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The Ideals and Practices of the Study of Ramist Dialectics and Rhetoric in *Academia Gustaviana* (1632 – 1665)

Abstract: The present chapter aims to provide a better understanding of Ramist practices in the study of rhetoric and dialectics in early modern *Academia Gustaviana* in Dorpat (Tartu). Such a study is important due to both the key role Ramism played in *Academia Gustaviana* and the importance Ramist doctrine placed in dialectics and rhetoric. Or, to put it differently, this study focuses on the key aspects —dialectics and rhetoric—of the key aspect—Ramism—of *Academia Gustaviana.* Fundamentally, this means that understanding the actual study practices in *Academia Gustaviana* is possible only after understanding the dialectics and rhetoric being taught there. For that reason, this chapter will first focus on the texts—both classical and contemporary—that were used to study the rules of rhetoric and dialectics. Then it will cover the practices, such as writing analyses of classical authors' poems or writing orations to be delivered in public. Describing and comparing all of this this chapter explicates the key idea in the study of rhetoric and dialectics and how such study took place while simultaneously discussing the student's role in writing disputations and the actual role of Ramus in *Academia Gustaviana.*

In his *Oratio De Dialectica* from October 10, 1638, Carolus Valeriani (fl. 1640)—a student in the newly founded *Academia Gustaviana* in Dorpat (Tartu)—constructed a wonderful analogy comparing dialectics to Ariadne's thread that helps us find a way out of the Minotaur's (sophist's) labyrinth: "Oh, dialectics, you are the greatest guiding thread. You lead us to cut off the fabrication, fictions, and lies of the Sophists."[1] Such praise in a speech about dialectics is of course not surprising, but it nevertheless highlights the central role of dialectics—also referred to as logic—in early modern education. Not only was it used to structure disciplines for more efficient educational programs (Hotson 2011, 44; Friedenthal and Piirimäe 2015, 65), but it also formed the basis on which students were meant to think, write,

1 "O Dialectica, tu filum es optimum: Tu nos, ad detruncanda illa commenta, fictiones et mendacia Sophistarum, ducis" (Valeriani 1638). Unless otherwise specified, all translations presented in this work are my own.

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compose arguments, and find solutions in general. As such, it was considered among the subjects of the *trivium*—the first three subjects of seven liberal arts—that students had to learn before moving on to more advanced studies—the *quadrivium.* And so—as the statutes of *Academia Gustaviana* prescribed—"its use does not only appear in disputations but maximally exhibits its power in composition and resolution."[2] From this perspective it becomes evident that a deeper understanding of early modern university education in Ramist *Academia Gustaviana* is dependent on understanding dialectics and—since Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) joined the two fields together (Mack 2011, 136)—rhetoric. But until now, these topics from the period of *Academia Gustaviana* have received relatively little attention.[3]

To fill this gap in research, I have studied available disputations (14)[4] and orations (3)[5] on rhetoric, dialectics, and poetics written in *Academia Gustaviana.* However, as explicitly covering every single disputation would far exceed the physical limitations of this chapter and severely test the patience of any potential reader, I explicitly focus on—and provide examples from—a select few that best illustrate the key aspects of Ramism in *Academia Gustaviana.* First, after a brief context (section 1), it is important to give insight into the basic texts from classical and more contemporary authors which were used to study the rules of dialectics and rhetoric (sections 2–3). But as we will see, only studying rules was deemed inefficient and so, secondly, we will examine disputations that dealt with analyzing the meaning, structure, and poetic figures of ancient poets' texts (sections 4–5). Finally, as one major aim of studying rhetoric and dialectics was to become a better public speaker, it is important to cover orations written and delivered by students (section 6).

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2 "Ejus vero usus cum non duntaxat in disputationibus appareat, verum in compositione et resolutione vim suam maxime ostendat" (*Constitutiones* 1997, 62).

3 There have been some quite excellent articles written about disputations from *Academia Gustaviana* by Meelis Friedenthal (Friedenthal 2010, 2015, 2020, 2021). In addition, there is also one thorough article by Katre Kaju (Kaju 2009) written on Laurentius Ludenius—the professor of poetics and rhetoric. Finally, Janika Päll (Päll 2003) and Kristi Viiding (Viiding 2017) have also written on Ludenius, but they focused on his contribution to the development of occasional poetry in Livonia. I however aim to focus on the Ramist influences in dialectical and rhetorical disputations to better our understanding of the fundamentals of Ramism in actual study practices in *Academia Gustaviana.*

4 This research is mostly based on Jaanson's index of rhetorical disputations (Jaanson 2000, p. 494), but a more accurate list of works studied in relation to this chapter can be found in the bibliography. Also, when citing Jaanson's bibliography, I have usually used the number of the entry instead of the page number. This is the only exception.

5 The only three orations that in their subject matter deal with rhetoric, poetics, or dialectics.

1 Introduction: Ramism, *Academia Gustaviana*, and Laurentius Ludenius

Unlike traditional humanist teaching that focused on a comprehensive understanding of every detail of a subject, Ramism set speed and applicability at the forefront of all teaching. For Ramus a good education did not drag on for years, costing students increasing amounts of time and money, but rather focused only on the most fundamental and useful aspects, trying to present them as efficiently and clearly as possible (Hotson 2011, 42–43).[6] To accomplish such a task and to cut down the time of study to a maximum of seven years—while it was common to dedicate seven years for only Latin and Greek studies (Hotson 2011, 39–40)—Ramus sought a new method of structuring knowledge that boils down to three laws. *Lex veritatis* establishes the truth of what is being taught. *Lex justitiae* determines the purpose of the discipline and shows what can and cannot be included in it. And *lex sapientiae* structures the discipline from general to particular (Hotson 2011, 45). Following these three laws, every discipline first had to be defined by its use and then divided into two or three parts that could in turn be defined and divided further (Hotson 2011, 46). From this, it was already relatively easy to produce textbooks that were on point, avoided unnecessary excursions into only tangentially related topics, replaced the long and winding texts of ancient authors, and allowed for constructing a system of visualized learning.

This method is intimately connected with Ramus' teaching of dialectics and rhetoric. When traditionally those two disciplines had been studied apart then following in the footsteps of Rudolph Agricola (1444–1485) Ramus and his colleague Omer Talon (1510–1562) both connected the study of those two disciplines and compressed them into a small set of core principles (Mack 2011, 136, 142). While rhetoric courses had traditionally taught five skills—invention, disposition, style, delivery, and memory—Ramus' dialectics focused only on the first two, and rhetoric dealt with the second two leaving the last one—memory—to the field of psychology (Mack 2011, 145).[7] But Ramus did not only cut down, in the case of dialec-

6 As is well known, the reasons for such an approach were at least partly personal. Having multiple times had to halt his studies due to lack of funding, Ramus understood too well the need for a faster and more focused curriculum that would make education available for poorer classes of society (Hotson 2011, 41).

7 To briefly define those principles, for Ramus, invention is about finding arguments. Disposition (also known as judgment) looks at the way a valid argument is construed and deals with propositions, syllogisms, and method. Style focuses on four tropes—metonymy, irony, metaphor, and syn-

tics, he also broadened its applicability. While dialectics before had strictly been used to combine propositions into a syllogistic form, Ramus also saw its use in structuring disciplines—invention could be used to determine the material suitable for each discipline, and disposition could be useful for its organization (Hotson 2011, 44). Thus, for Ramus, the three laws of structuring disciplines discussed in the previous paragraph were just one special case of dialectics (Mack 2011, 147).

