only did Great Britain not support Austria's position regarding the prevailing crisis in the Papal States, but it also took an opposing position regarding the German states.¹⁸⁴

In this situation, Palmerston probably went further than he had planned. In his instructions to Lamb, he asked that his words be interpreted in the spirit of the British Parliament so as to limit their impact. His speech of 2 August 1832 was a real example of the ambiguity of Palmerston's politics.¹⁸⁵ On the home front, he was forced to act as a leading figure within liberalism, whereas in official correspondence, he tried to adjust such arguments so as to leave space for diplomatic manoeuvring. Metternich later said that he acted like a conservative in domestic policy and like a liberal in foreign policy.¹⁸⁶ In fact, Palmerston wanted to preserve Britain's dominant position within the Concert of Europe.

¹⁸² Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁸³ Neumann to Metternich, 14 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁸⁴ RIDLEY, p. 156.

¹⁸⁵ In a private discussion with Neumann, Palmerston called it a "*collection of conscience*." Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 September 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁸⁶ BELL, vol. I, p. 154.

His modified speech was sent through official diplomatic channels to Vienna and Berlin. Although the dispatch was intended only for these two states, it eventually reached all the German courts. Lamb, who further interpreted it to Metternich, delivered the letter on 7 September 1832. In his response, the Austrian Chancellor said:

The English government, by all accounts, is taking a dim view of the Austrian position in the German Confederation and the true significance of the decree of 28 June . . . The 28 June regulation was unanimously adopted by confederation members, so there must have been a unanimous and general feeling as to its necessity, which nevertheless did not lead the Diet to go beyond the threshold of strictly observing the law.¹⁸⁷

That same day, he sent London another dispatch, writing:

There are significant differences here between principles and positions; differences which are becoming increasingly sharp between Great Britain and Austria each day . . . The principle of unchanging conditions is the foundation of Austria's internal and external policy. Our own existence and peace in Europe are firmly associated with preserving this principle . . . We are accused by England of rejecting a system of concessions and taking a route of repression. The idea that we have a preference solely for repression is erroneous. Our true system is the following: 'We do not pursue a system of repression as the antithesis to a system of concessions; we simply pursue a system of prevention in order not to be forced to pursue a system of repression.' I must justify a sincere desire to support good understanding between the two Powers and strive to eliminate misunderstandings arising from a one-sided perspective, which stands in the way of happy collaboration.¹⁸⁸

From Austria's standpoint, the British position was perceived as direct interference in the internal affairs of the German Confederation and a failure to respect international spheres of influence.

The British document was not given credit in other states of the German Confederation either. In Prussia, the new Foreign Minister, Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon, refused to accept it. The British ambassador in Berlin, Gilbert Elliot Murray Kynynmound, Earl of Minto, managed to salvage the situation by explaining that it was merely Palmerston's personal opinion, although this was not true. After the final acceptance of the dispatch, the British ambassador assured Prussia of the report's pacifist intentions and the British efforts to preserve peace in Europe. Metternich undertook the same step as Palmerston and had his response

¹⁸⁷ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 31 October 1832 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

¹⁸⁸ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 31 October 1832 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

sent around the German courts unofficially. His defence was able to firmly unite Austria and Prussia in their policies within the German Confederation.¹⁸⁹

Surprisingly, Palmerston and Metternich had the same opinion on the emerging customs union under Prussia.¹⁹⁰ Austria's Chancellor was aware that a change in political and economic conditions in Central Europe threatened Habsburg's interests and could result in Prussian domination within the territory.¹⁹¹ As such, he endeavoured to prevent this trade integration, even though it was difficult to find a means to achieve this.¹⁹² In contrast, Palmerston wanted a market that was as open as possible to ensure the maximum sale of British goods within the territory. While he spoke of adopting liberal reforms and freedoms, he opposed any kind of integration that might pose a threat to British power or economic interests.¹⁹³

As early as the beginning of 1833, Metternich informed Neumann that the situation in the German Confederation was gradually calming down and stabilising. On this occasion, he could not resist remarking on the poor political judgement of the British Foreign Secretary: "Nothing that Mr Palmerston had predicted has come to pass, and it is precisely the opposite of what he expected that has happened. We must acknowledge that this Minister is not distinguished by the strength of his calculations!"¹⁹⁴ The British government further distanced itself from supporting the German liberals, effectively leaving the affairs in Central Europe under the control of the two Eastern Powers.

Another unique case wherein Palmerston acted in line with Austrian policy was the matter of Switzerland. His actions in this confederation of cantons were deliberately counter to liberals. The July events boosted movements within individual cantons that aimed to strengthen the power of the central government. Conservative regions were opposed. Algernon Percy was a British diplomat and a conservative politician who sided with the conservative Catholic representatives.¹⁹⁵ Palmerston was opposed to the centralisation of Switzerland mainly because of the large number of radical liberals amongst the centralists linked to

189 BILLINGER, Robert, *The War Scare of 1831 and Prussian-South German Plans*. In: SCHNEID, Frederick (ed.), *European politics 1815–1848*, Farnham 2011, p. 277.

190 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 374.

191 PÁSZTOROVÁ, Barbora, *Metternich a německá otázka v letech 1840–1848*, Plzeň 2019, p. 41.

192 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 29 December 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

193 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 17 January 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

194 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 2 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

195 He was replaced by David Richard Morier in 1832, who remained in the role for a further 15 years.

Paris. The growing French influence aroused Palmerston's concern that centralisation would make Switzerland a puppet state of its neighbour.¹⁹⁶

Metternich's concern was ideological and political in nature in this case. The revolutionary sentiments in Switzerland were closely linked to those in the German Confederation.¹⁹⁷ Therefore, it was necessary to address issues in both countries simultaneously to stabilise the situation in either one.¹⁹⁸ Another factor was the fact that the centralisation of a government with a republican character would conflict with the provisions established in 1815. After Paris, Geneva was the largest refuge for many revolutionaries and a base for secret societies.¹⁹⁹ Liberals who wanted greater centralisation also supported revolutionaries, which strengthened Metternich's belief in a European revolutionary plot managed from Paris whose objective was to undermine the prevailing international order.²⁰⁰ The Austrian Chancellor saw a clear way out of the situation: to abolish the neutrality guaranteed by the Powers at the Congress of Vienna.²⁰¹ He defended this move by stating that it aimed to protect the federation from decline and from falling under the control of demagogues and added that the consequences would be less favourable for Austria than for France. His sole aim remained to strengthen the influence of the conservative party and ensure the defeat of liberals. In conclusion, Metternich positively noted that Switzerland's neutral status was not definitively lost.²⁰²

During May 1832, Vienna urged Neumann to push Palmerston so that London could take a shared approach alongside Vienna.²⁰³ The British Foreign Secretary was not against the idea, but he made his help conditional upon government support. His main argument linked the cantonal system to the guarantee of neutrality. If there were to be a change in the way the state was arranged, this guarantee would thus no longer apply. He wrote in his instructions to Granville regarding this issue:

196 Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

197 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 October 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

198 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 11 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

199 SOUTHGATE, p. 45.

200 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 11 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

201 LENHERR, Luzius, *Ultimatum an die Schweiz. Der politische Druck Metternich auf die Eidgenossenschaft infolge ihrer Asylpolitik in der Regeneration 1833–1836*, Bern 1991, p. 51.

202 Lamb explicitly added: "In the course of conversation, it was observed that the menace of revoking the neutrality of Switzerland might perhaps not be acted upon if it should fail to produce its effect." Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

203 Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

The neutrality of Switzerland was established not solely for her own benefit, but for the general advantage of Europe, and in order to diminish the chances of interruption of the peaceful relations of the states towards each other, it would seem that the motives which led to the guarantee of that neutrality would not cease to operate even in the event apprehended by the Cabinet of Vienna. It would be wiser therefore for the guaranteeing Powers to wait till Switzerland shall have failed in performing her part of the duties of neutrality before they anticipate the case in which they might find themselves absolved from the fulfilment of theirs.²⁰⁴

His primary opponent was Grey, who observed that Belgium, as a centralised state, had similarly attained neutral status. The position was later reconsidered, with an agreement to the proposal contingent on France's approval. This led to a recommendation for the central Swiss government to take measures to ease tensions and stabilise the situation as much as possible.

Metternich was relatively satisfied with the measures Palmerston took regarding the Swiss question. The only situation in which the British government protested against Austria was the length of time that imperial troops should remain at the Swiss-Austrian borders. In the end, a resolution was found to the crisis, and Switzerland retained its neutrality.²⁰⁵ Another issue soon arose. Palmerston received a dispatch claiming that the Eastern courts intended to force the Swiss government to expel all refugees, mostly liberals, from the revolutions in the German Confederation and Poland. In response, he declared:

If Switzerland agreed, she would be dishonoured, and her independence would be at an end. It is Austria that provokes all this; she forces the small governments to follow her system. Austria will bear all the responsibility, and the consequences will fall on her. France will not tolerate this, and I must warn you that England will act alongside France – this could lead to war or, at the very least, demonstrate that today's France will be defeated just as it was in the past.²⁰⁶

Hummelauer attempted to explain the Austrian position, asserting that his country's approach was driven by the conviction that they were acting both rightly and justly, and that it aligned with their own rights and interests. This issue stemmed from exaggerated reports from Paris, which sought to amplify the entire problem and deepen Palmerston's already profound suspicion towards the three Eastern courts. Metternich refuted these accusations, leading to the temporary postponement of the Swiss issue.

²⁰⁴ Palmerston to Granville, London, 15 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

²⁰⁵ SUTERMEISTER, Werner, *Metternich und die Schweiz 1840–1848*, unpublished dissertation, Bern 1895, p. 68.

²⁰⁶ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 4 July 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

The affairs of Central Europe were another example of Palmerston acting solely in accordance with British interests rather than in the role attributed to him as a “defender of liberalism.” His policy towards the Poles focused more on influencing British public opinion than on any genuine attempt at direct intervention in the region. It served as a second front against Russian opposition during the negotiations over Belgium in London. For him, the abolition of the Polish Constitution was evidence that the Eastern courts were moving towards repressive policies, directly conflicting with the British liberal regime. A similar perspective could be seen in his stance on the German Confederation. To Palmerston, Austrian rule represented a repressive regime seeking to suppress all liberal freedoms in Central Europe. In neither case was his plan successful; instead, it revealed the limits of British political influence, although it did win him public sympathy at home. The Swiss issue revealed another facet of his strategy, where liberal ties represented a potential expansion of French influence, which London viewed with great suspicion. In this instance, his policy aligned with Metternich’s, even though his excessive distrust did not entirely disappear but deepened as further European diplomatic events unfolded.

Despite some agreement on secondary policy issues, relations between London and Vienna were markedly tense, which made relations with St Petersburg deteriorate even faster.²⁰⁷ The more Palmerston distanced himself from cooperation with Eastern courts, the faster they came to an agreement on the necessity of cooperation.²⁰⁸ Within the German Confederation, the British Foreign Secretary failed to understand the Austrian perspective on the matter, and in an endeavour to satisfy public opinion, he intervened in affairs, but the British approach did not result in the desired effect.²⁰⁹ This misunderstanding of Metternich’s policies in Central Europe, and subsequently in the Italian states, deepened divisions in continental cooperation and resulted in polarisation between the Conservative and Maritime Powers.²¹⁰

207 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 37.

208 ANGELOW, Jürgen, *Von Wien nach Königgrätz. Die Sicherheitspolitik des Deutschen Bundes im europäischen Gleichgewicht (1815–1866)*, München 1996, p. 106.

209 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 374.

210 HOLBRAAD, Carsten, *The Concert of Europe. A Study in German and British International Theory 1815–1914*, London 1970, p. 141.

5 Crisis on the Italian Peninsula and a Final Split

While Palmerston's main international interest in the first half of the 1830s was Belgium's independence, for Metternich, it was undoubtedly maintaining the status quo in the Italian states. Austrian domination within the Italian regions had been laid out at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. For Metternich, it was a "question of life and death."¹ For this reason, he was prepared to defend the order in Italy, even at the cost of armed confrontation. He had even convinced Europe that this was the case in 1820–1821 when he suppressed the revolution in Naples and Piedmont.² British policy on the Italian Peninsula had been clearly pro-Austrian at the start of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Stable conditions in the area were crucial for maintaining the balance of power across the Continent.³ The monarchy's traditional rival in Southern Europe was France. Between 1815 and 1830, the operational capabilities of the House of Bourbon were significantly limited. Paris was internationally isolated, and the only way for France to gain international recognition was to cooperate within the Concert of Europe. These conditions changed with the July Revolution when France's desire to restore international prestige became more evident.⁴

Metternich was concerned about French aggression against Austria right after the revolution in Paris had succeeded.⁵ To counter this, he began rearming and strengthening the Austrian army to prepare for a defensive war with its western neighbour. The main focus of peacekeeping nevertheless remained international cooperation. As such, he appealed to the Italian rulers to recognise Louis Philippe's regime and cooperate with him as soon as possible. This would avoid an escalation of tensions domestically and prevent unrest. Another guarantee was Great Britain's support and interest in preventing France from pursuing expansionist policies. The Orléans regime, in contrast, endeavoured to push Vienna out of the Italian Peninsula and take over its position.⁶

1 REINERMAN, Alan J., *Metternich, the Powers and the 1831 Italian Crisis*. In: Central European History 10, 1977, 4, p. 207.

2 REINERMAN, Alan J., *Metternich and the Papal Condemnation of the Carbonari, 1821*. In: The Catholic Historical Review 54, 1968, 1, p. 68.

3 DAVIS, John Anthony, *Italy in the Nineteenth Century 1796–1900*, Oxford 2000, p. 55.

4 REINERMAN, Alan J., *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Revolution and Reaction, 1830–1848*, vol. II, p. 5.

5 BURY, John Patrick, *The New Cambridge Modern History. The Zenith of European Power 1830–1870*, vol. X, Cambridge 1960, p. 251.

6 REINERMAN, Alan J., *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Between Conflict and Cooperation, 1809–1830*, vol. I, Washington 1979, p. 171.

The July Revolution mobilised Italian revolutionaries, and Paris took advantage of this situation. During November 1830, the French ambassador in Vienna, Marshal Nicolas-Joseph Maison, was not afraid to speak of French readiness to risk a war with Austria should its interests in Italy be threatened. Louis Philippe's ambassador in Berlin, General Charles-Joseph, Comte de Flahaut, even told Palmerston that "the interference of Austria in Italy would produce a more popular war than the reunion of Belgium or the Rhineland provinces."⁷ Palmerston endeavoured to avoid an Austrian-French conflict at any cost, but at the same time, he exploited the emerging rivalry to pursue the adoption of liberal reforms at Italian courts. In contrast, Italian rulers feared the outbreak of revolution on their land alongside French aggression. They saw Austria as their primary protector. Metternich was not willing under any circumstances to tolerate a revolutionary movement on the peninsula. A revolution in Italy would also represent a threat to the security of the entire Habsburg Monarchy.⁸

The Austrian Chancellor continued his endeavours to avoid a war by all means, and his diplomatic representation at different courts reflected this. In Turin, Heinrich Franz Graf von Bombelles took up the envoy post, tasked with reducing Austro-French tensions.⁹ Similar changes occurred in other states. Metternich assured the Italian monarchs that they could count on Austrian military support, but only if they were unable to suppress the revolution by their own means and officially requested assistance.¹⁰ In Paris, however, an anti-Austrian faction was growing in strength. This group represented the Progress Party and radicals who, led by Marquis Gilbert du Motier de Lafayette, were calling for a stricter approach towards Vienna. French propaganda influenced public opinion with stories of Austria's desire to occupy the Italian Peninsula and implant its dynasty at different courts. At the same time, French diplomats in the region pressured the monarchies to maintain their neutrality in case of a conflict with Austria or to join the French side.¹¹ Through Apponyi, Metternich protested the incitement of revolutionaries within the Italian states. His complaints received no response from Paris.¹² Instead, French units composed of Italian volunteers began to gather at the Piedmontese border.¹³

⁷ SOUTHGATE, p. 44.

⁸ REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. II, p. 22.

⁹ ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 44.

¹⁰ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 20 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

¹¹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 27 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

¹² REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. I, p. 172.

¹³ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

Vienna thus found itself in a diplomatic trap. Either it could avoid war and give in to the revolutionaries, weakening its position of power on the peninsula, or it could risk an eventual war with France by intervening militarily to support the legitimate rulers. This dilemma was made even starker by France's declaration of a non-intervention policy, which Paris was attempting to apply to the Italian states as it had with Belgium.¹⁴ Another blow to the Habsburg Monarchy came with the outbreak of the Polish Uprising, during which a section of its army, numbering 30,000 soldiers, had to be left in Galicia in preparation for intervention. These troops had originally been sent to northern Italy. As a result, an army of 60,000 soldiers arrived on the peninsula in February 1831 instead of the originally planned 90,000.¹⁵ Russia, constrained by the events in Poland, could not provide Austria with sufficient support in the event of war, creating favourable conditions for the French government. Metternich also failed to secure support from Berlin, as a war with France was not desirable due to Italian affairs, further complicated by tense relations regarding the Belgian question. The southern German states even considered creating a neutral league to avoid war.¹⁶

During this growing crisis, the British government declared its policy generally neutral. Nevertheless, Palmerston's approach during the crisis in Italy appeared to favour France. The Foreign Secretary saw the most significant risk of a possible war in Piedmont, neighbouring France.¹⁷ London's primary interest was to avert French intervention and the expansion of its territory to include Savoy and Nice. The concept of the Italian states, which had arisen during the Congress of Vienna through cooperation with London and Vienna, had been set up to prevent Paris's aggression in this region. Austria and Great Britain were to take most of the burden here, using their fleets in the Mediterranean Sea to help defend the territory.¹⁸ This plan no longer applied after 1830. Palmerston assured Charles Felix's Foreign Minister, Victor-Amédée Sallier de La Tour, that a balance of power on the Continent was in Britain's interest, and this could only be secured through

14 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190; THAYER, William Roscoe, *The Dawn of Italian Independence. Italy from the Congress of Vienna to the Fall of Venice 1849*, vol. I, Cambridge 1892, p. 353.

15 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 15 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/113. However, as the situation on the peninsula became more complex, the number of Austrian soldiers had increased to a total of 120,000 by March 1831, according to Cowley. Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 19 March 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

16 BILLINGER, *The War Scare of 1831*, p. 278.

17 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

18 WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822*, London 1924, p. 101.

peace, which could be achieved through a doctrine of non-intervention.¹⁹ This development played into France's hands because London gave it the green light and the option to respond openly. Sébastiani assured de la Tour that France would not engage if no foreign troops crossed onto Piedmont soil. The Piedmontese minister was not satisfied with this declaration, as he did not perceive the threat to Turin as merely direct aggression, but also as France inciting an uprising. As a result, the northern Italian state turned to Vienna to secure international protection.²⁰

In 1830, no agreement guaranteed Austrian help for Piedmont. De la Tour asked Palmerston for his consent to Austro-Piedmont defence cooperation. The security barrier against the French threat at sea, which Austria was unable to secure, was the British fleet anchored in the Mediterranean.²¹ The British Foreign Secretary warned Paris about supporting Italian radicals and warned that this would breach the principle of non-intervention. He was inclined to favour some guarantee for Turin, but only if the entire cabinet agreed. Since Charles Felix's regime was one of the most conservative on the peninsula, Palmerston was mainly concerned about preserving the balance of power in the area and not supporting liberalism. At the same time, he called for reforms to be implemented and for Austrian military assistance not to be relied upon, as this would only provoke French intervention.²² No guarantee came from the British, as His Majesty's Government was preoccupied with electoral reform and the revolution in Belgium, viewing southern Europe as a secondary interest.²³

Once again, Palmerston's policy was ambiguous. If London were to provide Piedmont with certain security guarantees, then no French intervention would occur. Still, British diplomacy sought a joint approach with France during the revolution in Belgium, and it wanted to secure political synergy.²⁴ Palmerston's approach gave France the advantage. He considered a security guarantee for Northern Italy to be an unnecessary international burden for his country, and he declared that London would not go to war unless it were about national honour or the defence of the state.²⁵ On the other hand, Great Britain could not allow the Orléans regime to undermine the Vienna system and gain dominance in Southern Europe. Austria guaranteed the preservation of the status quo, even though the

19 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 16 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

20 REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. I, p. 173.

21 BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Great Britain and Sea Power 1815–1853*, Oxford 1963, p. 85.

22 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 24 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/111.

23 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 204.

24 Palmerston to Granville, London, 18 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/111.

25 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 24 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/111.

two states were ideologically far apart. Palmerston described Britain's political vision in Piedmont in a letter to Granville: "It will be impossible for England to take part with Austria in a war entered into to put down freedom and maintain despotism; neither can we side with France in a contest the result of which may be to extend her territories; we shall therefore keep out of the contest as long as we can."²⁶ The outcome was to be a kind of manoeuvring between Paris and Vienna. At the same time, both states were to be monitored to ensure that neither of them went further in their policies than London was willing to tolerate.

There was a change in Turin on 17 April 1831, when Charles Felix died, and Charles Albert succeeded to the throne. His government launched several minor reforms, but with little effect. The threat of rebellion on Piedmont's streets remained, making them seek security guarantees from Austria.²⁷ In the end, a secret military agreement was signed between Austria and Piedmont on 28 June 1831. The signature of this agreement remained secret, even to London. Yet, this did not mean that Charles Albert had abandoned good relations with Britain. For him, Great Britain remained a guarantor of Piedmont's independence, and its role in the Mediterranean Sea remained crucial.²⁸

In the end, the actual threat of the Austro-French war arose not out of the crisis in Piedmont but rather out of Central Italy, specifically the Papal States. Pope Pius VIII died on 30 November 1830 at the age of 69, when the Belgian Revolution was at its peak and the November Uprising was beginning.²⁹ The end of the rule of the pro-Austrian head of the Church encouraged Italian radicals to launch a revolt within the State of the Church.³⁰ Paris also exploited the election of a new pope, endeavouring to influence the conclave to advance its candidate.³¹ Metternich did not feel the need to interfere in the election because he believed that the Papal States would always rely on Austrian support.³² Nevertheless, the situation in Central Italy was critical.³³ The Church regime was wracked with corruption and ruled by an ultra-conservative group of clergy known as the Zelanti.³⁴ Power in different areas lay in the hands of local administrators, and the only region where the Pope had broad support was Rome. In this state, the conclave

²⁶ BELL, vol. I, p. 161.

²⁷ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

²⁸ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 203.

²⁹ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

³⁰ BUSCHKÜHL, Matthias, *Great Britain and the Holy See 1746–1870*, Blackrock 1982, p. 71.

³¹ SUCHÁNEK, Drahomír, *Právo exkluzivity při papežských volbách*, Praha, 2012, p. 104.

³² ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *The Decline of the Congress System. Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy*, London 2018, p. 48.

³³ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 15 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

³⁴ HALES, Edward Elton Young, *Revolution and Papacy 1769–1846*, London 1960, p. 262.

took three months to choose a new representative of God on Earth. This delay had negative consequences for the State of the Church. On 2 February 1831, Cardinal Bartolomeo Alberto Cappellari was elected Pope Gregory XVI. The next day, an uprising broke out in Modena and Bologna, quickly spreading to Parma and the Marche region. The state of his army forced the new head of the Church to turn to Austria to ask officially for help.³⁵

Paris protested strongly against this decision. The French Envoy in Rome, Louis Pierre Bellocq, threatened to leave if Austrian soldiers entered the territory of the Papal States. The policy of the Orléans regime was similar to its policy in Piedmont, except that regarding the Papal States, prestige played a key role rather than expansionist ambition.³⁶ France's objective was to end Austrian domination on the Italian Peninsula, even at the cost of war. Metternich was deeply outraged by French policy:

The course that the French government has recently pursued in Roman affairs is certainly regrettable; it does not surprise us, though. We have never had high expectations of those who base their actions on a nature and principles characterized by a peculiar combination of weakness and pretension, always participating in and indulging in all forms of flattery and envy of every kind, at all times, toward every regime.³⁷

Sébastieniani accused Austria of trying to rule over Italian territory. The Habsburg Monarchy's position in Parma and Modena was so strong that there was practically zero chance of French success. As such, the Papal States represented an ideal area for the Paris government to intervene.³⁸

Despite the threats, Metternich was ready to defend the Austrian position in Italy forcefully. He was concerned about Palmerston's stance and approach to maintaining stability in the region:

Palmerston initially showed hesitation as he feared defeat. Yet, he knew that if he supported Belgium, it would be met with an outcry from the allied forces, and to act or to allow those who would act would be fatal. Everything in this situation is leading to the worst, as the moral and political authority that still prevailed in Italy is now on the brink of collapse.³⁹

In his next report, he explained the crucial role the Italian Peninsula played in Austrian interests: "What the British Power could not accept for Belgium, what we could not accept for Italy, and the triumph of the revolution in a country that

³⁵ SMITH, Denis Mack, *The Making of Italy 1796–1870*, New York 1968, p. 59.

³⁶ THAYER, p. 361.

³⁷ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

³⁸ HALL, p. 67.

³⁹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

is in such direct contact with our own countries and with Germany.”⁴⁰ It was important that the revolution be rapidly suppressed in the Papal States and the prevailing political system be preserved. For the Chancellor, the link between the altar and the throne represented a guarantee of preserving the conservative order.

While France plotted against Vienna to discredit its status throughout Italy, Metternich came up with a counteraction to destabilise the precarious Orléans regime. He used the indirect influence of Napoleon’s son, François (Franz) Joseph Charles, Duke of Reichstadt – known as L’Aiglon (The Eaglet) – who had grown up under the supervision of Francis I, to influence the Bonapartists in France.⁴¹ They wanted L’Aiglon to be the monarch on the French throne. This worried Louis Philippe and forced him to take a moderate course, support peace, and secure domestic political stability.⁴² Following a meeting with the French King in Strasbourg, William I of Württemberg characterised Louis Philippe’s thoughts thus: “His desire for the maintenance of peace is evident, but at the same time he could not foresee to what extremity he might be driven by the difficulties with which he was surrounded and which were daily increasing.”⁴³ His position thus depended heavily on public sentiment and domestic political support.

The French monarch’s concerns over the throne led him to appoint a new government under Périer’s leadership.⁴⁴ The new Prime Minister immediately refuted the idea of French military intervention, allowing Metternich to establish order in Central Italy.⁴⁵ Sébastiani was the only remaining pro-war member of the cabinet, but after Louis Philippe’s intervention, he had to change his stance. The original government in Parma and Modena returned when the Austrian troops entered the territory. The situation in the Papal States also subsequently eased. The Austrian Chancellor had calculated that the faster the whole intervention was undertaken, the smaller the threat of French counteraction. As he mentioned in this case to London: “An advantage that will necessarily be linked to the result of our action will be to make the Italian populations less inclined, for a cer-

40 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna 19 February 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

41 PALMER, p. 252.

42 PROTHERO, p. 136.

43 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 July 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

44 POORE, Benjamin Perley, *The Rise and Fall of Louis Philippe, Ex-king of the French; Giving a History of the French Revolution, from its Commencement, in 1789*, Boston 1848, p. 210.

45 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 April 1831 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

tain period, to be misled by the multitude of provocateurs sent by France.”⁴⁶ Palmerston was against the presence of imperial troops in Central Italy and demanded their immediate withdrawal. He told Metternich that Great Britain would not support Austria in a war with France. Similarly, it could not expect London’s assistance in normalising conditions in the Papal States. For Metternich, this phase of the Italian crisis was, surprisingly, a victory. He calmed tensions temporarily and set up order on the peninsula without significant bloodshed.⁴⁷

For the Austrian Chancellor, undertaking administrative reforms was essential to ensuring the preservation of the established order in the Papal States.⁴⁸ The Chancellor was the only politician seeking reform laws for many years. In this case, we cannot concur with Webster, who attributed these efforts to Palmerston. A conference of the Powers was to be convened for this purpose, which would decide on the overall spirit of reforms. France’s plan to convene international discussions came from its aim to maintain its notional influence on conditions in the State of the Church. Périer’s plans had nothing to do with securing administrative changes. Rather, he wanted to win French votes in the upcoming election.⁴⁹ Metternich welcomed the idea of the conference. He could use it to gain international support for the Pope’s regime while also pursuing new laws with the help of all the other Powers. Rejecting the conference, in contrast, would mean the renewed threat of war and the strengthening of the French pro-war groupings. Austro-French cooperation could restore papal authority without threatening the conservative regime.⁵⁰

During the spring of 1830, the Chancellor attempted to acquire maximum support from London for his proposals. In mid-April 1831, he even requested that the number of ships in the British fleet anchored in the Mediterranean Sea be increased.⁵¹ At this time, Palmerston was still using Vienna to put pressure on France during negotiations at the London Conference.⁵² The British government at the time favoured Austrian dominance on the Italian Peninsula and considered this a lesser evil than French domination.⁵³ In a sign of good Anglo-Austrian rela-

⁴⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 April 1831 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁴⁷ ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 52.

⁴⁸ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 April 1831 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁴⁹ Chad to Palmerston, Berlin, 6 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁵⁰ RIEBEN, Hans, *Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie in Metternichs Europapolitik 1815–1848*, Aarau 1942, p. 124.

⁵¹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 19 February 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁵² BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 7.

⁵³ REINERMAN, *Metternich, the Powers*, p. 216.

tions, the London government sent Brook Taylor, an unaccredited diplomat at the Church Court conducting correspondence unofficially with Palmerston on his role, to the conference.⁵⁴ The British Foreign Secretary responded to the idea of the conference thus:

Although British interests may not be as directly affected by transactions which take place in Italy as by events occurring in countries nearer to England, yet nothing can be indifferent to His Majesty's Government which bears upon the mutual relations of the Powers of Europe, and which may tend to endanger the general peace. On this account, His Majesty's Government yielded last year to the request of the French and Austrian governments, constituting Sir Brook Taylor to proceed in a confidential character to Rome, in order to cooperate with the ministers of France and Austria in endeavouring amicably to settle the differences which had then broken out between Rome and its subjects.⁵⁵

The British task, then, was to mediate discussions between the two powers, with the ideal result of easing the heated situation on the Italian Peninsula.

Austria's diplomat was Count Rudolf von Lützow. Furthermore, France's choice of diplomatic representative, Louis, Comte de Saint-Aulaire, gave Metternich the impression that it was interested in reforms. In reality, both London and Paris hoped that their presence at the conference would hasten the Austrian army's withdrawal from the territory of the Papal States. Although Palmerston was suspicious of Austrian policy, Cowley assured him regarding Metternich's intentions: "His object was peace and Y.[our] L.[ordship] might be assured that nothing would be done by this government [Austria's] to disturb the tranquillity of Europe."⁵⁶ Foreign Minister Cardinal Tommaso Bernetti represented Pope Gregory XVI.⁵⁷ The head of the State of the Church later had another experienced advisor: Austrian citizen Giuseppe Maira Sebregondi, who was the Pope's principal advisor for a certain period.⁵⁸ Baron Christian Karl Josias von Bunsen participated in discussions on Prussia's behalf. Even though Russia was entirely focused on suppressing the revolution in Congress Poland at the time, it still sent Prince Grigory Grigorievich Gagarin as its delegate.⁵⁹

Taylor had limited options during the conference, as there were no official diplomatic relations between the two states.⁶⁰ The British government refused to provide the Papal States with international guarantees. Palmerston believed that the

⁵⁴ BUSCHKÜHL, p. 72.

⁵⁵ Palmerston to Seymour, London, 19 February 1831, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁵⁶ Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 7 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

⁵⁷ NIELSEN, Fredrik, *The History of Papacy in the XIXth Century*, London 1906, p. 61.

⁵⁸ REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. II, p. 51.

⁵⁹ Palmerston to Seymour, London, 19 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁶⁰ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 7 January 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

situation would stabilise by adopting reforms and not by providing international assurances.⁶¹ This was rather short-sighted, considering France's aggressive policies. Insufficient British diplomatic representation had resulted in Palmerston's imperfect view of events in Italy. He had received distorted, often incomplete, information from his ambassadors in Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, which markedly impacted his objectivity.⁶² At the first conference session on 13 April 1831, Saint-Aulaire did not propose administrative reforms but demanded the immediate withdrawal of Austrian troops from the territory of the Papal States.⁶³ Metternich agreed to withdraw his imperial soldiers, not because of fear of French intervention but because this would support Périer's government. An escalation of the situation would likely lead to the fall of the French cabinet and the formation of a new, much more radical one – something Vienna naturally wanted to avoid. Ultimately, the Austrian army withdrew in May 1831, with Bologna being the only place where they continued to operate.⁶⁴

Bunsen devised a compromise proposal for necessary reforms on 21 May 1831, centring around secularisation.⁶⁵ It also involved judiciary reform, integrating lay-people into the administrative apparatus and reorganising local government.⁶⁶ Neither the troop withdrawal nor the Prussian diplomat's proposal satisfied France.⁶⁷ Saint-Aulaire devised his own (radical) proposal, which included amnesty for all the rebels and rejected the provision of international guarantees. In the end, Francis I also agreed to withdraw the troops from Bologna, avoiding an official request from Gregory XVI.⁶⁸ In June 1831, the conference in the ecclesiastical capital ended, having reached a deadlock. France continued making demands to appeal to its domestic audience. This strategy paid off in July when Périer retained his mandate. Their objective was to demonstrate that France had influence on the Peninsula and could intervene in the internal affairs of the Papal States. Despite this, the period was not a disaster for Metternich. Order was maintained in the Papal States, albeit with some uncertainty. Austria held on to its privileged position throughout Italy

61 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 4 April 1831, TNA, FO 120/114.

62 Even Palmerston himself acknowledged this. For this purpose, Seymour was sent to Rome to officially represent His Majesty's Government. Palmerston to Lamb, London, 28 January 1832, TNA, FO 120/116; Palmerston to Seymour, London, 19 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

63 Cowley to Palmerston, Vienna, 5 April 1831, TNA, FO 120/113.

64 BERKELEY, George Fitz-Harding, *Italy in the Making 1815–1846*, Cambridge 1966, p. 119.

65 Full text of the memorandum in: SMITH, Denis Mack, *The Making of Italy 1796–1870*, New York 1968, p. 65.

66 BUNSEN, Frances, *A Memoir of Baron Bunsen*, vol. II, London 1868, p. 534.

67 HALES, p. 270.

68 BERKELEY, p. 119.

and was able to avoid a Europe-wide war. Still, new problems loomed on the horizon.⁶⁹

The influence of the Paris government manifested itself in a stronger position for the administrators of individual Legations. Furthermore, the anti-reformist group in Rome began to acquire more significant influence. France's excessive demands and Britain's lack of interest in reforms meant no progress was made during discussions. The need for administrative changes seemed absolutely clear to the Austrian Chancellor. A reactionary policy was not possible in this state because it would undoubtedly provoke another uprising, so Metternich endeavoured to ensure reforms were adopted as soon as possible.⁷⁰

London did not help Metternich, leaving him to deal with French pressure alone. For Palmerston, the issue of reforms, and the Papal States, in general, was a secondary problem.⁷¹ At the time, he was busy with the problems in Belgium and deteriorating relations with Russia. His awareness gap and poor information in reports, which he often only got from British newspapers, were also reflected in his relationship with the Austrian Chancellor.⁷² The British Foreign Secretary thought that Austria had unlimited influence in Rome. He even accused Metternich of rejecting reforms to maintain the Monarchy's power and influence there.⁷³ His stance on Vienna became highly suspicious, mistrustful, and extremely oppositional. He did not believe that Metternich was honestly trying to support the Pope in adopting reforms to stabilise conditions in the country.⁷⁴ These facts signalled the inevitability of a more severe crisis.⁷⁵

The Habsburg Monarchy could not adopt a policy of force. Any more Austrian troops arriving on Italian territory would mean French retaliation. It would also be a breach of international law, which Metternich wanted to avoid.⁷⁶ Paradoxically, he was thus observing the principles of non-intervention more thoroughly than Great Britain and France. Paris's belligerent policy had cemented and strengthened the bonds between Italian states. As such, in February 1831, De la Tour again asked Great Britain to add its signature to the defence agreement with Piedmont. Palmerston rejected the proposal again, so it was unclear if Britain

69 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 April 1831 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

70 ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 55.

71 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 173.

72 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 209.

73 Neumann to Metternich, London, 26 February 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

74 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 28 January 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

75 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 366.

76 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

would intervene in the event of French aggression. This naturally encouraged France to be bolder. Piedmont thus logically moved to favour cooperation with Austria. The British Foreign Secretary yielded to Paris in Italian affairs, expecting its support regarding Belgium. Metternich was persuaded to continue protecting the State of the Church, while France was both prepared and motivated to prevent Austria from doing so.⁷⁷

Following the departure of the Austrian troops, order in the Papal States was disturbed once again. Local governments refused to pay taxes to Rome, and papal decrees and laws in force were breached. In early 1832, the Papal States found themselves once again in the flames of revolution.⁷⁸ One cause was the failure to adopt political reforms, a chronic problem for the ossified Church system. Gregory XVI's attempt to suppress the unrest using his own forces collapsed that same month, leading to an official request for Austrian assistance.⁷⁹ General Joseph Wenceslaus Radetzky von Radetz launched the Austrian army's military operation on 24 January 1832. His troops were warmly welcomed in many places, which positively influenced the smooth completion of the campaign before the month ended.⁸⁰ The radicals in France began speaking louder again, and there was a mass mobilisation. It was only a short time before Périer's government had to act.⁸¹ The only possible compensation for Austria's intervention by the French Prime Minister was the immediate occupation of Ancona.⁸² The French corps set out towards the port on the Adriatic Sea on 7 February 1832.⁸³ Metternich, not wanting to risk war, advised the Pope not to take any measures against French aggression. The port was occupied on 23 February 1832, and the French Tricolour flew over the city.⁸⁴

The occupation of Ancona roused British public opinion from its lethargy, and the public began to criticise the policy of their Foreign Secretary. Palmerston had even supported the French campaign in the Mediterranean. He had hoped to ensure a greater influence for liberal powers in the region while also increasing

⁷⁷ REINERMAN, *Metternich, the Powers*, p. 218.

⁷⁸ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁷⁹ NIELSEN, p. 61.

⁸⁰ PESENDORFER, Franz, *Eiserne Krone und Doppeladler. Lombardo-Venetien 1814–1866*, Wien 1992, p. 177.

⁸¹ Forbes to Palmerston, Vienna, 14 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

⁸² Austrian military intervention began three days before the official Papal request, which convinced France of the legitimacy of its intervention against Ancona.

⁸³ Chad to Palmerston, Berlin, 6 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁸⁴ For more on France's occupation of Ancona, see: ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Francouzská okupace Ancony (1832) a její ohlas v Evropě*. In: *Moderní dějiny* 24, 2016, 2, p. 73–95.

the pressure on Gregory XVI regarding the adoption of reforms.⁸⁵ Lamb reported that Metternich was well aware of this fact: "Prince Metternich stated that he understood the British government to have approved of the French expedition but made no remark upon it."⁸⁶ Another motive for his attitude was Austria's postponement of the ratification guaranteeing Belgian independence. Palmerston believed that in this way, he would force Austria to ratify the guarantee rapidly. Thus, he did nothing against the occupation, even though this was another breach of the doctrine of non-intervention and international law. Metternich hoped the London government would perceive the French intervention as evidence of Paris's expansionist policy and a threat to British power and interests in the Mediterranean.⁸⁷ Lamb sought to persuade Palmerston of Austria's true intentions:

I believe, with perfect truth, that any exclusive Austrian object affirms itself to have in view only the preservation of the peace of Europe and the maintenance of its territorial divisions as they exist, on which objects he counts upon the cooperation of the British Government, attaching thereto the highest importance.⁸⁸

Nevertheless, his appeals proved to be of little use.

The British press and public opposed France. *The Courier* newspaper even wrote: "France violated the law of nations by the occupation of Ancona."⁸⁹ Palmerston expressed his opinion on Ancona's occupation and the presence of Austrian soldiers in a letter to Lamb:

It cannot be contended that the French being at Ancona makes any difference in the case; the Austrians are just as much foreigners at Rome as the French, and the advice given [to the Pope] by St. Aulaire, now with 1,500 French at Ancona, is not a bit more forcible interference in the domestic affairs of the Pope than the advice given last year by Lützow, while there were 20,000 Austrians in the Legations.⁹⁰

The Foreign Secretary's declaration confirmed the flagrant breach of the non-intervention doctrine. He ignored Austria's legitimate approach to the Legations and consciously tolerated Paris's attempts to pursue an aggressive revisionist policy.

⁸⁵ Palmerston to Seymour, London, 19 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁸⁶ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

⁸⁷ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

⁸⁸ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

⁸⁹ *The Courier*, London, 31 March 1832, enclosed in a letter: Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt England 196.

⁹⁰ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 19 April 1832, enclosed in a letter: Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 21 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

The French occupation shocked the other powers, even Metternich himself. I am surprised he should not have expected this attack upon Ancona, Lamb wrote to Palmerston,

as no secret was made at Paris of the intention to land by force, in case permission to that effect should be withheld. It is, however, highly creditable to him to have considered this affair with as much calmness and reason as I understand that the other Austrian ministers received it, ascertaining as a proof of treachery in the French government as the first blow in a plan for revolutionizing Italy.⁹¹

Not only did Paris act without the prior agreement of the legitimate sovereign, i.e. the Pope, but it did so only to satisfy the anti-Austrian sentiment of the French public.⁹² The motivation of Louis Philippe's government was the same as during the 1831 crisis, namely, to compete with Austria in the Italian region.⁹³ The official pretext was to support the papal authority in the territory of the eastern coast of the Papal States. In reality, revolutionaries did not undertake any operations in that area. The method of occupying the port was more of a military operation than an effort to cooperate with papal troops.⁹⁴ The French soldiers later assaulted the Pope's advocates and supported the revolutionaries in their fight. Reports from Vienna highlighted the indiscipline among French soldiers, noting that "in the streets they cried, 'Vive la liberté Italienne,' 'Vive Louis Philippe,' and some even, 'Vive Napoleon.'"⁹⁵ Therefore, it was absurd to speak of Paris providing help.⁹⁶

The Pope had limited options; all he could do was pin his hopes on Austria. For Metternich, the French occupation was an evident breach of the Papal States' independence.⁹⁷ Critics called for war with France in Vienna. Even Kolowrat, who was otherwise an advocate of peace, supported the war.⁹⁸ Yet the Austrian Chancellor did not want the monarchy to go to war, and he sought a diplomatic way out. He summarised his position in a discussion with the French ambassador in Vienna, Nicolas-Joseph, Marquis de Maison:

⁹¹ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

⁹² SAUVIGNY, Guillaumed Bertier de, *Metternich*, Paris 1986, p. 454.

⁹³ Chad to Palmerston, Berlin, 6 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁹⁴ ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 63.

⁹⁵ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124; Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 16 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

⁹⁶ HALL, p. 105.

⁹⁷ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

⁹⁸ ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 65.

We shall not declare war against you in this instance. What we shall do is redouble our precautionary measures, in order that we may not lose the fruits of our efforts in favour of the pacification of the Papal States. This result we are desirous of attaining, and in seeking to do so, we shall let nothing stand in our way.⁹⁹

He alerted the powers that the French act had breached the Vienna agreements of 1815 and demanded their troops withdraw from the Papal Legations as soon as possible. At the same time, he urged the Pope to continue with the administrative reforms. It was easy for him to get Russia on his side because the Tsar did not hesitate to join anything against France, and his victory over the Polish revolutionaries allowed him to take an active part in any armed conflict between Vienna and Paris. Similarly, Prussia, whose relations with its western neighbour remained in a state of mutual suspicion, was easy to get on Metternich's side.¹⁰⁰ It was challenging to get Great Britain's support.¹⁰¹ Palmerston did not want the French army to remain on papal territory for an extended period. At the same time, he perceived it as necessary for as long as Austrian soldiers were also there. He believed Metternich's objective was to absolve the Pope of responsibility for implementing reforms.¹⁰²

In March 1832, he sent a letter to Vienna via Lamb in which he clarified his position regarding France and Austria. The message noted Great Britain's efforts to keep the peace and prevent a conflict between the Habsburg Monarchy and France, which would naturally result in a Europe-wide war. London was attempting to rein in Paris to prevent the outbreak of a general war, something the British government was keen to avoid.¹⁰³ The country's policy was not focused against the Eastern Power. Austria was

the great conservative Power of Europe, the centre of resistance to all violent attempts from West or from East, the sort of fulcrum upon which the balance of European Power turns, and we wish to see her husband her resources and keep her strength unimpaired.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, Palmerston defended French policy in public. In the House of Commons, he stated that a ruler asking for international help could not also claim his

⁹⁹ Discussion between Metternich and Maison, Vienna, 17 February 1831, METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 211.

¹⁰⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

¹⁰¹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

¹⁰² WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 212.

¹⁰³ Palmerston was of the opinion that British cooperation with France would also result in better control over the policy in Paris. SOUTHGATE, p. 70.

¹⁰⁴ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 19 April 1832, enclosed in a letter: Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 21 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

own political independence.¹⁰⁵ His statements put him definitively on France's side.¹⁰⁶

In the meantime, Gregory XVI was looking for a way out of his predicament, and he took a surprising step when he approved the French occupation of Ancona on 16 April 1832, legitimising their soldiers' presence there.¹⁰⁷ This resulted in the Austrian army extending its presence in Central Italy. Although Metternich had planned for their earlier return, the withdrawal of both armed forces now depended on the other's departure.¹⁰⁸ Accession to French demands also impacted the politics of the other Italian states. Piedmont began extensive rearmament, and the government publicly criticised Austria and Great Britain, mainly because of its moderation and the latter for courting France. Other states also felt less secure, uncertain if any aggression against their country would even prompt a response. The impact of France's actions in Ancona was thus not limited just to the crisis in the Papal States but had much more far-reaching diplomatic consequences.¹⁰⁹

Metternich tried to convince Palmerston through Neumann to reassess his position regarding Central Italy: "We urgently ask the British government not to get side-tracked in considering this thorny and serious issue and not side with Italian liberals."¹¹⁰ He also urged Gregory XVI to adopt reforms because this was the only possible path leading to the withdrawal of the French army.¹¹¹ The British Foreign Secretary attempted instead to exploit Austro-French disputes to his advantage and decided to send the ambassador in Florence, George Hamilton Seymour, to Rome to defend British interests in reforms. Palmerston's ideas came out of the opinions of Italian exiles. They comprised four principal points: the state assembly should be elected and have full control over local matters; the guard should be reviewed; elected council candidates should sit in the state assembly, influence the adoption of laws, and oversee state finances; and the Legations should receive broad autonomy.¹¹²

105 ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 68.

106 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

107 VIDAL, César Louis-Philippe, *Metternich et la Crise Italienne de 1831–1832*, Paris 1931, p. 237.

108 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 8 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

109 VIDAL, p. 239.

110 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA StAbt, England 199.

111 Metternich to Lütow, Vienna, 21 April 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199; METTERNICH- WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 231.

112 Palmerston to Seymour, London, 19 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116; REINERMAN, Alan J., *An Unnatural "Natural Alliance."* *Metternich, Palmerston and the Reform of the Papal States 1831–1832*. In: *The International History Review* 10, 1988, 4, p. 549.

