

2 The July Revolution and the Structure of British and Austrian Foreign Policy

The summer of 1830 bore witness to many significant events whose consequences impacted politics in Britain and across Europe. The British king George IV died on 26 June 1830. He was succeeded by his younger brother, William IV. At the time, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, led a weak government that was reliant on the monarch's support. Despite this backing, it had to deal with several domestic, political, and international problems.¹ The Prime Minister was aware that the change of sovereignty meant that opposition voices were more powerful, but he continued to believe that his position was steadfast. In a letter to Robert Peel, 2nd Baronet, he wrote: "I should think that we do enjoy the respect and confidence of the country and that after the general election, we should have numbers."² This proved not to be the case. The government was markedly unpopular amongst the public, and it had many political opponents. The domestic political scene was divided into four main factions. Alongside the traditional Whigs and Tories, these were the group of Ultra-Tories and the so-called Canningites, of whom Palmerston was a member.³ By 1830, Palmerston was a somewhat secondary figure in British politics, despite having been a long-standing player on the scene and serving as Secretary at War from 1809 to 1828. The final phase of this period, during which he was a minister under George Canning in 1827, was significant in shaping his career.⁴ Although this government lasted only five months, Palmerston's handling of foreign affairs had a lasting impact on his future perspective on the European international environment.⁵

He had appreciated two things in particular about his predecessor. First, he dealt with foreign policy by differentiating between British interests and offering "inspiration" for other states through economic and military force. Second, he valued his vision, including courage and a new direction for British politics.⁶ He knew the need for cooperation with other Powers, keeping London a key player

1 STAHL, Andrea, *Metternich und Wellington. Eine Beziehungsgeschichte*, München 2013, p. 280.

2 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 107.

3 Although Palmerston was never truly a Canningite in the strict sense of the word. GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 25.

4 TEMPERLEY, Harold, *The Foreign Policy of Canning 1822–1827. England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World*, London 1966, p. 231.

5 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 16.

6 BULLEN, Roger, *Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale*, London 1974, p. 1.

in European politics.⁷ He was inspired by Canning's speech in the British parliament, during which he had stated: "The Idea of establishing it [Constitutional government] in other countries by the force of the sword was too chimerical to be entertained. [. . .] Let us not, in the foolish spirit of romance, suppose that we alone could regenerate Europe. To those struggles it is not our duty to be parties."⁸ Some historiographers describe Palmerston as a pupil of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, but this needs to be corrected.⁹ Unlike his successor, this British Foreign Secretary respected the international order, played a significant role in its formation, and aimed to achieve a general understanding within the Concert of Europe. On the other hand, in his efforts to pursue his objectives, Palmerston did not hesitate to go against this system, even at the cost of its dissolution.¹⁰ Regarding political character, he was an opportunist and had an excellent sense of what the British public desired.¹¹

Following Canning's death, the Tory Party became deeply divided into a faction supporting a continuation of current policy and a faction opposing this. The latter group became dominant, and as such, the establishment of the Duke of Wellington's government in 1827 was followed by radical changes in British diplomacy.¹² London reassessed its position on the newly emerging Greece and the continuing Portuguese succession dispute. Palmerston strongly opposed the government's course, which resulted in his resignation and move to the opposition.¹³ In 1828–1830, he began to show more interest in international problems, and his opinion shifted to a more liberal political camp.¹⁴ A year before becoming Foreign Secretary, he gave a speech to the British Parliament in which he criticised the government's approach to internal political arrangements on the Iberian Peninsula. Although only a few members of Parliament listened to him, his speech resonated across the political spectrum in the British Isles.¹⁵ Not only did he call for

7 HANSARD, Thomas Curson (ed.), *The Parliamentary Debates from the Year 1803 to the Present Time*, vol. XXII, London 1834, p. 80.

8 DIPPEL, Horst, *A Nineteenth-Century "Truman Doctrine" avant la lettre? Constitutional Liberty Abroad and the Parliamentary Debate about British Foreign Policy from Castlereagh to Palmerston*. In: GROTKÉ, Kelly, *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power*, Oxford 2014, p. 27.

9 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 10; SEAMAN, Lewis, *From Vienna to Versailles*, London 1955, p. 18.

