

Yury Arzhanov

Sergius of Reshaina, Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*

Philosophy and Sciences in the Christian Orient



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Yury Arzhanov and Matthias Perkams

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Yury Arzhanov

**Sergius of Reshaina,
Commentary on
Aristotle's *Categories***

Critical Edition and Translation

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TO THEODORE

Acknowledgements

My first acquaintance with Sergius' commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* goes back to when I had just started my study of the Syriac translations of Greek philosophical and scholarly literature. Sergius' name was associated with the beginning of this cultural process. Since then, I have frequently come back to this figure and the legacy of his work, of which his extensive commentary on the *Categories* was traditionally mentioned as his most substantial contribution to the study of Aristotle in Syriac schools.

During my work at the University of Bochum, Germany, I several times had the chance to discuss Sergius' commentary with one of the main specialists in Syriac and Arabic translations of Greek texts, Gerhard Endress, who always stressed the value of this treatise in the transmission of Greek philosophy "from Alexandria to Baghdad". As a result of these conversations, I acquired images of manuscripts containing it and started to collate them. Since at that time I had a group of students who were interested in Syriac philosophical works and had some training not only in Syriac, but also in Greek and Arabic, I formed a reading group where we together studied Sergius' treatise, starting with the prologue and the first book and comparing it to the Greek and Arabic commentary tradition. This reading class contributed to my interest in Sergius' treatise and gave me the idea of publishing the complete Syriac text.

On various occasions, I had the chance to talk about Sergius' commentary with Henri Hugonnard-Roche and John Watt, who had translated parts of it into French and English and had published a number of studies on it. Both supported my interest in this treatise and assured me that, although they had originally intended to publish it themselves, due to various reasons they had to give up on such plans. These conversations encouraged me to do further research on Sergius and to proceed in my preparatory work for the future edition.

In prior years, my involvement with several scholarly projects prevented me from doing much work on Sergius' text. It was a grant which I received from the Austrian Science Fund *FWF* (*Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung*; project no. P34900G) that created the necessary position which allowed me to finish this task. Thus, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Austrian Science Fund *FWF* for financially supporting my work and for the excellent communication during the time of my project.

The position I acquired with the support of the *FWF* was based at the University of Salzburg, which afforded me ideal conditions for the project. Both the director of the Department of Biblical Studies and Ecclesiastical History, Dietmar Winkler, and the staff of the department provided me with their support and expertise (mostly in the form of friendly conversations during coffee breaks and lunches), which helped me a great deal during my work. Aho Shemunkasho was kind enough to spend a few hours answering my questions, and his knowledge of Syriac, his mother tongue, allowed me to better understand many difficult passages in Sergius' text.

I am most grateful to Sebastian Brock, whom I once called a *Schutzengel* of Syriac scholars and who fulfilled this role again in the present project. He has carefully read both the Syriac text of the present edition and my preliminary English translation of it and given his feedback on both. I am also indebted to Michael Chase, George Karamanolis, Stephen Menn, and Alexander Lamprakis, who read the draft version of this book and made multiple suggestions on it that helped me to better understand Sergius' arguments as well as the philosophical peculiarities of his treatise. The English parts of the book were proofread by Zachary Candy, whom I would like to thank for the work he has done in improving them. My special thanks go to Florian Ruppenstein from the publishing house, De Gruyter, for setting the book's layout.

To my wife, Olga, I owe more than I can possibly say, since it was her constant care and support that made it possible for me to finish this book in a short period of time. She was most patient with me, being aware of my obsession with the present project. I dedicate this book to our son Theo who was born in June 2022, shortly after our move to Salzburg, and who has completely changed our life, having brought so much light, love, and joy into it. So, just as Sergius originally addressed his commentary to his contemporary Theodore, let the modern edition of this commentary be dedicated to another Theodore, who was born in Salzburg, together with this book.

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Introduction

1 Sergius of Reshaina and his Commentary

1.1 Sergius, a Christian Disciple of Ammonius

Sergius of Reshaina (Syr. *Sargis d-Reš 'Ayna*, or *Reš'aynaya*; d. 536) is a major figure in Syriac intellectual history¹. He is the first Syriac author known by name who translated Greek medical², scholarly³, and philosophical works⁴ into Syriac and who made a major contribution to the knowledge of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools (and, by extension, among later scholars writing in Arabic)⁵. If al-Farabi's account of the transfer of philosophical and medical instruction from the late ancient Alexandria, firstly, to Ḥarran in Syria and then further to Baghdad (the "from Alexandria to Baghdad" complex of narratives)⁶ has any credibility, Sergius marks the beginning of this process of transition.

Sergius studied with Ammonius Hermeiou in Alexandria and, after his return to Syria, started to adapt and transmit the Alexandrian philosophical and pedagogical model to his Christian audience. In his letter about Syriac translations of Galen⁷, Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, the most prominent figure in the history of scientific translations from Greek into Syriac and Arabic, makes Sergius his main object of criticism, thereby testifying to his authority as late as the ninth century. Thus, in his life and afterlife, Sergius is revealed to be the crucial link between late ancient Alexandria and the great translation movement of 'Abbasid Baghdad in the 8th–10th centuries⁸.

1 Sergius' role in the history of Syriac culture and philosophy was to some extent overemphasized in the 19th century, as a result of his being credited with a number of philosophical treatises which have come down to us as anonymous; cf., e.g., Renan 1852, Sachau 1870, Wright 1894: 89–93, and Baumstark 1894. A revision of his role and legacy has been made in a series of articles by Henri Hugonnard-Roche, see especially Hugonnard-Roche 1997b and 2004. For an up-to-date assessment of Sergius' place in the history of philosophy, see Watt 2018.

2 For Sergius' translations of Galen, see Degen 1981, Kessel 2016, and Bhayro 2019.

3 For Sergius' translations and adaptations of astronomical works, see Claude-Villey 2012.

4 See a review of Sergius' philosophical writings in Hugonnard-Roche 1997b and Aydin 2016: 10–25.

5 For the afterlife of Sergius in the Arabic world, see Watt 2011.

6 Al-Farabi's account was analyzed by M. Meyerhof who was the first to introduce the expression "von Alexandria nach Bagdad" (Meyerhof 1930). A number of scholars later questioned the historicity of al-Farabi's description and criticized Meyerhof's literal interpretation of it (see, e.g., Strohmaier 1987 and Gutas 1999).

7 The Arabic text with German translation of Ḥunayn's letter was published in Bergsträsser 1925 and Lamoreaux 2016.

8 For the role of Syrian scholars in the translation of Aristotle and Galen into Arabic, cf., e.g., Hugonnard-Roche 1991 and Tannous 2018. D. Gutas claims that this role has been overemphasized; cf. Gutas 1998: 20–24.

as the chronicle of Ps.-Zacharias also mentions¹⁴. By the late 5th century, the Alexandrian *iatrosophists* had developed a systematic approach to the study of the works of Hippocrates and Galen that included some elements of the philosophical education with which it could be combined¹⁵. It is thus unsurprising to find a reference to Galen in Sergius' Prologue to the commentary, which speaks of Galen as the reason to turn to the study of logic (§§2–3).

Ps.-Zacharias further reports an embassy to Rome and Constantinople in which Sergius took part, as well as his death in Constantinople in 536¹⁶. Based on this evidence, it is traditionally assumed that the time he spent in Alexandria fell in the last decades of the 5th century and that his subsequent literary activity, including the composition of his commentary on the *Categories*, may be dated to the early 6th century. At this time, Alexandria was, alongside Athens, one of the main centers of philosophical education, one particularly attractive to Christian students, as the study of philosophy there was not so closely associated with pagan religious elements as was the case in Athens¹⁷.

Sergius' education in Alexandria coincides with the period of the teaching activity of Ammonius Hermeiou (435/445–517/526)¹⁸, a pupil of Proclus who began giving philosophy classes in one of the Alexandrian schools at some time after 470. Ammonius was the teacher of several prominent philosophers, including Philoponus, Simplicius, and Damascius, as well as (indirectly) Olympiodorus, David and Elias, who appear as the last representatives of the Alexandrian philosophical tradition, which, by the mid-sixth century, was deemed acceptable for Christians after the transformation of the philosophical curriculum that had taken place in the late 5th century.

Christian students were apparently not rare in the school of Ammonius, probably the most famous among these being John Philoponus (*ca.* 490–575), who became one of the editors of Ammonius' lectures¹⁹. It is obvious that some elements of philosophical education in Alexandria, including first of all the doctrine of the eternity of the world, but also religious elements associated with the Chaldean Oracles and Orphic texts, were problematic for Christian hearers of Ammonius' classes. Some of them, who labelled themselves *philoponoi* ("industrious")²⁰, were eager to counterbalance these

¹⁴ Ps.-Zacharias writes that Sergius studied "books (βιβλία) of medicine" (كتب الطب) (Brooks 1921: 136.9; cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 368).

¹⁵ For the system of medical education in Alexandria in the late 5th century, see Overwien 2018 and Overwien 2019.

¹⁶ Brooks 1921: 136–138. Cf. the English translation in Greatrex 2011: 369–371.

¹⁷ For the forms of philosophical education in Athens and Alexandria in the late 5th century, see Watts 2006.

¹⁸ For Ammonius and his school, see Blank 2010, Griffin 2016, and Chase 2020: 1–11.

¹⁹ On Philoponus as a Christian student of philosophy, see Verrycken 1990, Zachhuber 2020: 145–169.

²⁰ The *philoponoi* was a socially active group of Christian laymen closely connected with the monastery of Enaton, which was situated close to Alexandria and whose monks had an active anti-

elements by suggesting Christian students of philosophy adopt an alternative course of reading, which, besides the Bible, also included works by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzus²¹.

The tension between Christian and pagan students of philosophy in Alexandria led to an open conflict in 486²². It was resolved by recourse to a compromise between the two groups, one with important consequences for philosophical education in the following decades. Among these was that by the end of the 5th century Ammonius had become the leading Alexandrian teacher of philosophy. In addition, the compromise between Alexandrian Church authorities and Ammonius most likely included alterations to the program of philosophical education that would make it more acceptable for Christian students²³.

In his pedagogical activity, Ammonius generally followed the principle of combining Aristotelian and Platonic writings (introduced originally by Porphyry and becoming a general principle in the Neoplatonic schools) into a homogeneous curriculum²⁴. While Ammonius apparently maintained interest in Platonic dialogues, on which he gave lectures, it was Aristotle's writings, especially his *Organon*, that dominated in the first part of the cursus of education²⁵. Thus, Aristotle's *Categories* (together with Porphyry's *Isagoge*) served as the first philosophical text read by students of philoso-

Chalcedonian position. Edward Watts stressed the role, which the *philoponoï* of Alexandria played in the transformation of the philosophical curriculum in Alexandria in the late fifth century, in a series of publications, see particularly Watts 2005 and Watts 2006: 211–230. Watts' arguments were largely criticized by Alain-Philippe Segonds (see Segonds *et al.* 2011: 461–462) and Ilsetraut Hadot (Hadot 2015: 20–25).

21 This program of substitution of traditional Greek authorities with the works of Church Fathers developed by the Alexandrian *philoponoï* is described in the *Life of Severus* written by Zacharias Rhetor, who himself belonged to this group. The *Life* has been preserved in Syriac and published with a French translation in Kugener 1904. An English translation: Ambjörn 2008.

22 The attack on the pagan philosophical schools was initiated by the *philoponoï* and monks of the monastery of Enaton near Alexandria, who were supported by the patriarch of the city, Peter Mongus. As a result, many philosophers were forced to flee from the city, thus leaving Ammonius as Alexandria's preeminent teacher of the philosophical curriculum. See Watts 2006: 216–225; cf. Hadot 2015: 18–21.

23 Ammonius' agreement with Alexandrian Christian authorities is reported in rather scornful fashion by Damascius; see his *Life of Isidore* (Athanasiasi 1999: 280). For various interpretations of Damascius' text and the historical events that underpin it, see Sorabji 2005, who states that the agreement concerned primarily Ammonius' "refraining from the open support of pagan ritual" (p. 204). Cf. Segonds *et al.* 2011: 463 and Hadot 2015: 21, who both admit that the agreement was primarily focused on financial issues and on increasing the number of Christian students in Ammonius' school rather than on the philosophical curriculum.

24 On the tendency to harmonize Plato and Aristotle in Middle Platonism which resulted in the educational synthesis by Porphyry, see particularly Karamanolis 2006 and Hadot 2015. On Porphyry's contribution to the Neoplatonic curriculum, see Chase 2012: 1374–1376. For Ammonius' system of teaching, cf. Griffin 2016: 396–398.

25 On Damascius' witness to Ammonius' interest in Plato, see Hadot 2015: 15–20; cf. Chase 2020: 1–3.

phy, preceded only by a general introduction to philosophy and logic centered on various preliminary questions (Greek τὰ προλεγόμενα, i.e. subjects discussed before a study of certain text)²⁶. Among these questions, we find a general division of philosophy reflecting the educational system established in the school of Ammonius, a discussion of the role of logic as an instrument rather than a part of philosophy, and the correct division of Aristotle's writings²⁷.

The events which took place in Alexandria in the 480s are known to us mainly from the *Life of Severus* by Zacharias Rhetor²⁸. Both Zacharias and the eponymous Severus, the future patriarch of Antioch, had belonged to the *philopoi* of Alexandria and were supporters of their philosophical and apologetic program. The latter is reflected by another treatise composed by Zacharias, a dialogue *Ammonius*, that describes a discussion between an unnamed Christian philosopher and Ammonius, who, at the end of the debate, is brought to silence and thus shown to be defeated by Christian arguments²⁹. It would be a reasonable assumption that Serigus of Reshaina was also a member of the *philopoi* during his stay in Alexandria. Although we have no direct evidence for this³⁰, we do find in Serigus' work one of the earliest attempts to present Aristotle's philosophy not only as acceptable but as fundamentally necessary for Christian education.

In his *Commentary*, Serigus stresses several times that logic should be considered an instrument³¹ necessary for Christian education, since without it “neither will one be capable of studying the books on medicine nor will the arguments of the philosophers be comprehensible”, nor even will “the divine books” be correctly interpretable, unless a person is illuminated from above (see the concluding §450). Aristotle's natural philosophy too is presented by the Syriac scholar as indispensable for education and compatible with Christian views. Serigus writes (§256) about his plans to “sufficiently explain everything what we have learned not only from this man (i.e., Aristotle), but also from other philosophers and from our Christian writers who have diligently searched for truth”, thus presenting non-Christian and Christian philosophers to be in

²⁶ As Elias remarks in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories* (*In Cat.* 107.24–26), the traditional set of the *prolegomena*-questions goes back to Ammonius' teacher, Proclus. For the genesis and formation of the tradition of the study of *prolegomena*, see Hadot 1990 and Mansfeld 1994. For the development of this tradition in the Greek, Syriac, and Arabic worlds, see Hein 1985.

²⁷ For the structure of philosophical curriculum in the school of Ammonius as reflected in the introductory treatises that derive from it, see Westerink 1990, Hadot 1990, Hadot 1991, and Hoffmann 2012.

²⁸ Ed. Kugener 1904; English translation in Ambjörn 2008.

²⁹ Ed. in Colonna 1973, English translation in Dillon, Russel, and Gertz 2012. Another pagan figure who appears in this dialogue is the medical philosopher (*iatrosophist*) Gessius, which makes apparent that medical education in Alexandria in this period was connected with similar debates between Christian and non-Christian students characteristic of the school of Ammonius.

³⁰ Cf. Fiori 2014: 86–88.

³¹ See the extensive discussion of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument in Serigus' *Commentary*, §§30–48.

some sort of agreement acceptable for his fellow believers. Thus, in Sergius' *Commentary* we find the same apologetic bias as in, e.g., the works of Severus of Antioch, one characteristic of the approach of the Alexandrian *philoponoï*, which Sergius in turn suggests as the pedagogical template for Syriac schools.

The term *philoponoï* turns out to play an important role in the history of the West Syriac (Syriac Orthodox) anti-Chalcedonian movement pioneered by Severus³². The intellectual elite of the West Syriac Church, who were interested in the study and translation of the Greek philosophy and who were associated mainly with the monastery of Qenneshre, took over this label, either using the Greek word or a Syriac calque³³. In so doing, the Syriac scholars of the 6th–7th centuries presented themselves as the heirs of the Alexandrian Christian laymen who first sought to Christianize the essentially pagan philosophical program and to adapt it for Christian schools largely associated with monasteries.

1.2 Sergius' Commentary on the *Categories*

The treatise by Sergius edited in this volume (henceforth *Commentary*) is in many aspects a product of the exegetical method established in the school of Ammonius by the end of the 5th century. Sergius composed his *Commentary* probably shortly after his return from Alexandria, having adapted it from written notes that he brought with him. Given that such notes by students “from the voice” (ἀπὸ φωνῆς) of their teacher formed the basis of the commentaries on the *Categories* and *Prior Analytics* ascribed to Ammonius himself (as the titles of these works make clear³⁴), we cannot state with certainty whether Sergius' own notes were made by him personally for his private use, or whether he had access to some “official” version of Ammonius' lectures prepared by someone else.

Indeed, many passages in Sergius' treatise are very similar to (sometimes verbatim reproductions of) the text of the commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's

³² On Severus' promotion of the apologetic program of the *philoponoï* in the Syriac milieu, which resulted in the appropriation both of the program and of the term in West Syriac intellectual circles, cf. Arzhanov 2019: 152–174.

³³ The 8th century author Phocas called Athanasius of Balad and Jacob of Edessa, the famous Syriac translators of Aristotle's works who were connected with the monastery of Qenneshre, “lovers of toil” (ܐܘܠܝܘܬܝܢ), using a calque of the Greek φιλόπονοι (see the text in Wright 1871: 494). The only Syriac manual on rhetoric composed in the 9th century by Antony of Tagrit, was addressed to a certain Syriac *philoponos* (ܐܘܠܝܘܢܝܢܝܢܝܢ), according to a later note by Barhebraeus (see Abbeloos & Lamy 1872: 363).

³⁴ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 1.1–2 and *In An. Pr.* 1.1–2. Among the works ascribed to Ammonius, only his commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* is considered to be written by him personally, while his other commentaries on Porphyry and Aristotle are compositions of his students (cf. Blank 2010: 661–662 and Griffin 2016: 402–404).

tle's *Categories* ascribed directly to Ammonius, as well as to Philoponus' commentary on the *Categories* likewise written on the basis of Ammonius' lectures, suggesting that these works all derive either from multiple individual sets of notes taken in the classroom or from some official version of them authorized by Ammonius himself. As such, the Greek texts, containing parallels to Sergius' *Commentary* are quoted *in extenso* in the footnotes to the English translation. Although we cannot take for granted that Sergius' text has any direct relation to them beyond a common source in Ammonius' lectures³⁵, they contain the Greek terminology that Sergius most certainly had in mind while composing his commentary, allowing us better to understand the technical vocabulary of the published work³⁶.

The structure of Sergius' treatise clearly reflects the Alexandrian approach to the *Categories*, that considered this book not merely the first part of the *Organon*, but indeed, the very first text to be read by the student of philosophy (albeit accompanied by Porphyry's *Introduction* and other introductory materials, as mentioned). Sergius himself stresses that he has composed his treatise (Syr. *maktbanuta*, "writing, book") with a specific structure in mind, speaking of its seven parts as *memre* (sg. *memra*, "treatise, part"), each of which is generally dedicated either to a single issue or to a group of questions pertaining to such a single issue (Syr. *šarba*, "subject matter")³⁷.

Thus, the first half of Sergius' treatise, which includes the Prologue and Books I and II, focuses on the traditional preliminaries (*prolegomena*) discussed prior to Porphyry's *Isagoge* and to Aristotle's *Categories*. At the end of Book II, Sergius briefly outlines the first chapter of the *Categories* dealing with homonymy, synonymy, and heteronymy (the *antepraedicamenta*) and in this way embarks upon the second half of his work. This half in general follows the text of the *Categories* and hence may be designated a commentary, although it does not include *lemmata* from Aristotle's text. Books III to VI are dedicated to the *praedicamenta*, the four primary categories discussed at length by Aristotle himself: substance, quantity, relation, and quality. The last Book VII deals with the rest of the categories (the *postpraedicamenta*)³⁸. The contents of Sergius' work can be outlined as follows:

³⁵ Furlani claims that Sergius used Philoponus as his source ("dipende in tutto"): Furlani 1922: 172. This assumption, however, turns out to be rather unlikely for chronological reasons, cf. Aydin 2016: 56–57.

³⁶ Cf. an attempt at reconstructing the Greek terms that underlie the epitome of Sergius' *Commentary* in Aydin 2016: 295–302.

³⁷ Cf. the opening paragraphs to Books II–VII, i.e. §§49–50, 122, 234, 313, 353, and 405.

³⁸ Such division of the *Categories* into three parts is discussed by Ammonius in *In Cat.* 14.3–4 and is assumed by Sergius, cf. *Commentary*, §406.