Palmerston's demands were unacceptable to Metternich.¹¹³ Therefore, he sent Sebregondi to pressure the Pope's Foreign Minister, Cardinal Giuseppe Albani, and gain agreement only on the reforms proposed by Vienna.¹¹⁴ His advice went unheeded. The Austrian Chancellor saw Albani as the main cause of stagnation, and he began trying to get him recalled. He achieved this on 11 June 1832. Sebregondi also managed to secure the convening of councils whose task was to adopt new reform measures. Once again, the councils were occupied by conservative clerics who opposed any changes.¹¹⁵ This meant that they achieved almost nothing. Even so, Metternich urged his envoy to maintain the councils, considering their existence crucial. Additionally, Sebregondi submitted proposals for the secularisation and reform of finance and the army. He managed to get Gregory XVI on his side for this, although he was politically constrained. The primary authority in domestic political matters remained with the Zelanti, who opposed and rejected any liberal reforms.¹¹⁶ Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Cappaccini accurately described the Papal States' internal conditions:

I question whether it is possible for you [Great Britain] to do any good with our affairs: our system is too corrupt, the vices which have grown up in all its Departments are too great and too deeply rooted to make it possible that they should be extirpated. Our structures are universally corrupt, our financial condition is deplorable, our psychical and our physical strength is gone, our moral force can hardly be said to exist, opinion is against us, in short, I see no prospect for the Country.¹¹⁷

Sebregondi's mission was based on these facts, which were significantly complicated and, from the outset, limited by Austrian options in pursuing reforms.

London's instructions at the restored conference mainly involved secularising the papal administration and electing representatives to the Roman assembly.¹¹⁸ Metternich was determined to oppose the British demands. The proposal for the election of representatives to the assembly would lead to the liberals having more significant influence on the politics of the Papal States, eventually weakening papal power and ending his rule.¹¹⁹ If the Legations were granted autonomy, this would seriously weaken papal control over the northern section of the State, potentially leading to its secession and the establishment of a liberal re-

113 PARRY, Jonathan, *The Politics of Patriotism. English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe 1830–1866*, Cambridge 2006, p. 147.

114 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 20 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

115 ŠEDIVÝ, *The Decline*, p. 56.

116 REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. II, p. 2.

117 Seymour to Palmerston, Vienna, 22 May 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

118 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 20 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

119 REINERMAN, *An Unnatural*, p. 550.

gime.¹²⁰ For the Austrian Chancellor, the British approach to progress in the Papal States was unacceptable, particularly as the French presence in Ancona and the far-reaching British reform requirements had stirred resistance in Rome to any changes, even the moderate ones Austria had proposed.¹²¹

The effort at securing Anglo-Austrian cooperation was unrealistic. London's proposals directly threatened Vienna's position on the peninsula, something Palmerston had not paid much attention to. He had overlooked that any disturbance to the Habsburg Monarchy's status would inevitably weaken the balance of power on the Continent. In contrast, Palmerston's assumption that only satisfying the liberal opposition could calm down conditions in Central Italy did not seem entirely correct. From a long-term perspective, Metternich's belief that concessions to the liberals would, in the end, result in the fall of church rule and the end of Austrian dominance on the peninsula was exactly accurate.¹²² This was also why the Austrian Chancellor could not abandon the course of his policy towards the Papal States, even at the cost of a possible war with France. For this reason, it seemed fitting to support Austria's stance, especially when British interests were not under direct threat. Even so, Palmerston did not want to return to his previous position. Like Périer in France, he too had to play the domestic card, especially at a sensitive time when electoral reform was being debated.¹²³

There was no doubt that Seymour had limited options in Rome. Gregory XVI could hardly let the representative of a Protestant state dictate conditions. As such, the British representative sent notes to London in April and May 1832, in which he declared his government's approach impracticable without cooperation with Austria.¹²⁴ This only prompted Palmerston to increase pressure on the Habsburg Monarchy. He believed that only the conditions set by Great Britain could secure peace. If Austria was not committed to achieving these, it cast suspicion on its true intentions, particularly its potential aim of annexing the Papal States.¹²⁵ Metternich assured the British Foreign Secretary they shared the same goal, specifically calming conditions in the State of the Church, not Austrian expansion.¹²⁶ These messages did not move Palmerston either. When he learned that Austria was waiting for Russia to sign the Belgian treaty of 15 November 1831 before ratifying it, his attitude towards Vienna hardened significantly.

120 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 March 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

121 REINERMAN, *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich*, vol. II, p. 147.

122 REINERMAN, *An Unnatural*, p. 550.

123 SOUTHGATE, p. 48.

124 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 10 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

125 Seymour to Palmerston, Vienna, 22 May 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

126 Metternich to Wessenberg, Vienna, 21 March 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 200.

Metternich's arguments were again centred on the need for cooperation against France and the dangers posed by Paris's appetite for conquest. The approval of reforms was firmly linked to the departure of the Orléans army, after which it would be possible to pressure the Pope into beginning administrative changes. On 10 May 1832, he sent another dispatch regarding Anglo-Austrian co-operation, in which he stated that shared interests made them natural allies:

In London, as in Vienna, the desire to see peace established in Europe is as strong as the wish to prevent a general conflict arising from a secondary cause; ultimately, both Cabinets fundamentally want the same thing. That said, opinions may differ on the choice of means, and this easily occurs when the good to be secured provides material for a polemical discussion on principles.¹²⁷

As a concession, he issued a declaration supporting the adoption of all of Bunsen's requirements from 1831, including self-administration for the Legations, reforms to the administration and police, a new tax policy, and the abolition of censorship.¹²⁸ By taking this step, he aimed to demonstrate Austria's sincere effort at securing reforms to show Great Britain.¹²⁹ Palmerston dismissed his proposal. He thought the only way out of the Pope's desperate situation was to adopt all of Britain's conditions immediately.¹³⁰

The tense situation at the conference in Rome led to Seymour's isolation, and he requested to be withdrawn in June 1832.¹³¹ In a letter to London, he wrote: "The Vatican door is locked, and the key is at Vienna."¹³² Palmerston agreed and used the opportunity to accuse Austria of encouraging Gregory XVI to resist reforms again.¹³³ During July, Metternich still held out hope that he could defend his policy to the British government. However, this hope soon faded, especially after Seymour continued to criticise Austria and the Papal States in Britain.¹³⁴ The reports from Rome had a surprisingly strong impact on Palmerston's opinions. Neumann made another personal attempt to persuade him but with little success:

The responsive note from Your Excellency victoriously refutes all the points that the Ambassador of Her Britannic Majesty and the Principal Secretary of State attempted to raise with-

¹²⁷ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 10 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

¹²⁸ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 27 May 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

¹²⁹ REINERMAN, *An Unnatural*, p. 554.

¹³⁰ BELL, vol. I, p. 163.

¹³¹ Seymour's report to the representatives of Austria and France, Rome, 19 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

¹³² WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 214.

¹³³ Neumann to Metternich, London, 13 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹³⁴ BERKELEY, p. 124.

out even making the slightest observation. After reading the dispatch, he still tried to make some remarks, which I insisted on not responding to, and I have no doubt that he will eventually recognise that this matter is concluded between us. The question remains whether England will find it to her advantage, but this gives us even greater reason not to allow her to position herself as a protector of the demands of the liberal party in Italy.¹³⁵

Palmerston believed that the five Powers' efforts had led nowhere and that the situation in the Papal States was worse than at the beginning of the crisis. He considered the reform efforts futile and placed all the blame on Austria and its eastern allies. For this reason, he decided to recall Seymour from Rome and return to Florence.¹³⁶

The schism between Great Britain and Austria became public in the autumn of 1832, causing a sensation.¹³⁷ Seymour's diplomatic correspondence with Lützow found its way into the British newspapers, influencing public opinion on the approach towards Austria. *The Times* printed the following words:

Mr Seymour wrote . . . to announce to the other Ambassadors of the Great Powers at Rome, that he had been ordered to quit that capital and return to his post at Florence, because (we state briefly the substance of the reason) the Pope had broken faith with his subjects, and had (under the shelter of the Austrian bayonet) left unfulfilled the suggestions of the memorandum presented to His Holiness by the five Powers, wherein they with (at least seeming) unanimity recommended to him the adoption of improvements which they all concurred in declaring to be indispensable for the permanent tranquillity of the Roman States, and which appeared to the British government to be founded in justice and reason.¹³⁸

The criticism of Austria emboldened the liberals on the Italian Peninsula, who saw their northern neighbour and the Pope as their archenemies. Emigrants in the British Isles also felt partial satisfaction.¹³⁹

Metternich blamed Palmerston for the leak, thinking he aimed to undermine Austria's position on the Italian Peninsula. The Foreign Secretary apologised for the information leak in a private letter to Metternich.¹⁴⁰ According to Webster, Palmerston had no motivation to publish Seymour's letters. The possibility of reforms being implemented seemed to have been blown, as was the idea of Anglo-Austrian cooperation.¹⁴¹

135 Neumann to Metternich, 14 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

136 Palmerston to Seymour, London, 9 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

137 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 219.

138 *The Times*, 10 November 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

139 Neumann to Metternich, London, 17 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

140 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 4 January 1833, TNA, FO 120/116.

141 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 219.

Palmerston's stance reflects a significant misunderstanding of Austrian conditions in Italy. This resulted from the lack of diplomatic representation in the Papal States, as mentioned above, and a certain contempt for the interests of Viennese diplomacy, which were based on the Monarchy's geographic position.¹⁴² This led to deteriorating relations between the two Powers, despite the Austrian Chancellor's repeated attempts to secure cooperation.¹⁴³

Britain's position regarding Italy also influenced Metternich's view of the liberal Powers in general. At the same time, Palmerston was distrustful of the Austrian Chancellor, and the Prince felt the same about him personally. From the British viewpoint, Italian affairs had led to greater mistrust between the two states, with conservative and reactionary Austria becoming an unreliable partner for Great Britain, and Metternich himself seen as a liar trying to pursue his anti-reformist policies under any circumstances. In contrast, for Austria's Chancellor, it was Great Britain that posed a threat to the Monarchy's power and interests. He believed that British diplomacy was more about promoting liberalism and national objectives than about preserving the balance of power. Consequently, Austria was forced to focus more on its eastern neighbours, particularly Russia, which became a natural choice from an international perspective. For Metternich, the events of 1830–1832 were a lesson, leading him to realise that it was impossible to gain British support even in other vital matters of international politics. His only hope was the fall of the liberal government and the instalment of a new conservative regime similar to the one before 1830.¹⁴⁴

Metternich, traditionally viewed as a reactionary, was, in fact, a driving force of a pro-reformist policy during the crisis of 1830–1832. He was the only representative of international diplomacy to seek moderate, apolitical changes that the Pope could agree with, which would also lead to improving the situation in his state. Although his politics were based more on Enlightenment than liberal ideas, his proposals were based on rational and constructive foundations. His plan for administrative reforms was also inspired by the working Lombardo-Venetian administration.¹⁴⁵ Even so, all the Austrian Chancellor's efforts came up against pervasive opposition. From an international political perspective, Austria's main rivals were initially France and then Great Britain. Palmerston endeavoured to promote his proposals, which were almost impossible to apply to the Italian context. His lack of knowledge of the situation on the Italian Peninsula, in the end, led to an unnecessary, and above all counterproductive, escalation of tensions in

¹⁴² Neumann to Metternich, London, 13 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

¹⁴³ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 10 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

¹⁴⁴ SEWARD, p. 224.

¹⁴⁵ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 10 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

relations between Great Britain and Austria, and last but not least, between the Powers and the Papal States. The occupation of Ancona, openly approved by the government in London, played a significant part in the resistance of the Pope and those around him to the interference of foreign states in the affairs of his own state. The Powers' inability to agree, alongside the firm resistance of the Pope and especially the Zelanti, prevented a reformist course from being implemented. The negative consequences of this were felt in the long-term by both the Papal States, in which dissatisfaction with the government grew, and by Austria, which, while holding on to significant influence on the Italian Peninsula after 1832, also gained the reputation of being an archenemy to the much-desired modernisation.

After 1833, the Italian states were of secondary interest to Great Britain from a geopolitical standpoint. They only came to the forefront of London's diplomacy in 1840 through economic disputes with the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The start of this conflict dates back to 1838, when France secured control of exports of Sicilian sulphur to the detriment of Great Britain. The kingdom's monarch, Ferdinand II, wanted to receive money from the sale of raw materials and hoped that by awarding France a monopoly, he would receive funds in return to expand the country's infrastructure.¹⁴⁶ This had a negative impact on British merchants because the product was an essential commodity for the manufacture of domestic goods. Palmerston took issue with the agreement, protested that it harmed London's commercial interests, and breached the Anglo-Sicilian trade agreement of 1816. He demanded that Ferdinand II cancel the agreement and confirm the unique commercial position of His Majesty's merchants. It should be noted in this regard that Great Britain and France were part of the Quadruple Alliance at this time, whose aim was the cooperation of the Western Powers at an international level. The British Foreign Secretary pressured the Southern Italian kingdom to accept his demands. Ferdinand II had not breached European law, something Metternich concurred with. The Austrian Chancellor considered Britain's steps to represent an intervention in the internal affairs of a weaker state. The Habsburg Monarchy was dynastically linked to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and had a defensive alliance.¹⁴⁷

Ferdinand II strongly rejected London's allegation, countering that no breach of the agreement with Great Britain had occurred. This claim was subsequently confirmed by leading London lawyers, proving that Sicily acted in full accordance with the law. Palmerston refused to accept the situation and sought to nullify the

146 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Britsko-neapolská válka o síru z roku 1840 a její evropská dimenze*. In: *Historica Olomoucensia* 50, 2016, p. 89.

147 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Italy in the European States System of the Pre-March Period. Some Reflections*. In: *West Bohemian Historical Review* 5, 2015, 2, p. 83.

agreement.¹⁴⁸ At stake were economic interests and British domination of the Mediterranean Sea, dealing with strong French competition which had started with the Algerian campaign and had escalated into the second Eastern Crisis. Facing possible difficulties from France in the event of the cancellation of the agreement or Great Britain possibly having to pay damages for breaching the 1816 agreement, Ferdinand II had to play for time, manoeuvring between both powers.¹⁴⁹

Palmerston lost patience in the spring of 1840 and issued an ultimatum: if the agreement were not annulled, the British fleet would be ordered to seize Neapolitan merchant ships. Despite these threats, the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies refused to comply and began to prepare for war.¹⁵⁰ The Royal Navy operation began in April 1840, when Neapolitan merchant ships were seized on the Maltese coast.¹⁵¹ Palmerston defended his move as an effort to protect British economic interests, using the same reasoning Polignac's government had employed in the intervention against Algeria. From the standpoint of international politics, though, Britain had again breached its non-intervention policy and especially the rule of law.¹⁵²

According to the Powers, and even the Sicilians themselves, Ferdinand's disadvantage was his political unreliability and unpopular state administration.¹⁵³ When he asked for support, not only did Russia reject it, but so did Prussia. Metternich shared the same suspicion of the Sicilian King as the other Eastern Powers and did not provide support either.¹⁵⁴ His primary focus remained on the Near East due to the escalating crisis in the Orient. The issue of southern Italy was a secondary problem from a diplomatic perspective.¹⁵⁵ The case of Austrian official support related to a second aspect of the problem, which was a likely but undesirable war with Great Britain.¹⁵⁶ Another, no less important threat, was a possible revolution that could spread to the other states of the Italian Peninsula.¹⁵⁷

148 Metternich to Hummelauer, 16 April 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

149 ŠEDIVÝ, *Crisis Among the Great Powers*, p. 108.

150 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 15 April 1840, enclosed in the letter Metternich to Hummelauer, 16 April 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230. Prince of Capua, Carlton Terrace, 20 April 1840, enclosed in the letter Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 2 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

151 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 10 April 1840, TNA, FO 27/602.

152 ŠEDIVÝ, *Italy in the European States System*, p. 84.

153 JUDD, *Palmerston*, p. 62.

154 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 2 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

155 ŠEDIVÝ, *Crisis Among the Great Powers*, p. 111.

156 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 2 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

157 ŠEDIVÝ, *Britsko-neapolská válka o síru*, p. 92.

As such, the Austrian Chancellor advised Ferdinand II to find a compromise with Great Britain, even if it meant concessions, since, from his point of view, much more was at stake than just Sicilian prestige. It was in his interest to calm the situation, keep the peace, and fully move Vienna's diplomatic efforts to Constantinople. As part of his mediation strategy, he asked Lamb to inform London of his efforts. However, Palmerston rejected his proposal and instead accepted the same offer which had come to him from Paris.¹⁵⁸ Metternich considered French mediation a threat to the Italian Peninsula and worried about a repeat of the events of 1832. But London did not take his protests seriously, so all he could do was accept the French approach.¹⁵⁹

Subsequent negotiations led to the abolition of the agreement in July 1840, with financial compensation for Britain and France. Thus, the Sulphur War ended after three months, with Great Britain emerging as its absolute winner. Besides the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Austria was also a loser, ceding its political influence to France. This evident triumph of Palmerston was achieved at the cost of breaching the non-intervention doctrine and even international law. Not only had Ferdinand II acted in full accordance with the law, but he had not even breached the 1816 agreement. From an international political perspective, the conflict was an example of Great Britain's policy of aggression towards a weaker state. When diplomacy could go no further, the British navy moved in. This behaviour contrasted with Palmerston's proclaimed argument for cohesion and co-operation between European Powers.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ At that time, already known as Baron Beauvale.

¹⁵⁹ ŠEDIVÝ, *Italy in the European States System*, p. 86.

¹⁶⁰ ŠEDIVÝ, *Crisis Among the Great Powers*, p. 120.

6 The Eastern Question and the First Turko-Egyptian Conflict

When Palmerston took up the role of Foreign Secretary for Great Britain in 1830, the Ottoman Empire was generally perceived in Europe as a declining power.¹ Even so, it covered vast territory from the Balkans to Mesopotamia and from the Arabian Peninsula to Algeria. Yet, the Sultan had little power in some of its provinces.² Some areas were ruled by local dignitaries who had little regard for decrees from Constantinople. During the Greek War of Independence, Europe was horrified by reports of Turkish brutality towards Christians and the ossified Sultanate regime. The weak Ottoman army was easily defeated by Russia in the war of 1828–1829 and had an atrocious reputation. In fact, the Russian Tsar had managed to expand the Russian Empire's territory in the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, securing Russia's dominant position on the Black Sea. Thus, Europe's overall image of the Ottoman Empire was negative.³

In the early 1830s, in addition to the traditional threats from the north, Sultan Mahmud II also had to deal with rivalry in the form of the Egyptian governor, Muhammad Ali.⁴ This former Albanian tobacco merchant had succeeded through several economic, administrative, and military reforms in turning the North African province into a prosperous state. Muhammad Ali's position was so strong that even though he was officially the Sultan's vassal, Mahmud II could only remove him from power through force.⁵ The conditions prevalent at the time meant that the Sultan used the Egyptian army to suppress the Greek uprising.⁶ Following the defeat at the Battle of Navarino and the subsequent evacuation of troops, Muhammad Ali focused on rebuilding his army and staying out of the Russo-Turkish War.⁷

1 COLLIER, Ian, *Hassuna D'Ghies and the 'New Ottomanism' of the 1830s*. In: MAURIZIO, Isabella (ed.), ZANOÙ, Konstantina, *Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Ideas in the Long nineteenth Century*, 2016, London, p. 99.

2 PRIESTLEY, Herbert Ingram, *France Overseas. A Study of Modern Imperialism*, New York 1938, p. 30.

3 RODKEY, Stanley Frederick, *Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830–1841*. In: *The Journal of Modern History* 1, 1929, 4, p. 570.

4 Gordon to Baker, Constantinople, 22 May 1830, TNA, FO 78/190.

5 MARRIOTT, John Arthur Ransome, *The Eastern Question. An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, Oxford 1917, p. 207.

6 JELAVICH, Barbara, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821–1878*, Cambridge 1984, p. 34.

7 BAUMGART, p. 294.

He made his forces' involvement in the campaign against the Greeks conditional upon Syria being placed under his direct administration. Mahmud II did not comply with this demand and offered him Crete as compensation. The Egyptian governor was not satisfied with this Mediterranean island and, as such, reiterated his claim to Syria in 1830. When he received the same answer, he decided military action was needed to resolve the dispute. In this regard, he sent his army to Lebanon with his son, the excellent strategist Ibrahim Pasha, in command.⁸

Palmerston paid very little attention to the approaching war in the East.⁹ His view of Near East policy was metaphorically Canningite. His primary interest was to ensure a prosperous and independent Greece that would remain outside Russian influence.¹⁰ He sent Stratford Canning, an expert on Ottoman affairs, to Constantinople in 1831 with this task in mind.¹¹ Palmerston was dissatisfied with the results of his negotiations, which lasted for over eighteen months. He thought Bavarian Prince Otto's choice for the Greek throne was a mistake, merely replacing one tyrant with another.¹² Palmerston's general approach to the Eastern Question also influenced discussions about Greece.¹³ From his perspective, the Ottoman Empire was "falling rapidly to pieces,"¹⁴ although this conflicted with British foreign policy's traditional interest in the continuation of the Sultan's empire as a foundation stone for peace in Europe. No other Power could control the Black Sea Straits, a vital interest for maintaining this balance of power, better than the Ottoman Empire. Stratford Canning repeatedly warned from Constantinople that this was indeed the case and that the Sultan would not be able to maintain control over the empire.¹⁵ But Palmerston ignored these reports during the first two years of his appointment.¹⁶ It was not until 1833 that he began to reassess his position regarding the entire problem and realised the importance of the situation.

8 SAUVIGNY, p. 464.

9 TULASOĞLU, *Gülây, Ein Muslimischer Pascha im Zentrum der Orientalischen Frage: Muhammed Ali von Ägypten*. In: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Haziran, 37, 2020, 1, p. 239.

10 ENGEL-JANOSI, Friedrich, *Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz. Essays zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 1830–1945*, Graz 1963, p. 33.

11 HOLLAND, Thomas Erskine, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, Oxford 1885, p. 19.

12 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna 26 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/125; BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 374.

13 LEVANDIS, John, *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers 1821–1898*, New York 1944, p. 43.

14 BOURNE, *Palmerston. The Early Years*, p. 375.

15 Stratford Canning to Palmerston, Paris, 3, 11 August, 13, 19 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25a.

16 LANE-POOLE, Stanley (ed.), *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford de Redcliffe from his Memoirs and Private and Official Papers*, vol. I, London 1888, p. 507.

The Foreign Secretary's reserved approach would have clear consequences in the future for diplomacy in London.¹⁷

Initially, not even the Ballhausplatz paid much attention to Ibrahim's invasion of Syria. Relations between Austria and Egypt were good prior to 1831. In the early 1820s, Vienna had been highly suspicious of Muhammad Ali and saw him as a new Ali Pasha of Ioannina.¹⁸ Austrian concerns disappeared after Egypt's military assistance on the Peloponnese peninsula, so the Habsburg Monarchy paid little attention to initial reports of Ibrahim's intervention.¹⁹ Vienna remained relatively calm because of the general conviction that the Sultan's army would secure an easy victory. This atmosphere was boosted by inaccurate reports from Austria's Consul General in Alexandria, Joseph von Acerbi, who referred to the Egyptian army's poor situation. Even the Austrian Internuncio in Constantinople, Baron Franz von Ottenfels, was convinced of Mahmud's soldiers' inevitable victory. Based on this information, Metternich did not attribute much significance to the situation in the eastern Mediterranean until 1832. He was busy with matters in Belgium, Poland, and, in particular, the Italian Peninsula, an approach identical to that also taken at the time by Palmerston.²⁰

British diplomacy was entirely focused on revolutionary events in Europe.²¹ Additionally, the domestic political situation surrounding electoral reform had a significant impact on the country's foreign affairs.²² During the heated debates on

17 BAKER, R. L., *Palmerston and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi*. In: *English Historical Review* 43, 1928, 169, p. 85.

18 Ali Pasha, the Governor of Yanina, wielded power and pursued politics that were almost independent of Constantinople, making him a thorn in Mahmud II's side, who launched a military campaign against him from 1820 to 1822.

19 RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *The Views of Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question in 1834*. In: *The English Historical Review* 45, 1930, 180, p. 627.

20 RODKEY, *Lord Palmerston*, p. 572.

21 SETON-WATSON, *The Russian Empire*, p. 303.

22 SATTLER, p. 11. It is important to briefly acknowledge this pivotal moment in British history. Negotiations for a coalition of Whigs, Canningites, and Ultra-Tories took place in 1829. Only after George IV's death and Wellington's electoral defeat did Grey dare to start talks about forming a new government. The situation on the Continent inspired British public opinion to conclude that their desired changes in politics could also be achieved through revolution. However, Grey and Palmerston were determined to avoid this. The leading liberal Tory leader, William Huskisson, was convinced that His Majesty's government could only continue following a general internal reconstruction. After his tragic death in 1830, Palmerston and the future Prime Minister, Melbourne, embraced this idea. Palmerston saw some parallels between the July Revolution and the rising tensions on Britain's streets. Parliamentary reform, therefore, became the cabinet's key solution for addressing domestic unrest. The government was in crisis from 1831, which impacted its stance on foreign affairs and the position of the other Powers towards it. Metternich's delay-

electoral reform in Britain's House of Commons, Muhammad Ali began his siege of the fortress of Acre, which lasted from November 1831 until May 1832. The Egyptian governor carefully monitored the situation in Britain and believed that the outbreak of revolution would secure the successful completion of his military campaign.²³ Palmerston did not respond to the fall of Acre and did not even send any instructions to Britain's Consul General, John Baker.²⁴ Only British Under-Secretary Backhouse sent a brief note on maintaining good relations with Muhammad Ali. In the meantime, Stratford Canning tried to assure Mahmud II of British military support.²⁵ Still, he could not provide official guarantees because only the government in London had that power. His main interest was to use the circumstances to secure the best possible conditions in Greece. In a private letter to Canning, Palmerston only assured the Sultan with a vague declaration of the necessity of keeping friendly relations:

ing tactic during 1832 regarding the ratification of the agreement on Belgium was influenced by British domestic political circumstances and the anticipated fall of Grey's cabinet.

In Palmerston's view, electoral reform meant redistributing political power to favour the middle class. His position came up against opposition from John Russell, the reform's central agitator. The Tories were also against the concept of the entire law. Thus, several schools of opinion were formed within Great Britain, which opposed each other and exacerbated the already tense situation. By mid-1831, Palmerston opposed Grey's proposal and, in the Tory spirit, desired the preservation of the aristocracy's greater political role. In March 1832, Palmerston joined forces with Melbourne and Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Marquess of Lansdowne, to propose a moderate reform plan. During this period of political chaos in May 1832, Wellington attempted to form a government, leading to great unrest in British streets. Ultimately, the Duke gave up his attempt due to minimal support. During this period, the threat of revolution again reached a peak. For many politicians, Wellington's failure was a sign to adopt a reform plan, which eventually happened on 7 June 1832. MILES, Taylor, *Empire and Parliamentary reform. The 1832 Reform Act Revisited*. In: BURNS, Arthur, INNES, Joanna (ed.), *Rethinking the Age of Reform. Britain 1780–1850*, Cambridge 2003, p. 296; MARCOWITZ, Reiner, *Großmacht auf Bewährung. Die Interdependenz französischer Innen- und Außenpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf Frankreichs Stellung im europäischen Konzert 1814/15–1851/52*, Stuttgart 2001, p. 130; DIPPEL, p. 25; MILTON-SMITH, p. 69; MARCHANT LE, Denis, *Memoir of John Charles Viscount Althorp Third Earl Spencer*, London 1873, p. 377; VERETÉ, Mayir, *Palmerston and the Levant Crisis 1832*. In: *The Journal of Modern History* 24, 1952, 2, p. 145; ANDERSON, Matthew Smith, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923*, London 1966, p. 79. More on the impact on international and colonial policy in: MIDDLETON, Alex, *Conservative Politics and Whig Colonial Government, 1830–41*. In: *Historical Research*, Oxford, 94, 2021, 265, pp. 522–553.

²³ VERETÉ, Mayir, *Palmerston and the Levant Crisis 1832*. In: *The Journal of Modern History* 24, 1952, 2, p. 145.

²⁴ BAUMGART, p. 295.

²⁵ Stratford Canning to Palmerston, Paris, 19 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25a.

This person [Palmerston] wanted to assure me that Mehmet Ali is well-intentioned, thinking only of wanting to strengthen the Ottoman Empire. And I told him,

wrote Neumann to Vienna,

that it was a strange way to strengthen an Empire by taking away provinces and making advances to him.²⁶

Ambassadors from other courts in London encountered a similar response:

Lord Palmerston responded with a few words which have been relayed to you on the subject, but the Prince de Lieven finds that it is not enough; the progress of Ibrahim Pasha in Syria demands more prompt remedies than those employed by England.²⁷

At this moment, Palmerston had not yet realised the seriousness of the situation.

The Ottoman ruler eventually urged London to provide naval support to halt Ibrahim Pasha's advance.²⁸ To secure the assistance of fifteen British warships, he dispatched his chargé d'affaires in Vienna, Jean Mavroyéni, and Namik Pasha on a special mission to London. Mahmud II believed that his ground army was sufficient to defeat his Egyptian vassal, but following the Battle of Navarino, the Ottoman navy was in a weakened state. Aware of this vulnerability, he pressed Canning to persuade Palmerston to offer aid.²⁹ In his report to the Foreign Office, the British diplomat wrote: "The situation of this country is, however, tremendously critical, and a fresh disaster by sea or land [from Muhammad Ali] may produce incalculable consequences."³⁰ Diplomat John Henry Mandeville conveyed His Majesty's Government's stance to the Porte³¹ and warned that London's response could be negative, given the political climate.³² Metternich shared a similarly cautious outlook and made his reservations clear to Namik Pasha during his stop in Vienna.³³ The Austrian Chancellor supported the Ottoman request for

26 Neumann to Metternich, London, 21 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

27 Neumann to Metternich, London, 11 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

28 CLAYTON, David Gerard, *Britain and the Eastern Question. Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, London 1971, p. 64.

29 LANE-POOLE, vol. I, p. 513.

30 Stratford Canning to Palmerston, Therapia, 11 August 1832, TNA, FO 352/25a.

31 Also, the Higher Porte or the Sublime Porte represented the central authority of the Ottoman Empire, including the Sultan's government and its administrative offices.

32 At this time, there was no official British ambassador in Constantinople, which was also reflected in the quality of information arriving in Britain from the Ottoman Empire.

33 MOLDEN, Ernst, *Die Orientpolitik des Fürsten Metternich 1829–1833*, Wien 1913, p. 40.

naval assistance. As early as the autumn of 1832, he had questioned the strength of the Sultan's army and recognised Muhammad Ali's growing power.³⁴

Following Acre's fall, Metternich became fully aware of the gravity of the situation and began to adopt a more active diplomatic approach. From a political standpoint, the Austrian Chancellor was clear: the conflict breached the principle of sovereignty, as it was a dispute between a sovereign and his subject. However, given the geopolitical realities and the resources available to Austria, his options for intervening in the Turko-Egyptian conflict were limited.³⁵ Another significant factor was Austria's economic interests. Trade between Alexandria, Trieste, and Venice was flourishing in the early 1830s.³⁶ If Vienna complied with Ottoman requests to impose an embargo on Egyptian ships, this would severely harm its trade. For this reason, the Ballhausplatz rejected the idea, alongside the request to adopt economic sanctions. In fact, ships were being built in Trieste for Muhammad Ali at this time. Therefore, Metternich's policy relied on Austria's dependence on trade with Alexandria, and he anticipated no hostile action from Egypt.

Great Britain was in a similar situation, and although it was a Maritime Power, it was not in its interest to disrupt relations with Egypt. One of Muhammad Ali's declarations summarised relations with London: "With English for my friends, I can do anything; without their friendship, I can do nothing. Wherever I turn, she is there to baffle me."³⁷ Britain's desire for good relations with the Egyptian vassal was also reflected in its rejection of the Sultan's request to provide naval assistance.³⁸ Palmerston's proposal to secure such support and the plan for a joint approach with Austria were outvoted by the other ministers.

British naval activity on the coast of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and around the Iberian Peninsula had entirely strained the Royal Navy's operational capabilities, and it did not have the resources to intervene in the Near East.³⁹ Palmerston explained this fact to the Austrian ambassador as well during a diplomatic conversation:

The Principal Secretary of State repeated to them [Ottoman plenipotentiaries] what he had said before: that the affairs of Holland and Portugal were occupying their naval forces, and that they could not, without addressing Parliament for a subsidy, equip a fleet in the current

³⁴ Lamb to Palmerston Vienna, 13 September 1832, TNA, FO 120/124.

³⁵ Metternich to Neumann, London, 17 October 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

³⁶ PAWELKA, Hedwig, *Englisch-Österreichische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Ankara 2011, p. 31.

³⁷ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 174.

³⁸ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 January 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201; Neumann to Metternich, London, 1 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

³⁹ INGRAM, Edward, *The British Empire as a World Power*, London 2001, p. 77.

situation and act against the Pasha of Egypt – that he hoped that the energetic instructions carried by Colonel Campbell, combined with the representations of other Powers, would be sufficient to bring Mehmet Ali to reason.⁴⁰

Half a year later, Palmerston made a similar statement at the British Parliament:

Without giving any very detailed explanation of the matter, he would only remind the House that when we were embarking in naval operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the purpose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the naval dignity of this country.⁴¹

This speech was essentially an attempt to defend his policy after having poorly assessed the beginning of the crisis in 1832. Holland headed a pro-French group that simultaneously supported Muhammad Ali, and its advocates included Henry Peter, Baron Brougham-Vaux, and John Charles Spencer, Viscount Althorp. These facts hindered Palmerston's diplomatic options.⁴²

Thus, nothing stood in the way of Ibrahim Pasha's army. In the decisive Battle of Konya on 21 December 1832, he defeated Reshid Pasha's army, captured the Ottoman dominion in the Near East, and gained free passage to Constantinople. In early 1833, Metternich called on the London government, again without success, to intervene in the conflict alongside other Powers.⁴³ In a letter to Neumann, he outlined Austria's and Great Britain's identical interests in the Orient and the necessity of working together.⁴⁴ However, considering the different approaches regarding Belgium, Palmerston was not inclined to cooperate with the Habsburg Monarchy and relied on taking action with France, of which Metternich was well aware.⁴⁵ On the other hand, Great Britain looked at French activity in North Africa and the Middle East with similar suspicion as Austria. Good relations between Paris and Alexandria only strengthened this impression.⁴⁶ Increased French influence in the Mediterranean threatened British domination in the area. Therefore, the Sultan's victory over his Egyptian vassal, alongside limitations on

40 Neumann to Metternich, London, 1 March 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

41 Palmerston's speech at the British House of Commons, London, 28 August 1833, *Foreign Affairs, HC Deb 28 August 1833 vol 20 cc899–901* [online], [quoted 2019-03-01]. Available on: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1833/aug/28/foreign-affairs#S3V0020P0_18330828_HOC_9.

42 SOUTHGATE, p. 63.

43 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 15 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

44 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 3 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

45 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 23 January 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

46 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 17 October 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

French power in the Middle East, was crucial for Great Britain.⁴⁷ By the spring of 1833, Palmerston had increasingly advocated for an active policy in the East and wanted his government to secure it.⁴⁸ Despite this, strong opposition in Parliament and even within the cabinet was against any engagement in the conflict. Even public opinion was indifferent to the fate of the Sultan.⁴⁹ During Namik Pasha's urging for British assistance, the Foreign Secretary told him that "someone would be sent to Alexandria in a very few days, and another person to Constantinople." The Ottoman representative replied that "he had come not to ask for mediation, but for assistance."⁵⁰

In the meantime, the situation in Constantinople changed once again. When Nicholas I learned about the Sultan's defeat at Konya, he sent General Nikolay Nikolayevich Muravyov to the Porte on a special mission.⁵¹ St Petersburg was concerned about the potential outcome of the Sultan's negotiations with his governor. For Russia, the worst-case scenario was that Muhammad Ali would end up ruling the entire Empire. The Tsar could not allow his Empire to have a neighbouring state capable of threatening his position in the Black Sea.⁵² Moreover, like Great Britain, St Petersburg viewed French influence in Egypt negatively, especially as it threatened to spread further into Anatolia.⁵³ Upon his arrival in Constantinople, Muravyov offered Mahmud II assistance from Russian land and naval forces. In addition to this, he travelled to Alexandria, where he demanded that Muhammad Ali cease all military operations. The Egyptian governor agreed to this request on the condition that he would gain control over Syria and Adana.⁵⁴

Among the foreign representatives in Constantinople, there was clear anti-Russian sentiment. The French chargé d'affaires, Édouard Burignot, Baron de Varrenne, opposed the Russian proposals and took the initiative by sending an official request to Ibrahim to withdraw his soldiers. Nonetheless, this request had no impact on the Egyptian commander, leaving the Sultan with no option but to turn to

47 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 14 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

48 Neumann to Metternich, London, 16 March 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

49 Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 January 1833 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

50 Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 January 1833 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

51 Neumann to Metternich, London, 1 February 1833 AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

52 TODOROVA, Maria, *British and Russian Policy Towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire*. In: *Études Balkaniques* 13, Paris 1977, p. 18.

53 FLORESCU, Radu, *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities 1821–1854*, Monachii 1962, p. 172.

54 Palmerston to William Temple, London, 7 May 1833, BULWER, vol. II, p. 136. Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 15 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

Russia for help. By the 1830s, Austria no longer regarded St Petersburg as an enemy but as an ally. Metternich expressed his opinion in a letter to London: "The Tsar is espousing a policy which, considering the situation in the [Ottoman] Empire, is the best possible one."⁵⁵ He also supported the Russian stance by instructing Acerbi, to convey Austria's opposition to Muhammad Ali's military actions. Nevertheless, this diplomatic move was the most Metternich could do.⁵⁶

Ultimately, on 2 February 1833, Mahmud II formally requested Russian assistance. The first of the Tsar's fleet arrived at the Golden Horn on 20 February.⁵⁷ In response to the Russian presence in the Straits, Louis Philippe appointed Baron Albin Reine Roussin as the new ambassador in Constantinople. He protested against the presence of Russian troops and promised the Sultan that if the foreign army withdrew, he would negotiate peace terms with Ibrahim Pasha, ensuring that Adana remained under the Sultan's control.⁵⁸ However, he miscalculated, as Egypt did not accept his proposal. Instead, Muhammad Ali ordered his army to resume its march on Constantinople to secure the conditions he demanded. This French diplomatic intervention ended in failure, convincing the Porte of the necessity of immediate Russian aid.

The new Austrian ambassador, Bartolomäus von Stürmer, aligned himself with Russia, aiming to establish a diplomatic counterbalance against France. During this period, Palmerston contracted the flu and was absent from his diplomatic duties for three weeks.⁵⁹ Upon his return, he took a far more assertive stance on the Eastern Question. He proposed that Great Britain, in cooperation with the three Eastern courts, draft a joint memorandum outlining a course of action in the Turko-Egyptian conflict, with the aim of resolving the situation in favour of the Ottoman Empire. He also suggested holding a diplomatic conference in Vienna to present a united front against French policy in Constantinople.⁶⁰

One of British diplomacy's positive steps was appointing Patrick Campbell as its new representative in Alexandria, replacing the unconvincing Baker.⁶¹ Campbell informed Muhammad Ali that the government in London would never allow the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, a small fleet headed by

55 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 15 February 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

56 MOLDEN, *Die Orientpolitik*, p. 44.

57 KARPEYEV, Igor, *Russia and Turkey. From Geopolitical Rivalry to Cooperation*. In: ÇIÇEK, Kemal (ed.), *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Ankara 2000, p. 435.

58 Palmerston to William Tempel, London, 21 March 1833, BULWER, vol. II, p. 124.

59 Neumann to Metternich, London, 19 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

60 Neumann to Metternich, London, 10 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

61 Neumann to Metternich, London, 16 March 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

Admiral William Hotham was sent to Alexandria's shores. Also, Austria's exceptional diplomat, the capable Anton Prokesch von Osten, was in Alexandria.⁶² Osten's task was to deter French attempts at mediation between the Sultan and his vassal and secure peace conditions so that Mahmud II would not lose the strategically important territory of Adana.⁶³ In this case, Austria's policy was not just against Egypt but also against France. At the Ballhausplatz, there was a general conviction that France planned to support Muhammad Ali in overthrowing the Sultan's regime.⁶⁴ Lamb sent Palmerston a report on Metternich's opinions on French policy: "Her [France's] object is the extension of her influence and power in the Mediterranean."⁶⁵ While this accusation was not officially confirmed, Paris had evident sympathy for the Egyptian government. The Austrian Chancellor criticised France's position and Roussin's intervention in Constantinople and hoped London would heed his words.⁶⁶ He believed that the entire affair was a "regrettable event."⁶⁷ The British ambassador hoped that the shared interests of the two states, the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the limiting of French influence in the Mediterranean would lead to natural cooperation between them.⁶⁸ In this case, for Britain, it was more about pursuing its interests rather than protecting general international principles, as it was for Austria.

Despite pressure from Britain and Austria, Muhammad Ali refused to give up his claim on Adana. In the end, Mahmud II had to concede the matter. Interestingly, the Russians encouraged him to do so. The Tsar's army was able to defend the Bosphorus against a foreign army, but it could not wage an offensive war. Consequently, Nicholas I preferred that a peace treaty be signed immediately.⁶⁹

⁶² Campbell to Palmerston, 4 April 1833, TNA, FO 78/343; Metternich did not select him randomly for this position. Through his extensive experience, he had proven himself to be an expert on the Orient and the Ottoman Empire. In addition to his diplomatic and military career, he travelled widely and wrote extensively. He took up the role on 2 April 1833. Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 14 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

⁶³ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 14 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/136; ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Anton Prokesch von Osten. The Co-author of Austria's Policy Towards Egypt in Vormärz*. In: Acta Fakulty filozofické Západočeské univerzity v Plzni 2013, 2, p. 44.

⁶⁴ BERTSCH, Daniel, *Anton Prokesch von Osten 1795–1876. Ein Diplomat Österreichs in Athen und an der Hohen Pforte. Beiträge zur Wahrnehmung des Orients im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 2005, p. 192.

⁶⁵ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 19 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

⁶⁶ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 April 1833. AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

⁶⁷ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 14 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

⁶⁸ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 April 1833. AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

⁶⁹ ANDERSON, *The Eastern Question*, p. 83.

A second factor was trying to calm the situation as quickly as possible before it escalated unnecessarily. The Sultan conceded to Ibrahim Pasha's conditions on 5 May 1833 in Kütahya.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, discussions were ongoing between Prokesch and Campbell on one side and the Egyptian governor on the other.⁷¹ Through joint pressure, they obtained Muhammad Ali's agreement to withdraw his claim on Adana on 14 May 1833. Unfortunately, this was too late, as reports on the agreement between the Sultan and Ibrahim Pasha arrived shortly afterwards in Alexandria.⁷² It was during this period that Palmerston's view on Russia's sincere intentions began to change. It became clear that he had misjudged St Petersburg's policies and intentions. Part of his typical shift in stance included a renewed trust in Paris:

Lord Palmerston told him [Jean Mavroyéni] that if Russia supported Ibrahim in Anatolia, she could very well be exposed to a war against both England and France simultaneously. We would never allow something to happen in Turkey that would be as damaging as what happened to the Pope under Austria.⁷³

During the negotiations on peace terms, Palmerston realised that Mandeville was not enough as Britain's representative in Constantinople. He, therefore, decided to replace him, sending John Ponsonby to the Ottoman capital, where he arrived in his new post in May after peace negotiations had been completed.⁷⁴ His anti-Russian policy had since become quite notorious and caused great concern for Metternich.

The terms of the peace agreement were a harsh blow for the Ottoman Empire. The new order in the East posed future challenges, as Metternich correctly believed. The Austrian Chancellor understood the necessity of finding a joint consensus between the Sultan and his governor, which was essential for the survival of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Together with the Russians, the Austrians were convinced that French intrigues and secret negotiations with Muhammad Ali were behind the Sultan's consent. As a result, the Sultan was forced to sign the current peace agreement because he feared a joint Franco-Egyptian action. In behind-the-scenes French negotiations, British diplomacy agreed with the Eastern courts, but London regarded the permanent presence of the Russian navy in the

⁷⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 19 May 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

⁷¹ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 14 May 1833, TNA, FO 120/136; Campbell to Palmerston, Alexandria, 25 June 1833, TNA, FO 78/227.

⁷² ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 519.

⁷³ Neumann to Metternich, London, 21 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁷⁴ BOLSOVER, George Henry, *Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question 1833–1839*. In: *Slavonic and East European Review* 13, 1934, 94, p. 99.

Bosporus as the greater evil. These ideas were also supported by John Duncan Bligh, the ambassador to St Petersburg. Bligh observed the growing speculation, writing:

I need hardly tell your Lordship that various speculations explanatory of this fresh instance of the weakness of the Turkish government are hazarded here, some persons supposing that a sudden panic must have seized the Divan, others that they had been prevailed upon by Egyptian gold, or by a secret French influence at variance with that which has been ostensibly striving to uphold the Turkish Power. The causes that brought about this concession to the Egyptians, and the effect it may eventually lead to, may very well be considered by His Majesty's Government of little importance, compared with the evils that will inevitably and immediately result from a prolonged occupation of the Bosporus by the Russians.⁷⁵

He also recommended that the British government cooperate with Austria to improve conditions for the Sultan and maintain the balance of power.

All the Tsar's assurances of his peaceful intentions regarding the Ottoman Empire did little to ease British and French concerns about the presence of Russian soldiers in the Bosporus.⁷⁶ Palmerston accused Nicholas I of attempting to occupy part of the Ottoman Empire under the guise of protecting the Sultan from Ibrahim Pasha.⁷⁷ British diplomacy's main objective was to secure the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces. Metternich did not understand London and Paris's position: the Sultan had asked another ruler for help against his vassal, which was a legitimate means of resolving the situation.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Great Britain could have given the Porte its means when Mahmud II had officially requested it. Metternich also failed to comprehend Britain's support for French policy, which directly conflicted with its interests. Both Austria and Great Britain wanted the Sultan's regime to continue.⁷⁹ Despite various attempts at joint action, such as co-operation between Campbell and Prokesch, Vienna and London did not come to an agreement.⁸⁰

This more ideological conflict over power between representatives of the Quadruple Alliance and conservative powers disrupted the natural balance of power regarding the Eastern Question. Austria found its main partner in Russia,

⁷⁵ Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 22 May 1833, TNA, FO 65/207.

⁷⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 June 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁷⁷ Neumann to Metternich, London, 21 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁷⁸ RODKEY, *The Views*, p. 628.

⁷⁹ ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 554.