10 DIPPEL, p. 47.

11 JUDD, *Palmerston*, p. 38.

12 STAHL, p. 278, GRÜNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 22.

13 BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 1.

14 Despite being considered a future minister, Palmerston had been primarily associated with roles related to financial matters rather than foreign policy until 1828.

15 SOUTHGATE, p. 2.

London's active involvement in Portugal and Greece, but he also accused the cabinet of supporting autocratic regimes across the English Channel.¹⁶

In terms of political affinity, Palmerston was a pragmatic Tory. In terms of diplomacy, he believed Great Britain should encourage constitutional regimes in Europe, bringing advantages to the countries and the whole continent. He claimed that conservative states suppressing natural developments in terms of liberal reforms were in danger of a permanent risk of revolution. The natural solution to deal with this threat was military intervention from outside. Not only did foreign intervention threaten British goals, but it also disturbed the European balance of power and lasting peace. In Palmerston's view of the world, reforms brought freedom and greater wealth, providing Great Britain, the most developed nation, with significant profit in the form of an increase in the trade balance. These opinions shifted Palmerston ideologically from the Tory camp to the Whigs.¹⁷

The stability of the various governments of the British Isles often depended on the political situation in Europe, which was also seen in the second half of 1830. As a result of the revolutionary battles taking place on 26–28 July in the Paris streets, Charles X's ultraconservative government, as represented by Prime Minister Jules Auguste Armand Marie, Count of Polignac, ended.¹⁸ These events went down in history as the July Revolution. The fate of the King of France's unpopular government was sealed upon issuing the Four Ordinances of Saint-Cloud. These decrees affected the rights of French citizens guaranteed by the Charter of 1814.¹⁹ His actions as head of the French government were a thorn in the side of the remaining Great Powers. According to many contemporaries, the revolution was the logical and inevitable outcome. Palmerston was also of this opinion. A year before the July events, he had visited France and concluded that if Polignac's policies did not change radically, the only possible solution was a change of the ruling system.²⁰

Reports of the outbreak of revolution in France nevertheless shocked Europe's courts. All of the Great Powers hesitated to take a clear position. Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were bound by international treaties arising from the 1815 Congress of Vienna and subsequently of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818.²¹

¹⁶ BELL, vol. I, p. 84.

¹⁷ BULLEN, *Palmerston*, Guizot, p. 2.

¹⁸ FORTESCUE, William, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in France 1815–1852*, Oxford 1988, p. 34.

¹⁹ HONE, William (ed.), *Full Annals of the Revolution in France 1830*, London 1830, p. 9.

²⁰ WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 78.

²¹ NICOLSON, Harold, *The Congress of Vienna. A Study in Allied Unity*, London 1946, p. 266.

These treaties declared that if a revolution occurred in France, the signatory countries should meet to agree on what to do next. It was a fact that none of the Powers wanted to get involved in a war with France. Russia's political representatives were divided in opinion. Emperor Nicholas I was discouraged by his diplomats from taking rash military action without securing support from the other participants in the Concert of Europe. Prussia responded by increasing its military readiness in the border regions and carefully monitoring how the situation in France developed. Nevertheless, it was not prepared to intervene alone. Austria contemplated intervention, but its economic situation prevented it from undertaking unilateral action.²²

The main decision lay on the shoulders of Great Britain. Despite the Duke of Wellington's government being generally seen as sympathetic to Polignac's regime, a schism developed in the cabinet, mainly due to Paris's foreign policy activities. Charles X trusted that success on the international scene would return to his government the popularity it had lost. As such, he decided to launch military operations on the Algerian coast, which led to the country's gradual occupation. The idea of a permanent French military base on the African coast was challenging for Great Britain to accept since the entire Mediterranean fell within the orbit of its primary interest.²³ Furthermore, the colonisation of Algeria disturbed the status quo, considering that France was the only country that could threaten Britain's naval dominance in the region.²⁴

Tense relations between London and Paris were further undermined by French diplomacy, which could not give an official reason for its military operation.²⁵ In a memorandum to Foreign Secretary George Hamilton-Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington wrote clear instructions:

We have demanded an official explanation. We have received a verbal one, which upon one point is so far unsatisfactory as that it states the intention of the French government to alter the nature of the tenure of its possession on the coast of Africa from being as heretofore a commercial factory to being hereafter a fortified post.²⁶

²² SKED, Alan, *Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire, 1815–1918*, London 2001, p. 26.

