

7 Civil War in Portugal and Spain, and the Quadruple Alliance

One of the main reasons London could not support Mahmud II was that its navy was being deployed off the coast of the Iberian Peninsula. Palmerston had been monitoring the situation in Portugal even before becoming Foreign Secretary, and after 1830, it became a central focus of his foreign policy. As an “heir” to the Canningite era, he considered the country a primary sphere of British influence.¹ Relations between Great Britain and Portugal had already been markedly tense during the Wellington cabinet, reaching a climax in mid-1830. Dom Miguel, the future Miguel I of Portugal, ruled Portugal from 1827 as regent on behalf of his fiancée and also niece, daughter of his older brother Dom Pedro, Maria da Glória.² A year later, he abolished the constitution he had sworn allegiance to and implemented a repressive regime which also arrested and deported his political opponents.³

Great Britain enjoyed a unique relationship with Portugal based on international agreements going back to the fourteenth century. These related to economic and military affairs, and British subjects enjoyed special privileges in the country.⁴ They were exempt from Portuguese taxes, and in court cases, they were defended by Portuguese lawyers approved by the British cabinet. Miguel's government, on the other hand, viewed British influence in an extremely negative light.⁵ The Portuguese public was incited to perpetrate violence against His Majesty's subjects, and in March 1830, British merchant ships were seized at the Azores. The hostility towards Dom Miguel continued even after the formation of Grey's cabinet. Similar acts of lawlessness were committed against the French as were against the British. In the summer of 1831, several French fishermen were imprisoned, and Admiral Roussin did not hesitate to retaliate. The French demanded satisfaction, sending a fleet to the River Tagus. Subsequently, the assets of Portuguese merchant ships operating on the Iberian coast were seized. Palmerston, surprisingly, did not object, being influenced by the need for cooperation

¹ RICH. p. 63.

² Dom Pedro waived his claim to the Portuguese throne in 1826, leaving himself only the title of Emperor of Brazil.

³ MACAULEY, Neill, *Dom Pedro. The Struggle for Liberty in Brazil and Portugal 1789–1834*, Durham 1986, p. 226.

⁴ Portuguese living in the British Isles did not enjoy the same privileges.

⁵ Wellington's cabinet demanded that Dom Miguel give amnesty to all political opponents, but he refused to comply.

with the Orléans regime in Belgium. The British public, though, did not approve of the French action. They demanded counteraction and a more active approach. Palmerston did not comply and declared that Great Britain had no exclusive right to resolve Franco-Portuguese disputes. Even so, discussions at the London Conference on Belgium influenced his response.⁶ The British Foreign Secretary was evident in his opinions of the Dom Miguel government from 1829, when he declared in the House of Commons that the Portuguese regent was “the destroyer of constitutional freedom, the breaker of solemn oaths, the faithless usurper.”⁷ This speech was one of his first about foreign policy, and although he gave it to a half-empty chamber, it continued to resonate for many years amongst the British political elite. In March 1830, he made another fiery speech in which he declared Portugal a “question of life and death” for Great Britain.⁸ By then, it was already evident that a more active approach to the issue and an official position would be necessary. Palmerston hinted at his future strategy regarding Portugal during one of his early meetings with the Spanish envoy in London, Francisco de Cea Bermúdez, in December 1830. The representative from Madrid was surprised by the liberal stance of the British Foreign Secretary towards Portugal. He declared that it was his duty:

To provide him with all the support that my special relationship with Lord Palmerston would allow me to offer, with some chance of success, but above all, I believed it was in the interest of our shared objective to advise him to avoid any preliminary discussions on the subject or polemics on matters of principle.⁹

Upon Palmerston’s assumption of office, Esterházy informed that despite the strong rhetoric with which the current Principal Secretary of State had spoken out against the recognition of Dom Miguel, his policy would remain consistent with that of the previous cabinet.¹⁰

The British Foreign Secretary nominated Sebastian Hoppner for the post of Consul in Lisbon in January 1831. Official relations between Portugal and Great Britain had been severed since 1828, and this was to be the first step towards improving this strained situation for London.¹¹ According to the Foreign Office’s in-

⁶ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 30.

⁷ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 169.

⁸ Palmerston’s speech to the British House of Commons, London, 6 April 1830, *Portugal HC Deb 06 April 1830 vol 23 cc1404–6* [online], [quoted 2019-03-01]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1830/apr/06/portugal#S2V0023P0_18300406_HOC_63.

⁹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 3 December 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

¹⁰ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

¹¹ Palmerston to Granville, London, 29 November 1830, TNA, FO 120/114.

structions, Hoppner was to maintain strict neutrality between Dom Miguel and his liberal rivals while also urging the regent to moderate his ultra-conservative policies.¹² Any restoration of good relations between London and Lisbon depended on the declaration of amnesty for political opponents mentioned above, which had also been demanded during Wellington's term of office.¹³ Additionally, the arrest of British subjects critical of Miguel's regime was also to stop, although Hoppner's demands were immediately rejected by Portugal.¹⁴

Britain's relations with France also deteriorated progressively. While Palmerston had not initially objected to the French action along the Portuguese coast, his stance changed in July 1831.¹⁵ There were widespread concerns within British society that France might intervene in Portugal, naturally disrupting good relations between London and Paris.¹⁶ Palmerston wrote to Granville about the threat of a severe crisis in the event of French military action in Portugal.¹⁷ As a result, Sébastiani proposed to London that they take joint action against Dom Miguel. Palmerston did not want to get involved in a more serious engagement. Despite his antipathy towards the Portuguese regime, he argued that they needed to respect each country's sovereignty.¹⁸ This was essentially reasserting the doctrine of non-intervention. Ultimately, the French fleet withdrew from the Portuguese coast, and Dom Miguel's rule remained unchanged.¹⁹

The new regent's rule and the restoration of the conservative regime in Portugal also had an international aspect. Dom Miguel, whom his brother had sent into exile before 1826, had found refuge in Vienna. He had even become a great admirer of Metternich, and the Austrian Chancellor supported his policies. Metternich considered the Portuguese charter "an act of madness" and Dom Miguel, its rightful ruler.²⁰ The Austrian court was linked dynastically to the courts in Portugal and Spain, giving Metternich the sense that Vienna was entitled to have a say in conditions on the Iberian Peninsula. But the repressive approach now prevalent in Lisbon horrified even the Austrian Chancellor. Following the events in France in July 1830, though, Metternich became convinced that Dom Miguel's rule aligned with monarchist principles and represented a barrier to Western lib-

¹² Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 10 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

¹³ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 4 January 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 193; Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹⁴ STAHL, p. 287.

¹⁵ Neumann to Metternich, London, 29 April 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

¹⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 4 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

¹⁷ Palmerston to Granville, London, 25 July 1831, TNA, FO 27/425.

¹⁸ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

¹⁹ MACAULEY, p. 228.

²⁰ SETON-WATSON, *Britain in Europe*, p. 92.

eralism.²¹ Palmerston did not want to allow the Eastern courts to intervene in politics on the Iberian Peninsula and warned them that Britain would respond.²²

The situation in Portugal took on a new dimension in the spring of 1832. Dom Pedro had decided to return to Portugal from Brazil with his daughter.²³ They initially found refuge together in Great Britain and then in the Azores.²⁴ London and Paris then became his principal supporters, to the dismay of Austria and Russia. While Palmerston refused to provide Pedro with warships, he also said it was not against Britain's non-intervention principles to sell him those warships for any military action. In July 1832, after liberal exiles and British volunteers joined his side, Pedro attacked Porto, the second largest city in Portugal, with his fleet of ships. His naval commander was former British naval officer Captain George Rose Sartorius. Palmerston did not protest against the deployment of British volunteers in Pedro's army because it was based on British law and public opinion. On the other hand, he did not want to get more engaged in the conflict and agreed to Dom Miguel's request that His Majesty's navy not violate Portuguese waters. A squadron under Commander Hyde Parker operated as an observer three miles from Portuguese shores.²⁵

This action against Dom Miguel was viewed with great suspicion in Spain. The July events also reflected Madrid's internal political stability.²⁶ The childless King Ferdinand VII married Maria Christina of Naples in 1829 following the death of his previous wife, Amalia of Saxony. In the spring of 1830, they were expecting their desired offspring. At the end of March of that year, the Pragmatic Sanction revoked the law of succession from the period of Philip V's rule. This law only entitled succession rights to male members of the House of Bourbon.²⁷ Following the birth of his daughter Maria Isabel Luisa, it was evident that Ferdinand's brother, Don Carlos, could give up hopes of the Spanish throne. Even so, his conservative supporters, particularly the Church and the rural areas where they dominated, did not want to accept this fact. Ferdinand found himself in a tricky domestic political situation – on the one hand, through his wife, he was forced to

21 Campuzano to Salmón, Lisbon, 12 December 1830, HOFFMAN, Fritz, *Metternich and the July Revolution*. In: SCHNEID, Frederick (ed.), European Politics 1815–1848, Farnham 2011, p. 149.

22 BULLEN, Roger, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 57.

23 He had been forced to leave due to domestic political problems the previous summer and abdicated in favour of his son, Pedro II.

24 Maria left Portugal for her father in Brazil in 1829.

25 RIDLEY, p. 167.

26 CHALUPA, Jiří, *Don Carlos a ti druzí. Karlistické války ve Španělsku v letech 1833–1939*, Praha 2008, p. 69.

27 The Pragmatic Sanction was declared by Charles VI in 1789, although it did not have the force of law.

acknowledge the succession of their daughter, and on the other hand, he was being pressured by the Church to secure the rights of his brother. Events were exacerbated by his poor health and the prospect of an early death. He likened himself “to a beer cap, suggesting that the entire beer would spill out should it be removed.”²⁸ As long as he was alive, his presence on the throne was like a safety valve preventing a society-wide crisis. The circumstances in Portugal and Spain were analogous, and the two countries mutually affected each other over the 1830s.²⁹ The succession problem became a crucial factor in Spanish history, with impacts lasting deep into the twentieth century.³⁰

Ferdinand's ambassador, Cea Bermúdez, saw Great Britain as a natural protector against France and feared the spread of revolution across the Pyrenees. He saw the maintenance of a conservative political course as a means to protect the Peninsula from revolutionary turmoil, and so, in the end, he supported Dom Miguel. Ferdinand VII had similar opinions, and during Pedro's naval campaign, he aligned himself with the conservatives. Palmerston did not want Dom Miguel to remain on the Portuguese throne, and he expanded cooperation with France. Metternich supported Spain and demanded that London avoid getting involved in the conflict.³¹ Bermúdez's view of the Whig cabinet began to change significantly in 1831, and during a conversation with Palmerston, he made this clear to him: “The [Spanish] government was mistaken about the true intentions of the Cabinet of St. James.”³²

As a result of the London conference discussions, the British Foreign Secretary continued seeking a compromise. To the Eastern courts, he said that “it is impossible for Great Britain to recognise the government of Dom Miguel.”³³ However, he also informed Austria of the British government's decision not to participate in Pedro's military campaign, allegedly because it would breach British law.³⁴ He added that he was willing to support Dona Maria in taking the throne without constitutional restoration.³⁵ In 1831, Palmerston aimed to secure international support for his policy regarding Belgium and avoid provoking the Eastern Powers headed by Austria.³⁶ Metternich sent a proposal to London suggesting

28 CHALUPA, p. 76.

29 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

30 LAWRENCE, Mark, *Spain's First Carlist War 1833–1840*, Basingstoke 2014, p. 221.

31 STAHL, p. 286.

32 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 13 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 195.