⁸⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, London, 18 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137; PROKESCH-OSTEN, Anton Graf, *Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten. Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich*, Wien 1881, p. 145.

while Great Britain aligned itself with France, hindering deeper cooperation.⁸¹ A conflict between Metternich and Palmerston also arose over international prestige, as both statesmen sought to establish their capital as the diplomatic centre of Europe.⁸² This mutual antagonism in Western Europe was logically reflected in London and Vienna's approach to the Eastern Question.⁸³

Austria's Chancellor urged the British Foreign Secretary to reassess his position regarding France and support the Eastern Powers in their Near East policy.⁸⁴ With this in mind, he welcomed the dispatch of a British squadron as a counterbalance to Russia's presence in the Sea of Marmara.⁸⁵ He also assured Palmerston of the Tsar's good intentions.⁸⁶ If the Russians were to annexe any of the Ottoman territories, Austria would go to war, he assured London.⁸⁷ However, reports arrived in the British capital from France about Austria's support for Russia's ulterior motives. Broglie was well aware of Palmerston's opinions on Russia, so he sent letters to London that were strongly anti-Russian. Nevertheless, British diplomacy did not trust France either, closely monitoring its activities in the Mediterranean Sea with disapproval, and thus rejected its request for joint mediation between the Sultan and his vassal.⁸⁸ At the same time, the British Foreign Secretary did not support Metternich's proposal for a joint approach with the Eastern Powers either.⁸⁹

Metternich was bitter about this diplomatic defeat, and in the dispatches to Neumann, he sharply criticised not only the British government but also Palmerston himself.⁹⁰ He was unsparing in his criticism of the Foreign Secretary as early as April 1833, and of the overall approach of diplomacy in London:

How to explain, in this case, the conduct he has kept [Palmerston], the abandonment in which he has left the affairs of the Orient, and the superiority he has ceded to a rival Power, both over Egypt and over the Ottoman Porte. This minister is not among the number of men

81 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 8 May 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

82 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 17 January 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

83 SCHULZ, Matthias, *Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815–1860*, München 2009, p. 115.

84 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

85 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 17 January 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

86 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

87 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 22 March 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

88 KRAUS, Karl, *Politisches Gleichgewicht und Europagadanke bei Metternich*, Frankfurt am Main 1993, p. 95.

89 RODKEY, *The Views*, p. 629.

90 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 3 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

of state for whom impassibility is appropriate; on the contrary, he belongs to those who easily receive and follow an impression of solidarity.⁹¹

Even Lamb did not hold back his criticism of his own government, emphasising that his country's diplomacy behaved towards Austria as: "Hostile [. . .] by trying to create embarrassment on all other questions that might arise."⁹² For Vienna, the only resolution to the situation was to rely on Russian policy rather than its traditional ally of Great Britain.⁹³ A few days later, Neumann defended the sincerity of his British counterpart with surprise at how open he was in his reports: "Sir Frederic Lamb, through his excessive frankness, had, more than once, displeased Lord Palmerston himself as well as the English Cabinet."⁹⁴ He shared Metternich's concerns over France's plans and warned against Anglo-French cooperation.⁹⁵ Neumann's opinions were similar and aimed to draw attention to Paris's insincere policies.⁹⁶

The continuing presence of Russian troops provoked the short-tempered Rousin to demand their immediate withdrawal. In an atmosphere of apparent cooperation between Maritime Powers, Ponsonby supported this demand and threatened that a British fleet would be sent to the shores of the Sea of Marmara.⁹⁷ His next step was to get Austrian support for a rapid assessment.⁹⁸ Metternich did not see any reason to pressure St Petersburg, and he considered London's and Paris's threats to be an unnecessary provocation.⁹⁹ His poor relations with Princess Lieven shaped Palmerston's view of Russian policy. In the summer of 1833, Anglo-Russian relations were extremely fraught, which was reflected in London's suspicious approach towards the Tsar regarding the Eastern Question.¹⁰⁰

⁹¹ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

⁹² Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137; Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 June 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁹³ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 9 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

⁹⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 June 1833 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁹⁵ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 July 1833, enclosed in a letter: Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 9 July 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

⁹⁶ BERESFORD, Chancellor, Edwin, (ed.), *The Diary of Philipp von Neumann, 1819–1850*, London 1928, vol. I, p. 284.

⁹⁷ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 12 July 1833, TNA, FO 120/139.

⁹⁸ RENDALL, Matthew, *Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia. Nicholas I. The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the Vienna System 1832–1841*. In: *The International History Review* 24, 2002, 1, p. 49.

⁹⁹ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

¹⁰⁰ Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 June 1833 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

A conference of the Powers was to be convened for this purpose, with its objective being to decide upon a joint approach and the future of the Sultan's Empire. However, due to insurmountable disputes within the Concert of Europe, the plan fell through. The first issue that emerged was between Palmerston and Metternich, with the question once again arising of which city should be the main centre of discussions. Louis Philippe's government surprisingly supported Vienna, and similarly, Russia's confidence in London's diplomatic role was also weaker. For Metternich, France's policy in Constantinople was a significant obstacle.¹⁰¹ Palmerston's plan for an agreement between the four Powers and the Sultan's empire based on maintaining the status quo and rejecting the claim to exercise influence in Constantinople was dismissed by Russia and Austria.¹⁰² The rejection of the proposal deepened Palmerston's mistrust of Metternich and Nesselrode. He blamed St Petersburg for much of the breakdown of the Concert, and, with Austria aligned with Russia, he saw it as complicit in this "crime."¹⁰³

Distrustful of the other Powers, the British Prime Minister and his government began to chart their own course. Despite heavy opposition, a plan to construct new warships was pushed through during the summer of 1833.¹⁰⁴ Faith in the Concert of Europe's Congress System began to progressively weaken in the British Isles. The disunity over negotiations about Belgium and reforms in the Papal States and Greece only reinforced this perception. There were also tensions between Neumann and Palmerston.¹⁰⁵ The former criticised London's approach to international issues and its attempts to make the capital the centre of all diplomatic negotiations. In contrast, reports from Ponsonby in Constantinople warned of Russian efforts to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and the fact that Mahmud II was essentially the Tsar's prisoner.¹⁰⁶ Ponsonby, however, worked diligently to curtail Russian influence at the Sultan's court.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, the British government was not the only one trying to take firm control of the situation. The Tsar was also trying to exploit the circumstances of his relationship with the Sultan to begin negotiations on a mutual cooperation agreement.¹⁰⁸ To this end, he sent the seasoned diplomat Count Orlov to the Bo-

101 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 9 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

102 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 7 September 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

103 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 113.

104 BARLETT, p. 111.

105 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 28 June 1833, TNA, FO 120/137; Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 June 1833 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

106 BOLSOVER, *Lord Ponsonby*, p. 105.

107 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Constantinople, 21 May 1833, TNA, FO 78/220.

108 The initiative, however, was based on the Ottoman Empire's need to secure rapid and effective support in the event of a further attack by Muhammad Ali.

sporus to assess the diplomatic terrain.¹⁰⁹ The Sultan welcomed discussions on security guarantees, and by 8 July 1833, a defensive treaty was signed on the outskirts of the Ottoman capital in Hünkâr Iskelesi. Two days later, the Russian fleet sailed out of the Bosphorus.¹¹⁰ The public articles outlined the mutual need to preserve peace and friendly relations and the provision of aid in the event of an attack from a third party.¹¹¹ The secret clause relieved the Sultan of the obligation to provide military support to Russia, instead instructing him to close the Dardanelles to all warships belonging to other states. This would create a defence barrier in the event of an attack from Great Britain or France in the Black Sea.¹¹² The treaty was signed for eight years.¹¹³

Ponsonby discovered the conclusion of the convention, including its secret article, just four days after its signature. Palmerston condemned the treaty as a whole and not just because of the secret article. In reports to Bligh in St Petersburg, he wrote:

The engagements which the Sultan has entered with Russia alter most remarkably the position of Turkey concerning the other Powers of Europe. This treaty, as far as His Majesty's Government are aware of its stipulations, though styled defensive, is in its essence offensive also; and it bears therefore a hostile character as it regards other Powers. It seems intended, moreover, to give Russia a claim to constant interference using her military force in the internal affairs of Turkey and thus to constitute Russia, as it were, umpire between the Sultan and his subjects and to confer upon her a kind of protectorate over Turkey.¹¹⁴

The British Foreign Secretary believed that the treaty effectively subordinated the Ottoman Empire to Russia, with its future and existence now dependent upon the political interests and sentiments of St Petersburg.

Great Britain became equally suspicious of Austria. Palmerston could not forgive Metternich for consistently supporting Russian policy and for the fact that all actions had been prearranged long in advance:

I [Palmerston] see that the Vienna Cabinet is politically married to that of St Petersburg, and as its religion does not allow divorce, it is henceforth pointless to approach Austria as soon

¹⁰⁹ Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg 8 June 1833, TNA, FO 65/207; Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 June 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

¹¹⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 July 1833, TNA, FO 10/137; The treaty itself comprised seven articles, six of which were public, and one was secret. ANDERSON, Matthew Smith (ed.), *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923*, London 1970, p. 43.

¹¹¹ TULASOĞLU, p. 240.

¹¹² Neumann to Metternich, London, 10 August, 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

¹¹³ KARPEYEV, p. 438.

¹¹⁴ Palmerston to Bligh, London, 13 October 1833, TNA, FO 65/206.

as it concerns Russia, even if the interests of the former might ever appear to us compromised.¹¹⁵

The prospect of cooperation from early 1833 was definitively buried, and the rift between London and Vienna became more than evident. Crucially, what seemed at first to be inconsistent policies on various European issues were, in fact, interconnected, as differing views mutually clashed over individual international political matters. The Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi marked the culmination of the first act, which began in 1830.

Palmerston also addressed the new Eastern policy course in the British Parliament.¹¹⁶ In one of his major speeches, which was to define Great Britain's foreign policy for decades, he declared:

Undoubtedly, then, his Majesty's Ministers would feel it to be their duty to resist any attempt on the part of Russia to partition the Turkish Empire; and they would equally have felt themselves at liberty to interfere and prevent the Pasha of Egypt from dismembering any portion of the dominions of the Sultan. The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire were necessary for maintaining tranquillity, liberty, and the balance of power in the rest of Europe. At the same time, he had great doubts that any intention to partition that Empire at all entered into the policy of the Russian government . . . Such an event, too, would lead to a general war in Europe . . . He could assure the hon. Gentleman, that the British government felt that maintaining the peace of Europe was an object of the greatest importance . . . they would do their utmost to preserve the peace of Europe.¹¹⁷

For Palmerston, the vital point was that the Ottoman administration should launch significant reforms. He saw this as the only way out of Ottoman decline and a precondition for maintaining peace and stability in Europe.¹¹⁸

Following the announcement of the convention, the Foreign Secretary sought to prevent its subsequent ratification. He hoped to achieve success by proceeding jointly with France.¹¹⁹ Ponsonby lodged an official protest in Constantinople and expected the other Powers' representatives to join him.¹²⁰ Both actions failed from the outset. Palmerston even considered using Muhammad Ali's army and

115 Neumann to Metternich, London, 31 August 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

116 CLAYTON, p. 71.

117 Palmerston's speech at the British House of Commons, London, 11 July 1833, *Russia and Turkey HC Deb 11 July 1833 vol 19 cc570–83* [online], [quoted 2019-03-01]. Available on: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1833/jul/11/russia-and-turkey#S3V0019P0_18330711_HOC_26.

118 SUBAŞI, Turgut, *British Support for Mustafa Resid Pasha and his Reforms*. In: ÇİÇEK, Kemal (ed.), *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Ankara 2000, p. 427.

119 RODKEY, *Lord Palmerston*, p. 574.

120 Campbell to Palmerston, Cairo, 20 November 1833, TNA, FO 78/228.

Britain's navy to try to thwart Ottoman-Russian cooperation. He also proposed cooperation regarding the protection of Christian believers in Syria.¹²¹ The British government was nonetheless against such proposals and considered cooperation with the Egyptian governor to be highly risky. A crucial factor was that Palmerston had completely ignored Metternich's position in his actions. The Austrian Chancellor was not informed of the treaty's signing and did not find out about it until the end of July 1833. He was naturally upset by Russia's secrecy, especially when, as the greatest defender of the Tsar's policies, he was last to discover such a fundamental act, and only indirectly. Lamb immediately conveyed his impression of Metternich's reaction to London:

It is hardly reconcilable with the fact of the negotiations of the Treaty having escaped him, and if Pr[ince] Mett[eternich] has been left in ignorance by the Court of St Petersburg of its intention to conclude it, this concealment coupled with the appearance of common action in the affairs of Turkey, which he professes to have received, amounts to the grossest treachery.¹²²

The situation was even more absurd in that Orlov was having dinner with Stürmer when the convention was signed but did not inform the internuncio about the treaty. As such, to the last minute, Metternich denied the existence of the treaty, as he assumed that he would have been informed of the matter in advance.¹²³ Despite all this, he did not condemn the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi and supported Russian policy.¹²⁴ He even welcomed the secret article, believing it secured the neutralisation of the Ottoman Empire and peace on Austria's south-eastern borders.¹²⁵

Anti-Russian propaganda grew in strength in Great Britain, fuelled by constant reports from Paris. Palmerston developed an erroneous impression of St Petersburg's unlimited influence in Constantinople.¹²⁶ For these reasons, Nicholas I needed Austria on his side to avoid isolation. The rulers of the two Eastern Powers were supposed to meet in 1830, but the outbreak of the November Uprising forced a postponement. They finally met in September 1833, when the Russian Tsar travelled to Münchengrätz (Mnichovo Hradiště) in North Bohemia. The goal

¹²¹ Palmerston to Campbell, London, 1 August 1833, TNA, FO 78/226.

¹²² Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 July, TNA, FO 120/137.

¹²³ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 8, 23 July 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

¹²⁴ RENDALL, Matthew, *Cosmopolitanism and Russian Near East Policy, 1821–1841*. In: PYTA, Wolfram, *Das europäische Mächtekoncert. Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Wiener Kongress 1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853*, Wien 2009, p. 245.

¹²⁵ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 October 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

¹²⁶ Bligh to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 13 October 1833, TNA, FO 65/206.

of the meeting was to secure cooperation in the Eastern Question.¹²⁷ In addition to Metternich and Francis I, Prince Felix of Schwarzenberg and Prokesch also participated in the discussions for Austria. Russia was represented by Tsar Nicholas I, accompanied by Nesselrode and Dmitrii Pavlovich Tatishchev.¹²⁸ The main issue for both states was the need to keep the Ottoman Empire in its current form. Both Powers committed to maintaining the Sultan's dynasty and ensuring it was not overthrown:

They concentrate all their efforts on making their action as effective as possible, aiming primarily at maintaining the European balance. Without any ambition for territorial expansion, nor for extending their influence, the two Emperors will find in all the vows they have made, a means to preserve the Ottoman Empire by maintaining its integrity.¹²⁹

Should the Empire be threatened with collapse, Austria and Russia would act in mutual accord with the shared intention of preserving the balance of power in Europe. The two Powers would consult each other prior to undertaking specific actions. The agreement was signed on 18 September, with Prussia joining in October 1833 in Berlin.¹³⁰

The Münchengrätz meeting represented the culmination of the shared foreign policy direction of two, and eventually three, Constitutional Powers. Metternich secured the goodwill of Russian diplomacy and also guaranteed that Austria would not be excluded from future discussions on the Ottoman Empire.¹³¹ He expressed his views in a report to Esterházy: "Our policy is in accordance with Russian opinions, and the confidence the Emperor has placed in the Tsar's hand is entirely justified."¹³² Meanwhile, the Austrian ambassador attempted to mediate a meeting between Palmerston and Lieven in London to improve mutual relations, although it yielded no results.¹³³ When the British Foreign Secretary learned of the Münchengrätz meeting, his concerns about Austria's credibility deepened.¹³⁴ He viewed the Austro-Russian "marriage" as a betrayal of British interests, believing the two Powers were conspiring to carve up the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁵ However, he was unaware of the actual nature of the meeting. Esterházy

¹²⁷ SEAMAN, p. 18.

¹²⁸ Nesselrode, Münchengrätz, 14 September 1833, NESSELRODE, vol. VII, p. 252.

¹²⁹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 September 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

¹³⁰ MARTENS, Friedrich, *Die Russische Politik in der Orientalischen Frage*, St Petersburg 1877, p. 31.

¹³¹ SAUVIGNY, p. 466.

¹³² Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 September 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 204.

¹³³ ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 555.

¹³⁴ Palmerston to William Tempel, London, 3 September 1833, BULWER, vol. II, p. 143.

¹³⁵ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 312.

attempted to clarify Austria's stance on the Near East to Palmerston, reassuring him that Austria remained committed to the Sultan's empire. He noted that Austria's policy towards the Eastern Question had been more consistent than Britain's since the 1820s.¹³⁶ While both acknowledged the threat Muhammad Ali posed to Constantinople, Palmerston saw Russia as the ultimate adversary, unlike Esterházy.

Metternich and Lamb held a similar discussion in Vienna, with the British ambassador sending reports about cooperation with Russia to London and raising the issue with the Austrian Chancellor.¹³⁷ He wrote to London: "At Münchengrätz P.[rin]ce Metternich threw Austria entirely into the arms of Russia, passing over all that has been done in Poland and Turkey to consolidate their union against the West of Europe."¹³⁸ He defended British policy, which aimed to prevent the Russian army from marching into Constantinople.

At the same time, he mistakenly believed that the Münchengrätz meeting was deliberately intended to weaken the alliance between Britain and France.¹³⁹ Metternich instead attempted to explain Austria's Near East position and genuine intentions to Lamb, emphasising the importance of preserving the Ottoman Empire and maintaining Europe's balance of power. However, he could not dispel British suspicions of a hidden agenda behind Austro-Russian cooperation in the Near East. Crucially, Nicholas I's insistence on keeping the Berlin agreement secret only reinforced Anglo-French beliefs that Vienna was involved in dividing the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁰ Metternich reassured Lamb of the Tsar's friendly stance towards the Sultan, but Roussin continued to believe the unfounded rumours that St Petersburg and Vienna planned to annexe the Danubian principalities or dismantle the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴¹ The Münchengrätz agreement had a detrimental impact, further deepening the rift between Austria and Britain. Despite this, both powers agreed on the necessity of reforming the Ottoman Empire, with Palmer-

136 Ibid, p. 312.

137 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 6 December 1833, TNA, FO 120/138.

138 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 October 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

139 "It seems to me to be in the nature of things that the three Powers, having failed in their endeavour to weaken the connection between England and France, will now turn their efforts to the strengthening of their own position, in which they will be less restrained than heretofore by the hope of conciliating the British government." Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 7 September 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

140 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 24 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

141 RENDALL, *Restraint or Self-Restraint*, p. 45.

ston urging Metternich to leverage Austria's influence over the Sultan as much as possible.¹⁴²

Hostility towards Russia grew across British society.¹⁴³ Palmerston urged Bligh to maintain good diplomatic relations but privately wrote to him about Russia's hidden intentions.¹⁴⁴ The main anti-Russian campaign played out in Constantinople. In an effort to reduce Russian influence at the Porte, Ponsonby objected to the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi, claiming it breached the Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1809.¹⁴⁵ However, this assertion was inaccurate. The 1833 treaty did not permit Russia to freely send warships through the Straits and, in fact, only confirmed the resolutions of the 1809 treaty.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the Porte had no difficulty in refuting Britain's accusations. When this failed, Ponsonby redirected his efforts towards the Russian Embassy and convinced the Sultan that Russia was plotting at his court.¹⁴⁷

In reality, Mahmud II was more displeased by the presence of the Anglo-French squadron in the Archipelago. He found support from Metternich, who believed Britain's response was both delayed and unnecessary at this stage.¹⁴⁸ In reaction to British policies, Metternich sent a strongly worded dispatch, signalling Austria's desire to end any further polemics with the British cabinet regarding the Eastern Question. This shift in the Chancellor's stance between 1830 and 1833 was evident, with Austrian diplomacy losing all trust in British intentions. His dissatisfaction was not directed solely at Palmerston, but at the entire British cabinet. He stated: "It is not just with this Minister alone that we no longer wish to debate questions . . . but with England in its entirety, and I will say even more, with any other Power whatsoever." He reiterated that Austria made "no difference between the Principal Secretary of State and the Cabinet he represents," and that any change in tone or conduct from Palmerston would require him to approach Austria, not the other way around.¹⁴⁹ He further explained that the Eastern Question was fundamentally simple, involving a weakening Ottoman author-

142 TODOROVA, Maria, *Aspects of the Eastern Question*. In: TODOROVA, Maria (ed.), *Essays from the First Bulgarian-Dutch Symposium of Historians*. Sofia 6–7. June 1984, Sofia 1984, p. 27.

143 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 24 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 10 January 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

144 Palmerston to Bligh, London, 6. November 1833, TNA, FO 65/206.

145 BOLSOVER, *Lord Ponsonby*, p. 106; CUNNINGHAM, Allan, INGRAM, Edward (ed.), *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, London 1993, p. 118.

146 This agreement banned warships from sailing in peacetime. ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 551.

147 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 17 November 1833, TNA, FO 120/139.

148 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 17 January 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

149 Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 31 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

ity and Mehemet Ali, who sought to establish an Arab Empire. Metternich criticised the British cabinet, especially under Palmerston, for attempting to sow discord among the Powers, a strategy Austria found incomprehensible.

Similar to Palmerston's approach with Ponsonby, the Austrian Chancellor also engaged in diplomatic efforts by appointing Anton von Laurin as Consul General in Alexandria. The newly appointed diplomat proved to be more effective than his predecessor, Acerbi. Upon arriving in Alexandria, Laurin quickly established stronger relations with Muhammad Ali and his advisors. Metternich underscored the significance of Laurin's role in his instructions:

The Viceroy of Egypt [sic] is not, like other Pashas, a simple administrator of regions entrusted to his care. He is a very powerful vassal and all the more formidable for his sovereign . . . It is thus of the utmost interest for us to observe and anticipate his initiatives, like those other Great Powers who would aspire to exert influence over his designs and resolutions and predict or eliminate everything in them that could compromise the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and, therefore, the general peace of Europe. The theatre of these actions is not in Constantinople, it is where Mohammed Ali resides.¹⁵⁰

The situation eased somewhat at the turn of 1833/34 once the joint fleet had sailed to winter ports in Malta and Poros.¹⁵¹ In contrast, Russian naval manoeuvres raised concerns in Sweden, which contacted London and asked for guarantees in the event of an attack by its neighbour. Palmerston assured Sweden unofficially that Britain would support them in a conflict with the Tsar. Sweden, in contrast, declared it would be strictly neutral during an Anglo-Russian war. A crucial aspect of this fact is that Palmerston considered the idea of a war with St Petersburg.¹⁵²

The anti-Russian mood in the British Isles could not be diminished. This was due to criticism of St Petersburg by the public and also because of the Lievens' activities in attempting to undermine Palmerston's authority as much as possible, both with Grey and with other cabinet members.¹⁵³ As noted in the previous chapter, a dispute over the nomination of Stratford Canning as ambassador to St Petersburg dominated the background during these events. After the Lievens were removed from their post in London, both states were represented diplomati-

¹⁵⁰ ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 522.

¹⁵¹ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 4 January 1834, TNA, FO 120/145.

¹⁵² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 13 December 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

¹⁵³ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 3 December 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203; Dorothea Lieven to Alexander Lieven, London, 12 January 1834, ROBINSON, Lionel George (ed.), *Letters of Dorothea Princess Lieven. During her Residence in London 1812–1834*, New York, London, Bombay 1902, p. 363.

cally only by *chargés d'affaires* for a certain period, which naturally did not improve relations either.¹⁵⁴

Regarding Anglo-Russian relations, the question arises as to what extent the meeting in Münchengrätz influenced cooperation between London and Vienna. For Palmerston, Austria became an “accomplice to crime” in the East. As St Petersburg’s main ally, it became the target of continuous suspicion from the Maritime Power. Metternich asserted and assured that Russia accepted the Austrian policy, emphasising the necessity of preserving the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵⁵ The Austrian Chancellor was well informed of Broglie’s negative impact on politics in the British Isles. He had endeavoured to exploit his influence on Louis Philippe to take a broader initiative and remove his Foreign Minister from the post. Nicholas I took a similar approach and sent a report to London on 18 December 1833 about his peaceful intentions and desire to maintain the Sultan’s regime. During January and February 1834, the mutual antagonism between West and East waned.¹⁵⁶ This was not changed even when Palmerston secretly called on Vice-Admiral Charles Rowley to steer a course for the Bosphorus in the event of a Russian invasion. This partial transformation in Britain’s policy resulted from stalling for time. The British Foreign Secretary publicly admitted that as long as Metternich supported Nicholas I, it would be impossible for London to take action against Russia. He hoped that Austria would change policy, allowing him to “extract” the Tsar from the Near East.¹⁵⁷ One such change was to occur after Francis I’s death and the arrival of a new emperor, who would not be so under the Chancellor’s influence and who would strengthen relations with Great Britain.¹⁵⁸

In March 1834, Nicholas I and Mahmud II signed another agreement. Part of this arrangement was reducing the Ottoman debt from six to four million ducats and agreeing on Russo-Ottoman borders in Asia. The Tsar’s steps in the first half of 1834 were designed to assure the Western Powers of his peaceful intentions.¹⁵⁹ But Palmerston did not believe them. The convention guaranteed the Asian borders but was also favourable to St Petersburg, with the Russian Empire, from Brit-

154 Russia was represented in London by Count Pavel Ivanovich Medem in 1834–1835. Britain was represented by John Duncan Bligh in St Petersburg. Esterházy to Metternich, London, 13 December 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

155 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208; BOLSOVER, George Henry, *Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question 1834*. In: *English Historical Review* 51, 1936, 202, p. 240.

156 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 22 February 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

157 BULWER, vol. II, p. 179.

158 BOLSOVER, George Henry, *David Urquhart and the Eastern Question 1833–1837. A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy*. In: *Journals of Modern History* 8, 1936, 4, p. 447.

159 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 6 June 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

ain's perspective, moving dangerously close to the crucial fortress of Kars and trade routes to Persia. The Foreign Office instructed Rowley's fleet to sail on the open sea again. Nicholas I determined it would be pointless to assure London again of St Petersburg's intentions as long as Palmerston was in post.¹⁶⁰

Metternich attempted to exploit the cooling of relations and again proposed a conference to be convened in Vienna. Lamb assured Palmerston of Austria's upright intentions and the effort to bridge current conflicts between East and West. Austria's chargé d'affaires in London, Karl von Hummelauer, conveyed Metternich's stance on the Near East and Russia to Britain's new Prime Minister, Melbourne. Britain's apparent indifference toward Vienna's concerns confirmed to Metternich that the nation was not interested in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶¹ In September 1834, he wrote a report to the British capital on Austrian confidence in Russian policy and its tolerance for relations between the Sultan and the Tsar.¹⁶² This information upset the London government. Melbourne attempted to restore relations and led a government debate on improving access to Continental Power.¹⁶³ He concluded that Palmerston's policy had been "more daring than skilful" until the mid-1830s.¹⁶⁴ Circumstances indeed indicated this. Metternich also noted that if there were to be any rapprochement, it would be up to Palmerston to take that step, as the rift between them was caused by him, not by the cabinet in Vienna: "If Lord Palmerston were ever to change his tone and conduct, it would be up to him to come to us, but it will never be us who will turn to him, especially when it comes to pursuing interests that are as much those of his Court as they are ours and of all the Powers."¹⁶⁵ In 1834, Hummelauer was the only Austrian diplomat in London. Talleyrand advocated for the traditional Vienna System and strongly opposed Palmerston's policy after he departed from London. Vienna, like Russia, was represented in London only by a chargé d'affaires.

Melbourne strongly encouraged Palmerston to reassess his positions on Austria.¹⁶⁶ In October 1834, the Foreign Secretary sent Lamb a note explaining the various perspectives of both Powers on the Eastern Question. The overall wording of the report bore a moderate, even friendly, tone.¹⁶⁷ Ultimately, domestic politics

¹⁶⁰ BOLSOVER, *Lord Ponsonby*, p. 107.

¹⁶¹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 10 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 214.

¹⁶² Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 31 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

¹⁶³ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 17 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹⁶⁴ BOLSOVER, *Palmerston*, p. 247.

¹⁶⁵ Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 31 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹⁶⁶ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 17 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹⁶⁷ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 21 October 1834, TNA, FO 120/147.

led to the collapse of the London government, and for some time, Palmerston was forced to leave the role of Foreign Secretary. He told to Vienna of this in a sarcastic message: "I feel sure that it will have been the happiest moment in his life when he [Metternich] reads it and that I shall never have given him greater satisfaction than when going out."¹⁶⁸ Metternich responded that he did not feel satisfaction but rather hope. For the Austrian Chancellor, this change represented the hope of reassessing Britain's approach to cooperation with Austria and the prospects of joint foreign policy coordination.

¹⁶⁸ BOLSOVER, *Palmerston*, p. 248.

7 Civil War in Portugal and Spain, and the Quadruple Alliance

One of the main reasons London could not support Mahmud II was that its navy was being deployed off the coast of the Iberian Peninsula. Palmerston had been monitoring the situation in Portugal even before becoming Foreign Secretary, and after 1830, it became a central focus of his foreign policy. As an “heir” to the Canningite era, he considered the country a primary sphere of British influence.¹ Relations between Great Britain and Portugal had already been markedly tense during the Wellington cabinet, reaching a climax in mid-1830. Dom Miguel, the future Miguel I of Portugal, ruled Portugal from 1827 as regent on behalf of his fiancée and also niece, daughter of his older brother Dom Pedro, Maria da Glória.² A year later, he abolished the constitution he had sworn allegiance to and implemented a repressive regime which also arrested and deported his political opponents.³

Great Britain enjoyed a unique relationship with Portugal based on international agreements going back to the fourteenth century. These related to economic and military affairs, and British subjects enjoyed special privileges in the country.⁴ They were exempt from Portuguese taxes, and in court cases, they were defended by Portuguese lawyers approved by the British cabinet. Miguel’s government, on the other hand, viewed British influence in an extremely negative light.⁵ The Portuguese public was incited to perpetrate violence against His Majesty’s subjects, and in March 1830, British merchant ships were seized at the Azores. The hostility towards Dom Miguel continued even after the formation of Grey’s cabinet. Similar acts of lawlessness were committed against the French as were against the British. In the summer of 1831, several French fishermen were imprisoned, and Admiral Roussin did not hesitate to retaliate. The French demanded satisfaction, sending a fleet to the River Tagus. Subsequently, the assets of Portuguese merchant ships operating on the Iberian coast were seized. Palmerston, surprisingly, did not object, being influenced by the need for cooperation

1 RICH. p. 63.

2 Dom Pedro waived his claim to the Portuguese throne in 1826, leaving himself only the title of Emperor of Brazil.

3 MACAULEY, Neill, *Dom Pedro. The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal 1789–1834*, Durham 1986, p. 226.

4 Portuguese living in the British Isles did not enjoy the same privileges.

5 Wellington’s cabinet demanded that Dom Miguel give amnesty to all political opponents, but he refused to comply.

with the Orléans regime in Belgium. The British public, though, did not approve of the French action. They demanded counteraction and a more active approach. Palmerston did not comply and declared that Great Britain had no exclusive right to resolve Franco-Portuguese disputes. Even so, discussions at the London Conference on Belgium influenced his response.⁶ The British Foreign Secretary was evident in his opinions of the Dom Miguel government from 1829, when he declared in the House of Commons that the Portuguese regent was “the destroyer of constitutional freedom, the breaker of solemn oaths, the faithless usurper.”⁷ This speech was one of his first about foreign policy, and although he gave it to a half-empty chamber, it continued to resonate for many years amongst the British political elite. In March 1830, he made another fiery speech in which he declared Portugal a “question of life and death” for Great Britain.⁸ By then, it was already evident that a more active approach to the issue and an official position would be necessary. Palmerston hinted at his future strategy regarding Portugal during one of his early meetings with the Spanish envoy in London, Francisco de Cea Bermúdez, in December 1830. The representative from Madrid was surprised by the liberal stance of the British Foreign Secretary towards Portugal. He declared that it was his duty:

To provide him with all the support that my special relationship with Lord Palmerston would allow me to offer, with some chance of success, but above all, I believed it was in the interest of our shared objective to advise him to avoid any preliminary discussions on the subject or polemics on matters of principle.⁹

Upon Palmerston's assumption of office, Esterházy informed that despite the strong rhetoric with which the current Principal Secretary of State had spoken out against the recognition of Dom Miguel, his policy would remain consistent with that of the previous cabinet.¹⁰

The British Foreign Secretary nominated Sebastian Hoppner for the post of Consul in Lisbon in January 1831. Official relations between Portugal and Great Britain had been severed since 1828, and this was to be the first step towards improving this strained situation for London.¹¹ According to the Foreign Office's in-

6 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 30.

7 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 169.

8 Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 6 April 1830, *Portugal HC Deb 06 April 1830 vol 23 cc1404–6* [online], [quoted 2019-03-01]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1830/apr/06/portugal#S2V0023P0_18300406_HOC_63.

9 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 3 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

10 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

11 Palmerston to Granville, London, 29 November 1830, TNA, FO 120/114.

structions, Hoppner was to maintain strict neutrality between Dom Miguel and his liberal rivals while also urging the regent to moderate his ultra-conservative policies.¹² Any restoration of good relations between London and Lisbon depended on the declaration of amnesty for political opponents mentioned above, which had also been demanded during Wellington's term of office.¹³ Additionally, the arrest of British subjects critical of Miguel's regime was also to stop, although Hoppner's demands were immediately rejected by Portugal.¹⁴

Britain's relations with France also deteriorated progressively. While Palmerston had not initially objected to the French action along the Portuguese coast, his stance changed in July 1831.¹⁵ There were widespread concerns within British society that France might intervene in Portugal, naturally disrupting good relations between London and Paris.¹⁶ Palmerston wrote to Granville about the threat of a severe crisis in the event of French military action in Portugal.¹⁷ As a result, Sébastiani proposed to London that they take joint action against Dom Miguel. Palmerston did not want to get involved in a more serious engagement. Despite his antipathy towards the Portuguese regime, he argued that they needed to respect each country's sovereignty.¹⁸ This was essentially reasserting the doctrine of non-intervention. Ultimately, the French fleet withdrew from the Portuguese coast, and Dom Miguel's rule remained unchanged.¹⁹

The new regent's rule and the restoration of the conservative regime in Portugal also had an international aspect. Dom Miguel, whom his brother had sent into exile before 1826, had found refuge in Vienna. He had even become a great admirer of Metternich, and the Austrian Chancellor supported his policies. Metternich considered the Portuguese charter "an act of madness" and Dom Miguel, its rightful ruler.²⁰ The Austrian court was linked dynastically to the courts in Portugal and Spain, giving Metternich the sense that Vienna was entitled to have a say in conditions on the Iberian Peninsula. But the repressive approach now prevalent in Lisbon horrified even the Austrian Chancellor. Following the events in France in July 1830, though, Metternich became convinced that Dom Miguel's rule aligned with monarchist principles and represented a barrier to Western lib-

¹² Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 10 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

¹³ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 4 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193; Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹⁴ STAHL, p. 287.

¹⁵ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

¹⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 4 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

¹⁷ Palmerston to Granville, London, 25 July 1831, TNA, FO 27/425.

¹⁸ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹⁹ MACAULEY, p. 228.

²⁰ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 92.

eralism.²¹ Palmerston did not want to allow the Eastern courts to intervene in politics on the Iberian Peninsula and warned them that Britain would respond.²²

The situation in Portugal took on a new dimension in the spring of 1832. Dom Pedro had decided to return to Portugal from Brazil with his daughter.²³ They initially found refuge together in Great Britain and then in the Azores.²⁴ London and Paris then became his principal supporters, to the dismay of Austria and Russia. While Palmerston refused to provide Pedro with warships, he also said it was not against Britain's non-intervention principles to sell him those warships for any military action. In July 1832, after liberal exiles and British volunteers joined his side, Pedro attacked Porto, the second largest city in Portugal, with his fleet of ships. His naval commander was former British naval officer Captain George Rose Sartorius. Palmerston did not protest against the deployment of British volunteers in Pedro's army because it was based on British law and public opinion. On the other hand, he did not want to get more engaged in the conflict and agreed to Dom Miguel's request that His Majesty's navy not violate Portuguese waters. A squadron under Commander Hyde Parker operated as an observer three miles from Portuguese shores.²⁵

This action against Dom Miguel was viewed with great suspicion in Spain. The July events also reflected Madrid's internal political stability.²⁶ The childless King Ferdinand VII married Maria Christina of Naples in 1829 following the death of his previous wife, Amalia of Saxony. In the spring of 1830, they were expecting their desired offspring. At the end of March of that year, the Pragmatic Sanction revoked the law of succession from the period of Philip V's rule. This law only entitled succession rights to male members of the House of Bourbon.²⁷ Following the birth of his daughter Maria Isabel Luisa, it was evident that Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, could give up hopes of the Spanish throne. Even so, his conservative supporters, particularly the Church and the rural areas where they dominated, did not want to accept this fact. Ferdinand found himself in a tricky domestic political situation – on the one hand, through his wife, he was forced to

21 Campuzano to Salmón, Lisbon, 12 December 1830, HOFFMAN, Fritz, *Metternich and the July Revolution*. In: SCHNEID, Frederick (ed.), *European Politics 1815–1848*, Farnham 2011, p. 149.

22 BULLEN, Roger, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 57.

23 He had been forced to leave due to domestic political problems the previous summer and abdicated in favour of his son, Pedro II.

24 Maria left Portugal for her father in Brazil in 1829.

25 RIDLEY, p. 167.

26 CHALUPA, Jiří, *Don Carlos a ti druzí. Karlistické války ve Španělsku v letech 1833–1939*, Praha 2008, p. 69.

27 The Pragmatic Sanction was declared by Charles VI in 1789, although it did not have the force of law.

acknowledge the succession of their daughter, and on the other hand, he was being pressured by the Church to secure the rights of his brother. Events were exacerbated by his poor health and the prospect of an early death. He likened himself “to a beer cap, suggesting that the entire beer would spill out should it be removed.”²⁸ As long as he was alive, his presence on the throne was like a safety valve preventing a society-wide crisis. The circumstances in Portugal and Spain were analogous, and the two countries mutually affected each other over the 1830s.²⁹ The succession problem became a crucial factor in Spanish history, with impacts lasting deep into the twentieth century.³⁰

Ferdinand’s ambassador, Cea Bermúdez, saw Great Britain as a natural protector against France and feared the spread of revolution across the Pyrenees. He saw the maintenance of a conservative political course as a means to protect the Peninsula from revolutionary turmoil, and so, in the end, he supported Dom Miguel. Ferdinand VII had similar opinions, and during Pedro’s naval campaign, he aligned himself with the conservatives. Palmerston did not want Dom Miguel to remain on the Portuguese throne, and he expanded cooperation with France. Metternich supported Spain and demanded that London avoid getting involved in the conflict.³¹ Bermúdez’s view of the Whig cabinet began to change significantly in 1831, and during a conversation with Palmerston, he made this clear to him: “The [Spanish] government was mistaken about the true intentions of the Cabinet of St. James.”³²

As a result of the London conference discussions, the British Foreign Secretary continued seeking a compromise. To the Eastern courts, he said that “it is impossible for Great Britain to recognise the government of Dom Miguel.”³³ However, he also informed Austria of the British government’s decision not to participate in Pedro’s military campaign, allegedly because it would breach British law.³⁴ He added that he was willing to support Dona Maria in taking the throne without constitutional restoration.³⁵ In 1831, Palmerston aimed to secure international support for his policy regarding Belgium and avoid provoking the Eastern Powers headed by Austria.³⁶ Metternich sent a proposal to London suggesting

28 CHALUPA, p. 76.

29 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

30 LAWRENCE, Mark, *Spain’s First Carlist War 1833–1840*, Basingstoke 2014, p. 221.

31 STAHL, p. 286.

32 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 13 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

33 Palmerston to Chad, London, 3 December 1831, TNA, FO 64/181.

34 Palmerston to Granville, London, 30 November 1831, TNA, FO 120/114.

35 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

36 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 31.

Great Britain could recognise Dom Miguel in exchange for awarding amnesty to his opponents.³⁷ The British Foreign Secretary doubted the Portuguese regent would keep his word and rejected the idea. In the end, Prussia and Russia backed the Austrian proposal and insisted on Dom Miguel's unconditional recognition. Shortly afterwards, the Eastern courts also began providing him with financial support.³⁸

Pedro's military campaign caused concerns in Paris. Louis Philippe worried about Spain entering Portuguese territory, resulting in an international crisis and a radicalisation of public opinion calling for intervention by the French army. For Palmerston, Madrid needed to remain neutral.³⁹ He sent diplomatic notes, threatening that Great Britain would join the conflict if Spain fired shots within the Portuguese borders.⁴⁰ Palmerston's stance towards Austria also hardened. He reported to Lamb that the Holy Alliance had ended, and Great Britain would not tolerate the Eastern Powers interfering in Spanish-Portuguese relations. He also urged Metternich to reassess his position and recognise Dom Pedro's rule as regent.⁴¹

The Austrian Chancellor conveyed to London in his instructions that his court was well-acquainted with the matters of the Iberian Peninsula and closely considers them in their approach:

We cannot ignore the reality of the dangers that Spain would face if the government currently in power in Lisbon, with Dom Miguel at the head, were to be overthrown in favour of the constitutional party, which is widely popular in the country. Emperor Dom Pedro is currently preparing to launch an attack against Portugal. It even seems that the disposition of the Spanish mindset is such that the court of Madrid could not refuse, without serious inconvenience, to support Dom Miguel against such an undertaking, and His Catholic Majesty would no doubt be within his rights, in responding to these motives and at the request of the legitimate government of Portugal, to provide military assistance in repelling Dom Pedro's attack against that same government.⁴²

Palmerston shared the French monarch's concern and considered Spanish intervention a threat to peace across Europe because it could also threaten the internal political stability of France and Louis Philippe's position.⁴³ His reports to

37 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

38 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 245.

39 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

40 Palmerston to Addington, London, 27 March 1832, TNA, FO 72/390.

41 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 246; Palmerston to Lambo, London, 19. February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

42 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

43 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

Vienna were uncompromising, demanding one sole outcome – the removal of Dom Miguel.⁴⁴

During this period, Palmerston once again bowed to the non-intervention doctrine and declared that any British intervention in the event of Spanish aggression would not be a breach of these principles but rather to protect British subjects.⁴⁵ In reality, he regarded the Iberian Peninsula as a British sphere of influence, while disregarding the Spanish envoy's request for Great Britain to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Pyrenean states, which were seen as a dynastic dispute.⁴⁶ The support for liberalism was merely a cover for his ambition to expand its dominance.⁴⁷

Before Pedro's invasion, Dom Miguel sought to rally his supporters with his March 1832 manifesto, in which he stated, among other things:

My gallant and numerous Army, in a body flew to arms, and incessantly do I receive the most unequivocal proof of their tried fidelity. Finally, the whole Nation is as one man, ready to defend itself. Thus, in like manner as it took to me its solemn oath, through the medium of its Representatives in the Three Estates of the Realm [. . .] these Kingdoms being saved from impiety and anarchy.⁴⁸

The manifesto was based on maximum devotion to the Church and its essential role in the nation's welfare. Dom Miguel defended his right to the throne and was not afraid to refer to Portuguese laws dating back to the thirteenth century when he did so. This declaration was primarily designed to impact the Eastern Powers, evidenced by its translation into several languages. In the end, Miguel's forces managed to repel Pedro's invasion, and the whole affair was limited to just a few liberal bastions in Porto. Spain heavily funded the Portuguese pretender in both financial and material terms. His army included experienced British officers serving in Portugal since the end of the Napoleonic era.⁴⁹

Reports of the failure of Pedro's campaign disconcerted Palmerston. He laid some of the blame on Hoppner and replaced him with William Russell in June 1832. He ordered Commander William Parker's fleet to maintain a state of readiness and instructed British military observers in Portugal to monitor the borders in the

⁴⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 26 February 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

⁴⁵ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 30 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁴⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

⁴⁷ ALFARO, Alfonso Goizueta, *Forging Liberal States: Palmerston's Foreign Policy and the Rise of a Constitutional Monarchy in Spain, 1833–7*. In: *Historical Research*, Oxford 94, 2021, 222, p. 833.

⁴⁸ Miguel's Manifesto of 22 March 1832, attached to Neumann's dispatch to Metternich, London, 25 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

⁴⁹ MACAULEY, p. 165.

event of a Spanish intervention.⁵⁰ At the same time, his instructions urged Russell to maintain strict neutrality.⁵¹ From the British standpoint, Palmerston was unable to take any decisive action. It was impossible to send military or monetary aid to Pedro because the British cabinet would not allow such a proposal.⁵² He asked Sébastiani to provide money and agreed to provide support using Pedro's funds. The question remains as to how far Palmerston was willing to go regarding breaching the doctrine of non-intervention.⁵³ Regarding the Iberian Peninsula, he was willing to intervene in favour of Dona Maria. In contrast, concerning France's breach of the integrity of the Papal States that same year, he kept out of Austro-French disputes. From this perspective, Palmerston's politics would appear to be not a traditional effort to keep the balance of power but rather to pursue British objectives alone.⁵⁴ This position is supported by his instructions to Russell on 29 August 1832. In these, he proposed that if his campaign fails, Dom Pedro be given a safe return from Porto, escorted by British warships, and assured that he could rely upon their aid in the event of complications.⁵⁵

In the end, the situation changed for the better for Pedro in September 1832. Miguel's attempt to blockade the enemy fleet at Porto failed, and the port remained in the hands of the liberals. As Miguel's situation deteriorated, attacks began on the British representatives at the Lisbon court. Russell and Hoppner sent reports to the cabinet in London stating the need to intervene and support Pedro. The Tories, headed by Wellington, opposed this, demanding that neutrality be maintained.⁵⁶ Palmerston was inclined to act in Portugal but did not oppose Wellington publicly.⁵⁷ The Foreign Secretary's resolve to intervene on the Iberian Peninsula was directly proportional to the international situation in the rest of

50 Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

51 According to Neumann, Palmerston confirmed this position several times: "*During the interview I had with Lord Palmerston last week, I asked him if this arrival had any influence on the attitude of neutrality that England had taken in the affairs of Portugal? The Minister told me that no, as long as Spain did not deviate from hers, the British government would faithfully observe the commitments it had previously made in this regard, which had been made in good faith so far, and that nothing could be reproached.*" Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

52 Addington to Palmerston, Madrid, 8 July 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

53 RIDLEY, p. 168.

54 Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 10 December 1832, TNA, FO 325/25c.

55 Palmerston to Russell, London, 29 August 1832, TNA, FO 63/364; RIDLEY, p. 170.

56 STAHL, p. 288.

57 Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons. London, 1 July 1832, *Interference in the Affairs of Portugal HC Deb 01 June 1832 vol 13 cc307–9* [online], [quoted 2019-04-01]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1832/jun/01/interference-in-the-affairs-of-portugal#S3V0013P0_18320601_HOC_85.