²³ Aberdeen to Stuart de Rothesay, London, 31 May 1830, The National Archives (hereinafter referred to as TNA), Foreign Office (hereinafter referred to as FO) 120/110.

²⁴ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna 4 January 1830, Austria-Österreichisches Staatsarchiv/Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereinafter referred to as AT-OeStA/HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (hereinafter referred to as StAbt), England 191; ŠEDIVÝ, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question*, p. 424.

²⁵ WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 25.

²⁶ WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 25.

Threats from London did no good, with an expeditionary force disembarking in Algeria on 14 June 1830. British diplomacy came to terms with the occupation and did not undertake any counteraction.²⁷ Another unfortunate coincidence for London was the dangerous rapprochement between St Petersburg and Paris. The spectre of a Russo-French alliance represented a worst-case scenario for the Foreign Office.²⁸ Britain's response to the July Revolution reflected the French army's operation on the North African coast. Wellington's government was unwilling to intervene in support of Charles X and made its disinterest in French affairs very clear.²⁹ The Prime Minister wrote to his friend, Hugh Percy, Duke of Northumberland, about the revolution: "I confess that I cannot understand how an army of twenty thousand men [in arms] could have been beaten out of Paris, if disposed to do its duty."³⁰ The British government's hesitant and ambiguous policy regarding the July Revolution and Algerian occupation resulted in a domestic political schism, providing space for future reorganisation.

Palmerston was one of the greatest sympathisers of France's newly established July regime.³¹ He was convinced that the new king, Louis Philippe of Orléans, from a cadet branch of the House of Bourbon, would seek peace in Europe and national prosperity. The British politician did not doubt the necessity of establishing friendly relations between Paris and London as soon as possible. Furthermore, he believed that the revolution should not just break out in France but should be progressively reflected in the German Confederation, Italy, and Spain. His opinion is evidenced in the following words: "We shall drink to the cause of Liberalism all over the world. [. . .] Let Spain & Austria & Italy & Portugal & parts of Germany will sooner or later be affected. [. . .] The reign of Metternich is over."³² According to Palmerston, the July Revolution not only changed the ruling dynasty but also brought new opportunities for the entire Continent. Despite considering Charles X's foreign policy dangerous, he was naively convinced that the new French government would change its course.³³

27 ŠEDIVÝ, Miroslav, *Rakousko a Východní otázka 1829–1841*, unpublished dissertation, Praha 2008, p. 62.

28 During this period, Russia and France negotiated to achieve a new international order in Europe. Revisionist desires in Paris were reflected in Polignac's memorandum, which included the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, this project was abandoned due to a lack of interest from Russia.

29 SVOBODA, Karel, *Autokrat a jeho doba. Rusko a revoluce v letech 1830–1831*, Praha 2016, p. 22.

30 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 137.

31 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

32 BROWN, Palmerston. *A Biography*, p. 143.

33 BELL, vol. I, p. 86.

As political circumstances indicated, the July Revolution directly resulted in the fall of the Duke of Wellington's government, which occurred in October 1830. The "Iron Duke" himself said of the matter: "However, we should still have been too strong for them if the French Revolution had not occurred at the very moment of the dissolution of Parliament."³⁴ In the autumn of 1830, Wellington was still trying to form a new government. He nominated Palmerston for a ministerial position, which he rejected.³⁵ Once the government failed to receive a vote of confidence, Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey, was tasked with appointing a new government. This represented a milestone in British politics. After more than twenty years, the Tories' political dominance was over. Grey initially offered Palmerston the post of Home Secretary, but in the end, Henry Vassall-Fox, Baron Holland, recommended him for the position of Foreign Secretary.³⁶ Britain's new Prime Minister agreed, and Palmerston greatly appreciated his nomination. He took up his new role on 22 November 1830. Aberdeen assured the Austrian ambassador in London, Pál Antal, Prince Esterházy, that "under the circumstances, the choice of Lord Palmerston for the portfolio of foreign affairs was the most favourable one we could expect."³⁷ Government cooperation between the Canningites and the Whigs was the logical outcome of the changes in British politics since the mid-1820s. They had more opinions in common than they had differences. Even so, areas of friction later surfaced, threatening Palmerston's government role.³⁸ During his active government period, the Foreign Secretary never became a full Whig member. In international matters, he was often criticised by the cabinet, and after an entire decade in office, a strong opposition built up against him, disagreeing with how he managed his position.³⁹