33 Palmerston to Chad, London, 3 December 1831, TNA, FO 64/181.

34 Palmerston to Granville, London, 30 November 1831, TNA, FO 120/114.

35 Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

36 BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 31.

Great Britain could recognise Dom Miguel in exchange for awarding amnesty to his opponents.³⁷ The British Foreign Secretary doubted the Portuguese regent would keep his word and rejected the idea. In the end, Prussia and Russia backed the Austrian proposal and insisted on Dom Miguel's unconditional recognition. Shortly afterwards, the Eastern courts also began providing him with financial support.³⁸

Pedro's military campaign caused concerns in Paris. Louis Philippe worried about Spain entering Portuguese territory, resulting in an international crisis and a radicalisation of public opinion calling for intervention by the French army. For Palmerston, Madrid needed to remain neutral.³⁹ He sent diplomatic notes, threatening that Great Britain would join the conflict if Spain fired shots within the Portuguese borders.⁴⁰ Palmerston's stance towards Austria also hardened. He reported to Lamb that the Holy Alliance had ended, and Great Britain would not tolerate the Eastern Powers interfering in Spanish-Portuguese relations. He also urged Metternich to reassess his position and recognise Dom Pedro's rule as regent.⁴¹

The Austrian Chancellor conveyed to London in his instructions that his court was well-acquainted with the matters of the Iberian Peninsula and closely considers them in their approach:

We cannot ignore the reality of the dangers that Spain would face if the government currently in power in Lisbon, with Dom Miguel at the head, were to be overthrown in favour of the constitutional party, which is widely popular in the country. Emperor Dom Pedro is currently preparing to launch an attack against Portugal. It even seems that the disposition of the Spanish mindset is such that the court of Madrid could not refuse, without serious inconvenience, to support Dom Miguel against such an undertaking, and His Catholic Majesty would no doubt be within his rights, in responding to these motives and at the request of the legitimate government of Portugal, to provide military assistance in repelling Dom Pedro's attack against that same government.⁴²

Palmerston shared the French monarch's concern and considered Spanish intervention a threat to peace across Europe because it could also threaten the internal political stability of France and Louis Philippe's position.⁴³ His reports to

³⁷ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 December 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

³⁸ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 245.

³⁹ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁴⁰ Palmerston to Addington, London, 27 March 1832, TNA, FO 72/390.

⁴¹ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 246; Palmerston to Lambo, London, 19. February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁴² Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 November 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 192.

⁴³ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 10 February 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

Vienna were uncompromising, demanding one sole outcome – the removal of Dom Miguel.⁴⁴

During this period, Palmerston once again bowed to the non-intervention doctrine and declared that any British intervention in the event of Spanish aggression would not be a breach of these principles but rather to protect British subjects.⁴⁵ In reality, he regarded the Iberian Peninsula as a British sphere of influence, while disregarding the Spanish envoy's request for Great Britain to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Pyrenean states, which were seen as a dynastic dispute.⁴⁶ The support for liberalism was merely a cover for his ambition to expand its dominance.⁴⁷

Before Pedro's invasion, Dom Miguel sought to rally his supporters with his March 1832 manifesto, in which he stated, among other things:

My gallant and numerous Army, in a body flew to arms, and incessantly do I receive the most unequivocal proof of their tried fidelity. Finally, the whole Nation is as one man, ready to defend itself. Thus, in like manner as it took to me its solemn oath, through the medium of its Representatives in the Three Estates of the Realm [...] these Kingdoms being saved from impiety and anarchy.⁴⁸

The manifesto was based on maximum devotion to the Church and its essential role in the nation's welfare. Dom Miguel defended his right to the throne and was not afraid to refer to Portuguese laws dating back to the thirteenth century when he did so. This declaration was primarily designed to impact the Eastern Powers, evidenced by its translation into several languages. In the end, Miguel's forces managed to repel Pedro's invasion, and the whole affair was limited to just a few liberal bastions in Porto. Spain heavily funded the Portuguese pretender in both financial and material terms. His army included experienced British officers serving in Portugal since the end of the Napoleonic era.⁴⁹

Reports of the failure of Pedro's campaign disconcerted Palmerston. He laid some of the blame on Hoppner and replaced him with William Russell in June 1832. He ordered Commander William Parker's fleet to maintain a state of readiness and instructed British military observers in Portugal to monitor the borders in the

⁴⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 26 February 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

⁴⁵ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 30 June 1832, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁴⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

⁴⁷ ALFARO, Alfonso Goizueta, *Forging Liberal States: Palmerston's Foreign Policy and the Rise of a Constitutional Monarchy in Spain, 1833–7*. In: *Historical Research*, Oxford 94, 2021, 222, p. 833.

⁴⁸ Miguel's Manifesto of 22 March 1832, attached to Neumann's dispatch to Metternich, London, 25 May 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 196.

⁴⁹ MACAULEY, p. 165.

event of a Spanish intervention.⁵⁰ At the same time, his instructions urged Russell to maintain strict neutrality.⁵¹ From the British standpoint, Palmerston was unable to take any decisive action. It was impossible to send military or monetary aid to Pedro because the British cabinet would not allow such a proposal.⁵² He asked Sébastiani to provide money and agreed to provide support using Pedro's funds. The question remains as to how far Palmerston was willing to go regarding breaching the doctrine of non-intervention.⁵³ Regarding the Iberian Peninsula, he was willing to intervene in favour of Dona Maria. In contrast, concerning France's breach of the integrity of the Papal States that same year, he kept out of Austro-French disputes. From this perspective, Palmerston's politics would appear to be not a traditional effort to keep the balance of power but rather to pursue British objectives alone.⁵⁴ This position is supported by his instructions to Russell on 29 August 1832. In these, he proposed that if his campaign fails, Dom Pedro be given a safe return from Porto, escorted by British warships, and assured that he could rely upon their aid in the event of complications.⁵⁵

In the end, the situation changed for the better for Pedro in September 1832. Miguel's attempt to blockade the enemy fleet at Porto failed, and the port remained in the hands of the liberals. As Miguel's situation deteriorated, attacks began on the British representatives at the Lisbon court. Russell and Hoppner sent reports to the cabinet in London stating the need to intervene and support Pedro. The Tories, headed by Wellington, opposed this, demanding that neutrality be maintained.⁵⁶ Palmerston was inclined to act in Portugal but did not oppose Wellington publicly.⁵⁷ The Foreign Secretary's resolve to intervene on the Iberian Peninsula was directly proportional to the international situation in the rest of

⁵⁰ Neumann to Metternich, London, 3 July 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

⁵¹ According to Neumann, Palmerston confirmed this position several times: *“During the interview I had with Lord Palmerston last week, I asked him if this arrival had any influence on the attitude of neutrality that England had taken in the affairs of Portugal? The Minister told me that no, as long as Spain did not deviate from hers, the British government would faithfully observe the commitments it had previously made in this regard, which had been made in good faith so far, and that nothing could be reproached.”* Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 August 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 197.

⁵² Addington to Palmerston, Madrid, 8 July 1832, TNA, FO 120/119.

⁵³ RIDLEY, p. 168.

⁵⁴ Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 10 December 1832, TNA, FO 325/25c.

⁵⁵ Palmerston to Russell, London, 29 August 1832, TNA, FO 63/364; RIDLEY, p. 170.

⁵⁶ STAHL, p. 288.

⁵⁷ Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons. London, 1 July 1832, *Interference in the Affairs of Portugal HC Deb 01 June 1832 vol 13 cc307–9* [online], [quoted 2019-04-01]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1832/jun/01/interference-in-the-affairs-of-portugal#S3V0013P0_18320601_HOC_85.

Europe, whether this was the end of the immediate threat in Belgium or Italy. He also grew in certainty when it became evident that the French would help. More importantly, he relied on Pedro for victory. The crisis in Spain also led to a stalemate.⁵⁸

From September 1832, Ferdinand VII's health deteriorated rapidly. Most of the court and those around him were convinced his end was near and that he would not survive the coming winter. These reports mobilised both opposing camps, awaiting their "moment of reckoning." The army at the Portuguese borders was ordered to return to Madrid and maintain order. Dom Miguel had lost his "Spanish card," weakening his hitherto secure position. The liberal supporters of Christina's succession gained the upper hand in Madrid, forcing Don Carlos to sail to join his nephew, Dom Miguel.⁵⁹ In Lisbon, Ferdinand VII exiled him to Rome after he issued an official statement refusing to recognise Isabella's claim to the throne. Don Carlos refused to do so and instead waited for his brother's death. A new government was set up in the Spanish capital, favouring Christina, led by the former London ambassador, Cea Bermúdez. In the meantime, the Austrian envoy in Madrid, Lazar Ferdinand von Brunetti, advocated for Don Carlos to Ferdinand VII, arguing that only by choosing him would Spain avoid the risk of civil war.⁶⁰

During the ongoing diplomatic crisis with Russia, Palmerston nominated Stratford Canning for a special mission in Madrid to strengthen British influence. The Foreign Secretary had unwavering confidence in the former Prime Minister's cousin. Palmerston wrote in his instructions to Madrid:

As the present state of public affairs does not require that you should repair immediately to your government post at St. Petersburg, the King has been pleased to select you to proceed on a unique and temporary mission to the court of Madrid with reference to the present state of affairs in Portugal. His Majesty's Government has hitherto felt that the view taken of Portuguese affairs by the Spanish government was so different from their own that it was hardly possible for the two governments to unite in any joint effort of negotiation or mediation for the purpose of terminating the civil war by an amicable arrangement between the contending parties, but recent events in Spain and the turn which the contest has taken in Portugal seem to afford an opening for such an attempt.