Europe, whether this was the end of the immediate threat in Belgium or Italy. He also grew in certainty when it became evident that the French would help. More importantly, he relied on Pedro for victory. The crisis in Spain also led to a stalemate.⁵⁸

From September 1832, Ferdinand VII's health deteriorated rapidly. Most of the court and those around him were convinced his end was near and that he would not survive the coming winter. These reports mobilised both opposing camps, awaiting their "moment of reckoning." The army at the Portuguese borders was ordered to return to Madrid and maintain order. Dom Miguel had lost his "Spanish card," weakening his hitherto secure position. The liberal supporters of Christina's succession gained the upper hand in Madrid, forcing Don Carlos to sail to join his nephew, Dom Miguel.⁵⁹ In Lisbon, Ferdinand VII exiled him to Rome after he issued an official statement refusing to recognise Isabella's claim to the throne. Don Carlos refused to do so and instead waited for his brother's death. A new government was set up in the Spanish capital, favouring Christina, led by the former London ambassador, Cea Bermúdez. In the meantime, the Austrian envoy in Madrid, Lazar Ferdinand von Brunetti, advocated for Don Carlos to Ferdinand VII, arguing that only by choosing him would Spain avoid the risk of civil war.⁶⁰

During the ongoing diplomatic crisis with Russia, Palmerston nominated Stratford Canning for a special mission in Madrid to strengthen British influence. The Foreign Secretary had unwavering confidence in the former Prime Minister's cousin. Palmerston wrote in his instructions to Madrid:

As the present state of public affairs does not require that you should repair immediately to your government post at St. Petersburg, the King has been pleased to select you to proceed on a unique and temporary mission to the court of Madrid with reference to the present state of affairs in Portugal. His Majesty's Government has hitherto felt that the view taken of Portuguese affairs by the Spanish government was so different from their own that it was hardly possible for the two governments to unite in any joint effort of negotiation or mediation for the purpose of terminating the civil war by an amicable arrangement between the contending parties, but recent events in Spain and the turn which the contest has taken in Portugal seem to afford an opening for such an attempt.

Dom Miguel has not succeeded in making any impression on the defences of Oporto, and Dom Pedro has not found himself strong enough to undertake offensive operations. His Majesty's Government has determined to make an endeavour to induce Spain to cooperate in measures that may stop the effusion of blood and restore peace to the Peninsula. If you

⁵⁸ BARTLETT, *Great Britain and Sea Power*, p. 96.

⁵⁹ LAWRENCE, p. 46.

⁶⁰ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

should find the Spanish government so disposed, you will, in the first place, propose to them to unite with that of Great Britain in inviting the contending parties to agree to an immediate armistice, with a view to negotiation. If they should press for the recognition of the title of Dom Miguel as the basis of such an arrangement, you will refer to the events which have taken place since the usurpation of Dom Miguel and to the circumstances in which both Spain and Portugal are placed at this moment, and you will express the strong opinion of H.M.G. that a secure and permanent settlement is not to be effected in this way. You will then propose the following arrangements, namely, the establishment of Donna Maria on the throne as Queen.⁶¹

He added that if he failed, he would withdraw to Lisbon, where he would await further instructions.⁶² Palmerston saw Canning as one of the ablest diplomats of his time and was sure his instructions would be followed thoroughly in Madrid.

Fulfilling Palmerston's tasks was particularly challenging for Canning. Cea Bermúdez, like his predecessor, favoured Dom Miguel. London viewed the removal of both rivals and the establishment of Dona Maria's rule – without her father's regency, as was originally demanded – as the solution to the tricky situation.⁶³ Grey proposed that the young Infanta marry one of the Austrian archdukes.⁶⁴ Metternich commented on this as a completely unrealistic option: "The history of Lord Grey's entire administration is but a string of absurdities, fantastical projects destined to fail due to means contrary to their success, and finally conceptions where criminality and a lack of practical sense are indistinguishable."⁶⁵ Neumann, after a few days, wrote a report to Vienna on British stubbornness in recognising Dom Miguel and its efforts at achieving some compromise with the Spanish government. He also reported on Stratford Canning's mission, which he claimed was "shrouded in secrecy,"⁶⁶ adding that London "no longer believed that Dom Pedro gave [Portugal] greater hope for a better future."⁶⁷

Metternich responded that the entire problem had a simple solution – the removal of Dom Pedro to "some corner of Europe."⁶⁸ He emphasised that stability in Portugal could only be restored if Great Britain ceased its intervention, Dom Pedro was defeated, and Dom Miguel was recognised. This, Metternich argued, would also have broader implications, notably for events in Spain:

61 Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 13 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

62 Neumann to Metternich, London, 11 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

63 Palmerston to Cea Bermúdez, London, 7 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

64 Neumann to Metternich, London, 4 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

65 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

66 Neumann to Metternich, London, 11 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

67 Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

68 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

The idea of the 'Affair of the Two Brothers' is one of those utopian ideas that can only be conceived in hollow minds. It is enough to demonstrate that there is no consideration of the real situation. The true difficulty lies in chasing Dom Miguel away. After five years of hesitation, proceeding with insults and a hostile expedition against this Prince, and the difficulties of combining land and sea operations, if they were to be undertaken, it would be evident that success cannot be obtained by simple wishes accompanied by a few sentences. We do not aim solely at ending the Oporto expedition but also at resolving the Portuguese affair, which is also the affair of Donna Maria.⁶⁹

In a surprising diplomatic turn, London gave cautious consideration to parts of the proposal. One of the British Prime Minister's potential responses was to send Hummelauer to Dom Miguel to negotiate terms of an agreement. Grey, in parallel, proposed a compromise, suggesting the establishment of a Dona Maria regency without the restoration of the constitution.⁷⁰ Palmerston agreed to this approach, though he was hesitant about the complete recognition of Dom Miguel.⁷¹

During June 1833, there was a change in command, with the legendary Charles John Napier becoming the chief commander of Pedro's naval forces.⁷² His task was to open a second front and stop Porto from being surrounded. The same month, he destroyed Miguel's fleet and opened a route to Lisbon. It is extraordinary what Dom Pedro achieved in his military campaign. With only a tenth of the men that his opponent, Dom Miguel, had, he managed to hold and supply Porto for a year, eventually achieving naval dominance and securing a route inland.⁷³ However, the path to Portugal's capital remained fraught with challenges.⁷⁴

Even so, events did not develop positively for Great Britain in Spain. Cea Bermúdez was unwilling to listen to Canning's proposals that Dona Maria be recognised, insisting on the acceptance of Dom Miguel.⁷⁵ Thus, there was nothing for the British envoy to do other than undermine Bermúdez's position and secure better conditions for negotiation. Therefore, he decided to speed up to Queen Christina and tell her a similar story of the two Infantas to engender a feeling of allegiance in her. Canning wrote to London for further instructions and information, which he could use to get the Spanish government on his side. In his response, Palmerston assured Isabella of British support should Spain recognise

69 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 252.

70 Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

71 Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 13 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

72 MOWAT, p. 77.

73 It is important to add that many French and British volunteers joined the side of Dom Pedro. Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

74 GUEDALLA, p. 182.

75 Stratford Canning to Palmerston, Madrid, 24 January 1833, TNA, FO 352/26a.

Dona Maria's claims. In the end, the effort ended with Cea's victory. The ailing King entrusted him with full authority, and his supporters established the government, leaving Christina with no choice but to passively observe.⁷⁶ The whole matter frustrated Palmerston, so he sought to extricate himself from his obligation to maintain neutrality in the best possible way. To this end, he entrusted Stratford Canning, who, in a long letter to Cea Bermúdez, explained the "good intentions" of the British government in its stance but also added that the doctrine of neutrality fundamentally differs in the case "of a disputed succession between two branches of the same Royal house [. . .] from that of a contest between a recognised sovereign on one side, and his subjects or colonies in a state of insurrection on the other."⁷⁷

Metternich observed Palmerston's failure in Madrid with satisfaction. In May 1833, before Dom Miguel's fleet was defeated, he proposed that the three Eastern courts recognise Miguel's rule as soon as Porto fell. In contrast, the British Foreign Secretary demanded that Vienna cooperate. In exchange for Austrian aid in Spain, he was willing to give up both the demand for a constitution and the prospect of Dom Pedro as Portugal's ruler. This was a repetition of his 1832 proposals. According to him, it was possible to maintain a conservative regime on the Peninsula only on the condition that Austria abandon its support for Dom Miguel. Should this not happen, then the entire affair would inevitably escalate.⁷⁸ Napier's win changed the course of events. Following the military coup, the liberals also took control of the capital, and the momentum now switched to Pedro.⁷⁹ Circumstances forced Palmerston to make diplomatic changes. He removed Addington from Madrid and appointed George Villiers, Earl of Clarendon, in his place. He expected Villiers to pursue more liberal policies.⁸⁰

For British policy, Dom Miguel had to retreat from Lisbon to the Spanish borders, where he still enjoyed strong support, mainly from amongst peasants. Isabella was transferred back to Portugal from France, and Dom Pedro planned to set up his own government. London was dissatisfied with the acts of the new administration. Britain's shift away from Dom Pedro was evident from the end of 1832 and resulted from several factors. Palmerston disagreed with the confisca-

⁷⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 April 1833 AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

⁷⁷ Stratford Canning to Cea Bermúdez, Madrid, 12 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

⁷⁸ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 373.

⁷⁹ Hoppner to Palmerston, Lisbon, 25 July 1833, Enclosed in letter: Esterházy to Metternich, London, 3 August 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁸⁰ Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 14 May 1833, TNA, FO 65/206; Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

tion of the property of the Jesuits as supporters of Dom Miguel. Further cooling in the relationship was caused by Pedro's troops' seizure of a British merchant ship.⁸¹ The British Foreign Secretary also opposed adopting a more radical constitution than initially planned in 1826.⁸² In the meantime, the issue of the Iberian Peninsula was becoming a strategic priority.⁸³

Ferdinand VII died on 29 September 1833, and a struggle for the Spanish crown broke out.⁸⁴ Maria Christina immediately seized the opportunity, declaring herself regent and planning to appoint a constitutional government.⁸⁵ Don Carlos, in contrast, with the support of the Catholic Church and following Dom Miguel's model, issued a manifesto for the Spanish people and appealed to Salic law.⁸⁶ At the time, he was still in Portugal alongside his nephew, while mobilising a Carlist army. Initially, Palmerston did not fully support Isabella, waiting to see what her uncle did.⁸⁷ Following the announcement of Ferdinand's death, Metternich also took an extremely cautious approach. He did not even protest the presence of French troops at the Spanish border. Lamb wrote to London the following:

Immediately after King Ferdinand's death, P[rince] Metternich expressed a hope that no Gov[ernmen]t would interfere in the affairs of Spain. His inclinations naturally led him to prefer Don Carlos, yet he expressed great indifference between competitors and, after the appearance of the declaration, a conviction that submission of the Infant, though not to be hoped for, would be the happiest solution to the difficulty.⁸⁸

In terms of international support, at this stage, both Don Carlos and Dom Miguel could rely only on aid from the Eastern Powers.⁸⁹ This was significantly limited

⁸¹ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 16 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁸² The more radical constitution originally dated back to 1822. Palmerston saw the 1826 constitution as a much better alternative, as it was more similar to the British model. RIDLEY, p. 171.

⁸³ As the newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung* wrote: "*Portugal now takes the place of Belgium. Heaven grant that no seeds of great and universal evils lie dormant within it.*" Cartwright to Palmerston, Frankfurt, 12 August 1833, TNA, FO 33/44.

⁸⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203; CARR, Raymond, *Spain 1808–1939*, Oxford 1966, p. 155.

⁸⁵ Neumann to Metternich, London, 10 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

⁸⁶ Lamb to Palmerston. Vienna, 27 April 1833, TNA, FO 120/136; SOUTHERN, Henry, *The Policy of England Towards Spain. Considered Chiefly with Reference to a Review of the Social and Political State of the Basque Provinces. And a Few Remarks on Recent Events in Spain*, London 1837, p. 9.

⁸⁷ RIDLEY, p. 171.

⁸⁸ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 October 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

⁸⁹ These events occurred during the peak of the crisis in the first phase of the Eastern Question and after the meeting in Münchengrätz and Berlin. The issues in Europe and the Middle East influenced the differing approaches to the question of the Iberian Peninsula, and the subsequent events further exacerbated this divergence.

and essentially involved only diplomatic acts. Don Carlos did not receive as much military support as he had anticipated, and his units were in retreat.⁹⁰ The only exception was Tomás de Zumalacárregui y de Imaz, who operated around Navarre and was named the leading commander of the Carlist forces. He managed to turn a number of paramilitary groups into a regular army.⁹¹ He set up guerrilla war tactics, which were effective and essential against the better-armed government forces.⁹²

In Madrid, Cea Bermúdez refused to cooperate with the Spanish liberals and trusted in establishing a conservative government that supported the regency.⁹³ Villiers was outraged by his stance and refusal to recognise Dom Miguel as a rebel. He demanded military intervention from his government, which he considered the only possible means to achieve British objectives. Palmerston's hands were tied. British intervention was off the cards, and any intervention by France would not be appreciated by the British public or the government's opposition. Although the British Foreign Secretary supported Louis Philippe's army being used, he realised the opposition it would arouse in Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Metternich discouraged the French King from taking such a step, and Louis Philippe agreed and rejected the idea.

Grey and Palmerston thought that effective action was only possible by the British. The non-intervention doctrine would once again have to be "bent," and the deployment of armed forces would have to be pushed through the British cabinet.⁹⁴ The government did not want to hear about Grey and Palmerston's plan, which affected communication with Madrid. As a result, Britain's Foreign Office did not send Villiers any diplomatic notes between November 1833 and February 1834. Esterházy also complained about the lack of communication.⁹⁵ Instead, reports were sent to Russell in Paris, who urged intervention, arguing that Great Britain was "neither the tutor nor the police officer of Europe."⁹⁶ The only purpose of this message was to gain time for a suitable moment to intervene. Key to this was cooperation with Spain. Palmerston tried to exploit the ongoing turmoil and gain Madrid on

90 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

91 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23, 26 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

92 CHALUPA, p. 84.

93 SOUTHERN, p. 29.

94 Palmerston to Granville, London, 28 October 1833, TNA, FO 27/468.

95 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

96 Palmerston to Russell, London, 11 December 1833, TNA, FO 63/398; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 385.

his side. From early 1834, his point of view on Isabella also changed, and he was now willing to accept her recognition in exchange for a joint Anglo-Spanish approach in Portugal.⁹⁷

In December 1833, Talleyrand presented his Anglo-French defence alliance project. Palmerston did not accept his proposal, believing that relations between the two countries were already very good and did not need to be consolidated by any formal agreement.⁹⁸ For London, the situation at the end of 1833 was complex from an international perspective. British efforts divided the European Continent into two political and ideological camps, and as such, Palmerston needed to create a counterbalance to Münchengrätz. Since he could not pursue his policies in Eastern Europe, he needed to control at least the western part of Europe.⁹⁹ He saw an unlikely diplomatic partner in Austria and considered the Berlin agreement hostile towards Great Britain. For these reasons, he desired to create a more vital link between liberal states, boosting London's position within Europe. Despite rejecting Talleyrand's proposal, Palmerston considered signing international agreements on his terms. His primary objective was to establish acceptable regimes in Portugal and Spain.¹⁰⁰

The first sign of the possibility of cooperation came in January 1834 from Dom Pedro. He sent a proposal to London in which he agreed to all of Palmerston's conditions, including establishing a new government, amnesty for prisoners, and abandonment of the constitution, in exchange for British military aid. The proposal led to a government crisis. Palmerston and Grey supported military action on the Iberian Peninsula, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer Althorp and other Canningites were against it. The Portuguese plan was rejected, and not even Grey's threat to resign made any difference. This bad news for Palmerston was followed by good news from Madrid. The liberal and pro-British Francisco Martínez de la Rosa was appointed instead of Cea Bermúdez. This created the space for Palmerston to implement an alliance between Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. The Foreign Secretary noted that this coalition would ensure Metternich and Nicholas I could be kept away, and the Western partnership would create an adequate counterbalance to the cooperation of the Eastern Powers.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Palmerston to Walden, London, 8 April 1834, TNA, FO 63/418.

⁹⁸ BELL, vol. I, p. 194.

⁹⁹ SATTTLER, p. 15.

¹⁰⁰ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 180.

¹⁰¹ Palmerston to Villiers, London, 10 April 1834, TNA, FO 72/419; GRANT, Arthur James, TEMPERLEY, Harold, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century 1789–1914*, London 1947, p. 198.

Palmerston required Spain to provide a ground army against Dom Miguel and Great Britain to deploy the navy to blockade Portuguese ports.¹⁰² The Spanish envoy, Manuel Pando Fernández, Marquess of Miraflores, endorsed the British proposal.¹⁰³ After a quick convening of the government, the remaining members ultimately agreed, mainly because of the lower cost to the British Treasury of deploying the navy compared to the cost of a ground operation. The treaty of alliance was signed on 22 April 1834.¹⁰⁴ Eventually, Talleyrand was also invited.¹⁰⁵ Palmerston's change in position regarding an alliance with France had been affected by concerns over the impossibility of overseeing its foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ The official agreement was a French commitment allowing Great Britain to control Paris's foreign policy effectively.¹⁰⁷ The Quadruple Alliance represented an excellent success for Palmerston, and he took all the credit for it.¹⁰⁸ The fact that the cooperation was also focused against the Eastern Powers, headed by Austria, is evidenced in his declaration:

I should like to see Metternich's face when [he] reads our treaty.¹⁰⁹

He wrote to Lamb about the Quadruple Alliance:

[The] creation of the Quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the West, will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East. [The] moral effect of the formal union of four constitutional West Gov[ernmen]t will expel absolutism from Iberian Peninsula.¹¹⁰

102 BULLEN, Roger, *France and the Problem of Intervention in Spain*. In: *The Historical Journal* 20, 1977, 2, p. 367.

103 CARR, p. 158.

104 Palmerston's primary interest was to establish a Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. ALFARO, p. 836.

105 The original version of the agreement was that France would be included only as an involved party, not a fully-fledged member. After lengthy discussions with Talleyrand, Palmerston eventually agreed to an alliance of four parties. Its contents were to be kept secret from other Powers, but after less than three days, Talleyrand revealed the alliance's existence to Lieven and Esterházy. The French ambassador hoped this would create a more credible impression on Austria and Russia. Over time, he reassessed his position regarding the alliance and began to believe it would negatively affect French interests in Europe. In the summer of 1834, he was withdrawn and never returned to the post of French ambassador.

106 BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Britain and the European Balance, 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, p. 156; HARRIS, p. 304.

107 WALTON, William, *A Reply to the Anglo-Cristino Pamphlet Entitled The "Policy of England Toward Spain"*, London 1837, p. 70.

108 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 35.

109 RIDLEY, p. 172.

110 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 22 April 1834, TNA, FO 120/147.

Thus, the Quadruple Alliance was in direct conflict with the traditional policy of a balance of power because the coalition formed was a grouping in direct opposition to conservative states. In a broader context, Europe became divided into two distinct poles.¹¹¹ A closer view showed that differing views on foreign policy and the pursuit of national interests within the Quadruple Alliance were more influential than the ideological nature of cooperation.

Talleyrand saw the alliance from a different perspective, as he explained during a meeting with the Russian and Austrian ambassadors:

England's position in negotiations with Portugal became more constrained, limiting its ability to act freely, while France maintained its independence and lack of commitment. Faced with the necessity of deciding on matters concerning the Iberian Peninsula, the French and English governments found it challenging to choose an option that would minimise inconveniences and better align with their essential needs. The primary goal was to preserve political peace and maintain the union among Europe's Great Powers.¹¹²

The ambassador, through his statement, emphasised France's role in maintaining diplomatic control over Great Britain. The sincerity of the Alliance will be determined by the events to come.¹¹³

Esterházy sent a report about signing the treaty to Vienna on 25 April 1834, in which he described British interests in controlling France and not allowing it to intervene without London's consent.¹¹⁴ He also wrote that "it is under its aegis that the revolution has just been covered, and the propaganda in these regions [the Iberian Peninsula] has been encouraged by the British government, which sacrifices to such interests all those who, since then, have immemorably served as a basis for its political conduct on such a vital issue."¹¹⁵ Metternich considered the Quadruple Alliance a means that boosted revolutionary tendencies on the Continent.¹¹⁶ Although he shared his concerns over French intervention on the Peninsula, he did not officially oppose the agreement. Nevertheless, he considered

111 GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 23.

112 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 April 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

113 The Duke de Broglie was of the same opinion, who, in conversation with Apponyi, expounded the treaty: "We decided to accept it—if only to stop England on the path it was ready to take. In accepting it, we have not made any commitments and have, so to speak, reserved the right to give the treaty whatever interpretation the circumstances may require." Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 25 January 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 299.

114 The entire wording of the agreement is contained in: *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXII, p. 124.

115 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 April 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

116 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 28 May 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

Dona Maria's government "the embodiment of revolution in its most dangerous form."¹¹⁷ Metternich, however, began to question the final victory of Don Carlos and Dom Miguel in the summer of 1834. The overwhelming support their liberal opponents received from London and Paris made success seem increasingly unlikely.

Thus, the Quadruple Alliance completed Europe's division into two political camps.¹¹⁸ Yet, problems within the tenuous alliance between Great Britain and France would soon become apparent.¹¹⁹ Lamb noted Paris's insincere politics from Vienna: "The Alliance with England is [from the French perspective] absolutely uncordial."¹²⁰ A key question is to what extent Palmerston himself was aware of this fact. One could also argue that Britain was less enthusiastic about the agreement than it officially claimed. In addition to controlling France on the international stage, London aimed to limit or eliminate Paris's influence in Madrid.¹²¹

The agreement had an immediate military impact. The Spanish forces, cooperating with the British navy, defeated Miguel's army within weeks.¹²² Under the terms, a government supporting Dona Maria was established, with the only issue left being how to deal with Don Carlos and Dom Miguel.¹²³ The latter was arrested by British soldiers while attempting to save his life. Madrid asked Palmerston to extradite him, but he refused, hoping to persuade both men to go into exile with the offer of a pen-

117 Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 17 September 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 292.

118 Even the *Morning Post*, in its issue of June 20, 1834, surprisingly published a highly critical article on this subject:

Our own peculiar information leads us to conclude that, instead of being a Treaty for the subjugation merely of the Peninsula, it is a Treaty intended to separate Europe into two great and hostile divisions, of one of which divisions, that, namely, of the authors of this Treaty, general innovation is to be the object, liberty the watchword, social improvement the pretext, while all that is really intended by this Treaty or conspiracy is to strengthen and perpetuate the political authority in various countries of certain sets of very worthless, unprincipled, and ambitious individuals, this was specifically directed at Palmerston and Talleyrand, the most unprincipled and the most drivelling of all living Statesmen.

Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 20 June 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

119 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 36; BURY, p. 253.

120 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 26 May 1836, TNA, FO 7/257.

121 ALFARO, p. 834.

122 BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 371.

123 Dom Pedro died on 24 September 1834. Supporters of Dona Maria, led by Defence Minister Marshal João Carlos, Duke of Saldanha, and Prime Minister Pedro de Sousa Holstein, Duke of Palmela, were in power in Lisbon.

sion and acceptable living conditions. Dom Miguel agreed to the idea and went to Rome, where he lived until his death, while Don Carlos went to Portsmouth in Britain.¹²⁴ Backhouse offered him a pension of 30,000 pounds per year if he gave up his claim to the Spanish crown and undertook never to return to his country.¹²⁵ Don Carlos rejected all these proposals and continued to assert his legitimate right to the throne.¹²⁶ Madrid demanded that London imprison the former king's brother, but British law did not allow it. After a few weeks, the unguarded Don Carlos escaped, reaching Spanish shores on 7 July 1834.¹²⁷ Navarre and Biscay became Carlist bastions, and regular campaigns were launched from there to penetrate deeper into Spain.¹²⁸ The situation was further exacerbated by reports of Don Pedro's deteriorating health and his subsequent death on 24 September 1834.¹²⁹

Palmerston was also partially to blame for underestimating the entire situation. The Foreign Secretary had overlooked Carlos's contacts with opposition representatives of the Spanish government, who were also his supporters. He believed Carlos did not have the same support in the north of the Iberian Peninsula and was considered a traitor by the Carlists, but he was wrong.¹³⁰ Carlos's escape also had a domestic political impact, leading to Grey's resignation as Prime Minister and his replacement by Melbourne. Hummelauer provided detailed insights into the ongoing crisis, highlighting the British cabinet's precarious situation, mainly due to international political issues. Based on his reports, Talleyrand warned Melbourne that Palmerston's policies were steering London into "complete isolation,"¹³¹ a concern further amplified by Apponyi's visit to Louis-Philippe, during which Palmerston faced scathing criticism. This situation reportedly caused significant unease within the British cabinet. The accumulating evidence of political missteps in Spain and the German Diet's resolution to limit Palmerston's influence led to speculation that the British government might be forced to change its course and "distance itself from such diplomatic embarrassments."¹³² Palmerston's position was hanging by a

124 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 20 June 1834 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205; Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 27 June 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

125 Webster gives a sum of 20 thousand, while Ridley suggests 30 thousand. WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 400; RIDLEY, p. 172.

126 RIDLEY, p. 173.

127 Aston to Palmerston, Paris, 1 September 1834, TNA, FO 27/487.

128 Aston to Palmerston, Paris, 12 September 1834, TNA, FO 27/487.

129 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 1 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

130 BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 372.

131 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 7 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

132 Ibid.

thread, with the question being whether the Foreign Secretary would fall immediately or during the next parliamentary session. One proposed solution was sending him on a diplomatic mission to India, a suggestion the East India Company opposed. The new Prime Minister faced a combination of foreign and domestic issues that paralysed the government's composition, ultimately resulting in its dissolution by William IV on 16 November 1834.¹³³ This was the last time a British monarch would intervene in the formation of the cabinet in this manner. As a result, Palmerston was forced to leave his ministerial role for just under a year, leaving Spanish-Portuguese matters unresolved.¹³⁴

Metternich became convinced that his duty was to support Don Carlos in his battle. In instructions to Apponyi in Paris, he said:

Convinced as we were of these truths, we felt that the importance of the cause imperatively called for the recognition of a two-fold distinction in the succours his Highness undoubtedly demanded of us, and accordingly, we at once took measures to supply: (a) prompt material succours; (b) political and moral succours. So far as moral support is concerned, what the Carlists eagerly demand of us is the recognition of Don Carlos. The recognition embraces two periods: the present and the future. We have not recognised Queen Isabella, and the Powers will certainly never recognise the Iberian republic; there is little doubt upon whom the choice of the Powers would fall. We do not disguise our conviction of the fact that the recognition of Don Carlos, openly by the Allied [Eastern] Powers, would be an inestimable moral support to the cause of the prince. What we cannot undertake to decide is the effect it would produce on the two maritime Powers, and more particularly the influence it would exercise upon the King of the French.¹³⁵

Relations between Great Britain and Austria rode a wave of mutual suspicion into mid-1834. Influenced by Palmerston's opponents, Hummelauer wrote to Vienna about British efforts to isolate Austria in the Eastern Question and Western Europe. Palmerston, in turn, expressed his views on the Austrian Chancellor: "The turn which affairs have taken both in Portugal and Spain must be enough to drive him almost mad."¹³⁶ Metternich received information that Palmerston was no longer in office on 29 November 1834. A message from the Foreign Secretary was also delivered to him via Fox-Strangways: "Lose no time in taking this note to Prince Metternich. I am convinced he will never in his life have been more overjoyed than when he reads it, and that I shall never have seemed so agreeable to

¹³³ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 24 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹³⁴ Palmerston to William Tempel, London, 16 November 1834, BULWER, vol. II, p. 181.

¹³⁵ Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 17 September 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 294; METTERNICH- WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 445.

¹³⁶ Palmerston to Granville, London, 13 October 1834, TNA, FO 27/479.

him now that I am bidding him good-bye!"¹³⁷ For the Austrian Chancellor, the collapse of Melbourne's government was a chance to restore Anglo-Austrian cooperation.¹³⁸

Robert Peel was appointed Prime Minister, and Wellington became Foreign Secretary, giving Metternich a real hope for closer collaboration.¹³⁹ The new government regarded cooperation with France with suspicion and considered stabilising relations with the Eastern Powers essential.¹⁴⁰ In January 1835, Lamb temporarily returned to London to build new foundations for Anglo-Austrian cooperation and told Hummelauer after a conversation with the king: "Things will go better than in the past. My presence here could then be of real use."¹⁴¹ The Tory cabinet kept the status quo on the Iberian Peninsula, limiting all military operations. Wellington assured Vienna's envoy: "Prince Metternich will be convinced that I will not follow similar paths [as the Whig government]; I rely on this trust from him."¹⁴² The Austrian Chancellor knew it was essential to get the French government on their side to secure victory for Don Carlos.¹⁴³ Paris agreed with his proposal to maintain neutrality during the raging Spanish Civil War in return for a marriage between Louis Philippe's son and the Austrian archduchess. In the end, the entire project collapsed in March 1835, with a change in political representatives in France. Recently appointed, the Broglie government showed little interest in strengthening ties with Vienna and instead reinstated material support for Isabella's forces.¹⁴⁴

Metternich's prospects for restoring traditional Anglo-Austrian cooperation ended in April 1835. Peel's short-lived government resigned, and Melbourne was once again tasked with setting up a new cabinet.¹⁴⁵ Esterházy urged the new

¹³⁷ Palmerston to Fox-Strangways, London, 16 November 1834, TNA, FO 7/233; Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 29 November 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208; METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 447.

¹³⁸ STAHL, p. 293.

¹³⁹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 6 February 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

¹⁴⁰ Fox-Strangways to Wellington, Vienna, 26 March 1835, TNA, FO 7/253; Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 (first dispatch) 28 January 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴¹ During this time, he was represented by William Fox-Strangways. Lamb fully returned to his role following health issues in July 1836. Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 January 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴² Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 28 January 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴³ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 28 January 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209; STAHL, p. 293.

¹⁴⁵ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 558.

Prime Minister not to appoint Palmerston as Foreign Secretary to ensure good relations with Austria.¹⁴⁶ The request led to a minor scandal, which Metternich immediately distanced himself from, but it did not prevent Palmerston from taking up the post again on 26 April 1835.¹⁴⁷ Domestic political changes had also occurred in Austria, with Emperor Francis I dying on 2 March 1835 and his son Ferdinand I becoming Emperor.¹⁴⁸ Lamb attempted to convince Palmerston of Metternich's good intentions and Austria's efforts to begin new diplomatic cooperation. The Austrian Chancellor expressed that it would be far more advantageous for Vienna to have Great Britain as a strong ally, given that it is further from its borders and does not directly threaten Austria.¹⁴⁹ His messages did not affect Palmerston, who prioritised cooperation with France and stabilising the Iberian Peninsula to resolve the entire affair.¹⁵⁰

Once Melbourne's government had been established, a plan to intervene militarily in Spain with France's assistance was produced.¹⁵¹ Requests from Mira-

146 Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

147 RIDLEY, p. 182; Palmerston to Sullivan, Stanhope St., 16 April 1835, BOURNE, Kenneth (ed.), *The Letters of the Third Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and Elizabeth Sullivan 1804–1863*, London 1979, p. 263.

148 Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253; In the circular sent to the other courts, it was stated: *“The dying Monarch, who bequeathed his love to his people, his gratitude to his army, and to the servants of the government who served him well, has guided the voice of his heart, that voice which, for many years of his life, was so powerful, and which even after his death will ensure him the full recognition of those whom Providence had destined him to govern for such a long period, and in such times!”* Circular to the Courts of Europe, Vienna, 12 March 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 214.

149 He wanted to bring Great Britain and Austria together against Russia. As such, he wrote to London about Metternich's scepticism regarding Russian policy. One of his letters stated:

‘Austria's interests lie in forming alliances with Powers like England, situated on the other side of Europe, rather than with military Powers closer to home, where such alliances could be dangerous and undesirable. An alliance with Russia is not a matter of cooperation between two systems but the need to avoid mutual conflicts.’ Metternich has told me much about the fact that it is a question of the personal character of the current and previous Russian Tsar, who has the same objectives as Austria, and that Russia will one day be in frequent or permanent opposition. He stressed that an alliance with England is far more desirable, based on both nations' natural interests. Austria's role is to maintain a balance between the two political systems. For myself, Prince Metternich represents Austrian principles – strictly and purely conservative, but not extreme, which marks itself out from other states in Europe, whose leader is considered Russia. I must tell Your Lordship that his [Metternich's] objections towards Russia are significant, and it seems he desires an alliance with England to hold back Russia.

Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

150 BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 73.

151 RIDLEY, p. 198.

flores for joint British-French intervention came to both Western Powers' capitals as early as April 1834.¹⁵² Metternich responded sharply, warning of the serious consequences of such an action.¹⁵³ The Austrian Chancellor was still providing the Carlists with material, although he had not yet decided whether to recognise Don Carlos. One of his letters states that the Eastern Powers would officially accept the Carlist pretender once he captured Madrid. In contrast to the Portuguese case, Palmerston did not support any further direct intervention by the government.¹⁵⁴ Like Austria's support for the Carlists, he continued to provide material and financial support to the liberals.¹⁵⁵ French Legion units from Africa, organised under British command, began to assemble in Spanish ports.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Palmerston had never agreed with confiscating means heading to the shores of the Iberian Peninsula or the direct blockading of the Carlist ports by the British navy.¹⁵⁷ These practices were considered a breach of international law, and the British Foreign Secretary wanted to avoid this, or at least to appear to do so.¹⁵⁸

In May 1835, Palmerston agitated Esterházy by once again accepting the proposed French intervention against Don Carlos: "Leave this struggle to have a Spanish national character, and do not give it a European character through a direct intervention by means of the entry of a French armed force."¹⁵⁹ The Foreign Secretary assured him that it was in the greatest interest of Great Britain to maintain the best and most sincere relations with Austria. He further stated on his own initiative that, with regard to French armed intervention, there was a consistent sentiment and opinion shared by Madrid, Paris, and London – namely, a strong objection to resorting to such a measure. Moreover, the Spanish government had not yet considered requesting such assistance from France, and the latter had not yet determined to provide it.

Esterházy was not satisfied with Palmerston's declaration and, on the same day, demanded a well-defined position regarding the intervention. Privately, he informed Metternich that he had no illusions about the true British policy concerning the Conservative Powers and the question of Spain. A clear explanation, though, was not forthcoming from Palmerston. This was primarily due to the division

152 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

153 GUEDALLA, p. 199.

154 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

155 LAWRENCE, p. 132.

156 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 12 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

157 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

158 RIDLEY, p. 196.

159 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 May 1835 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

within the British cabinet on the issue of intervention. One solution was to leave the entire matter to France without London either expressing its support or condemning it. Even the French government was divided in this case, with the only resolute supporters of intervention being the financial circles led by the House of Rothschild.¹⁶⁰

During another conversation, Palmerston admitted that he personally supported the French intervention. His opinion was based on the belief that the government in Madrid had the advantage both in terms of material resources and moral influence in the country. He thought that only a greater effort and better military leadership were needed for success. In his view, Don Carlos was personally incapable, merely serving as a symbol for the apostolic principles and the church's claims, which had found an advocate in him. For this reason, Palmerston believed this Prince was unfit to rule Spain.¹⁶¹

Two weeks later, Palmerston delivered a speech in the British Parliament defending international involvement and emphasising the importance of the Quadruple Alliance:

It was in England's interest that the cause of the Queen of Spain should be successful; it was of great importance to this country that the alliance, which had been fortunately cemented between the four Powers of the West – England, France, Constitutional Spain, and Constitutional Portugal – should continue, and it could only continue with the success of the Queen of Spain.¹⁶²

Metternich declared that “Palmerston was reopening the schism in Europe.”¹⁶³ He replied that the reaction of the three Eastern courts would come soon and that the intervention would bring about the same atmosphere and irritation as in the case of the French in Ancona.¹⁶⁴ Continuing, it was noted that the three Eastern Powers were in open conflict with Great Britain in every matter, whether related to Spain, Portugal, or the Italian Peninsula.¹⁶⁵ The speech caused a significant rift in Parliament. Later, in a meeting with Esterházy, the recognition of Queen

160 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 May 1835 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

161 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 12 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

162 Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 24 June 1835, *Affairs of Spain – Orders in Council HC Deb 24 June 1835 vol 28 cc1133–81* [online], [quoted 2019-04-24]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1835/jun/24/affairs-of-spain-orders-in-council#S3V0028P0_18350624_HOC_27.

163 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 430.

164 Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

165 Palmerston to Granville, London, 27 July 1835, TNA, FO 27/508; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 431.

Isabella was admitted to be of paramount importance to British interests, and this perspective guided the transactions concerning the Iberian Peninsula:

He explicitly confirmed that his policy aimed to counterbalance the alliance of constitutional Powers with the alliance of monarchic Powers, which was formed to oppose any innovation, and which, in his personal conviction, was based on the existence of a formal treaty concluded by these Powers among themselves, although he admitted having no knowledge of it.¹⁶⁶

During September 1835, the government of Prime Minister Juan Álvarez Mendizábal came to power. Maria Christina was dealing with a poor financial situation; nevertheless, the new Prime Minister was a good choice for Palmerston. But circumstances on the front developed to the disadvantage of the pro-government forces.¹⁶⁷ The unrest led the Regent forces to lose control over the northeastern part of the country, with Barcelona controlled by radicals. They demanded adopting the 1812 constitution, which Villiers discouraged Mendizábal from doing.¹⁶⁸ Madrid now found itself in a delicate situation. It was not in control of either the northeast or the northwest, where the Carlists ruled. The radicalisation of the war led to all parties involved committing more acts of violence.¹⁶⁹

The split between politicians in Britain grew in line with the conflict.¹⁷⁰ A significant number of Don Carlos supporters among members of Parliament visited him at his base in Bilbao.¹⁷¹ The Tories were still protesting against the Legion operations and demanded that they be immediately dissolved.¹⁷² For Metternich, circumstances in Spain were evidence of the ineffectiveness of the constitutional government and also the cause of the anarchy that had arisen.¹⁷³ Representatives of the Eastern courts demonstrated their support for Don Carlos at a meeting in Teplitz (Teplice) in 1835, but they did not recognise him officially.¹⁷⁴ In Palmerston's mind, the meeting in the North Bohemian town aroused considerable suspicion, and he believed its purpose was, as in the case of Münchengrätz, an agree-

166 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 31 July 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

167 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 25 September 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

168 WALTON, p. 40.

169 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

170 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 25 September 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

171 LAWRENCE, p. 77.

172 RIDLEY, p. 200.

173 WOODWARD, Ernest Llewellyns, *Three Studies in European Conservatism: Metternich, Guizot, The Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, London 1963, p. 54.

174 LAWRENCE, p. 133.

ment on the division of the Ottoman Empire. He was not prepared to admit that the monarchs had met without concluding any specific agreement.¹⁷⁵

While the Conservative Powers had declared their unity, relations within the Quadruple Alliance were tense. London began to suspect Paris of a lack of support for the Spanish government and of trying to expand its influence on the Peninsula. By the end of 1835, the situation on the Iberian Peninsula looked far from ideal from the British point of view. The Carlist forces were gaining ground, the cooperation with France was showing signs of strain, Parliament and the government were unable to agree on a unified course of action, and the alliance of the three Eastern courts remained strong and unweakened.¹⁷⁶ Sébastiani tried to balance the tense relations between Paris and London with another round of rapprochement with Vienna. Although Palmerston also spoke of the need for cooperation, Hummelauer did not believe his sincerity. He supposed that the desire for good relations with Austria came from the French side: "Lord Palmerston did not seem inclined to yield to this impulse, and so far, I see no sign that he wishes to put himself forward in this regard."¹⁷⁷ Metternich was of the same opinion, believing that the British cabinet was trying to reach its goals by indirect means, which they failed to achieve directly.¹⁷⁸

The tendency for partnership from the French side persisted even after the fall of the Broglie government in February 1836. The new Prime Minister, Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers, aimed to further strengthen ties with Austria, even at the cost of a change in policy towards Spain. The new cabinet, on its accession, communicated to Madrid that it could not count on French intervention in its favour.¹⁷⁹ Inconsistencies in Anglo-French cooperation reached a peak in March 1836. The Foreign Office in London sent an official offer to Paris for coordinated action. Both would provide their navy to blockade ports, and the operation would end with the military entering Spanish territory. From Palmerston's standpoint, the plan was for the French army to act as an extension of British influence on the Peninsula. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary was aware of the challenges in securing parliamentary approval for direct intervention by his government and the potential logistical difficulties this would entail. Therefore, relying on the French option emerged as the best possible strategy. Thiers unsurprisingly refused this request.

175 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 November 1835 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

176 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 November 1835 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

177 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 1 December 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

178 Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 9 January 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

179 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 15 April 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 212.

Palmerston, on the other hand, was surprised by the disagreement and did not understand France's sudden lack of interest in the Spanish question. One of the reasons why Paris refused the British offer was an unwillingness to weaken relations with the Danube Monarchy. Another blow to London was the planned visit of Louis-Philippe's son, Prince Louis, Duke of Nemours, to Vienna, aimed at consolidating the understanding with Austria. When Mendizábal resigned in June 1836, Villiers saw French plotting behind the event. He was convinced that Austria had had a negative influence on the French government, with an official visit to Vienna recently taking place.¹⁸⁰ In the end, nothing came of the Austro-French courtship, and due to the domestic political situation, Thiers, under pressure, shifted his political course. Traditionally, France relied on foreign policy successes to address domestic crises, prompting him to reopen discussions with London about intervention. Discussions on the deployment of the French army deepened complications within the government and eventually led to Thiers' resignation.¹⁸¹ He was replaced by the anti-British Molé, who considered Spain to be lost. Palmerston had the impression that the Quadruple Alliance was no longer a reality.¹⁸²

To the Foreign Secretary, French aloofness from Great Britain was a sign to reassess relations with the Eastern Powers.¹⁸³ Austria had traditionally been a key partner for Britain, serving as a counterbalance to Paris. Lamb tried once again to improve relations between Palmerston and Metternich. He informed the Austrian Chancellor of the British Foreign Secretary's interest in a joint objective, explicitly preserving the balance of power within Europe. Vienna welcomed improved relations with London, although Metternich did not believe in setting conditions suitable for closer cooperation. If, from Palmerston's side, it was more a question of keeping London out of isolation, from Metternich's point of view, European policy was determined by preserving the general order, stability within

180 BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 386.

181 MACMILLAN, John, *Historicising Intervention: Strategy and Synchronicity in British Intervention 1815–50*, In: *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge, 39, 2013, 5, p. 1108.

182 BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 75.

183 As further evidence of the strained British-French relations, the incident during the French blockade of the Mexican coast in 1838 played a significant role. In November of that year, a French warship intercepted a British merchant vessel, boarded it, and forcibly removed a Mexican pilot. The Conservatives labelled this action as an "insult to the flag" and a threat to the commercial interests they represented. They rejected the French apology and accused the British government of failing to defend Britain's honour and trade interests. In response, Palmerston stated that he was satisfied with the French apology, as it met the necessary requirements of the code of honour. MELACON, Glenn, *Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839–1840*, In: *The International History Review*, London, 21, 1999, p. 862.

the individual states, and promoting joint efforts to resolve international political issues:

The relations between Austria and England, as well as all political relations between Powers, consist of two elements. One of these elements is not subject to change; the other is variable and depends on the vicissitudes of time. The first is tied to material circumstances, such as the geographical situation of states; these circumstances create by themselves conditions of existence stronger and more durable than the changing will of men; the second, being the work of men is necessarily subject to the variable spirit of the latter. This truth has perhaps never been more evident than in the current position in which the Cabinets of Vienna and London find themselves regarding their reciprocal relations. The old England no longer exists, disappearing day by day even more; a new England is replacing it.¹⁸⁴

Regarding Spain itself, Metternich was convinced that Great Britain's difficulties lay in three basic points: the suppression of the original institutions and their replacement by new, revolutionary struggles that could not be resolved, and finally, the unwillingness to get Austria to cooperate.¹⁸⁵ For these reasons, Palmerston did not want to end the cooperation with Paris, but on the other hand, an *entente cordiale* was no longer something that could be spoken of by 1836.¹⁸⁶

France's change in approach to Spain was also reflected in their bilateral relations. The influence of Paris in Madrid declined sharply, and many French supporters of the Queen ceased their active involvement. Radicals began to believe that Louis Philippe wanted Don Carlos to win.¹⁸⁷ At the end of 1836, the Carlists successfully repulsed Maria Christina's army's offensive, and within Great Britain, there was a growing conviction that she would be defeated.¹⁸⁸ The failures of the government army reinforced Metternich's position and emphasised the significance of Austrian support for Don Carlos.¹⁸⁹ In this context, as British influence in Spain waned, the desire for rapprochement with Austria increased. During a conversation with Melbourne, Esterházy was "disarmed"¹⁹⁰ by the Prime Minister's remark about the events in the Peninsula, stating: "I cannot help but foresee that the development of events in these regions will also support the opinions

184 Metternich to Esterházy, Prague, 17 September (first dispatch) 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

185 Metternich to Esterházy, Prague, 17 September (second dispatch) 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

186 BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 391.

187 BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 75.

188 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

189 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 1 December 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

190 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

and reasoning put forward by the Austrian cabinet.”¹⁹¹ The Austrian ambassador’s response to this opinion was to caution against pursuing national policies at the expense of preserving the general peace of Europe. Above all, he stressed the importance of distancing oneself from interventionist policies aimed at imposing a foreign doctrine, which might disturb the existing peace in Europe.¹⁹² Lamb’s reports further demonstrate his intentions, proving that Metternich’s stance on the Spanish question had not changed and that Vienna maintained strict neutrality.¹⁹³ At the same time, Metternich, in his letters to London, expressed the belief that the entirety of Palmerston’s diplomatic effort was aimed at diminishing French influence in Spain.¹⁹⁴

Meanwhile, by the end of 1836, the Carlists aimed to expand the war into a nationwide affair, attempting to extend the conflict into the country’s south-east.¹⁹⁵ It became clear to London that the conflict would not end soon. Palmerston sought to salvage the situation by requesting joint intervention with France but was once again rejected.¹⁹⁶ A few days later, Madrid made the same offer, invoking intervention in the name of the Quadruple Alliance, but Paris also responded negatively.¹⁹⁷ Louis Philippe declared: “France will shed the blood of its children only in its own defence, and not otherwise than under the national colours.”¹⁹⁸ However, despite his statement, the actions of the July Monarchy did not align with these words. French blood was shed not only during the Belgian Question but also in Ancona, and even French Legionnaires lost their lives in the ongoing conflict in the Iberian Peninsula.

By 1837, there was widespread scepticism regarding further engagement in the Carlist War. Reports of defeats suffered by the British Legions fighting for Maria Christina further complicated the situation. Many members of Parliament opposed Palmerston’s approach and attacked him vehemently, as did domestic legionnaires.¹⁹⁹ In April 1837, the Foreign Secretary delivered a lengthy speech to Parliament, defending Britain’s involvement in Spain:

191 Ibid.

192 Ibid.

193 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 November 1836, TNA, FO 7/258.