During his time in government in 1830–1841 (with a brief interlude during the winter of 1834–1835), Palmerston was surrounded by many able diplomats who made an indelible mark on British and global history of international relations. One of his key advisors was the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Backhouse. Another Under-Secretary was Sir George Shee, 2nd Baronet, who held the role between 1830 and 1834. When Palmerston returned to his role in 1835, the position was taken on by William Fox-Strangways, 4th Earl of Ilchester. In 1840, he was replaced by Granville Leveson-Gower, 2nd

34 WELLINGTON, vol. VII, p. 383.

35 SUDLEY, Arthur Paul John (ed.), *The Lieven-Palmerston Correspondence 1828–1856*, London 1943, p. 19.

36 WEBSTER, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, vol. I, p. 21.

37 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 November 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 190.

38 BULLEN, *Palmerston*, Guizot, p. 3.

39 BELL, vol. I, p. 97.

Earl Granville, who later became Foreign Secretary. One of the most important ambassadors of this era was John Ponsonby, Great Britain's representative in the Ottoman Empire. He replaced Robert Gordon in 1831 and remained in the role until 1841. His First Secretary from 1835 was the infamous David Urquhart, and together with Ponsonby, they had a significant influence on British policy in the Eastern Question. When Palmerston took up his role, the 2nd Earl Granville's father, Granville Leveson-Gower, 1st Earl Granville, was the ambassador to France. Arthur Aston became Secretary to the Embassy in Paris in 1833 and replaced in 1839 by Palmerston's biographer, Henry Lytton Bulwer. William Russell was in Berlin. The diplomatic mission in St Petersburg was problematic. After 1832, Palmerston could not find a suitable replacement for the Tory William à Court, 1st Baron Heytesbury. His nomination of the leading nineteenth century British diplomat, Stratford Canning, was rejected by the Emperor, and as such, he eventually appointed John Lambton, 1st Earl of Durham, to the open position.⁴⁰

In Vienna, Frederick Lamb, Baron Beauvale (from 1839), served as the British ambassador between 1832 and 1841.⁴¹ Lamb was one of the ablest diplomats of his time. As is evidenced in his private correspondence, he had a close relationship with Palmerston. He was the brother of Lady Emily Cowper, Palmerston's romantic partner of many years and later his wife, and the brother of the future British Prime Minister, William Lamb, Viscount Melbourne. His good relations with Metternich, whom he admired, were important in terms of Anglo-Austrian diplomacy.⁴² He used his position to strive for the warmest possible relations between London and Vienna.⁴³ He did not always receive Palmerston's or Metternich's unconditional diplomatic support and often conflicted with both men. From a political perspective, he could interpret and explain the Austrian Chancellor's positions to the British Foreign Secretary and highlight both states' shared international political interests. Over his entire career, he strived to break down the Foreign Secretary's distrust of the Austrian Chancellor and establish closer Anglo-Austrian relations.⁴⁴

At the start of Palmerston's tenure as Foreign Secretary, the main guarantee of European security was the cooperation of all Great Powers. However, during his time in the cabinet, this idea faded away, with acting in one's own interest and calculating cooperation with France taking precedence for him.⁴⁵ Thus, Great

40 RAYMON, Jones, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1815–1914*, Waterloo 1983, p. 42.

41 Following the death of his brother, he became 3rd Viscount Melbourne in 1848.

42 WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 7.

43 GRUNER, *Metternich, Palmerston*, p. 21.

44 Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 3 September 1833, TNA, FO 120/137.