Dom Miguel has not succeeded in making any impression on the defences of Oporto, and Dom Pedro has not found himself strong enough to undertake offensive operations. His Majesty's Government has determined to make an endeavour to induce Spain to cooperate in measures that may stop the effusion of blood and restore peace to the Peninsula. If you

58 BARTLETT, *Great Britain and Sea Power*, p. 96.

59 LAWRENCE, p. 46.

60 Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

should find the Spanish government so disposed, you will, in the first place, propose to them to unite with that of Great Britain in inviting the contending parties to agree to an immediate armistice, with a view to negotiation. If they should press for the recognition of the title of Dom Miguel as the basis of such an arrangement, you will refer to the events which have taken place since the usurpation of Dom Miguel and to the circumstances in which both Spain and Portugal are placed at this moment, and you will express the strong opinion of H.M.G. that a secure and permanent settlement is not to be effected in this way. You will then propose the following arrangements, namely, the establishment of Donna Maria on the throne as Queen.⁶¹

He added that if he failed, he would withdraw to Lisbon, where he would await further instructions.⁶² Palmerston saw Canning as one of the ablest diplomats of his time and was sure his instructions would be followed thoroughly in Madrid.

Fulfilling Palmerston's tasks was particularly challenging for Canning. Cea Bermúdez, like his predecessor, favoured Dom Miguel. London viewed the removal of both rivals and the establishment of Dona Maria's rule – without her father's regency, as was originally demanded – as the solution to the tricky situation.⁶³ Grey proposed that the young Infanta marry one of the Austrian archdukes.⁶⁴ Metternich commented on this as a completely unrealistic option: "The history of Lord Grey's entire administration is but a string of absurdities, fantastical projects destined to fail due to means contrary to their success, and finally conceptions where criminality and a lack of practical sense are indistinguishable."⁶⁵ Neumann, after a few days, wrote a report to Vienna on British stubbornness in recognising Dom Miguel and its efforts at achieving some compromise with the Spanish government. He also reported on Stratford Canning's mission, which he claimed was "shrouded in secrecy,"⁶⁶ adding that London "no longer believed that Dom Pedro gave [Portugal] greater hope for a better future."⁶⁷

Metternich responded that the entire problem had a simple solution – the removal of Dom Pedro to "some corner of Europe."⁶⁸ He emphasised that stability in Portugal could only be restored if Great Britain ceased its intervention, Dom Pedro was defeated, and Dom Miguel was recognised. This, Metternich argued, would also have broader implications, notably for events in Spain:

⁶¹ Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 13 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

⁶² Neumann to Metternich, London, 11 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

⁶³ Palmerston to Cea Bermúdez, London, 7 November 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

⁶⁴ Neumann to Metternich, London, 4 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

⁶⁵ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

⁶⁶ Neumann to Metternich, London, 11 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

⁶⁷ Neumann to Metternich, London, 25 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 198.

⁶⁸ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199.

The idea of the 'Affair of the Two Brothers' is one of those utopian ideas that can only be conceived in hollow minds. It is enough to demonstrate that there is no consideration of the real situation. The true difficulty lies in chasing Dom Miguel away. After five years of hesitation, proceeding with insults and a hostile expedition against this Prince, and the difficulties of combining land and sea operations, if they were to be undertaken, it would be evident that success cannot be obtained by simple wishes accompanied by a few sentences. We do not aim solely at ending the Oporto expedition but also at resolving the Portuguese affair, which is also the affair of Donna Maria.⁶⁹

In a surprising diplomatic turn, London gave cautious consideration to parts of the proposal. One of the British Prime Minister's potential responses was to send Hummelauer to Dom Miguel to negotiate terms of an agreement. Grey, in parallel, proposed a compromise, suggesting the establishment of a Dona Maria regency without the restoration of the constitution.⁷⁰ Palmerston agreed to this approach, though he was hesitant about the complete recognition of Dom Miguel.⁷¹

During June 1833, there was a change in command, with the legendary Charles John Napier becoming the chief commander of Pedro's naval forces.⁷² His task was to open a second front and stop Porto from being surrounded. The same month, he destroyed Miguel's fleet and opened a route to Lisbon. It is extraordinary what Dom Pedro achieved in his military campaign. With only a tenth of the men that his opponent, Dom Miguel, had, he managed to hold and supply Porto for a year, eventually achieving naval dominance and securing a route inland.⁷³ However, the path to Portugal's capital remained fraught with challenges.⁷⁴

Even so, events did not develop positively for Great Britain in Spain. Cea Bermúdez was unwilling to listen to Canning's proposals that Dona Maria be recognised, insisting on the acceptance of Dom Miguel.⁷⁵ Thus, there was nothing for the British envoy to do other than undermine Bermúdez's position and secure better conditions for negotiation. Therefore, he decided to speed up to Queen Christina and tell her a similar story of the two Infantas to engender a feeling of allegiance in her. Canning wrote to London for further instructions and information, which he could use to get the Spanish government on his side. In his response, Palmerston assured Isabella of British support should Spain recognise

⁶⁹ Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 16 December 1832, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 199; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 252.

⁷⁰ Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁷¹ Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 13 December 1832, TNA, FO 352/25c.

⁷² MOWAT, p. 77.

⁷³ It is important to add that many French and British volunteers joined the side of Dom Pedro. Neumann to Metternich, London, 28 May 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

⁷⁴ GUEDALLA, p. 182.

⁷⁵ Stratford Canning to Palmerston, Madrid, 24 January 1833, TNA, FO 352/26a.

Dona Maria's claims. In the end, the effort ended with Cea's victory. The ailing King entrusted him with full authority, and his supporters established the government, leaving Christina with no choice but to passively observe.⁷⁶ The whole matter frustrated Palmerston, so he sought to extricate himself from his obligation to maintain neutrality in the best possible way. To this end, he entrusted Stratford Canning, who, in a long letter to Cea Bermúdez, explained the "good intentions" of the British government in its stance but also added that the doctrine of neutrality fundamentally differs in the case "of a disputed succession between two branches of the same Royal house [...] from that of a contest between a recognised sovereign on one side, and his subjects or colonies in a state of insurrection on the other."⁷⁷

Metternich observed Palmerston's failure in Madrid with satisfaction. In May 1833, before Dom Miguel's fleet was defeated, he proposed that the three Eastern courts recognise Miguel's rule as soon as Porto fell. In contrast, the British Foreign Secretary demanded that Vienna cooperate. In exchange for Austrian aid in Spain, he was willing to give up both the demand for a constitution and the prospect of Dom Pedro as Portugal's ruler. This was a repetition of his 1832 proposals. According to him, it was possible to maintain a conservative regime on the Peninsula only on the condition that Austria abandon its support for Dom Miguel. Should this not happen, then the entire affair would inevitably escalate.⁷⁸ Napier's win changed the course of events. Following the military coup, the liberals also took control of the capital, and the momentum now switched to Pedro.⁷⁹ Circumstances forced Palmerston to make diplomatic changes. He removed Addington from Madrid and appointed George Villiers, Earl of Clarendon, in his place. He expected Villiers to pursue more liberal policies.⁸⁰

For British policy, Dom Miguel had to retreat from Lisbon to the Spanish borders, where he still enjoyed strong support, mainly from amongst peasants. Isabella was transferred back to Portugal from France, and Dom Pedro planned to set up his own government. London was dissatisfied with the acts of the new administration. Britain's shift away from Dom Pedro was evident from the end of 1832 and resulted from several factors. Palmerston disagreed with the confisca-

76 Neumann to Metternich, London, 14 April 1833 AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

77 Stratford Canning to Cea Bermúdez, Madrid, 12 April 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 201.

78 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 373.

79 Hoppner to Palmerston, Lisbon, 25 July 1833, Enclosed in letter: Esterházy to Metternich, London, 3 August 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 202.

80 Palmerston to Stratford Canning, London, 14 May 1833, TNA, FO 65/206; Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

tion of the property of the Jesuits as supporters of Dom Miguel. Further cooling in the relationship was caused by Pedro's troops' seizure of a British merchant ship.⁸¹ The British Foreign Secretary also opposed adopting a more radical constitution than initially planned in 1826.⁸² In the meantime, the issue of the Iberian Peninsula was becoming a strategic priority.⁸³

Ferdinand VII died on 29 September 1833, and a struggle for the Spanish crown broke out.⁸⁴ Maria Christina immediately seized the opportunity, declaring herself regent and planning to appoint a constitutional government.⁸⁵ Don Carlos, in contrast, with the support of the Catholic Church and following Dom Miguel's model, issued a manifesto for the Spanish people and appealed to Salic law.⁸⁶ At the time, he was still in Portugal alongside his nephew, while mobilising a Carlist army. Initially, Palmerston did not fully support Isabella, waiting to see what her uncle did.⁸⁷ Following the announcement of Ferdinand's death, Metternich also took an extremely cautious approach. He did not even protest the presence of French troops at the Spanish border. Lamb wrote to London the following:

Immediately after King Ferdinand's death, P[rince] Metternich expressed a hope that no Gov[ernmen]t would interfere in the affairs of Spain. His inclinations naturally led him to prefer Don Carlos, yet he expressed great indifference between competitors and, after the appearance of the declaration, a conviction that submission of the Infant, though not to be hoped for, would be the happiest solution to the difficulty.⁸⁸

In terms of international support, at this stage, both Don Carlos and Dom Miguel could rely only on aid from the Eastern Powers.⁸⁹ This was significantly limited

⁸¹ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 16 February 1833, TNA, FO 120/116.

⁸² The more radical constitution originally dated back to 1822. Palmerston saw the 1826 constitution as a much better alternative, as it was more similar to the British model. RIDLEY, p. 171.

⁸³ As the newspaper *Allgemeine Zeitung* wrote: "*Portugal now takes the place of Belgium. Heaven grant that no seeds of great and universal evils lie dormant within it.*" Cartwright to Palmerston, Frankfurt, 12 August 1833, TNA, FO 33/44.

⁸⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203; CARR, Raymond, *Spain 1808–1939*, Oxford 1966, p. 155.

⁸⁵ Neumann to Metternich, London, 10 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

⁸⁶ Lamb to Palmerston. Vienna, 27 April 1833, TNA, FO 120/136; SOUTHERN, Henry, *The Policy of England Towards Spain. Considered Chiefly with Reference to a Review of the Social and Political State of the Basque Provinces. And a Few Remarks on Recent Events in Spain*, London 1837, p. 9.

⁸⁷ RIDLEY, p. 171.