However, such simplification and reorganization did not come without its critics. For many humanists, by abandoning authors of antiquity for simplified textbooks, Ramus had abandoned true knowledge. His teaching was seen as a waste of time, disgraceful, dishonorable, and fundamentally—according to one widely circulated maxim—"No one will be great, who thinks Ramus is great."[8] But this ideology failed to account for the practical needs of students. As Hotson puts it, "wherever lecturers required twice as much time to get through a single philosophical text as students were prepared to devote to their entire undergraduate education, the philological perfectionism of teachers was trampling over the most basic pedagogical needs of students" (Hotson 2011, 67). Additionally, neither should the needs of the state be neglected, as there were many countries and smaller principalities that needed to produce a considerable number of public servants but where the time-consuming humanist education was not feasible. So, with a lot of help from Johann Skytte[9] (1577–1645)—former treasurer of Sweden, a leading figure in educational reform, Governor General of Livonia, and founder of *Academia Gustaviana*—and keeping in mind the needs of the state and students, Ramism found its way to the Swedish Empire and to *Academia Gustaviana.*

Founded in 1632, *Academia Gustaviana* was the Swedish Empire's second university. As a result, when it came to establishing the university in Dorpat, Skytte did not have to reinvent the wheel but could base it on the University of Uppsala. Thus—for example—the Ramist statutes of Uppsala were quite literally copied for *Academia Gustaviana* and only later edited to better fit local peculiarities

ecdoche—and 20 figures of speech. Finally, delivery focuses on voice and gestures (Mack 2011, 146–150).

8 "Numquam ille magnus erit, cui Ramus est magnus" (Lipsius 1611, 103). Translation from (Hotson 2011, 56).

9 For a detailed account of Skytte's life and role in shaping educational politics in the Swedish Empire and Ramism, see *Ramism, Rhetoric and Reform: An Intellectual Biography of Johan Skytte (1577–1645)* (Ingemarsdotter 2011).

(Vasar 1932, xxxi, 76–80).[10] In the statutes, Ramus was not only used as the authority, Ramist ideals such as "use," "clarity," and "applicability" were also constantly emphasized. Professors had to teach their subjects clearly (*clare*) and self-evidently (*perspicue*) (*Constitutiones* 1997, 54). In most cases, they had to make sure that their courses could be completed in a year and "without any perplexities and metaphysical speculations of the Scholastics."[11] Additionally, teachers also had to keep in mind the different skill levels and financial opportunities of their students. Those who had the necessary means had to be led to a more developed education while not neglecting the less talented or poorer students. Fundamentally, the Swedish state needed both those who could calculate and had beautiful handwriting and those who knew laws and history (*Constitutiones* 1997, 64). Finally, it was emphasized that teachers ought to make sure that the students who had completed their studies knew how to use the skills acquired. So, for example, if a student had learned rhetoric, then it would be a shame if they could not deliver a proper speech (*Constitutiones* 1997, 62). For 20 years in *Academia Gustaviana* (from 1634 to 1654), this job of making sure students could deliver a proper speech fell on the shoulders of Laurentius Ludenius (1592–1654) (Lorenz Luden).[12]

Born in 1592 to a family of educated officials in Northern Germany, Ludenius received his education from the universities of Rostock and Greifswald.[13] Though there are some uncertainties when it comes to the details of his study, we know that in 1613 he received his master's degree and in 1621 he was promoted to a doctor of both law and philosophy (Kaju 2009, 42–43). Ludenius' own long and productive teaching career began already after receiving his master's and can be divided into two periods—the first in Greifswald and the second in Dorpat.[14] In Greifswald, he spent about 17 years, at first as a professor of mathematics and later as a professor of practical philosophy and history (Kaju 2009, 44–45). He also coveted the professorship of jurisprudence, but when the position opened in 1624 his applica-

10 However, this did not mean that *Academia Gustaviana* was to simply become a second and smaller version of Uppsala. There were quite a few social, educational, and political aspects that differentiated the two (see Krēslins 2010).

11 "… sine omnibus prorsus Scholasticorum perplexitatibus metaphysicisque speculationibus" (*Constitutiones* 1997, 54).

12 It is also interesting to note that statutes also prohibited students from feeling defeatist or extraneous. They were not to admire foreign lands or think of themselves as unfit for great things, as such an attitude was not only dangerous to themselves but also to the prosperity of the Swedish Empire (*Constitutiones* 1997, 64).

13 His father was a pastor in Wedingstedt; one of his brothers became superintendent of Northern Dithmarschen, the other was a school rector in Regensburg and later deacon in Heide (see Kaju 2009, 40–41).

14 For a more detailed study on Ludenius' life and works, see Kaju (2009).

tion was rejected (Kaju 2009, 46). We can only speculate how much this rejection affected his decision to accept the invitation to *Academia Gustaviana*,[15] but nevertheless, in 1634 he was invited to take the position of professor of poetics and rhetoric in Dorpat and when he arrived a year later, he was given a professorship of jurisprudence as well (Kaju 2009, 46–47).

Just like other professors of philosophy—and unlike professors of medicine, jurisprudence, or theology—Ludenius as a teacher of rhetoric and poetics was rather constrained by the statutes. In rhetoric, he was to follow the textbooks of Ramus and Talon but also Cicero's *De Oratore* to teach how to become a truly masterful orator, how to compose letters or epigrams, and how to write and deliver speeches (*Constitutiones* 1997, 60). In poetics, he was to use examples of ancient poets—Homer, Ovid, Virgil, Horace et al.—to teach the proper way of writing a verse (*Constitutiones* 1997, 62). Regardless of these constraints, Ludenius was one of *Academia Gustaviana*'s most productive professors being a *praeses* for about 80 disputations (Jaanson 2000) and instructing the writing of—and writing forewords to—at least 175 orations (Kaju 2009, 62). To put these numbers in perspective, the statutes required professors to deliver one disputation per year (*Constitutiones* 1997, 30) and some failed to even do that.[16]

Such high productivity can be both a blessing and a curse for modern scholars. On the one hand, disputations and orations have become an irreplaceable source in the study of early modern universities. While statutes merely prescribed what was to be taught and how, disputations and orations allow us to examine what was actually taught. In addition, the inclusion of paratexts—such as dedications, forewords, gratulations, and poems—provides a great opportunity to study social interactions between students themselves and also other classes in society. But, on the other hand, the vast amount of works produced—for Ludenius in particular but also for disputations in general—makes the corpus of study quite vast and any work in this field time-consuming. Couple this with the fact that most of the student disputations rarely present original philosophical ideas and the neglect they have suffered becomes rather understandable.

The disputations of Ludenius were quite typical for their place and time. They were written in Latin like most of the disputations from this period, printed in quarto format, usually fitted on one or rarely on two sheets of paper—making the average length of a disputation on rhetoric 8 or 16 book pages, which is slightly

15 Kaju brings out additional considerations such as the Thirty Years' War and the troubling financial situation in Greifswald that had left Ludenius in considerable debt (Kaju 2009, 48).