45 SKED, Alan, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation*, Basingstoke 2007, p. 67.

Britain pursued its national interests and sought support from foreign powers only when it could derive tangible benefits from such an alliance.⁴⁶ The British Foreign Secretary was steadfast in this policy. Although many have called him a leading figure of European liberalism, he often acted out of self-interest and offensively, regardless of whether it involved a constitutional or absolutist state. He advocated for a balance of power and peace, but to achieve this, he acted selfishly and contrary to his beliefs. Where he could not achieve his goals through diplomatic means, using force was an alternative solution for him, as his following words confirm: “Diplomats and protocols are very good things, but there are no better peace-keepers than well-appointed three-deckers.”⁴⁷ Even so, such a policy could not be pursued alone, and as such, Great Britain saw France as its main partner since the two states were closest ideologically.

The newly elected Whig cabinet was immediately aware of these facts and began diplomatic discussions with Paris. The expression “*entente cordiale*” is used for this period of Anglo-French rapprochement, and Palmerston was one of the first to use it.⁴⁸ From an ideological perspective France was the ideal partner for Great Britain, as similar political regimes determined their moral positions. As in London, public opinion played a crucial role in Paris, being a “hidden” driver in both countries. Even with the new liberal regime, the still strong revisionist sentiment did not change in France. This factor was also reflected in its foreign policy objectives and clashed with British and Austrian plans. Although relations with Paris were warm, London’s international policy still focused on containing France, with mutual cooperation seen as the best way to achieve this. At the same time, the two states competed for spheres of influence worldwide, and their relations were far from ideal.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, London and Paris reached an agreement in terms of international law. A non-intervention policy represented the cornerstone of diplomacy for both powers. This ideology was based on the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Canning came up with this claim as Foreign Secretary, and Palmerston took over where he left off. Eight months before joining the government, in March 1830, he had made a speech in the British Parliament about the matter. In it, he had declared the use of force as the only unacceptable form of intervention. Any other form, such as diplomatic assistance, was not against British principles. In fact, the line between intervention and non-

46 BULLEN, Roger, *The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815–48*. In: SKED, Alan (ed.), *Europe’s Balance of Power 1815–1848*, London 1979, p. 123.

47 JUDD, Palmerston, p. 45.

48 WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 4.

49 EDWARDS, William, *British Foreign Policy 1815–1933*, London 1934, p. 3.

intervention was so slim that there were regular clashes in the British Parliament over what these terms actually meant. The Foreign Secretary later declared: "I maintain, on the contrary, that their alleged principle of neutrality and non-interference has only been a cloak, under cover of which they have given effectual assistance to that party, whom they secretly favoured."⁵⁰ During the 1830s, this doctrine of Great Britain was bent several times, and its interpretation was far from clear.⁵¹ There were even differences of opinion within the British cabinet on its interpretation. In diplomatic practice, Palmerston exploited this principle to pursue his objectives of power and implemented it as he saw fit on some international issues.⁵² France took a similar approach. Louis Philippe's government did not hesitate to breach the "European legal order" to achieve its national interests, and like London, it utilised its interpretation for its benefit.⁵³

Austria had different political motives than Britain. Metternich had held the post of Foreign Minister since 1809 and was appointed Chancellor in 1821 by Emperor Francis I. Following Napoleon's defeat, Great Britain was Austria's principal partner, and they pursued shared objectives. It was only when Canning arrived as Foreign Secretary in 1822 that a fundamental schism appeared between the two powers.⁵⁴ Metternich said the following:

Mr Canning's administration has gone down in the history of England and Europe. We must consider the short duration of [Canning's] government as equivalent to the league which drew us away from the right and practical old order to the politics of fantasy, which shall bring France to 1789 in a few years.⁵⁵

The Ballhausplatz's foreign policy was based on eliminating conspiratorial movements on the Continent, which the Prince saw as a means of disturbing the peace and causing permanent instability.⁵⁶ He believed that only a working international system would protect all governments against the common enemy, revolution, which could only result in chaos.⁵⁷ For Metternich, Europe was the embodi-

⁵⁰ Palmerston's speech at the British Parliament, London, 10 March 1830, HANSARD, vol. XXII, pp. 80–81.

⁵¹ DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, Anselm, *Von Wiener Kongress zur Pariser Konferenz. England, die deutsche Frage und das Mächtesystem 1815–1856*, Göttingen 1991, p. 68.

⁵² SATTLER, Gertrude, *Lord Palmerston und Österreich*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1949, p. 3.