Introduction to philosophy and logic	Prologue	Praise of Aristotle as a collector of all sciences.
	Book I	Introduction to philosophy: Division of philosophy; division of Aristotle's writings; logic as instrument of philosophy.
	Book II	Introduction to logic: The goal of logic; the sequence of Aristotle's writings; the reason for the obscurity of Aristotle's language; the scope of the <i>Categories</i> ; genera and species; the ten primary genera; kinds of speech.
Commentary on Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>		Synonyms, homonyms, heteronyms, and polynoms.
	Book III	Substance and accident; universal and particular; types of properties; types of division; primary and secondary substances; definition of substance based on its properties.
	Book IV	The sequence of the categories; divisions of quantity: number, language, line, surface, body, place, time; definition of quantity based on its properties.
	Book V	Properties of the genus of relatives; relatives that are simultaneous; definition of relatives.
	Book VI	Quality; its kinds and properties; division of the ten categories; definition of the remaining six categories.
	Book VII	Change; opposition; priority and posteriority; simultaneity; motion; conclusion of the treatise.

As becomes apparent from this overview, Sergius' work is not limited to the text of Aristotle's *Categories*, but has a much broader task, i.e., giving a general introduction to philosophy. As he notes, Aristotle's treatise is "an introduction into and a beginning of the study of logic" (§449), addressed to those who are "at the beginning of their learning" (§64)³⁹. It is thus possible that Sergius designed his work as a manual for students who might have limited their education in philosophy to an introductory course and not be interested in further study or in other Aristotelian works⁴⁰.

In the Prologue to the *Commentary*, Sergius reports a dialogue between him and his disciple Theodore⁴¹ (to whom he addresses the treatise as a whole) concerning

³⁹ Cf. §186 and §275.

⁴⁰ Cf. §60, where Sergius describes various parts of the *Organon* and proceeds to Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Having enumerated all these treatises, however, Sergius stresses that his main focus will be the *Categories*.

⁴¹ According to Hunayn b. Ishaq's *Letter*, Theodore at certain point of his career became bishop of the town Karḥ Ġuddan, see Bergsträsser 1925: 12.22. Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1997: 124 n. 13 and Aydin 2016: 10 n. 1. Theodore was a disciple of Sergius (see *Commentary*, §§4–7) and assisted him in translating the works of Galen into Syriac, revising Sergius' raw translations and correcting their style (see §2). Several translations of the Greek astronomical and medical works made by Sergius (e.g., the treatise *On the*

Galen (§2). Theodore had inquired as to the source of the clear logical structures found in Galen's works, and Sergius replied that the famous doctor had learned the science of logic from Aristotle, who holds a special position in the history of philosophy, given that it was Aristotle who had brought together all of human knowledge into one coherent system (§3). In the following paragraphs (§§4–7), Theodore begs Sergius to teach him this science which underlies Galen's works. Notwithstanding the artificial character of the described dialogue, the Prologue gives us an idea of Sergius' purposes with his treatise, which was clearly not intended *prima facie* to be a line-by-line commentary on the text of the *Categories*: rather, it is meant to explicate more general questions of the role of Aristotle's philosophy and particularly of his logic.

From Sergius' brief remarks scattered throughout the *Commentary* we may deduce that he had a much broader audience in mind than just his disciple Theodore (cf. §240 where Sergius says explicitly that he is addressing "many"). In the beginning and the concluding paragraphs of nearly every book, Sergius stresses his constant concern for those who are going to read his treatise⁴², for whom he did his best to make his explanations as clear as possible, "so that even little children might not to be confused by our answers" (§234). While addressing Theodore on one occasion (§418), Sergius writes: "This is how you can clearly explain and make apparent to the students the teaching on the six kinds (of change) which have been discussed thus far." It is thus possible that he was also thinking of teachers who could use his work for an introductory course in philosophy, since in §380 he mentions those who will "listen" to what he is writing. However, his primary audience was evidently the students themselves: it is these he has in mind when discussing such questions as which kinds of speech exist, what makes a definition, in how many ways a division is possible, etc.

Thus, in terms of methodology, Sergius first of all intended to compose a manual containing a general introduction to philosophy and logic. The Alexandrian tradition of commentary on the *Categories*, with its extensive *prolegomena* and general excursions into basic philosophical questions, provided Sergius with a useful framework that, however, required further adaptation to suit the needs of Syriac schools. This necessarily involved shifting the focus from Aristotle's text itself to the more general philosophical topics treated within it. As a result, what distinguishes Sergius' work from the Alexandrian tradition that served as his model is the near total absence of Aristotle's *ipsissima verba*. The text of the *Categories* is quoted neither systematically by way of full *lemmata* nor in the abbreviated form which would have allowed readers to follow Aristotle's text. It is only sporadically that we find any quotations from the *Categories* at all — even these, however, derive not from Aristotle's treatise, but most likely from the Greek commentary tradition that Sergius made use of (see 1.3, below).

Influence of the Moon and Galen's *On Simple Drugs*) are dedicated to Theodore, who is called "a priest" (ܩܘܪܕܐܢܐ), i.e. has not yet at that time received the position of a bishop.

⁴² Cf. *Commentary*, §§29, 138, 239, 261, 380, etc.

This state of affairs is unsurprising if placed in the context of the pedagogical aim pursued by Sergius, i.e., to give a general introduction to philosophy. It also explains the author's remark at the end of the *Commentary* (§449) that he could have composed his treatise even if Aristotle's work were not at his disposal. While Sergius on several occasions (§§60 and 450) discloses his plans to write commentaries on further parts of the *Organon*, meanwhile, no such works have come down to us. Although two East Syriac authors, Timothy I and 'Abdisho' bar Brikha, refer to Sergius' commentaries in the plural⁴³, they may have meant short logical treatises transmitted under Sergius' name⁴⁴.

There is little doubt that two expositions of logical figures based on Aristotle's *Analytica Priora* and attributed (either by medieval scribes or by modern scholars) to Sergius do not really belong to him⁴⁵. Another short work bears the title *Natural demonstration by the chief physician Sergius*, having come down to us in the same codex (London, BL Add. 12155) that contains a selection from Sergius' *Commentary* (ms. E, see 2.2, below)⁴⁶. This collection of various definitions may indeed ultimately derive from Sergius, although it must have been revised and reshaped by the compilers of the codex that contains it (cf. the extent of the revisions to Sergius' *Commentary* in the collection of excerpts appearing on the next folio of the same codex, discussed in 2.2, below).

Two further treatises on logic, on the other hand, may with good reason be attributed to Sergius, although, as in the previous case, their texts may have undergone revision at the hands of later Syriac scholars. Ms. London, BL Add. 14658, which opens with Sergius' *Commentary* (ms. L in the present edition, see 2.1.1, below), contains on fols. 124v–129r a short work with the title *On Genus, Species, and Individuality*, which is attributed to the “priest and chief physician Sergius” and which contains an exposition

⁴³ The East-Syriac Catholicos Timothy I (d. 823) refers in *Epistle* 19.20 to “commentaries on the books of logic” (ܩܘܬܒܐ ܕܠܘܓܝܩܐ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܕܩܘܬܒܐ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܕܗܘܢܐ ܕܗܘܢܐ), which he attributes to the authoritative Greek philosophers Olympiodorus, Stephanus, and Alexander, mentioning also Sergius (ed. Heimgartner 2021a: 105.2; transl. Heimgartner 2021b: 80). The plural form used by Timothy may thus be explained by the fact that he referred to multiple authors and not to multiple works by each individual author. In his catalogue of Syriac writers, 'Abdisho' bar Brikha (d. 1318) also uses the plural when referring to Sergius, noting that he “composed commentaries on logic” (ܩܘܬܒܐ ܕܠܘܓܝܩܐ ܕܗܘܢܐ), see Assemani 1725: 87 (cap. LXIV). The compressed expression of 'Abdisho' in all likelihood goes back to Timothy's letter, however.

⁴⁴ See two reviews of philosophical works which are for some reasons attributed to Sergius in Huggonard-Roche 1997b: 126–129 and Aydin 2016: 10–17.

⁴⁵ These consist of a *scholion* on the term “scheme” preserved in ms. BL Add. 14660 and explicitly attributed to Sergius (unpublished, an Italian translation in Furlani 1926a), as well as a treatise *On Three Conversions* in ms. BL Add. 14658, which has been identified by D. King as the second part of the commentary on *Prior Analytics* traditionally ascribed to Proba.

⁴⁶ Unpublished; Italian translation in Furlani 1926a.

of the Tree of Porphyry⁴⁷. Another treatise preserved in three different versions (in mss. BL Add. 14658, DS 27, and DS 28) bears in the BL codex the title *On the Division of Substance*. While not being explicitly ascribed to Sergius, it may in fact go back to him⁴⁸.

If the three aforementioned treatises may indeed be considered to derive from Sergius, they may all be characterized as very general introductions to logical issues that have clearly been designed for school use. All three of them are associated either with Aristotle's *Categories* or with Porphyry's introduction to this treatise and thus corroborate the assumption that Sergius' commentary on the *Categories* was designed not as the first part in a series of expositions of all parts of the *Organon*, but rather as an independent work that primarily served as a general introduction to philosophy.

It is in keeping with Sergius' approach that one of the logical treatises ascribed to him bears the title *Natural Demonstration*, even though it focuses primarily on logical categories. Sergius discusses natural philosophy in various parts of his *Commentary*, another distinct feature that differentiates his work from the mainstream Alexandrian tradition. Indeed, in Book IV (see §256 and further) he goes so far as to depart completely from the text of the *Categories*, turning instead to Aristotle's *Physics*. While the Greek commentators, including Ammonius, also referred to the *Physics* as proper source of information on space and time, Sergius goes much farther in incorporating large portions from this work directly into his treatise (sometimes in the form of periphrases and sometimes as quotations).

Thus, in spite of Sergius' multiple statements (see §§27, 240, and 256) that he plans to comment on Aristotle's works on natural philosophy on some other occasion, he clearly considered it necessary to include at least some elements of these works in his commentary on the *Categories*⁴⁹. It would be a reasonable assumption that the Syriac scholar was thinking of those teachers and students of philosophy who might never turn to further philosophical subjects, confining their teaching and training to a general introduction to philosophy, which ought properly to count among its indispensable components some elements of physics⁵⁰.

Sergius' *Commentary* proved to be an influential text in the history of Syriac philosophy. We find revisions of it and quotations of various length taken from it in a number of later works:

47 Unpublished; Italian translation in Furlani 1925. This work has been traditionally considered a genuine work of Sergius; cf. Furlani 1925, Hugonnard-Roche 1997b, Aydin 2016.

48 Unpublished. This treatise includes several parts, which appear in different order in the three versions and one of which goes back to Ammonius' commentary on the *Isagoge*.

49 Cf. §261 where Sergius anticipates and refutes a possible criticism of this approach.

50 Cf. further examples of the combination of *Categories*-derived logical notions with natural philosophy in Arzhanov 2021a: 24–25.

- (1) Shortly after Sergius' death, some parts of his *Commentary* were integrated into the introduction to philosophy written by Paul the Persian, who is traditionally dated to the mid-6th century, being active at the court of the Sasanian king Khosraw I Anushirvan (reigned in 531–578)⁵¹.
- (2) At the end of the 6th century, the East Syriac author Barḥadbshabba, who received his education in the famous school of Nisibis, made use of the introductory part of Sergius' *Commentary* in his treatise *The Cause of the Foundation of the Schools*⁵².
- (3) Around 600, parts of the *Commentary* dealing with the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers and with Aristotle's main categories were quoted by another East Syriac author, Gabriel Qatraya, in his commentary on the Eucharist⁵³.
- (4) A number of divisions and definitions deriving from the *Commentary* were included in the treatise *On the Division of Substance*, preserved, as mentioned above, in three different versions, one of which dates from the 7th century⁵⁴.
- (5) The 8th-century apologetic compendium preserved in ms. E includes a large selection of periphrastic quotations from Sergius' work, probably reflecting its use in the West Syriac schools⁵⁵.
- (6) The East Syriac author Theodore Bar Koni (late 8th century) includes lengthy quotations from Sergius' treatise in his *Book of Scholia*⁵⁶. This compendium is dated to the year 792⁵⁷ and is an example of a manual written for those beginning their study of theology in East Syriac schools.
- (7) Sergius' *Commentary* is one of the sources for the *Book of Definitions*, compiled in East Syriac school circles around the year 900⁵⁸ and traditionally ascribed to Mi-

51 Paul composed several introductions to philosophy and logic as well as a commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation*; see on him Hugonnard-Roche 2000, 2011, and 2018. It is not clear whether he wrote in Syriac or in Persian. His treatise on logic preserved in Syriac is published in Land 1875: 1–32. Fragments from his introduction to philosophy preserved in Arabic by Miskawayh are analyzed and translated into English in Gutas 1983. For a parallel between Paul's text and Sergius', cf. Gutas 1983: 233 and *Commentary*, §3.

52 Ed. with a French translation in Scher 1908, English translation in Becker 2006. For the parallels between Barḥadbshabba and Sergius, see Perkams 2019.

53 On Gabriel Qatraya and his work, see Brock 2014. The text of Gabriel's treatise is partially edited in Neroth van Vogelpoel 2018. The passage dealing with Pythagoras and Aristotle (cf. *Commentary*, §§129–130) is published with an English translation in Brock 2016: 146–147.

54 On one of the mss. containing it (London, BL Add. 14658), see 2.1.1, below.

55 On ms. E, see 2.2, below.

56 Ed. in Scher 1954, French translation in Hespel & Draguet 1982. The discussion of logical topics, starting with a definition of "substance", appears in Theodore at the beginning of Book VI, which focuses on the New Testament. Cf. Scher 1954: 9–14 and *Commentary*, §§217–231; Scher 1954: 14–15 and *Commentary*, §§138–149; Scher 1954: 16–17 and *Commentary*, §§98–107; Scher 1954: 17–18 and *Commentary*, §§203–212 (Theodore's version is in most cases a summary of Sergius' text).

57 For the dating of Theodore's work, see Griffith 1981: 162.

58 For the dating of this compilation, see Abramowski 1999.

chael Badoqa⁵⁹. Similar to (5), the *Book of Definitions* is addressed to those just beginning their studies.

- (8) The 10th-century Baghdad scholar Ḥasan Bar Bahlul made use of the *Commentary* in compiling his *Lexicon* (Syr. *Leksiqon*)⁶⁰, although it is possible that his knowledge of Sergius' treatise was second-hand.
- (9) An epitome of the *Commentary* is preserved in ms. Berlin, Petermann I. 9, dated to the 13th century (on which see 2.3, below)⁶¹. The epitome must thus have been produced sometime prior to the composition of the Berlin codex itself by an anonymous Syriac scholar.

The transmission history of the *Commentary* does not belong only to the medieval period. Its latest stage dates from the early 20th century, when the youngest manuscript containing it was commissioned by Alfonse Mingana. This manuscript, Mingana Syr. 606, was copied in Alqosh in 1933 by the famous scribe Mattai bar Pawlos (d. 1947) on the basis of ms. B (on the Erbil group of mss., see 2.1.3, below). This manuscript was produced 11 years after the first scholarly article analyzing Sergius' work had been published.

In 1922, Giuseppe Furlani made a brief summary of the contents of the *Commentary* in an article published in Italian, including lengthy quotations taken mainly from books I–IV and based on the version of the *Commentary* preserved in ms. L⁶². Furlani's article has until now remained the only general presentation of the whole text of Sergius' *Commentary*, although some parts of it have been translated into other European languages. In 1997, Sebastian Brock made an English translation of a short fragment from the Prologue⁶³. Henri Hugonnard-Roche, who dedicated a number of articles to the figure and legacy of Sergius, published a French translation of the Prologue and Book I⁶⁴. John Watt translated a large portion of Book II into English⁶⁵. These scholars all supplied their translations with extensive commentaries that made apparent both the dependence of Sergius' treatise on the philosophical school of Ammonius and its value for the history of the Syriac philosophical tradition. The recent edition of the

⁵⁹ Ed. in Furani 1922. Since Furlani knew Sergius' treatise from ms. L, he pointed to a number of parallels between the two texts in the commentary to his edition of the *Book of Definitions*.

⁶⁰ See the entry "Aristotle" in Duval 1901: 290, containing a quotation from the *Commentary*, §59.

⁶¹ Published in Aydin 2016.

⁶² Furlani 1922. On ms. L, which is the earliest witness to the *Commentary*, see 2.1.1, below.

⁶³ Brock 1997. Brock's quotations were taken from the very beginning of the treatise and from the last part of it. Brock's translation has been quoted several times in other publications, see, e.g., Penn et al. 2022: 278–279.

⁶⁴ Hugonnard-Roche 1997c and Hugonnard-Roche 1997d. The translation was based on mss. M and P (see 2.1.2 and 2.1.3, below).

⁶⁵ Watt 2014. The translation was based on mss. L, M, and P.

epitome by Sami Aydin⁶⁶, which contains multiple references to the *Commentary*, reveals further parallels to the Alexandrian commentary tradition and attempts to contextualize it in the history of Syriac philosophy.

1.3 The *Commentary* and the Syriac Aristotelianism in the Early 6th Century

The Syriac philosophical tradition⁶⁷ has much to do with the reception of and attitudes towards Greek philosophy, and thus is sometimes considered secondary to it, since the philosophical contributions specific to Syriac are either translations from the Greek or attempts to follow Greek models of philosophy⁶⁸. It is characteristic that the early period of Syriac literature started with the two figures, Bardaiṣan and Ephrem, who held the opposite views on the Greek culture. Bardaiṣan, the first “Aramaic philosopher”, was eager to introduce some elements of Platonism into his writings, so that in the *Book of the Laws of the Countries* he appears as Socrates in a Platonic dialogue⁶⁹. Ephrem, on the other hand, was active in criticizing it, making first of all Platonic ideas the object of his criticism⁷⁰.

In the late 5th century, a new period in Syriac reception and adaptation of Greek philosophy starts which is characterized by the interest in Aristotle rather than Plato and which appears to be closely associated with the tradition of Neoplatonism known to us from the Alexandrian school. Sergius of Reshaina who received his philosophical and medical education in Alexandria in the late 5th century marks the beginning of this period. Sergius turns out to be the first Syriac scholar known to us by name who introduced the main features of the Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle into the Christian education in Syria. First, his interest in both Aristotle and Galen, and secondly, his focus on producing commentaries on the *Organon* which served as a general introduction to philosophy and logic, are two features which become characteristic of Syriac philosophy in the pre- and early Islamic period.

Sergius opens his *Commentary* with a short Prologue⁷¹, in which he praises Aristotle for having brought all sciences into a coherent system and compares him to a wise

⁶⁶ Aydin 2016.

⁶⁷ On the Syriac philosophical tradition in general, see Endress 1987, Daiber 2012, Hugonnard-Roche & Watt 2018.

⁶⁸ For Syriac attitudes towards Greek culture, see the classical study of Brock 1982.

⁶⁹ For the figure and legacy of Bardaiṣan, see Drijvers 1996. Ilaria Ramelli has explored the reception of Platonic ideas by Bardaiṣan in detail in Ramelli 2009. See also Jurasz 2019.

⁷⁰ For Ephrem’s attitude towards Greek philosophy, see Possekel 1999.

⁷¹ The Prologue has become an object of interest in several recent studies. It was first (partly) translated into English in Brock 1997. A French translation with an extensive commentary was published in Hugonnard-Roche 1997c. I made an edition of the Syriac text of the *Prologue* (unfortunately on only a

doctor (an image which appears fitting in context of Sergius' reference to Galen) who has mixed a number of simple drugs into one perfect remedy⁷². On a number of occasions (see particularly §§54 and 450), Sergius reiterates the value of Aristotle's philosophy in general and of logic in particular. These persistent attempts make clear that the place of Aristotle and his writings in Syriac schools in the early 6th century had not yet been settled⁷³.

The period when Sergius was writing his *Commentary* was a tumultuous one characterized by intense theological debates that, following the Council of Chalcedon (451), had begun to integrate Aristotle's logical terminology more extensively⁷⁴. Although Church authorities never mentioned Aristotle in this context, the terms which they applied in their exposition of the Trinity and the two Natures of Jesus Christ ("substance", "nature", "hypostasis") ultimately go back to the *Categories* and the Neoplatonic commentaries on this treatise, which thus had a significant impact on early Christian theology⁷⁵. We may hardly doubt that Sergius had these theological discussions in mind when working on his *Commentary*. It is worth noting that Book III, which deals with the term "substance", is longer than any other part his treatise, due probably to the importance of this term and the number of questions connected with its application⁷⁶.

The reception history of the *Commentary* makes apparent that Sergius' work was subsequently integrated into theological discussions, sometimes as a substitute for the *Categories* itself. One of the earliest textual witnesses to the *Commentary* has come down to us in the form of a collection of excerpts from it preserved in an 8th-century florilegium composed with the purpose of providing help in theological debates (ms. E, see 2.2, below). This collection has two subtitles. In the first one, the sixth book of the *Commentary* is pointed out as the direct source of the quotations. The second part of the collection, however, is called plainly an exposition of Aristotle's *Categories*, which in fact contains extracts from Sergius' *Commentary*. This polemical florilegium, thus, gives good reasons to assume that Sergius' treatise was read and used in the context of

limited ms. basis) for the volume published by D. Gutas (Gutas 2022: 224–227). An English translation of this text was made by D. King (Gutas 2022: 189–192).