16 For Ludenius, the average comes closer to four disputations per year. Compared to Heinrich Hein (1590—1666), for example, who only held four disputations during the entirety of his professorship (1632–1656) (Kaju 2009, 56).

below the average 16–24 page length of *Academia Gustaviana*'s disputations (Friedenthal 2021, 872).[17] All disputations were printed—as was the custom—and handed out on the Sunday[18] before the dispute (*Constitutiones* 1997, 50, 52).[19] In their content, they are furnished with gratulations and dedications; the orations each have a foreword from Ludenius. However, the disputations do not contain any *corollaria*—a collection of questions—that sometimes accompanied the main text and gave an opportunity to discuss a wider array of topics (Friedenthal 2021, 876).

Finally, the problem of authorship must be discussed. As Axel Hörstedt in his study of disputations from the Swedish Empire has argued, the question of the authorship of the disputations is quite a complicated one, and though he seems to agree that in 17th-century Swedish universities most disputations were written by students (Hörstedt 2018, 163), he concedes that "an all-embracing answer cannot be given" and "one often has to look for clues in the dissertation itself"(Hörstedt 2018, 165). Similarly, for disputations by Ludenius, the answer is not immediately evident. First, there is the lecture program of 1653, where it is stated that "Laurentius Ludenius … in order not to overcharge masters students with expenses, submits the text for disputations."[20] Katre Kaju has seen this as proof that Ludenius was also the author of most of his disputations (see Kaju 2009, 57). But there are a couple of caveats with this interpretation. Firstly, there is a bit of a leap from "submits the text for disputations" to "being the author"—though admittedly such a leap in interpretation is still feasible. But secondly, this lecture program was produced after Ludenius had stepped back from his professorships of rhetoric and poetics, and so it is not directly applicable to the disputations discussed in this chapter anyway. This brings us to the second hypothesis—that students themselves were responsible for writing disputations, either on their own or from materials given to them by professors. This claim can be backed up by both the large number

17 This might be due to the introductional role of those subjects, which in turn lead to the disputations of rhetoric and dialectics being produced by younger and less experienced students. However, more extensive research is needed to draw a conclusion on this matter.

18 The dispute took place on the following Friday for theologians and on Saturday for everyone else. Though it has to be noted that some of those on rhetoric seem to have been held—based on the title page—on Wednesdays instead (Trottonius: March 17, 1641; Kühnius: December 20, 1643; Holstenius: April 16, 1645; Ilianus: October 8, 1645; Thawonius: February 25, 1646; Wallerius: May 12, 1647).

19 This practice was necessary as it firstly gave university staff a chance to review the quality of the text and inspect whether the disputation contained anything improper, and secondly gave the opponent time to prepare (Friedenthal 2021, 872). Disputations that were not reviewed beforehand were not allowed to be defended (*Constitutiones* 1997, 50).

20 "Laurentius Ludenius … et ne sumptibus Dnn. Studiosi onerentur, textum ipsum Disputationibus subijciet" (Vasar 1932, 183).

of disputations produced by Ludenius and the copy-paste nature of many of them. However, whatever the case for disputations, orations were usually—at least to an extent—written by the students (*a se conscripta*), as confirmed by Ludenius in his foreword to each of the three examined orations.

2 Classical Authors in the Study of Rhetoric

Throughout the Middle Ages, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero had been the two pillars of rhetoric study—supplemented with Quintilian or, from the 13th century onward, also Aristotle's *Rhetoric*—and though the early modern period brought many new discoveries into ancient author's texts and changes in method, the relevance of those two hardly wavered (Mack 2011, 13). This kind of high demand was backed by the respect those texts still commanded. Even Ramus himself thought that his textbooks offered only an expedited way of learning but not a substitute for reading classical authors. So—for instance—the statutes of *Academia Gustaviana* had no difficulty asserting that the three books of *De Oratore* "should never be silenced in the academies, as they—and not just parts of them—should be put forth."[21] And indeed, this prescription seems to have been followed, as among the disputations on rhetoric there are two that focus on Cicero's dialogue.

The first of the two, *M. T. Ciceronis ad Q. Fratrem de Oratore Dialogus, sive Liber I* (Lotichius 1641),[22] focuses on the first book of *De Oratore* and follows closely the structure and vocabulary of Cicero's original. The author of the disputation cut the first book into 141 *Theses* and roughly molded them into seven main topics. The first discusses why have there been so few admirable orators while there are innumerable great men in other fields such as philosophy or math (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 1–18; see Cicero 1967, I.5–22). The second emphasizes the use of eloquent speech that mostly boils down to different forms of social conduct—leading people, influencing people, entertaining people (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 19–31; see Cicero 1967, I.30–34). The third part starts with doubting whether it was indeed the elegance of orators or rather the wisdom of philosophers that has accomplished so many great things (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 32–38; see Cicero 1967, I.35–42), but then

21 "… Qui in academiis nunquam conticescere debeant, illos quoque [Rhetor] proponet nec non partitiones ejusdem" (*Constitutiones* 1997, 60). Though *rhetor* could also mean an orator in general, in this context it refers to a teacher of rhetoric.

22 As Ludenius was the default co-author for all the mentioned disputations, for brevity and ease of distinction, I will omit him and cite the disputations only by the name of the responding student. In the bibliography, Ludenius is included with the clarification "[P]" for *praeses*, while responding students are marked with "[R]" for *respondens*.

answers this doubt by claiming that even the sciences need orators to further their knowledge (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 33–53; see Cicero 1967, I.46–73). That is followed in the fourth part by a discussion of whether rhetoric is an art (*ars*) or not (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 64–70; see Cicero 1967, I.104–110). After that, the fifth part deals with the skills needed to be a good speaker and emphasizes that "first, natural talents bring the most power to speaking."[23] But as talent is not always granted—nor is it sufficient—the sixth part goes over the learning and practice of rhetoric (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 89–36). First, of course, the students need to know the five rhetorical canons—*inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio*—but emphasis is also put on different exercises, such as substituting words in texts or translating from Greek to Latin and disputing on all things from all possible angles (Lotichius 1641, *Theses* 96–122; see Cicero 1967, I.143–158). After the sixth part, the final part concludes by emphasizing the importance of practice as it can turn even stutterers into elegant speakers (Lotichius 1641, *Thesis* 138; see Cicero 1967, I.260).

Throughout this entire disputation, the author's voice is completely missing.[24] Not a single comment is made on the claims of *De Oratore* or on the aims of this disputation. The seven parts of the disputation did not receive any subtitles or any metatextual attention, only a single Roman numeral. As such, it should be evident that while some disputations have been classified as prototypical articles where scholars could react to current polemical topics or test out new ideas,[25] that does not apply to this disputation in particular—or to disputation on rhetoric from *Academia Gustaviana* in general. The aim of these *pro exercitio* disputations was for students to practice and showcase their competence in—rather than contribute to—the field of study (Friedenthal 2021, 869). These disputations were tools for rehearsal and repetition where a student could explain the ideas learned from lectures.

Everything said about the first disputation also holds true for the second disputation, *M. T. Ciceronis ad Q. Fratrem de Oratore Dialogus, sive Liber II* (Trottonius 1641), which focused on the second book of *De Oratore* and as such is not going to receive any further attention. Interestingly, we do not have a disputation on the third book of *De Oratore.* Still, whether this means that it was entirely neglected

23 "Naturam primum atque ingenium ad dicendum vim afferre maximam" (Lotichius 1641, *Thesis* 72; see Cicero 1967, I.113).

24 The author even copies the self-reference "to me" (*mihi*) from Cicero (Lotichius 1641, *Thesis* 1; see Cicero 1967, I.5).

25 See Friedenthal (2021, 879). Also, for a detailed study into the development of disputation from the Middle Ages to modernity, see Chang (2021).