⁵³ DIPPEL, p. 36.

⁵⁴ SKED, *Decline*, p. 28.

⁵⁵ Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 12 August 1831, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 194.

⁵⁶ ROHL, Eva-Renate, *Metternich und England: Studien zum Urteil des Staatskanzlers über eine konstitutionelle Monarchie*, unpublished dissertation, Wien 1973, p. 141.

⁵⁷ HALL, John Major, *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, London 1916, p. 19.

ment of a social and political order that needed to be defended by shared forces.⁵⁸ The Great Powers represented protectors of general security, and their task was to suppress any threats to the prevailing international system without compromise.⁵⁹ During his time in diplomatic service, the Austrian Chancellor was consistent in his opinions and, in contrast to Palmerston, sought cooperation on a Europe-wide basis. He aimed for the fruit of his policy to be not just stability for Austria but stability for the entire Continent.

The policy of non-intervention, in Metternich's view, represented a disruption to the system that ensured the preservation of European order. If any of the smaller states asked via its legitimate representative for help from one of the Great Powers, it was the duty of every member of the Concert to offer their support.⁶⁰ This differing understanding of this core international political problem between Austria and Great Britain was significant throughout the 1830s and shaped their distinct approaches to the issues of the time. The British Foreign Secretary and the Austrian Chancellor were representatives of different ideological schools, and they differed in their understanding and pursuit of European diplomacy.⁶¹ Metternich considered Palmerston a: "Mouthpiece of the revolutionary propaganda."⁶² In his opinion, his policies were responsible for the destruction of the continental law. Under his leadership, British diplomacy acted only out of calculation and did not respect the social order.⁶³ The two politicians agreed that the system of the Concert of Europe should be preserved by holding international conferences. Despite this, they differed in their perception of what these meetings should be for and where they should be centred. For Metternich, Vienna was the natural centre, and this related to his desire to return Austria to the prestige it lost after 1822.⁶⁴ Palmerston proposed London for this purpose.⁶⁵ This rivalry was just one more point of friction that became apparent between the two statesmen.

Although only thirteen years apart, both diplomats reflected different eras. Metternich's opinions were influenced by the 1789 revolutionary events in France and the later Jacobin Reign of Terror.⁶⁶ Palmerston was nine years old at the time and lived in the relatively peaceful British Isles. The Austrian Chancellor played a

⁵⁸ DOERING-MANTEUFFEL, p. 66.

⁵⁹ SKED, *Decline*, p. 28.

⁶⁰ SKED, *Metternich and Austria*, p. 88.

⁶¹ ROHL, p. 140.

⁶² SIEMANN, Wolfram, *Metternich's Britain*. In: GESTRICH, Andreas (ed.), German Historical Institute. The 2011 Annual Lecture, London 2012, p. 23.

⁶³ SIEMANN, *Metternich's Britain*, p. 24.

⁶⁴ Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 April 1833, TNA, FO 120/136.

⁶⁵ WEBSTER, *Palmerston, the Metternich*, p. 6.

⁶⁶ ROHL, p. 141.

crucial role at the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, while Palmerston was more of a marginal figure in British politics. These facts painted different pictures for these two key figures of European policy in the first half of the nineteenth century.⁶⁷

The Austrian Chancellor's view of the British Isles was far less critical prior to 1830 than afterwards. The experience of the British political regime was essential for forming his political opinions. A young Metternich undertook his first visit to the British Isles in 1794. He regularly attended sessions of the British Parliament, making contact with leading political figures of the time, such as William Pitt the Younger. British politician and philosopher Edmund Burke markedly influenced his opinions, Metternich having come across his ideas in London. According to him, the ideal system of government was one in which the sovereign held all power and was surrounded only by advisors. He did not believe in the concept of a constitutional (parliamentary) monarchy, with Great Britain the only exception. He also supposed that the British political system, having been tested over centuries, provided a guarantee of internal stability. This opinion led to his stance on Europe's newly emerging constitutional regimes.⁶⁸ For Metternich, Britain represented a guarantee of a lasting balance of power, and he believed that its political motives prior to 1830 aligned closely with those of Austria.⁶⁹

Even at the start of the 1830s, relations between London and Vienna were relatively good. Both states were distrustful of France for different reasons.⁷⁰ Metternich tried to discourage Polignac from his Algerian campaign in the interest of preserving the status quo.⁷¹ He realised that the project would lead to the disruption of already fragile relations between Great Britain and France, and he also foresaw a deteriorating domestic political situation within France if the campaign were to fail. Although the French presence did not fundamentally impact Austrian interests in North Africa, the intervention was against Metternich's interna-

⁶⁷ SIEMANN, *Metternich's Britain*, p. 25.