72 This image goes back in all probability to a *topos* that presents Plato as the one who brought together all the sciences for the first time and that was most likely created in the Academy of Athens. Cf. the quotation from the 2nd-century head of the Athenian Academy, Atticus, in Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI.2.2–4.

73 See general overviews of the reception of Aristotle in Syriac schools in Baumstark 1900, Daiber 2001, Bruns 2003, King 2010: 1–17.

74 For the role of Aristotle's logic in the Christological debates, see Bradshaw 2004: 154–186, Krausmüller 2011, Karamanolis 2013: 117–143, Edwards 2019: 129–148, and Zachhuber 2020.

75 See Edwards 2019: 129–146.

76 Cf. the remark by G. Furlani on the importance of Book III in context of the current theological debates in Furlani 1922: 163.

theological debates, and not simply as a commentary on Aristotle, but, in a sense, as a replacement for him.

It was not only the philosophical education in the school of Ammonius that gave Sergius an impulse to promote Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools. Like his fellow Christian students, the *philoponoi*, Sergius was eager to make Greek philosophy part of Christian intellectual discourse⁷⁷, stressing in his *Commentary* the role of Aristotle's logic not only in medicine, but also in other parts of human knowledge (see §450). The increasing post-Chalcedonian trend of incorporating philosophical terms into Christian theology in turn prompted Sergius to provide a systematic exposition of Aristotelian logic that might be applied in theological debates of his time.

Sergius was, however, not the first Syriac intellectual to attempt this expository work. Several passages in the *Commentary* give good reason to assume that Aristotle's logical works were known to Syriac scholars before Sergius, although the tradition of their study had not yet achieved a rigid scholastic form. In §293, Sergius gives an example of certain differences between the terms used by the "ancients", i.e., the Greek philosophers of the past, and those used by their Syriac commentators:

Now, we shall consider that of things that are said, some exist primarily and in the strict sense, and some of those things that are said exist secondarily and accidentally. In the Syriac language, we are accustomed to call these two kinds "truly" (*šarrira'it*) and "seemingly" (*ša'ila'it*), so that what the ancients named "strictly" (*hattita'it*) and "primarily" (*qadma'it*) we usually call "truly" (*šarrira'it*), while what we designate as "seemingly" (*ša'ila'it*) they referred to as "accidentally" (*gedšana'it*) and "secondarily" (*trayyana'it*). Thus, there are quantities in the true and strict sense, namely those which have been divided and discussed thus far, and there are those of another kind, seeming and derivative, of which we say that they are quantities only in belief and not in reality.

This is an example of nuances which Sergius finds in rendering the two Greek terms, *κυρίως* and *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, that appear in *Cat.* 5a38–39. The point that Sergius makes is rather general, i.e., that there are various ways of understanding and translating the Greek terms. But in so doing, he also gives us an example of the development of the Syriac logical lexicon in the period that precedes his work, as he speaks of an established custom of using particular terms.

On other occasion, Sergius appears more critical. He comments several times on the Syriac translation of the Greek term *ποιότης*, "quality". The first comment comes in §99:

We have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. <...> All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus which he called *pw'tws*

⁷⁷ Another *philoponos*, Severus of Antioch, was likewise particularly eager to apply the philosophical knowledge acquired in Alexandria in his polemical writings that formed the basis of anti-Chalcedonian theology in the West Syriac (Syriac Orthodox) tradition; cf. Zachhuber 2020: 119–144.

Arabic in the form of quotations by Miskawayh⁸⁰, contains passages that clearly go back to Sergius' *Commentary*⁸¹ and testify to the broad dissemination of the latter work shortly after Sergius' lifetime. Proba in all likelihood also belongs to the mid-6th century⁸²; he was the author of a commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* and *Prior Analytics* I.1–7, all of which proved very popular in Syriac schools⁸³. Both Paul and Proba belonged to the next generation of Syriac teachers of philosophy, who shared Sergius' interest in general introductions to Aristotle and similarly depended on the Alexandrian exegetical tradition.

Sergius' remarks on the Syriac translation of the Greek ποιότης, "quality", quoted above include a reference to translations from Greek into Syriac which were made apparently before or during his lifetime. Indeed, further evidence for a prior tradition of translation from Greek to Syriac may be represented by two anonymous Syriac translations of logical treatises (Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, respectively) belonging to the 6th century, although it remains a matter of debate whether their composition was prior, posterior, or contemporary relative to Sergius' career. Both translations have been preserved in the same codex now located in the British Library of London, Add. 14658, which also contains Sergius' *Commentary*. The translation of the *Isagoge*⁸⁴ has sometimes been considered to be a product of Sergius himself⁸⁵. However, the only quotation from the *Isagoge* (12.24–25) that Sergius includes (in §160) differs in many aspects from the anonymous translation and thus does not speak to any connection between them. There is similarly no apparent link between Sergius' *Commentary* and the early Syriac translation of the *Categories*⁸⁶.

While Sergius' work focuses on and comments on the text of Aristotle's treatise, this text itself, as it has been already noted above, is basically absent from the *Commentary*. Unlike his contemporary Greek commentators (Ammonius, Philoponus, Simplicius), Sergius does not include *lemmata* from Aristotle's text (either in full or in abbreviated form) be explained by his subsequent commentary. In fact, although his exposition generally follows the order of the topics in the *Categories* such that we are able to indicate (as it is done in the margins of the present edition) the assumed passages in the Greek text to which Sergius' comments refer, it is not always clear to which exact passage from the *Categories* his discussion corresponds, and so these

⁸⁰ See the analysis and English translation of the quotations from Paul in Gutas 1983.

⁸¹ See Gutas 1983: 233 and §3 of Sergius' *Commentary*.

⁸² On Proba and his legacy, see besides Brock 2011, also Suermann 1990 and Hugonnard-Roche 2012a.

⁸³ See Van Hoonacker 1900, Hugonnard-Roche 2012b and Hugonnard-Roche 2017.

⁸⁴ Ed. Brock 1988; cf. the online edition at: <https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/isagoge.html> (retrieved on 20.08.23). On this version, see Brock 1989, Hugonnard-Roche 1994, Hugonnard-Roche 2012c.

⁸⁵ This attribution was suggested by Renan 1852: 27, but was rejected by later scholars.

⁸⁶ Ed. King 2010; cf. the online edition of this version at: <https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/categoriae.html> (retrieved on 20.08.23). For the differences between the two editions, see Arzhanov 2021b. On this Syriac translation of the *Categories*, see Hugonnard-Roche 1987.

indications in many cases turn out to be rather conjectural. At the end of the *Commentary* (see §449), moreover, Sergius makes a remark that reflects his general attitude towards the text of the *Categories*: “Even if I had not this treatise at my disposal while I was writing down these things, I would still have urged you to meditate about them...” The remark may be understood to describe a merely hypothetical scenario, but one can also interpret it to mean that Sergius in fact *did not* have the text of the *Categories* at his disposal while writing down the *Commentary*, neither the Greek original nor the Syriac version of it⁸⁷.

Even if Sergius did have access to the separate text of the *Categories*, he did not make much use of it, since in the *Commentary* we find very few passages where Sergius actually quotes Aristotle. Rather, in most cases (see §§231, 293, 296, etc.⁸⁸), Sergius simply paraphrases the text of the *Categories*, including longer or shorter portions of it into his exposition of particular topics. Often such periphrastic manner of combining Aristotle’s own words with an exposition of them finds close parallels in the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, although the latter authors include the corresponding passages from the *Categories* in the form of *lemmata* before giving their exposition of the text. Given Sergius’ general tendency to paraphrase Aristotle rather than to cite him, we are unable to say if there are any passages from the *Categories* at all included by Sergius in his *Commentary* that might qualify as direct quotations. One can point to eight instances in Sergius’ treatise where he gives the impression of quoting Aristotle’s words rather than paraphrasing them:

- (1) §70 *Cat.* 1a16–17
- (2) §137 *Cat.* 1a24–25
- (3) §222 *Cat.* 3b10
- (4) §223 *Cat.* 3b24–25
- (5) §228 *Cat.* 4a10–11
- (6) §324 *Cat.* 6a36–37
- (7) §332 *Cat.* 6b19–20
- (8) §349 *Cat.* 8a31–32

In none of these cases does the text of the *Categories* quoted by Sergius fit with the anonymous Syriac translation of this tract⁸⁹. Thus, we have good reason to assume that Sergius did not use the anonymous Syriac version during his work on the *Commentary*, which is unsurprising given Sergius’ own statement in §449 that he would have composed his treatise even without access to Aristotle’s text.

⁸⁷ This is what G. Furlani suggests in his Italian translation of this passage based on ms. L only (Furlani 1922: 136). However, the Syriac text as it is preserved in mss. B and D allows for the interpretation reflected in my English translation of this passage.

⁸⁸ See also §§299, 300, 306–307, 327–329, 333–334, 343, 350, 370, 376, 380, 383, 385, 388, 409, and 440.

⁸⁹ Cf. the comparison between the Syriac versions of the *Categories*, including the quotations from it by Sergius, in Hugonnard-Roche 1987 and King 2011.

A closer look at instances (1) and (2) makes the differences between the two texts apparent:

	Greek version	Sergius' <i>Commentary</i>	Anonymous Syriac translation
(1)	1a16–17: τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς	ܐܘܬܪܐܬܐ ܡܠܝܩ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܐܘܬܪܐܬܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܝܩ ܡܘܠܝܩܐ	ܡܘܠܝܩ ܐܘܬܪܐܬܐ ܡܠܝܩ ܠܝܩ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܐܘܬܪܐܬܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ
(2)	1a24–25: ὁ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν	ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܝܩ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ	ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܡܘܠܝܩ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ ܠܥܥܘܩܐ

Quotation (1) by Sergius belongs to the *prolegomena* part of his treatise and apparently goes back to the Greek commentaries which considered the problem of the scope of Aristotle's work. In this context, the passage of *Cat.* 1a16–17 was traditionally mentioned as an argument that Aristotle's aim was to discuss simple words rather than simple things or notions. It is likely that it was such commentaries that Sergius used as a source of this quotation⁹⁰. Similarly, we may surmise that quotation (2) by Sergius goes back not to a separate version of the *Categories* (be it in Greek or Syriac) but to the commentary tradition, since the Syriac author takes *Cat.* 1a24–25 as a definition of “accident”, i.e. of a term that does not actually appear in Aristotle's text. In chapter 2 of the *Categories*, Aristotle speaks of “being in something as subject” and “being said of something as subject” and of various combinations of them which result in four different types⁹¹. It fell to later commentators to interpret these terms used by Aristotle as referring to universal and particular, on the one hand, and to substance and accident, on the other⁹². In the *Commentary*, Sergius defines the term “accident” with reference to the quotation from Aristotle's text, making no mention of the fact that the term he defines is not found there, which makes it very probable that the source of his quotation is to be found among the Alexandrian commentaries rather than in Aristotle himself⁹³.

⁹⁰ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.3–5, Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.29–33, and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 9.12–13.

⁹¹ On Aristotle's terminology in *Cat.* 2, cf. Ackrill 1963: 74–76.

⁹² Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.14–15 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 29.1. For the ancient commentaries dealing with Aristotle's terms, see Thiel 2004: 73–78.

⁹³ Cf. also Sergius' definition of the 11th type of being-in-something in §149. Where the version of Ammonius and Philoponus have: “as in a subject, as an accident is in a substance” (ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.17 = Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.25–26), Sergius skips the first part of the definition. This interpretation seems to be a result of deliberate choice, and it gives good reason to assume that Sergius supposed that no separate text of the *Categories* needed to be consulted alongside his own treatise.

with the later Syriac versions of the *Categories*, all of which appear to represent the same tradition of interpretation of Aristotle’s text in this respect.

- (4) In §383, the *Commentary* refers to *Cat.* 10a29–30, where Aristotle speaks of things that are called “paronymously” (παρωνύμως). In order to make this Greek term comprehensible, Sergius applies the Syriac expression ܡܗܘܢܐܘܢ ܕܡܝܢ ܕܘܚܪܐ, “such things which derive from something”. Similar explicative translation appears also in the *Anon.*, which renders the Gr. παρωνύμως λέγεται in *Cat.* 10a29–30 as ܕܘܚܪܐ ܕܘܚܪܐ ܕܘܚܪܐ.

These examples demonstrate that in both the *Commentary* and in *Anon.* we see different attempts at understanding Aristotle’s logical terminology, which in many cases turn out to belong to the same tradition. If we recall Sergius’ remarks quoted above about Syriac translations and interpretations of Aristotle’s logical texts which predate him, we may assume that neither Sergius nor the author(s) of the *Anon.* were completely isolated in their work. Rather both texts appear as part of a general process of reception and creative adaptation of Aristotle’s logic in Syriac schools in the late 5th — early 6th century, a process that was taken up by subsequent generations of Syriac Aristotelians, whose names are also known to us.

Sergius’ contribution to this process may hardly be overstated. Given the long history of reception of his *Commentary* (see 1.2, above), we may assume that this text was studied in both West and East Syriac schools, having been preserved to the present day both in full and in abridged form (as selected quotations, paraphrases, and epitomes). These textual witnesses, which will be discussed in the following sections, contribute to our knowledge of the afterlife of Sergius’ work.

2 The Syriac Text of the *Commentary*

2.1 Manuscripts Containing the Full Version of the *Commentary*

2.1.1 London, British Library, Add. 14658 (L)

The London codex BL⁹⁶ Add. 14658 is the oldest witness to the text of Sergius' *Commentary*⁹⁷. This parchment manuscript came to London in 1843 as a result of the purchase of a large collection of codices from the Coptic monastery Dayr al-Suryan, located in the Nitrian desert in Egypt⁹⁸. It has been preserved without the first and the last folios. Thus its colophon, if there ever was one, is lost. However, based on a paleographical analysis of its writing, William Wright dated it to the 7th century, and this dating, which brings this codex quite close to Sergius' lifetime, has been generally accepted by later scholars.

The codex is written in two columns, containing 36 to 40 lines. In its present condition, it includes 188 folios, and apart from the large portions at the beginning and at the end, a considerable number of folios is missing from it, while some of the folios are bound in an incorrect order, a state of affairs mostly affecting the first quires of the codex, which contain Sergius' *Commentary*. The manuscript was copied by an unknown scribe in the regular *Estragela* script. Parts of the text (see, e.g., fol. 42r) which were either damaged or unreadable have first been erased and later written anew in somewhat smaller letters but in the same *Estragela* script as the main text.

The text also contains interlinear or marginal corrections written in the same or very similar *Estragela* script and probably dating from the time of the manuscript production. Apart from these, a number of paratextual marks have been added to the text at a probably much later date. They have, first, the form of a square bracket (<)⁹⁹ or of ligatures combining either Syriac or Arabic letters, and they appear in all parts of ms. L, indicating how the codex was likely used at various periods of time¹⁰⁰. The West Syriac vowels (which reflect Greek vowel signs) attached to some proper names and Greek loanwords in the text seem also to belong to the later period than the original text.

⁹⁶ It was originally housed in the British Museum (hence it is referred to as "BM"), but is now part of the manuscript collection of the British Library.

⁹⁷ See the description of the codex in Wright 1872: 1154–1160.

⁹⁸ For the history of the collection of the monastery Dayr al-Suryan and its migration to several European libraries, see Wright 1872: i–xvii; Brock & Van Rompay 2014: xv–xviii.

⁹⁹ This sign usually served in Syriac manuscripts as a marker of a quotation that appears in the text, cf. Wright 1872: xxviii.

¹⁰⁰ The marginal notes that are found in other parts of the codex include the imperative "write" (ܘܠܝܚܝܬܘܢ), which gives reason to assume that this manuscript was used as a *Vorlage* for further copies (see fols. 99v, 124v, 129v, etc.). This is quite apparent in the case of the Syriac sentences of Menander (on fol. 163v), as the corrections found in ms. L were included in the later copy of this text on the fly-leaves of another codex; cf. Arzhanov 2017.

The contents of this codex have been described multiple times¹⁰¹. Scholars have stressed the importance of not only concrete works included in it (for many of which the codex remains the only witness) but also of the structure of this remarkable collection as a whole¹⁰². In its present state, the codex opens with Sergius' *Commentary*, which is followed by a number of further texts on logic¹⁰³, as well as treatises on grammar¹⁰⁴, natural philosophy¹⁰⁵, and psychology¹⁰⁶, but also some pseudepigraphic works attributed to Plato¹⁰⁷. Thus, this collection reflects the full cursus of late ancient higher education, which began with introductory texts and concluded with the study of Platonic works¹⁰⁸. Sergius' *Commentary*, with its extensive *prolegomena* part, thus plays the role here of an introductory work with which the course of philosophical study commences, a role apparently in line with Sergius' intention.

Due to the loss of a number of folios both at the beginning and in various other parts of the codex, Sergius' *Commentary* has been preserved in ms. L only partially, so that about a quarter of the text has been lost. Fortunately, one of the missing pages from this codex has been identified among the individual folios preserved in the collection of the University of Leipzig (this folio now bears the shelf-mark "Or. 1078/I")¹⁰⁹. However, ms. L is still characterized by a number of large lacunae and by an incorrect order of the folios¹¹⁰. We may describe the state of the text of Sergius' *Commentary* in this manuscript (supplied now with the Leipzig folio) as follows:

- (lacuna at the beginning comprising ca. 8 folios)
- fol. 1
- (lacuna comprising ca. 2 folios)
- fols. 2–7
- (lacuna comprising ca. 2 folios)
- fols. 8–16 + fols. 30–39

101 See the earliest descriptions in Renan 1852b: 294–310, Sachau 1852: 71, Wright 1872: 1154–1160. Many original attributions have been corrected by later scholars, cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2007: 279–281.

102 See Hugonnard-Roche 2007, King 2010b, and Arzhanov 2019: 190–193.

103 The anonymous Syriac translations of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and of Aristotle's *Categories*, as well as some short texts on logic, on which see section 1, above.

104 The Syriac version of Dionysius Thrax' *Techne grammatike*.

105 Ps.-Aristotle's *De mundo*, Alexander of Aphrodisias' *On the Universe*, and Paul of Alexandria's *On the Motion of the Sun*.

106 Ps.-Aristotle's *On the Soul*.

107 The dialogue "Sokrates", Ps.-Platonic *Definitions*, and Plato's *Advice to his Disciple*.

108 Cf. Arzhanov 2019: 190–193.

109 See Kessel 2019: 398. This folio belonged to the collection of Constantin Tischendorf, with the shelf-number "XV.b.3" (according to the note that is visible on the photo of this codex); cf. Tischendorf 1855: 67–68, where the folio has the number XVI.D. See also the description in the catalogue of Vollers 1906: 381, who refers to it as part of the "Codex Tischendorf XVI" and describes it as the first fragment bound together in this manuscript.

110 Cf. Wright 1872: 1154 and Furlani 1922: 137.

- (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio)
 fol. 29 + fol. 17
 (lacuna comprising ca. 4 folios)
 fols. 20–25 + fol. 19 + fol. 18 + fols. 26–28 + fols. 40–42
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio)
 fols. 43–46
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio)
 fols. 47–52 + Leipzig folio
 (lacuna comprising ca. 1 folio)
 fols. 53–61r

Besides the highly lacunose character of the manuscript, the text preserved in it turns out to contain multiple errors which distinguish it from the other textual witnesses (cf. the stemma in 2.4, below) and make it, in most cases of textual variety, a rather unreliable source. The following cases demonstrate the most obvious errors in L:

- 100.13 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 118.19 ܫܘܚܘܚܘܢܐ BCDP: ܫܘܚܘܚܘܢܐ L
 196.5 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCD, Epit.: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 198.3 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 202.15 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 204.20 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 216.20 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BCDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 224.3 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 232.23 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 244.18 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BDP, Epit.: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L
 384.12 ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ BDP: ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ L

One might provide a much longer list of errors in L which distinguish it as an isolated line of the transmission of the text. As it will be shown below (see 2.2), this line probably includes ms. E, which contains a selection from the *Commentary*, but does not comprise further witnesses known to us to date.

The *Commentary* in ms. L contains schematic divisions (Syr. ܥܩܠܐ) of the subject matter at the end of Books II, IV, V, and VI, which are also found in other manuscripts. The loss of such divisions at the end of Books I and III may be explained by the loss of the corresponding folios of ms. L, which originally might have contained them. However, no divisions are found in the extant fol. 61r, which contains the final part of the *Commentary*. In L, the seventh and final book ends with a short remark¹¹¹ followed by a small ornament separating the *Commentary* from the next treatise in the codex. Apart from ms. L, the only mss. we have that contain the final portion of the *Commentary* are mss. B and D. Both of these are rather late (19th century) copies of the same prototype (cf. 2.1.3, below), which thus serves as our only witness to the presence of

111 Fol. 61r: ܥܩܠܐ ܐܘܘܪܘܢܐ, “Book VII came to end”.

the divisions at the end of Book VII. It remains unclear whether the original text of the *Commentary* contained divisions at the end of the *Commentary* or not, but their absence in the oldest copy of the work, ms. L, makes it possible that the divisions were not originally appended to all the books, but with some of the divisions perhaps being added at a later stage of transmission.