—contrary to the adamant demand from the statutes—cannot be conclusively answered.

Cicero's *De Oratore* was not, however, the only classical work of rhetoric that was discussed in *Academia Gustaviana.* Already from the title of the *Rhetoricorum ad C. Herennium Liber Primus* (Valeriani 1640), it is evident that this disputation is based on *Rhetorica ad Herennium.* The author here again followed closely the structure and wording of the original but at the same time left out multiple short anecdotes that were meant to exemplify and simplify understanding of different approaches, topics, and divisions.[26]

The disputation itself starts by distinguishing three types of speeches—one for praise or censure (*demonstrativum*), one for discussing policy (*deliberativum*), and one for arguments in matters of law (*judiciale*) (Valeriani 1640, *Thesis* 5; see *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.ii; pp. 4–5). Then the focus turns to the five classical canons of speech composition—*inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio* (Valeriani 1640, *Thesis* 7; see *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.iii; pp. 6–7). After that, the remainder of the disputation focuses on the six parts of an oration in judicial matters—introduction, statement of facts, division, proof, refutation, and conclusion.[27] So *exordium* or introduction begins the speech with a kind of introduction suited to the cause of your speech and the mood of an audience (Valeriani 1640, *Theses* 11–30; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.iii–viii; pp. 10–23). This is followed by *narratio* that aims to state the facts of the case briefly, clearly, and convincingly (Valeriani 1640, *Theses* 31–36; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.viii–ix; pp. 22–29). After *narratio* comes *divisio*, where the speaker explains what is agreed upon and what is disputed between him and his adversary. This is also a good time to briefly introduce the number and content of arguments to be brought (Valeriani 1640, *Theses* 37–41; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.x; pp. 28–31). Finally, *Theses* 42–70 deal with *confirmatio* and *confutatio* while mostly focusing on the different types of disagreements—conjectural, legal, and juridical—and how to answer them (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.xi–xvi; pp. 32–54).

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26 For instance, *Thesis* 38 talks about the importance of stating what you and your opponent agree upon and what you do not agree upon (Valerianus 1640, *Thesis* 38; see *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.x; p. 30). While this claim is taken from *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the illustrating and brilliant example from Greek mythology has been left out "Interfectam esse ab Oreste matrem convenit mihi cum adversariis. Iure fecerit et licueritne facere, id est in controversia." "Orestes killed his mother; on that I agree with my opponents. But did he have the right to commit the deed, and was he justified in committing it? That is in dispute" (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.x; pp. 30–31).
27 *Exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio, conclusio* (Valeriani 1640, *Thesis* 10; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 1964, I.iii; pp. 8–9). However, conclusion is not discussed, neither in the disputation nor in *Rhetorica ad Herennium.*

Already from this short description, the jurisprudential focus of this disputation should be noticed. Now, though Ludenius was also a professor of jurisprudence, an interesting connection can additionally be drawn between the topic and the respondent. We know from secondary sources that two years later Valeriani also disputed on topics of jurisprudence (see Jaanson 2000, no. 352).[28] Additionally, he has written gratulations for an oration about Swedish civil law (see Jaanson 2000, no. 302). And though we sadly do not know anything about Valeriani after his studies in *Academia Gustaviana*, those two factors still allow us to hypothesize a possible inclination toward the study of law. So, it is interesting to see that the only dialectical disputation that extensively deals with delivering a jurisprudential speech comes from a student with quite a bit of interest in this field —implying that even if the student was not the author of the disputation, he still had a bit of say in the topics he wanted to dispute on.

Coming back to *Academia Gustaviana*, regardless of *Rhetorica ad Herennium*'s status as one of the most important works in rhetoric, the statutes neglected to mention it. Nor is there an explicit mention of Cicero's *De Inventione*[29] which was still cited in at least one disputation (see Wal(l)erius 1647, *Thesis* 66). That means that though the classical works prescribed by the statutes were of course read, this list was not seen as exhaustive. Other important rhetorical texts were also used—both ancient and contemporary.

3 Alsted in the Study of Rhetoric

Though in early modern times ancient texts were still held in high regard, that does not mean that more contemporary authors would have been neglected in the study of dialectics and rhetoric. One such example comes from Christophorus Kühnius (d. 1652), who matriculated to *Academia Gustaviana* in 1640 and left in 1643 (Tering 1984, no. 384). During his three years at the university, he disputed three times on topics of theology and held one theological oration (see Jaanson 2000, no. 339, 376, 417, 418). As he also became a pastor sometime after graduating, his theological inclinations should be beyond doubt. Which also means that, when looking at his disputation on rhetoric *Oratoriae Ecclesiasticae Delineatio* (Kühnius 1643), it is safe to assume that the ecclesiastical orientation should rather be attributed to him than to Ludenius. However, what is not apparent are the works that

28 Sadly, this disputation has not been located.

29 I mention *De Inventione* here as according to Mack it was the second most popular book on rhetoric and was often used and even printed together with *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Mack 2011, 17).

were used. Unlike in the case of previously discussed disputations, there is no statement that declares this disputation to be based on a certain book of a certain author's certain work. This does not mean that the disputation is original. Though there are a couple of lines from ancient poets mixed in at the beginning,[30] the main body of the text is taken chapter by chapter from *Orator: Sex Libris Informatus* (1612) by Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588–1638) who was one of the most notable post-Ramist authors.

The disputation itself focuses on the sixth book "Liber Sextus De Rhetorica Ecclesiastica" and begins by praising the power of eloquent speech with a reference to a picture of Hercules leading people via chains attached to his tongue: "The painter pierced the tip of Hercules' tongue; and to that, tied chains with which Hercules drew a great multitude of men."[31] After additionally discussing the aims of the ecclesiastic orator—which is to clearly teach (*perspicue doceat*), piously delight (*pie delectet*), and sharply persuade (*acriter flectat*) (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 3; see Alsted 1612, VI.1)—the disputation is divided into three parts. The first briefly mentions the character (*natura*) of the speaker, then the second and longest deals with the art (*ars*) of composing a speech—again, *inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio*—and finally there is a discussion of practice (*exercitatio*) (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 7; see Alsted 1612, VI.2–3). As the main steps of dialectics remain the same as in the previously discussed disputations, there is no need to go into detail here. The thing to note, though, is the attention to particularities in early modern dialectics. So, for example, unlike in case of *Rhetorica ad Herennium, exordium* here consists of a prayer, a prompt, a passage from the Scripture, and possibly but not always the reason for gathering (Kühnius 1643, *Theses* 36–44; Alsted 1612, VI.13). *Narratio* no longer states the facts but rather paraphrases the passage from the Scripture (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 45; Alsted 1612, VI.14). *Divisio*, which in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* explained the common ground and point of divergence, is replaced with *propositio*, which introduces the contents of the speech (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 46; Alsted 1612, VI.15). C*onformatio* and *confutatio* still try to persuade the audience but instead of juridical arguments they aim to explain, demonstrate, and show the ap-

30 There is a part of Claudianus' *Panegyricus dictus Manlio Theodoro consuli* (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 1; see Claudianus 1922, lines 19–20), and lines 98–105, with few modifications, from *Laus Pisonis* (Kühnius 1643, *Theses* 2,8; *Laus Pisonis* 1935).