194 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 29 November 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

195 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

196 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 9 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

197 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 16 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

198 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 30 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

199 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 14 April 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 216.

They now came forward with a formal motion, to persuade this House to pass a vote which is intended to be, and which, if adopted, would be a censure upon the government, and a call upon that government by this House to break faith with the Queen of Spain to abandon our engagements – to tear our treaty in pieces, and to desert our ally, because some temporary disaster has befallen our arms . . . The opinion which this House will tonight pronounce, will decide not simply between conflicting parties in England, but between antagonist principles struggling for ascendancy in the other countries of Europe; and on that decision may depend the peace, the welfare, and the happiness of nations.²⁰⁰

Although Palmerston's speech had the desired effect for a time, conflicts within Parliament persisted until the end of the war.²⁰¹ In Vienna, diplomacy observed the Whig cabinet's erratic policies. Metternich was particularly disturbed by Palmerston's speech, which he felt justified intervention by disregarding the order upheld by his predecessors, whose policies, he believed, were far superior to those of the current administration.²⁰²

The situation of the Queen's army in 1837 was dire. One attempt to reverse this state was an official request to the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance for direct intervention. However, the request proved ineffective, and Carlist forces advanced towards Madrid.²⁰³ In September, Don Carlos himself launched an offensive to capture the capital. With an army of 16,000 soldiers, it was expected that Madrid would not withstand the assault, and its fall seemed inevitable.²⁰⁴ At the same time, secret discussions were ongoing between the pretender and Maria Christina, who sought a way out through a marriage alliance between her daughter and Don Carlos's son, Don Louis. This marriage was intended to bring about a compromise and a truce. All discussions were kept secret, and the government was not even informed. The Carlists reached the gates of Madrid, but at a crucial moment, Don Carlos, likely fearing General Baldomero Espartero's approaching army, ordered a retreat. Although this decision was kept secret, it had a negative impact on the morale of Carlist soldiers. Paradoxically, the government

200 Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 19 April 1837, *Affairs of Spain – Adjourned Debate HC Deb 19 April 1837 vol 38 cc1–120* [online], [quoted 2019-04-24]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1837/apr/19/affairs-of-spain-adjourned-debate#S3V0038P0_18370419_HOC_21.

201 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 28 April 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 216; WALTON, p. 227.

202 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 May 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 218.

203 Circular to the Political Chiefs, Madrid, 6 July 1837, TNA, FO 72/481.

204 Circular Despatch to Foreign Ministers of Quadruple Alliance, Madrid, 6 July 1837, TNA, FO 72/481.

in Madrid began to question Maria Christina's loyalty, and Espartero soon took control of the political situation at the court as a power broker.²⁰⁵

A month after the events in Madrid, Sébastiani was reappointed as Foreign Minister and worked to bolster relations with London. Nevertheless, the rivalry between France and Britain persisted at the Spanish court. During the conflict, Palmerston continued to strengthen Britain's position on the Iberian Peninsula. With the assistance of Villiers and Henry Southern, Palmerston continued to intervene in Spanish government affairs.²⁰⁶ He secured the repayment of Spain's outstanding debts to Great Britain, dating back to 1813, and insisted on the recognition of the exceptional privileges of British subjects.²⁰⁷ The Progressistas (liberals) sided with Palmerston, while France supported the Moderatos (conservatives).²⁰⁸ These two political groups competed for power in the Cortes and had opposing visions for the future direction of Spain.²⁰⁹

The struggle for influence in Spain intensified as officials searched for a future husband for Isabella. The British government opposed a marriage to one of Louis Philippe's sons and began seeking its own candidate.²¹⁰ Villiers proposed Austrian Archduke Charles, dismissing concerns about a Habsburg ruling in a constitutional state.²¹¹ Palmerston rejected this, believing Metternich would never agree, despite supporting Don Carlos as the rightful heir.²¹² He also feared Austrian influence would weaken the Western Powers' position in Spain.²¹³ He wrote to Villiers:

An Austrian Prince and constitutional government could hardly coexist; and if Spain is again to be consigned to absolutism, it does not matter what the name of the head of the despotism to be . . . And if representative government can once be quietly established in Spain. Spain will infallibly be independent, and that will be better for us than her being tied either to France or Austria.²¹⁴

205 CHALUPA, p. 108.

206 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 13 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

207 GEFFCKEN, Friedrich Heinrich, *The British Empire. With Essays on Prince Albert, Lord Palmerston, Lord Beaconsfield, Mr. Gladstone, and Reform of the House of Lords*, London 1889, p. 203.

208 CARR, p. 171.

209 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (first dispatch), TNA, FO 72/510.

210 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

211 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (second dispatch), 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

212 Milbanke to Palmerston, London, 27 November 1838, enclosed in letter to: Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 16 December 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

213 PARRY, p. 152.

214 Palmerston to Villiers, London, 14 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/500. WEBSTER, vol. I, p. 465.

Villiers persisted with his support for the Archduke despite Palmerston's objections. The resurgent Eastern Question also influenced relations between Great Britain and Austria during this time. Palmerston would eventually support the proposed Spanish-Austrian marriage, but only on the condition that Metternich upheld the liberal government in Madrid. Nevertheless, the Chancellor was not inclined towards the proposed marriage and primarily refused to recognise Isabella as the legitimate ruler, expressing his disagreement.²¹⁵

Events in Spain suddenly gained momentum. There was a change in the Carlist army command in mid-1838, with Rafael Maroto taking over. He was a moderate Don Carlos supporter, and as commander, he was aware of how much the exhausting five-year war had cost.²¹⁶ A rift emerged within the Carlist ranks, leading to several bloody conflicts. Maroto survived an attempt at a military coup, and eventually, Don Carlos found himself effectively held captive by his own general. His prestige and support gradually eroded, both domestically and internationally. In the end, Don Carlos lost control over his army entirely. All of this foreshadowed his downfall. At this point, Palmerston welcomed the turn of events, seeing them as a positive development for British interests. He assigned the commander of the British naval contingent, John Hay, to attempt mediation between the two sides. Like his counterpart, Espartero also wanted to end the fighting and agreed to the negotiations. The internal contradictions within the Carlist camp played a significant role in Don Carlos's downfall. Conspiracies and intrigues against Maroto eventually led to his change of attitude and the negotiation of a truce. Intercepted letters from June 1839 between senior Carlist officers were sent to London marked as "Very Secret."²¹⁷ In these, Villiers describes Maroto's peculiar attitudes and notes his growing distance from Don Carlos. On the last day of August 1839, the two armies met in Vergara, where a treaty was finally signed, bringing an end to the long-running civil war in Spain. Don Carlos was given over to government soldiers, and the Carlists were guaranteed an amnesty and retained their military ranks.²¹⁸

Palmerston received the news of the peace treaty positively but expressed concerns about Espartero's growing influence over the Spanish government. Don Carlos fled to France, where he was detained and forced to abandon his claim to the Spanish throne. Some loyal Carlists resisted the peace treaty and continued

²¹⁵ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 15 December, TNA, FO 72/510; Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (second dispatch), TNA, FO 72/510; Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509; Palmerston to Granville, London, 20 September 1836; BULWER, vol. II, p. 211.

²¹⁶ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

²¹⁷ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 June 1839, TNA, FO 72/530.

²¹⁸ CHALUPA, p. 115.

fighting until 1840, when they finally dispersed. Espartero became a national hero, and the Foreign Secretary's concerns proved well-founded.²¹⁹ Maria Christina had to appoint him Prime Minister, giving him the title Duke *de la Victoria*, whose Portuguese equivalent Wellington could boast of.

Maria Christina's attempts to diminish Espartero's power failed, and after an unsuccessful coup in 1840, she fled to France, leaving her daughter's regency to the ambitious general, who became the *de facto* ruler.²²⁰ London prioritised peace on the Iberian Peninsula, and Palmerston instructed special envoy Arthur Ingram Aston to avoid domestic political conflicts. Britain's Foreign Office wanted Espartero to accept the constitutional regime and ensure the Carlist threat was eliminated. Internationally, Spain was stable, and there was no risk of an Austrian or French puppet government.²²¹

In parallel with the civil war in Spain, Dona Maria's government in Portugal was being consolidated. The rivalry between Great Britain and France was also manifested at the Lisbon court. A central point of mutual disputes was, as in the case of Spain, marriage policy. The Queen was sixteen years old in 1835, meaning that she could enter wedlock and strengthen her rule. Maria's advisors looked to France and specifically to Louis Philippe's son, the Duc de Nemours. Great Britain did not hesitate to exploit its influence at the Portuguese court, and Cowley ordered Saldanha to resign if the marriage was approved. Palmerston also invited Portugal's representative, Francisco Almeida, Prince of Lavradio, to his office and explained that marriage to the French King's son would mean the end of friendly relations between London and Lisbon.²²² Both these diplomatic interventions were enough to put an end to Franco-Portuguese discussions. Palmerston wanted the Queen to marry, and he proposed Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha as an alternative. London's proposal was accepted, and the marriage occurred in April 1836. Anglo-Portuguese relations became rather strained during this time. One reason for this was Palmerston's zealous promotion of the abolition of the slave trade since taking office. The Portuguese government refused to join the relevant international agreements, and Palmerston took this extremely personally.²²³ Another issue was commercial relations, with the Foreign Secretary re-

219 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

220 CARR, p. 159.

221 SOUTHGATE, p. 110.

222 RIDLEY, p. 183.

223 Despite prolonged negotiations, Portugal repeatedly rejected British offers, even as Palmerston gradually increased pressure, including offering financial compensation for Portugal's colonies in India. In 1839, Palmerston went as far as to threaten that if Portugal did not comply with British demands, the United Kingdom would proceed with the seizure of colonies such as Goa.

questing special privileges for trade with Great Britain, something Portugal vigorously opposed.²²⁴

A local uprising broke out in September 1836 in Lisbon when the new King, Ferdinand II, attempted to disperse a crowd of demonstrators who wanted to install the 1826 constitution.²²⁵ Madrid asked London for military assistance, but British ambassador Howard de Walden rejected the request. Nevertheless, a British fleet continued to guard the River Tagus, and Palmerston instructed them to protect the Queen in an emergency. Napier was invited to London to set up a military plan, with the goal of stabilising the Portuguese crown government. Ultimately, the government's soldiers suppressed the revolution on their own, making British intervention unnecessary. Metternich knew the implications for what he called the "quadruple complicity": "The Lisbon affair would widen the distance that already separated the two Maritime Powers."²²⁶ The peace, however, did not last long, and another revolt broke out in September 1837, leading to a new civil war.²²⁷ Palmerston supported a conservative faction in Lisbon, promoting them against liberal-democratic representatives. Wellington also complained directly about the government's actions:

In our own times, there is a remarkable instance of such a vote, upon a motion made by myself for an address to the King upon neutrality in Portugal. I set out of the course taken by the House of Commons upon that Vote. It was carried by a large Majority. The King in his answer concurred it. The government took no notice of it.²²⁸

Due to British diplomacy, another coup occurred at the end of 1839, restoring a monarchist-conservative government. Fundamental to the entire course of events was

Fears of British intentions, which included the potential loss of overseas territories, pushed Portuguese officials, including Foreign Minister Marquis Sá da Bandeira, to seek a compromise. This eventually led to an agreement that involved leasing customs control over Goa to the British East India Company to avoid the direct takeover of the colony. Although Lisbon was hesitant, in 1842 it reluctantly agreed to sign a new treaty, even after Palmerston had left office. These new treaties included stricter measures, such as the "equipment clause," which allowed the punishment of ships outfitted for the slave trade, even if slaves were not physically present on board. More on this topic: MCGREGOR, Robert George, *Lord Palmerston and British Anti-Slavery, 1830–1865*, unpublished dissertation, Southampton, 2019.

²²⁴ Walden to Palmerston, Lisbon, 27 May 1835, TNA, FO 63/436.

²²⁵ Following the annulment of her engagement to Dom Miguel in 1835, Maria married Auguste, Duke of Leuchtenberg, although he died two months later. The following year, she married Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who gained the title of King of Portugal and reigned as Ferdinand II.

²²⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 1 October 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

²²⁷ BARTLETT, *Great Britain and Sea Power*, p. 97.

²²⁸ Wellington to Londonderry, London, 24 April 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 220.

that Palmerston did not favour revolutionaries demanding greater democratisation of the country and adopting a more liberal constitution. Instead, he gravitated towards the conservative, in certain regards repressive, regime which guaranteed Great Britain its crucial influence in the country.²²⁹ This narrative of Portuguese affairs in the second half of the 1830s contrasts sharply with Palmerston's reputation as "the main champion of the Liberal cause in Europe."²³⁰ Rather, the British Foreign Secretary was focused on promoting British interests above all else, adapting the circumstances in Portugal to best fit London's desires.²³¹

By the end of 1840, Britain enjoyed dominant influence on the Iberian Peninsula. As the 1840s opened, peace had been established in Spain and Portugal following an entire decade of unrest. A government of radicals, who respected Isabella as sovereign, came to power in Spain. Meanwhile, in Portugal, the Infanta emerged victorious, and despite domestic political difficulties, she managed to defend her government. By the end of Palmerston's second ministerial term, the two countries stood, surprisingly, on opposite sides. The Foreign Secretary benefited from his role as a "mediator" between the two states. Nevertheless, the question of the Iberian Peninsula was far from resolved, and it manifested itself in his future political career. Historically, the British campaign in Western Europe had proven successful. London had managed to use and boost its influence. The Quadruple Alliance, although fragile, had fulfilled its role in its initial phase by uniting liberal representatives in their shared struggle. On the other hand, in his efforts to achieve personal success, Palmerston had further damaged already strained relations with Austria, even though he claimed to be willing to set aside his own political principles to achieve his objectives.²³² In contrast, Metternich remained steadfast in his beliefs.²³³ He maintained that Don Carlos and Dom Miguel were the legitimate heirs to the throne, insisting that the principle of legitimacy be preserved.²³⁴ He did not view the wars in Spain and Portugal as an ideological struggle between liberalism and conservatism, but rather as a fight between law and order versus revolution and chaos. For the Austrian Chancellor, the question of the Iberian Peninsula was not as significant as it was for Palmerston. Instead, he saw the main threat to European peace in the resurgent Eastern Question, which became newly relevant by the late 1830s.²³⁵

229 RIDLEY, p. 190.

230 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 415; DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, p. 67.

231 STAHL, p. 288.

232 SAUVIGNY, p. 463.

233 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 December 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

234 SEWARD, p. 233.

235 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 39.

8 Escalation of the Eastern Question and the Path to Its Culmination

Metternich was deeply disappointed by Britain's ongoing policy towards the Ottoman Empire. He had high expectations after Wellington's appointment as Foreign Secretary and hoped for a complete reassessment of Great Britain's approach to the Near East.¹ However, the Tory government was dominated by anti-Russian members who had no intention of altering the previous course. British suspicion of St Petersburg was widespread across European embassies, with Granville, for example, observing that Russian armaments created the impression that the Russian navy might one day unexpectedly appear on the Thames.² Public opinion was another significant factor, as Russia was widely considered Albion's main enemy. For Austrian politics, Ponsonby and David Urquhart³ posed the greatest threat in Constantinople, with Metternich referring to Ponsonby as an "empty brain."⁴ He pressured Wellington to remove him from Constantinople, but before this could happen, Peel's government fell, and Palmerston was reappointed. The main objective for British diplomats in the Ottoman capital was to limit Russian influence.⁵ Throughout their tenure, they actively fuelled Palmerston's Russophobic views through diplomatic reports, bolstering public opinion in favour of anti-Russian policies.⁶ Austria, on the other hand, saw Britain's aggressive policy as the primary threat to European balance:

Austria, which desires the preservation of peace and hates revolutions, propaganda, and all the disorder that comes from it, will see more danger in England's aggression than in the occupation of Constantinople by Russia, and it will no longer oppose the latter.⁷

Following the establishment of a new cabinet in London in 1835, it became clear to Metternich that Britain would not reconsider its current international approach.⁸ Somewhat unexpectedly, he turned instead to France. In terms of inter-

1 Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 31 October 1834, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 208.

2 Aponnyi to Metternich, Paris, 27 January 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, Frankreich 299.

3 David Urquhart was appointed as Secretary to the British ambassador in 1835. He was considered an expert on the Middle East in Great Britain. In 1833, he published a study entitled *England, France, Russia, and Turkey*, which was full of anti-Russian opinions.

4 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 552.

5 RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Conversation on Anglo-Russian Relations in 1838*. In: *The English Historical Review* 50, 1935, p. 197, p. 120.

6 BOLSOVER, *David Urquhart*, p. 449.

7 Aponnyi to Metternich, Paris, 25 January 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, Frankreich 299.

8 Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 May 1835, TNA, FO 120/149.

national politics, the Quadruple Alliance was an illusion for the Austrian Chancellor. Making Louis Philippe cooperate with continental Powers could be key to isolating British diplomacy in the Near East and Western Europe.⁹ The aim of this approach was not to form an official partnership with the Orléans regime but to limit its cooperation with Great Britain. The success of this vision depended on St Petersburg's attitude. Even after five years of rule, Nicholas I maintained a strong personal antipathy towards Louis Philippe. Despite advice from Nesselrode and Orlov, the Russian Tsar did not soften his stance and refused to consider cooperation with France. Nor did he heed Metternich's advice that closer ties with Paris might reduce anti-Russian sentiments in the Eastern Question.¹⁰ Even so, relations between the two countries were not tense enough to threaten the outbreak of war. As late as 1836, Louis Philippe expressed his firm stance against war:

If ever my Ministers show a tendency in the Council towards war, I will break them in my hands, and that at all risks and perils, even to the point of abandoning the whole world as I abandoned Soult, Molé, Gérard, etc. I will change my Ministry on the spot. I am not saying this because I feel capable of doing it – I will do it. You can give Prince Metternich the most positive assurance about this.¹¹

By contrast, relations between Russia and Great Britain in the second half of the 1830s were much more strained.

Ponsonby sought to weaken Russia's position at the Sultan's court.¹² One opportunity arose when, on 5 May 1836, British reporter William Churchill shot a young Ottoman citizen at a hunt, mistaking him for a quail. The court in Constantinople sent him to prison, and they also flogged him fifty times before he began serving his sentence. The Ottomans violated international treaties by not allowing the British Embassy to assist in the judicial process. Ponsonby demanded that two pro-Russian ministers, Mehmed Akif and Ahmed Paşa, be dismissed.¹³ The Porte attempted to reach an amicable solution by releasing Churchill and apologising but refused to dismiss the two ministers. Ponsonby insisted that Akif be dismissed and informed Palmerston of his demand, threatening to resign if the Sultan did not comply.¹⁴ Simultaneously, he asked the British cabinet to officially support his position. The government was divided on the issue.¹⁵ Melbourne opposed Ponsonby

⁹ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 560.

¹⁰ LINCOLN, p. 214.

¹¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 24 January 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, Frankreich 299.

¹² TODOROVA, *British and Russian*, p. 23.

¹³ It was no coincidence that both statesmen were signatories to the Russo-Ottoman Treaty of 1833. Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 15 June 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁴ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 10 May 1836, TNA, FO 78/274.

¹⁵ TODOROVA, *British and Russian*, p. 21.

and refused to intervene. Meanwhile, Palmerston supported Ponsonby, and during a discussion with the British Prime Minister, he declared: "Ponsonby has really done us valuable and important service, and has acted with courage, firmness and ability."¹⁶ Palmerston refused to acknowledge that Ponsonby's threats might have exceeded the limits of domestic instructions and instead believed they were rationally justified.¹⁷ In this regard, he overlooked Lamb's reports from Vienna, which warned of the British ambassador's dangerous policies.¹⁸

Tense relations with Great Britain due to the Churchill Affair led Mahmud II to request Austrian diplomatic intervention in London. What surprised Metternich most about the British ambassador's actions was not the excessive demands but rather the threats suggesting Britain's approval of the division of the Ottoman Empire. Metternich called Ponsonby "a madman" favoured by the British Foreign Secretary and added: "What arrogance! This style is clearly from the school of Lord Palmerston."¹⁹ He strongly urged Palmerston not to dismiss the Ottoman minister.²⁰ In his view, the conflict only served to benefit French policy in the Near East.²¹ Ponsonby remarked that he "was not prepared for the part Austria had acted."²² Lamb wrote a noteworthy report to London stressing the need for cooperation with Austria and Russia in the Near East, correctly observing that European peace depended on it.²³ Even so, he declined Metternich's request to propose Ponsonby's dismissal to the British government, temporarily straining their relations.²⁴ After extensive debate, London ultimately refused to grant Ponsonby official support. One reason was the ambassador's considerable unpopularity within parts of the British cabinet, as well as Russia's reaction to British interference, which saw four Russian ships withdrawn from Constantinople to Odessa.²⁵

¹⁶ Palmerston to Melbourne, London, 19 July 1836, WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. II, p. 847.

¹⁷ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 26 July 1836, TNA, FO 120/150.

¹⁸ The British diplomat returned to his post in Vienna during June 1836. Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 17 June 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213; Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 5 August 1836, TNA, FO 120/153.

¹⁹ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 568.

²⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 5 August 1836, TNA, FO 120/153.

²¹ Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 8 June 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 215.

²² Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 22 July 1836, TNA, FO 120/155.

²³ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 22 July 1836, TNA, FO 120/153.

²⁴ BOURNE, Palmerston. *The Early Years*, p. 362.

²⁵ This act was intended to demonstrate that Russia would not participate in the protection of the Ottoman Empire if Great Britain interfered in its internal affairs. Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 17 July 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213.

In the meantime, the Sultan dismissed Akif in June 1836, appointing Ahmed Houlousi.²⁶ The British ambassador celebrated a diplomatic success, which was an apparent defeat for Metternich. His diplomatic intervention in London had been for nothing. The Austrian Chancellor never forgot this and would be reluctant to provide the Ottoman Sultan with similar help in the future. During September 1836, Metternich continued to criticise London, pointing out the contradiction in Great Britain claiming to defend the Ottoman Empire's unity while simultaneously acting in a way that undermined it:

The so-called affair has dispersed like smoke, and what remains is reduced to such simple elements that they no longer arouse interest nor even the attention of anyone. What remains is a weakened Ottoman Power, which, in large part, owes this weakening to the abandonment in which it was left by the Court of London; a strong Russia, whose increase in power must in part be attributed to the English complicity.²⁷

The Tsar's response was naturally much stronger. St Petersburg demanded Ponsonby's immediate dismissal. Metternich, after all and surprisingly, did not want to support Nicholas I. He did not want the same as in the British case: that pressure from the Powers would restrict the Sultan's sovereignty. In early 1837, Churchill received compensation, and the entire affair calmed down.²⁸ Great Britain enjoyed a diplomatic victory from the matter, and Ponsonby temporarily consolidated his position in Constantinople.²⁹

Before Churchill's case was resolved, another scandal shook Anglo-Russian relations, with Urquhart behind the scenes.³⁰ He established a newspaper entitled *Portfolio* in 1835 to support his anti-Russian positions.³¹ Its objective was to discredit St Petersburg's position in Constantinople and turn the Eastern Powers against each other. Some of its articles were directly aimed at reducing Austro-Russian cooperation. Palmerston tolerated Urquhart's opinions and identified with his politics. Like him, he believed that the Russians aimed to occupy and control the Straits.³² Metternich followed these events with great contempt. He considered the accusation that Russia was trying to occupy the Bosphorus and estab-

²⁶ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 22 July 1836, TNA, FO 120/155.

²⁷ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 29 November 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 215.

²⁸ BOLSOVER, *Lord Ponsonby*, p. 111.

²⁹ CLAYTON, p. 75.

³⁰ ŠTERMENSKI, p. 36.

³¹ COLLIER, p. 100.

³² Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 28 July 1836, TNA, FO 78/272.

lish its protectorate in Constantinople to be preposterous.³³ He understood *Portfolio's* desire to dismantle cooperation between the conservative Powers.³⁴

Urquhart went even further in his anti-Russian campaign. From his position as Secretary at the British Embassy, Urquhart began to support the Caucasus peoples fighting St Petersburg for their independence.³⁵ He ordered the British schooner *Vixen* to be sent to the Black Sea coast, with supplies on board meant for the Caucasus.³⁶ The cargo was then seized alongside the ship, on 27 November 1836, by a Russian warship when it deliberately broke the naval blockade declared by the government in St Petersburg.³⁷ The goods being transported included salt, which was subject to Russian regulations. The entire case was written about in the press, drawing the attention of British public opinion, and the London government was forced to respond.³⁸ Palmerston received the first official information on the ship's seizure in January 1837.³⁹ Metternich was informed of the situation at the same time.⁴⁰

The Foreign Secretary protested to Nesselrode via Durham, considering the Russian intervention unjustified because the *Vixen* was sailing in international waters.⁴¹ He also questioned Russian sovereignty in the Caucasus. At this time, a commission was set up under the supervision of Admiral Mikhail Petrovich

33 He considered it all the more imprudent when he received a message from Palmerston calling for joint action on the Eastern Question two weeks before the incident: "*It must always be a leading object of the policy of Great Britain to cultivate the most friendly relations with Austria; and it will at all times afford the sincerest gratification to His Majesty's government to interchange with the Cabinet of Vienna the most confidential explanations of views and sentiments upon the political transactions of Europe.*" Palmerston to Metternich, London, 11 November 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 215.

34 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 573.

35 ARDELEANU, Constantin, The Lower Danube, Circassia and the Commercial Dimensions of the British–Russian Diplomatic Rivalry in the Black Sea Basin (1836–1837). In: BILIARSKY, Ivan, CRISTEA, Ovidiu, OROVEANU, Anca (eds.), *The Balkans and Caucasus: Parallel Processes on the Opposite Sides of the Black Sea*, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2012, p. 47.

36 The *Vixen* sailed from Constantinople to the Caucasus port of Soudjouk-Kalé on November 15. Alexander Polden and Thomas Morton to Palmerston, London, January 27, 1837, *Papers Relating to Seizure and Confiscation of the Vixen by Russian Government. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, 1837*, TNA, FO 352/61c.

37 DIACONU, Eusebiu-Costel, In the Service of His Majesty: The British Consular Service in Black Sea Ports. Administration and Personnel (1825–1842). In: *East European Journal of Diplomatic History*, 9, 2022, Bucharest, p. 13.

38 James Yeames to Durham, London, 22 December 1836, TNA, FO 65/233.

39 INGLE, Harold, Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain 1836–1844, Berkeley, 1976, p. 64.

40 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 4 February 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

41 Palmerston to Durham, London, 21 March 1837, TNA, FO 65/231.

Lazarev, which produced evidence that the *Vixen* was carrying guns and gunpowder in addition to salt.⁴² Nesselrode deliberately disregarded these findings and concealed this fact in a discussion with Durham. The detained sailors were even released and sent to Constantinople. From the outset, Metternich supported Russia and realised that Urquhart was involved.⁴³ The only aspect he did not make a statement on was the issue of international law, on which basis the Russians detained the ship.⁴⁴ Lamb wrote to London about his discussion with Metternich:

Prince Metternich said to the question of maritime and territorial rights, upon which he would pronounce no opinion, that there were three parties who might pretend to the right of sovereignty over the countries in question – the Turks, the Russians, and the native inhabitants. That he knew little or nothing of the ground of the pretensions of either party.⁴⁵

The British ambassador continued to hope that Metternich would eventually side with London's interpretation of what had happened.⁴⁶

The affair not only deepened the divide between the Great Powers, but also exposed growing divisions within the British diplomatic apparatus. Urquhart's aggressive policy began to gain traction from January 1837, causing more disruption in the worsening British–French relations. Etienne-Guillaume-Theophile de Bionneau, Marquis d'Eyragues, First Secretary of the French embassy in the Ottoman Empire, complained in a letter to Ponsonby about the conduct of Urquhart, stating that it threatened not only cooperation between London and Paris but also the preservation of peace in Europe.⁴⁷

Yet another target of Urquhart's assaults was both Palmerston and his superior at the embassy. In his reports, Urquhart made it clear that it was he, not Ponsonby, whom the home government had appointed to run the embassy.⁴⁸ He topped off his absurd assertions with the view that British diplomacy had left the Ottoman Empire at the mercy of Russia, a view he communicated to the officials

⁴² DIACONU, p. 10.

⁴³ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 574.

⁴⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 8 February 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 218.

⁴⁵ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 February 1837, TNA, FO 120/161.

⁴⁶ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 February 1837, TNA, FO 120/161; Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 4 March 1837, TNA, FO 120/170.

⁴⁷ d'Eyragues to Ponsonby, Therapia, 6 January 1837, Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 February 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

⁴⁸ Ponsonby to d'Eyragues, Pera, 15 January 1837, Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 February 1837 AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

of the Porte itself.⁴⁹ Ponsonby was deeply outraged by these reports and considered them highly inappropriate and scandalous. In reply to d'Eyragues, he wrote:

I am forced to believe that Mr Urquhart's deviations from the right course have not been confined to the absurd affectation by which he makes himself ridiculous, but that they extend to multiplied intrigues against me. [. . .] I confess that I have since that period heard so much from so many different quarters as to Mr Urquhart's disposition and actions toward me, in a light that marks deep hostility against me, or the wildest and most extravagant ambition and insanity, as the foundation of his conduct, that I can no longer turn away from the cogent circumstantial proofs in the affair itself that fix Mr Urquhart as an accomplice in the deception.⁵⁰

He subsequently reported the whole affair to Palmerston in London, where he described Urquhart's plot in detail, adding: "I feel myself obliged to tell you that I cannot carry on the business of this Embassy if Mr Urquhart be left here."⁵¹ In February 1837, Palmerston received comprehensive information on the situation in Constantinople and the problems his Secretary had brought about. Most of all, however, he was outraged by the potential disruption of British–French cooperation, which was crucial to furthering British foreign policy and upon which he relied in the current affair.

At the same time, Palmerston called upon Ponsonby to discuss the future Near East strategy. The outcome was London's request to clarify the legality of the affair. The British press and Urquhart called for a stronger response, ideally military, against Russia.⁵² When Urquhart became dissatisfied with his government's response, he began denigrating British foreign policy in articles in the *Portfolio*, even accusing the Foreign Secretary of betrayal.⁵³ Palmerston came to his defence in Parliament on 17 March 1837. While he did not recognise the Russian blockade, he prioritised peace over war.⁵⁴ Due to his negative campaign, Ur-

49 d'Eyragues to Ponsonby, Therapia, 6 January 1837, Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 February 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

50 Ponsonby to d'Eyragues, Pera, 15 January 1837, Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 February 1837 AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

51 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Pera, 18 January 1837, Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 February 1837 AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

52 ŠTERMENSKI, p. 37.

53 ARDELEANU, p. 51; KING, Charles, *Imagining Circassia. David Urquhart and the Making of North Caucasus Nationalism*. In: *The Russian Review. An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present* 66, 1952, 2, p. 247.

54 INGLE, p. 69.

quhart was removed from Constantinople, and upon his return to London, he continued to criticise Palmerston's policies.⁵⁵

In the meantime, Metternich also requested a legal statement from St Petersburg. For him, this was more about acquiring arguments against Palmerston's accusations.⁵⁶ Lamb tried fruitlessly to get the Austrian Chancellor on Britain's side as he awaited the Russian statement: "I will appear to you a singular reproach, but the chief one I have to make to Prince Metternich in this affair is indirection. Why did he assume an attitude which he was not prepared to support?"⁵⁷ However, this judgement was unsound, as Metternich consistently maintained his position while awaiting the Russian government's official statement. He also believed the entire matter should be resolved between Great Britain and Russia alone.⁵⁸

Russia's response on the act's legality arrived in Vienna on 18 March 1837. This document stated that the Caucasus territory had been transferred to Russia in the Treaty of Adrianople and that Russia's acts regarding the *Vixen* were undisputed. Metternich was satisfied with this explanation and informed Esterházy in London of his position. From his situation in London, Palmerston sought to win Austria to his side and influence the course of events. On the contrary, the Austrian ambassador resisted the Foreign Secretary's advances, agreeing that

it was not only futile, but also necessary, to avoid being drawn by the Principal Secretary of State onto the sterile, ungrateful, and compromising ground of discussing contentious issues or potentially reigniting similar conflicts.

Instead, Esterházy resolved

to hold firmly to the advantageous position Austria maintained in this isolated case, emphasising the utmost importance of not unsettling their stance within the favourable circumstances in which it was fortunately situated.⁵⁹

He later assured the British Foreign Office that it was in Vienna's highest interest to see such threats removed in the future.

⁵⁵ Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 14 April 1838, TNA, FO 78/328; KING, p. 248.

⁵⁶ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 576.

⁵⁷ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 21 April 1837, TNA, FO 120/161.

⁵⁸ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 8 April 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 218.

⁵⁹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 April 1837 (first dispatch), AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

Palmerston received Russia's official statement on 13 May 1837.⁶⁰ The Foreign Secretary acknowledged the breach of Russian law. In his response, he added to Durham:

The grounds of seizure of the Vixen, therefore, appear to have been twofold: first, the having on board a cargo not allowed to be imported at all; and secondly, an attempt to trade at a Russian port, where there is no custom-house, and where a cargo, even goods of which the importation was legal, could not properly be landed. His Majesty's Government, considering in the first place that Soudjouk-Kalé, which Russia acknowledged in the Treaty of 1783 as a Turkish possession, now belongs to Russia, as stated by Count Nesselrode, by virtue of the Treaty of Adrianople; and considering further, that this port is occupied, as stated in your Excellency's despatch of May 13, by a Russian fort and garrison, see no sufficient reason to question the right of Russia to seize and confiscate the Vixen in port of Soudjouk-Kalé, on the grounds set forth in Count Nesselrode's note.⁶¹

What initially appeared to be a step towards easing the strained relations between Britain and Russia was, in fact, merely a diplomatic *façade* concealing Britain's actual objectives.

Just four days after receiving a favourable response to Nesselrode's explanations, reports from St Petersburg indicated that Bell had been dispatched on another mission to the Caucasus, with the full support of the British Foreign Office and diplomatic representatives in Constantinople. Bell himself referenced this in his personal memoirs.⁶² Nesselrode also harboured these suspicions, which were further confirmed two weeks after the resolution of the incident when Ponsonby sent a new series of dispatches. He claimed that Russia aimed to partition the Ottoman Empire in collaboration with Muhammad Ali, who had allegedly been promised hereditary control over Syria by the Russians.⁶³

The entire matter was resolved by May 1837, and in contrast to the Churchill Affair, the Russians celebrated victory. It demonstrated how tense relations were between Great Britain and Russia in the second half of the 1830s. The question of war hung over the event, a confrontation which might grow into a general conflict at any time. In this case, though, the agitator for war would not be Russia but Great Britain, driven by Russophobic public opinion and supported by the Embassy in Constantinople.⁶⁴ Palmerston and the government in London fostered an evident aversion to St Petersburg's policies, which had their roots in 1833. Great

⁶⁰ Durham to Palmerston, St Petersburg, 13 May 1837, TNA, FO 65/234.

⁶¹ Palmerston to Durham, London, 23 May 1837, TNA, FO 65/231.

⁶² BELL, James Stanislaus, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia During the Years 1837, 1838, and 1839*, London, 1840, s. 5.

⁶³ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 22 July 1837, TNA, FO 78/358.

⁶⁴ INGRAM, Edward, *The British Empire as a World Power*, London, 2001, p. 83.

Britain's leading foreign political objective remained a revision of current conditions within the Ottoman Empire and a desire for revenge.⁶⁵ The circumstances surrounding the *Vixen*, nonetheless, opened up a series of minor crises covering the Central, Near, and Far East.⁶⁶ For Metternich, Anglo-Russian rivalry unnecessarily threatened the already shaky integrity of the Ottoman Empire and Europe-wide peace.⁶⁷ The greater danger, he considered, was the approach of France and its rapprochement with Muhammad Ali. During the ongoing crisis over the *Vixen* Affair, Paris set an anti-Ottoman course that posed a danger not only to diplomacy in Vienna but also in London.⁶⁸

The antagonism between Great Britain and Russia was also reflected in Eastern Europe.⁶⁹ Palmerston attempted to exploit the tense atmosphere in Poland to encourage liberals there to fight against the Tsar and divert his attention from Asia.⁷⁰ Nicholas I's speech, in which he threatened the artillery bombardment of Warsaw, served as a justification. The unrest in Poland drew the attention of the three Eastern Powers to the Republic of Cracow (Krakow). Based on the 1815 treaties, this small city-state was meant to be independent and neutral under the protection of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. One of the articles establishing Cracow's neutrality expressly forbade the provision of asylum to refugees, deserters, and other suspicious persons within the territory.⁷¹ The republic became a refuge for revolutionaries from the November Uprising who had escaped Russian arrest. Since Cracow belonged to all three Eastern Powers, their representatives disapproved of this sanctuary for revolutionaries. Metternich viewed the republic as a place of dangerous conspiratorial tendencies for Austria. In February 1836, the Eastern Powers finally occupied Cracow, using the local unrest against Russian rule in Poland as a pretext.⁷²

Metternich sent an official note about the occupation to Paris but not London. At the time, the Thiers government wanted closer cooperation with Austria, and the Austrian Chancellor attempted to exploit this situation. Initially, Palmerston did not oppose the advance of the three Eastern courts. His pro-speech in the British Parliament was delivered in a spirit of understanding and with a deliberate dis-

65 HOBBSBAWN, Eric John Ernest, *The Age of Revolution Europe 1789–1848*, London, 1962, p. 105.

66 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 18 February 1837, TNA, FO 78/301.

67 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 8 February 1837, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 218.

68 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 April 1837 (second dispatch), AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 216.

69 PURYEAR, Vernon John, *England, Russia, and the Straits Question 1844–1856*, Berkley, 1931, p. 30.

70 SATTTLER, p. 29.

71 ABBENHUIS, p. 52.

72 BELL, H., vol. I, p. 269.

tancing from the Cracow question. He even emphasised that the Russo-Ottoman treaty was a “dead letter,” which did not alter the real objective – the preservation of peace in the Ottoman Empire.⁷³ This somewhat surprising turn must be seen in a broader context, particularly in light of the ongoing British–French controversy over the Iberian Peninsula. Hummlauer informed Metternich that Palmerston’s only concern in this case was to divert the attention of the British Parliament, which was struggling with its traditional internal difficulties, from the affairs of Cracow. These words proved to be true.⁷⁴

In the following months, Palmerston initiated a diplomatic intervention, sending a message in which he expressed protest against the actions of the Conservative courts.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, Ancillon initially refused to receive it and only did so after intensified British pressure.⁷⁶ One of Palmerston’s efforts was to appoint a consul to Cracow. During an interview with Sébastiani, he said: “My colleagues [from the cabinet] shared this feeling, but because it was partly a personal matter for me, I asked them not to allow an unfortunate influence to be shown on the subject itself.”⁷⁷ The three Eastern Powers rejected this initiative.⁷⁸ After this refusal, Palmerston’s diplomatic dispatches escalated, continuing with a fierce attack on the Eastern Powers, disregarding the conventions agreed upon in 1815.⁷⁹ He compared the situation in Cracow to the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century. Metternich entered the debate, arguing the city was the centre of an international conspiracy that posed a threat to Austria’s domestic situation. He further explained that the intervention was justified under international agreements aimed at maintaining regional stability.⁸⁰ Russia responded similarly, and Palmerston could do nothing more than merely lodge further protests. He found no support from his government or France. The only one who joined the attack and accused Russia, in particular, of instigating the suppression of the freedoms and rights of Poles was the infamous *Portfolio*.⁸¹ Austrian troops remained in Cra-

73 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 27 February 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 212.

74 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 24 June 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213.

75 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 3 July 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213; Palmerston to Russell, London, 15 April 1836, TNA, FO 64/204.

76 Palmerston to Russell, London, 3 May 1836, TNA, FO 64/204.

77 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 3 July 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213.

78 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 30 December 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 213.

79 Canning and Palmerston’s speech to the British House of Commons, London, 1 March 1836, *The Republic of Cracow HC Deb March 1 1836 vol 31 cc1129–30* [quoted 2019-04-24]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1836/mar/01/the-republic-of-cracow#S3V0031P0_18360301_HOC_34.

80 BELL, H., vol. I, p. 270.

81 Hummlauer to Metternich, London, 15 April 1836, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, England 212.

cow until 1841, and Palmerston gained nothing from his counterattack. The Foreign Secretary's weak policy on Cracow stemmed from British diplomacy's full engagement in the Ottoman Empire, parliamentary struggles, and the Iberian Peninsula.

The Eastern Question had dominated European foreign policy throughout the 1830s. Palmerston was determined not to repeat his earlier mistake of 1833, while also seeking to restore Britain's lost influence in Constantinople.⁸² After the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi was signed, he was forced to acknowledge the failure of British cabinet policy in the East and clarify his stance on the Eastern Question. During his 1838 speech, he retrospectively acknowledged that Metternich had been right:

What Metternich says of our shirking from helping the Sultan when Mehmet was at Acre and when a word might have stopped the Pasha without a blow is perfectly true, and there is nothing that has happened since I have been in this office which I regret so much as that tremendous blunder of the English Government. But it was not my fault; I tried hard to persuade the Cabinet to let me take the step. But Althorp, Brougham, and others, some from ignorance of the bearing of foreign affairs, some for one foolish reason, some for another, would not agree. Grey, who was with me on the point, was weak and gave way, and so nothing was done in a crisis of the utmost importance to all Europe when we might with the greatest of ease have accomplished a good result.⁸³

This statement encapsulates several of Palmerston's key ideas. The first part acknowledges the error in Britain's approach during the initial Eastern Crisis, while the latter portion shifts the blame to opposing factions within the cabinet, deflecting responsibility from himself. Ultimately, his goal was to realign the conditions in Constantinople to favour Britain.

Palmerston's interest in the Near East had grown steadily since 1832 for several reasons. British trade was continuing to grow with the help of steamships. Trade routes crossed the Suez to the Red Sea, or the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf.⁸⁴ In both cases, the Ottoman Empire and Muhammad Ali played a significant role in transportation. London was also suspicious of Russian activities in Asia and French influence within the Mediterranean Sea.⁸⁵ Palmerston considered the Egyptian governor a tool of Paris and viewed his interests as hostile to

⁸² TODOROVA, *Aspects of the Eastern Question*, p. 27; PAVLOWITCH, Stevan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia 1837–1839*, Paris 1961, p. 16.

⁸³ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 283.

⁸⁴ CONNELL, Brian (ed.), *Regina vs. Palmerston. The Correspondence Between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837–1865*, London, 1962, p. 31.

⁸⁵ JUDD, Denis, *The Victorian Empire*, London 1970, p. 71.

British trade.⁸⁶ London's greatest concern, though, was that Egypt might attack Constantinople and Russia would enter a war, the outcome of which could lead to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁷

London attempted to isolate Muhammad Ali's influence and restrict his economic ambitions in the Near East.⁸⁸ At the same time, the Foreign Secretary, alongside Ponsonby, strove to achieve the most significant possible influence in Constantinople in 1837–1838.⁸⁹ In August 1838, they managed to secure an economic treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which was favourable to British economic needs.⁹⁰ This treaty reduced import duties and limited monopolies; overall, it did not benefit the Porte. Cheap British goods entered the Ottoman market, logically impacting domestic production. Metternich viewed the Anglo-Ottoman economic treaty very unfavourably. He knew it would negatively impact the Empire's economic situation, which would be reflected in the country's political stability.⁹¹ The agreement was essentially focused against Muhammad Ali's trade, threatening British economic interests in Syria and Adana. The Pasha responded to the treaty in 1838 by attempting to declare independence, something Great Britain and Austria refused to accept.⁹² It was evident from the Ottoman-Egyptian relations in 1838 that the Küthaya peace treaty had only had a temporary effect.⁹³ Mahmud II considered the acts of his vassal to be a symbol of his disloyalty and considered revenge to overcome the humiliating defeats.⁹⁴ Although Muhammad Ali abandoned his plan for independence by the end of August 1838, the Ottoman army was ready for a new conflict. Metternich advised the ailing Mahmud II to

86 MOSELY, Philip Edward, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*, Cambridge, 1934, p. 94.

87 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 193.

88 RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Colonel Campbell's Report on Egypt in 1840 with Lord Palmerston's Comments*. In: *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 3, 1929, 1, p. 103.

89 TODOROVA, *British and Russian*, p. 23.

90 The treaty was signed on 16 August 1838, in Balta Liman, and Mahmud II received British military guarantees in the event of war with Muhammad Ali.

91 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich a Turecko*. In: *Historický Obzor* 11, 2004, 9/10, p. 203.

92 His drive for independence continued throughout the second half of the 1830s. However, he was limited by international support, with the exception of France. In response to this declaration, Palmerston threatened to block Egyptian ports with the British navy if Muhammad Ali took this step. Esterházy to Metternich, London, 26 June 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 220; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 27 June 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

93 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich a idea konference ve Vídni v roce 1839*. In: *Historický obzor* 12, 2005, 3/4, p. 82.

94 SAUER, Manfred, *Österreich und die Levante 1814–1838*, unpublished dissertation, Wien, 1971, p. 388.

abandon his preparations for war and trusted that the current peace could continue.⁹⁵

In contrast to the Austrian Chancellor, Ponsonby encouraged the Ottoman Sultan to take bold action, assuring him of Britain's support.⁹⁶ He would have to do everything in private because doing so would conflict with the official instructions from London, in which Palmerston had urged that a compromise be found between the Sultan and his vassal.⁹⁷ The Foreign Secretary discouraged the Porte from going to war with Egypt.⁹⁸ When Metternich received information in March 1839 on Ponsonby's warmongering, the Chancellor asked Palmerston to encourage his ambassador to be more moderate.⁹⁹ In the meantime, the Ottoman ambassador in London, Reshid Pasha, tried to negotiate an Anglo-Ottoman offensive alliance. Palmerston's dismissal of the proposal arrived in Constantinople in March 1839, leading to great disappointment.¹⁰⁰ The London government refused to participate in a direct war with Egypt, and the Foreign Secretary wanted to preserve peace in the Near East. Therefore, he considered there to be no reason for any kind of agreement.¹⁰¹

In the end, British "pacifism" could not stop Ottoman troops from marching to the Syrian borders and awaiting the order to attack. War was declared on 9 June 1839, and the Egyptian governor and his son were labelled as rebels. Initially, Muhammad Ali did not undertake a large counterattack, hoping the Ottoman soldiers would withdraw. Metternich called for a diplomatic resolution to be worked on by the Powers.¹⁰² Nevertheless, after the Ottomans directly occupied Syrian territory, the Egyptian army was mobilised under the command of Ibrahim Pasha. Shortly afterwards, on 24 June 1839, the decisive Battle of Nezib was fought, and the Sultan's army was utterly defeated.¹⁰³ Admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha's desertion and seizure of the Sultan's navy in Alexandria exacerbated the poor situation of the Ottoman armed forces. After six years, Muhammad Ali's

95 Metternich to Stümer, Vienna, 26 Feb, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 71.

96 MIDDLETON, Charles R., Palmerston, Ponsonby and Mehmet Ali. Some Observation on Ambassadorial Independence in the East 1838–1840. In: *East European Quarterly* 15, Boulder 1982, p. 412.