Ms. L contains nearly no rubrics or subtitles. The titles of each book of the *Commentary* are clearly marked in the codex by means of red ink, which is also used in the extant divisions that appear (as noted just above) at the end of some books. But no other subtitles are found in this codex save for one occasion: on fol. 33r we encounter the rubric ❖ ܠܘܫܢܐ ܕܠܘܫܢܐ ❖, “On substance”, which is marked by red asterisks and thus clearly has the role of a subtitle for the corresponding part of Book III that indeed discusses this category¹¹². No other examples of this kind are found in L, thus suggesting that the rubrics found nearly exclusively in the Erbil group of mss. were attached to the text not by Sergius, but by later scribes.

2.1.2 Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Syr. 354, Part I (P)

Ms. Paris Syr. 354 (which formerly belonged to the collection of the monastery of Seert, where it bore the number 91¹¹³) is a paper manuscript, which consists of two parts originating from two different codices¹¹⁴. Presently, it contains 147 folios. The second, shorter part includes folios 138–147; it is written in the East Syriac script and, according to a note on fol. 145r, was copied in the year 1224¹¹⁵. The first part, in which Sergius’ *Commentary* is found and which comprises folios 1–137, was written by multiple hands in various forms of the East Syriac script. According to a note attached to the title of Book II of the *Commentary*, this codex was copied in the year 1187¹¹⁶.

The text of the manuscript (i.e., of the first part of the ms., hereafter simply “manuscript/codex”) is written in a single column with a widely differing number of lines depending on the folio. Indeed, the type of writing varies considerably throughout the manuscript; we may thus presume that not a few different scribes contributed to its production. The writing style sometimes changes only after several folios; thus, we see a change in hand in the middle of fol. 5v, in the middle of fol. 46v, at the beginning of fol. 52r, at the beginning of fol. 59v, and at the end of fol. 62v. In other places, however,

¹¹² It is interesting to note that Ammonius mentions two subtitles which he found in the text of Aristotle’s *Categories* that he made use of during his lectures, “On substance” and “On relatives” (*In Cat.* 66.14–19). It is thus possible that at least this rubric found both in L and in the Erbil mss. derives from Sergius himself.

¹¹³ Cf. Desreumaux 1991: 231. Cf. the description of the Seert ms. in Scher 1905: 67–68.

¹¹⁴ See the description of the codex in Nau 1911: 306–310.

¹¹⁵ See Nau 1911: 309.

¹¹⁶ Fol. 13v: ܠܘܫܢܐ ܕܠܘܫܢܐ ܕܠܘܫܢܐ, “the year 1498 of the Greeks”, i.e., 1187 AD.

such change occurs within the same page, which one may observe on fol. 73r: there, the first seven lines of the text are written in one hand, but in the middle of line 7 the hand changes, and then in line 11 it changes once again. A similar situation is found on fol. 74r: the first alteration of the hand is apparent in line 5, but the new hand goes only as far as line 12, when still a new hand may be seen, which in turn is replaced by another one in line 15. This final change in hands resulted in the repetition of the last words written by the previous scribe¹¹⁷.

This frequent change of hands in the ms. yields not only cases of dittography, like the one just mentioned, but also a large number of errors. In general, the codex is characterized by a rather negligent way of writing. Some portions of the text are in the wrong place, with the correct text simply added below¹¹⁸. On fol. 27r, half of the page is crossed out; a marginal note at the first line of the passage states that “corrupted text begins” here¹¹⁹. It seems likely, moreover, that ms. P was copied from a manuscript that was either destroyed or corrupted in some parts, as we find unexplained omissions of text on fol. 18r. The scribe(s) have in turn left parts of several lines unfilled, suggesting they were aware that words were missing, probably with the hope that these gaps could be filled in if a better copy became available.

At the end of the first part of the Paris codex, one finds a note that a certain Zeno (whose full name is recorded) “polluted and corrupted these pages”¹²⁰. However, it may hardly be taken as reporting the name of one of the scribes (or *the* scribe) who produced this codex. Rather it refers either to the author of multiple marginal notes found throughout the codex, written rather carelessly and usually not directly connected with the main text¹²¹; or whomever drew a number of marginal pictures depicting both human figures and animals¹²². However, apart from these additions, ms. P contains quite a few marginalia which may be understood as scholia to the Syriac text, containing either short explanations for difficult terms or different readings, some of which are transmitted by other textual witnesses. All such variants that are significant for the history of the Syriac text are documented in the critical apparatus of the edition.

Sergius’ *Commentary* occupies the main part of the codex. It starts on fol. 1v and breaks on fol. 109v, after which several pages are added that derive from another commentary on the *Categories*¹²³. In its present state, P lacks only a small portion of

117 The words ܟܠܗ ܗܘ ܗܘܐ appear twice in lines 14 and 15.

118 See the cases of the transposition of the text abbreviated as “transp.” in the critical apparatus of the edition.

119 Fol. 27r, note in the right margin: ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ.

120 Fol. 117v: ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ.

121 See, e.g., fols. 13v, 14r, 29v (all three notes are crossed out), 39r, 96r, 85v, 94v, and 99v.

122 See fols. 1r, 65v, 99v, and 117v.

123 Cf. the end of the text on fol. 117v: ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ ܡܫܘܒܝܢ ܟܠܗ ܗܘܐ ܝܘܠܝܢܝܢ, “finished is the writing of the *Categories* of Aristotle, (son of) Nicomachus”. The text deals

As noted, ms. P, written by multiple hands in a rather negligent manner, also contains a large number of errors that distinguish it from all other textual witnesses. The most obvious examples (from which only a small selection is given below) are the following:

- 136.5 ܐܘܪ BCDL, Epit.: ܐܘܪ P
 172.3 ܚܚܩܩ BCDL: ܚܚܩܩ P
 182.23 ܚܚܩܩ BCDL, Epit.: ܚܚܩܩ P
 192.21 ܚܚܩܩ BCDL, Epit.: ܚܚܩܩ P
 210.21 ܚܚܩܩ BCDEL: ܚܚܩܩ P
 216.13 ܚܚܩܩ BCDL: ܚܚܩܩ P
 222.2 ܚܚܩܩܩܩ BCDL, Epit.: ܚܚܩܩܩܩ P
 240.22 ܚܚܩܩ BDL: ܚܚܩܩ P
 244.6 ܚܚܩ BDL: ܚܚܩ P
 244.7 ܚܚܩ BDL: ܚܚܩ P

As it becomes clear from these examples (and one might make this list much longer), most of the errors can be explained by the carelessness of the scribes, who appear to have had little experience in copying texts and easily misinterpreted the readings of the original. While the *Vorlage* of P was deficient in some parts (see above), it is apparent that the scribes further contributed to this deficiency. It is also worthy of note that it is only in ms. P that we find the words ܚܚܩܩܩܩ and ܚܚܩܩܩܩܩ with two *lamads*; these appear in this form throughout the whole manuscript and are not found in any other textual witness of the *Commentary*.

Ms. P shares no defective readings with ms. L¹²⁶, but has a large number of errors in common with the Erbil mss. and with the epitome (see the concrete examples in 2.1.3 and 2.3, below). Thus P, BCD, and Epit. belong to the same line of transmission, distinct from that of ms. L and including several extant textual witnesses.

Ms. P contains graphic divisions after each one of Books I–VI. Since the final portion of the *Commentary* (§§448–450) is no longer extant in P, we do not know whether the divisions were also attached to Book VII (as in case of mss. BCD, see below) or not (as in case of ms. L, see 2.1.1, above). Similar to ms. L, ms. P does not contain any rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary*, although there are some rubrics written in red ink in the fragment of the above-mentioned exegetical work which pertains to the commentary of Bar Šalibi and which was included in the codex after fol. 107, thus replacing the missing end of Sergius' work.

¹²⁶ In one case, both P and L turn out to contain similar errors, which, however, do not fully match; see 334.23: ܚܚܩܩ P: ܚܚܩܩ L: ܚܚܩܩ BD.

2.1.3 The Erbil Group (Mss. BCD)

The three codices, which derive from the same old copy of Sergius' text, are now situated in Erbil in Northern Iraq. Before this, their location changed several times due to the social and political upheaval in the region¹²⁷. The production of these manuscripts was connected with the activity of Gabriel Danbo, who in 1808 initiated a reopening of the monastery of Rabban Hormizd situated in the mountain region near the village of Alqosh for his newly founded Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd¹²⁸. For the sake of security, the manuscripts were later transferred to the nearby convent of Our Lady of the Seeds (Notre Dame des Semences)¹²⁹. In the second half of the 20th century, the manuscripts were brought first to the monastery of St. George near Mosul and later on to the convent of St. Antony in Baghdad. At the beginning of the 21st century, due to the new period of instability in Northern Iraq, the collection was transported again first to the monastery Notre Dame des Semences and then to Erbil, where it remains preserved in the new cultural center of the Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd, the "Scriptorium Syriacum". Thus, at different periods of time, the three manuscripts described below were referred to as either the Alqosh or the Baghdad codices, while in the two modern descriptions of them they are designated as mss. of Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C. ("Antonian Order of St. Ormizda of the Chaldeans")¹³⁰.

Ms. Erbil-Ankawa, O.A.O.C., Syr. 169 (B)¹³¹, previously bore the shelf-marks Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences, ms. 51¹³², and Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery, ms. 169¹³³. This paper manuscript contains 260 folios¹³⁴ and was written in a single column (with 25–27 lines per page) in regular East Syriac script. The copyist, deacon Šem'on¹³⁵, indicates his name several times in this codex, first in the decoration on fol. 1v and second at the end of Sergius' *Commentary* on fol. 158r. On fol. 1v, Šem'on also notes the year "2133 of the Greeks", which points to 1821/1822 as the date of the production of the codex. This is the period of time that followed the restoration of the monastery of St. Hormizd, with the manuscript most likely produced for its library and for use in the education

127 For an overview of the history of this collection and its various locations, see Kessel 2023: 151–152.

128 For the history of the monastery of Rabban Hormizd the Persian, see Wilmshurst 2000: 258–270.

129 Cf. Wilmshurst 2000: 270–274.

130 The description of these mss. by Manhal Makhoul was published online on the platform *e-Ktobe*; see <http://syriac.msscatalog.org/> (accessed on 17.07.2023). An alternative description of six philosophical manuscripts (Syr. 169–174) of this collection was provided in Kessel 2023.

131 See: <http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71255> (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 152–160.

132 Vosté 1929: 22 (codex LD).

133 Haddad & Ishaq 1988: 82.

134 A foliation was made in 2022, but it is not present on the photos which I had at my disposal for my edition. The folios of the codex contain earlier numbers written by means of Syriac letters on both recto and verso side of the folios. The first no. (Syr. *Alaf*) appears on fol. 1v.

135 He belonged to the Asmar scribal family from Telkepe. See Wilmshurst 2000: 226–227 and Kessel 2023: 153–154.

of the monks¹³⁶. More than a hundred years later, ms. B was used as a *Vorlage* for the production of another copy, i.e. ms. Birmingham, Mingana, Syriac 606, dated to 1933¹³⁷.

Ms. Syr. 170 of the same collection (C)¹³⁸, *olim* Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences 49 (as noted on the current fol. 1r)¹³⁹ or 52¹⁴⁰, *olim* Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery 170¹⁴¹, has been preserved until now only in the fragmentary form. This paper codex is written in the East Syriac script in one column, with 20 lines per page, and presently contains 149 folios. Neither the name of the scribe nor the exact date of its production is known. It is possible that both were indicated in the colophon, which is now lost. However, since we have good reasons to state (see 2.1.3.2, below) that the scribe of C knew and during his work made use of ms. D, which is dated to 1840, we may assume that ms. C was copied either in the middle or in the second half of the 19th century¹⁴². Moreover, one folio which derives from another manuscript is included just before the text of Sergius' *Commentary*, which is here preserved in an incomplete form due to the loss of the final folios.

The third codex, Syr. 171, from the same collection (D)¹⁴³, *olim* Alqosh, Notre Dame des Semences 50 (as indicated on fol. 1r)¹⁴⁴ or 53¹⁴⁵, *olim* Baghdad, Chaldean Monastery 171¹⁴⁶, is a paper manuscript written in one column, with 28–29 lines per page. Presently, it contains 233 folios. Neither the name of the scribe nor the date of production of the manuscript are indicated. However, at the last folio, one finds a note that the volume came into the possession of the monastery of St. Hormizd in the year ١٨٤٠, i.e., 1840. Provided that this codex was commissioned for the library of this convent, it is likely that this year should also be taken for its actual dating.

The three afore-mentioned codices are collections of philosophical works that to a large extent have the same contents, although each one of them also contains works that are not found in other ones. The treatises included in mss. BCD may be outlined as follows:

136 For Gabriel Danbo's interest in education in general and in philosophy in particular, see Kessel 2023: 144–147.

137 See below, 2.1.3.2.

138 Cf. <http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71256> (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 160–165.

139 Cf. Scher 1906: 498.

140 Vosté 1929: 22 (codex LII).

141 Ḥaddad & Iṣḥaq 1988: 82–83.

142 Wilmhurst 2000: 268 mentions that in 1850 the monastery of Rabban Hormizd was raided by the Kurds, followed by a flood which destroyed a large number of mss. (ca. 1000). It is possible that the production of ms. C resulted from the restoration process of the lost part of the collection.

143 Cf. <http://syriac.msscatalog.org/71257> (accessed on 17.07.2023) and Kessel 2023: 165–173.

144 Cf. Scher 1906: 498.

145 Vosté 1929: 22–23 (codex LIII).

146 Ḥaddad & Iṣḥaq 1988: 83.

		B	C	D
(1)	John bar Zo'bi, <i>Divisions of philosophy</i>			×
(2)	Proba, <i>Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge</i>	×	×	×
(3)	Ps.-Ammonius, <i>Two Lives of Aristotle</i>		×	
(4)	Aristotle, <i>Categories</i> (transl. by Jacob of Edessa)	×	×	×
(5)	Sergius of Reshaina, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's Categories</i>	×	×	×
(6)	Aristotle, <i>On Interpretation</i> (transl. by Proba)	×		×
(7)	Proba, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation</i>	×		×
(8)	Paul the Persian, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation</i>			×
(9)	Severus Sebokht, <i>Letter to Yonan on difficult questions connected with Aristotle's On Interpretation and Prior Analytics</i>			×

Since ms. C is presently incomplete both at the beginning and at the end, it is now impossible to reconstruct the original extent of its contents. However, it becomes apparent from the comparison above that all three manuscripts share the same core of texts that were used for the study of Aristotle's logic in Syriac schools:

- 1) Items (1)–(3) are treatises which may be classified as introductions to logic and Aristotle's philosophy. John bar Zo'bi's *Divisions* included in ms. D suggest in summary fashion the main philosophical terms and their definitions, together with the divisions, found in graphic form after each book of Sergius' *Introduction*, which might also be included in the list of introductory treatises.
- 2) Besides introductory materials, the texts are based on Porphyry's *Introduction* and Aristotle's treatises *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics* (I.1–7), thus representing the core of the logical curriculum¹⁴⁷.
- 3) Apart from the text of the *Categories* in the version of Jacob of Edessa, we find no separate works of Porphyry and Aristotle but only commentaries on them, which were probably considered substitutes for the texts which they commented on.

The compiler of C added the two pseudepigraphical *Vitae* of Aristotle¹⁴⁸ before the text of the *Categories*, a practice with parallels in other philosophical compilations, e.g., in ms. Vat. Sir. 158, dated to the 9th/10th centuries¹⁴⁹, and in ms. Berlin, Petermann I. 9, which contains the epitome of the *Commentary*¹⁵⁰. It is also found in one of the manuscripts now preserved in the Chaldean Patriarchate of Baghdad (CPB 223, *olim* Mosul

¹⁴⁷ On the scope of the logical curriculum in Syriac schools, cf. Watt 2017.

¹⁴⁸ Published in Sachau 1899: 1.335–336 and Baumstark 1900: 2–3.

¹⁴⁹ See the description in Assemani 1759: 304–307. On ms. Vat. Sir. 158 as reflecting the philosophical curriculum of the Qenneshre monastery, see Tannous 2010.

¹⁵⁰ See 2.3, below.

35)¹⁵¹, and it is possible that the latter codex served as the source for the *Vitae* in ms. C. The compiler of ms. D, on the other hand, included at the beginning of the collection the treatise on the division of philosophy attributed to John bar Zo'bi¹⁵². It provides a short general introduction to philosophy, which the compiler of D found necessary to put in front of Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge*, even though this commentary also contains an introductory part dealing with the *prolegomena*.

All three manuscripts preserved now in Erbil-Ankawa exhibit a pedagogical background similar to that of ms. L described above. It is thus likely that they were produced to be used for introductory classes in logic and philosophy (since logic was considered a general introduction to philosophical studies). However, in their composition and concept, the three mss. differ slightly from one another. Their compilers apparently had the same pedagogical aim in mind but decided to include some treatises that we do not find in other witnesses. These differences make it clear that we cannot consider either of these codices as mechanical copies of another representative of the Erbil group in spite of the similarities between them.

All three Erbil mss. include graphic divisions after each book of Sergius' *Commentary*, including Book VII (after which no divisions appear in ms. L, cf. 2.1.1, above). Apart from the latter case, these divisions match those found in the earlier witnesses and thus probably reflect an old tradition. However, it remains unclear whether this tradition goes back to Sergius himself or to the later stage of the transmission of his work. It is remarkable that Sergius never refers to them in the text of his *Commentary*, but this may not serve as a decisive argument against his authorship of them. Both the older (L and P) and the younger (BCD) witnesses turn out to be quite consistent in their transmission, which makes it possible that they derive from Sergius himself.

The same, however, does not hold for the subtitles, which are found either in the text or in the margins of the Erbil codices and which apparently go back to a common source (see the next section). Apart from the Erbil group, we do not find these rubrics in any other witness (for the only case in ms. L, see 2.1.1, above), and it is likely that they were introduced into Sergius' text at a late stage of its transmission.

2.1.3.1 The Common Source

The differences in contents among the three mss. make it possible that their scribes made use of various sources, while compiling them. However, a comparison of the texts of Sergius' *Commentary* as found respectively in mss. B, C and D allows us to assume that the text of Sergius' work in all three of them was copied from one and the same prototype independently from one another. Their common source:

¹⁵¹ Cf. Kessel & Bamballi 2018.

¹⁵² Cf. Daiber 1985. For further mss. containing it, see Kessel 2023: 167 n. 22.

- (1) contained several extensive lacunae in Book VII that the scribes of mss. B and D (C is not extant in this part) were unable to fill in from other mss.;
- (2) included a number of subtitles which subdivided the seven books of Sergius' *Commentary* into smaller units;
- (3) included scholia and corrections to the main text;
- (4) was characterized by a number of specific errors that migrated into its later copies.

All three Erbil mss. share the above-listed characteristics of the common prototype:

(1) B and D contain several lacunae in Book VII of Sergius' *Commentary* (the text in ms. C breaks earlier), which coincide completely in both mss. The first lacuna appears in B on fol. 154r and in D on fol. 125v. In both mss., the extant text breaks with the same word and begins the new passage with the same word as well. While the scribe of B has left about two-thirds of the page blank, the scribe of D has left only half of the page blank (i.e. the remaining room on it). Neither space, however, corresponds to the actual size of the missing text, which might have occupied no less than two full folios in B and about a folio and a half in D. It is thus likely that the space left in both mss. was not intended to be filled in on the basis of a better copy of the text, but rather to indicate that a large portion of the text was missing in the original.

The next lacuna appears in B on the immediately following fol. 154v, occupying several lines of this page and about two-thirds of the following fol. 155r. In D, it starts at the end of fol. 126r and occupies more than a half of the following fol. 126v. As in the previous case, the extant text breaks and then starts again with the same words in both codices. This time, the size of the lacuna corresponds more or less to the actual size of the text which was damaged or missing in the common source of B and D. It is more likely that part of the page was completely missing in the *Vorlage* of B and D — as the next extant portion of the text has approximately the same size as the previous one — and that it was contained on the verso side of the damaged folio of the original. After it, a third lacuna appears in B on fol. 155r and goes as far as the first half of the following fol. 155v. In D, the lacuna occupies the second half of fol. 127r. The lacunae in both mss. again correspond approximately to the size of the actual gap in the text.

The next blank space is present in ms. B in the last part of fol. 155v and in the first half of fol. 156r. In D, it occupies the second half of fol. 127r. The last lacuna in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* is found in ms. B on fol. 156v and in the first lines of fol. 157r. In D, it extends from the last lines of fol. 127v until the middle of fol. 128r. In both cases, the space that was left blank in mss. B and D corresponds more or less to the actual extent of the missing text. More lacunae are found in the other parts of the Erbil mss. and they make apparent that they were produced on the basis of the same copy which was damaged in some of its parts. The scribes who produced later copies of this codex evidently had no other exemplar of Sergius' text at their disposal that would have

allowed them to fill the gaps present in their source. It is worth keeping this conclusion in mind when we come to point (3) below.