⁸⁸ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 October 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

⁸⁹ These events occurred during the peak of the crisis in the first phase of the Eastern Question and after the meeting in Münchengrätz and Berlin. The issues in Europe and the Middle East influenced the differing approaches to the question of the Iberian Peninsula, and the subsequent events further exacerbated this divergence.

and essentially involved only diplomatic acts. Don Carlos did not receive as much military support as he had anticipated, and his units were in retreat.⁹⁰ The only exception was Tomás de Zumalacárregui y de Imaz, who operated around Navarre and was named the leading commander of the Carlist forces. He managed to turn a number of paramilitary groups into a regular army.⁹¹ He set up guerrilla war tactics, which were effective and essential against the better-armed government forces.⁹²

In Madrid, Cea Bermúdez refused to cooperate with the Spanish liberals and trusted in establishing a conservative government that supported the regency.⁹³ Villiers was outraged by his stance and refusal to recognise Dom Miguel as a rebel. He demanded military intervention from his government, which he considered the only possible means to achieve British objectives. Palmerston's hands were tied. British intervention was off the cards, and any intervention by France would not be appreciated by the British public or the government's opposition. Although the British Foreign Secretary supported Louis Philippe's army being used, he realised the opposition it would arouse in Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Metternich discouraged the French King from taking such a step, and Louis Philippe agreed and rejected the idea.

Grey and Palmerston thought that effective action was only possible by the British. The non-intervention doctrine would once again have to be "bent," and the deployment of armed forces would have to be pushed through the British cabinet.⁹⁴ The government did not want to hear about Grey and Palmerston's plan, which affected communication with Madrid. As a result, Britain's Foreign Office did not send Villiers any diplomatic notes between November 1833 and February 1834. Esterházy also complained about the lack of communication.⁹⁵ Instead, reports were sent to Russell in Paris, who urged intervention, arguing that Great Britain was "neither the tutor nor the police officer of Europe."⁹⁶ The only purpose of this message was to gain time for a suitable moment to intervene. Key to this was cooperation with Spain. Palmerston tried to exploit the ongoing turmoil and gain Madrid on

⁹⁰ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 8 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

⁹¹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23, 26 October 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

⁹² CHALUPA, p. 84.

⁹³ SOUTHERN, p. 29.

⁹⁴ Palmerston to Granville, London, 28 October 1833, TNA, FO 27/468.

⁹⁵ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 29 November 1833, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 203.

⁹⁶ Palmerston to Russell, London, 11 December 1833, TNA, FO 63/398; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 385.

his side. From early 1834, his point of view on Isabella also changed, and he was now willing to accept her recognition in exchange for a joint Anglo-Spanish approach in Portugal.⁹⁷

In December 1833, Talleyrand presented his Anglo-French defence alliance project. Palmerston did not accept his proposal, believing that relations between the two countries were already very good and did not need to be consolidated by any formal agreement.⁹⁸ For London, the situation at the end of 1833 was complex from an international perspective. British efforts divided the European Continent into two political and ideological camps, and as such, Palmerston needed to create a counterbalance to Münchenergrätz. Since he could not pursue his policies in Eastern Europe, he needed to control at least the western part of Europe.⁹⁹ He saw an unlikely diplomatic partner in Austria and considered the Berlin agreement hostile towards Great Britain. For these reasons, he desired to create a more vital link between liberal states, boosting London's position within Europe. Despite rejecting Talleyrand's proposal, Palmerston considered signing international agreements on his terms. His primary objective was to establish acceptable regimes in Portugal and Spain.¹⁰⁰

The first sign of the possibility of cooperation came in January 1834 from Dom Pedro. He sent a proposal to London in which he agreed to all of Palmerston's conditions, including establishing a new government, amnesty for prisoners, and abandonment of the constitution, in exchange for British military aid. The proposal led to a government crisis. Palmerston and Grey supported military action on the Iberian Peninsula, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer Althorp and other Canningites were against it. The Portuguese plan was rejected, and not even Grey's threat to resign made any difference. This bad news for Palmerston was followed by good news from Madrid. The liberal and pro-British Francisco Martínez de la Rosa was appointed instead of Cea Bermúdez. This created the space for Palmerston to implement an alliance between Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. The Foreign Secretary noted that this coalition would ensure Metternich and Nicholas I could be kept away, and the Western partnership would create an adequate counterbalance to the cooperation of the Eastern Powers.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Palmerston to Walden, London, 8 April 1834, TNA, FO 63/418.

⁹⁸ BELL, vol. I, p. 194.

⁹⁹ SATTLER, p. 15.

¹⁰⁰ BROWN, *Palmerston. A Biography*, p. 180.

¹⁰¹ Palmerston to Villiers, London, 10 April 1834, TNA, FO 72/419; GRANT, Arthur James, TEMPERLEY, Harold, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century 1789–1914*, London 1947, p. 198.

Palmerston required Spain to provide a ground army against Dom Miguel and Great Britain to deploy the navy to blockade Portuguese ports.¹⁰² The Spanish envoy, Manuel Pando Fernández, Marquess of Miraflores, endorsed the British proposal.¹⁰³ After a quick convening of the government, the remaining members ultimately agreed, mainly because of the lower cost to the British Treasury of deploying the navy compared to the cost of a ground operation. The treaty of alliance was signed on 22 April 1834.¹⁰⁴ Eventually, Talleyrand was also invited.¹⁰⁵ Palmerston's change in position regarding an alliance with France had been affected by concerns over the impossibility of overseeing its foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ The official agreement was a French commitment allowing Great Britain to control Paris's foreign policy effectively.¹⁰⁷ The Quadruple Alliance represented an excellent success for Palmerston, and he took all the credit for it.¹⁰⁸ The fact that the cooperation was also focused against the Eastern Powers, headed by Austria, is evidenced in his declaration:

I should like to see Metternich's face when [he] reads our treaty.¹⁰⁹

He wrote to Lamb about the Quadruple Alliance:

[The] creation of the Quadruple alliance among the constitutional states of the West, will serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the East. [The] moral effect of the formal union of four constitutional West Gov[ernmen]t will expel absolutism from Iberian Peninsula.¹¹⁰

¹⁰² BULLEN, Roger, *France and the Problem of Intervention in Spain*. In: The Historical Journal 20, 1977, 2, p. 367.

¹⁰³ CARR, p. 158.

¹⁰⁴ Palmerston's primary interest was to establish a Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal. ALFARO, p. 836.

¹⁰⁵ The original version of the agreement was that France would be included only as an involved party, not a fully-fledged member. After lengthy discussions with Talleyrand, Palmerston eventually agreed to an alliance of four parties. Its contents were to be kept secret from other Powers, but after less than three days, Talleyrand revealed the alliance's existence to Lieven and Esterházy. The French ambassador hoped this would create a more credible impression on Austria and Russia. Over time, he reassessed his position regarding the alliance and began to believe it would negatively affect French interests in Europe. In the summer of 1834, he was withdrawn and never returned to the post of French ambassador.

¹⁰⁶ BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Britain and the European Balance, 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), Europe's Balance of Power 1815–1848, London 1979, p. 156; HARRIS, p. 304.

¹⁰⁷ WALTON, William, *A Reply to the Anglo-Cristino Pamphlet Entitled The "Policy of England Toward Spain,"* London 1837, p. 70.

¹⁰⁸ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 35.

¹⁰⁹ RIDLEY, p. 172.

¹¹⁰ Palmerston to Lamb, London, 22 April 1834, TNA, FO 120/147.

Thus, the Quadruple Alliance was in direct conflict with the traditional policy of a balance of power because the coalition formed was a grouping in direct opposition to conservative states. In a broader context, Europe became divided into two distinct poles.¹¹¹ A closer view showed that differing views on foreign policy and the pursuit of national interests within the Quadruple Alliance were more influential than the ideological nature of cooperation.

Talleyrand saw the alliance from a different perspective, as he explained during a meeting with the Russian and Austrian ambassadors:

England's position in negotiations with Portugal became more constrained, limiting its ability to act freely, while France maintained its independence and lack of commitment. Faced with the necessity of deciding on matters concerning the Iberian Peninsula, the French and English governments found it challenging to choose an option that would minimise inconveniences and better align with their essential needs. The primary goal was to preserve political peace and maintain the union among Europe's Great Powers.¹¹²

The ambassador, through his statement, emphasised France's role in maintaining diplomatic control over Great Britain. The sincerity of the Alliance will be determined by the events to come.¹¹³

Esterházy sent a report about signing the treaty to Vienna on 25 April 1834, in which he described British interests in controlling France and not allowing it to intervene without London's consent.¹¹⁴ He also wrote that "it is under its aegis that the revolution has just been covered, and the propaganda in these regions [the Iberian Peninsula] has been encouraged by the British government, which sacrifices to such interests all those who, since then, have immemorially served as a basis for its political conduct on such a vital issue."¹¹⁵ Metternich considered the Quadruple Alliance a means that boosted revolutionary tendencies on the Continent.¹¹⁶ Although he shared his concerns over French intervention on the Peninsula, he did not officially oppose the agreement. Nevertheless, he considered

¹¹¹ GRUNER, Metternich, Palmerston, p. 23.

¹¹² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 April 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

¹¹³ The Duke de Broglie was of the same opinion, who, in conversation with Apponyi, expounded the treaty: "We decided to accept it—if only to stop England on the path it was ready to take. In accepting it, we have not made any commitments and have, so to speak, reserved the right to give the treaty whatever interpretation the circumstances may require." Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 25 January 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 299.

¹¹⁴ The entire wording of the agreement is contained in: *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. XXII, p. 124.

¹¹⁵ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 April 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

¹¹⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 28 May 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

Dona Maria's government "the embodiment of revolution in its most dangerous form."¹¹⁷ Metternich, however, began to question the final victory of Don Carlos and Dom Miguel in the summer of 1834. The overwhelming support their liberal opponents received from London and Paris made success seem increasingly unlikely.

Thus, the Quadruple Alliance completed Europe's division into two political camps.¹¹⁸ Yet, problems within the tenuous alliance between Great Britain and France would soon become apparent.¹¹⁹ Lamb noted Paris's insincere politics from Vienna: "The Alliance with England is [from the French perspective] absolutely uncordial."¹²⁰ A key question is to what extent Palmerston himself was aware of this fact. One could also argue that Britain was less enthusiastic about the agreement than it officially claimed. In addition to controlling France on the international stage, London aimed to limit or eliminate Paris's influence in Madrid.¹²¹

The agreement had an immediate military impact. The Spanish forces, cooperating with the British navy, defeated Miguel's army within weeks.¹²² Under the terms, a government supporting Dona Maria was established, with the only issue left being how to deal with Don Carlos and Dom Miguel.¹²³ The latter was arrested by British soldiers while attempting to save his life. Madrid asked Palmerston to extradite him, but he refused, hoping to persuade both men to go into exile with the offer of a pen-

¹¹⁷ Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 17 September 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 292.