97 Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 11 May 1837, TNA, FO 78/300.

98 RODKEY, Lord Palmerston and Rejuvenation, p. 591.

99 Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 28 March 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 738.

100 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 15 April 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 222; UFFORD, Letitia, *The Pasha. How Mehmet Ali Defied the West 1839–1841*, Jefferson, 2007, p. 85.

101 SETON-WATSON, *The Russian Empire*, p. 122.

102 Milhanke to Palmerston, Vienna, 28 March 1839, TNA, FO 120/180.

103 CLAYTON, p. 80.

path to Constantinople was again open. Furthermore, before reports of the army's collapse arrived in the Ottoman capital, Sultan Mahmud II was dead, with his sixteen-year-old son, Abdulmejid I, succeeding to the throne.¹⁰⁴

Reports of the Ottoman army's rout arrived at European courts on 8 July 1839, causing a stir. Metternich knew that the Powers would need to mediate to achieve a regular peace acceptable to Constantinople.¹⁰⁵ He, therefore, rejected the proposals of his diplomats, such as Prokesch and Stürmer, who called for a free agreement between Muhammad Ali and Abdulmejid I.¹⁰⁶ The Chancellor took the situation into his own hands in July 1839. Fearing unrest within the Ottoman Empire, he ordered Stürmer to support the young Sultan alongside the representatives of the other Powers and express unity in preserving the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁷ The Porte's agreement with Muhammad Ali's demands could only be secured with the consent of all five Powers. Palmerston had to accept Metternich's initiative and send instructions to Constantinople to order cooperation with the other states.¹⁰⁸ From the Foreign Secretary, this was a brief overcoming of his suspicion and negative attitude towards the Austrian Chancellor.¹⁰⁹ This showed he could abandon his ideological battle to preserve general peace and cooperate in a matter of Europe-wide significance.

Contrary to Palmerston's belief, Ponsonby maintained his usual rhetoric, arguing that the outbreak of war was due to St Petersburg, which viewed the Sultan's defeat as an opportunity to gain control of the Straits.¹¹⁰ The question arises whether the Foreign Secretary took this step out of genuine conviction or due to a calculated fear of isolation. Cooperation with the Eastern courts might have offered Palmerston similar advantages to those gained from French cooperation during the First Carlist War – promoting his political interests and limiting Russian influence in the Near East. The outcome was a joint diplomatic note which committed Abdulmejid I not to conclude any agreement without the prior consent of the Powers.¹¹¹ This was Metternich's greatest success regarding the Eastern

104 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Francouzská červencová monarchie v kritickém roce 1840*. In: Historický obzor 14, 2007, 3/4, p. 51.

105 KANTOR, Wera, Karl Ludwig Graf Ficquelmont. Ein Lebensbild mit besonderer Rücksicht auf seine diplomatische Mitarbeit bei Metternich, unpublished dissertation, Wien, 1948, p. 250.

106 LACHMAYER, Katharina, *Mehmed Ali und Österreich*, unpublished dissertation, Wien, 1952, p. 105.

107 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 July 1839, TNA, FO 120/180; RICHARDSON, James L., *Crisis Diplomacy. The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, Trieste, 2012, p. 44.

108 Palmerston to Granville, London, 23 July 1839, TNA, FO 27/536.

109 GRUNER, Metternich, Palmerston, p. 24.

110 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 22 July 1839, TNA, FO 78/357.

111 The Collective Note was written on 27 July 1839.

Question during the Second Turko-Egyptian War. The note became the foundation for establishing order in the Near East and preserving the overall balance of power.¹¹² As part of Metternich's plan, the government of Egypt would be definitively given to Muhammad Ali. The government of the entire Syria would be entrusted to Ibrahim Pasha. Upon the death of Muhammad Ali, Ibrahim Pasha would govern Egypt, and Syria would once again fall under the direct authority of the Porte, as previously agreed.¹¹³

Palmerston proposed an international conference to examine arrangements within the Sultan's empire. Metternich also came up with the same proposal, hoping to find a general agreement through cooperation with the Powers. Their joint objective was to preserve the Ottoman Empire's integrity.¹¹⁴ The old rivalry resurfaced over which city was to be the main diplomatic centre. Palmerston had little hope that the Powers would meet in London.¹¹⁵ In 1838, he proposed that delegates of the Powers meet in a city on the Thames to discuss the situation in the Near East.¹¹⁶ Because the Foreign Secretary had no hope of the conference being held domestically, he was reluctantly willing to accept Vienna as one of the options for a venue for discussions.¹¹⁷ He wrote to the Austrian capital in this regard:

The French government proposed that these matters should be discussed in a Conference of the Five Powers, to be held at Vienna. Prince Metternich has stated the reason why, in his opinion, these matters cannot properly be submitted to a formal conference, but he has proposed that Vienna should be the seat of negotiation on these affairs. Her Majesty's Government saw many strong reasons in favour of the French proposal and some of much weight against it; the proposal of Prince Metternich has fewer objections but offers less potential benefit.¹¹⁸

Not only was the city on the Danube closer to the epicentre of the problem, but Austria also had almost identical interests to Britain.¹¹⁹ Considering the great distance between the two cities, it was evident that the main focus of discussions would be left to Lamb, who at the time had become Baron Beauvale, which suited

112 RICHARDSON, p. 44.

113 Pisani to Ponsonby, Pera, 22 July 1839, TNA, FO 78/357; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225.

114 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 28 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225.

115 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich a idea konference, p. 83.

116 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 October 1838, TNA, FO 120/169.

117 According to Metternich, this was to be a series of diplomatic discussions rather than a congress in the true sense.

118 Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 28 July 1839, TNA, FO 120/180.

119 Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 14 July 1840, AT-OESTA/HHSTA, StAbt, Frankreich 315.

Metternich.¹²⁰ The British Foreign Office's ability to respond swiftly was limited, as reports from Vienna took ten days to reach London.¹²¹

For Palmerston, the conference was the only solution to the situation.¹²² British troops were operating in Canada, Afghanistan, and Persia, and a war with China was on the horizon.¹²³ Her Majesty's army's operational capabilities were at their limits, and there were no funds for another conflict.¹²⁴ Beauvale also encouraged the Foreign Secretary's consent, supporting Metternich's ideas.¹²⁵ Britain's formal consent was sent on 29 June 1839, after Palmerston had learned that the French had accepted the proposal. A final response was expected from St Petersburg. During this period, a diplomatic dispute broke out between London and Vienna. The Foreign Secretary asked Metternich to agree to a joint intervention by the warships of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and France in the Sea of Mar-

¹²⁰ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich a idea konference, p. 83.

¹²¹ RIDLEY, p. 221.

¹²² Parallel to the ongoing Second Egyptian-Ottoman War, Great Britain was also involved in the Far East during the First Opium War. The display of naval Power in China highlighted Britain's global military reach and reinforced its strategic position within Europe's complex diplomatic environment. On the other hand, it once again revealed the operational limits of the British navy, as Palmerston had to rely on cooperation with other Great Powers to enforce the declared policies in the Ottoman Empire. Initially, Palmerston considered Chinese affairs secondary, prioritising pressing European issues. His perspective shifted after 1835 when British policy towards China started to resemble its approach to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies during the Sulphur Crisis. The strategic importance of China to British interests became increasingly evident by October 1839, particularly in the context of rising tensions with Russia over the Ottoman Empire.

The possibility of renewed conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, along with the threat of Russian expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean, directly threatened Britain's control over key routes to India and the Persian Gulf. This situation compelled Palmerston, to some extent, to adopt a broader global strategy. The war also had significant implications for Anglo-French relations. Britain's victory in the war strengthened its influence in the Far East, which had long-term consequences for its relations with France. The government in Paris became fully aware of the shifting balance of power in Asia and grew more cautious in its dealings with Great Britain in this region. In light of Britain's growing influence, France was gradually forced to reassess its strategy in both Asia and the Mediterranean. MELAN ÇON, p. 863. More about British policy in relation to the First Opium War: PLATT, Stephen R., *Imperial Twilight: The Opium War and the End of China's Last Golden Age*, New York, 2018.

¹²³ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 2 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223; OTTE, Thomas, *A Janus-Like Power. Great Britain and the European Concert*, In: PYTA, Wolfram (ed.), *Das europäische Mächtekonzept*, Köln, 2009, p. 144.

¹²⁴ MORGAN, Gerald, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810–1895*, London, 1981, p. 30.

¹²⁵ Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 1 July 1839, TNA, FO 120/180.

mara in the event of Ibrahim's army marching on Constantinople.¹²⁶ In a message to Paris, Palmerston wrote: "There can be no doubt that the perfect union of England and France will confirm Austria in the course which she was herself one of the first to chalk out. With Austria, Prussia will go; and it is impossible that Russia can be unwilling to concur in the same course."¹²⁷ The Austrian Chancellor initially accepted the proposal but withdrew his agreement, fearing St Petersburg's reaction. Palmerston escalated the situation, and through Ponsonby, he demanded the Sultan's unconditional approval for British and French navy ships to enter the Sea of Marmara.¹²⁸

Even the French were aware of the importance of Austrian naval cooperation:

In order the better to obtain the result which we have in view, it may perhaps be expedient that the Austrian flag should appear among some light vessels will be sufficient for the purpose. It is to be observed, moreover, that Prince Metternich has already expressed this opinion.¹²⁹

They were not yet aware of Vienna's change of opinion. The Austrian Chancellor considered the British proposal to the Sultan as unnecessarily provocative, and he had the same criticism of Paris.¹³⁰ His rejection of the Anglo-French request was, to some extent, influenced by the expectation of St Petersburg's agreement to hold a conference in Vienna.¹³¹ Metternich convinced his ally of his essential role in preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and universal peace:

Europe wants the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and, particularly, that of the Sultan's throne. No one wants the downfall of the first, which would surpass the second. If the need arises, we must urgently come to the aid of those who would be threatened, and it is only Russia, with the Black Sea, that is in a position to offer effective help. The two Maritime Powers would have no objection to such an action.¹³²

126 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, 8 July 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III 116. Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 28 July 1839, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I, p. 117.

127 Palmerston to Granville, London, 30 July 1839, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I, p. 227.

128 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich a idea konference, p. 84.

129 Duke of Dalmatia to Bourqueney, Paris, 17 July 1839, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I, p. 80.

130 Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 7 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 315.

131 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, 29 July 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III 115.

132 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, 21 July 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III 115.

However, at the beginning of August, Metternich received an unexpected message from the Tsar, who refused to participate, arguing that the two warring parties should resolve their conflict without the intervention of external Powers.¹³³

This message was so discouraging for Metternich that it contributed to his physical and nervous collapse, and he was only able to return to his office later that year in September.¹³⁴ Interestingly, for Palmerston, the Tsar's refusal presented a path to closer ties with Austria:

A Power capable of utilizing all means of conciliation that contribute to the establishment and consolidation of a union between the Powers – a result that, if it can indeed be achieved, could only be attained through the moral and political position unique to Austria and the long-prepared paths laid by the foresight of its Cabinet. Not wishing to directly align with Russia, nor being able to do so with France, the rapprochement with Austria on this question, independent of the personal sentiments of British ministers, seems to me only all the more solidly established.¹³⁵

Esterházy added that the British Foreign Secretary sincerely regretted the obstacles in the relations between Austria and Russia. The refusal from St Petersburg was grounded in rationality, based on mutual treaties that stipulated only the Sultan himself could request military support, not foreign Powers.¹³⁶ Conversely, the British and Austrian approach on the Eastern Question was completely aligned, and both London and Vienna agreed on the fundamental principles of further political action.¹³⁷

In the meantime, a division had opened up between Great Britain and France. This resulted from the issue of supporting different sides of the conflict. While Palmerston backed Abdulmejid I, the French government, headed by Marshal Victor Soult, expressed its sympathies for the Egyptian governor and was unwilling to take part in military intervention on the Nile. Paris's agreement to a collective intervention in the Straits in July 1839 had been primarily focused against Russia. Furthermore, France had sought more significant territorial gains

133 Nesselrode to Medem, St Petersburg, 25 July 1839, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I, p. 306.

134 ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 770. During this critical period, even Palmerston was away from his office for several weeks, answering “only very rarely and on urgent matters.” Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 September 1839 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

135 Esterházy to Metternich, 22 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

136 Esterházy to Metternich, 14 August 1839 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

137 Esterházy to Metternich, 14 August 1839 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

for Muhammad Ali than Great Britain and Austria were prepared to give.¹³⁸ For Palmerston, it was tolerable if Muhammad Ali received hereditary possession of Egypt and some of Syria.¹³⁹ The French government furthermore demanded the right to the whole of Syria for the descendants of the Egyptian governor, stubbornly rejecting any other proposals.¹⁴⁰ This was too much for the Foreign Secretary:

As Count Sébastiani and I have always spoken and acted towards each other with unreserved confidence, we did not attempt to disguise, in this conversation, that the feelings of the British and French government, about the course to be pursued towards Mehemet Ali, are somewhat different, and that the French government leans much more towards the Pasha than the British government does [. . .] Count Sébastiani observed that this was a critical decision and implied a separation from France and a dissolution of the Alliance of the five Powers. So, on the present occasion, England might agree with Austria, Prussia and Russia, in thinking it necessary to employ against Mehemet Ali active measures to which France, for reasons of her own, might be unwilling to become a party.¹⁴¹

Paris's stance disconcerted Metternich, too.¹⁴² France's open support for Muhammad Ali was evident in July 1839. The Egyptian governor had connections with French journalists and was popular amongst the French public, for whom he was a hero and a "North African Napoleon."¹⁴³ The government in Paris was always sensitive to the response of its population, and as such, a pro-Egyptian course became a component of official French policy.¹⁴⁴ Although he enjoyed international support, Muhammad Ali did not have the backing of the Muslim population in the Near East, which complicated his negotiating position.¹⁴⁵

One of the first demands was that the seized fleet be returned to restore the Sultan's power. Soult opposed this, worsening relations with London.¹⁴⁶ In Sep-

138 The Viceroy of Egypt demanded hereditary possession of Egypt, Syria, and part of the Arabian Peninsula. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia. 30 October 1839, TNA, FO 78/359.

139 TULASOĞLU, p. 241.

140 SHAW, Stanford, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge, 1967, p. 57.

141 Palmerston to Bulwer, London, 10 September 1839, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I, p. 366.

142 Metternich to Kaisersfeld, Vienna, 25 November 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III, 116.

143 SRBIK, Heinrich Ritter von, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, München 1925, Band II, p. 72.

144 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 30 October 1839, TNA, FO 78/359; Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 2 August 1839, TNA, FO 27/541.

145 Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 28 August 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225.

146 Palmerston to Clanricarde, London, 25 July 1839, enclosed in a letter: Ficquelmont to Metternich, St Petersburg, July 8 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III 116.

tember 1839, Palmerston abandoned the idea of naval cooperation with France and began openly criticising it. As relations with Paris deteriorated, there was a rapprochement between London and St Petersburg.¹⁴⁷ Nicholas I shared Palmerston's objective of expelling Muhammad Ali from Syria, so he decided to negotiate terms for cooperation.¹⁴⁸ The Tsar sent Russia's ambassador, Count Phillip Ivanovich Brunnov, to London to submit a proposal for a joint resolution to the Eastern crisis.¹⁴⁹ Palmerston was interested in the Russian diplomat's offer.¹⁵⁰ In it, the Tsar committed not to renew the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi, which was due to expire in 1841. During peacetime, the Straits were also to be closed to all warships of all Powers, with Russia the only one entitled to sail to the Sea of Marmara.¹⁵¹ An essential aspect of the proposal was that the Tsar was willing to proceed regardless of France's opinion: "If the English government can obtain cooperation from France on the agreed terms, the Emperor will be satisfied; otherwise, he will be simply forced to do without it."¹⁵² Despite initial agreement on the main issues, Palmerston hesitated to accept the proposal because he was unwilling to agree to its conditions. He saw Russian intervention in the Sea of Marmara as the greatest problem and asked that any intervention involve the British navy.¹⁵³

Another issue was the scepticism of the anti-Russian ministers, who viewed rapprochement with St Petersburg disparagingly and did not want to abandon a pro-French course.¹⁵⁴ Significant disputes erupted within Parliament, with some members refusing to endorse the foundational aspects of the agreement prematurely. Esterházy sided with Russia and did not give significant weight to the British arguments:

In this manner, we have only to deal with whims rather than a will, as it should be that of a Great Power like England. As it seems to me impossible that England remains in this state of vacillation and uncertainty, which, already humiliating, would necessarily become dishonourable over time, this Power seems to me to be thus far not compelled to an action corre-

147 RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832–1841*, Urbana, 1923, p. 121.

148 SCHIEMANN, Theodor, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus. Im Kampf mit Polen und im Gegensatz zu Frankreich und England 1830–1840*, Band III, Berlin, 1913, p. 394.

149 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 September 1839 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

150 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 September 1839 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

151 LINCOLN, p. 218.

152 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 September 1839 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

153 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 4 October 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

154 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 15 November 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

sponding to its declarations. I do not abandon hope that it will find it easier to come to an understanding with Russia, proposing a similar action itself, than with France, which until now has only reluctantly agreed to principles.¹⁵⁵

In the end, Palmerston managed to get part of the cabinet on his side, and once Nicholas I accepted his concerns, he agreed to the amended Russian proposal.¹⁵⁶

Metternich was delighted with the cooperation between Great Britain and Russia. His initial disappointment at Nicholas I's rejection of his proposal subsided, even though St Petersburg agreed to hold the conference in London.¹⁵⁷ In this respect, Palmerston achieved a diplomatic victory. On the other hand, Metternich's primary interest was preserving the Ottoman Empire's integrity:

You know, my Prince, how long I have worked to establish clear explanations between the courts of Russia and Great Britain and how much care I have taken to prepare the way for the eventual agreement. This will prove, I have no doubt, that the enterprise offers fewer difficulties than expected from one side or the other.¹⁵⁸

Britain's Foreign Secretary, assured of Russian and Austrian support, criticised the French government's approach in a dispatch to Granville. At the same time, he realised that under the current circumstances, the threat from St Petersburg was unrealistic for Constantinople. To publicly oppose Paris, he needed an ally in the East; otherwise, Great Britain risked becoming isolated internationally – something London undoubtedly wanted to avoid.¹⁵⁹

Palmerston's faith in Russia's genuine intentions began to be satisfied. Nicholas I agreed to the presence of an Anglo-French fleet in the Straits should Russian ground troops be used to defend Constantinople.¹⁶⁰ The Russian Tsar was prepared to support Great Britain at the upcoming conference and hoped this would lead to the dissolution of the Anglo-French partnership.¹⁶¹ He recognised the clear disparity between the two Western governments and conveyed to Nesselrode: "Everything depends on Palmerston's resolve."¹⁶² Ultimately, discussions regard-

155 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 1 October 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

156 SCHIEMANN, Band III, p. 388.

157 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 10 October 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225; MIDLETON, Charles R., p. 410.

158 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 30 September 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 225.

159 Palmerston to Granville, London, 2 December 1839, TNA, FO 27/578.

160 Palmerston to Granville, London, 29 October 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

161 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 September 1839 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 223.

162 INGLE, p. 128.

ing the Eastern dispute were concentrated in London.¹⁶³ Neumann travelled to the British capital, representing Austria alongside Prussian envoy Bülow.¹⁶⁴ Metternich was ultimately forced to acknowledge a subordinate position, with Palmerston emerging as the key figure.

Despite his dissatisfaction with France's policy, the Austrian Chancellor remained convinced he could persuade France to act jointly, relying on Louis Philippe's moderate position.¹⁶⁵ Palmerston had no such patience: "It appears that the French Government which began by declaring itself the protector of the Sultan, has now become in appearance, and for all practical purposes in the negotiation, the protector of the Pasha."¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Soult accused the British cabinet of trying to break up the joint alliance that had secured peace in Europe for a decade. He contended that France had initially thwarted Ibrahim Pasha's further advance in the first conflict, while Ponsonby's secret policy had emboldened the Sultan to launch the attack on Muhammad Ali, which ultimately resulted in the current crisis.¹⁶⁷ Sébastiani interpreted the French government's positions in London, refusing to make the slightest concession regarding Muhammad Ali's claims.¹⁶⁸ His criticism escalated to the point where, during a conversation with Palmerston, he condemned British attempts to spread constitutional forms – even in Asia – that had already caused so much damage in Greece and Spain. After the heated discussion ended, he turned to Hummelauer, who was waiting for Palmerston, and remarked: "France does not want constitutions elsewhere; there are already too many of them – but nothing can cure the people of this country."¹⁶⁹

During the Christmas holidays, preliminary negotiations among the three Powers began at Palmerston's estate in Broadlands and later moved to London. The representatives agreed that Russia, Great Britain, and Austria would coordinate their naval forces in the Sea of Marmara if Ibrahim Pasha advanced towards

163 MARTENS, p. 37.

164 Neumann was the representative in the absence of Esterházy.

165 Esterházy to Metternich, 29 November, London, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224; Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 7 February 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230. Even in the later stages of the crisis, he did not dismiss the possibility of France joining the resolution of the issue: "*We are ready to move forward with Austria, Prussia, and Russia (without France) if their agreement can be obtained on reasonable terms, but we would prefer to include France, and we think that every appropriate effort should be made to ensure this.*" Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 21 February 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

166 Palmerston to Granville, London, 29 October 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

167 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 November 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

168 Palmerston to Granville, London, 1 December 1839, TNA, FO 27/598.

169 Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 29 November 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

Constantinople, with Austria contributing a few ships merely for appearances. The Straits would be closed to foreign warships during peacetime, based on the Sultan's traditional rights, in line with Metternich's wishes. Muhammad Ali would be restricted to governing Egypt and granted hereditary rule over the territory.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, Palmerston emphasised that it was not feasible to impose conditions on the Egyptian Pasha that would be unacceptable to him and potentially lead to greater instability in the region. This concern also extended to British trade with Egypt, as any disruption would be highly unpopular with the British public.¹⁷¹ Metternich was reportedly satisfied with the ongoing negotiations in the British Isles: "Whether the object you have kept in mind since last summer, whether in Vienna, London, or elsewhere, what matters is the goal we have set, which is the salvation of the Empire."¹⁷² He subsequently authorised Neumann to sign a joint convention in which the courts of Austria, Russia, Prussia,¹⁷³ and Great Britain committed to collective cooperation in addressing the future conditions of the Ottoman-Egyptian settlement, as well as the question of the Straits.¹⁷⁴

The seemingly smooth negotiations between the three European Powers encountered resistance from the British cabinet, particularly from pro-French members: "The majority of the Cabinet declared that the Turco-Egyptian matter could not be addressed without France."¹⁷⁵ Neumann attributed the discord within the British Government partly to Palmerston. He feared that the negotiations would lead nowhere and that a powerful diplomatic faction from Paris was exerting control over British domestic policy. Metternich was disappointed with the progress, but nonetheless, he instructed Neumann to remain in London and monitor the ongoing British–Russian discussions.¹⁷⁶ Meanwhile, he informed London that Paris had initiated separate negotiations, offering significant concessions to Muhammad Ali. This French action undermined the collective approach of the remaining courts and, above all, discouraged the Egyptian Pasha from agreeing to the potential settlement.¹⁷⁷

170 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 781.

171 Neumann to Metternich, London, 31 December 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

172 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 1 January 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

173 At Metternich's urging, Prussia joined the convention, although it did not participate in the actual December negotiations. Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 5 January 1840, TNA, FO 120/189.

174 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 12 January 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

175 Neumann to Metternich, London, 17 January 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

176 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 22 January 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 789.

177 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 7 February 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

France's intransigence escalated further in March 1840.¹⁷⁸ A new government was formed in Paris under Thiers, which sought to hold negotiations with Constantinople and Alexandria behind the other European Powers' backs. A dangerous paradox emerged between France and Great Britain. Thiers did not believe that the Powers would be willing to sign any agreement on Muhammad Ali's fate without Paris's consent. On the other hand, Palmerston considered France's objections as "big talk, [which] cannot make war for such a cause."¹⁷⁹ Another wave of criticism within the British government arose for taking action regarding the Eastern Question without the cooperation of France.¹⁸⁰ As a result, diplomatic negotiations at the conference stalled for a while.¹⁸¹ Nesselrode wrote to St Petersburg: "Since half the Cabinet, Melbourne foremost, do not want to move without France, they will have [to] give in to Palmerston. There was little to do but wait and watch and hope that Palmerston triumphed."¹⁸² Therefore, it was evident that the future approach would depend on the positions of the key figures of British and Austrian diplomacy.

Metternich hoped that the governments in Paris and London would find common ground, at least on the issue of the Straits. According to the Prince, the key to achieving this lay in the resignation of Thiers' government and the formation of a new cabinet.¹⁸³ He remarked on the change in circumstances in France by stating:

What has happened in France during the course of the last month is a revolution in the true sense of the word, and it is not one of those revolutions that bring bodies back to health, but rather one that is a necessary consequence of the July Revolution, which was only an accident in the restoration, an inevitable accident, but a real one.¹⁸⁴

The problem also lay on the British side. Neumann struggled to understand why Nicholas I agreed to London as the main venue for the negotiations instead of Vienna. In his view, the Russian court made a mistake, especially given that British–Russian relations were strained by conflicting positions on a global scale in places

178 VEIT-BRAUSE, Irmeline, Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840. Studien zur deutschen Einheitsbewegung, unpublished dissertation, Köln 1967, p. 14.

179 SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 202.

180 In this context, the claim that Palmerston "*repeatedly advocated a diplomatic concert between the five Powers*" appears somewhat irrelevant. In this case, it was Metternich who swallowed his pride and, in the interest of maintaining general peace in Europe, was willing to make concessions. Palmerston's policy was strictly motivated by long-standing objectives in the Eastern Question. HOLBRAAD, p. 139.

181 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 789.

182 INGLE, p. 130.

183 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 17 March 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

184 Metternich to Kaisersfeld, Vienna, 6 April 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III 120.

like Greece, the Ionian Islands, Persia, and China. He also pointed out that the government in London was overextending its forces with these activities, limiting its ability to respond flexibly to a potentially larger conflict, which in turn restricted its approach to the Eastern Question.¹⁸⁵ The tense relations between Russia and Great Britain were also evident at the London Conference, where disagreements began to arise due to delays in the British approval of the convention. One issue, for example, was the invitation of the Ottoman envoy without Palmerston informing the Powers. Brunnov considered that Russia might cease participating in the joint negotiations.¹⁸⁶

The disputes within the conference led Palmerston, in May 1840, to offer another compromise to Paris. Based on this proposal, Muhammad Ali was to be guaranteed hereditary rule over Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and a small part of Syria, with the right to nominate his successors. Adana, the rest of Syria, and Crete would be returned to the Sultan.¹⁸⁷ However, Palmerston expressed concern, saying:

After the promises of support that we have made to the Porte, the threatening language we have used towards Mehmet Ali on various occasions leaves us with nothing else to offer the Sultan but advice to retreat in the future. We would present to the whole world evidence of our impotence. Moreover, it is not certain that this future will present itself as one might expect.¹⁸⁸

Although the proposal was originally crafted by Metternich and conveyed to Palmerston by Neumann without prior consultation, the Foreign Secretary presented it to Thiers but gained nothing from the French side.¹⁸⁹ The new ambassador in London, François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, considered the concessions too minor and hoped that the Powers would eventually agree to grant hereditary rule over Syria to Muhammad Ali. This was unacceptable both to Vienna and St Petersburg. While Palmerston did not lose confidence in a favourable resolution of the situation, Neumann was not so sure. He particularly pointed out that, in the eyes of

¹⁸⁵ Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 March 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

¹⁸⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 24 March 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

¹⁸⁷ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 793.

¹⁸⁸ Metternich added a note in pencil on the margin of the dispatch: "It is indeed likely that we would see the emergence of a very different situation, one that would change the balance of power and create tensions we have not yet anticipated. The language used is a reflection of the gravity of the matter at hand, and we must remain vigilant as we consider our next steps in this delicate situation." Neumann to Metternich, London, 8 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

¹⁸⁹ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 25 April 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230; ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 794.

some members of the government, the necessity of cooperating with France was seen as an insurmountable requirement. Additionally, he noted that the resolution of the Turco-Egyptian conflict would not be possible without the use of force, specifically a naval blockade of Alexandria and the Syrian coast.¹⁹⁰

Even though the French side presented a counterproposal, what surprised Palmerston was the complete exclusion of the Porte from the negotiations. As a result, he decided to rely more on Austrian assistance and accommodate the Sultan as much as possible: "My mission is to favour the plan that appears the most beneficial to the Sultan's interests and presents the greatest chance of success both in the present and in the future."¹⁹¹ Consequently, Palmerston intended to use the Austrian guarantee of providing a naval force in the event of a blockade to persuade the cabinet to agree to the convention: "Two small Austrian warships will suffice to confirm your involvement in the operation."¹⁹² Metternich tentatively agreed to the proposal but refused to provide a land army due to financial reasons. He was assured by the Foreign Secretary that this guarantee would be crucial for further negotiations within the government.¹⁹³ The proposal for the blockade sparked another wave of opposition within the British cabinet. Objections also came from Vienna, as a prolonged blockade of Alexandria would result in significant losses for Austrian trade.¹⁹⁴

Even in the course of June, both Vienna and London were still convinced that France could be won over to their side.¹⁹⁵ No new alternative solutions were coming from Paris, which led Neumann to fear that the situation had reached a stalemate. He once again attributed this to Palmerston's lack of initiative. As a result, he approached Prime Minister Melbourne to explain that he could not rely on positive guarantees from Thiers. Melbourne responded that the whole matter needed time to avoid premature conclusions.¹⁹⁶ This reply did not satisfy the Austrian ambassador, as he believed the Sultan was playing for time. The situation was further complicated by reports from Constantinople, indicating a worsening condition throughout the Empire, which were confirmed by various diplomatic sources. In June, the Ottoman envoy Chekib Effendi replaced the less active Nourri Effendi, and he launched a much more proactive policy aimed at securing the Powers'

190 Neumann to Metternich, London, 12 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

191 Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

192 Neumann to Metternich, London, 9 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

193 Neumann to Metternich, London, 19 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

194 Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 May 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

195 Neumann to Metternich, London, 10 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 2, 4 June 1840, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 16.

196 Neumann to Metternich, London, 12 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

agreement to the convention.¹⁹⁷ Neumann eventually reached an agreement with Brunnov, and they decided to put pressure on Palmerston: "We immediately informed him that the delays in the discussions were leading to an anxiety that needed to be addressed."¹⁹⁸ They presented him with a plan that involved Muhammad Ali temporarily withdrawing from Aleppo, and if he adhered to the negotiation conditions, he could be granted control of Syria for life under certain terms, specifying the circumstances under which he would have to relinquish it. Palmerston agreed to this plan.

Following their agreement, Neumann had another conversation with Melbourne on 22 June 1840, during which he asked whether the cabinet would support Palmerston or insist on seeking French consent. The Prime Minister's response revealed the true intentions of his government, rooted in deep-seated animosity towards Russia: "Russia will take over the matter for itself."¹⁹⁹ He was alluding to St Petersburg's influence not only over the Sultan but also Russia's expansion into Central Asia and the threat to India. For these reasons, they wanted France on their side, hoping to create a common counterbalance against Russia. That same evening, Neumann also met with Guizot and informed him of the plan agreed upon by the three Powers. A few days later, the French ambassador reported that Thiers responded positively. A debate then erupted at the conference session, during which Palmerston and Brunnov tried to push through a solution without the "Syrian concession." Neumann objected, arguing that this would not convince France to cooperate. Shortly after that, another message arrived from Paris, in which Thiers requested additional concessions for Muhammad Ali in a territorial agreement.²⁰⁰

During the subsequent session, Palmerston hesitated on whether to accept the French plan. Guizot had submitted a request that Aleppo be placed under hereditary administration by the Egyptian governor. The British Foreign Secretary, initially uncertain, eventually conceded, after pressure from other representatives (except Neumann), that the French demands had gone too far. He agreed to present a plan to the government that did not rely on French assistance: "If Lord Palmerston fails, he [Brunnov] hopes that the matter will fall into the hands of Russia. Still, he counts on the Secretary of State's ability to be satisfied with marching without France's involvement."²⁰¹ This decision was further supported by a critical

¹⁹⁷ Neumann to Metternich, London, 15 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

¹⁹⁸ Neumann to Metternich, London, 22 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

¹⁹⁹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 23 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

²⁰⁰ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

²⁰¹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 30 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

development – Metternich had definitively committed to providing naval support in the event of a joint military intervention.²⁰²

On 5 July 1840, Palmerston appeared before the cabinet and cited a conversation between himself, Neumann, and Guizot from May 1840. He explained that Thiers would not pressure Muhammad Ali to accept the conditions proposed by the other courts.

indicating that France's designs were based on establishing a powerful Arab entity that could serve as an ally against England. On the other hand, developments in Turkey could force the Emperor of Russia to intervene, and Austria would also see itself involved materially or politically, and perhaps in a way that would disturb its balance, it was important for England to maintain the balance of power, that Anglo-Austrian interests coincided, and that despite having different positions, they could align in the same public forum. It was of utmost importance for England's interests to reconcile those of the Empire, to preserve an alliance that had always been so useful to Great Britain and to find equal sympathy in that country without, wanting to break with the French government.²⁰³

Unsurprisingly, the response was negative. Disappointed and humiliated by the rejection, Palmerston submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister.²⁰⁴ Melbourne could not afford to lose an experienced Foreign Secretary who enjoyed tremendous support from the party, something Palmerston had counted on.

Following the Prime Minister's intervention three days later, the cabinet agreed to proceed without French involvement. The next day, Palmerston sent instructions to Constantinople and Vienna regarding the deployment of forces and the joint diplomatic approach.²⁰⁵ The convention on the Straits between Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Eastern Powers was signed on 15 July 1840.²⁰⁶ Based on this agreement, Muhammad Ali was guaranteed the hereditary possession of Egypt and rule over the Syrian Sanjak of Acre, with the strategic military fortress left in place.²⁰⁷ If the Egyptians rejected this proposal, the signatory Powers would be forced to secure it by all available means, including military force.²⁰⁸ For

202 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 24 June 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

203 Neumann to Metternich, London, 9 July 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

204 SOUTHGATE, p. 130.

205 Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 10 July 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230, Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 10 July 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

206 The entire wording of the convention is in the dispatch: Neumann to Metternich, London, 16 July 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228; HOLLAND, p. 95.

207 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 16 July 1840, TNA, FO 120/190.

208 Memorandum from 15 July 1840, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. II, p. 1.

Metternich, the convention represented hope that the Near East conflict could be resolved, although he was also concerned about France's response.²⁰⁹

The French political circles discovered that the agreement had been signed on 25 July 1840.²¹⁰ Their answer was extremely hostile. The secret signing of the agreement without France's involvement was perceived as a deliberate humiliation. Guizot was surprised by the signing of the convention. Lieven, who arrived in London with him, said to Palmerston: "The disciple of Mr. Canning – had rebuilt the Holy Alliance that the latter had destroyed."²¹¹ Thiers spoke of Great Britain's betrayal and dramatic consequences, even though French diplomacy's official response was moderate.²¹² The French press, on the other hand, did not mince words. Newspapers like *Le National* and *Journal des Débats* called for war and suggested annexing territory on the left bank of the Rhine.²¹³

The French public, eager to challenge the Vienna arrangements of 1815, was driven by revisionist sentiment. Thiers' government immediately increased the army's budget and began an extensive arms build-up. Throughout August 1840, France's belligerence focused on the Italian Peninsula. While Metternich was shocked by this response, he did not believe that the government in Paris, and Louis Philippe in particular, would be willing to risk a war against all the Powers. For this reason, he did not let the threats intimidate him. In response to these reports, Palmerston wrote to Paris:

No Power has the slightest intention or thought of attacking France; but then France cannot expect that other Powers should see with indifference a wanton attack made by her upon a state which has given her no offence and which she would select as an object of attack, merely because she supposes it weak, and incapable of repelling or resenting an outrage.²¹⁴

This statement revealed that London was not afraid of acting against France, its greatest ally on the Continent (at least until then), to pursue its national interests.

Thiers' fiery international politics had mainly developed from public sentiment.²¹⁵ He had little room for diplomatic manoeuvre if he wanted to satisfy the French public and keep his government in place. As such, Metternich was con-

²⁰⁹ Metternich to Neumann, 25 July 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 230.

²¹⁰ ŠEDIVÝ, *Crisis Among the Great Powers*, p. 54.

²¹¹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 July 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 228.

²¹² Guizot's memorandum to Palmerston, Paris, 29 July 1840, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. II, p. 20.

²¹³ VEIT-BRAUSE, p. 16.

²¹⁴ Palmerston to Bulwer, London, 31 August 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 229.

²¹⁵ Thiers controlled a large part of the French newspapers, which made it easier for him to influence public opinion.

vinced that France was bluffing, attempting to intimidate Austria and Prussia into making concessions.²¹⁶ It is likely that the compromising materials, which the Chancellor had carefully kept on the French king, also played a role in this regard.²¹⁷ He instructed Apponyi to maintain a balanced and moderate tone in his statements about the government in Paris:

It is especially dangerous to see the government constrained in order to escape these embarrassments, to call upon, or to seek aid from the revolutionary element armed and without doubt in rather troubling circumstances, but the governments, such as those of individuals, as long as their ministers are chiefly concerned, will always resist the use of arms under these conditions.²¹⁸

The key to resolving the crisis, in Metternich's view, was to remove Thiers and bolster Louis Philippe's authority.

It was surprisingly Prussia that represented a particular threat to the Austrian Chancellor. In early June 1840, Frederick William IV ascended to the throne and was reluctant to be drawn into a war on the Rhine over issues in the Near East. At the conference, Bülow presented Prussia's reservations about ratifying the protocol and declared: "That if the Eastern Question were to lead to a conflict between the Powers more directly involved in this matter than Prussia herself, Prussia would adopt the position of the strictest neutrality."²¹⁹ Metternich believed that Bülow was being influenced by Russell, who claimed that by signing, Prussia would commit to deploying military forces. For Frederick William IV, this posed a threat, as he wanted to concentrate his military capacities primarily on the Rhine, not outside Europe. The Austrian Chancellor instructed Neumann: "To confer with Lord Palmerston on the best way to at least neutralize what, in form, the Prussian declarations may have that is compromising and harmful."²²⁰ At the planned meeting at Pilnitz on 13 August 1840, he wanted to personally explain to the Prussian monarch the consequences that the acceptance of Prussia's request would entail. Yet, a situation arose that could be called the "fog of diplomacy." While Metternich managed to secure Frederick William IV's promise, in the meantime, the protocol was concluded two days after the meeting, leaving Prussia the freedom to decide when to deploy military troops.²²¹ From a broader political perspective, it was not a defeat in the true sense of the word. At the meeting

²¹⁶ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 803.

²¹⁷ See Chapter 1 for more details.

²¹⁸ Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 22 August 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²¹⁹ Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 10 August 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²²⁰ Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 10 August 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²²¹ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 805.

in Pilnitz, mutual cooperation and friendship between Berlin and Vienna were confirmed.²²²

Palmerston himself faced difficulties. Almost immediately after the convention was issued in July, pro-French members within the cabinet began to mobilise. The main agitators were Holland and Russell. The former acted mainly through behind-the-scenes diplomacy, frequently hosting banquets and other social events at his home, where he invited influential foreign diplomats, trying to either extract information or offer friendly advice. His guests included figures such as Guizot and even Neumann.²²³ On the other hand, Russell engaged in direct political combat, leaving Melbourne in the problematic position of mediator. One of his allegations accused Palmerston of allegedly forcing the Ottoman Sultan, through Ponsonby, to attack the Egyptian governor, making him the architect of every crisis. This political struggle also evolved into an information war, with the British press divided into two irreconcilable camps.²²⁴ Granville also caused Palmerston difficulties, being too soft in his approach towards Thiers, easily manipulated, and often bypassing his instructions. This all played into Paris's hands, allowing it to escalate its pressure, especially as the situation became more complicated in the Near East.²²⁵

After Muhammad Ali rejected the terms set by the London Conference, Palmerston decided to address the crisis through military action.²²⁶ The campaign began after signing the treaty and lasted until November.²²⁷ He ordered Vice-Admiral Robert Stopford to cut off communications between Egypt and Syria and seize all weapons destined for Ibrahim Pasha. Palmerston was dissatisfied with Stopford's progress and lack of initiative. In the initial phase, the Vice-Admiral failed to take advantage of the uprising in Syria, which could have significantly influenced the course of military operations. Consequently, in August 1840, Commodore Napier was dispatched to Beirut to patrol the Syrian coast, cut off supplies to the Egyptian troops by sea, and begin a naval operation involving the

222 Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 22 August 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

223 Neumann to Metternich, London, 31 December 1839, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 224.

224 ANDERSON, *The Eastern Question*, p. 99.

225 Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 8 August 1840, TNA, FO 27/604; Neumann to Metternich, London, 2 September 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231; Neumann to Metternich, London, 30 September 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

226 SHAW, p. 57.

227 Palmerston unusually demanded that military preparations begin even before the treaty was officially ratified. ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich and the Syrian Question: 1840–1841*. In: *Austrian History Yearbook* 41, 2010, p. 88.

bombardment of Beirut.²²⁸ Austrian and Ottoman ships were operating here alongside British ships.²²⁹

Reports of British victories in Syria and news of the ratification of the 15 July Treaty on 15 September heightened pro-war sentiments in France.²³⁰ Palmerston delivered only the notification of the convention's ratification to Guizot, stating that: "They seek no exclusive advantage for themselves in these arrangements. The goal is to preserve the balance of power in Europe and to prevent events that might disturb the general peace."²³¹ Threats from Paris escalated, with Thiers declaring that war would be inevitable if acceptable conditions for Muhammad Ali were not presented at the London Conference.²³² In response to his speech, Palmerston wrote to the chargé d'affaires in Paris, Henry Lytton Bulwer:

If France throws down the gauntlet, we shall not refuse to pick it up; . . . if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the end of it; . . . her army of Algiers will cease to give her anxiety, and Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile.²³³

France's Prime Minister did not stop applying pressure, and he demanded that the Egyptian governor receive hereditary rights to Syria, or else he might invade the Rhineland. There was an immediate response from the German states to any French invasion. The press called for the defence of the German Confederation, and the public was now in a fighting mood.²³⁴

Metternich was not so concerned about Central Europe as he was about a possible French invasion of the Italian Peninsula. Still, he guaranteed Austria would be ready to meet its military obligations.²³⁵ Neither Palmerston nor Nicho-

²²⁸ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 21 November 1840, TNA, FO 78/398; Metternich to Meysenburg, Vienna, 11 October 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland III, 120; SCHOLL, Heinrich Freiherrn von, *Geschichte des Krieges 1840–41*, Wien, 1866, p. 21.

²²⁹ For more on the Austrian navy's operations during the Syrian campaign, see: BAYER, Heinrich, KHUEPACH, Artur, *Geschichte der k. u. k. Kriegsmarine*, II. Teil: Die K. K. Österreichische Kriegsmarine in dem Zeitraum von 1797 bis 1848, III. Band. *Geschichte der k. k. Kriegsmarine während der Jahre 1814–1847. Die österreichisch-venezianische Kriegsmarine*, Graz, Köln, 1966, pp. 244–253.

²³⁰ Neumann to Metternich, London, 17 September 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²³¹ Palmerston to Guizot, London, 18 September 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²³² Bulwer to Palmerston, Paris, 20 September 1840, FO 27/605.

²³³ SOUTHGATE, p. 134.

²³⁴ FAHRMEIR, Andreas, *Europa zwischen Restauration, Reform und Revolution 1815–1850*, München, 2012, p. 74.

²³⁵ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 821.

las I agreed to concessions for the Egyptian governor, and the Foreign Secretary was prepared to use decisive force if required to resolve the situation.²³⁶

During the upcoming government meeting, the discussion aimed to focus on domestic issues and the session of Parliament. Even so, Palmerston anticipated the debate would inevitably shift towards foreign affairs. Russell, backed by his brother Francis Russell, Duke of Bedford, and Lord Spencer, launched a sharp attack on the Foreign Secretary. This growing opposition also surfaced in Parliament, where Guizot adopted a diplomatic yet intimidating tone while waiting for the outcome of the 28th September cabinet meeting. During the session, critics accused Palmerston of jeopardising Europe's balance of power with his hardline stance on France, potentially sparking a general war.²³⁷

Prime Minister Melbourne intervened, seeking Queen Victoria's help to calm the tensions and find a compromise. She opposed a confrontational course with France and called for the consolidation of relations with Louis Philippe. Since the Queen was expecting her first child, any further strain on the British government seemed undesirable. Palmerston's political position benefited from military victories, but tensions remained high. Russell threatened to resign, throwing the cabinet's stability into question. As disputes escalated, Palmerston secured support from several Tories, including Aberdeen. Public opinion also shifted in his favour, with many anti-Whig media magnates openly supporting him. In the end, Melbourne, concerned about the Queen's well-being, directed the Foreign Office to soften its pressure on Paris.²³⁸

Guizot, meanwhile, adopted a wait-and-see tactic, withholding any official statement until he knew the outcome of the British government's deliberations. During the conference at the beginning of October, Palmerston informed Neumann of the cabinet's position and emphasised that the four Powers would need to maintain a united front in their actions against France. At the same time, he hinted that if Thiers followed through on his promises and Paris was forced into military intervention, it would endanger the stability of Europe. Therefore, it was necessary to resume talks with France and possibly invite it to join the negotiations. The Austrian ambassador responded by paraphrasing from Metternich's letter:

The French government is in a state of unease, from which it wishes to extricate itself. Should it refuse to aid in this endeavour, I hesitate to declare that affirmatively while limiting it to observing that it is fitting to lend support within the bounds of a neighbouring polit-

236 Neumann to Metternich, London, 30 September 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

237 Neumann to Metternich, London, 6 October 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

238 Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 4 October 1840, TNA, FO 120/187.

ical line. We would obtain better conditions from France in favour of the matter if we handled it with more care, since it was generally agreed that the ineffectiveness of our coercive measures would provoke France.²³⁹

However, he added that if representatives from Russia or Prussia opposed it, he would be obliged to support them.

The government in Paris, led by Thiers, began to escalate tensions once again with the remaining European Powers.²⁴⁰ After a letter written in a moderate tone, it was followed by a barrage of accusations and aggressive dispatches. French chargé d'affaires Count François Adolphe Bourqueney accused Austria of detaining over 7,500 soldiers during the intervention in Beirut, thereby violating the convention under which Vienna had agreed that no ground forces would be used. Neumann responded that if such an event occurred, it must have involved the navy, not ground troops, adding that this was standard procedure in the British case, as seen previously in Bilbao and San Sebastián. To this, the French diplomat replied: "If the Austrian troops have not disembarked, then the British sailors have." Neumann answered:

You knew that coercive measures would be used to wrest Syria from Mehemet Ali – you were only told that you would not take part in them, and since the convention was signed, you have said so both here and in Paris. Act quickly, because if this drags on too long, public sentiment will rise more and more in France.²⁴¹

Thiers, in turn, told Granville regarding the bombing of Beirut: "Violence against the Pasha was essentially an act of moral violence against France."²⁴² Such exchanges became a daily occurrence by early October 1840.