(2) Although in one case we find one subtitle in L (see above), neither L nor P contain any further titles save for the headings of each of the seven books and the divisions attached to them. All three Erbil codices, on the contrary, include a large number of additional rubrics, which are very similar to what we find in various Syriac mss. containing works on Aristotle's logic, i.e., either translations of the *Organon* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* or commentaries and scholia on both works. It seems that this tradition originally goes back to the rubrics included in Porphyry's *Isagoge* at a very early period and found in nearly all Syriac works pertaining to it¹⁵³. The Erbil mss., which have Proba's commentary on the *Isagoge* in common as their first component text, also mark each section of Proba's work with a rubric written in red ink, i.e., "On genus"¹⁵⁴, "On species", "On differentia", etc., all of which either stand as first words in the line (as in ms. C) or as separate titles between the lines (as in mss. B and D). The same or similar rubrics appear further in those parts of the codices that contain the text of the *Categories*. Thus, at the beginning of chapter 5, the codices indicate the subject under discussion, "On substance", at the beginning of chapter 6 we find the title "On quantity", and so on through the rest of the categories¹⁵⁵. It was thus logical for the compilers of the Erbil mss. to put the same rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* that allow the reader, first, to navigate it, and, second, to understand the correspondence between passages in the *Commentary* and those in Aristotle's and Porphyry's treatises.

The rubrics in the text of Sergius' *Commentary* are identical in all three mss., which makes it probable that they derive from the common *Vorlage*. This assumption is corroborated by the fact that one of the subtitles is misplaced in all three codices. The rubric, "On the goal of the treatise *Categories*", is found at the beginning of §66, when it would make more sense to put it in front of §65, i.e. just before the words, "Concerning the goal of this treatise..." It is thus probable that this rubric was introduced in the wrong place already in the *Vorlage* of the Erbil mss. and that the mistake was carried over into its later copies.

(3) The three Erbil codices contain a number of corrections to the text of Sergius' *Commentary* that, while taking somewhat different forms in each of these manuscripts, are clearly related to one another. It is possible that the individual scribes of

153 On Greek mss. of Porphyry's *Isagoge* containing rubrics, cf. Barnes 2003: xvii–xviii.

154 Ms. C lacks it due to the loss of the first folios of the codex.

155 These subtitles are found already in the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*, in all extant witnesses to Jacob of Edessa's version (which is included in the Erbil mss.), and in the only ms. containing the translation of it by George of the Arabs.

mss. B, C, or D were responsible for some of these corrections in particular, but the main bulk of them most likely goes back to the common *Vorlage* of the three codices:

66.6 መከላከላገገገ CDP: መከላከላገገገ B, add. D in marg. — The variant is added by the scribe of D in the margin (thus probably reflecting the correction in its source) and introduced into the main text of B (ms. C does not contain it).

68.9 ዕሩሩገገገገ CDP: ዕሩሩገገገገ B, add. D in marg. — Similar to the previous example, D indicated the alternative reading which was most likely suggested in the *Vorlage* in the margin, while the copyist of B took it for the correct reading of the text (again, C does not contain it).

128.17 ዕሩሩ ለመከላገገ LP: ዕሩሩ ለመከላገገ BCD — The additional letters *nun* and *dalat* are clearly marked as such in mss. BCD by means of red ink (in B only *dalat* is written in red, in C the letter *nun* stands above the line).

130.8 ለመከላገገገ BCDL: ለመከላገገገ P: ለመ add. BD in marg. — The variant of P and the additional variant of B and D both look like glosses which aimed to elucidate the difficult passage in Sergius' text.

134.18 ለመከላገገገ LP: ለመከላገገገ BCD — The possessive suffix (the latter *he*) is written in red ink *supra lineam* in mss. CD which have the same main text as LP, while ms. B contains the variant with the suffix in the main text. It is thus probable that the correction was present in the common *Vorlage*, and while the scribe of B introduced it into the main text, the scribes of C and D preferred to copy the original variant together with the correction proposed in their *Vorlage*.

136.12 ለመከላገገገ BCDL: ለመከላገገገ P — As the reading in P indicates, this word has changed during the transmission; this fact is corroborated by BCD. In all three latter mss., the two letters of the word (*yud* and *taw*) are marked with red ink, thus indicating that this word originally had the form ለመከላገገገ but was corrected to ለመከላገገገ. Additionally, one letter (*waw*) of the next word, ለመከላገገገ, is also written in red in all three mss., thus making apparent that it was transmitted as ለመከላገገገ but later corrected. All these corrections were most likely made *supra lineam* in the *Vorlage* of BCD and introduced into the main text by the copyists of the latter.

144.10 ለመከላገገገ BEP: ለመከላገገገ CD — Mss. C and D add the letter *dalat* to the particle ለመ, probably indicating that it should be changed into ለመ. The additional letter is written in red in both codices and was most likely copied from the interlinear correction in the common prototype.

166.12 ለመከላገገገ CLP: ለመከላገገገ BD — The variant of BD is written in such a way that the additional *yud* is marked with red ink and remains unattached to the following letter, thus making it probable that this was a correction written above the line in the scribes' source, which they then introduced into the main text. This correction, however, is not present in ms. C. Similar corrections of the same word (ለመከላገገገ vs. ለመከላገገገ) are found two more times in the following lines.

190.12 ለመከላገገገ BCDLP: ለመከላገገገ corr. BC — The correction (the letter *he*) is written above the line in C and just after the letter in the line in B (it is not present in D). In both cases it is marked red.

A limited number of corrections in BCD, which stand in contrast to the previous cases in being written not between the lines or in the main text but mostly in the margins, contain variants found in other textual witnesses. Thus, they reflect the work of a scholiast or a commentator on Sergius' text who had access to a number of textual witnesses and noted alternative readings in the form of scholia to the text.

64.11 ለመከላገገገ P, D in marg.: ለመከላገገገ BCD — It is likely that mss. BCD transmit an erroneous form that appeared as a corruption of the variant preserved in P. Only ms. D indicates the correct reading in the margin, one that most likely derives from a gloss in the common *Vorlage* of BCD.

70.13 ܘܚܘܒܘ P, D in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD — While all three codices contain a clearly erroneous variant, ms. D adds the correct reading (found in P) in the margins. Given that this reading is absent from B and C, it is possible that this was a correction made by the scribe of D only, but it is likely that it goes back to a scholion in the common *Vorlage* of BCD.

168.6 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, D in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD — All three Erbil mss. contain a variant that differs from what we find in L and P. Both variants seem possible at this place in the text, but it is a characteristic of D only that it suggests the variant of LP in the form of a marginal gloss.

172.5 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, D in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD — Ms. D contains the correct reading found in LP and indicated in the margin of D.

262.19 ܘܚܘܒܘ BDP: ܘܚܘܒܘ Epit., add. BDP in marg. — In this case, we find the variant of Epit. in the form of a gloss both in BD and in P. This makes it probable that some of the glosses found in mss. BCD derive from an even older copy than their common prototype.

358.14 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, add. D in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD, add. P in marg. — The correction or the alternative reading found in the margins of P appears as the main reading in mss. BD, while D indicates the main reading of LP in the margin.

360.2 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, add. D in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD: ܘܚܘܒܘ add. DP in marg. — As in the previous case, both P and D contain same glosses in the margins, while D additionally suggests the variant found in the main text of L and P.

378.18 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, Epit., BD in marg.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD — Both B and D suggest in the margins the correct reading that we find in all other witnesses.

Point (1) above makes apparent that the scribes of mss. B and D (and probably that of C) did not have access to any other copy of Sergius' *Commentary* save for the old and lacunose codex that served as their common source. Given that some of the corrections in their text are based on other manuscripts containing Sergius' work, these corrections were most probably present in their common source and copied together with the main text. It is noteworthy that the scribes of each codex (B, C, and D) worked independently from each other in this respect, so that the alternative readings found in the *Vorlage* are sometimes noted in one ms. only, and other times appear in multiple mss. However, these scholia in all probability go back to the glosses in the common prototype, which, in turn, carried them over from an even older copy (cf. the case of 262.19 above). As will be shown below, some of these scholia found their way not only into BCD but also into P. Hence, they most likely derive from a codex that predates these witnesses (see the examples in 2.1.3.3, below).

(4) Finally, the three Erbil mss. share the following errors that reflect their common *Vorlage*:

70.8 ܘܚܘܒܘ P: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD

172.15 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD

174.20 ܘܚܘܒܘ L: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD

180.9 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, Epit.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BCD

194.5 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, Epit.: ܘܚܘܒܘ CD: ܘܚܘܒܘ B

228.23 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD

232.6 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP, Epit.: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD

246.13 ܘܚܘܒܘ LP: ܘܚܘܒܘ BD

- 250.14 ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ BD
 322.17 ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ BD
 328.16 ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ BD
 346.15 ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ L: ܩܘܘܘܠܘܢ P: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ BD
 372.4 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ BD, Epit.
 382.10 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ BD
 384.4 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ LP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ BD

These examples are the most evident cases of textual corruption. As the critical apparatus of the edition makes clear, the three Erbil codices also share a large number of textual variants that cannot be classified as clear errors but that still demonstrate the interrelation between them. All told, the four points outlined above give good reasons to conclude that each of the copies of Sergius' *Commentary* contained in the three Erbil mss. were copied from the same prototype. Apart from the *Commentary*, as the manuscripts differ from one another in terms of the precise extent of their component works, it is possible that additional exemplars were used for other parts of them.

2.1.3.2 Mss. B, C, and D as Independent Copies

In addition to the common errors listed in (4) above, all of which derive from the common *Vorlage*, each of the Erbil codices contains its own errors that show them to be separate copies of the old prototype which were made independently from one another. Ms. B, which is chronologically the earliest copy in the group, contains multiple unique errors not found in two other codices:

- 72.10 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ B
 176.10 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDLP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ B
 178.5 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDLP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ B
 178.13 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDLP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ B
 182.4 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDLP, Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 188.23 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ CDLP: ܩܘܘܠܘܢ Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 202.21 ܩܘܠܘܢ CDLP: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 262.19 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ DP, Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 262.20 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ DP, Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 270.18 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ DP: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 272.17 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ DP, Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 272.18 ܩܘܘܠܘܢ DP, Epit.: ܩܘܠܘܢ B
 280.10 ܩܘܠܘܢ DLP: ܩܘܠܘܢ B

All unique errors of B, of which only a small sample has been given above, are present in the copy that was produced on the basis of B nearly one hundred years later than the B¹⁵⁶. Manuscript Mingana Syr. 606 (M), which is now preserved in the Cadbury

156 Cf. Kessel 2023: 154.

Research Library in Birmingham¹⁵⁷, was commissioned by Alfonse Mingana and produced in Alqosh in 1933 by Mattai bar Pawlos¹⁵⁸. Mattai copied the original manuscript with much diligence, reproducing in his copy all the characteristics of the original, including all errors found in B. Thus, we find in B some additions to the main text written *supra lineam* that are found within the text of M (cf. the inclusion of the word ܐܘܬܝ in 112.10); the marginal glosses of B are faithfully copied in the margins of M (cf. the addition of two words in 84.8 in both codices); and even the words written twice in B (cf. the case of dittography in 204.16) are mechanically copied in M. Additionally, ms. M contains errors not found either in B or in any other ms. from the Erbil group, making it apparent that the scribe had no other copy in front of him except B. Here are two examples of errors unique to M (neither of which are indicated in the critical apparatus of the present edition):

- 64.9 ܐܘܬܝ BCDP: ܐܘܬܝ M
 106.3 ܐܘܬܝ BCDP: ܐܘܬܝ M

The next codex from the Erbil group, ms. D, that was produced chronologically after B, contains the following unique errors:

- 100.20 ܐܘܬܝ BP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 120.4 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 122.13 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 122.22 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 124.15 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 148.21 ܐܘܬܝ BCELP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 176.7 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 186.17 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 188.5 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 192.1 ܐܘܬܝ BCL: ܐܘܬܝ D
 192.13 ܐܘܬܝ BCLP: ܐܘܬܝ D
 196.6 ܐܘܬܝ BCL, Epit.: ܐܘܬܝ D
 250.12 ܐܘܬܝ B: ܐܘܬܝ P: ܐܘܬܝ D
 264.6 ܐܘܬܝ BP, Epit.: ܐܘܬܝ D

The errors found in D in those parts of the *Commentary* that have not been preserved in C do not allow us to confirm whether these errors are characteristic of D only or were also shared by C. However, the variants listed above give good reasons to conclude that D was copied from the common *Vorlage* of the Erbil group independently and was not based on B.

There are few erroneous variants that D shares with B only and not with C. The number of such cases, found in the part of the *Commentary* represented in all three

¹⁵⁷ For the description of this codex, see Mingana 1939: 1.1163–1166.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. the extensive colophon on fol. 232v of the codex, quoted in Mingana 1939: 1.1165–1166.

- 68.14 ܡܘܨܚܐ ܐܝܢ CP: ܡܘܨܚܐ BD — Both B and D contain an error, not present in C, which has the correct reading also preserved in P.
- 92.3 ܪܘܚܐܝܘܢܐ ܪܘܚܐܝܢ BCP: ܪܘܚܐܝܘܢܐ ܪܘܚܐܝܢ D — C, like B, does not contain the error of D.
- 116.6 ܡܘܨܚܐ CLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ BD — The error of B and D is not present in C, which shares the correct readings with older witnesses.
- 120.4 ܡܘܨܚܐ BCLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ D — The error is found only in D, but not in B and C.
- 122.22 ܡܘܨܚܐ BCLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ D — Again, neither B nor C share the error of D.
- 142.22 ܡܘܨܚܐ BCP, D in marg.: ܡܘܨܚܐ D: ܡܘܨܚܐ add. BD in marg. — While B and C maintain the correct reading, D suggests here the erroneous variant in the main text that is corrected in the margin by means of two other variants, one of which is erroneous too.
- 186.17 ܡܘܨܚܐ BCLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ D — The error is found in D only, while C together with B contains the correct variant.
- 190.12 ܡܘܨܚܐ BCDLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ corr. BC — This “correction” (which in reality is a *Verschlimmbesserung*) is not present in D and thus could derive only from the common prototype directly.
- 190.19 ܡܘܨܚܐ om. BD — One word is omitted by both B and D but is present in C.
- 206.18 ܡܘܨܚܐ ܐܝܢ CLP: ܡܘܨܚܐ D: ܡܘܨܚܐ B — Here, all three Erbil Mss. differ from one another, and C turns out to be the only witness among them containing the correct variant.
- 210.16 ܡܘܨܚܐ + ܡܘܨܚܐ D — D’s addition is not found in C.

Such cases are much more numerous than presented here. On the basis of those presented, though, we can already discount the possibility that D or B was the only source of C, as the latter in a number of cases suggests correct readings where B and D contain errors. It is apparent that the scribe of C had access to the same copy of Sergius’ *Commentary* as the scribes of B and D did, but it is possible that on some occasions he consulted other copies. It is also worthy of mention that in C we do not find any of the marginal glosses present in B and/or D that derive from a copy older than their common prototype.

Summing up the data presented in sections 2.1.3.1 and 2.1.3.2, one might draw the following conclusions that contribute to establishing the *stemma codicum*:

- 1) The three Erbil mss. are copies of the same *Vorlage*. The lacunae in BD, the scholia with variant readings, and a number of errors found in BCD derive from the common source.
- 2) The common prototype contained some variant readings deriving from other witnesses. No other sources save for the old *Vorlage* were accessible to the scribes of BCD for the section containing Sergius’ *Commentary*. However, since the number of works included in the three mss. is not identical, it is possible that the scribes of B, C, and D made use of further codices while copying the other component texts.
- 3) The three copies were produced independently from one another on the basis of the same source. However, the scribes of later copies made use of the earlier ones (i.e. D of B, and C of B and/or D).
- 4) Ms. M is a direct copy of B and may thus be excluded from the stemma.

- 130.3 ܐܠ L: ܐܠܘܢ ܐܠ BCDP
 132.15 ܐܠܘܢ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BCDP
 152.16 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BCDP
 166.6 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BCDP
 182.15 ܐܠܘܢܐ ܐܠܘܢܐ L, Epit.: ܐܠܘܢܐ ܐܠܘܢܐ BCDP
 230.15 ܐܠܘܢܐ L, Epit.: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 280.8 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 298.11 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 304.14 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 330.9 ܐܠܘܢܐ ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 344.6 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP
 362.7 ܐܠܘܢܐ L: ܐܠܘܢܐ BDP

Besides these common errors, the prototype of BCD is connected to P through a number of marginal glosses found in the Erbil mss. One of these glosses contains an alternative textual variant that turns out to be the same as the readings of P:

- 148.2 ܐܠܘܢܐ BCDL: ܐܠܘܢܐ P, add. B supra lin., add. D in marg. — The reading of P is a clear corruption of the correct variant found in all other witnesses. It was most likely noted in the form of a gloss in the *Vorlage* of B and D.

In some cases, we find either the readings of BCD or marginal glosses preserved in the Erbil mss. also in the margins of P:

- 272.13 ܐܠܘܢܐܐܠܘܢܐ] + ܐܠܘܢܐܐܠܘܢܐ BDP in marg. — All three mss. contain the same gloss, which suggests either an alternative reading (no other witness supports it) or a correction to the text.
 328.16 ܐܠܘܢܐ LP: ܐܠܘܢܐ BD, add. P in marg.
 372.6 ܐܠܘܢܐܐܠܘܢܐ] + ܐܠܘܢܐܐܠܘܢܐ BDP in marg.
 378.18 ܐܠܘܢܐܐܠܘܢܐ LP, Epit., add. BD in marg.: ܐܠܘܢܐ BD, add. P in marg. — Apparently, both P and the common prototype of BCD contained in their margins alternative readings found in the main text of P or BD.

All such cases corroborate the conclusion that the source for alternative readings used by both P and the prototype of BCD were not the corresponding mss. (i.e. the *Vorlage* of BCD was not contaminated by P), but the scholia in their common prototype.

Two cases are of particular interest in this regard. In 390.6, we find in ms. D a marginal gloss that is also included into the main text of P and that clearly represents a commentary on Sergius' text. The gloss is attached to Sergius' remark that "contraries belong to the same genus" and contains a quotation from the *Cat.* 14a19–20, where Aristotle states that contraries must "either be in the same genus or in contrary genera or be genera themselves". The quotation derives from the 7th century Syriac version of the *Categories* made by the famous West Syriac scholar Jacob of Edessa (d. in 708)¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁹ Ed. in Georr 1948. Cf. the online edition in <https://hunaynnet.oeaw.ac.at/categoriae.html> (accessed on 11.10.23).

Hence, this scholion most likely belonged to a West Syriac commentator on Sergius' treatise and was preserved in the margins of the manuscript that served as a source for both the prototype of BCD and for P. While the former upheld the paratextual character of this scholion, the scribe of P included it in the main text.

Another example of this kind is found in 400.19, where mss. B and D contain marginal glosses. The glosses paraphrase the last part of the paragraph, which refers to the change in the vision that results from what is visible. Similar to the previous case, the variant is found in the main text in P but put in the margins in mss. B and D. Hence, it is likely that it entered the prototype of BCD from another copy of Sergius' work related to P and containing a marginal note.

All these examples make apparent that the similarities between the source of BCD and P are twofold. On the one hand, they share a number of common errors that make them part of the same line of transmission of the text of Sergius' *Commentary*. On the other hand, they contain a number of additional elements that most likely go back to a common prototype.

Summing up the observations above, one may state the following:

- 1) The prototype of BCD forms a separate line of transmission in comparison to L.
- 2) Cases of similar readings between L and BCD may be explained by scholia introduced into the prototype of BCD (or even earlier; see point 4).
- 3) The *Vorlage* of BCD belongs to the same line of transmission as P, with which it shares a large number of errors.
- 4) The common prototype of BCD and P contained multiple glosses and scholia, including short commentaries on Sergius' text, corrections, and alternative readings. These elements were partly introduced into the main text of later copies, but mostly maintained their paratextual character.

2.2 Collection of Excerpts in Ms. London, British Library, Add. 12155 (E)

The codex now preserved in the British Library of London as Additional 12155¹⁶⁰ is dated to the 8th century and thus appears to be the second oldest witness after ms. L, which is now located in the same collection. However, in contrast to the latter, ms. E does not contain the full text of Sergius' *Commentary*, but only a number of excerpts, which are reproduced mostly in abridged and revised form.

This manner in which the text of the *Commentary* has been reproduced fits with the overall state of the materials included in this large collection of heterogeneous writings. The codex bears the title, "A volume of testimonies from the holy fathers

¹⁶⁰ Cf. the description in Wright 1871: 921–955.

II.11 (179ra.25–179rb.10) A periphrastic quotation of selected passages taken from §§138–149, which first lists eleven modes of saying that something is in something else and then further explains these modes.

II.12 (179rb.10–27) Periphrastic and selective quotation of §154 characterizing the correct way of making a definition.

II.13 (179rb.27–36) This fragment does not match with the transmitted text of Sergius' *Commentary* but appears as a summary of or rather as a scholion on §§157–163, dealing with various kinds of accidents.

II.14 (179rb.36–43) Periphrastic quotation of §164.

II.15 (179rb.43–54) Adapted quotation of several sentences selected from §§173–174 dealing with a division of substances into the simple and the composite.