⁶⁸ On the other hand, Metternich demonstrated a degree of tolerance for constitutional monarchies beyond Austria accepted constitutional systems in certain cases, particularly in France, Norway-Sweden after 1814, and some German states. Metternich's acceptance of these systems largely depended on how restrictive their constitutions were rather than opposition to constitutional monarchy itself. However, Britain stood as a significant exception to his general aversion to parliamentary rule, illustrating a nuanced approach to different forms of governance within Europe. He harboured a general suspicion of parliamentary systems, particularly those that could foster increased democratic participation and potentially destabilise the established political order.

⁶⁹ SIEMANN, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär*, p. 132.

⁷⁰ BULLEN, *Palmerston, Guizot*, p. 4.

⁷¹ Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, 10 June 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, Frankreich 272.

tional political principles since it affected the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. It could also arouse a serious quarrel, especially between Great Britain and France, that would lead to increased tensions within Europe. The Austrian Chancellor hoped for a traditional resolution of the situation via diplomacy, with cooperation with London.⁷² Once it was evident that French intervention was inevitable, Vienna began actively supporting Britain. The only agent with the means to prevent the French expedition was the government in London. But Wellington's cabinet policy lacked strength in this case. Despite Austrian help, it was the passive approach of Aberdeen and Wellington that enabled France to occupy Algeria.⁷³

When the revolution broke out in Paris, Metternich was at his summer residence in Königswart (Kynžvart), West Bohemia. By chance, Russian Vice-Chancellor Karl Robert, Count von Nesselrode, was staying in Carlsbad (Karlovy Vary) for his health. At a joint meeting on 5 August 1830, the two statesmen agreed not to interfere in Paris's domestic political affairs on the condition that the revolution did not spread beyond the French borders.⁷⁴ They are reported to have acknowledged Louis Philippe's legitimacy if he undertook to maintain the order set out at the Congress of Vienna.⁷⁵ Nesselrode acted of his own volition in this regard since he had not received any official instructions from St Petersburg.⁷⁶

Austro-Russian relations were tense at that time, and Metternich attempted to exploit his meeting with Nesselrode to restore the long history of cooperation between the two Eastern Powers. Russia's Vice-Chancellor was more cautious. One of the Austrian Chancellor's ideas, for example, was that a joint diplomatic centre be established in Berlin in case the revolution spread across the Continent. Nesselrode rejected the idea. His rational arguments were first that it was illogical to arrange a diplomatic gathering whose objective was to wait and see whether the disorder would spread through Europe. Secondly, he disagreed that the centre of discussions should be in the alternatively suggested Vienna. He thought the ideal venue for such an event was London.⁷⁷ Despite this, the meeting in Carlsbad

72 Esterházy to Metternich, London, 23 January 1830, AT-OeStA/HHStA, StAbt, England 189.

73 TEMPERLEY, *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, p. 61.

74 SIEMANN, *Metternich. Strategie und Visionär*, p. 769.

75 Cowley to Palmerston, 19 December 1830, TNA, FO 7/223.

76 Metternich to Nesselrode, Vienna, 11 August 1830, NESSELRODE, Anatole (ed.), *Lettres et papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850*, vol. VII, Paris 1908, p. 147; SVOBODA, p. 27.