31 "Pictor summam Herculis linguam perterebravit; atq[ue] ex ea religatis catenulis, ingentem hominum multitudinem trahi fecit" (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 1). That is a reference to Hercules Gallicus, the idea that the great deeds of Hercules were achieved not by strength but by wisdom and eloquence. An account of such a picture was first made by Lucian and via Erasmus' translation it became available to the Latin-speaking world (see Lucian 1534, 405).

plicability of the thing being preached (Kühnius 1643, *Theses* 47–57; Alsted 1612, VI.16).

One more important thing to note is that under speech composition the author also discusses *memoria* (Kühnius 1643, *Thesis* 63; Alsted 1612, VI.19), which Ramus had relocated to the study of psychology (Mack 2011, 145). Evidently Alsted had brought it back to rhetoric and so it continued to find its way into disputations at *Academia Gustaviana.*

Alsted's influence in *Academia Gustaviana*, however, goes far beyond occasional use. *De Elocutione Disputatio Rhetorica* (Ilianus 1645) is the only disputation in this section that deals with rhetoric—tropes and figures. The disputation starts off with some general discussion, listing four main characteristics of eloquent oration —pure (*pura*), evident (*perspicua*), ornate (*ornata*), and suitable (*decora*) (Ilianus 1645, *Theses* 3–12)—but then quickly turns to the main topic at hand and discusses four tropes—metonymy, irony, metaphor, synecdoche—ten figures of words (*figura dictionis*) and ten figures of meaning (*figura sententiae*). So far, this is a classic Ramist scheme of rhetoric (see Mack 2011, 148–150). However, there are two major additions. First, the figures of words get divided into primary and secondary (Ilianus 1645, *Thesis* 65), where the primary are the ten figures already mentioned by Ramus and Talon, and the secondary are 25 additional figures not mentioned by them. Those 25 figures are, however, present in Alsted's *Encyclopaedia* (Alsted 1630, 386–388). As most of the disputation neatly follows the structure of his *Encyclopaedia*, there is reason to believe that it had a fair influence on the writing process. The second addition likely comes from German pedagogue Conrad Dieterich's (1575–1639) *Institutiones Rhetoricae* (1616) and—as this time even the author himself notes—also goes beyond Ramus.

In a nutshell, *Institutiones Rhetoricae* is a textbook that covers the basics of Ramist rhetoric, introducing notions both in Greek and Latin, giving definitions, and then bringing examples of use. The simplest argument for the use of this textbook in this disputation is the uncanny similarity between the two. They both use a similar, at times the same, wording, constant bilingual use of notions, and most importantly the addition of a third set of figures—amplifications (*amplificationes*)—that Ramus and Alsted did not identify (Ilianus 1645, *Thesis* 100; see Dieterich 1616, 138). This unusual addition with its almost word-for-word copied introduction should be enough to conclude that Dieterich's textbook was indeed used in composing this disputation. So, to sum up, Alsted's *Encyclopaedia* does not cover the third type of figures but gives a detailed account of 25 secondary figures of words. At the same time, there is no mention of those 25 figures in *Institutiones Rhetoricae*, which goes over amplifications. One final thing to note is that in the parts of the disputation that coincide with *Institutiones Rhetoricae*, there are a lot of Latin and Greek synonyms, but in the case of the 25 secondary figures copied

from *Encyclopedia* the Greek is conspicuously absent (Ilianus 1645, *Theses* 81–88; Alsted 1630, 386–388). This mirrors the languages of Dieterich who used synonyms and Alsted, who did not.

The influence of Alsted's *Encyclopedia* can also be found in the disputation *De Dispositione Oratoria Disputatio* (Wal(l)erius 1647), but as it otherwise offers relatively little to this work, I will not be discussing it in any further detail.

4 *Resolutio* or *Analysis*

Though there is undeniable merit in learning the rules of rhetoric and dialectics, Ramists saw such a singular focus on theory as an inefficient way of teaching. To aid and simplify the process of study, it was also thought useful or even necessary to prepare an explanation or analysis (*resolutio sive analysis*) of a written text. This opinion is also echoed in two disputations from *Academia Gustaviana* —one by Thawonius (1622–1679) and the other by Holstenius (1622–1669)— which claim that "an explanation or an analysis is carried out for broader understanding and easier remembering."[32] But not only the difficulty but also the time spent on studies could be cut down by analysis as "long is the way of rules, but short and efficient the way of examples."[33]

Analysis—as explained to us by Alsted in his *Orator: Sex Libris Informatus* and reaffirmed in the aforementioned disputations—is a process where a written text is untangled in order to better understand and learn to imitate it (Thawonius 1646, *Theses* 26–32; Holstenius 1645, *Theses* 2–10; Alsted 1612, 23–26). There are two possible approaches—*praecognitio* or *recognitio. Praecognitio* focuses on the writer—their life, reason for writing, and aim with the text—and the thing written—its use (*usus*), pleasantness (*jucunditas*), and necessity (*necessitas*). *Recognitio*, on the other hand, is either conceptional (*directiva, notionalis*) or real (*objectiva, realis*). The first deals with the grammar, rhetoric, and logic of the text. The second is the analysis of the things themselves by observation (*sensus*) and use (*usus*).

The disputations of Thawonius and Holstenius are the only two disputations written in *Academia Gustaviana* that more-less explicitly claim to belong to the field of analysis. Already on the title page, they distinguish their aim to methodically explain (*Methodice Resoluta*) the text. Additionally, both dedicate half a page (about 7–9 *Theses*) to explaining the methodology discussed in the previous para-

32 "Facit Resolutio sive Analysis, et ad pleniorem intelligentiam; et ad faciliorem reminiscentiam" (Thawonius 1646, *Thesis* 25; see Holstenius 1645, *Thesis* 1).

33 "Longum sit iter per Praecepta; Breve vero & efficax per Exempla" (Thawonius, *Thesis* 24). See also *Orator: Sex Libris Informatus* (Alsted 1612, 7, 24) for possible origins for the last two quotes.

graph. The most notable difference in this respect is that while Holstenius starts from this methodology and then moves on to analyze Cicero's *Pro Archia Poeta*, Thawonius adds his methodological discussion to the end of his analysis of Virgil's *Eclogues*—almost as if he had some leftover space to fill.[34]

The first of the two disputations, *Oratio Ciceronis pro Archia poeta methodice resoluta.* (Holstenius 1645), focuses on Cicero's speech *Pro Archia Poeta*, where Cicero defended his former teacher—Greek poet Aulus Licinus Archias (c. 120 – 161 BCE)—against accusations of fabricating his Roman citizenship. Put briefly, Cicero argues—as summarized in the disputation—that Archias was indeed a Roman citizen and that even if he was not, he ought to be given that honor (Holstenius 1645, *Thesis* 12; see Cicero 1909). The author of the disputation, in turn, reproduces the entirety of the speech without any omissions resulting in by far the longest dialectical disputation (31 pages) written in *Academia Gustaviana.* But its length is not its only distinguishing feature—it is also the only disputation that presents the main body of the text in three columns. This allows the author to present Cicero's original (middle) with reconstructions of the text's arguments (left) and the explanations of each part or sentence (right) all side by side. In practice, this means that Cicero's original speech is divided into parts. First according to the classical speech structure into *exordium, propositio, narratio, conformatio, confutatio, peroratio*, but then even further into sentences (*periodus*), parts of sentences (*membrum*), and even syllables (*syllaba*). In the rightmost column, the different parts and their functions are then explained. For example, whether the sentence in question is for transitioning between two different divisions of the text, or maybe it expresses the conclusion to a syllogism, or—on another level—it could explain what Archias did before coming to Rome, etc. The leftmost column in turn presents the arguments implicit in the text in syllogistic form. For example, whoever's name is written in the citizen record of Heraclea[35] is a citizen of Rome; Archias' name is written there, and therefore Archias is a citizen of Rome (Holstenius 1645, *Theses* 43 – 44; see Cicero 1909, 8).