II.16 (179rb.54–179va.6) A periphrastic account of §177, to the effect that substance is prior to the other nine categories which require it in order to subsist.

II.17 (179va.6–21) Adapted quotation of selected sentences from §§178–179 concerning the division of substance into primary and secondary.

II.18 (179va.21–47) Adapted quotation of §§180–181 and the first sentence of §182, describing the three kinds of division (the rest of §182 is quoted later, see II.24).

II.19 (179va.48–179vb.20) A short summary of §204–207, with an exposition of the types of property.

II.20 (179vb.20–28) A short summary of §96 on the difference between substance and accident.

II.21 (179vb.28–49) A summary (with extensive quotations) of §§84–86, describing the four kinds of speech.

II.22 (179vb.49–180rb.22) Adapted quotation of §§97–108, with an overview of the ten categories.

II.23 (180rb.23–52) Adapted quotation of §114–115 on various types of definition.

II.24 (180rb.52–180va.9) Fragment addressing the precise nature of substance' division into primary and secondary. It starts with an adapted quotation from the second half of §182 (starting shortly after the quotation in II.18), proceeds with a summary of §183 and a slightly modified quotation from §184, and concludes with the last sentence of §185.

As becomes clear from this overview, most of the excerpts appear not as faithful quotations of Sergius' *Commentary* but rather as free periphrases or even as short summaries of the contents. This form probably owes to the purpose of the florilegium as a whole, which was prepared as an aid in polemic (cf. the title of the whole codex).

Thus, it seems unnecessary in most cases to indicate all the variants of ms. E in the critical apparatus of the edition, as these variants turn out to be the result of the work of the compilers of ms. E rather than actual variants in the transmission of Sergius' text. Only in few cases are the variants of E indicated in the critical apparatus, the first of which is the case of I.1, which appears as an actual quotation rather than periphrasis. It is in this case only that some conclusions may be drawn as to the place of the ms.

E in the stemma. Additionally, in the cases of II.11, II.18, II.22, II.23, and II.24, which contain at least in some parts faithful quotations from the transmitted text of the *Commentary*, some variants have been included in the critical apparatus.

2.3 Epitome in Ms. Berlin, Petermann I. 9 (Epit.)

The collection of excerpts from Sergius' *Commentary* in ms. E discussed in the previous section gives an example of an adaptation of this work that combines direct quotations with periphrastic summaries and supplies them with additional materials deriving from other sources. Ms. E is dated to the 8th century and testifies to the popularity of Sergius' treatise in Syriac schools in the centuries following his death. A very similar kind of adaptation of Sergius' *Commentary* has been preserved in a later codex¹⁶⁷. Though much larger than the collection of excerpts in E, it shares most of the characteristics of the latter, for here too we find direct quotations from the *Commentary* together with passages that appear as adaptations of the original text supplied by a number of additional materials, which, just as in ms. E, mostly appear in the opening part of the text.


In contrast to ms. E, this version of the *Commentary* may be called an epitome, since it was clearly composed not as a collection of fragments but as a separate treatise. It has been preserved in the only manuscript, Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Petermann I. 9 (Sachau 88)¹⁶⁸. This paper codex written in the East Syriac script is dated to 1260 AD¹⁶⁹ and constitutes a large collection of various philosophical texts. Neither the name of its scribe nor the location of its production are known to us. On fols. 83v–104r, it contains a treatise (Syr. *memra*) on Aristotle's *Categories* attributed to Sergius and addressed to a certain Philotheos¹⁷⁰.

The epitome in the Berlin codex contains a few passages which are not found in the *Commentary*. Their inclusion may be explained by the fact that the compiler of the epitome did not mechanically put together short and long excerpts from the *Commentary*, but also made use of additional elements for a more coherent final product. Thus, we find a longer introduction at the beginning and a short conclusion at the end that do not derive from the *Commentary*. A number of sentences were intended to serve as bridges between the excerpts taken from the *Commentary*, although in some

¹⁶⁷ Edited with an English translation in Aydin 2016. See also Hugonnard-Roche 1997.

¹⁶⁸ For a description of this codex, see Sachau 1899: 321–335. In the catalogue of Sachau, it appears under no. 88 (hence the no. in the brackets). Sachau noted that the ms. belonged to the collection of Petermann of the Königliche Bibliothek in Berlin under no. 9.

¹⁶⁹ According to the note on fols. 36r and 112r, it was written down in the year 1571 of the Greeks, i.e. in 1260 AD.

¹⁷⁰ Syr.: 

cases there are no such bridges, with the compiler having mechanically attached one fragment of Sergius' work to another or simply adding "and so on" (Syr. ܐܘܬܘܪܐ)¹⁷¹ at the point where the original text breaks off.

This work has sometimes been considered an independent treatise composed by Sergius himself¹⁷², although already G. Furlani noted in his overview of the *Commentary*, that the treatise preserved in the Berlin codex is nothing else than an abridged version of the latter¹⁷³. The epitome lacks the rhetorical elegance of the *Commentary* and its clear logical form. It is not merely these stylistic deficiencies, moreover, that speak against its attribution to Sergius:

- 1) The excursus into Platonic notion of forms/species (εἶδη) which appears in §§72–79 of the *Commentary* presents Platonic philosophy in a rather critical way, which is in general characteristic of Sergius' work, who on most topics rejects Plato's interpretation in favor of Aristotle's. This critical bias of Sergius, however, is completely absent from the epitome¹⁷⁴, which presents Platonic ideas in a neutral manner.
- 2) On one occasion, the epitome explicitly contradicts what we find in the *Commentary*. In §163 of the latter, Sergius states that in contrast to fever, which does not destroy the body completely, the destruction of the general constitution of body necessarily results in the destruction of the body itself. But according to the epitome¹⁷⁵, the destruction of the constitution of the body *does not* necessarily result in the death of the body. This statement is further developed in the text of the epitome, thus excluding the possibility that the appearance of the negative particle in it should be considered as a scribal error. It seems rather unlikely that Sergius (who was a physician) was the author of both statements.
- 3) The terminology used in the epitome is characteristic of a later period than that of Sergius. Jacob of Edessa points out in a letter addressed to scribes that in his time (i.e. in the late 7th century) a number of key philosophical terms had changed¹⁷⁶. One of the examples which he makes refers to the term ܩܘܠܐ, which, according to Jacob, had been replaced by ܩܘܠܐܩܘܠܐ. It is the latter term that appears in the epitome: In the passage corresponding to 146.11, where Sergius lists the Syriac terms for quality and where all witnesses of the *Commentary* have the word ܩܘܠܐ (which appears several times in Sergius' work), the epitome suggests¹⁷⁷ the term ܩܘܠܐܩܘܠܐ, i.e., a slightly different form of the word that, according to Ja-

171 Cf. Aydin 2016: 158.22.

172 Cf. Hugonnard-Roche 1997: 346–349; Aydin 2016: 67–70.

173 Furlani 1922: 135.

174 See Aydin 2016: 98–101.

175 See Aydin 2016: 116.22.

176 See the edition in Phillips 1869. Cf. Arzhanov 2021: 28–29.

177 Aydin 2016: 102.24.

- cob, entered the Syriac philosophical lexicon nearly two centuries after Sergius' time.
- 4) In the epitome, we find a number of exegetical additions which may be explained by the work of a later commentator of Sergius' treatise rather than by the editorial attempts of Sergius himself. For instance, in the passage corresponding to 148.4, the epitome contains an addition that suggests a comment on the original text. While explaining the category of "where", Sergius speaks of words signifying ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ, "places". The epitome here¹⁷⁸ has ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܕܘܚܪܐ ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ, "places or spaces", thus providing an alternative to the same word introduced by the particle ܕܘܚܪܐ, which usually marks a gloss.
 - 5) As noted, the epitome has a rather chaotic structure that is not characteristic of the *Commentary*. Sergius himself writes in the latter (see §§29, 138, 239, etc.) that he took great pains to make his work easy to read and understand. Also, the witness of Ps.-Zacharias of Mytilene, which is generally critical towards Sergius, stresses his rhetorical skills (see 1.1, above). One, however, is unable to see a skillful editorial hand in the epitome.

The last point is of particular value. The compiler of Epit. has freely moved around passages of the *Commentary*. For instance, the excursus on prime matter appears in §236–238 of the *Commentary* as the first topic which Sergius discusses in Book IV focused on quantity in context of the question of the sequence of the categories and why the category of quantity appears just after substance by Aristotle. It is worthy of note that in ms. P, whose folios were bound in an incorrect order, this passage appears before Book IV. The same sequence is characteristic of the epitome, which includes the excursus on prime matter in the concluding part of the section on substance. While this may be a coincidence, this feature of the epitome may well indicate a relation to P.

As noted above, the text of the epitome has come down to us in a single, rather late copy. Thus, we may assume that some of the errors in the latter derive from the scribes who copied the epitome. However, there are a considerable number of errors which connect the text of the epitome to the line of transmission of Sergius' text represented by mss. BCD and P. Epit. shares with P the following errors that in some cases are also found in BCD:

288.9 ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ BDL: ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ P, Epit.

336.16 ܘܢܘܠܘܢ L: ܘܢܘܠܘܢ BDP, Epit.

418.1 ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ BDL: ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ P: ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ ܠܗܘܢܝܘܬܐ Epit.

Thus, there is only one error which Epit. shares exclusively with P, while in two other cases it turns out to be related to BCD. Often Epit. shares errors with BCD only:

178 Aydin 2016: 104.4.

- 178.12 ܐܠ LP: ܐܠܐ BCD, Epit.
 190.8 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BCD, Epit.
 220.21 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BCD, Epit.
 284.23 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BD, Epit.
 334.16 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BD, Epit.
 348.9 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BD, Epit.
 372.4 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BD, Epit.
 434.7 ܐܠܘܢ LP: ܐܠܘܢ BD, Epit.

Additionally, in mss. BCD and P, we find two marginal glosses that represent the readings of Epit.:

- 262.19 ܐܠܘܢ BDP: ܐܠܘܢ Epit., add. BDP in marg.
 292.6 ܐܠܘܢ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܐܠܘܢ B, Epit. — Only B shares the same error with Epit., indicating the correct variant in the margin.

These glosses most likely derive from the same common prototype of BCD and P, which contained a number of alternative readings (see above). Among these scholia, the variants of Epit. are also found, and they most likely derive from a codex related to the copy from which the epitome was compiled.

Summing up the data above, one may assume that Epit. was produced by an unknown compiler at the time after the 7th century (cf. the witness of Jacob of Edessa) on the basis of a codex that belongs to the same line of textual transmission of the *Commentary* as BCD and P. The address to a certain “Philotheos” (which might have been a general reference to any “God-loving” reader) seems to be a fictional substitute for the addressee Theodore found in the *Commentary*. Hence, the epitome serves for us as an additional witness to the text of the *Commentary*. One should bear in mind, of course, that the person who compiled this epitome has deliberately changed certain terms and otherwise added to it. Still, in many cases of textual divergence between the various witnesses to Sergius’ work, the text of the epitome may serve as an additional witness supporting one of the variants.

2.4 Relation Between Textual Witnesses and Principles of Edition


The characteristics of various textual witnesses to Sergius’ *Commentary* outlined above may be summarized as follows:

- 1) Ms. L is characterized by a number of specific errors that distinguish it from all other witnesses save for E (see 2.1.1).
- 2) The collection of excerpts preserved in ms. E consists largely of adapted and paraphrased quotations from the *Commentary*, which make it in most cases irrelevant for textual criticism (see 2.2). However, even in their altered state, several excerpts have remained close to the transmitted text of the *Commentary* (see partic-

- ularly excerpts I.1, II.11, and II.18), on the basis of which one can conclude that ms. E belongs to the same line of transmission as L.
- 3) Some representative of the EL-line became available to the common source of mss. BCD, variants of which were noted as glosses in the margins (see 2.1.3.3).
 - 4) Another line of transmission embraces all other textual witnesses, including the codex that served as the source for the epitome of the *Commentary* (i.e. [Epit.]), since the epitome has no errors in common with with EL, but a number in common with BCD and P (see 2.3).
 - 5) Ms. P shares a large number of errors with BCD and belongs to the same line of transmission as both their common source ([A]) and the epitome's ([Epit.]). Since both P and [A] contain several variant readings deriving from [Epit.] in the form of glosses (see 2.3), it is likely that their common source included these variant readings in the margins and that they migrated into the later representatives of this group.
 - 6) Mss. BCD go back to the same common source ([A]), which contained several lacunae, multiple subtitles, and a number of marginal scholia and corrections to the main text of Sergius' *Commentary* (see 2.1.3.1). It was also characterized by a large number of specific errors which we find in all three later copies of it.
 - 7) Scholia and corrections found in [A] go back to the common source of [A] and P, which included a number of marginalia based on the variant readings from other witnesses (see 2.1.3.1(3) and 2.1.3.3).
 - 8) Mss. B, C, and D were produced independently from one another on the basis of the same copy, [A]. The scribe of D knew B and probably made use of it as an additional witness to [A], while the scribe of C in some cases made use of B and D, when copying the text of [A] (see 2.1.3.2).
 - 9) Ms. M is a direct copy of B and thus may be excluded from the edition.
 - 10) While the graphical divisions attached to each book of Sergius' *Commentary* are present in all textual witnesses and probably go back to the original version of this treatise, the subtitles found only in the late codices BCD turn out to be later additions to it (and are therefore indicated in the critical apparatus and not in the main text).

These observations, which reflect the process of *recensio*¹⁷⁹, yield the following *stemma codicum* of textual witnesses to Sergius' *Commentary*, which has served as the basis for the critical edition:

¹⁷⁹ On the process of evaluation of the extant textual witnesses known as *recensio*, see Maas 1960: 5–9, West 1973: 29–47, Chiesa 2002: 57–83, Tarrant 2016: 49–64. Cf. Timpanaro 2005: 58–74.



As noted above, the following edition is a critical one; that is, the result of an attempt to come as close as possible (the process of *emendatio*) to the original form of what may be called the final version of the text written by Sergius at the beginning of the 6th century¹⁸⁰. The dotted lines in the stemma represent cases of contact between different lines of transmission that nonetheless falls short of full-scale contamination between the sources, since most of the alternative readings deriving from other textual witnesses were introduced in the form of scholia and glosses into some of the representatives of the [Epit.]–[A]–P line. To a large extent, these variant readings maintained their paratextual character in the later copies, so that we still find them in the form of interlinear corrections and marginal notes in mss. BCD, which form the latest stages of textual transmission. Thus, we are still able to deal with Sergius' text as a closed textual tradition and to evaluate the variants of various textual witnesses based on the stemma above, notwithstanding possible contamination between them.

In order to make the process of establishing the text in the critical edition (the *examinatio* together with the *constitutio textus*)¹⁸¹ as transparent as possible, I have supplied the edition with a positive critical apparatus, thus making explicit which textual witnesses contain which individual variants. The edition includes no *apparatus fontium*, as all textual witnesses are indicated in the outer margins of the Syriac text. The only exceptions to this rule are two witnesses that contain excerpts from the *Commentary* and revisions of it, namely ms. E and the epitome, which do not appear in the margins and which appear in the critical apparatus only in those cases when variants contained in it support readings of other witnesses (for the limitations on their use in the critical edition, see 2.2 and 2.3, above).

¹⁸⁰ Cf. West 1973: 33.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Maas 1960: 9–13, West 1973: 47–59, Chiesa 2002: 83–99.

The critical apparatus claims to be exhaustive. It contains both meaningful words and different variants of the same words that appear in different witnesses and that in some cases allow the reader to see the relations between them. The only forms that do not appear in the critical apparatus are such variants of Syriac words as reflect individual habits of scribes of the manuscripts (e.g., such variants as ܩܪܘܢܐ / ܩܪܘܢܐ and ܩܪܘܢܐ / ܩܪܘܢܐ are not indicated). However, I have included in the apparatus various spellings of personal names (of Aristotle, Porphyry, Plato, and other Greek authors) and of Greek words¹⁸², which might be relevant not only for the textual history of Sergius' treatise, but also for the history of the Syriac language. The variety in transliteration of these names might contribute to our knowledge of the spread of Greek language among Syriac scholars in different periods of history¹⁸³.

The use of punctuation marks (dots)¹⁸⁴ in the Syriac text is rather limited and does not reflect any particular manuscript. The use of *Seyame* is restricted to nouns in plural and plural feminine participles¹⁸⁵. Although in some mss. *Seyame* is attached to numbers, it is not applied with this function in the edition. The sign of *Pasoqa* marks the end of a clause, but in those cases where the sentences were too long, they have been further sub-divided by means of *Šwayya* and *Taḥtaya*¹⁸⁶. When applying these punctuation marks, I was eager to follow the extant manuscripts as far as possible. The latest codices that are now preserved in Erbil-Ankawa turned out to be particularly helpful in understanding the structure of the Syriac text and its division into smaller units. However, it did not always prove possible to adhere to the extant witnesses; thus, in some cases, the division of sentences and the use of punctuation dots reflect editorial choices rather than extant codices.

The tables with divisions that appear after each book of Sergius' treatise present specific technical problems. Since there are certain divergences between mss. in the details of these tables, it seemed best to give the divisions in the form of plain text, since variant readings, which are bound to the line numbers, could thus be denoted in the critical apparatus. All divisions are presented in the form of diagrams in the Appendix to the edition.

The content of the footnotes to the English translation of Sergius' treatise is limited to (1) such differences in the transmission of Syriac text as are relevant for the translation, and (2) Greek parallels to the *Commentary* which allow for a better under-

¹⁸² E.g., the systematic use of the forms ܩܪܘܢܐ and ܩܪܘܢܐ with two *Lamads* in ms. P; see 2.1.2.

¹⁸³ For the influence of the Greek language on Syriac in various historical periods, see Butts 2016.

¹⁸⁴ On the use of dots in Syriac manuscripts at different periods of Syriac history, see Segal 1953. Cf. also a general introduction in Kiraz 2015.

¹⁸⁵ Since the application of *Seyame* in Syriac manuscripts is often random, those cases where it is absent from plural nouns and present for singular nouns are not indicated in the apparatus.

¹⁸⁶ On the use of these three punctuation marks in the period when Sergius was composing his treatise, see Segal 1953: 58–77, particularly 73–75.

standing of the Syriac terminology used by Sergius in his work. Although we cannot say that the *Commentary* is wholly derivative of any particular Greek source, it evidently goes back to written notes of the oral lectures of Ammonius Hermeiou (see 1.2, above). Given that extant commentaries deriving from the school of Ammonius (which are attributed either to the latter or to his disciples) provide us with the same or very similar materials as those Sergius utilized for his work, these texts are either referred to or quoted *in exenso* in the footnotes.

The footnotes also include some observations on the philosophical terminology used by Sergius and the relation of this terminology to both contemporary and later Syriac philosophical treatises. However, due to the limitations of such kind of annotations, these observations represent only the first soundings of the study of Sergius' philosophical vocabulary. A full-scale commentary on the Syriac text of the treatise as well as an extensive glossary of its terminology with corresponding Greek terms could not, for obvious reasons, be part of the present volume (which has already grown too voluminous) and must be postponed to a later date.

Since Sergius most likely made use of some sort of Greek text while working on his *Commentary*, it is unsurprising that the latter contains a large number of Greek loanwords, which are indicated in brackets in the English translation. A list of these Greek words appears as a separate index at the end of the book, together with a general index, which includes both subjects and proper names, together with a list of references to parallels with Sergius' text.

Finally, a short note on transliteration: Following the practice in my two previous books, the transliteration of Syriac terms in the present edition reflects East Syriac vocalization, whereby long and short vowels in both Syriac and Arabic words remain undifferentiated.

