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ENGLISH AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE

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Logic and philosophy for linguists
This chapter is in the book Logic and philosophy for linguists
Richard Montague ENGLISH AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE 1. INTRODUCTION1 I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages. On the other hand, I do not regard as successful the formal treatments of natural languages attempted by certain contemporary linguists. Like Donald Davidson2 I regard the construction of a theory of truth—or rather, of the more general notion of truth under an arbitrary interpretation—as the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology offer little promise towards that end. In the present paper I shall accordingly present a precise treatment, culminating in a theory of truth, a formal language that I believe may be reasonably regarded as a fragment of ordinary English. I have restricted myself to a very limited fragment, partly because there are portions of English I do not yet know how to treat, but also for the sake of simplicity Reprinted from: Bruno Visentini, et al., Linguaggi nella societa e nella tecnica (Milan, 1970), 189-223. 1 Some of the ideas in the present paper were adumbrated in seminar lectures in Amsterdam in January and February of 1966 and in Los Angeles in March of 1968. An earlier version of the present paper was delivered at the University of British Columbia in July of 1968. Much of the work reported here was supported by U.S. National Science Foundation Grant GP-7706.1 should like to express my appreciation, for valuable criticism and suggestions, to Professors Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, David Lewis, Terence Parsons, Barbara Hall Partee, Dana Scott, and J. F. Staal, Messrs. Donald Berkey, John Cooley, and Perry Smith, and especially my student Dr. J. A. W. Kamp, without whose suggestions the present paper would not have been possible. 2 In Davidson (1970).
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston

Richard Montague ENGLISH AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE 1. INTRODUCTION1 I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and natural languages. On the other hand, I do not regard as successful the formal treatments of natural languages attempted by certain contemporary linguists. Like Donald Davidson2 I regard the construction of a theory of truth—or rather, of the more general notion of truth under an arbitrary interpretation—as the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the developments emanating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology offer little promise towards that end. In the present paper I shall accordingly present a precise treatment, culminating in a theory of truth, a formal language that I believe may be reasonably regarded as a fragment of ordinary English. I have restricted myself to a very limited fragment, partly because there are portions of English I do not yet know how to treat, but also for the sake of simplicity Reprinted from: Bruno Visentini, et al., Linguaggi nella societa e nella tecnica (Milan, 1970), 189-223. 1 Some of the ideas in the present paper were adumbrated in seminar lectures in Amsterdam in January and February of 1966 and in Los Angeles in March of 1968. An earlier version of the present paper was delivered at the University of British Columbia in July of 1968. Much of the work reported here was supported by U.S. National Science Foundation Grant GP-7706.1 should like to express my appreciation, for valuable criticism and suggestions, to Professors Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, David Lewis, Terence Parsons, Barbara Hall Partee, Dana Scott, and J. F. Staal, Messrs. Donald Berkey, John Cooley, and Perry Smith, and especially my student Dr. J. A. W. Kamp, without whose suggestions the present paper would not have been possible. 2 In Davidson (1970).
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/Boston

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter 1
  2. Contents 5
  3. Introduction 7
  4. PART i : MEANING AND FORMAL SEMANTICS
  5. ON SENSE AND REFERENCE 13
  6. MEANING AND SYNONYMY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES 33
  7. A SURVEY OF FORMAL SEMANTICS 48
  8. TRUTH 83
  9. ENGLISH AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE 94
  10. ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE 122
  11. SEMANTICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 142
  12. KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, AND LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 165
  13. TENSE LOGICS AND THE TENSES OF ENGLISH 177
  14. PART II: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEANING
  15. THE MEANING OF A WORD 187
  16. TRUTH 203
  17. CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY 226
  18. PART III: PHILOSOPHERS ON GRAMMAR
  19. A PROGRAM FOR SYNTAX 238
  20. METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT LINGUISTIC THEORY 251
  21. GRAMMAR AND PHILOSOPHY 263
  22. PART IV: THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LINGUISTIC THEORY
  23. THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 279
  24. COMPETENCE, CREATIVITY, AND INNATENESS 299
  25. LINGUISTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 327
  26. LINGUISTICS AS PSYCHOLOGY 336
  27. Bibliography 344
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111546216-007

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter 1
  2. Contents 5
  3. Introduction 7
  4. PART i : MEANING AND FORMAL SEMANTICS
  5. ON SENSE AND REFERENCE 13
  6. MEANING AND SYNONYMY IN NATURAL LANGUAGES 33
  7. A SURVEY OF FORMAL SEMANTICS 48
  8. TRUTH 83
  9. ENGLISH AS A FORMAL LANGUAGE 94
  10. ANALYSIS OF CONVERSATIONAL LANGUAGE 122
  11. SEMANTICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 142
  12. KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, AND LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE 165
  13. TENSE LOGICS AND THE TENSES OF ENGLISH 177
  14. PART II: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MEANING
  15. THE MEANING OF A WORD 187
  16. TRUTH 203
  17. CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY 226
  18. PART III: PHILOSOPHERS ON GRAMMAR
  19. A PROGRAM FOR SYNTAX 238
  20. METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT LINGUISTIC THEORY 251
  21. GRAMMAR AND PHILOSOPHY 263
  22. PART IV: THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND LINGUISTIC THEORY
  23. THE THOUGHT: A LOGICAL INQUIRY 279
  24. COMPETENCE, CREATIVITY, AND INNATENESS 299
  25. LINGUISTICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY 327
  26. LINGUISTICS AS PSYCHOLOGY 336
  27. Bibliography 344
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