Metternich was concerned that the crisis could indeed escalate into a state of war and attempted to organise another conference, namely in Wiesbaden, where France would also be invited. His proposal was rejected by both Russia and Great Britain. The former refused to yield to Thiers' threats, and Palmerston remained firm in his position despite internal government compromises. Metternich, for the umpteenth time, tried to push forward his vision of the "Acre Option," which he had already proposed at the beginning of July, prior to the signing of the final version of the convention.²⁴³ His conciliatory tone was influenced by the argu-

²³⁹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 5 October (first dispatch) 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁴⁰ Metternich to Meysenbug, Vienna, 11 October, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Russland 120.

²⁴¹ Neumann to Metternich, London, 5 October (second dispatch) 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁴² Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 5 October 1840, TNA, FO 27/606.

²⁴³ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 15 October 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

ment that, in the event of war, Austria, due to its geographical position, would be exposed to much greater danger than Russia or Great Britain.²⁴⁴

The more pressure France applied on the international stage, the more radicalised the situation became on the domestic front. The government initiated a massive military programme. Granville sent exaggerated reports about the “inevitability of war in Europe,”²⁴⁵ and the French press continued its warlike rhetoric. In mid-October 1840, a Parisian worker even made an attempt on the life of Louis Philippe. Concerns over a revolution breaking out and the fall of the Orléans regime forced him to reassess his position regarding his government. He refused to continue to support his Prime Minister’s policy of making threats, leading France to the edge of a Europe-wide war. He, therefore, rejected Thiers’ proposal for an aggressive parliamentary speech, instead accepting his resignation.²⁴⁶ Marshall Soult established a new government, although Foreign Minister François Guizot led it. Upon his return to continental Europe, he stated: “[I] will certainly defend the cause of peace and, since the conservative party holds this immense stake, it is necessary to maintain the current state of things.”²⁴⁷ The changed government in Paris also represented a significant event in the so-called Rhine crisis and a crucial factor in calming the situation down internationally. Nevertheless, the arrival of the new government did not yet mean the immediate end to mutual conflicts, with neither Louis Philippe nor Guizot ready to abandon France’s extensive arms proliferation. The issue was not that the new Foreign Minister personally wished to continue the warlike rhetoric of his predecessor, but rather that the French Parliament and the public were in a position where an immediate change in political direction was not feasible. This meant that preparations for war progressed.²⁴⁸

While these domestic political changes took place in Paris, military operations on the Syrian coast continued. In October 1840, the joint Austrian, British, and Ottoman forces managed to drive Ibrahim Pasha out of Beirut and the surrounding area, with the Egyptian army’s only refuge left in the Acre fortress. Palmerston ordered that Ottoman soldiers be supplied with British muskets, and he urged the Sultan to deploy another 10,000 men to Syria.²⁴⁹ British officers were

²⁴⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 17 September 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁴⁵ Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 15 October 1840, TNA, FO 27/606.

²⁴⁶ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 6 November, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 318; RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Anglo-Russian Negotiations about a “Permanent” Quadruple Alliance 1840–1841*. In: *The American Historical Review* 36, 1931, 2, p. 344.

²⁴⁷ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 8 November, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 318.

²⁴⁸ ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 822.

²⁴⁹ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Constantinople, 5 August 1840, TNA, FO 78/395; Neumann to Metternich, London, 30 September 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

sent to Constantinople to oversee the army's operation.²⁵⁰ He also asked Metternich for Austria to provide similar assistance. In instructions of 5 October 1840, Palmerston ordered Stopford to begin an offensive operation before winter began, which might complicate any military action.²⁵¹ Following this, he dispatched instructions to Constantinople outlining the future political strategy:

Having taken into consideration the fact by which the Sultan deprived Mehemet Ali of the Pashalik of Egypt, the bearings of that act upon the present state of pending questions, and the course which it may be expedient to take thereupon, have invited the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia at this Court to submit to their respective governments that undoubtedly there is much force in the reasons which, according to His Excellency's reports, induced the Sultan to take this step, and that while on the one hand, this measure in no degree prevents the Sultan from reinstating Mehemet Ali, if he should publicly make his submission to his sovereign, on the other hand it may operate as a powerful instrument of moral coercion upon Mehemet Ali, by making him aware that if the contest between him & his sovereign should be prolonged, and if the issue of that contest should be unfavourable to him, he might lose all, by his too obstinate resistance.²⁵²

The attack on the Acre fortress began on 2 November, 1840. Once their gunpowder store was hit, the Egyptian soldiers surrendered in just a single day. Ibrahim Pasha had no option but to withdraw his army back to Egypt.²⁵³

Reports of Acre's capture arrived in Paris on 28 November 1840. It was evident to Guizot and the rest of the French government that Syria was definitively lost for Muhammad Ali, and the only option for France was to reconcile itself to this fact.²⁵⁴ On this occasion, Metternich stated: "All this, of course, is now no more than ancient history. Our new journey has begun with the capture of St. Jean d'Acre."²⁵⁵ France's main task was to limit as far as possible the consequences of the diplomatic defeat it had suffered.²⁵⁶ Metternich welcomed the end of Thiers' government and felt satisfied with the new cabinet, but he still viewed the strengthening of the French army as a threat to the German Confederation and the Italian Peninsula. Following a meeting of representatives of Austria and Prussia in Vienna, an agreement was signed on 28 November 1840, regarding the defence of the German states against France. In the event of war, Metternich con-

²⁵⁰ Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 28 October 1840, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 15.

²⁵¹ Ponsonby to Palmerston, London, 21 October 1841, TNA, FO 78/398.

²⁵² Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 15 October 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁵³ Neumann to Metternich, London, 21 November 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 229.

²⁵⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 November 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 229.

²⁵⁵ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 29 November 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁵⁶ BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 23.

firmed he would send the Austrian army to the Rhine. In return, Frederick William IV promised military participation if the Italian Peninsula were to be attacked and called on the other federal states to participate, too. This agreement represented a diplomatic victory for Metternich. It guaranteed Austria that the whole of the German Confederation would defend Italian states.²⁵⁷

In early November, Guizot sent London a message regarding its peaceful intentions:

For the sake of excluding the Pasha of Egypt from the government of Candia during the few years of life that now remain to him, to risk the dangerous consequences that may result to all the world, from France not concurring in settlement of the peace in the East; for it cannot be doubted, that the want of such concurrence will render precarious such settlement, as well as expose to hazard the peace of the West of Europe.²⁵⁸

He also hoped that the 15 July convention, the main thorn in the French government's side, would be withdrawn. Palmerston did not trust his statement. In response, he wrote:

But as to the notion that Her Majesty's Government could, out of deference to the wishes of France, suspend operations which Great Britain is carrying on upon the coast of Syria in fulfilment of the engagements of a Treaty concluded with Four other Powers, you [the other three Powers] acted very properly in not giving any encouragement to such a suggestion. M. Guizot seems, indeed, throughout the whole conversation to have operated under the assumption that the Treaty of July last is not to be executed.²⁵⁹

Paris continued to reject the idea of disarming, and the French Prime Minister, driven by public opinion, could not concede any sign of defeat to the outside world, as this would inevitably lead to another government collapse. On the other hand, Metternich took a cautious approach to France and wanted it to be reintegrated into the Concert of Europe.²⁶⁰ He believed that this was the way to secure peace in Europe. As a result, he proposed the official recognition of France's occupation of Algeria and Muhammad Ali's guaranteed possession of Egypt. Palmerston opposed the Austrian Chancellor's proposal. A concession to Paris like this would transform its diplomatic defeat into a triumph, he wrote to Beauvale in Vienna.²⁶¹

²⁵⁷ Bavaria, Hanover, Baden, and Württemberg added their signatures to the agreement.

²⁵⁸ Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 6 November 1840, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 2.

²⁵⁹ Palmerston to Granville, London, 12 November 1840, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 4.

²⁶⁰ VEIT-BRAUSE, p. 38.

²⁶¹ Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 19 December 1840, TNA, FO 120/189.

Napier began unofficial discussions with Muhammad Ali in Alexandria on surrender terms. The British commodore went far beyond the instructions he had been given in the discussions. Without consulting Constantinople or London, he submitted on 27 November 1840 a proposal to the Egyptian governor, which granted him hereditary rule over Egypt and offered safe passage to Ibrahim's soldiers as they withdrew. The news of Napier's conclusion of the treaty provoked significant resentment in the European courts. In this case, it was not the terms of acceptance that were at issue, but rather the manner of negotiation, from which the Sultan was completely excluded. Napier also bypassed Palmerston, as he had not received any binding instructions from him. Logically, neither Metternich nor the Sultan agreed with Napier's convention. According to Vienna, a peace agreement could only be signed between representatives of Abdulmejid I and Muhammad Ali. The Austrian Chancellor declared the British naval officer's action as an "act of insanity."²⁶²

Palmerston sent him official instructions through Stopford in a series of memoranda dated 14 and 15 November, outlining the procedure and stating that a special envoy would be sent to Alexandria to conduct official negotiations on behalf of Her Majesty:

When admitted, he will state to Mehemet Ali that he is ordered by the British government to inform him that if he makes an immediate submission to the Sultan, and delivers into the hands of the officer to be sent a written engagement to restore without further delay the Turkish fleet, and causes his troops immediately to evacuate the whole of Syria, the District of Adana, the Island of Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities, the four Powers will recommend to the Sultan to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the Pashalic of Egypt. But the officer will state that this recommendation will be given by the four Powers only in the event of the prompt submission of Mehemet Ali and that the officer is directed to remain three days at Alexandria to learn the decision. If at the end of the three days Mehemet Ali has not determined to make his submission to the Sultan, the officer should reembark and proceed to Constantinople to report to H. M.'s ambassador.²⁶³

In his instructions to Stopford, Palmerston urged him to continue military operations and expel the Egyptian army from Syria until "he received word from Constantinople that a new arrangement had been reached with Mehemet Ali."²⁶⁴

The terms set during the negotiations in London were almost identical to those proposed by Napier.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, this did not change the fact that when

²⁶² ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 856.

²⁶³ Palmerston to Stopford, London, 14 November 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 229.

²⁶⁴ Palmerston to Stopford, London, 15 November 1840, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 229.

²⁶⁵ Napier subsequently issued an apology for his actions: "I never had the least idea that the convention would be carried into execution without the authority of the Porte and the com-

Edward Fanshawe arrived as the official representative of the British government, he declared the convention null and void and presented his own treaty. Metternich was satisfied with this solution, as it adhered to proper diplomatic practice, and significant effort from Neumann had contributed to its final wording. Muhammad Ali agreed to the terms and signed the new agreement on 8 December 1840. Three days later, the Pasha sent a letter to the Grand Vizier in which he assured the Porte of his loyalty, Ibrahim Pasha's withdrawal from Syria, and the actual preparations in the Alexandrian port for the departure of the Turkish fleet.²⁶⁶

The resolution in the East also brought a solution in the West. After Guizot learned about the proposed agreement from 14 November, he expressed "great satisfaction with this initiative." He further added that he was surprised, particularly that Great Britain and Austria were providing such aid and provisions to the new French administration in order to deliver "proof of their support." Guizot concluded, "that is enough about the inheritance of Egypt."²⁶⁷ Yet, within his cabinet, different sentiments prevailed, and even in early December, Palmerston was still dealing with a series of French threats. Metternich was similarly informed of this.²⁶⁸ After Muhammad Ali accepted the agreement with the Sultan and reaffirmed his loyalty, the French pressures began to lose clear justification. Another factor was Palmerston's staunch inflexibility towards Soult's government. In the end, a relative compromise was reached, in which Paris pledged to maintain peace in Europe but continue its armament until the Eastern Question was fully resolved.²⁶⁹ The agreement from the Pasha's side did not mark the end of this conflict.²⁷⁰

When reports arrived at Constantinople of Egypt's agreement, the Porte began discussing a plan to depose the governor and expel him from the country.²⁷¹ These forceful remarks drew the attention of the Powers' diplomatic representatives.

mander in chief to whom the whole correspondence was addressed." Napier to Ponsonby, Marmaris Bay, 14 December 1840; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 January 1841, OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

²⁶⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 21 December 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231

²⁶⁷ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 5 December 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁶⁸ Palmerston to Granville, London, 8 December 1840, FO 27/600B; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 23 December 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

²⁶⁹ Beuvalle commented on the "*Armed Peace*." Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 19 January 1841, TNA, FO 120/197.

²⁷⁰ Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 20 December 1840, TNA, FO 78/399.

²⁷¹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 26 December 1840, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 231.

Stürmer warned the Divan²⁷² and counselled against hasty actions, and representatives of Russia and Prussia took his side. This disagreement became fully evident at the meeting of diplomatic representatives on 20 December in Constantinople. The British embassy argued that it was solely the Sultan's decision how he chose to deal with his vassal and that it was not within the competence of the other Powers to interfere with this right:

If the Sublime Porte informs us that the Sultan has agreed to the submission of Mehemet Ali and is satisfied with it, the role of my government is merely to provide counsel, in this case, to the Sublime Porte, agreeing that Mehemet Ali be granted the hereditary government of Egypt. Until then, until the Porte communicates the Sultan's decision to us, I must refrain from offering any advice or opinion.²⁷³

Ponsonby did not respond publicly to the Ottoman statements, preferring to scheme behind the scenes against Alexandria.²⁷⁴ The Sultan's reply came on 27 December 1840, and based on the British ambassador's advice, he refused to guarantee Muhammad Ali's hereditary rights to Egypt.

In fact, the Porte wanted to gain time and the opportunity to prepare for an eventual military intervention against its vassal. Reports of Abdulmejid's intransigence concerned Metternich.²⁷⁵ He wrote to Stürmer in Constantinople: "Austria condemns any military action which the Turkish army's units undertake against the Egyptian army."²⁷⁶ He rightly blamed Ponsonby for encouraging the Sultan. During January 1841, the Chancellor's suspicion shifted to Palmerston, whom he believed was endeavouring to overthrow the Egyptian governor's government:

Lord Ponsonby, who has taken it upon himself to make this matter understood, has the idea that, if instead of saving Mehemet Ali, we manage to swallow him up, Lord Palmerston will have nothing against it. You understand that for Mr Ponsonby, nothing more is needed!²⁷⁷

Metternich continued to criticise London, and he even considered withdrawing from the conference and beginning direct discussions with France: "The incident, which they have led into confusion, stems from Palmerston, who never hesitates to act independently and rashly."²⁷⁸ Ponsonby warned Palmerston that a large

272 The Divan (or The Divan-ı Hümayun) was a vital administrative and executive council within the Ottoman Empire, acting as one of the principal organs of governance.

273 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 20 December 1840, TNA, FO 78/399.

274 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 954.

275 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 January 1841, TNA, FO 120/197; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 14 January 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

276 Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 17 January 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 83.

277 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 January 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

278 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 2 February 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 235.

portion of Egypt's budget, as planned by Muhammad Ali, would be allocated for further military armament, and that in the future, it would be in his interest to again test his strength against the Sultan.²⁷⁹ The Foreign Secretary must have heeded this information, as in his correspondence to Constantinople, he instructed Ponsonby "to obtain security for the Sultan against the potential threat that Mehemet Ali may entertain."²⁸⁰ Relations between Great Britain and Austria at the beginning of 1841 were on a similar level as before the outbreak of the Second Eastern Crisis.

Beauvale, influenced by Metternich, wrote to his brother in London, asking him to recall Ponsonby from Constantinople.²⁸¹ Melbourne accepted the British ambassador in Vienna's position and told Palmerston that if Constantinople's representative ignored his government's instructions, he should immediately be dismissed from his role. Of course, the British Foreign Secretary did not concur, as Ponsonby was sufficiently meeting his task and had great influence over the Sultan.²⁸² In January 1841, unequivocal instructions arrived in the Ottoman Empire to urge the Divan to agree to the granting of the hereditary statute.²⁸³ Abdulmejid I found that he no longer had any support from the Powers, and all he could do was guarantee Muhammad Ali the hereditary possession of Egypt in a decree of 13 February 1841.²⁸⁴ In return, he demanded a hefty tribute of a quarter of Egypt's gross income, plus control over his army.²⁸⁵ Alexandria could not accept such unfavourable terms.²⁸⁶

Metternich disagreed with the Sultan's proposal and required that it be changed immediately. Austria was prepared to withdraw its signature from the 15 July 1840 agreement if the demands were not met.²⁸⁷ He even approved the option of rejecting the Egyptian governor's proposal and wrote the following to Stürmer: "In any case, if the Sultan refuses to listen to the wishes of his allies, tell the Porte that it will be the master of its own decisions."²⁸⁸ Palmerston needed to respond quickly, and so in March and April 1841, he sent dispatches to Constantinople on the following steps:

279 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 17 January 1841, FO 120/197.

280 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 1 February 1840, TNA, FO 78/430.

281 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 5 May 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 235.

282 Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 26 January 1841, TNA, FO 7/296.

283 Neumann to Metternich, London, 1 February 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 235.

284 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 15 February 1841, TNA, FO 120/197.

285 He reserved the right to appoint Egyptian officers and select his successor from among Muhammad Ali's descendants.

286 LINCOLN, p. 219.

287 Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 April 1841, TNA, FO 120/197.

288 Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 2 April 1841, AT-OEST/HHSTA, StAbt, Türkei VI, 83.

It is extremely important that the matters in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be settled as soon as possible; . . . and it is obvious that no such final settlement can be reached to without such direct communication. Mehemet Ali will since that time have learnt, that the Conference has not separated and that the Alliance has not been dissolved; but that, on the contrary, the four Powers remain steady to their purpose, and true to their engagements.²⁸⁹

In the subsequent report, he wrote:

I [am] inclosing a copy of an instruction given by Prince Metternich to the Internuncio on 2 April, directing him, if necessary, to declare to the Porte that if the Divan will not adopt the modifications in the firman of 13 February [. . .] His Imperial Majesty will consider himself released from the obligations he contracted by the Treaty of July. I have to acquaint that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the view of this matter taken by the Austrian government and are prepared to take the same course.²⁹⁰

Britain's Foreign Secretary urged the Sultan to fulfil his commitment and change the terms issued in the February firman.²⁹¹ Meanwhile, in Alexandria, Napier announced that, should Muhammad Ali refuse the Sultan's proposal, Great Britain would not oppose it. The Porte, on the other hand, did not want to reduce its claims and demanded the unconditional approval of its exact wording.²⁹²

Metternich's attention turned again to Ponsonby. He saw him as the leading cause of the Sultan's intransigence.²⁹³ The British diplomat had many advocates at the Divan, one of whom was Reshid Pasha, the organiser of the February firman.²⁹⁴ He lost his role in March 1841 as a result of plots at the Ottoman court, and there were changes at the Divan.²⁹⁵ A conservative camarilla came to power and significantly impacted Abdulmejid's policies. This was naturally also reflected in his position on Muhammad Ali, with a new modified firman finally issued on 19 April, its ratification being conditional on the approval of the London Conference. Reports on the new agreement met Metternich's expectations. Now, he believed nothing

289 Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 10 April 1841, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 364.

290 Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 21 April 1841, *Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. III, p. 385.

291 Ferman or firman is an official Ottoman document mainly used for decrees or regulations.

292 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 18 March 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

293 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 14 January, 9 April 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 237.

294 Relations between Ponsonby and Reshid Pasha had been at an all-time low since the issuance of the February firman, and the British diplomat expected he would be recalled shortly. Palmerston to Ponsonby, London, 21 April 1841, TNA, FO 120/194.

295 Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 11 March 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Türkei VIII, 15; KARPEYEV, p. 438.

was standing in the way of France joining the Concert of Europe in full and Europe returning to peaceful international coexistence. In contrast, the situation in London was different. Palmerston was not prepared to approve a convention if Muhammad Ali did not accept the conditions.²⁹⁶ Metternich considered this foolish and called for its signature as soon as possible.²⁹⁷ Esterházy tried fruitlessly to urge the British Foreign Secretary to reassess his intransigence. The Austrian Chancellor was not wrong, however, in believing that the end of the conflict would also calm the situation in Europe. Guizot issued a declaration in which he agreed with the conditions for Muhammad Ali and stated that France would no longer build up its arms.

The domestic political situation in Britain was not developing positively for the current cabinet. The government was facing a difficult economic situation and was being threatened with a vote of no confidence. The Tories were in line to win the next election. There was growing opposition to Palmerston's actions in the Eastern Question and the favouring of Ponsonby, hated by Francophile representatives.²⁹⁸ On 1 June, new terms were sent from Constantinople, guaranteeing the Pasha the hereditary possession of Egypt and the right to appoint his successors and nominate army officers. The North African army could number 18,000 men. The Egyptian governor's navy could only be built with the Sultan's consent. The only question remaining was the level of tribute to be paid, which was to be resolved later. Muhammad Ali agreed to these terms, and the general crisis ended.²⁹⁹

Regarding resolving the conflict and the approaching end of the 1833 Russo-Ottoman treaty, Palmerston proposed during the London conference that the future of this strategically important point be discussed. On 13 July 1841, three days after Melbourne's government had lost a vote of no-confidence, all five Powers and the Ottoman Empire signed a new Straits Treaty.³⁰⁰ This convention reaffirmed the principle of closing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all warships during peacetime.³⁰¹ Mistrust towards Paris persisted on the part of Palmerston even after the resolution of the crisis. This was partly due to French hesitancy in signing the convention on the abolition of the slave trade, as well as the Straits Treaty. According to diplomats in London, Guizot was in no hurry to sign, as he antici-

296 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 5 May 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 235.

297 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 May 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

298 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 May 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 234.

299 The entire wording of the treaty at: Palmerston to Beauvale, London, 13 July 1841, TNA, FO 120/195.

300 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 13 July 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 234.

301 ANDERSON, *The Eastern Question*, p. 52.

pated the imminent fall of the Whigs' government and the rise of a new Tory one, with which he sought to negotiate common terms.³⁰²

Metternich wrote a letter two days after the signing of the convention, in which he insightfully summarised the state of British politics and the situation in which it found itself. He alluded to the fact that British policy had changed after the long war with France, and following a period of internal consolidation, the first signs of its new direction began to appear, particularly regarding the Eastern Question:

My first reproaches date from the period between 1820 and 1823, when Great Britain, particularly in matters of the Levant, did not know how to play the role that its most evident interest should have made it play. As there is no effect without a cause, it is necessary first to identify the cause here, and it was not difficult for me to discover it in the following elements.

He further alluded to the specific and insincere relationship between London and Paris:

The two neighbouring countries, after having passed from a long state of war to one of peace, established relations between them, whose reciprocal influence quickly manifested itself in a visible way. The first consequence of these relations for England was to lend strength to the Whig party, a party that followed the impulses of liberalism before the proper balance between the precepts of reason based on sound politics and theories devoid of practical application had invaded the Continent. The truth that is demonstrated to me is that the contact between France and Great Britain, since the time of the restoration, can be considered as an uninterrupted exchange of moral poison between the two countries.

According to Metternich, this had to have an impact on domestic politics:

This, therefore, has been the task imposed on England by circumstances [. . .] I find in the existence of two parties separated by denominations that for a long time now no longer represent realities. Today, the Tories and the Whigs have lost all distinctive character and purpose. In Great Britain, as in all other states, there are now only two definable parties: those men devoted to the preservation of the institutions on which the ancient social order rests, and the party of men who work for the fall of these institutions, whether led astray by vain theories or driven by ambitious views or the lure of gain toward wrongdoing.

Finally, he referenced the key turning point in international politics that occurred during Canning's time:

A period marked the end of old England; it is that of Mr Canning's ministry. Thus, my Prince, you will do justice to my foresight, as it was not in hindsight that I pointed out the transition from old to new England; whether it was instinct on Mr Canning's part or sheer circumstance, it remains a fact that between him and me, a man of the old school, the split

302 Esterházy, Neumann to Metternich, London, 8 July 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 234.

was immediate, and it was demonstrated throughout the course of his brief and disastrous administration that any rapprochement between us was impossible.³⁰³

For Palmerston, the July convention represented the notional completion of his second term as Great Britain's Foreign Secretary. He had managed to correct what might be perceived as his failure during the first Eastern Crisis. The issue of revising the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi was one of the central points of his foreign policy. On the other hand, the deteriorating relationship between Britain and France culminated during the Rhine Crisis, and relations between the two countries never returned to what they had been in the 1830s, lasting until the end of Palmerston's time in office. The Quadruple Alliance was not a functional entity, and Anglo-French tensions were evident not only concerning the Ottoman Empire but also in the Mediterranean, with competition over influence on the Italian Peninsula. Palmerston's diplomacy cast a shadow of isolation over British politics. The Second Eastern Crisis was a textbook example of British policy being governed by the Foreign Secretary's opportunistic intentions: Palmerston was able to unite with "hostile" Eastern Powers against Paris for Britain's self-interest. Relations between London and Vienna deteriorated following their apparent cooperation on the Eastern Question. Palmerston considered Metternich's diplomacy so unstable that he could not be trusted. Likewise, the Chancellor was equally sceptical in his dealings with the British Foreign Secretary. He thought that nationalist motives governed foreign policy in London and did not seek cooperation between the Powers. The Foreign Office's priorities were to pursue its interests, hidden beneath the cloak of liberalism, even at the cost of breaching international law or causing detriment to preserving the balance of power in Europe. Even so, he had great expectations about the convention's signature and boasted that "he had not enjoyed such feelings of tranquillity and peace of mind" for a long time.³⁰⁴

Suspicion from the British side towards Russia diminished after the signing of the July Treaty, but it did not disappear entirely. The interests of the two states clashed on an almost global scale, and whenever one issue was temporarily settled, another arose on the horizon. This polarity persisted until the Crimean War. Palmerston officially left his ministerial role on 2 September 1841. This closed the first chapter of his role in high politics, which defined his positions for the rest of his long diplomatic career. For Metternich, this marked a chance to consolidate relations with London and restore cooperation based on traditional friendship.

303 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 July 1841, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 236.

304 ŠEDIVÝ, Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question, p. 970.

9 Conclusion

The end of the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War marked the conclusion of an entire decade of international relations, characterised by a bipolar division of Europe. A decade in which Palmerston played an essential role as Britain's Foreign Secretary. For Metternich, it was a period of unwelcome changes in which his influence within international politics waned. Although the Habsburg Monarchy was in a clearly weak position, it could still pursue its main diplomatic objectives: preserving general peace, securing a stable empire, and maintaining the traditional order in Europe. In contrast to Austria, Great Britain was a world Power in the true sense of the word. Its objectives were reflected in its economic and trading activities worldwide.

Palmerston's foreign policy was characterised by a series of contradictions throughout his tenure. While he often adhered to a policy of non-intervention, he was not afraid to use Britain's powerful navy to achieve political goals, even in the face of strong opposition from both Parliament and the government. He also held conflicting stances in relation to other Powers and surrounding states. By initiating the Quadruple Alliance, he aimed to create a coalition to counter the more unified and coherent cooperation of the three Eastern courts. Yet, the alliance of liberal states suffered from significant divisions from the very beginning. This was further complicated by the fact that two of the signatory states were in the midst of civil wars, leaving their domestic politics either unstable or deeply fractured. For Palmerston, this situation presented several opportunities: firstly, to assert British influence in individual states through a "protective policy" that supported political factions favourable to Britain; secondly, to control and manipulate French foreign policy and influence in the region. On the other hand, he sought to use this alliance to engage more directly with the union of conservative courts. In this context, Russia played a key role, particularly through the Eastern Question. British policy, which had failed in 1833, was to be compensated by a more forceful and aggressive approach in the late 1830s. This required Palmerston to appoint "hawks" to ambassadorial positions in Constantinople.

In this regard, it is essential to challenge historical narratives that attempt to portray the British Foreign Secretary as merely a puppet of his diplomats, absolving him of responsibility for his assertive, even aggressive, policies. For London, Russia was not only a threat to the balance of power but also the main rival in the struggle for dominance on the Continent. This conflict was not confined to the 1830s but was part of a long-term rivalry that ultimately culminated in the Crimean War. The difference lay in the political approaches of individual British Foreign Secretaries and governments towards St Petersburg. Palmerston viewed

Russia as a genuine threat to British interests and the only Power capable of challenging London.

Tensions between Great Britain and Austria had been growing since the 1830s. Palmerston did not see Austria as a suitable partner and believed their differences of opinion were insurmountable. The first signs of distrust surfaced during the Belgian Revolution when consensus among the Powers was necessary, without which the birth of a new state would have been impossible. The question of establishing an independent Belgium dominated Palmerston's politics during the first three years of his term. Discussions and conflicts at the London conference also influenced other European issues, such as the crisis in the Italian states, the November Uprising in Poland, and unrest within the German Confederation. These events worsened the international climate, eventually dividing Europe into liberal and conservative blocs.

This bipolarity stemmed from competition for influence on the Continent. Through his actions, Palmerston disrupted the Vienna Order, prioritising British interests over the stability of Europe. Great Britain abandoned its policy of international cooperation to secure France's assistance in Belgium. As a result, it was also willing to overlook breaches of international law on the Italian Peninsula. At the same time, rivalry with conservative Powers during negotiations in London pushed Palmerston to publicly support liberals in Eastern Europe.

Another determining factor of British foreign policy was public sentiment within Britain. During the first half of the 1830s, the Whig cabinet endeavoured to achieve maximum support from potential liberal voters and, as such, sought to meet their desires. The cabinet in London was in a permanent crisis, with the issue of electoral reform coming to the fore during this complicated period. From a British perspective, events abroad were a backdrop to domestic political problems. Pursuing constitutionalism on the European Continent served as a form of propaganda that garnered public support in Britain. The endeavour to support liberals in Britain and elsewhere in Europe along with geopolitical interests, simultaneously led Palmerston to cooperate with France and set up the Quadruple Alliance. Both these actions were primarily the pragmatic consequences of the Whig government's needs at home and abroad. At the same time, it is important to reject an exaggerated emphasis on Palmerston's ideological convictions as the primary source of his "liberal" politics during this period.

Austria, although geopolitically a suitable partner, was not considered an ideal candidate for cooperation with London from a political and pragmatic standpoint. This reality was evident during the Greek War of Independence and continued through the revolutions in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy. The political essence of Metternich's and Palmerston's approaches differed fundamentally. Metternich advocated for firm and unchanging

principles based on the balance of power, the suppression of revolutions, and the preservation of a stable, conservative order, which he deemed essential for maintaining peace in Europe. These principles were crucial for Austria's prosperity and its position as a Great Power. Metternich's policy can, therefore, be seen as straightforward and protective, but with a noble political undercurrent. In contrast, Palmerston was unafraid to pursue a more pragmatic and realistic policy aimed at weakening the influence of individual Powers, with the goal of disrupting their positions across Europe and undermining their mutual cooperation. This approach was evident in matters such as the occupation of Ancona, the situation in Poland, and, most notably, the Eastern Question.

Initially, the Austrian Chancellor perceived the London Conference as the beginning of restoring the cooperation of 1815–1822. He changed his mind in 1832, expressing disappointment over its course. During this time, Palmerston began implementing his “liberal” politics, which resonated east of the Rhine. The result was Metternich's counteraction on the Iberian Peninsula and the help given to Dom Miguel and Don Carlos, fulfilling the idea of legitimacy from an ideological perspective. This period was also characterised by deepening cooperation between London and Paris, which affirmed the Ballhausplatz in its assumption that Great Britain was ignoring the legacy of 1815 in pursuing its interests. Münchengrätz was, then, also a natural response to the formation of a Western European bloc. The alliance of the three Eastern courts stood on much firmer foundations compared to the Quadruple Alliance. While differences in the ambitions of London and Paris were evident from the very outset of the treaty's existence and were demonstrated fully during the Second Eastern Crisis, Metternich trusted Nicholas I's policies. Despite certain disagreements, Prussia also stood firmly at Austria's side.

In this regard, it can be said that the deeper the disputes between Great Britain and France became, the more London leaned towards cooperation with Vienna. The main problem, though, was the British Foreign Secretary's distrust of Metternich and his hostility towards him, primarily based on their differing political approaches. Palmerston was well aware that Great Britain could not achieve dominance on the Continent by relying solely on its own power, isolated and without alliances with other continental Powers. Therefore, in the mid-1830s, during the initial deteriorating stage of cooperation between France and Great Britain, London sought to draw closer to Austria. The goal was not a genuine consolidation of relations, but rather the creation of a natural counterbalance to France, whose foreign policy objectives did not always align with Britain's.

During the deteriorating Anglo-Russian relations in the second half of the 1830s, this possibility was also discussed in London, but it once again faltered due to Palmerston's aversion to the Austrian Chancellor. On the other hand, Metter-

nich himself did not want to weaken Austrian-Russian cooperation. For him, it represented a guarantee of the existing order and firm political stances. These tendencies were particularly evident in the later phases of the Iberian question and, subsequently, during the Second Eastern Crisis. Metternich not only saw British policy as insincere but also as directly conflicting with his vision and a threat to the balance of power. His firm political stance was demonstrated by his participation in cooperation during the Second Ottoman-Egyptian War, as he recognised that this collaboration would yield the expected political results and contribute to maintaining peace in Europe. He was also aware that British diplomacy posed a greater threat than the traditionally feared Russia. In his eyes, the unpredictability of Palmerston's policies made Britain an unreliable partner. Even so, he was not opposed to mutual cooperation, provided that London could clearly declare its own goals that aligned with Austria's vision. Thus, his policy was shaped by addressing individual problems while keeping the long-term goal of maintaining peace and prosperity in Europe in mind.

From 1837, Britain's diplomatic interests again shifted from Western Europe to the Near East. London's oriental policy was typically marked by rivalry with St Petersburg over spheres of influence in Afghanistan, Persia, and the Caucasus. By the end of the 1830s, Great Britain was active in China, where it waged the First Opium War. The Ottoman Empire's existence was a guarantee for British trade and allowed the use of commercial routes for goods moving further east. General peace and the balance of power in Europe also depended on the continuation of the Sultan's empire. When Sultan's army was defeated during the First Eastern Crisis of 1831–1833, leading to the signing of the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi, this signalled a weakening of Britain's position in the Bosphorus and beyond. From Metternich's point of view, there was nothing objectionable in the Russo-Ottoman alliance. If St Petersburg guaranteed Constantinople its empire's integrity and offered armed assistance to the Sultan, then this also meant the balance of power could be preserved in Europe. The Austrian Chancellor trusted St Petersburg and believed in its peaceful intentions. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary saw the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi as a tool to ensure Russian control of the Straits and the establishment of a protectorate in the Ottoman Empire. The consequences of this first conflict between Muhammad Ali and Mahmud II were reflected in British society, igniting a wave of Russophobia, which had major political repercussions, influencing Great Britain's foreign policy.

The imminent second conflict between the Sultan and his Egyptian vassal allowed Palmerston to look again at the circumstances in the Near East. The British Foreign Secretary's most significant concern was the possibility of Franco-Russian cooperation, which would threaten London's international status. Muhammad Ali's Egyptian domain viewed Paris as a role model, and France's politicians wel-

came the opportunity to expand their influence in North Africa through Alexandria. Four years after the signing of the Quadruple Alliance, the Anglo-French *entente* definitely ended. London's representative in Vienna, Frederick Lamb, recommended to Palmerston that under the prevailing circumstances, he should reassess his position on Austria and begin active cooperation with the country. Despite this, his proposal fell on deaf ears and was rejected by the Foreign Secretary. Nor did his stance change during the unfolding crisis in 1839. Metternich attempted to convince the government in London of Austria's clear and firm foreign policy intentions. Besides the Ottoman Empire, the common denominator was concern over France and its pro-war pronouncements, which escalated during the Rhine Crisis. In hindsight, it turned out to be a brief instance of cooperation, which faded away again during 1841.

The rivalry between the two men was also reflected in their differing views on where the main centre of European diplomacy should be. Metternich considered Vienna a strategic venue for holding international talks. He wanted to turn the city on the Danube into a venue for holding conferences focused on the latest foreign problems of the period. The British Foreign Secretary was firmly convinced of London's fundamental role. The capital became a centre of discussions concerning Greece and Belgium. During Palmerston's period as Foreign Secretary, London played a crucial role in foreign policy matters, taking the notional baton from Vienna in this regard. This enabled Palmerston to control diplomatic events and influence diplomatic discussions. During this period, London became the epicentre of international politics, attracting both liberal and conservative leaders from across Europe. Even Metternich himself would later find refuge in the city on the Thames.

During the second phase of the Eastern crisis, Austria's Chancellor proposed that Vienna should be the centre of gravity for subsequent diplomatic negotiations. Despite the alliance with St Petersburg, Nicholas I did not support this plan, promoting London instead. This was a blow to Metternich's desire to restore the shine to the Austrian capital it had enjoyed in 1814–1815. Differences were also seen in the purpose behind the conference. The Foreign Secretary saw holding negotiations domestically as a tool to pursue Britain's national interests and, in particular, a means to control tense British-French relations. For the Austrian Chancellor, the objective of discussions was to find a true *entente* between the Powers, as he was aware that all members of the Concert of Europe had the same interests.

Another conflict between them played out in their differing interpretation of the law. For Metternich, international law was paramount, and it was what Austria's foreign policy was based upon. In contrast, Palmerston bent the law to his advantage. From this perspective, the disagreements between liberalism and con-

servatism played a secondary role. One way these arguments were reflected was in relation to the King of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, William I, with Metternich unambiguously supporting him as the legitimate monarch fighting against revolutionaries. Similarly, this was the case in the Sultan's struggle with his governor and in the civil wars in Spain and Portugal. In all of these cases, the Austrian Chancellor stood on the side of the law as the basis for battling chaos and revolution. In contrast, the Foreign Secretary adapted international law to fit Great Britain's national policy and, on principle, opportunistically ignored the legal principles of Europe's state system. Examples include the occupation of Ancona discussed previously and the Russo-Ottoman treaty of 1833. In this way, Palmerston sacrificed the diplomatic legacy of 1815 to British foreign policy profits.

For Palmerston, the Habsburg Monarchy was a potential partner and rival. Several factors led Palmerston to consider Metternich, his opponent in the political climate of the 1830s. According to the Foreign Secretary, Vienna would be a much better partner for London if its conservative government transformed itself and took on a liberal system similar to Britain's. There were several good opportunities for establishing Anglo-Austrian cooperation during Palmerston's era, such as the necessity of containing France and cooperation regarding the Near East. Still, there was a fundamental difference in ideological opinion, and in the Foreign Secretary's eyes, this made Vienna an unreliable partner. From 1815, Metternich did not waver from his ideals, which he considered correct and beneficial for Austria and outside of Austria. He could not grasp why Palmerston did not want to understand his positions based on Austria's international position and on which its very existence was dependent. Of prime importance was maintaining a balance of power and general peace, which could guarantee prosperity for Austria and the whole of Europe.

10 Summary

The aim of the present book is to analyse Viscount Palmerston's international policy in relation to Austria in the years 1830–1841. The topic is defined by the Foreign Secretary's tenure, including the hiatus of 1834–1835. The main focus of this work is placed on the primary participation of insular diplomacy in Europe within the period of the outbreak of the July Revolution, the dissolution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, the November Uprising, events in the German Confederation and the Papal States, civil wars in Portugal and Spain, and the Second Near Eastern Crisis. A distinctive feature of these matters is the clash between Palmerston and Metternich. In the 1830s, both men were the leading figures of European foreign relations and, at the same time, symbols of two different political streams. The aim of the present work is to revise the “traditional” view of Palmerston – a progressive statesman who defends the freedom of European liberalism – and Metternich – a reactionary opponent to social modernisation. The text emphasises the Foreign Secretary's policy motives that are grounded in the promotion of national interests at the expense of the Great Powers' cooperation and the efforts of the Austrian Chancellor for the best possible relations within the Concert of Europe that were perceived as essential for the prosperity of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The presented text was prepared based on primary sources of a diplomatic nature. Documents from The National Archives in London were the primary source of the texts, especially the correspondence between Palmerston and the British Embassy in Vienna, which was represented by Frederick Lamb (later known as The Lord Beauvale). Furthermore, in connection with European issues, correspondence between the British Foreign Office and individual key players of the analysed period, such as the British Embassy in Constantinople, St Petersburg, Paris, Frankfurt, Madrid, and Lisbon, was used. As for the Austrian side's point of view, it was necessary to explore the archives stored in the Austrian State Archives, in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv section in Vienna, mainly the documents between Metternich and the Austrian Embassy in London, represented by Paul Anton Esterházy, Phillip von Neumann, Johann von Wessenberg, and Karl von Hummelauer. Furthermore, writings between Vienna and Constantinople, Paris, and St Petersburg were used to complete the picture of the period in question.

Palmerston's inauguration was strongly influenced by the July events in France. The first issue he had to tackle was a revolution in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. Contributing to the emergence of an independent Belgium was a key concern for Great Britain, as it represented a security barrier and played an

important economic role due to its geopolitical position. Initially, the British Prime Minister pursued cooperation on a Great Powers basis; that is why he insisted that the London conference – whose task was to find a solution to the aforementioned problem – continue. He was faced with Metternich's resistance, who demanded adherence to international law, which stated that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands' king was a legitimate ruler fighting against the revolution. The discrepancy of opinion escalated in 1832; there was an open dispute between the two diplomats and a gradual disintegration of the Great Powers' unity caused by several events. The November uprising following the Belgian Revolution sparked the flame of the British-Russian struggle, which lasted for a decade in the 1830s. Rather than being ideologically driven, Palmerston's support for the Polish revolutionaries was determined by a desire to satisfy the British public in an effort to gain political points and potential voters. The internal political problems related to electoral reform also resonated in the foreign policy strategy. For this reason, the façade of support for liberalism and political freedoms concealed a cold British calculation of how to ensure its Great Power status. Alongside Russia and Prussia, Austria represented the opposition to these ideas. They were perceived as backward and despotic Powers whose common goal was to repress and restrict freedom in Europe.

Diplomacy in Vienna was driven by different motives. The internal problems of the Habsburg Monarchy were also reflected in progress on international issues, and therefore, the stability, peace, and prosperity of the Empire depended on European cooperation and universal peace. In order to achieve these intentions, international law and legitimism were adhered to. Metternich also encountered a lack of understanding from the British side, not only in the German Confederation but especially on the Apennine Peninsula in connection with the uprising in the Papal States. Together, London and Vienna strove for the adoption of reforms in order to strike a balance in central Italy. Palmerston's distrust of Metternich caused the collapse of these ambitions and deepened the gap between the two nations even further. Throughout the period, the Austrian Chancellor sought to reform the ecclesiastical state and was aware that adopting new laws was essential for the stability of the Holy See. Palmerston's tacit consent to the violation of European state law in connection with the French occupation of Ancona was yet another issue that harmed British-Austrian relations. London was willing to sacrifice international guarantees and disrupt the European balance of power in exchange for its national interests. For the government in Britain, cooperation with Paris was considered superior to the traditional concept of the Concert of Europe. Through such cooperation, France could both be kept in check and, at the same time, serve as a tool to promote British policy.

The limits of Palmerston's strategy became apparent during the First Near Eastern Crisis of 1831–1833. Excessive focus on Western European affairs caused a lack of diplomatic flexibility in the East. Not only did the government in London respond late to the developments in the Ottoman Empire, but it also did not have adequate opportunities to help Constantinople ensure the stability of the Sultan's empire. These errors resulted in the signing of a treaty in Hünkâr Iskelesi between Mahmud II and Nicholas I. The existence of the aforementioned alliance posed no threat to Metternich. It was a document signed between rightful monarchs which, moreover, provided protection for the Ottoman Empire, on whose continuity European stability also depended. From the point of view of international law, it was a struggle between the Sultan and his subjects. Palmerston saw the treaty as a way for Russia to spread its influence over the Bosphorus with the ultimate goal of controlling Constantinople. These odd ideas, fed by the British public, triggered a wave of Russophobia, the consequences of which were reflected not only in Europe and the Middle East, but also in faraway Asia.

The crisis in the East completed the Continent's bipolar division into a liberal and conservative part. The British desire for cordial relations with France and the subsequent deepening of cooperation on the Iberian Peninsula forced Austria, Russia, and Prussia to cooperate more closely; the cooperation resulted in a meeting in Münchengrätz, followed by one in Berlin. The Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal served only as a demonstration of the already distorted cooperation within the Concert of Europe. At the same time, the alliance contained a tool for the government in London to promote its ambitions in Lisbon and Madrid in an effort to secure vital power through military-diplomatic intervention during the ongoing Liberal Wars. For Palmerston, the Western European Union also represented a way to effectively control Paris's foreign policy. Discrepancies between the two countries soon became apparent during the Iberian campaign. Both Great Britain and France favoured their own national interests over Alliance cohesion. The London government promoted the idea of liberalism, but this was, in fact, just a way to conceal the spread of their power. Due to this fact, Palmerston chose to support the conservative representatives of the Spanish government, who were in favour of advice from the British Isles, rather than the more liberal representatives aligned with the French side. On the other hand, Austria fully trusted the Russian advance in the Near East and was convinced of its pure intentions. Despite his efforts to establish friendly relations with Great Britain in the second half of the 1830s, Metternich encountered Palmerston's indifference and persistent mistrust.

The strategy of relying on the French proved to be flawed during the Second Near Eastern Crisis. The Orléans government tried to exert its influence on the Apennine Peninsula, Belgium, and the Pyrenees, as well as in North Africa. Mu-

hammad Ali was seen as an instrument to achieve this ambition, even at the risk of European isolation. However, the Egyptian governor also posed a threat to British objectives in the Near East. The Entente between London and Paris was over, and Palmerston had no choice but to find a new ally. He did not overcome his antipathy towards Metternich, considering cooperation with Austria useful only if it aligned with his ideology. Meanwhile, the Austrian Chancellor continued to seek a common consensus. In order to reach a Great Power consensus, a conference in Vienna to discuss the ongoing Ottoman-Egyptian conflict was proposed. The fact that Russia rejected the proposal was a heavy blow to him, but he did not hesitate to support the idea that London, instead of the Habsburg metropolis, should be the centre of diplomatic talks. The Second Crisis in the Near East represented an opportunity for the Foreign Secretary to revise Britain's shaky influence over the Bosphorus. His goal was to emerge from the situation as a winner and to maximise the benefits, which he managed to some extent. Still, the success of this campaign depended on the sincere commitment of Austria and Russia to peace and stability in Europe.

After the crisis, relations between Palmerston and Metternich were strained again. According to the British Foreign Secretary, Austria was not a Power that had the potential to be a full partner to Great Britain, and the Austrian Chancellor was an unreliable person who longed only to suppress natural social development. He urged the Danubian Monarchy to reform, which he considered the only possible way to achieve mutual power consistency. Vienna, on the other hand, was firm in its ideopolitical views in the 1830s and, instead of enforcing nationalism, strove for a clearly defined and functional cooperation of all Great Powers, subject to respect for international law and legitimacy.