In addition to this three-column re-structuring, the author also spends some *Theses* on general remarks about the text. So, for example, in the beginning, he analyses the style of the text—which he calls moderate and agreeable (*mediocre et suave*) (Holstenius 1645, *Thesis* 17)—and elaborates on the metrical structure —that he identifies as not fixed but rather alternating between *spondeus*, *criticus*, and *anapaestus* (Holstenius 1645, *Thesis* 23). Furthermore, quite expectedly, in

34 Which might not be the most absurd of all reasons, considering that while printing in quarto format, an author could fill at least eight pages.

35 An ancient Roman city situated at the Gulf of Taranto.

every part of the reconstruction the author keeps reminding his reader of the use of such analysis—that is, to be able to imitate it whenever the need arises (Holstenius 1645, *Theses* 10, 25, 33, 39 et passim).

Given the unusual length and structure of the disputation, the question of authorship should briefly be discussed. It does seem feasible to think that Holstenius, who by 1645 had already studied in Uppsala and Abo and who a mere five years later became a professor of Greek and Hebrew languages at *Academia Gustaviana*, would be a good candidate for its authorship. The main difficulty with such an attribution is, however, that there is no evidence of Holstenius delivering any disputations before this one (Tering 1984, no. 575). So the question left unanswered is whether such a detailed reconstruction of a classical text could be the first disputation of an industrious student, and if not, then what prompted Ludenius to present such an uncharacteristically structured disputation?[36]

The second of the two disputations is *P. Virgilii Maronis Ecloga I. Methodice Resoluta* (Thawonius 1646), and it analyses the first book of Virgil's *Eclogues*, where two herdsmen discuss their fortunes (as represented by Tityrus) and misfortunes (Meliboeus) during a time of unrest (Liberator's civil war). The author of the disputation again emphasizes the logical structure of the text, this time uncovering two enthymemes (*enthymema*).[37] The first enthymeme reconstructed from the *Eclogues* states that "Tityrus 1. is the idle one who, 2. thanks to Octavian [Augustus], 3. has received land and consequently, therefore, Tityrus is grateful to Octavian."[38] Because the author also identifies Tityrus in the poem with Virgil ("Behind Tityrus we understand the person of Virgil"),[39] it is not only fictional Tityrus but Virgil himself who in this way is grateful to Augustus. The second enthymeme is much shorter—because Tityrus has plenty of apples, chestnuts, and cheese to spare, he invites Meliboeus to rest with him for the night (Thawonius 1646, *Theses* 20–21).

Here the most intriguing question arises from the fact that—unlike in the case of *Pro Archia Poeta*, for example—on *Eclogues* we do have extensive commen-

36 Another interesting question that for now will be left for future research is how such an unusually structured disputation was defended, as the title page makes it clear that this disputation was indeed publicly defended on April 16, 1645.

37 An enthymeme is a type of rhetorical syllogism that differs from main dialectics syllogism by being probable rather than necessarily true. However, it must be stressed, that there are multiple differing understandings of what exactly enthymeme is or should be (for a more detailed account see Bizzell et al. 2020).

38 "Tityrus 1. est otiosus, 2. per Octavium 3. receptis agris: Consequens: E(rgo) Tityrus Octavio gratias agit" (Thawonius 1646, *Thesis* 6).

39 "Sub Tityro, persona Virgilii … intelligitur" (Thawonius 1646, *Thesis* 4).

taries written by Ramus himself (Ramus 1582).[40] And that in turn gives grounds for comparisons between the disputation and Ramus' original. So first, we do find the first enthymeme almost word for word present in Ramus with similar emphasis on proving the "*per Octavium*" part—"Tityrus is the idle one who, thanks to Octavian [Augustus], has received land and hence he is grateful."[41] Similarly, both conclude the first main part with line 59 from Virgil's poem and divide the remaining text—the lament of Melibaeus—into parts (Thawonius 1646, *Theses* 17–19; Ramus 1582, 38–42). However, there are multiple subtle differences. Where Ramus identifies three parts of the lament, the author of the disputation thinks there are four. Or where in the analysis of style Ramus speaks about anaphora and apostrophe, in the disputation there is irony and apostrophe (Thawonius 1646, *Thesis* 19; Ramus 1582, 41). The biggest difference by far, however, is that Ramus does not distinguish a second enthymeme in the poem—for Ramus, the invitation to rest for the night is just a way of concluding the text (Ramus 1582, 42). From all of this, it would seem dubious to conclude in favor of the unmediated presence of Ramus' original. Still, that does not rule out some mediated influence via student notebooks or other similar means.

5 Structuring and Interpreting Texts

Although there are indeed only two disputations that self-identify as analyses, there is a whole series of disputations—with only one exception that focuses on Horace's *De Arte Poetica* (Ramzius 1641)—written on Virgil's *Georgica*,[42] that to some extent could also be seen as a sort of analysis or—as Viiding has argued for one of them (Viiding 2015, 182)—a further continuation of commentary writing practices arising from scholia. However, as none of them are concerned with revealing syllogisms and arguments but only with structuring the text, a clear divide should be drawn between them and the disputations discussed in the previous section.

Broadly speaking, all these disputations consisted of short, usually one-line commentaries or subtitles followed by two to six lines from the classical author's original text. The commentaries divided the text into parts—usually into two or three—that in turn were divided into further parts—two or three. So, to bring

40 For a more detailed description of Ramus' commentaries, see Mack (1998).

41 "Tityrus est otiosus per Octavium receptis agris: quapropter ei gratias agit" (Ramus 1582, 29–30).

42 This choice of *Georgica* here might serve multiple purposes, as Ramus had also based his teaching of physics on it (Hotson 2011, 53).

just one example, in a disputation *P. Virgilii Maronis Georgicon e Libro IV. De Mellatione Discursus* (Ruberus 1643), the author focuses on roughly the first half (lines 1–285) of the fourth book of *Georgica.*[43] He divides the entire text into two and identifies two main topics of interest—the method of keeping bees (*continendarum ratio*) and death or illness in bees (*corruptio*) (Ruberus 1643, *Thesis* 2). The method of beekeeping is divided into three chapters—s*ubjecta, facta*, and *adjuncta. Subjecta* focuses on places of beekeeping—the general area (*apiarium*) and beehives (*alvearium*), both of which, again, merit multiple subdivisions. Then *facta* focuses on four different behaviors of bees, and *adjuncta* deals with similarities and differences between humans and bees. After the author finishes with *adjuncta*, he turns to the second main part of the disputation and goes over reasons for death and illness in bees, both *ex parte* and *in totum.* The first of which—quite expectedly—is divided further into different causes of death or illness and their remedies. The latter earns only one simple remark: "but if all bees perish, they can be restored with a rotted corpse of a calf."[44] Basically, if all else fails, it is time to start sacrificing livestock.[45]

Dichotomies are perhaps one of the most famous aspects of the Ramist method and, as is evident from the above, they were not only reserved for structuring disciplines in general but could also be applied to texts in particular. In *De Mellatione Discursus*, everything that could be split into dichotomies was split into dichotomies, and so every single *Thesis* introduces a new division or subdivision. In Ramist textbooks, these kinds of divisions were also the basis for constructing bifurcating tables and, while reading the analysis, it is rather easy to see how such a table could be constructed. But at least in the case of analyses printed in *Academia Gustaviana*, no such tables are present.[46] Readers have to rely on the aid of letters and numbers with occasional *Sic … iam* (so much for … now) constructions to get the full structure of the text.