Sergius of Reshaina
Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*

Syriac Text and English Translation

Sigla, Abbreviations, and Signs Used in the Edition

Sigla

B	Erbil-Ankawa, Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd, Syr. 169
C	Erbil-Ankawa, Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd, Syr. 170
D	Erbil-Ankawa, Chaldean Antonian Order of St. Hormizd, Syr. 171
E	London, British Library, Additional 12155
L (+ Lg)	London, British Library, Additional 14658 + Leipzig, Or. 1078/I
P	Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Syr. 354, Part I
Epit.	the epitome of the <i>Commentary</i> as preserved in ms. Berlin, Staatsbibliothek, Petermann I. 9 (Sachau 88)

Abbreviations and Signs

al. man.	<i>alia manu</i> (“by another hand”): commentaries and scholia written in the manuscripts not by the same hand as the main text
add.	<i>addidit</i> (a scribe “added”): applies to material added by a scribe
cod.	<i>codex</i>
corr.	<i>correxit</i> (a scribe “corrected”): applies to scribal corrections in the mss.
des.	<i>desinit</i> (ms. “ends” at): indicates end of the text in particular manuscripts
in marg.	<i>in margine</i> (“in the margin”): indicates that material is written in the margin of a manuscript as opposed to the main text block
inv.	<i>invertit</i> (a scribe “inverted”): applies to simple inversions of word order
lac.	<i>lacuna</i> (“gap”): indicates spaces in manuscripts that are left blank
om.	<i>omisit</i> (a scribe “omitted”): applies to words that are omitted in a manuscript
om. hom.	<i>omisit per homoioteleuton</i> (a scribe “omitted due to homoioteleuton”): applies to omissions in manuscripts or in editions due to identical endings in two words
parum cl.	<i>parum clare</i> (“not clear enough”): applies to passages which are either damaged or unreadable
sc.	<i>scilicet</i> (“that is to say, namely”): used especially in explaining an obscure text or an ambiguity, or supplying a missing word
scr.	<i>scripsi</i> (“I have written”): applies to editorial corrections/alleged corrections expressly marked as such in the edition as opposed to corrections by scribes, denoted as “corr.”
sup. lin.	<i>supra lineam</i> (“above the line”): scribal corrections in the manuscripts put above the main text
tit.	<i>titulus</i> (“title”): refers to the subtitles and rubrics which appear in red ink and which most likely were added to the main text at a late stage of the transmission
transp.	<i>transposuit</i> (a scribe “transposed”): denotes transpositions/relocations of entire phrases/passages as opposed to simple inversions of word order denoted “inv.”
+	introduces an addition in the manuscript following the lemma to which this addition is attached
<...>	material supplied by the editor
(...)	additions in the English translation

*Further, with God's help, we begin to write the treatise composed by the chief
physician Sergius on the goal of Aristotle's Categories¹*

[Prologue]

- 1 There is a story, O brother Theodore², told by the ancients about the bird called stork. It rejoices and becomes strong at the time when it separates itself from the cultivated land and retreats into a desert place, and it lays down in its first abode until the moment when its life is completed³. In the same manner, as it seems to me, a man will not be able to comprehend the ideas of the ancients and to enter into the mystery of knowing their writings, unless he separates himself from the whole world and its concerns, and also abandons his body — not physically but intellectually — and casts behind him all its desires. For only then will his mind be emptied and able to turn to itself and contemplate by itself, clearly seeing what has been written by them and properly distinguishing between those things that are stated correctly and those that are not put like that. Then nothing opposed to his lightness will be able to impede him through the weight of his body in the course of such a path as this⁴.
- 2 So, when we were translating certain writings of Galen the doctor from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians⁵, I was the one who translated, while you wrote down after me and improved the Syriac text as the style of this tongue demands it. And when you saw the clear divisions of the terms that are in the writings of this man, the definitions and demonstrations that are fre-

1 The reference to the *Categories* in the title is characteristic of mss. BCD. The last part of the title in P, "...on the goal of all Aristotle's writings", reflects the contents of Books I–II that deal with the whole corpus of Aristotle's texts with a focus on the logical treatises (the *Organon*).

2 Sergius addressed his treatise to Theodore, who, according to Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq, was bishop of the town Karḥ Ḡuddan (cf. the introduction). In what follows (§§2–5), Sergius explains that Theodore became his disciple and assisted him in the translation work.

3 The same Syriac word (spelled either as *ḥorba* or as *ḥurba*) may be translated either as "desert place" or as "stork". This specifically Syriac wordplay makes it likely that the "story" quoted by Sergius was known to him in Syriac and not in Greek.

4 The question of how one should prepare himself for the study of philosophy was treated as one of the *prelolegomena* points, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 6.21–24. Similar to Sergius, David starts his *Prolegomena philosophiae* with the notion that the person who begins to learn philosophy should "bid farewell to all earthly cares" (πάση τῇ τοῦ βίου φροντίδι χαιρεῖν εἰπόντες), see David, *Prolegomena* 1.4–5 (trans. in Gertz 2018: 83).

5 Sergius translated a large corpus of writings of Galen which are listed in a letter of the 9th century Syriac translator and physician Ḥunayn b. Iṣḥāq (see Bergsträsser 1925, Lamoreaux 2016) and of which only some portions have come down to us.

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20 סכסו om. P | סכסו BCD: סכסו P

quently and excellently set in them, you asked me where precisely this man had received such a foundation and beginning in education and acquired such riches, i.e., from himself or from someone else among the authors before him.

- 3 To this, for the sake of the love of learning which is in you, I answered that the beginning, the origin, and the reason of this whole teaching was Aristotle, not only for Galen and for his other fellow doctors, but also for all writers and famous philosophers that came after him. For until the time when nature brought forth this person into the world of men, all parts of philosophy and of the whole of learning were dispersed in the manner of simple drugs and scattered without order and knowledge among various writers. But he alone like a wise doctor collected all parts⁶ that were scattered, put them together skilfully and intelligently, and prepared out of them one perfect remedy of his teaching which uproots and destroys the frail disease of ignorance in the souls of those who sincerely approach his writings. Just as those who build statues (ἀνδριάς) shape every part of the figure separately and afterwards put them together one after another as the craft demands it, thus creating a perfect statue; in the same way he (i.e. Aristotle) also combined, joined and put together every single part of philosophy in the order demanded by nature, and by means of all his books made of it one perfect and awe-inspiring statue of the knowledge of all beings⁷.

- 4 Now, when you had heard this from me, O brother Theodore, you immediately wished to know the goal of the teaching of this man, the order (τάξις) of

6 Thus ms. P, mss. BCD: "writings".

7 Sergius' presentation of Aristotle finds a close parallel in *Praeparatio Evangelica* XI.2.2–4, where Eusebius quotes Atticus, the second century Platonist, who praises in nearly the same words Plato for bringing together various disciplines which before him were scattered and creating from them a perfect body (σώμα τι) of philosophy.

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his writings, and the sequence in which they should be understood⁸. And after I had made an attempt to tell in your presence one thing after another of what I could remember about it, your love also persuaded me to send you in written form what I had reported orally before you. When I was asked about it, I said, because of the greatness of this task, that there is one treatise where I had written briefly about the goal of Aristotle's philosophy and that it would explain as far as possible the teaching of this man to those who come across it⁹. You, nevertheless, were not persuaded by this but even more lovingly urged us that, instead of doing it in the way we had done previously, i.e. (speaking) generally about the whole teaching of this sage concerning the principles of the universe, we should rather briefly describe what seems proper to us regarding each of his writings separately.

- 5 Thus, since it was not possible for me to avoid your request, there is something that I must urge upon you and upon those who might read this treatise, before I come to the analysis of these things. After having read only one time what is written here, one should not turn immediately to useless accusations and reproaches. Rather one should keep reading and trying to comprehend — one time, and another, and a third, and a fourth time, — if this is what the subject requires. But if even then something would look obscure¹⁰, in that case he should not be reluctant to go to someone who is able to instruct him and to explain him what he does not understand. Thus he will save himself from the tumult that occurs in the minds of those who do not comprehend what they are reading, and also spare himself accusations and reproaches, of which the author of the book has no use.

8 Sergius formulates Theodore's alleged inquiry in the form of the preliminaries (*prolegomena*, cf. the list of the preliminaries by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 21.6–10) some of which he is going to discuss in the following two books of his commentary (cf. §21). Here, Sergius refers to two points, the goal (ὁ σκοπός) and the sequence of the reading (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως). Later on, in §5, he mentions also the problem of obscurity of Aristotle's language, which was considered among the *prolegomena* points as well.

9 As it becomes clear from the next sentence, Sergius refers here to the treatise *On the Principles of the Universe* which is attributed to him and which is in fact a revised version of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *On the Universe*.

10 The obscurity of Aristotle's language was one of the *prolegomena* questions, which Sergius discusses in §§61–64 below.

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6 For there are many who are so violently driven by envy as if by mighty blasts of wind that as soon as they start reading a book they turn to reproach instead of understanding, because they believe that by insulting others they will increase their own glory. What they do not comprehend is that everything, whatever it may be, is proven by its own strength and not by the weakness of something else. For comparing one's strength with someone else's weakness does not make one firm. Neither will smallness of some nature bring greatness to something that is compared with it. Instead, it would be proper for them, if they are seeking good judgement, to receive from someone a systematic explanation of what has been written. And if there is something that seems to need clarification and correction by others, they should set it straight without envy and deal with it without reproach. Thus they will not put human nature to shame and bring no slander on it, since it is not possible for it to succeed in everything.

7 I am saying all this, so that anyone who reads this should be aware that I am now writing about the goal of his (i.e. Aristotle's) writings¹¹, not because I am overcome by the glory of (this) man, much less because I have the same opinion as him, but because I was compelled by your love, as I mentioned above, and because I am sure that these things bring much learning and great riches to those who read them with comprehension. Now, let us turn to the account of the subject matter of that about which we are going to write.

11 Ms. P: "teachings".

BOOK ONE

[Division of philosophy]

8 The ancients divided philosophy¹² in the most consistent way, as it seems to me, O brother Theodore, into two primary parts, which are theory¹³ and practice¹⁴, and they also gave an explanation as to the reason for this division.

9 They say that God, who is the principle of everything, also possesses two general powers, from which all his actions originate. The first one is that through which He establishes everything and brings it into being; the other is that through which He takes care of the subsistence and preservation of everything created by Him. Therefore, since philosophy is likeness to God, it also has two primary parts, which are theory and practice. By means of the first one, through which it knows everything, it resembles the productive power of the Creator. And by means of the other one, that is by doing what is right, it imitates His marvellous providence¹⁵.

10 Further, they say that, since the rational soul which is the mother of knowledge is divided into two parts, so also philosophy which is knowledge of everything is divided into two parts. That all the powers of the soul are divided into two kinds is said in multiple places. Hence, they say that some of its powers are cognitive, e.g. intellect, reasoning, and calculation, and some are animal, e.g. passion, anger, and will. And because philosophy is purification of the whole soul, consequently, they say, it is also divided into two parts. Through its first,

12 The following division is to a large extent found in the *prolegomena* texts which either derive from or are dependent on Ammonius. Thus, it seems proper to quote *in extenso* the corresponding Greek passages from these texts which reflect the Greek source used by Sergius.

13 Syr. *yida'ta*, "knowledge". Later, Sergius also renders the Greek θεωρία with the loanword *te'oriya*.

14 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.6: διαίρεται οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 26.7; David, *Prolegomena* 55.17.

15 Sergius reports the argument found by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.10–16: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐλέγομεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὁμοίωσιν θεῶ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ θεὸς διττὰς ἔχει τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς πάντων τῶν ὄντων, τὰς δὲ προνοητικὰς ἡμῶν τῶν καταδεεστέρων, εἰκότως ἡ φιλοσοφία διαίρεται εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ γινώσκομεν τὰ ὄντα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ προνοοῦμεθα τῶν καταδεεστέρων, καὶ οὕτως ἐξομοιοῦμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.9–13; David, *Prolegomena* 55.35–56.7.

intellectual part, it purifies the cognitive powers of the soul, keeping them from mistaking one thing for another and so grasping the truth and the exact meaning of things. Through its second, practical part, on the other hand, it refines its animal powers, instigating them not to be employed in anything useless, but to make their motions upright and profitable¹⁶.

11 But also each one of these parts is further divided into other parts that are called subparts. Thus, they subdivide theory, which is a primary part of philosophy, into the teaching on spiritual natures, which are called divine, so that the teaching on them is also called divine; the teaching on visible natures, which is also called natural; and the teaching consisting of mathematical sciences, which are called sciences in the proper sense¹⁷.

12 They also give the following reason for the three-fold division of this part which is similar to the previous one¹⁸. Some living beings are completely separate and removed from matter and from the density of bodies, dwelling in the subtle, perfect, and incorporeal spiritual realm. And some of them are placed in opposition to these, i.e. in matter and in the density of the lower world, outside of which their subsistence is impossible. And further, there are some whose nature is placed between these, and thus they are not completely removed from matter like those that are above, but neither are they mixed with it in such a way that they cannot even be separated from it intellectually like those that are below. Instead, they are separate from it in one way and mixed with it in another¹⁹. Those beings that are completely separate from matter are called divine and angelic, as well as (encompassing) all rational and intelligible

16 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.16–22: πάλιν δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς διτταί αἱ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ μὲν γνωστικαὶ οἷον νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις, αἱ δὲ ζωτικαὶ καὶ ὀρεκτικαὶ οἷον βούλησις θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. ὁ οὖν φιλόσοφος πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη βούλεται κοσμηῆσαι καὶ εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγαγεῖν· διὰ οὖν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τελειοῦται τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν γνωστικόν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ ζωτικόν. εἰκότως οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς τε θεωρητικόν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.14–26; David, *Prolegomena* 56.7–16.

17 I.e. the theoretical part is subdivided into theology, physics, and mathematics. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.22–23: πάλιν τὸ θεωρητικόν διαιρεῖται εἰς θεολογικόν μαθηματικόν καὶ φυσιολογικόν. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.35–36; David, *Prolegomena* 57.23. For Sergius' note on mathematical sciences, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.24–25.

18 I.e. here Sergius again gives an ontological reason for the logical division. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.23–24: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα βούλεται θεωρεῖν ὁ φιλόσοφος, τῶν δὲ ὄντων πάντων τρεῖς εἰσι τάξεις.

19 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.25–31: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων παντάσιν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῆ περι αὐτῶν ἐπινοία, οἷά ἐστι τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ παντάσιν ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῆ περι αὐτῶν ἐπινοία, οἷά ἐστι τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἔνυλα εἶδη, ξύλον καὶ ὄστουν καὶ σὰρξ καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ σώματα (ταῦτα δὲ φυσικὰ καλοῦμεν ὡς ὑπὸ φύσεως δημιουργούμενα προσεχῶς), τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατὰ τι μὲν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.36–28.2; David, *Prolegomena* 57.26–58.12.

powers. And other beings whose subsistence is in matter are called natural and natures, for their subsistence derives from nature. They are all visible bodies, in some of which there is life and some of which are deprived of movement.

13 Those intermediary ones that are called mathematical sciences are truly sciences dealing with things. I am speaking about geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (ἀστρονομία), and music. Since all these crafts and suchlike are sciences which we learn and which derive either from certain books or from other bodies made of bronze, wood or stone, they are not separated from matter for they also come from matter. But since, after we have learned them, they are collected and established in our memory and subsist in our rational thought, they exist without matter. Thus, they may be separated from it intellectually, and it becomes clear that they also have another kind of subsistence which is outside of matter. That is why they are placed between those beings which are above and those which are below²⁰.

14 Now, since we want to ascend from the lower natures to which we belong towards those above in order to be associated with them in knowledge, but it is impossible to ascend immediately from such a lower position to their height, an intermediary nature has been established for us, namely the mathematical sciences, which are to some extent associated with both sides and by means of which we are educated in understanding what is the knowledge of the incorporeals and gradually ascend to them²¹.

15 They say that this is similar to a man who has been confined to a very dark house and has spent a long time there. If he were to leave it all at once for a

20 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.30–12.4: τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατὰ τι μὲν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά· κύκλος γὰρ καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δίχα ὕλης τινὸς οὐ δύνανται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀχώριστα ἐστὶ τῆς ὕλης, ἐπειδὴ δὲ θεασαμένοι κύκλον ξύλινον καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ λίθινον ἀνεμαζάμεθα αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ἔχομεν παρ' ἑαυτοῖς δίχα τῆς ὕλης. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.38–28.5; David, *Prolegomena* 58.9–17.

21 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.20–24: μέσον δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ μαθηματικὸν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ δύναμεθα ἀμέσως ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παντάπασιν ἀχωρίστων τῆς ὕλης ἐπὶ τὰ παντάπασιν χωριστὰ, ὀδεύομεν διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων, τῶν κατὰ τι μὲν χωριστῶν κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχωρίστων.

house that is very illuminated without any intermediary, his eyes would at once become dim, being hurt by the light. But if he were to leave it for a less dark house first and later on to the one which is more illuminated, so as to become gradually accustomed to the rays of light, then he would be able to dwell even in very strong light without harm. In the same way, if we make an attempt to ascend all at once from those natural things that are in matter to those ones whose subsistence is far from material nature, our cognitive faculties will become blind and our mind obscured through the darkness of ignorance. If, instead, we are trained little by little in the mathematics which we call intermediary and ascend to the knowledge of rational natures, then we will gradually and properly proceed along the path of knowledge and reach as far as possible what we strive for²².

16 That is why some of the ancients²³ called mathematical sciences bridges and ladders, while others said that, since they deal with and teach about the incorporeals as well, these sciences should certainly be taken as something through which we ascend from the inferior to the superior and from natural beings towards those ones that are above nature²⁴.

17 Thus, they say that the cause for the threefold division of the first part of philosophy is the following. Since, as we have said, things are divided into three kinds, i.e. into those which are above nature, those that are in nature, and those intermediary ones which are in mathematical sciences, it is proper that also this part of philosophy, which is knowledge of all existing things, should be subdivided into three parts, namely knowledge of the divine things which are

22 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.27–13.5: ἐὰν γὰρ βουληθῶμεν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν φυσιολογικῶν ἐπὶ θεολογίαν ἀμέσως αὐτοὺς ἀναγαγεῖν, τυφλώττομεν, καθάπερ οἱ ἐκ σκοτεινότητου οἴκου εἰς πεφωτισμένον ἀμέσως εἰσερχόμενοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν οἴκῳ διατρίβειν σύμμετρον ἔχοντι φῶς, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν φωτεινότατον. οὕτως σὺν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δεῖ διατρίψαντας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐπὶ θεολογίαν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.14–21; David, *Prolegomena* 58.32–59.3.

23 Ammonius refers to Plotinus in this context, see *In Isag.* 12.25–27.

24 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 13.5–7: κλίμαξ γὰρ τις καὶ γέφυρά ἐστι τὰ μαθήματα κοινωνοῦντα μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καθὸ ἀχώριστα τοῖς δὲ θείοις καθὸ χωριστά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.13–14; David, *Prolegomena* 59.19–23.

למלכותו יתברך. וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת
שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.

P6v כִּי אֵל אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת 18

5 כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ. וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ
וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ. וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ
יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.
10 וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.

19 אֵל אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ 19

C93r וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ
B62v וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ
15 וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.
P7r וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.
וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.

20 אֵל אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ 20

וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.
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וְעַתָּה יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ יִשְׁמַע בְּקוֹלֵנוּ וְיַעֲשֶׂה לָנוּ כְּכָל הַבְּרָחוֹת שֶׁנִּשְׁמַע מִפִּי הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ.

3 BCD: אֵל P 4 BCD: אֵל P 6 אֵל CDP: אֵל B 7 BCD: אֵל P 8 BCD: אֵל P 9 BCD: אֵל P | אֵל C: אֵל BD: אֵל P 11 BCD: אֵל P 13 BCD: אֵל P 15 P: אֵל BCD: אֵל P 18 om. P 19 BCD: אֵל P 22 CDP: אֵל B 23 P: אֵל BCD

above nature, the teaching on natural things which are in visible natures, and the tradition of mathematical sciences which are between these two.

18 But the practical part too, O our brother, they similarly subdivide into three parts, i.e. into the general rule over all people, the rule over a man's own house, and the rule over oneself only. For they say that everyone who is doing something good, does it either to all people and the city, or to his house, or to himself. Thus, if someone is doing good to all people he is called a general ruler, if it is to his house he is named a domestic ruler, and if it is to himself then he is called pious and vigilant²⁵.

19 So, they say that in this practical (part of) philosophy a person is sometimes a law-giver and sometimes a judge²⁶. Because for the common good, one promulgates laws that serve for instruction and education as well as for the virtuous conduct of those who are under his rule, and he passes judgement on those who infringe upon them and gives honor and respect to those who observe them. But beyond this, also in his own house the domestic ruler lays down certain laws, and he punishes those who transgress them and shows favor to those who follow them. And also for himself he lays down certain laws and judgements, if he wishes to set his habits in order and to purify the animal part of his soul²⁷.

20 For this is what one of the ancient philosophers said to himself: "Accustom yourself, first of all, to restrain your stomach and to master your sleep and lust."²⁸ Furthermore he said: "If you are doing good things be glad. But when you are doing bad things reprove yourself."²⁹ So, the first of these (sayings) is

25 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.2–6: διαιρείται τοίνυν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἰς τε τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν. ὁ γὰρ πράττων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἰς ἑαυτὸν πράττει κοσμῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ λέγεται ἠθικός, ἢ εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καὶ λέγεται οἰκονομικός, ἢ τὴν ὄλην κοσμεῖ πόλιν καὶ λέγεται πολιτικός.

26 Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 32.26–30; David, *Prolegomena* 75.33–76.16. Both Elias and David ascribe this division to the Platonists. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b.

27 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.11–17: τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον διαιρεῖται εἰς τε τὸ νομοθετικὸν καὶ δικαστικὸν· ὁ γὰρ πολιτικὸς φιλόσοφος ἢ νόμους τίθησι, καθ' οὓς δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ δικάζει καὶ τοὺς μὲν γερῶν ἀξιοῖ τοὺς δὲ παρατρέψαντάς τι τῶν κεμμένων νόμων κολάζει. εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ θεωρεῖται τὸ νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ νόμους τίθεμεν καὶ δικάζομεν τῶν οἰκετῶν ἢ υἱῶν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἠθικῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.8–25.