¹¹⁸ Even the *Morning Post*, in its issue of June 20, 1834, surprisingly published a highly critical article on this subject:

Our own peculiar information leads us to conclude that, instead of being a Treaty for the subjugation merely of the Peninsula, it is a Treaty intended to separate Europe into two great and hostile divisions, of one of which divisions, that, namely, of the authors of this Treaty, general innovation is to be the object, liberty the watchword, social improvement the pretext, while all that is really intended by this Treaty or conspiracy is to strengthen and perpetuate the political authority in various countries of certain sets of very worthless, unprincipled, and ambitious individuals, this was specifically directed at Palmerston and Talleyrand, the most unprincipled and the most drivelling of all living Statesmen.

Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 20 June 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

¹¹⁹ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 36; BURY, p. 253.

¹²⁰ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 26 May 1836, TNA, FO 7/257.

¹²¹ ALFARO, p. 834.

¹²² BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 371.

¹²³ Dom Pedro died on 24 September 1834. Supporters of Dona Maria, led by Defence Minister Marshal João Carlos, Duke of Saldanha, and Prime Minister Pedro de Sousa Holstein, Duke of Palmela, were in power in Lisbon.

sion and acceptable living conditions. Dom Miguel agreed to the idea and went to Rome, where he lived until his death, while Don Carlos went to Portsmouth in Britain.¹²⁴ Backhouse offered him a pension of 30,000 pounds per year if he gave up his claim to the Spanish crown and undertook never to return to his country.¹²⁵ Don Carlos rejected all these proposals and continued to assert his legitimate right to the throne.¹²⁶ Madrid demanded that London imprison the former king's brother, but British law did not allow it. After a few weeks, the unguarded Don Carlos escaped, reaching Spanish shores on 7 July 1834.¹²⁷ Navarre and Biscay became Carlist bastions, and regular campaigns were launched from there to penetrate deeper into Spain.¹²⁸ The situation was further exacerbated by reports of Don Pedro's deteriorating health and his subsequent death on 24 September 1834.¹²⁹

Palmerston was also partially to blame for underestimating the entire situation. The Foreign Secretary had overlooked Carlos's contacts with opposition representatives of the Spanish government, who were also his supporters. He believed Carlos did not have the same support in the north of the Iberian Peninsula and was considered a traitor by the Carlists, but he was wrong.¹³⁰ Carlos's escape also had a domestic political impact, leading to Grey's resignation as Prime Minister and his replacement by Melbourne. Hummelauer provided detailed insights into the ongoing crisis, highlighting the British cabinet's precarious situation, mainly due to international political issues. Based on his reports, Talleyrand warned Melbourne that Palmerston's policies were steering London into "complete isolation,"¹³¹ a concern further amplified by Apponyi's visit to Louis-Philippe, during which Palmerston faced scathing criticism. This situation reportedly caused significant unease within the British cabinet. The accumulating evidence of political missteps in Spain and the German Diet's resolution to limit Palmerston's influence led to speculation that the British government might be forced to change its course and "distance itself from such diplomatic embarrassments."¹³² Palmerston's position was hanging by a

¹²⁴ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 20 June 1834 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205; Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 27 June 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 205.

¹²⁵ Webster gives a sum of 20 thousand, while Ridley suggests 30 thousand. WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 400; RIDLEY, p. 172.

¹²⁶ RIDLEY, p. 173.

¹²⁷ Aston to Palmerston, Paris, 1 September 1834, TNA, FO 27/487.

¹²⁸ Aston to Palmerston, Paris, 12 September 1834, TNA, FO 27/487.

¹²⁹ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 1 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹³⁰ BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 372.

¹³¹ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 7 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹³² Ibid.

thread, with the question being whether the Foreign Secretary would fall immediately or during the next parliamentary session. One proposed solution was sending him on a diplomatic mission to India, a suggestion the East India Company opposed. The new Prime Minister faced a combination of foreign and domestic issues that paralysed the government's composition, ultimately resulting in its dissolution by William IV on 16 November 1834.¹³³ This was the last time a British monarch would intervene in the formation of the cabinet in this manner. As a result, Palmerston was forced to leave his ministerial role for just under a year, leaving Spanish-Portuguese matters unresolved.¹³⁴

Metternich became convinced that his duty was to support Don Carlos in his battle. In instructions to Apponyi in Paris, he said:

Convinced as we were of these truths, we felt that the importance of the cause imperatively called for the recognition of a two-fold distinction in the succours his Highness undoubtedly demanded of us, and accordingly, we at once took measures to supply: (a) prompt material succours; (b) political and moral succours. So far as moral support is concerned, what the Carlists eagerly demand of us is the recognition of Don Carlos. The recognition embraces two periods: the present and the future. We have not recognised Queen Isabella, and the Powers will certainly never recognise the Iberian republic; there is little doubt upon whom the choice of the Powers would fall. We do not disguise our conviction of the fact that the recognition of Don Carlos, openly by the Allied [Eastern] Powers, would be an inestimable moral support to the cause of the prince. What we cannot undertake to decide is the effect it would produce on the two maritime Powers, and more particularly the influence it would exercise upon the King of the French.¹³⁵

Relations between Great Britain and Austria rode a wave of mutual suspicion into mid-1834. Influenced by Palmerston's opponents, Hummelauer wrote to Vienna about British efforts to isolate Austria in the Eastern Question and Western Europe. Palmerston, in turn, expressed his views on the Austrian Chancellor: "The turn which affairs have taken both in Portugal and Spain must be enough to drive him almost mad."¹³⁶ Metternich received information that Palmerston was no longer in office on 29 November 1834. A message from the Foreign Secretary was also delivered to him via Fox-Strangways: "Lose no time in taking this note to Prince Metternich. I am convinced he will never in his life have been more overjoyed than when he reads it, and that I shall never have seemed so agreeable to

¹³³ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 24 October 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 206.

¹³⁴ Palmerston to William Tempel, London, 16 November 1834, BULWER, vol. II, p. 181.

¹³⁵ Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 17 September 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 294; METTERNICH- WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 445.

¹³⁶ Palmerston to Granville, London, 13 October 1834, TNA, FO 27/479.

him now that I am bidding him good-bye!”¹³⁷ For the Austrian Chancellor, the collapse of Melbourne’s government was a chance to restore Anglo-Austrian cooperation.¹³⁸

Robert Peel was appointed Prime Minister, and Wellington became Foreign Secretary, giving Metternich a real hope for closer collaboration.¹³⁹ The new government regarded cooperation with France with suspicion and considered stabilising relations with the Eastern Powers essential.¹⁴⁰ In January 1835, Lamb temporarily returned to London to build new foundations for Anglo-Austrian cooperation and told Hummelauer after a conversation with the king: “Things will go better than in the past. My presence here could then be of real use.”¹⁴¹ The Tory cabinet kept the status quo on the Iberian Peninsula, limiting all military operations. Wellington assured Vienna’s envoy: “Prince Metternich will be convinced that I will not follow similar paths [as the Whig government]; I rely on this trust from him.”¹⁴² The Austrian Chancellor knew it was essential to get the French government on their side to secure victory for Don Carlos.¹⁴³ Paris agreed with his proposal to maintain neutrality during the raging Spanish Civil War in return for a marriage between Louis Philippe’s son and the Austrian archduchess. In the end, the entire project collapsed in March 1835, with a change in political representatives in France. Recently appointed, the Broglie government showed little interest in strengthening ties with Vienna and instead reinstated material support for Isabella’s forces.¹⁴⁴

Metternich’s prospects for restoring traditional Anglo-Austrian cooperation ended in April 1835. Peel’s short-lived government resigned, and Melbourne was once again tasked with setting up a new cabinet.¹⁴⁵ Esterházy urged the new

¹³⁷ Palmerston to Fox-Strangways, London, 16 November 1834, TNA, FO 7/233; Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 29 November 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208; METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 447.

¹³⁸ STAHL, p. 293.

¹³⁹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 6 February 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 208.

¹⁴⁰ Fox-Strangways to Wellington, Vienna, 26 March 1835, TNA, FO 7/253; Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 (first dispatch) 28 January 1834, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴¹ During this time, he was represented by William Fox-Strangways. Lamb fully returned to his role following health issues in July 1836. Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 January 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴² Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 28 January 1834 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴³ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 28 January 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁴⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209; STAHL, p. 293.

¹⁴⁵ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 9 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 558.

Prime Minister not to appoint Palmerston as Foreign Secretary to ensure good relations with Austria.¹⁴⁶ The request led to a minor scandal, which Metternich immediately distanced himself from, but it did not prevent Palmerston from taking up the post again on 26 April 1835.¹⁴⁷ Domestic political changes had also occurred in Austria, with Emperor Francis I dying on 2 March 1835 and his son Ferdinand I becoming Emperor.¹⁴⁸ Lamb attempted to convince Palmerston of Metternich's good intentions and Austria's efforts to begin new diplomatic cooperation. The Austrian Chancellor expressed that it would be far more advantageous for Vienna to have Great Britain as a strong ally, given that it is further from its borders and does not directly threaten Austria.¹⁴⁹ His messages did not affect Palmerston, who prioritised cooperation with France and stabilising the Iberian Peninsula to resolve the entire affair.¹⁵⁰

Once Melbourne's government had been established, a plan to intervene militarily in Spain with France's assistance was produced.¹⁵¹ Requests from Mira-

¹⁴⁶ Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

¹⁴⁷ RIDLEY, p. 182; Palmerston to Sullivan, Stanhope St., 16 April 1835, BOURNE, Kenneth (ed.), *The Letters of the Third Viscount Palmerston to Laurence and Elizabeth Sullivan 1804–1863*, London 1979, p. 263.

¹⁴⁸ Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253; In the circular sent to the other courts, it was stated: "The dying Monarch, who bequeathed his love to his people, his gratitude to his army, and to the servants of the government who served him well, has guided the voice of his heart, that voice which, for many years of his life, was so powerful, and which even after his death will ensure him the full recognition of those whom Providence had destined him to govern for such a long period, and in such times!" Circular to the Courts of Europe, Vienna, 12 March 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 214.