However—just like in case of Virgil's *Eclogues*—Ramus' also wrote commentaries on *Georgica* (Ramus 1556), and so the originality of the presented dichotomies

43 The fourth book of *Georgica* is about beekeeping and, if it is not already evident from the text, the advice provided is of little practical use. Rather, it could have been read as a metaphorical tale about human society.

44 "Si vero in totum periere Apes; instaurantur e putrefacto cruore vituli" (Ruberus 1643, *Thesis* 37).

45 On a more serious note, this advice comes from belief in bugonia—an understanding that bees were born from animal carcasses—and in this context this advice makes sense.

46 However, such tables are present in some manuscripts. How those manuscripts were used and whether they were only lecture notes or a basis for informal disputations will have to remain a topic for future research.

could also be questioned. And indeed, some similarities can be noticed in the way both Ramus and the author of the disputation divide the text. Still, this disputation can hardly be seen as a copy of Ramus' work. Where Ramus wrote extensive commentaries bringing additional quotations from Varro, Pliny, Columella, or Ovid, the author of the disputation has focused solely on reproducing the general structure. So, it does seem doubtful to think that Ramus' commentaries must have been used in constructing such a simplistic disputation. This doubt about the use of Ramus' commentaries on *Georgica* is even better illustrated in the sequel to the previously discussed disputation.

P. Virgilii Maronis Georgicon e Libro IV. Discursus De Poetica Methodi Comprehensione (Columbus 1643) is the last disputation in the series focusing on *Georgica.* It continues the fourth book from roughly the same place where *De Mellatione Discursus* left off and focuses on the story of Aristaeus, the mythical Greek hero who —after inadvertently causing the death of Eurydice—lost all of his bees. This story also explains the origins of the bugonic wisdom mentioned at the end of the previous disputation. But unlike in case of the other disputations in the *Georgica* series, here the author goes far beyond simply retelling the story to explain the symbolic nature of its parts.

As this disputation is first and foremost about dialectics, as expected, it gets divided into two—*inventio* and *dispositio* (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 10). In the *inventio*, the author discusses the causes of *inventio.* The first cause of *inventio* is of course God himself, as apparently is illustrated by the line from *Georgica:* "Who is this God, oh Muses, who emits this art for us?"[47] The second is the human cause from the following line: "Where did this new advancement in human expertise come from?"[48] This is divided into three—senses (*sensus*), reasoning (*intellectus*), and experience (*experientia*). As the senses are activated by external necessity, then in this story, Aristaeus—who has been sprung to action by the loss of his bees—signifies the senses (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 15). Reasoning in turn gets divided into three. First, to figure out how to get his bees back, Aristaeus turns to his mother, Cyrene, who offers valuable advice and as such signifies reasoning in general (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 16). But besides Cyrene, there are also various nymphs who designate innate notions (*notitiae connatae*) via which we learn about the common principles of nature (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 17). Finally, though we all have those innate notions, they are weak (*imbecilla et tenuis*), and so we need to exercise them (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 18). After reasoning comes the third

47 "Quis DEUS hanc, Musae, quis nobis excutit artem?" (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 12; Virgil 1900, IV.315).

48 "Unde nova ingress[us], hominu[m] experie[n]tia coepit?" (Columbus 1643, *Thesis* 12; Virgil 1900, IV.316).

human cause—experience—that gets praised in true Ramist fashion for its undisputable use, as "art without use is nothing, knowledge without experience, is worthless," and "rules without use are monstrous."[49] The importance of practice, experience, and use is illustrated when Aristaeus—armed with his mother's teaching—fights Proteus, the shape-shifting sea god, to learn the cause of the death of his bees (Columbus 1643, *Theses* 33, 34). Now, finally done with *inventio*, the disputation briefly goes over *dispositio* where Aristaeus—having learned his fault in the death of Eurydice and how it caused the demise of his bees—can take action by sacrificing to gods, and getting his bees back (Columbus 1643, *Theses* 36–37).

Comparing this interpretation with Ramus' commentaries, we see that the author of the disputation has chosen to go in a different direction. There indeed is a clear Ramist dichotomic structure in the disputation, but it does not copy the divisions presented by him (Ramus 1556, 336–367). Ramus makes no mention of *inventio* or *dispositio*, nor does he equate Cyrene with reasoning or Aristaeus with senses. Ramus took a textual approach, explaining words and bringing comparisons from other ancient texts. The author of the disputation on the other hand took an almost gnoseological approach that tries to uncover the workings of human intellect from Virgil's poem. Such an approach is especially interesting as though there indeed are interpretations that equate Aristaeus with senses and Cyrene with intellect—for example, *De Arte Cyclognomica* (1569) by Cornelius Gemma (1535–1578)—I have not managed to locate other authors who attempted to use such comparisons while investigating *inventio* or *dispositio*.

6 The Ultimate Test of Eloquence

As the study of rhetoric and dialectics was aimed at making students better public speakers, it is only natural to conclude this discourse by examining orations produced in *Academia Gustaviana*. After all, from a Ramist perspective, it would only make sense to learn through practice, and so every student of rhetoric was expected to "write and publicly deliver a speech by heart."[50] This, of course, means that there are many orations—at least 175—that could be discussed. I have, however, chosen to study only the disputations that in their subject matter explicitly also deal with dialectics and rhetoric and, in this chapter, will cover only one—*Oratio*

49 "Ars sine usu est nulla. Ratio sine experientia, invalida," "sine usu praecepta sunt monstrosa" (Columbus 1643, *Theses* 33, 34).

50 "… Orationum, qvas scribant et publice recitent, idqve ex memoria" (*Constitutiones* 1997, 60).

de Dialectica (Valeriani 1638) by Carolus Valeriani—which for our examination of Ramism is the most interesting.

Like all orations, it starts with an accompanying foreword from Ludenius that praises the subject—in this case dialectics, which of course distinguishes humans from beasts (*hominem a bestis distinguit*) (Valeriani 1638, A2^{r})—mentions the student and time of oration, and concludes with an obligatory dedication to the Governor General of Livonia, Benedictus Ochsenstierna [sic],[51] to the rectors, to the barons, and the professors (Valeriani 1638, A2^{v}). But the first curio of this oration can already be seen before Ludenius' foreword. The title page boasts that this speech was delivered in public and from memory (*publice ac memoriter*). Such claims were made in only about 27 orations instructed by Ludenius (see Jaanson 2000). From this it seems feasible to hypothesize that, contrary to the prescription of the statutes, not every student was industrious enough to memorize an entire oration. Otherwise, such a remark here would simply seem superfluous.