11 Bibliography

11.1 Manuscripts

Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna

- Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, *Staatenabteilungen*, Großbritannien Diplomatische Korrespondenz 189, 190–206, 208–216, 218–225, 228–231, 234–237
- Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, *Staatenabteilungen*, Frankreich 272, 292, 294, 299, 315, 318
- Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, *Staatenabteilungen*, Russland III 115, 116, 120
- Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, *Staatenabteilungen*, Türkei, VI 71, 78, VIII 15, 16

The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London

Foreign Office

- 7 (Austria – Domestic): 223, 233, 253, 255, 257, 296
- 27 (France): 424, 425, 468, 471, 479, 487, 508, 527, 536, 541, 578, 598, 602, 600B, 604–606
- 33 (Germany): 44, 181
- 63 (Portugal): 364, 398, 418, 436
- 64 (Prussia): 181, 204
- 65 (Russia): 187, 199, 206, 207, 231, 234, 237, 358
- 72 (Spain): 390, 419, 481, 500, 509, 510
- 78 (Turkey): 190, 220, 226, 227, 272, 274, 300, 301, 328, 343, 358, 359, 395, 398, 399, 427, 430
- 120 (Austria): 110–114, 116, 119, 124, 125, 136–139, 145, 147, 149, 150, 153, 155, 161, 169, 170, 180, 187, 189, 190, 194, 195, 197
- 352 (Stratford Canning Papers): 25A, 25C, 26C, 61C

11.2 Published Correspondence, Diaries, Memoirs

- ASHLEY, Evelyn (ed.), *The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston*, vol. I, London 1879.
- ANDERSON, Matthew Smith (ed.), *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923*, London 1970.
- Annual Register, or a View of the History, Politics and the Literature for the Years 1831*, London 1832.
- BELL, James Stanislaus, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia During the Years 1837, 1838 and 1839*, London, 1840.
- BENSON, Arthur Christopher Esher (ed.), *The Letters of Queen Victoria. A Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence Between the Years 1837 and 1861*, London 1907.

- BERESFORD, Chancellor (ed.), *The Diary of Philipp von Neumann. 1819–1850*, vol. I, London 1928.
- BOURNE, Kenneth (ed.), *The Letters of the Third Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and Elizabeth Sullivan 1804–1863*, London 1979.
- CONNELL, Brian (ed.), *Regina vs. Palmerston. The Correspondence Between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister 1837–1865*, London 1962.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *Protocols of Conferences of London. Relative to Affairs of Belgium 1830–1831*, London 1832.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers 1830–1831*, vol. XVIII, London 1833.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers 1831–1832*, vol. XIX, London 1834.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers 1832–1833*, vol. XX, London 1836.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant*, vol. I–III, London 1841.
- Great Britain. Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers 1833–1834*, vol. XXII, London 1847.
- GIELGUD, Adam (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski and his Correspondence with Alexander I. With Documents Relative to the Prince's Negotiation with Pitt, Fox, and Brougham, and an Account of his Conversations with Lord Palmerston and other English Statesmen in London in 1832*, London 1888.
- GNOROWSKI, Stanisław, *Insurrection of Poland in 1830–31 and the Russian Rule Preceding it since 1815*, London 1839.
- HANSARD, Thomas Curson (ed.), *The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time*, vol. XXII, London 1834.
- HOLLAND, Thomas Erskine (ed.), *The European Concert in the Eastern Question. A Collection of Treaties and Other Public Acts Edited with Introduction and Notes*, Aalen 1979.
- HONE, William (ed.), *Full Annals of the Revolution in France. 1830*, London 1830.
- LANE-POOLE, Stanley (ed.), *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford de Redcliffe from his Memoirs and Private and Official Papers*, vol. I, London 1888.
- LEVER, Tresham (ed.), *The Letters of Lady Palmerston: Selected and Edited from the Originals, at Broadlands and Elsewhere*, London 1957.
- MARCHANT, Denis (ed.), *Memoir of John Charles Viscount Althorp Third Earl Spencer*, London 1873.
- METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, Richard (ed.), *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, vol. V, London 1882.
- NESSELRODE, Anathole (ed.), *Lettres et papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850*, vol. VII, Paris 1908.
- POORE, Benjamin Perley, *The Rise and Fall of Louis Philippe, Ex-king of the French; Giving a History of the French Revolution, from its Commencement, in 1789*, Boston 1848.
- PROKESCH-OSTEN, Anton Graf von, *Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten. Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich*, Wien 1881.
- STRANGE, Guy Le (ed.), *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*, vol. II, London 1890.
- SOUTHERN, Henry, *The Policy of England Towards Spain. Considered Chiefly with Reference to a Review of the Social and Political State of the Basque Provinces. And a Few Remarks on Recent Events in Spain*, London 1837.
- SUDLEY, Anton Paul George (ed.), *The Lieven-Palmerston Correspondence 1826–1856*, London 1943.
- WELLINGTON, Arthur (ed.), *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington*, vol. VII–VIII, London 1878–1880.

11.3 Online Sources

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/>

11.4 Secondary Sources

- ABBENHUIS, Maartje, *An Age of Neutrals 1815–1914*, Cambridge 2014.
- ALFARO, Alfonso Goizueta, *Forging Liberal States: Palmerston's Foreign Policy and the Rise of a Constitutional Monarchy in Spain, 1833–7*. In: *Historical Research*, Oxford, 94, 2021, 222, s. 828–848.
- ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, René, *A Diplomatic History Since the Congress of Vienna*, London 1958.
- ANDERSON, Matthew Smith, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923*, London 1966.
- ANGELOW, Jürgen, *Von Wien nach Königgrätz. Die Sicherheitspolitik des Deutschen Bundes im europäischen Gleichgewicht (1815–1866)*, München 1996.
- ARBLASTER, Paul, *A History of Low Countries*, Houndmills 2006.
- ARDELEANU, Constantin, *The Lower Danube, Circassia and the Commercial Dimensions of the British-Russian Diplomatic Rivalry in the Black Sea Basin (1836–1837)*. In: BILIARSKY, Ivan, CRISTEA, Ovidiu, OROVEANU, Anca (eds.), *The Balkans and Caucasus Parallel Processes on the Opposite Sides of the Black Sea*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2012, s. 39–56.
- BAKER, R. L., *Palmerston and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi*. In: *English Historical Review* 43, 1928, 169, s. 83–89.
- BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Peace, War and the European Powers 1814–1914*, London 1996.
- BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Great Britain and Sea Power 1815–1853*, Oxford 1963.
- BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Britain and the European Balance. 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, s. 145–163.
- BAUMGART, Winfried, *Europäisches Konzert und Nationale Bewegung. Internationale Beziehungen 1830–1878*, Paderborn 1999.
- BAYER, Heinrich, KHUEPACH, Artur, *Geschichte der k. u. k. Kriegsmarine, II. Teil: Die K. K. Österreichische Kriegsmarine in dem Zeitraum von 1797 bis 1848, III. Band. Geschichte der k. k. Kriegsmarine während der Jahre 1814–1847. Die österreichisch-venezianische Kriegsmarine*, Graz, Köln 1966.
- BEALES, Derek, *From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815–1885*, London 1969.
- BELL, Clifford Francis Herbert, *Lord Palmerston*, vol. I, London 1936.
- BERKELEY, George Fitz-Harding, *Italy in the Making 1815–1846*, Cambridge 1966.
- BERTSCH, Daniel, *Anton Prokesch von Osten 1795–1876. Ein Diplomat Österreichs in Athen und an der Hohen Pforte. Beiträge zur Wahrnehmung des Orients im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts*, München 2005.
- BETLEY, Jan Andrzej, *Belgium and Poland in International Relations 1830–1831*, Mouton 1960.
- BILLINGER, Robert, *The War Scare of 1831 and Prussian-South German Plans*. In: SCHNEID, Frederick (ed.), *European Politics 1815–1848*, Farnham 2011 s. 203–219.
- BILLINGER, Robert, *They Sing the Best Songs Badly. Metternich, Frederick William IV, and the German Confederation during the War Scare of 1840–41*. In: RUMPLER, Helmut (ed.), *Deutscher Bund und deutsche Frage 1815–1866*, München 1990, s. 94–113.
- BINDOFF, Stanley Thomas, SMITH, Malcom, WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1789–1852*, London 1934.

- BITIS, Alexander, *Reserves under Selfdom? Nicolas I's Attempts to Solve the Russian Army's Manpower Crisis of 1831–1832*. In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 51, 2003, 2, s. 185–196.
- BLACKBOURN, David, *History of Germany 1780–1918. The Long Nineteenth Century Second Edition*, Oxford 2003.
- BLANC, Louis, *History of Ten Years*, London 1844.
- BOLSOVER, George Henry, *David Urquhart and the Eastern Question 1833–1837. A Study in Publicity and Diplomacy*. In: *Journals of Modern History* 8, 1936, 4, s. 444–467.
- BOLSOVER, George Henry, *Lord Ponsonby and the Eastern Question 1833–1839*. In: *Slavonic and East European Review* 13, 1934, 94, s. 98–118.
- BOLSOVER, George Henry, *Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question 1834*. In: *English Historical Review* 51, 1936, 202, s. 237–256.
- BOURNE, Kenneth, *Palmerston. The Early Years 1784–1841*, New York 1982.
- BOTZENHART, Manfred, *Reform, Restauration, Krise. Deutschland 1789–1847*, Frankfurt am Main 1985.
- BRIGGS, Asa, *The Age of Improvement*, London 1958.
- BROWN, David, *Lord Palmerston and Parliamentary Representation 1830–1865*. In: 57th Conference of the ICHRP: Representative and Parliamentary Institutions from Middle Age to Present Times 2010, s. 41–53.
- BROWN, David, *Palmerston and Austria*. In: HÖBELT, Lothar (ed.), *A living Anachronism? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy*, *Festschrift für Francis Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag*, Wien 2010, s. 29–48.
- BROWN, David, *Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846–1855*, Southampton 1998.
- BROWN, David, *Compelling but not Controlling? Palmerston and the Press 1846–1855*. In: *The Journal of the Historical Association* 86, 2001, 281, s. 41–61.
- BROWN, David, *Palmerston. A Biography*, London 2010.
- BUCHAN, John, *The Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg*, London 1923.
- BULLEN, Roger, *France and the Problem of Intervention in Spain*. In: *The Historical Journal* 20, 1977, 2, s. 363–393.
- BULLEN, Roger, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale*, London 1974.
- BULLEN, Roger, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, s. 54–78.
- BULWER, Henry Lytton (ed.), *The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. With Selection from His Diaries and Correspondence*, vol. I–II, Leipzig 1871.
- BUNSEN, Frances, *A Memoir of Baron Bunsen*, vol. II, London 1868.
- BURY, John Patrick, *The New Cambridge Modern History. The Zenith of European Power 1830–1870*, vol. X, Cambridge 1960.
- BUSCHKÜHL, Matthias, *Great Britain and the Holy See 1746–1870*, Blackrock 1982.
- CARR, Raymond, *Spain 1808–1939*, Oxford 1966.
- CLAYTON, David Gerard, *Britain and the Eastern Question. Missolonghi to Gallipoli*, London 1971.
- CRAIG, Gordon Alexander, *Geschichte Europas 1815–1980. Vom Wiener Kongreß bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1995.
- COLBY, Charles William, *The Earlier Relations of England and Belgium*. In: *The American Historical Review* 21, 1915, 1, s. 62–72.
- COLLER, Ian, *Hassuna D'Ghies and the "New Ottomanism" of the 1830s*. In: MAURIZIO, Isabella, ZANOÙ, Konstantina (eds.), *Mediterranean Diasporas Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century*, 2016, London, s. 97–116.
- CORY, William, *A Guide to Modern English History*. vol. II, New York 1882.

- CUNNINGHAM, Allan, INGRAM, Edward (eds.), *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*, London 1993.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Muriel Evelyn, *Lord Palmerston*, Cardiff 1987.
- DEMOULIN, Robert, *Guillame Ier et la transformation économique des Provinces Belges*, Liege 1938.
- DIACONU, Eusebiu-Costel, *In the Service of His Majesty: The British Consular Service in Black Sea Ports. Administration and Personnel (1825–1842)*. In: *East European Journal of Diplomatic History*, Bucharest, 9, 2022, s. 7–17.
- DUMONT, Georges-Henry, *Histoire des Belges. Des Origines à la Dislocation des 17 Provinces*, Bruxelles 1954.
- DIPPEL, Horst, *A Nineteenth-Century “Truman Doctrine” avant la lettre? Constitutional Liberty Abroad and the Parliamentary Debate about British Foreign Policy from Castlereagh to Palmerston*. In: GROTKÉ, Kelly (ed.), *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power*, Oxford 2014, s. 23–48.
- DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, Anselm, *Von Wiener Kongress zur Pariser Konferenz. England, die deutsche Frage und das Mächtesystem 1815–1856*, Göttingen 1991.
- DUMONT, Georges-Henry, *Histoire des Belges. Des origines à la dislocation des 17 provinces*, Bruxelles 1954.
- DUNK, von der Hermann, *Der Deutsche Vormärz und Belgien 1830/48*, Main 1966.
- EDWARDS, William, *British Foreign Policy 1815–1933*, London 1934.
- EGERTON, Hugh Edward, *British Foreign Policy in Europe. To the End of the 19th Century*, London 1917.
- ENGEL-JANOSI, Friedrich, *Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz. Essays zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 1830–1945*, Graz 1963.
- FAHRMEIR, Andreas, *Europa zwischen Restauration, Reform und Revolution 1815–1850*, München 2012.
- FLORESCU, Radu, *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities 1821–1854*, Monachii 1962.
- FORTESCUE, William, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in France 1815–1852*, Oxford 1988.
- GEFFCKEN, Friedrich Heinrich, *The British Empire. With Essays on Prince Albert, Lord Palmerston, Lord Beaconsfield, Mr. Gladstone, and Reform of the House of Lords*, London 1889.
- GILDEA, Robert, *Barricades and Borders. Europe 1800–1914*, Oxford 2003.
- GLEASON, John Howes, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain*, Cambridge 2003.
- GRANT, Arthur James, TEMPERLEY, Harold, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century 1789–1914*, London 1947.
- GRIMSTED, Patricia Kennedy, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I. Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy 1801–1825*, Berkeley 1969.
- GRUNER, Wolf, *Der Deutsche Bund 1815–1866*, München 1992.
- GRUNER, Wolf, Dietrich, *Metternich, Palmerston, the German Confederation, and Europe – 1830–1834: Ideology and National Interest*. In: *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire / Romanian Journal of History* 1, 2022, 4, s. 13–56.
- GUEDALLA, Philip, *Palmerston*, London 1926.
- HAHN, Henning Hans, *Außenpolitik in der Emigration. Die Exildiplomatie Adam Jerzy Czartoryskis 1830–1840*, Oldenburg 1978.
- HALES, Edward Elton Young, *Revolution and Papacy 1769–1846*, London 1960.
- HALL, John Major, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, London 1912.
- HARRIS, Robin, *Talleyrand. Betrayer and Saviour of France*, London 2007.
- HELMREICH, Jonathan, *Belgium and Europe. A Study in Small Power Diplomacy*, The Hague 1976.
- HERRE, Franz, *Metternich*, Praha 1996.
- HOBBSAWN, Eric John Ernest, *The Age of Revolution Europe 1789–1848*, London 1962.
- HOFFMAN, Fritz, *Metternich and the July Revolution*. In: SCHNEID, Frederick (ed.), *European Politics 1815–1848*, Farnham 2011, s. 143–154.

- HOLBRAAD, Carsten, *The Concert of Europe. A Study in German and British International Theory 1815–1914*, London 1970.
- HOLLAND, Thomas Erskine, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, Oxford 1885.
- HULICIUS, Eduard, *Belgie*. Praha 2006.
- CHALUPA, Jiří, *Don Carlos a ti druzí. Karlistické války ve Španělsku v letech 1833–1939*, Praha 2008.
- CHAMBERLAIN, Muriel Evelyn, *Lord Palmerston*, London 1988.
- CHURCH, Clive, *Europe in 1830. Revolution and Political Change*, London 1983.
- INGLE, Harold, *Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain 1836–1844*, Berkeley 1976.
- INGRAM, Edward, *The British Empire as a World Power*, London 2001.
- ENGEL-JANOSI, Friedrich, *Geschichte auf dem Ballhausplatz. Essays zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 1830–1945*, Graz 1963.
- JELAVICH, Barbara, *Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State 1821–1878*, Cambridge 1984.
- JELAVICH, Barbara, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs. 1814–1918*, Chicago 1969.
- JONES, Raymond, *The British Diplomatic Service 1815–1914*, Waterloo 1983.
- JUDD, Denis, *The Victorian Empire*, London 1970.
- JUDD, Denis, *Palmerston*, London 1975.
- KANTOR, Wera, *Karl Ludwig Graf Ficquelmont. Ein Lebensbild mit besonderer Rücksicht auf seine diplomatische Mitarbeit bei Metternich*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1948.
- KARPEYEV, Igor, *Russia and Turkey: From Geopolitical Rivalry to Co-Operation*. In: ÇIÇEK, Kemal (ed.), *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Ankara 2000, s. 433–440.
- KING, Charles, *Imagining Circassia. David Urquhart and the Making of North Caucasus Nationalism*. In: *The Russian Review. An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present* 66, 1952, 2, s. 238–255.
- KRAUS, Karl, *Politisches Gleichgewicht und Europagedanke bei Metternich*, Frankfurt am Main 1993.
- LACHMAYER, Katharina, *Mehmed Ali und Österreich*, nevydaná disertační práce, Wien 1952.
- LAWRENCE, Mark, *Spain's First Carlist War 1833–1840*, Basingstoke 2014.
- LENHERR, Luzius, *Ultimatum an die Schweiz. Der politische Druck Metternich auf die Eidgenossenschaft infolge ihrer Asylpolitik in der Regeneration 1833–1836*, Bern 1991.
- LEVANDIS, John, *The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers 1821–1898*, New York 1944.
- LINCOLN, Bruce William, *Nicholas I. Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias*, London 1978.
- LINGELBACH, Erza William, *Belgian Neutrality. Its Origin and Interpretation*. In: *The American Historical Review* 39, 1933, 1, s. 48–72.
- MACAULEY, Neill, *Dom Pedro. The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal 1789–1834*, Durham 1986.
- MACMILLAN, John, *Historicising Intervention: Strategy and Synchronicity in British Intervention 1815–50*. In: *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge, 39, 2013, 5, s. 1108.
- MARCOWITZ, Reiner, *Großmacht auf Bewährung. Die Interdependenz französischer Innen- und Außenpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf Frankreichs Stellung im europäischen Konzert 1814/15–1851/52*, Stuttgart 2001.
- MARRIOTT, John Arthur Ransome, *The Eastern Question. An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, Oxford 1917.
- MARTENS, Friedrich, *Die Russische Politik in der Orientalischen Frage*, St. Petersburg 1877.
- MELACON, Glenn, *Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839–1840*, In: *The International History Review*, London, 21, 1999, s. 855–874.
- MCGREGOR, Robert George, *Lord Palmerston and British Anti-Slavery, 1830–1865*, unpublished dissertation, Southampton, 2019.

- MIDDLETON, Alex, *Conservative Politics and Whig Colonial Government, 1830–41*. In: Historical Research, Oxford, 94, 2021, 265, s. 522–553.
- MIDDLETON, Charles R., *Palmerston, Ponsonby and Mehmet Ali. Some Observation on Ambassadorial Independence in the East 1838–1840*. In: East European Quarterly, Boulder, 15, 1982, s. 409–424.
- MILES, Taylor, *Empire and Parliamentary reform. The 1832 Reform Act Revisited*. In: BURNS, Arthur, INNES, Joanna (eds.), *Rethinking the Age of Reform. Britain 1780–1850*, Cambridge 2003, s. 295–311.
- MILTON-SMITH, John, *Earl Grey's Cabinet and the Object of Parliamentary Reform*. In: The Historical Journal 15, 1972, 1, s. 55–74.
- MOLDEN, Ernst, *Die Orientpolitik des Fürsten Metternich 1829–1833*, Wien 1913.
- MORGAN, Gerald, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia. 1810–1895*, London 1981.
- MOSELY, Philip Edward, *Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839*, Cambridge 1934.
- MOWAT, Robert, *A History of European Diplomacy 1815–1914*, New York 1931.
- MÜLLER, Jürgen, *Der Deutsche Bund 1815–1866*, München 2006.
- NAVRÁTILOVÁ, Hana, MÍŠEK, Roman, *Prokesch von Osten, Austrian Envoy and Traveller in Orient*. In: Archiv Orientální. Quarterly Journal of African and Asian Studies 70, 2002, 1, s. 43–55.
- NEW, Chester William, *Lord Durham*, Oxford 1929.
- NIELSEN, Fredrik, *The History of Papacy in the XIXth Century*, London 1906.
- NICOLSON, Harold, *The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity*, London 1946.
- OROVANU, Anca, *The Lower Danube, Circassia and the Commercial Dimensions of the British-Russian Diplomatic Rivalry*. In: BILIARSKY, Ivan (ed.), *The Balkans and Caucasus Parallel Processes on the Opposite Sides of the Black Sea*, Newcastle upon Tyne 2012, s. 39–56.
- OTTE, Thomas, *A Janus-like Power. Great Britain and the European Concert*, In: PYTA, Wolfram (ed.), *Das europäische Mächtekoncert: Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Wiener Kongress 1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853*, Köln 2009, s. 125–154.
- PALMER, Alan Warwick, *Metternich. Councillor of Europe*, London 1972.
- PARRY, Jonathan, *The Politics of Patriotism. English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe 1830–1866*, Cambridge 2006.
- PÁSZTOROVÁ, Barbora, *Metternich a německá otázka v letech 1840–1848*, Plzeň 2019.
- PÁSZTOROVÁ, Barbora, *Vliv červencové revoluce ve Francii na německý nacionalismus*. In: Historický obzor 28, 2017, č. 3/4, s. 50–59.
- PAVLOWITCH, Stevan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia 1837–1839*, Paris 1961.
- PAWELKA, Hedwig, *Englisch-Österreichische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Ankara 2011.
- PESENDORFER, Franz, *Eiserne Krone und Doppeladler. Lombardo-Venetien 1814–1866*, Wien 1992.
- PINKNEY, David, *The French Revolution of 1830*, Princeton 1972.
- PRIESTLEY, Herbert Ingram, *France Overseas. A Study of Modern Imperialism*, New York 1938.
- PRICE, Munro, *The Perilous Crown. France between Revolutions 1814–1848*, Oxford 2007.
- PROTHERO, George Walter, *Question of the Scheldt*, London 1920.
- PURYEAR, Vernon John, *England, Russia, and the Straits Question 1844–1856*, Berkeley 1931.
- RAYMOND, Jones, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1815–1914*, Waterloo 1983.
- REINERMAN, Alan J., *An Unnatural "Natural Alliance." Metternich, Palmerston and the Reform of the Papal States 1831–1832*. In: *The International History Review* 10, 1988, 4, s. 541–558.
- REINERMAN, Alan J., *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Between Conflict and Cooperation, 1809–1830*, vol. I, Washington 1979.

- REINERMAN, Alan J., *Austria and the Papacy in the Age of Metternich. Revolution and Reaction, 1830–1848*, vol. II, Washington 1989.
- REINERMAN, Alan J., *Metternich and the Papal Condemnation of the Carbonari, 1821*. In: *The Catholic Historical Review* 54, 1968, 1, s. 55–69.
- REINERMAN, Alan J., *Metternich, the Powers and the 1831 Italian Crisis*. In: *Central European History* 10, 1977, 4, s. 206–219.
- RENDALL, Matthew, *A Qualified Success for Collective Security. The Concert of Europe and the Belgian Crisis 1831*. In: *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18, 2007, 2, s. 271–295.
- RENDALL, Matthew, *Cosmopolitanism and Russian Near East Policy, 1821–1841*. In: PYTA, Wolfram (ed.), *Das europäische Mächtekoncert. Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik vom Wiener Kongress 1815 bis zum Krimkrieg 1853*, Wien 2009, s. 237–255.
- RENDALL, Matthew, *Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia. Nicholas I. the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the Vienna System 1832–1841*. In: *The International History Review* 24, 2002, 1, s. 37–63.
- RIEBEN, Hans, *Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie in Metternichs Europapolitik 1815–1848*, Aarau 1942.
- RIDLEY, Jasper Godwin, *Lord Palmerston*, London 1970.
- RICH, Norman, *Great Power Diplomacy 1814–1914*, New York 1992.
- RICHARDSON, James L., *Crisis Diplomacy. The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge 1994.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Anglo-Russian Negotiations about a “Permanent” Quadruple Alliance 1840–1841*. In: *The American Historical Review* 36, 1931, 2, s. 343–349.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Colonel Campbell’s Report on Egypt in 1840 with Lord Palmerston’s Comments*. In: *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 3, 1929, 1, s. 102–114.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Conversation on Anglo-Russian Relations in 1838*. In: *The English Historical Review* 50, 1935, 197, s. 120–123.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830–1841*, In: *The Journal of Modern History* 2, 1930, 2, s. 193–225.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832–1841*, Urbana 1923.
- RODKEY, Frederick Stanley, *The Views of Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question in 1834*. In: *The English Historical Review* 45, 1930, 180, s. 627–640.
- ROHL, Eva-Renate, *Metternich und England: Studien zum Urteil des Staatskanzlers über eine konstitutionelle Monarchie*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1973.
- SATTLER, Gertrude, *Lord Palmerston und Österreich*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1949.
- SAUER, Manfred, *Österreich und die Levante 1814–1838*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1971.
- SAUVIGNY, Guillaumed Bertier de, *Metternich*, Paris 1986.
- SEAMAN, Lewis, *From Vienna to Versailles*, London 1955.
- SETON-WATSON, Hugh, *The Russian Empire 1801–1917*, Oxford 1967.
- SETON-WATSON, Robert William, *Britain in Europe 1789–1914*, Cambridge 1937.
- SEWARD, Desmond, *Metternich. Der erste Europäer*, Zürich 1993.
- SHAW, Stanford, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge 1967.
- SCHÄFER, Gerhard, *Die frühe Burschenschaftsbewegung*. In: HEITHER, Dietrich (ed.), *Blut und Paukboden. Eine Geschichte der Burschenschaften*, Frankfurt am Main 1997, s. 14–53.
- SCHELTEMA, Johann Friedrich, *Holland and Belgium*. In: *The North American Review* 210, 1919, s. 769–777.
- SCHIEMANN, Theodor, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus. Im Kampf mit Polen und im Gegensatz zu Frankreich und England 1830–1840*, Band III, Berlin 1913.

- SCHIEHMANN, Theodor, *Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus. Vom Höhenpunkt seiner Macht bis zum Zusammenbruch im Krimkriege 1840–1855*, Band IV, Berlin 1914.
- SCHOLL, Heinrich von, *Geschichte des Krieges 1840–41*, Wien 1866.
- SCHROEDER, Paul, *Systems, Stability, Statecraft*, New York 2004.
- SCHROEDER, Paul, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*, Oxford 1994.
- SCHULZ, Matthias, *Normen und Praxis. Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat 1815–1860*, München 2009.
- SCHULZE, Hagen, *Der Weg zum Nationalstaat. Die deutsche Nationalbewegung vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Reichsgründung*, München 1997.
- SIEMANN, Wolfram, *Metternich's Britain*. In: GESTRICH, Andreas (ed.), German Historical Institute. The 2011 Annual Lecture, London 2012, s. 1–45.
- SIEMANN, Wolfram, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär. Eine Biografie*, München 2016.
- SIMMS, Brendan, RIOTTE, Torsten, *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History 1714–1837*, Cambridge 2010.
- SKED, Alan, *The Metternich System 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, s. 98–121.
- SKED, Alan, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation*, Basingstoke 2007.
- SKED, Alan, *Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918*, London 2001.
- SLUGA, Glenda, *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics, before and after the Congress of Vienna*. In: SLUGA, Glenda, JAMES, Carolyn (eds.), *Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 1500*, New York, 2016, s. 115–130.
- SMITH, Denis Mack, *The Making of Italy 1796–1870*, New York 1968.
- SOUTHGATE, Donald, *The Most English Minister . . . The Policies on Politics of Palmerston*, London 1966.
- SRBIK, Heinrich Ritter von, *Metternich. Der Staatsmann und der Mensch*, Band II, München 1925.
- SRBIK, Heinrich Ritter von, *Statesman of Philosophical Principles*. In: KRAEHE, Enno E. (ed.), *The Metternich Controversy*, New York, Chicago, San Francisco, s. 33–47.
- STAHL, Andrea, *Metternich und Wellington. Eine Beziehungsgeschichte*, München 2013.
- SUCHÁNEK, Drahomír, *Právo exkluzivity při papežských volbách*, Praha 2012.
- SUTERMEISTER, Werner, *Metternich und die Schweiz 1840–1848*, published dissertation, Bern 1895.
- SUBAŞI, Turgut, *British Support for Mustafa Resid Pasha and his Reforms*. In: ÇIÇEK, Kemal (ed.), *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilisation. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Ankara 2000, s. 427–432.
- SVOBODA, Karel, *Autokrat a jeho doba. Rusko a revoluce v letech 1830–1831*, Praha 2016.
- SWEET, Paul Robinson, *Friedrich von Gentz. Defender of the Old Order*, Madison 1941.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Anton Prokesch von Osten: The Co-author of Austria's Policy towards Egypt in Vormärz*. In: Acta Fakulty filozofické Západočeské univerzity v Plzni 2013, 2, s. 37–48.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Britsko-neapolská válka o síru z roku 1840 a její evropská dimenze*. In: Historica Olomoucensia 50, 2016, s. 87–103.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Crisis Among the Great Powers. The Concert of Europe and the Eastern Question*, London 2017.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Francouzská okupace Ancony (1832) a její ohlas v Evropě*. In: Moderní dějiny 24, 2016, 2, s. 73–95.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Italy in the European States System of the Pre-March Period: Some Reflections*. In: West Bohemian Historical Review 5, 2015, 2, s. 75–90.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich a idea konference ve Vídni v roce 1839*. In: Historický obzor 12, 2005, 3/4, s. 80–87.

- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich and the Syrian Question. 1840–1841*. In: Austrian History Yearbook 41, 2010, s. 88–116.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich a Turecko*. In: Historický Obzor 11, 2004, 9/10, s. 194–206.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, Plzeň 2013.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Rakousko a Východní otázka 1829–1841*, unpublished dissertation, Praha 2008.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *The Decline of The Congress System. Metternich, Italy and European Diplomacy*, London 2018.
- ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Zrod německého nacionalismu*, Plzeň 2013.
- ŠTERMENSKI, Jelena Paunović, *David Urquhart. The First British Diplomat in Serbia*, Belgrade 2014.
- ŠUSTA, Josef, *Dějiny Evropy v letech 1812–1870*, vol. I, Praha 1922.
- TEMPERLEY, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827. England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World*, London 1966.
- THAYER, William Roscoe, *The Dawn of Italian Independence. Italy from the Congress of Vienna, 1814, to the Fall of Venice, 1849*, vol. I, Cambridge 1892.
- TODOROVA, Maria, *Aspects of the Eastern Question*. In: TODOROVA, Maria (ed.), Essays from the First Bulgarian-Dutch Symposium of Historians. Sofia 6–7. June 1984, Sofia 1984, s. 23–31.
- TODOROVA, Maria, *British and Russian Policy towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire*. In: Études Balkaniques, Paris, 13, 1977, s. 17–41.
- TREVELYAN, George Macaulay, *Lord Grey of the Reform Bill. Being the Life of Charles, Second Earl Grey*, London, New York, Toronto 1929.
- TROLLOPE, Anthony, *Lord Palmerston*, London 1882.
- TULASOĞLU, Gülay, *Ein Muslimischer Pascha im Zentrum der Orientalischen Frage: Muhammed Ali von Ägypten*. In: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Haziran, 37, 2020, 1, s. 235–245.
- TWAMLEY, Zachary, *“A Fine Subject to Expatiate Upon.” British Foreign Policy and the Rhetoric of National Honour, 1830–1880*, unpublished dissertation, Dublin 2024.
- UFFORD, Letitia, *The Pasha. How Mehmet Ali Defied the West 1839–1841*, Jefferson 2007.
- VANDERBOSCH, Amry, *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815. A Study in Small Power Politics*, The Hague 1959.
- VEIT-BRAUSE, Irmeline, *Die deutsch-französische Krise von 1840. Studien zur deutschen Einheitsbewegung*, unpublished dissertation, Köln 1967.
- VERETÉ, Mayir, *Palmerston and the Levant Crisis 1832*. In: The Journal of Modern History 24, 1952, 2, s. 143–151.
- VIDAL, César Louis-Philippe, *Metternich et la crise italienne de 1831–1832*, Paris 1931.
- WALPOLE, Spencer, *The Life of Lord John Russell*, London 1891.
- WALTON, William, *A Reply to the Anglo-Cristino Pamphlet Entitled “The Policy of England Toward Spain,”* London 1837.
- WARD, Adolphus William, GOOCH, George Peabody, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783–1919*, Cambridge 1923.
- WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *Palmerston, Metternich and the European System 1830–1841*, London 1934.
- WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh 1815–1822*, London, 1924.
- WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841. Britain, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Question*, vol. I–II, London 1951.
- WEBSTER, Sir Charles Kingsley, *Urquhart, Ponsonby and Palmerston*. In: The English Historical Review 62, 1947, 244, s. 327–351.
- WOODWARD, Ernest Llewellyns, *Three Studies in European Conservatism. Metternich, Guizot, The Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, London 1963.

Index

- Aberdeen, Lord George Hamilton-Gordon
Gordon see George Hamilton-Gordon, 4th
Earl of Aberdeen 15, 17, 23, 204
- Abdulmejid I, Sultan of the Ottoman
Empire 185, 189, 209, 211–213
- Acerbi, Joseph von 113, 119, 132
- Adair, Robert 39
- Ahmed Hulusi Pasha 174
- Ahmed Pasha 172
- Albani, Cardinal Giuseppe 103, 111
- Alexander I, Emperor of Russia 57
- Althorpe, John Charles Spencer, Viscount 117,
207 see Spencer, John Charles
- Ancillon, Johann Peter Friedrich 49, 50, 82, 181
- Aston, Arthur Ingram 18, 168
- Backhouse, John 17, 114, 154
- Baker, John (Consul General) 114, 119
- Belliard, General Augustin Daniel 24
- Belloccq, Louis Pierre 92
- Bell, James 179
- Beauvau, Frederick Lamb, Baron 18, 25, 45, 46,
70, 75–79, 81, 82, 99–101, 110, 120, 128, 130,
134, 141, 148, 151, 153, 156, 157, 162, 164,
173, 176, 178, 186, 187, 212, 221, 223 see
Lamb, Frederick
- Bedford, Francis Russell, 7th Duke of 204
- Belloccq, Louis Pierre 92
- Bernetti, Cardinal Tommaso 95
- Bionneau, Étienne-Guillaume-Théophile de,
Marquis d'Eyragues 176, 177
- Bligh, John Duncan 122, 126, 131
- Bombelles, Heinrich Franz, Count von 88
- Borgo, Carlo Andrea Pozzo di 53, 60, 72 see
Pozzo di Borgo, Carlo Andrea
- Brougham, Henry Peter, 1st Baron Brougham
and Vaux 117, 182
- Brogie, Victor, Duke de 50, 123, 133, 156, 161
- Brunetti, Lazar Ferdinand von 144
- Brunnov, Count Philipp Ivanovich 191, 196, 198
- Bulwer, Henry Lytton 7, 8, 18, 80, 203
- Bülów, Heinrich von 29, 49, 50, 193, 201
- Bunsen, Baron Christian Karl Josias von 95,
96, 105
- Burignot de Varenne, Édouard, Baron 118
- Bourqueney, François Adolphe 205
- Campbell, Colonel Patrick 117, 119, 121, 122
- Canning, George 12, 13, 19, 20, 71, 215
- Canning, Sir Stratford 18, 69–72, 112, 114, 115,
132, 138, 144–147, 150, 200 see Stratford de
Redcliffe, Viscount
- Cappaccini, Monsignor (Papal Nuncio) 103
- Cappellari, Cardinal Bartolomeo Alberto 92
see Gregory XVI, Pope
- Carlos, Don 139, 144, 148, 149, 153–156,
158–160, 163, 165–167, 170, 219
- Cartwright, Thomas 74
- Castlereagh, Charles Stewart, Viscount 13,
26, 45
- Cea Bermúdez, Francisco de 137, 140, 144–147,
149, 150
- Charles Albert, King of Sardinia 91
- Charles Felix, King of Sardinia 89–91
- Chekib Effendi 197
- Chad, George William 62
- Chłopicki, Józef Grzegorz 58
- Churchill, William 172–174, 179
- Clarendon, George Villiers, 4th Earl of 147, 149,
160, 162, 166, 167
- Cowley, Henry Wellesley, Baron 37, 65,
95, 168
- Cowper, Lady Emily 18, 71
- Czartoryski, Prince Adam Jerzy 58, 63, 68
- Desages, Émile 53
- Devaux, Paul 38
- Dom Miguel 137–170 see Miguel I, King of
Portugal
- Dom Pedro 137–170 see Pedro I, Emperor of
Brazil
- Durand, Louis Marie Raymond 60
- Durham, John Lambton, 1st Earl of 18, 69, 70
- Espartero, General Baldomero 165–168
- Esterházy, Prince Pál Antal 17, 25, 29, 40–42, 67,
129, 130, 137, 149, 151, 152, 156, 158, 159,
163, 191, 223

- Fanshawe, Edward 210
 Ferdinand II, King of Portugal 169
 Ferdinand II, King of the Two Sicilies 108–110
 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain 139, 140, 144, 148
 Flahaut, General Charles-Joseph, Count de 88
 Fox-Strangways, William, 4th Earl of
 Ilchester 17, 155–157
 Francis I, Emperor of Austria 20, 24, 39, 58, 93,
 96, 129, 133, 157
 Frederick William III, King of Prussia 28,
 201, 208
- Gagarin, Grigory Grigorievich 95
 Gérard, General Étienne Maurice 50
 George IV, King of Great Britain 12, 113
 Gordon, George Hamilton-Gordon, 4th Earl of
 Aberdeen 15, 17, 23, 204
 Gordon, Robert 18
 Granville, Granville Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl 17,
 18, 46, 84, 91, 138, 172, 192, 202, 205, 206
 Gregory XVI, Pope 92, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102–105
 see Cappellari, Cardinal Bartolomeo
 Alberto
 Grey, Charles, 2nd Earl Grey 7, 17, 49, 51, 59, 60,
 62–64, 68–70, 72, 73, 78, 79, 85, 132, 136,
 145, 146, 149, 150, 154, 182
 Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume 196, 198–200,
 202–204, 206–208, 210, 214
- Hay, John 167
 Heytesbury, William à Court, 1st Baron 18, 45,
 59, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69
 Holland, Henry Vassall-Fox, 3rd Baron 17,
 68, 202
 Hoppner, Sebastian 137, 138, 142, 143
 Hotham, Admiral William 120
 Howard de Walden, Thomas Ellis, 2nd
 Baron 169
 Hummelauer, Karl, Baron 25, 85, 134, 146,
 154–156, 161, 181, 193, 223
- Ibrahim Pasha 112, 113, 115, 117–119, 121,
 122, 184, 186, 188, 193, 202, 206, 207,
 209, 210
- Isabella II, Queen of Spain 144, 146–148, 150,
 155, 156, 160, 166, 167, 170
- John Henry Mandeville 115, 121 see Mandeville,
 Sir John Henry
- Karl, Archduke of Austria 34, 63
 Kolowrat-Liebsteinsky, Franz Anton von 25,
 66, 100
 Konstantin Pavlovich, Grand Duke 58
- Lafayette, Gilbert du Motier, Marquis de 58
 Lamb, Frederick, Baron Beauvale see Beauvale,
 Frederick
 Laurin, Anton von 132
 Lazarev, Admiral Mikhail Petrovich 176
 Lebeau, Jean Louis Joseph 36, 37
 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg 36–42, 46, 52–54 see
 Leopold I, King of the Belgians
 Lieven, Prince Khristofor Andreyevich 29, 62, 63,
 68, 115, 132
 Lieven, Princess Dorothea 7, 59, 62, 64, 68–72,
 124, 129, 132, 200
 Louis Philippe I, King of France 3, 16, 20, 23,
 24, 30, 33–36, 59, 60, 87, 88, 93, 100,
 119, 125, 133, 141, 149, 154, 156,
 162–164, 166, 168, 172, 193, 200, 201,
 204, 206
 Louis, Duke of Nemours 35, 162
 Lützow, Count Rudolf von 95, 99, 106
- Mahmud II, Sultan of the Ottoman
 Empire 111–115, 118–120, 122, 125, 131, 133,
 136, 173, 183, 185, 220, 225
 Maison, Marshal Nicolas-Joseph 88, 100
 Mandeville, Sir John Henry 115, 121
 Maroto, General Rafael 167
 Maria Christina of Naples 139
 Maria da Glória see Maria II, Queen of Portugal
 Maria II, Queen of Portugal 5, 137–168
 Martínez de la Rosa, Francisco 150
 Matuszewicz, Adam 29, 44, 49, 53, 59
 Mavroyéni, Jean 115, 121
 Mehmed Akif 172, 174

- Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount 18, 54, 134, 154, 156, 157, 163, 172, 195, 197–199, 202, 204, 212, 214
- Mendizábal, Juan Álvarez 160, 162
- Metternich, Klemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince, *passim*
- Miguel I, King of Portugal see Dom Miguel
- Minto, Gilbert Elliot Murray Kynynmound, Earl of 82
- Miraflores, Manuel Pando Fernández, Marquess of 151
- Molé, Louis-Mathieu 28, 162, 172
- Muhammad Ali Pasha 111–135, 171–216
- Muraviov, General Nikolay Nikolayevich 118
- Namik Pasha 115, 118
- Napier, Charles John 146, 147, 169, 202, 209, 213
- Neumann, Philipp 25, 50, 51, 69, 70–72, 80, 81, 83, 84, 102, 105, 115, 117, 123–125, 145, 193–198, 201, 202, 204, 205, 210, 223
- Nesselrode, Karl Robert, Count 23, 60, 70–72, 125, 129, 172, 175, 176, 179, 189, 192, 195
- Nothomb, Jean Baptiste 38
- Northumberland, Hugh Percy, Duke of 16
- Nourri Effendi 197
- Nyevelt, Van Zuylen, Baron 38
- Orlov, Alexey Fyodorovich 45, 125, 128, 172
- Ottensfels, Baron Franz von 113
- Otto of Bavaria, King of Greece 34, 112
- Osten, Anton Prokesh von 120–122, 129, 185,
- Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount, *passim*
- Parker, Hyde 139
- Paskevich, General Ivan 67
- Pérrier, Jean Casimir 36, 37, 65, 93, 94, 96, 98, 104
- Pitt, William, the Younger 22
- Pilsach, Ludwig Senfft 53 see Senfft von Pilsach, Ludwig
- Polignac, Prince Jules Auguste Armand Marie de 14, 22, 109
- Ponsonby, John 18, 30, 32, 35, 37, 121, 124–127, 131, 132, 171–174, 176, 177, 179, 183–185, 188, 193, 202, 211–214
- Porta, Horace François Bastien Sébastiani 39–42, 49, 53, 65, 90, 92, 93, 138, 143, 161, 166, 181, 190, 193
- Pozzo di Borgo, Carlo Andrea 53, 60, 72
- Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha 36, 37, 168
- Prince Felix of Schwarzenberg 129
- Radetzky von Radetz, Joseph Wenceslaus 98
- Reshid Pasha 117, 184, 213
- Roussin, Baron Albin Reine
- Rowley, Vice-Admiral Charles 133, 134
- Russell, William 18, 142, 143, 149, 181, 201, 202
- Russell, Francis, Duke of Bedford 204
- Saint-Aulaire, Louis, Comte de 95, 96
- Sallier de La Tour, Victor-Amédée 89, 90, 97
- Sartorius, Captain George Rose 139
- Sebregondi, Giuseppe Maira 95, 103
- Seymour, George Hamilton 102, 104–106
- Shee, George, 2nd Baronet 17
- Siemann, Wolfram 3, 6, 10, 24
- Soult, Marshal Victor 172, 189, 190, 193, 206, 210
- Southern, Henry 166
- Spencer, John Charles see Althorp, John Charles Spencer, Viscount
- Stopford, Vice-Admiral Robert 202, 207, 209
- Stürmer, Bartolomäus von 119, 128, 185, 211, 212
- Šedivý, Miroslav 3, 6, 10, 11,
- Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de 29, 32, 35, 36, 39, 40, 46, 72, 134, 150–152, 154
- Tatishchev, Dmitrii Pavlovich 129
- Taylor, Brook 95
- Thiers, Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe 161, 162, 180, 195–207
- Urquhart, David 18, 172, 174–177
- Van Zuylen van Nijevelt, Baron 38
- Victor-Amédée Sallier de La Tour see Sallier de La Tour, Victor-Amédée
- Villiers, George see Clarendon, George Villiers, 4th Earl of

- Walewski, Marquis Alexandre Colonna 64
- Webster, Sir Charles Kingsley 2, 6, 8–10, 64, 106
- Wellesley, Arthur 7, 13, 15–17, 23, 27, 44, 137, 138, 143, 156, 168, 169, 172 *see* Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of
- Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of
- Wessenberg, Johann von 29, 34, 53, 223
- William I, King of the Netherlands 3, 26–31, 34, 38–45, 47, 48, 51–53, 60
- William IV, King of Great Britain 14, 71, 79, 155
- William, Prince of Orange *see* William II, King of the Netherlands
- Zumalacárregui y de Imaz, Tomás de 149

Open-Access-Transformation in History

Open Access for excellent academic publications in the field of history: Thanks to the support of 34 academic libraries and initiatives, 9 frontlist publications from 2025 can be published as gold open access, without any costs to the authors.

The following institutions and initiatives have contributed to the funding and thus promote the open access transformation in history and ensure free availability for everyone:

Universitätsbibliothek Bayreuth
Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Universitätsbibliothek Bielefeld
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Darmstadt
Sächsische Landesbibliothek – Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden (SLUB)
Universitätsbibliothek Duisburg-Essen
Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Düsseldorf
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, Frankfurt a. M.
Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
Universitätsbibliothek Greifswald
Fernuniversität Hagen, Universitätsbibliothek
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg / Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek – Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hannover
Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB)
Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Tirol, Innsbruck
Rheinland-Pfälzische Technische Universität Kaiserslautern-Landau
Universitätsbibliothek Kassel – Landesbibliothek und Murhardsche Bibliothek der Stadt Kassel
Universitäts- und Stadtbibliothek Köln
Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig
Bibliothek des Leibniz-Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz
Universitätsbibliothek Marburg
Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Münster
Bibliotheks- und Informationssystem (BIS) der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg
Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
Universitätsbibliothek Passau
Universität Potsdam
Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg
Universitätsbibliothek Vechta
Universitätsbibliothek der Bauhaus-Universität Weimar
Herzog August Bibliothek Wolfenbüttel
Universitätsbibliothek Wuppertal
Zentralbibliothek Zürich