¹⁴⁹ He wanted to bring Great Britain and Austria together against Russia. As such, he wrote to London about Metternich's scepticism regarding Russian policy. One of his letters stated:

'Austria's interests lie in forming alliances with Powers like England, situated on the other side of Europe, rather than with military Powers closer to home, where such alliances could be dangerous and undesirable. An alliance with Russia is not a matter of cooperation between two systems but the need to avoid mutual conflicts.' Metternich has told me much about the fact that it is a question of the personal character of the current and previous Russian Tsar, who has the same objectives as Austria, and that Russia will one day be in frequent or permanent opposition. He stressed that an alliance with England is far more desirable, based on both nations' natural interests. Austria's role is to maintain a balance between the two political systems. For myself, Prince Metternich represents Austrian principles – strictly and purely conservative, but not extreme, which marks itself out from other states in Europe, whose leader is considered Russia. I must tell Your Lordship that his [Metternich's] objections towards Russia are significant, and it seems he desires an alliance with England to hold back Russia.

Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 25 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

¹⁵⁰ BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 73.

¹⁵¹ RIDLEY, p. 198.

flores for joint British-French intervention came to both Western Powers' capitals as early as April 1834.¹⁵² Metternich responded sharply, warning of the serious consequences of such an action.¹⁵³ The Austrian Chancellor was still providing the Carlists with material, although he had not yet decided whether to recognise Don Carlos. One of his letters states that the Eastern Powers would officially accept the Carlist pretender once he captured Madrid. In contrast to the Portuguese case, Palmerston did not support any further direct intervention by the government.¹⁵⁴ Like Austria's support for the Carlists, he continued to provide material and financial support to the liberals.¹⁵⁵ French Legion units from Africa, organised under British command, began to assemble in Spanish ports.¹⁵⁶ Nevertheless, Palmerston had never agreed with confiscating means heading to the shores of the Iberian Peninsula or the direct blockading of the Carlist ports by the British navy.¹⁵⁷ These practices were considered a breach of international law, and the British Foreign Secretary wanted to avoid this, or at least to appear to do so.¹⁵⁸

In May 1835, Palmerston agitated Esterházy by once again accepting the proposed French intervention against Don Carlos: "Leave this struggle to have a Spanish national character, and do not give it a European character through a direct intervention by means of the entry of a French armed force."¹⁵⁹ The Foreign Secretary assured him that it was in the greatest interest of Great Britain to maintain the best and most sincere relations with Austria. He further stated on his own initiative that, with regard to French armed intervention, there was a consistent sentiment and opinion shared by Madrid, Paris, and London – namely, a strong objection to resorting to such a measure. Moreover, the Spanish government had not yet considered requesting such assistance from France, and the latter had not yet determined to provide it.

Esterházy was not satisfied with Palmerston's declaration and, on the same day, demanded a well-defined position regarding the intervention. Privately, he informed Metternich that he had no illusions about the true British policy concerning the Conservative Powers and the question of Spain. A clear explanation, though, was not forthcoming from Palmerston. This was primarily due to the division

¹⁵² Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁵³ GUEDALLA, p. 199.

¹⁵⁴ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 April 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 209.

¹⁵⁵ LAWRENCE, p. 132.

¹⁵⁶ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 12 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

¹⁵⁷ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

¹⁵⁸ RIDLEY, p. 196.

¹⁵⁹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 May 1835 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

within the British cabinet on the issue of intervention. One solution was to leave the entire matter to France without London either expressing its support or condemning it. Even the French government was divided in this case, with the only resolute supporters of intervention being the financial circles led by the House of Rothschild.¹⁶⁰

During another conversation, Palmerston admitted that he personally supported the French intervention. His opinion was based on the belief that the government in Madrid had the advantage both in terms of material resources and moral influence in the country. He thought that only a greater effort and better military leadership were needed for success. In his view, Don Carlos was personally incapable, merely serving as a symbol for the apostolic principles and the church's claims, which had found an advocate in him. For this reason, Palmerston believed this Prince was unfit to rule Spain.¹⁶¹

Two weeks later, Palmerston delivered a speech in the British Parliament defending international involvement and emphasising the importance of the Quadruple Alliance:

It was in England's interest that the cause of the Queen of Spain should be successful; it was of great importance to this country that the alliance, which had been fortunately cemented between the four Powers of the West – England, France, Constitutional Spain, and Constitutional Portugal – should continue, and it could only continue with the success of the Queen of Spain.¹⁶²

Metternich declared that "Palmerston was reopening the schism in Europe."¹⁶³ He replied that the reaction of the three Eastern courts would come soon and that the intervention would bring about the same atmosphere and irritation as in the case of the French in Ancona.¹⁶⁴ Continuing, it was noted that the three Eastern Powers were in open conflict with Great Britain in every matter, whether related to Spain, Portugal, or the Italian Peninsula.¹⁶⁵ The speech caused a significant rift in Parliament. Later, in a meeting with Esterházy, the recognition of Queen

¹⁶⁰ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 May 1835 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

¹⁶¹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 12 June 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

¹⁶² Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 24 June 1835, *Affairs of Spain – Orders in Council HC Deb 24 June 1835 vol 28 cc1133–81* [online], [quoted 2019-04-24]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1835/jun/24/affairs-of-spain-orders-in-council#S3V0028P0_18350624_HOC_27.

¹⁶³ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 430.

¹⁶⁴ Fox-Strangways to Palmerston, Vienna, 30 May 1835, TNA, FO 7/253.

¹⁶⁵ Palmerston to Granville, London, 27 July 1835, TNA, FO 27/508; WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 431.

Isabella was admitted to be of paramount importance to British interests, and this perspective guided the transactions concerning the Iberian Peninsula:

He explicitly confirmed that his policy aimed to counterbalance the alliance of constitutional Powers with the alliance of monarchic Powers, which was formed to oppose any innovation, and which, in his personal conviction, was based on the existence of a formal treaty concluded by these Powers among themselves, although he admitted having no knowledge of it.¹⁶⁶

During September 1835, the government of Prime Minister Juan Álvarez Mendíbal came to power. Maria Christina was dealing with a poor financial situation; nevertheless, the new Prime Minister was a good choice for Palmerston. But circumstances on the front developed to the disadvantage of the pro-government forces.¹⁶⁷ The unrest led the Regent forces to lose control over the northeastern part of the country, with Barcelona controlled by radicals. They demanded adopting the 1812 constitution, which Villiers discouraged Mendíbal from doing.¹⁶⁸ Madrid now found itself in a delicate situation. It was not in control of either the northeast or the northwest, where the Carlists ruled. The radicalisation of the war led to all parties involved committing more acts of violence.¹⁶⁹

The split between politicians in Britain grew in line with the conflict.¹⁷⁰ A significant number of Don Carlos supporters among members of Parliament visited him at his base in Bilbao.¹⁷¹ The Tories were still protesting against the Legion operations and demanded that they be immediately dissolved.¹⁷² For Metternich, circumstances in Spain were evidence of the ineffectiveness of the constitutional government and also the cause of the anarchy that had arisen.¹⁷³ Representatives of the Eastern courts demonstrated their support for Don Carlos at a meeting in Teplitz (Teplice) in 1835, but they did not recognise him officially.¹⁷⁴ In Palmerston's mind, the meeting in the North Bohemian town aroused considerable suspicion, and he believed its purpose was, as in the case of Münchenergrätz, an agree-

¹⁶⁶ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 31 July 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 210.

¹⁶⁷ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 25 September 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

¹⁶⁸ WALTON, p. 40.

¹⁶⁹ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

¹⁷⁰ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 25 September 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

¹⁷¹ LAWRENCE, p. 77.

¹⁷² RIDLEY, p. 200.

¹⁷³ WOODWARD, Ernest Llewellyns, *Three Studies in European Conservatism: Metternich, Guizot, The Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century*, London 1963, p. 54.

¹⁷⁴ LAWRENCE, p. 133.

ment on the division of the Ottoman Empire. He was not prepared to admit that the monarchs had met without concluding any specific agreement.¹⁷⁵

While the Conservative Powers had declared their unity, relations within the Quadruple Alliance were tense. London began to suspect Paris of a lack of support for the Spanish government and of trying to expand its influence on the Peninsula. By the end of 1835, the situation on the Iberian Peninsula looked far from ideal from the British point of view. The Carlist forces were gaining ground, the cooperation with France was showing signs of strain, Parliament and the government were unable to agree on a unified course of action, and the alliance of the three Eastern courts remained strong and unweakened.¹⁷⁶ Sébastiani tried to balance the tense relations between Paris and London with another round of rapprochement with Vienna. Although Palmerston also spoke of the need for cooperation, Hummelauer did not believe his sincerity. He supposed that the desire for good relations with Austria came from the French side: "Lord Palmerston did not seem inclined to yield to this impulse, and so far, I see no sign that he wishes to put himself forward in this regard."¹⁷⁷ Metternich was of the same opinion, believing that the British cabinet was trying to reach its goals by indirect means, which they failed to achieve directly.¹⁷⁸

The tendency for partnership from the French side persisted even after the fall of the Broglie government in February 1836. The new Prime Minister, Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers, aimed to further strengthen ties with Austria, even at the cost of a change in policy towards Spain. The new cabinet, on its accession, communicated to Madrid that it could not count on French intervention in its favour.¹⁷⁹ Inconsistencies in Anglo-French cooperation reached a peak in March 1836. The Foreign Office in London sent an official offer to Paris for coordinated action. Both would provide their navy to blockade ports, and the operation would end with the military entering Spanish territory. From Palmerston's standpoint, the plan was for the French army to act as an extension of British influence on the Peninsula. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary was aware of the challenges in securing parliamentary approval for direct intervention by his government and the potential logistical difficulties this would entail. Therefore, relying on the French option emerged as the best possible strategy. Thiers unsurprisingly refused this request.

¹⁷⁵ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 November 1835 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

¹⁷⁶ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 6 November 1835 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

¹⁷⁷ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 1 December 1835, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 211.

¹⁷⁸ Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 9 January 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁷⁹ Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 15 April 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 212.