The oration itself follows the classical six-part structure already studied in disputations—*exordium, narratio, propositio, conformatio, confutation*, and *peroratio*—with remarks on the side of the text to indicate not only progress from one part to the other (*transitio*), but also different arguments, claims (*propositio*), and the reasons behind them (*ratio*). After in turn thanking all the relevant people, Valeriani starts with the story of Theseus in the Minotaur's labyrinth, cited in the introduction to this chapter. After concluding that it is indeed dialectics that is the greatest tool against a sophist, Valeriani goes on to equate dialectics with logic, claiming that though they are not always the same, "in this exercise we are allowed to accept the words 'logic' and 'dialectics' interchangeably."[52] Then the oration moves to the definition of dialectics, but before getting there Valeriani expresses his astonishment that before Aristotle there had not been a methodical approach to logic: "Here we begin to wonder—I don't know why; when we call to mind the histories of the ancients … and when we call to mind the logic before Aristotle—that sun of the philosophers—as never having been engraved in letters, nor methodically engraved in the mind, nor written down by anybody."[53] For the definition itself, however, as Ramists did not accept Aristotle's definition of logic as *habitus instrumentalis*—instrumental skill (Sellberg 2020)—Valeriani moves straight to Ramus'

51 Bengt Bengtsson Oxenstierna (1591–1643).

52 "Verum licebat nobis in hoc exercitio, vocem Logices et Dialectices indifferenter accipere" (Valeriani 1638, A4^{v}).

53 "Hic mirari, nescio quid, incipimus; quando Veterum Historias nobiscum memoria reperimus … et quando Logicam ante Aristotelem, Solem illum Philosophorum, nunquam sive insculptam Literis, sive methodice insculptam animis aut ab aliquo esse conscriptam, reperimus" (Valeriani 1638, B1^{r}).

definition claiming that dialectics is the art of discussing well: "*Dialectica est Ars bene disserendi*" (Valeriani 1638, B1^{v}).

After giving us a workable definition, Valeriani looks at the parts of logic. First, according to Ramus, there are two parts *inventio* and *iudicium*—the first two parts of the five classical parts of any oration—gathering materials and forming a structure (Valeriani 1638, B2^{v}). However, he continues that there are other ways of dividing logic. For example, according to Aristotle logic can be divided into universal (*communis*) and particular (*proprius*), where the universal deals with the formal aspect of syllogism and the particular deals with the matter of syllogism (Valeriani 1638, B2^{v}, B3^{r}). Following definitions and divisions, the oration goes over all the causes. Efficient cause—as always—starts with God. He is followed by the most ingenious philosophers (*ingeniosissimos Philosophos*), who have found and written down this art. After philosophers, teachers and instructors are praised for communicating the art of logic to us (Valeriani 1638, B3^{r}, B3^{v}). Finally, observation, use, and practice are named as efficient causes in the study of logic (Valeriani 1638, B3^{r}, B3^{v}). Material cause talks about the use of logic in philosophy, medicine, jurisprudence, and theology (Valeriani 1638, B4^{r}). Formal cause mentions forming logic into a habit, and final cause—or the aim of logic—is to find truth. (Valeriani 1638, B4^{v}).

Then we get to the second part of the oration that goes over the four reasons for studying logic. The first is due to its worth or merit (*dignitas*), the second is its certainty (*certitudo*), the third is its pleasantness (*jucunditas*), and the fourth is its use (*utilitas*) (Valeriani 1638, B4^{v}–C3^{r}). Finally, before the conclusion, Valeriani considers one objection from those who consider themselves the most learned men (*viros doctissimos … enarrant*) but discard the value of logic. The answer to this claim for Valeriani is simple. Regardless of the opinions of those critics, for him logic is the foundation on top of which the rest of the sciences can fruitfully and usefully be built (Valeriani 1638, C3^{v}).

Now, although Ramus had tried to replace Aristotle's logic and the statutes echoed this aim by stating that the "professor of logic should teach the logic of Ramus while avoiding perplexing disputations of the scholastics, and tiring the youth with many dictations,"[54] from this oration, we can see a rather neutral approach to Aristotle. Every time Ramus' name and ideas are mentioned, Aristotle's position is also represented. There is no explicit statement that Aristotle was wrong or that Ramus was right. Rather, there seems to be acknowledgment of the importance of both of these authors: "Aristotle in preparing his Logic—bearing much, working, perspiring and, suffering—made it the best and most elegant. … [But] … Ramus left

54 "Logices Professor Rami Logicam enarrabit, ubi cavebit perplexis Scholasticorum Disputationibus, multisqve dictatis juventutem fatigare" (*Constitutiones* 1997, 62).

for posterity logic of his own composition with neat organization and the most convenient method."[55] So, interestingly, we do not really encounter the explicitly hostile attitude towards Aristotle that could be expected from Ramist-influenced oration.

7 Conclusion: Ramus in the Background

The course of Ramist rhetoric and dialectics in *Academia Gustaviana* was quite multifaceted. First, though Ramus had sought to simplify and expedite it by writing textbooks to replace ancient authors' long and winding texts, in the study of rhetoric or dialectics there simply was no way to avoid classical authors like Cicero or Virgil and texts like *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which were still used and held in high regard. But this does not of course mean that there would not have been any room for more contemporary "post-ramist" authors, as Alsted and his *Orator: Sex Libris Informatus* or *Encyclopaedia* were often used, rephrased, or copied to study the rules of dialectics and rhetoric. Still, as focusing solely on rules was regarded as the least efficient way to study, there were also some analyses written that attempted to study the texts of Virgil or Cicero by revealing their structure and analyzing their grammar, metrics, meaning, or at least syllogistic nature, or that in most cases simply subtitled and divided the text. However, the ultimate test in rhetoric and dialectics undoubtedly had to have been writing and delivering a speech that combined theory with the study of ancient literature and authors to compose an eloquent speech that could hope to change people's minds and lead their hearts.

From this study, it becomes apparent that though *Academia Gustaviana* was in its statutes quite Ramist, in the teaching of rhetoric and dialectics things are a bit more ambivalent and Ramus himself seems to be mostly missing from the disputations. Of course, there is a clear presence of Ramist ideals, the most notable of which are the emphasis on use and focus on a clear dichotomic structure. But when it comes to authors cited or copied, then we mostly find classical authors such as Cicero or Virgil, or more the contemporary Alsted. Even further, when looking at the analyses of texts, it is quite questionable if Ramus' own commentaries were used. Or—as we saw from the oration—though Aristotle's logic was sup-

55 "Aristoteles … in Logica conficienda sua multa ferens, faciens, sudans et algens; eam edidit optimam et elegantissimam. … Petrus Ramus … ita et logicam ordine concinno et methodo brevissima a se conscriptam, posteritati excolendam reliquit" (Valeriani 1638, B2^{r}).

posed to be replaced by Ramus', still, they existed side by side with Ramus, neither being praised nor criticized over Aristotle.

This raises an interesting point about the suitability of the statutes of Uppsala for use in Dorpat. How well could the professors in the peripheral *Academia Gustaviana*, with a limited library,[56] follow the prescriptions made for the main university of the Swedish Empire? This means that to fully understand why some authors were used while others neglected, we should perhaps additionally study this materialistically quite constrained context in which the academy operated. This, however, remains outside the scope of this work.

We can conclude by considering the most intriguing question of authorship. In the case of the orations, it seems feasible to think that students were also the authors, as Ludenius proudly declares in the forewords that the orations were indeed written by students. But this still leaves open the question of to what extent they were written by students or how involved Ludenius was while instructing the writing. In the case of the disputations, however, giving a singular answer is even more complicated and most likely needs to be investigated on a case-by-case basis. Still, as we saw, even if students did not write the disputations themselves, the writing process was to an extent a cooperative effort, where the topic of the disputation was discussed beforehand to better fit students' own interests, if possible.

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