77 SVOBODA, p. 28.

sketched out the future direction of cooperation between Vienna and St Petersburg for the entire subsequent decade.⁷⁸

In reality, Metternich was the only statesman who responded swiftly to the revolutionary situation and did not remain a passive observer. He travelled from Carlsbad to the Austrian capital to inform Emperor Francis I of the discussion. Louis Philippe's envoy, General Augustin Daniel Belliard, was awaiting him in the Hofburg, his mission being to inform the Austrian monarch of the new King of the French's interests. His letter to Francis I stated that Louis Philippe would strive to achieve peace both at home and beyond France's borders. In his response, the Austrian Emperor assured the French King that he did not want to take any action against a country which sought peace in Europe.⁷⁹

Metternich was not particularly enthusiastic about the situation. In his opinion, the Orléans regime was not likely to last for long and was doomed to collapse. He was also convinced of the end of the old Europe, which would be racked with rebellion.⁸⁰ The centre of revolution would be Paris, from where the entire network of insurgency would be directed. The Chancellor remained convinced throughout his political career that the French capital was a haven for all conspirators across Europe.⁸¹ His greatest concern was the collapse of the monarchy and the spread of revolution across Europe. Metternich did not think Charles X's resignation was a disaster, but the election of Louis Philippe only increased his consistent animosity towards France.⁸² Nonetheless, Metternich had certain diplomatic levers he could use against Louis Philippe in an emergency. Wolfram Siemann made this clear by finding that Metternich had copies of a letter incriminating Louis Philippe for wanting to join the Austrian side in the fight against revolutionary France and Napoleon.⁸³

Despite Tsar Nicholas I's stubborn refusal to recognise Louis Philippe as King, the desire to maintain peace and the current international order prevailed in Europe. As a result, other countries quickly moved to recognise the new regime. This conviction was supported by the French King's declaration, in which he portrayed himself as an ardent conservative and supporter of the Vienna order. Great Britain was the first to officially recognise Louis Philippe's regime, with

⁷⁸ SIEMANN, *Metternich. Stratege und Visionär*, p. 766; BARTLETT, Christopher John, *Peace, War and the European Powers 1814–1914*, London 1996, p. 30.

⁷⁹ HALL, p. 21.

⁸⁰ Metternich to Emperor Francis I, Königswart, 31 July 1831, METTERNICH-WINNEBURG, vol. V, p. 18.

⁸¹ SVOBODA, p. 33.

⁸² ŠEDIVÝ, *Rakousko a Východní otázka*, p. 73.

⁸³ SIEMANN, *Metternich. Stratege und Visionär*, s. 661.

other Powers following later. Russia formally (*de jure*) acknowledged the regime on 18 September 1831.⁸⁴ However, the persistent tension between St Petersburg and Paris continued throughout the 1830s, affecting the workings of the Concert of Europe.

The Austrian Chancellor had the final word on the conduct of the Habsburg Monarchy's foreign policy. He said of cooperation with the Emperor: "Heaven has placed me next to a man who might have been created for me as I for him. The Emperor Francis knows what he wants, which never differs from what I want most."⁸⁵ In fact, he was almost unrestricted in diplomatic matters and had the Emperor's full support. However, from a domestic political perspective, Franz Anton von Kolowrat, who held significant influence over the Empire's financial affairs, was a formidable rival. As a result, Metternich often had to seek compromises to appease the court chamberlain and align his international political interests with internal pressures. Like Palmerston, Metternich could rely on experienced diplomats. Pál Antal, Prince Esterházy, was the Austrian ambassador in London, but due to various political and personal difficulties, he was often outside Great Britain. Like Lamb, he endeavoured to bring his Foreign Secretary's stances closer to his British counterpart. Baron Philipp von Neumann and Baron Karl von Hummelauer were subordinates who had far less influence on Metternich and foreign affairs than their superiors.⁸⁶ Since London often played a crucial role in European matters during the 1830s, the Austrian Chancellor instead had to rely on the reports of his diplomats. The actual state of affairs or the interpretation itself was often misinterpreted, limiting him in making important decisions.

Metternich's concern regarding the spread of revolution and Palmerston's conviction that events in France would impact surrounding European countries soon proved justified. A month after the July events, Belgian citizens in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands took to the streets to express their disagreement with the rule of King William I. Thus, Europe found itself again facing a revolution, and it was up to the Powers, headed by the new British Foreign Secretary, to take up a stance and try to maintain peace on the Continent. In the following diplomatic battle, both politicians found themselves with opposing positions and advocating different approaches.

⁸⁴ SVOBODA, p. 29.

⁸⁵ SKED, *Decline*, p. 23.

⁸⁶ Although Neumann's diplomatic role increased significantly during the 1830s.