Palmerston, on the other hand, was surprised by the disagreement and did not understand France's sudden lack of interest in the Spanish question. One of the reasons why Paris refused the British offer was an unwillingness to weaken relations with the Danube Monarchy. Another blow to London was the planned visit of Louis-Philippe's son, Prince Louis, Duke of Nemours, to Vienna, aimed at consolidating the understanding with Austria. When Mendizábal resigned in June 1836, Villiers saw French plotting behind the event. He was convinced that Austria had had a negative influence on the French government, with an official visit to Vienna recently taking place.¹⁸⁰ In the end, nothing came of the Austro-French courtship, and due to the domestic political situation, Thiers, under pressure, shifted his political course. Traditionally, France relied on foreign policy successes to address domestic crises, prompting him to reopen discussions with London about intervention. Discussions on the deployment of the French army deepened complications within the government and eventually led to Thiers' resignation.¹⁸¹ He was replaced by the anti-British Molé, who considered Spain to be lost. Palmerston had the impression that the Quadruple Alliance was no longer a reality.¹⁸²

To the Foreign Secretary, French aloofness from Great Britain was a sign to reassess relations with the Eastern Powers.¹⁸³ Austria had traditionally been a key partner for Britain, serving as a counterbalance to Paris. Lamb tried once again to improve relations between Palmerston and Metternich. He informed the Austrian Chancellor of the British Foreign Secretary's interest in a joint objective, explicitly preserving the balance of power within Europe. Vienna welcomed improved relations with London, although Metternich did not believe in setting conditions suitable for closer cooperation. If, from Palmerston's side, it was more a question of keeping London out of isolation, from Metternich's point of view, European policy was determined by preserving the general order, stability within

¹⁸⁰ BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 386.

¹⁸¹ MACMILLAN, John, *Historicising Intervention: Strategy and Synchronicity in British Intervention 1815–50*, In: *Review of International Studies*, Cambridge, 39, 2013, 5, p. 1108.

¹⁸² BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 75.

¹⁸³ As further evidence of the strained British-French relations, the incident during the French blockade of the Mexican coast in 1838 played a significant role. In November of that year, a French warship intercepted a British merchant vessel, boarded it, and forcibly removed a Mexican pilot. The Conservatives labelled this action as an "insult to the flag" and a threat to the commercial interests they represented. They rejected the French apology and accused the British government of failing to defend Britain's honour and trade interests. In response, Palmerston stated that he was satisfied with the French apology, as it met the necessary requirements of the code of honour. MELACON, Glenn, *Honour in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839–1840*, In: *The International History Review*, London, 21, 1999, p. 862.

the individual states, and promoting joint efforts to resolve international political issues:

The relations between Austria and England, as well as all political relations between Powers, consist of two elements. One of these elements is not subject to change; the other is variable and depends on the vicissitudes of time. The first is tied to material circumstances, such as the geographical situation of states; these circumstances create by themselves conditions of existence stronger and more durable than the changing will of men; the second, being the work of men is necessarily subject to the variable spirit of the latter. This truth has perhaps never been more evident than in the current position in which the Cabinets of Vienna and London find themselves regarding their reciprocal relations. The old England no longer exists, disappearing day by day even more; a new England is replacing it.¹⁸⁴

Regarding Spain itself, Metternich was convinced that Great Britain's difficulties lay in three basic points: the suppression of the original institutions and their replacement by new, revolutionary struggles that could not be resolved, and finally, the unwillingness to get Austria to cooperate.¹⁸⁵ For these reasons, Palmerston did not want to end the cooperation with Paris, but on the other hand, an *entente cordiale* was no longer something that could be spoken of by 1836.¹⁸⁶

France's change in approach to Spain was also reflected in their bilateral relations. The influence of Paris in Madrid declined sharply, and many French supporters of the Queen ceased their active involvement. Radicals began to believe that Louis Philippe wanted Don Carlos to win.¹⁸⁷ At the end of 1836, the Carlists successfully repulsed Maria Christina's army's offensive, and within Great Britain, there was a growing conviction that she would be defeated.¹⁸⁸ The failures of the government army reinforced Metternich's position and emphasised the significance of Austrian support for Don Carlos.¹⁸⁹ In this context, as British influence in Spain waned, the desire for rapprochement with Austria increased. During a conversation with Melbourne, Esterházy was "disarmed"¹⁹⁰ by the Prime Minister's remark about the events in the Peninsula, stating: "I cannot help but foresee that the development of events in these regions will also support the opinions

¹⁸⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Prague, 17 September (first dispatch) 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁸⁵ Metternich to Esterházy, Prague, 17 September (second dispatch) 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁸⁶ BULLEN, *France and the Problem of Intervention*, p. 391.

¹⁸⁷ BULLEN, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula*, p. 75.

¹⁸⁸ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

¹⁸⁹ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 1 December 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁹⁰ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (second dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

and reasoning put forward by the Austrian cabinet.¹⁹¹ The Austrian ambassador's response to this opinion was to caution against pursuing national policies at the expense of preserving the general peace of Europe. Above all, he stressed the importance of distancing oneself from interventionist policies aimed at imposing a foreign doctrine, which might disturb the existing peace in Europe.¹⁹² Lamb's reports further demonstrate his intentions, proving that Metternich's stance on the Spanish question had not changed and that Vienna maintained strict neutrality.¹⁹³ At the same time, Metternich, in his letters to London, expressed the belief that the entirety of Palmerston's diplomatic effort was aimed at diminishing French influence in Spain.¹⁹⁴

Meanwhile, by the end of 1836, the Carlists aimed to expand the war into a nationwide affair, attempting to extend the conflict into the country's south-east.¹⁹⁵ It became clear to London that the conflict would not end soon. Palmerston sought to salvage the situation by requesting joint intervention with France but was once again rejected.¹⁹⁶ A few days later, Madrid made the same offer, invoking intervention in the name of the Quadruple Alliance, but Paris also responded negatively.¹⁹⁷ Louis Philippe declared: "France will shed the blood of its children only in its own defence, and not otherwise than under the national colours."¹⁹⁸ However, despite his statement, the actions of the July Monarchy did not align with these words. French blood was shed not only during the Belgian Question but also in Ancona, and even French Legionnaires lost their lives in the ongoing conflict in the Iberian Peninsula.

By 1837, there was widespread scepticism regarding further engagement in the Carlist War. Reports of defeats suffered by the British Legions fighting for Maria Christina further complicated the situation. Many members of Parliament opposed Palmerston's approach and attacked him vehemently, as did domestic legionnaires.¹⁹⁹ In April 1837, the Foreign Secretary delivered a lengthy speech to Parliament, defending Britain's involvement in Spain:

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 2 November 1836, TNA, FO 7/258.

¹⁹⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 29 November 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 215.

¹⁹⁵ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 25 November 1836 (first dispatch), AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 213.

¹⁹⁶ Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 9 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

¹⁹⁷ Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 16 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

¹⁹⁸ Granville to Palmerston, Paris, 30 December 1836, TNA, FO 27/527.

¹⁹⁹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 14 April 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 216.

They now came forward with a formal motion, to persuade this House to pass a vote which is intended to be, and which, if adopted, would be a censure upon the government, and a call upon that government by this House to break faith with the Queen of Spain to abandon our engagements – to tear our treaty in pieces, and to desert our ally, because some temporary disaster has befallen our arms . . . The opinion which this House will tonight pronounce, will decide not simply between conflicting parties in England, but between antagonist principles struggling for ascendancy in the other countries of Europe; and on that decision may depend the peace, the welfare, and the happiness of nations.²⁰⁰

Although Palmerston's speech had the desired effect for a time, conflicts within Parliament persisted until the end of the war.²⁰¹ In Vienna, diplomacy observed the Whig cabinet's erratic policies. Metternich was particularly disturbed by Palmerston's speech, which he felt justified intervention by disregarding the order upheld by his predecessors, whose policies, he believed, were far superior to those of the current administration.²⁰²

The situation of the Queen's army in 1837 was dire. One attempt to reverse this state was an official request to the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance for direct intervention. However, the request proved ineffective, and Carlist forces advanced towards Madrid.²⁰³ In September, Don Carlos himself launched an offensive to capture the capital. With an army of 16,000 soldiers, it was expected that Madrid would not withstand the assault, and its fall seemed inevitable.²⁰⁴ At the same time, secret discussions were ongoing between the pretender and Maria Christina, who sought a way out through a marriage alliance between her daughter and Don Carlos's son, Don Louis. This marriage was intended to bring about a compromise and a truce. All discussions were kept secret, and the government was not even informed. The Carlists reached the gates of Madrid, but at a crucial moment, Don Carlos, likely fearing General Baldomero Espartero's approaching army, ordered a retreat. Although this decision was kept secret, it had a negative impact on the morale of Carlist soldiers. Paradoxically, the government

²⁰⁰ Palmerston's speech to the British House of Commons, London, 19 April 1837, *Affairs of Spain – Adjourned Debate HC Deb 19 April 1837 vol 38 cc1–120* [online], [quoted 2019-04-24]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1837/apr/19/affairs-of-spain-adjourned-debate#S3V0038P0_18370419_HOC_21.

²⁰¹ Esterházy to Metternich, London, 28 April 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 216; WATTON, p. 227.

²⁰² Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 May 1837, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 218.

²⁰³ Circular to the Political Chiefs, Madrid, 6 July 1837, TNA, FO 72/481.

²⁰⁴ Circular Despatch to Foreign Ministers of Quadruple Alliance, Madrid, 6 July 1837, TNA, FO 72/481.

in Madrid began to question Maria Christina's loyalty, and Espartero soon took control of the political situation at the court as a power broker.²⁰⁵

A month after the events in Madrid, Sébastiani was reappointed as Foreign Minister and worked to bolster relations with London. Nevertheless, the rivalry between France and Britain persisted at the Spanish court. During the conflict, Palmerston continued to strengthen Britain's position on the Iberian Peninsula. With the assistance of Villiers and Henry Southern, Palmerston continued to intervene in Spanish government affairs.²⁰⁶ He secured the repayment of Spain's outstanding debts to Great Britain, dating back to 1813, and insisted on the recognition of the exceptional privileges of British subjects.²⁰⁷ The Progressistas (liberals) sided with Palmerston, while France supported the Moderatos (conservatives).²⁰⁸ These two political groups competed for power in the Cortes and had opposing visions for the future direction of Spain.²⁰⁹

The struggle for influence in Spain intensified as officials searched for a future husband for Isabella. The British government opposed a marriage to one of Louis Philippe's sons and began seeking its own candidate.²¹⁰ Villiers proposed Austrian Archduke Charles, dismissing concerns about a Habsburg ruling in a constitutional state.²¹¹ Palmerston rejected this, believing Metternich would never agree, despite supporting Don Carlos as the rightful heir.²¹² He also feared Austrian influence would weaken the Western Powers' position in Spain.²¹³ He wrote to Villiers:

An Austrian Prince and constitutional government could hardly coexist; and if Spain is again to be consigned to absolutism, it does not matter what the name of the head of the despotism to be . . . And if representative government can once be quietly established in Spain. Spain will infallibly be independent, and that will be better for us than her being tied either to France or Austria.²¹⁴

205 CHALUPA, p. 108.

206 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 13 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

207 GEFFCKEN, Friedrich Heinrich, *The British Empire. With Essays on Prince Albert, Lord Palmerston, Lord Beaconsfield, Mr. Gladstone, and Reform of the House of Lords*, London 1889, p. 203.

208 CARR, p. 171.

209 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (first dispatch), TNA, FO 72/510.

210 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

211 Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (second dispatch), 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

212 Milbanke to Palmerston, London, 27 November 1838, enclosed in letter to: Hummelauer to Metternich, London, 16 December 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

213 PARRY, p. 152.

214 Palmerston to Villiers, London, 14 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/500. WEBSTER, vol. I, p. 465.

Villiers persisted with his support for the Archduke despite Palmerston's objections. The resurgent Eastern Question also influenced relations between Great Britain and Austria during this time. Palmerston would eventually support the proposed Spanish-Austrian marriage, but only on the condition that Metternich upheld the liberal government in Madrid. Nevertheless, the Chancellor was not inclined towards the proposed marriage and primarily refused to recognise Isabella as the legitimate ruler, expressing his disagreement.²¹⁵

Events in Spain suddenly gained momentum. There was a change in the Carlist army command in mid-1838, with Rafael Maroto taking over. He was a moderate Don Carlos supporter, and as commander, he was aware of how much the exhausting five-year war had cost.²¹⁶ A rift emerged within the Carlist ranks, leading to several bloody conflicts. Maroto survived an attempt at a military coup, and eventually, Don Carlos found himself effectively held captive by his own general. His prestige and support gradually eroded, both domestically and internationally. In the end, Don Carlos lost control over his army entirely. All of this foreshadowed his downfall. At this point, Palmerston welcomed the turn of events, seeing them as a positive development for British interests. He assigned the commander of the British naval contingent, John Hay, to attempt mediation between the two sides. Like his counterpart, Espartero also wanted to end the fighting and agreed to the negotiations. The internal contradictions within the Carlist camp played a significant role in Don Carlos's downfall. Conspiracies and intrigues against Maroto eventually led to his change of attitude and the negotiation of a truce. Intercepted letters from June 1839 between senior Carlist officers were sent to London marked as "Very Secret."²¹⁷ In these, Villiers describes Maroto's peculiar attitudes and notes his growing distance from Don Carlos. On the last day of August 1839, the two armies met in Vergara, where a treaty was finally signed, bringing an end to the long-running civil war in Spain. Don Carlos was given over to government soldiers, and the Carlists were guaranteed an amnesty and retained their military ranks.²¹⁸

Palmerston received the news of the peace treaty positively but expressed concerns about Espartero's growing influence over the Spanish government. Don Carlos fled to France, where he was detained and forced to abandon his claim to the Spanish throne. Some loyal Carlists resisted the peace treaty and continued

²¹⁵ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 15 December, TNA, FO 72/510; Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 1 December (second dispatch), TNA, FO 72/510; Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509; Palmerston to Granville, London, 20 September 1836; BULWER, vol. II, p. 211.

²¹⁶ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/510.

²¹⁷ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 29 June 1839, TNA, FO 72/530.

²¹⁸ CHALUPA, p. 115.

fighting until 1840, when they finally dispersed. Espartero became a national hero, and the Foreign Secretary's concerns proved well-founded.²¹⁹ Maria Christina had to appoint him Prime Minister, giving him the title Duke *de la Victoria*, whose Portuguese equivalent Wellington could boast of.

Maria Christina's attempts to diminish Espartero's power failed, and after an unsuccessful coup in 1840, she fled to France, leaving her daughter's regency to the ambitious general, who became the *de facto* ruler.²²⁰ London prioritised peace on the Iberian Peninsula, and Palmerston instructed special envoy Arthur Ingram Aston to avoid domestic political conflicts. Britain's Foreign Office wanted Espartero to accept the constitutional regime and ensure the Carlist threat was eliminated. Internationally, Spain was stable, and there was no risk of an Austrian or French puppet government.²²¹

In parallel with the civil war in Spain, Dona Maria's government in Portugal was being consolidated. The rivalry between Great Britain and France was also manifested at the Lisbon court. A central point of mutual disputes was, as in the case of Spain, marriage policy. The Queen was sixteen years old in 1835, meaning that she could enter wedlock and strengthen her rule. Maria's advisors looked to France and specifically to Louis Philippe's son, the Duc de Nemours. Great Britain did not hesitate to exploit its influence at the Portuguese court, and Cowley ordered Saldanha to resign if the marriage was approved. Palmerston also invited Portugal's representative, Francisco Almeida, Prince of Lavradio, to his office and explained that marriage to the French King's son would mean the end of friendly relations between London and Lisbon.²²² Both these diplomatic interventions were enough to put an end to Franco-Portuguese discussions. Palmerston wanted the Queen to marry, and he proposed Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha as an alternative. London's proposal was accepted, and the marriage occurred in April 1836. Anglo-Portuguese relations became rather strained during this time. One reason for this was Palmerston's zealous promotion of the abolition of the slave trade since taking office. The Portuguese government refused to join the relevant international agreements, and Palmerston took this extremely personally.²²³ Another issue was commercial relations, with the Foreign Secretary re-

²¹⁹ Villiers to Palmerston, Madrid, 17 November 1838, TNA, FO 72/509.

²²⁰ CARR, p. 159.

²²¹ SOUTHGATE, p. 110.

²²² RIDLEY, p. 183.

²²³ Despite prolonged negotiations, Portugal repeatedly rejected British offers, even as Palmerston gradually increased pressure, including offering financial compensation for Portugal's colonies in India. In 1839, Palmerston went as far as to threaten that if Portugal did not comply with British demands, the United Kingdom would proceed with the seizure of colonies such as Goa.

questing special privileges for trade with Great Britain, something Portugal vigorously opposed.²²⁴

A local uprising broke out in September 1836 in Lisbon when the new King, Ferdinand II, attempted to disperse a crowd of demonstrators who wanted to install the 1826 constitution.²²⁵ Madrid asked London for military assistance, but British ambassador Howard de Walden rejected the request. Nevertheless, a British fleet continued to guard the River Tagus, and Palmerston instructed them to protect the Queen in an emergency. Napier was invited to London to set up a military plan, with the goal of stabilising the Portuguese crown government. Ultimately, the government's soldiers suppressed the revolution on their own, making British intervention unnecessary. Metternich knew the implications for what he called the "quadruple complicity": "The Lisbon affair would widen the distance that already separated the two Maritime Powers."²²⁶ The peace, however, did not last long, and another revolt broke out in September 1837, leading to a new civil war.²²⁷ Palmerston supported a conservative faction in Lisbon, promoting them against liberal-democratic representatives. Wellington also complained directly about the government's actions:

In our own times, there is a remarkable instance of such a vote, upon a motion made by myself for an address to the King upon neutrality in Portugal. I set out of the course taken by the House of Commons upon that Vote. It was carried by a large Majority. The King in his answer concurred it. The government took no notice of it.²²⁸

Due to British diplomacy, another coup occurred at the end of 1839, restoring a monarchist-conservative government. Fundamental to the entire course of events was

Fears of British intentions, which included the potential loss of overseas territories, pushed Portuguese officials, including Foreign Minister Marquis Sá da Bandeira, to seek a compromise. This eventually led to an agreement that involved leasing customs control over Goa to the British East India Company to avoid the direct takeover of the colony. Although Lisbon was hesitant, in 1842 it reluctantly agreed to sign a new treaty, even after Palmerston had left office. These new treaties included stricter measures, such as the "equipment clause," which allowed the punishment of ships outfitted for the slave trade, even if slaves were not physically present on board. More on this topic: MCGREGOR, Robert George, *Lord Palmerston and British Anti-Slavery, 1830–1865*, unpublished dissertation, Southampton, 2019.

²²⁴ Walden to Palmerston, Lisbon, 27 May 1835, TNA, FO 63/436.

²²⁵ Following the annulment of her engagement to Dom Miguel in 1835, Maria married Auguste, Duke of Leuchtenberg, although he died two months later. The following year, she married Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who gained the title of King of Portugal and reigned as Ferdinand II.

²²⁶ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 1 October 1836, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

²²⁷ BARTLETT, *Great Britain and Sea Power*, p. 97.

²²⁸ Wellington to Londonderry, London, 24 April 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 220.

that Palmerston did not favour revolutionaries demanding greater democratisation of the country and adopting a more liberal constitution. Instead, he gravitated towards the conservative, in certain regards repressive, regime which guaranteed Great Britain its crucial influence in the country.²²⁹ This narrative of Portuguese affairs in the second half of the 1830s contrasts sharply with Palmerston's reputation as "the main champion of the Liberal cause in Europe."²³⁰ Rather, the British Foreign Secretary was focused on promoting British interests above all else, adapting the circumstances in Portugal to best fit London's desires.²³¹

By the end of 1840, Britain enjoyed dominant influence on the Iberian Peninsula. As the 1840s opened, peace had been established in Spain and Portugal following an entire decade of unrest. A government of radicals, who respected Isabella as sovereign, came to power in Spain. Meanwhile, in Portugal, the Infanta emerged victorious, and despite domestic political difficulties, she managed to defend her government. By the end of Palmerston's second ministerial term, the two countries stood, surprisingly, on opposite sides. The Foreign Secretary benefited from his role as a "mediator" between the two states. Nevertheless, the question of the Iberian Peninsula was far from resolved, and it manifested itself in his future political career. Historically, the British campaign in Western Europe had proven successful. London had managed to use and boost its influence. The Quadruple Alliance, although fragile, had fulfilled its role in its initial phase by uniting liberal representatives in their shared struggle. On the other hand, in his efforts to achieve personal success, Palmerston had further damaged already strained relations with Austria, even though he claimed to be willing to set aside his own political principles to achieve his objectives.²³² In contrast, Metternich remained steadfast in his beliefs.²³³ He maintained that Don Carlos and Dom Miguel were the legitimate heirs to the throne, insisting that the principle of legitimacy be preserved.²³⁴ He did not view the wars in Spain and Portugal as an ideological struggle between liberalism and conservatism, but rather as a fight between law and order versus revolution and chaos. For the Austrian Chancellor, the question of the Iberian Peninsula was not as significant as it was for Palmerston. Instead, he saw the main threat to European peace in the resurgent Eastern Question, which became newly relevant by the late 1830s.²³⁵

²²⁹ RIDLEY, p. 190.

²³⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 415; DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, p. 67.

²³¹ STAHL, p. 288.

²³² SAUVIGNY, p. 463.

²³³ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 16 December 1838, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 219.

²³⁴ SEWARD, p. 233.

²³⁵ BROWN, *Palmerston and Austria*, p. 39.