28 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 94, lines 9–11). Ammonius quotes this passage also without reference to Pythagoras: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἠθικός νόμους τίθησιν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν λέγη κρατεῖν δ' εἰθίξειο τῶνδε γαστρός μὲν πρώτιστα καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος (Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.17–20; cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.18–21).

29 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 96, line 43; Sergius inverts the order of the sentences) as quoted in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 16.3 (cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.10–12).

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like establishing laws, while the other one is like a judgement, which is either praise that follows the one who observes the law or reproach of the one who breaks it.

[Division of Aristotle's writings]³⁰

- 21 So, after this, we ought to turn also to the general division of all Aristotle's writings. This will make comprehensible our account when we write about the goal of each one of them separately. Indeed, it is necessary to know that those things which have been discussed until now and which we are also discussing now are useful for understanding the goals of Aristotle's writings which we are going to discuss. For it is about these goals in particular and about the division of all his writings that we are going to speak in the following sections³¹.
- 22 So, the general division of his works is the following. Some of them are particular, being written about each and every kind of matter; others are written universally about nature in general, and still others are in between, since they are neither written about something as a whole like the universal ones nor do they speak about some concrete things only like the particular ones³². Those which are written as particular are his letters which he addressed to his friends or his listeners concerning concrete inquiries (ζητήματα)³³. Those which are placed between the particular ones and the universal ones are his writings about the government of the nations and the investigations³⁴ into the natures of animals³⁵.
- 23 We ought to know, however, that the books which Aristotle composed on the government of the nations are not on how they should be governed, exist

³⁰ This subtitle appears in mss. BCD.

³¹ Sergius refers here to the same two *prolegomena* issues (Gr. σκοπός and τάξις), to which he has already pointed in the form of the alleged inquiry by Theodore in §4 above.

³² See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.21–23: φέρε δεύτερον καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ποιησώμεθα. τούτων οὖν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξύ τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν μερικῶν. Cf. Philoronus, *In Cat.* 3.8–11; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.10–12; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.9–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.17–20.

³³ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.23–24: καὶ ἐστὶ μερικὰ μὲν ὅσα πρὸς τινὰς ἰδίᾳ γέγραφεν, ἢ ἐπιστολάς ἢ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. See also Philoronus, *In Cat.* 3.22–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.11–13; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.21–24.

³⁴ Syr. *tas'ita*, “story”, here apparently renders the Gr. ἱστορία, “inquiry, investigation”.

³⁵ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.26–28: μεταξύ δὲ ὅποσα περὶ ἱστορίας γέγραφεν, ὡς αἱ γεγραμμένα αὐτῷ Πολιτεῖαι ἀμφὶ τὰς πενήκοντα καὶ διακοσίας οὔσαι. See also Philoronus, *In Cat.* 3.26–29; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.29–34.

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and dwell in the cities, but on what the governments and customs of each particular nation are and the laws that are established in each land. Also, what he wrote about animals was not on the subsistence and the constitution of each one of them, but on their nature during birth and growth and the habits of the whole genus. Thus, the nature of this kind of writings is not particular (in the same way) as in the letters, since he spoke about one whole nation or country and about one whole genus of animals. But neither is it universal in the same way as the other writings, in which he considered generally the nature of things about which he wrote³⁶.

24 Now, of those writings of his that are universal, some are like notebooks, others are written as questions-and-answers between two persons (πρόσωπα), and still others are as if (they are spoken) by one person but combining multiple arguments³⁷. We ought to know that every time this philosopher found some opinion or idea suitable for teaching, he wrote it down like a reminder in summary fashion which he could make use of in one of his teachings. Thus, those books where he recorded one by one all the ideas that he had found are called notebooks, for they were written in the form of reminders³⁸. Also, some of these notebooks were written about particular things, namely those which deal only with one concrete subject, and some are universal, namely those which encompass multiple concepts³⁹.

25 Now, in those books of his that are composed in the form of questions and answers, either there is one person (πρόσωπον) or there are several persons

36 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.6–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.29–4.6.

37 Ammonius and other commentators divided Aristotle's universal writings first into systematic treatises and into those which were written in the form of notes written for memory: τῶν δὲ καθόλου τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συνταγματικά τὰ δὲ ὑπομνηματικά (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.4–5; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.11–12; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.1). The systematic treatises, in turn, were divided into those written in the dialogue form and those written by Aristotle in the first person: καὶ πάλιν τῶν συνταγματικῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ διαλογικά, ὡς ὅσα δραματικῶς διεσκευάσται κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν πλειόνων προσώπων, τὰ δὲ αὐτοπρόσωπα ὡς ὅσα γέγραφεν ὡς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.14–17; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.10–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.15–16).

38 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.28–4.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.12–13; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.25–35.

39 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.13–14: τῶν δὲ ὑπομνηματικῶν τὰ μὲν μονοειδῆ, ὡς ὅταν περὶ ἑνός τινος ποιῆται τὴν ζήτησιν, τὰ δὲ ποικίλα, ὅταν περὶ πολλῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.12–14; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 7.1–3.

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הענין הזה. והענין הזה כפי מה שכתבנו
C96r | P9r

2 הענין הזה P: הענין הזה BCD 3 הענין הזה CDP: הענין הזה B 5 הענין הזה P: הענין הזה BCD
הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P 7 הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P
הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P 8 [הענין הזה] + הענין הזה BD add. in marg.
הענין הזה BCD add. in marg. | הענין הזה CDP: הענין הזה B 9 הענין הזה CDP: הענין הזה B
10 הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P 12 [הענין הזה] om. P 15 הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P
17 הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P 18 הענין הזה BCD: הענין הזה P 22 [הענין הזה] + הענין הזה D
add. (corr?) in marg.

who pose questions or answer them, and there are one or more interlocutors who argue against those who are questioned⁴⁰.

26 Also, those writings which are spoken as if by one person⁴¹ are further divided as follows. Some of them are about *te'oriya* (θεωρία), which means “knowledge” and is the first part of philosophy, and some of them are written about practice, which is the second part of philosophy, as we have said above. And further, some of them are written about instruments (ὄργανα) of philosophy which are called in Greek *dialeqtiqa* (διαλεκτικά) and *logiqa* (λογικά) and which we designate as “logic” and “logical craft”⁴². For this is not a part of philosophy, neither is it a subpart, but it is only its instrument (ὄργανον), as we will demonstrate at length later on⁴³.

27 So, of his theoretical writings some are about rational and incorporeal beings, and they are also called “After natures”⁴⁴, others are about visible natures, their accidents and affections, and their generation and corruption — we will speak about each one of them according to our ability in the appropriate places⁴⁵, — and still others are written about mathematical sciences which, as we have demonstrated, are between nature and those beings that are above nature⁴⁶.

28 Of those (writings) which he composed as instruments of philosophy, some concern those things that contribute to the logical craft, some of them he composed about logic (itself), and some of them he wrote about such things that are attached to the logical craft⁴⁷. We will further explain these subjects in detail in those sections that suit each one of them, quoting from the words of this man (i.e. Aristotle).

40 Ammonius and other commentators thus divide the systematic treatises (τὰ συνταγματικά), cf. the commentary to §24 above.

41 What Ammonius and other commentators refer to with the term τὰ αὐτοπρόσωπα are treatises written by Aristotle in the first person.

42 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.18–5.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.23–35. Sergius modifies Ammonius’ division in some aspects.

43 See §§30–48.

44 Gr. μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, “(what comes) after natural things”, i.e. the treatise *Metaphysics*.

45 Sergius speaks several times of his intention to compose commentaries on Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy, particularly on *Physics*, cf. §256. Additionally, the present commentary contains several sections which are based on the *Physics* and not on the *Categories* (see §§263–284) and it is possible that here he refers to these sections rather than to his future commentaries.

46 Sergius’ division is very close to the account of Philoponus in *In Cat.* 4.35–5.6.

47 Ammonius speaks of the writings which either concern principles of the logical method or the method itself or serve as complements to it: τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλως εἰς τὴν μέθοδον συντελούντων (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–8, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 5.8–14; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.28–31).

29 For now, we intend to speak only briefly about the general division of his writings in order to train the hearing of those who learn, but later on we will speak clearly and specifically about each one of them according to our ability. For a general explanation might be very obscure for those who learn. A particular teaching, instead, would be for them more instructive. While something general is similar to an idea, that which is called particular, instead, is like a perfect depiction of this idea. That is why we shall first think about the former and then turn to the latter.

[Logic, an instrument of philosophy]

30 After this, it is necessary for us to examine whether the logical craft is a part or a subpart of philosophy, or whether it is only its instrument (ὄργανον). This issue has been disputed by some not insignificant people, indeed by those who occupy nothing less than the foremost position, at the peak (κεφάλαιον) of the whole philosophy⁴⁸.

31 Thus, e.g., the Stoics — people who became renowned in logic and in teaching worldly kind of argumentation — stated that logic is a part of philosophy. Consequently, according to their idea, philosophy is divided not into two parts, as we have stated above, i.e. into theory and practice, but into three parts, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic. However, the Peripatetics, one of whom was Aristotle, established only two primary parts of philosophy which have been discussed above, and they considered logic to be not its part, but its instrument⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Ammonius does not mention this question in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories*, although Olympiodorus discusses it at length (*Prolegomena* 14.13–18.12). Elias remarks (*Prolegomena* 26.35–27.1) that it belongs to the study of the *Analytics*, and we indeed find extensive discussions of this topic in the commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Elias himself.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.20–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.21–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.18–20.

- 32 Plato, on the other hand, and all the Academics were not sure in which direction they should move, so that they said various things which contradict one another. For sometimes they assumed logic to be part of philosophy, but sometimes clearly proclaimed it to be its instrument. E.g., in the treatise called *Phaedo* and also in the one called *Phaedrus*, Plato stated that logic was part of philosophy, while in another treatise with the title *Parmenides*, as if he had forgot about the earlier ones, he clearly called logic an instrument⁵⁰.
- 33 Those who defend (Plato's views) answer to this that what we consider to be erroneous is not in fact what they mean. We will speak about it after we have first considered those arguments which the Stoics elaborate in order to establish by means of them that, as they believe, logic is a part of philosophy and not its instrument⁵¹. As soon as we have refuted and disclosed their haughtiness in this issue and demonstrated that they speak vainly, then we will also show that logic is not both a part and an instrument of philosophy but only an instrument in accord with the view of the Peripatetics.
- 34 Now, those from the Stoa state that, if there is something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart, then it is either a part or a subpart of the craft that uses it. Therefore, if philosophy uses

50 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.20–24; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.20–27.

51 See §§46–47, below.

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 P 11 om. P 12 כהנהנהנה C: כהנהנהנה BDP | כהנהנהנה BCD: כהנהנהנה P 15 כהנהנהנה BCD: כהנהנהנה
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logic and if logic is neither a part nor a subpart of any other craft, it is clear that it is either a part or a subpart of philosophy⁵². So, they believe to have demonstrated by means of this argument that logic is either a part or a subpart of philosophy.

35 However, they suppose it to be not a subpart but rather a part of philosophy, and they demonstrate this as follows⁵³. Everything that is a part and a portion of something else has the same subject matter (ὄλη) and also the same goal as that thing whose part it is⁵⁴. Thus, they say, we shall first examine what the subject matter of the parts of philosophy is and what their goal is. If we then discover that logic has such a subject matter and such a goal that correspond to either of them (i.e. the parts of philosophy), then we could say that logic is a subpart of that part to which they correspond. But if one finds out that it corresponds neither in material nor in goal to either of them, then it would become apparent that it may not be their subpart.

36 Now, the subject matter of that primary part of philosophy which is called theory are all divine and human things, while its goal is the true knowledge of them. As for the other part which is called practice, its subject matter is government in the world and moderation of the passions, i.e. not allowing them to act in excess of what is appropriate, while its goal is to choose those things which are profitable and to avoid those which are harmful. So, they say that logic is not associated with any of them either in subject matter or in goal, since the subject matter of logic is skilful organisation of speech, while its goal is applica-

52 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.6–12: ἐάν τις τέχνη κέχρηται τινι ὁ μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον, τοῦτο πάντως ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἢ μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον. <...> ἢ δὲ φιλοσοφία, φασὶν, κέχρηται τῇ λογικῇ, ἥτις οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης *** τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.29–15.2.

53 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–6: συλλογίζονται γὰρ οὕτως.

54 Cf. Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–32: τὸ γὰρ μόριόν τινος καὶ τῆς ὕλης κοινωνεῖ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστὶ μόριον.

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tion of correct arguments that are arranged properly by means of ordered speech. Therefore, since both the subject matter and the goal of logic are different from those of the parts of philosophy, i.e. of theory and practice, it is clear that it is not a part of any of them and it thus may not be considered to be a subpart of philosophy⁵⁵.

37 Hence, they say, since we have first shown that (logic) should be either a part or a subpart of philosophy, but now it has been clearly demonstrated that it is not a subpart, what remains as the only possible conclusion is that it is a part of philosophy, which is thus divided not into two parts but into three parts, as we have said, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic.

38 This is what the Stoics say, being sure that their arguments are straightforward and they have not missed anything. Against it the followers of Aristotle spoke, refuting them as follows: The first premise from which they believe to straightforwardly develop their argument is not correctly formulated and understood⁵⁶. For instead of saying, “something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart”, they should have expanded it and said, “if it is not a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of another craft, it is either a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of the craft that uses it”. This way, they would have shown consequently that logic is not a part or a subpart of philosophy but its instrument. However, they omit “an instrument”

55 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.22–34; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–7.8; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 1.13–2.1.

56 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2: ἐροῦμεν ὅτι παρελογίσαντο. Cf. also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–11: δυνατὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἀντιστῆναί τε καὶ ἐλέγξει τὴν πρότασιν ὡς κακῶς προβεβλημένην.

and put only “a part or a subpart” in their statement and thus believe to have shown that logic is not a subpart of philosophy but its part⁵⁷.

39 After this, we shall listen further to some of the Peripatetics. Whenever some craft makes use of a part of another craft, it is much greater than the one whose part serves as its instrument, as we may say about bridle-making and navigation. One of them, i.e. bridle-making, produces bridles and provides those who use them in horsemanship with them, while navigation gives course to ships and allows one to steer them. Hence in both cases the latter (crafts) are superior to the former ones which they utilize for their service. Provided that this is true, if we consider that rhetors, doctors, and any other craftsmen use logic, then if logic were a part of philosophy it would turn out that rhetoric and medicine are much greater than philosophy for they use its part as their instrument. But since it would be absurd to place philosophy which is the source of rhetoric and medicine after them: logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument⁵⁸.

40 Further, merely from the fact that logic originates from philosophy they cannot demonstrate at all that it is a part of philosophy, because not everything that is generated by some craft is necessarily part of it. For, behold, there are plenty of crafts which produce their own instruments, as in the case of carpenters and blacksmiths. For a carpenter produces a hammer, a rule, and a corner,

57 See this argument in Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2–7 and a more detailed account in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–23.

58 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.1–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.31–16.10; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 2.22–33. Sergius’ account finds its closest parallel in Philoponus.

which are instruments for his craft and not a part of it. And also a blacksmith forges an anvil and a hammer, which are tools that he uses and not a part of his craftsmanship. That is why logic too, even though it is produced and established by philosophy for the sake of demonstrating things, is not a part of philosophy but an instrument, by means of which it shows and makes visible things that are hidden. Without it, in fact, it would be impossible for philosophy to enter the world of men⁵⁹.

41 Also, from the defining account of the part it becomes evident that logic is clearly an instrument of philosophy. For a part is something that completes the thing whose part it is when it is present in it and makes it deficient when taken away from it⁶⁰. E.g., we say that, when a leg which is a part of a body is in it, it makes the whole (body) complete, but when it is separated from (the body), it makes it deficient. But logic neither makes the nature of philosophy complete when it is present nor does it make the latter in any way deficient if it is not present. In fact, its essence is in things, for it is knowledge of all existing things in which it exists, regardless of whether we comprehend them or not. For logic reveals to us those things which we do not comprehend⁶¹ and it is knowledge whose essence is in things, regardless of whether we know them or not. Thus, we need logic by means of which we come to our knowledge. And consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but an instrument by means of which philosophy becomes known to us⁶².

42 Further, they say the following. If all the parts are removed from something whose parts they are this thing will perish too. But as we have just said, philo-

59 Cf. a brief note by Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.36–10.1 and a lengthy account of this argument by Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.23–8.6. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–30.

60 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.6–7: τὸ μέρος συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πράγματος· ἀμέλει τοι παρὸν μὲν σώζει τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸν δὲ φθείρει.

61 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.10–11: ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς λογικῆς ἐδειθήμεν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως εἰς κατάληψιν τῶν κεκρυμμένων. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.24–25.

62 For this argument, see Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.26–33; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.21–27; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.4–17.

sophy will not perish if logic is removed from it, since this is what its nature is. Consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument⁶³.

43 After this, it is time to speak about those from the Academy who state that logic is both a part and an instrument of philosophy. For I suppose that by means of what was said a sufficient refutation has been provided of those who state that it is only a part of philosophy. Now, we shall also understand that a part differs very much from an instrument. For a part exists in virtue of itself and not in virtue of something else, while an instrument is used for the benefit of something else and not in virtue of itself. For instance, a hand, a leg, or any other part of the body exists in virtue of itself, while an axe, a saw, or a drill exists in order to be used by something else and not in virtue of itself. Therefore, it is clear that a part and an instrument are not same thing⁶⁴.

44 And further, the following (argument). If one part is attached to another part, together they will bring about the whole whose parts they are. However, if you attach one instrument to another a thousand times, they will never bring about the whole thing whose instruments they are. Hence the instrument and the part differ from one another. That is why logic may not be at the same time both an instrument and a part of philosophy, as Plato and all the Academics state, but it is either only a part, which is not possible as we have shown above

63 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.14–15: ἡ λογικὴ ἀναιρουμένη οὐκ ἀναρεῖ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα ὄργανον τῆς φιλοσοφίας. See also Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–11; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.27–29.

64 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 16.30–34: ἴδιον μέρους ἐστὶ, φασί, τὸ δι' αὐτὸ παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ὄργανου δὲ τὸ δι' ἕτερον παραλαμβάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἡ λογικὴ οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν παραλαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, διὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄλλο παραλαμβανόμενον τοῦ δι' ὃ παραλαμβάνεται ὄργανόν ἐστιν, ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ὄργανον. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.25–27.

in our refutation of the Stoics, or only an instrument, as the truth requires. So the statement of those who consider it both part and instrument is false⁶⁵.

45 And if they say, as they are accustomed to do, “Behold, a hand may at the same time be a part and an instrument!”, one should answer them that, even if the same hand might be both a part and an instrument, however it cannot be both of them for one and the same thing. For it is a part of the body, while it is an instrument not of the body but of the soul which uses it in order to make necessary movements. But this is what those who set logic as a part and an instrument of philosophy do not comprehend⁶⁶.

46 The followers of Plato, however, say in his defence that logic may be considered in two ways. On the one hand it exists by itself apart from things, and on the other it is in things that its subsistence may be observed. Also, of other objects, e.g. of a measure of one or two cubits, we say that they exist in the same two ways. On the one hand it exists in measure, and on the other its subsistence is in some other body that is measured. Thus, some amount of water or wine or other things that can be measured exists by itself as the measure but also in those things that are measured by it. Also a pint is said both of the measure and of wine or water or oil whose amount is measured. Similarly, a peck is said of the measure and also of grain of a certain amount⁶⁷.

65 A short version of this argument is found in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.29–31: καὶ πάλιν συντιθέμενα τὰ μέρη ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα οὐδαμῶς· τὰ ἄρα μέρη οὐκ ὄργανα.

66 Philoponus suggests the same fictitious dialogue, see *In An. Pr.* 8.31–36: εἰ δὲ τις εἶποι ‘καὶ μὴν ἡ χεὶρ μέρος οὐσά ἐστι καὶ ὄργανον, ὥστε οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ὄργανον οὐσαν εἶναι καὶ μέρος’, φαμέν ὅτι ἄλλ’ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ οὐ ἐστὶ μέρος ἡ χεὶρ, τοῦτου ἐστὶ καὶ ὄργανον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ὡς σώματος, ὄργανον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς. Olympiodorus also presents this imagined speech which he puts in the mouth not of some anonymous Platonist but of Plato himself: *Prolegomena* 17.18–23.

67 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.36–38 and 11.15–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–5 and 9.13–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–29.

47 In the same way, they say, also logic exists for its own sake and for the sake of something else that uses it. It exists for its own sake when one observes it in his intellect without applying it in speech and in demonstrations. But it exists for the sake of what uses it when it is skilfully applied in speech, in combination of words, and in demonstrations. That is why Plato regarded it both as instrument and part. He took it for an instrument when considered in its application through the combination of words and demonstrations. But he regarded it as a part of philosophy when one contemplates it in pure knowledge in his intellect apart from its application by something else⁶⁸. Now, whether they are speaking well or they are far from understanding, that is what you will distinguish and comprehend yourself while reading this.

48 Here ends the first book, wherein three points⁶⁹ have been discussed, namely the division of philosophy, the general division of all the writings of Aristotle, and the question of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument. In the second book, we will speak about the goal of logic.

End of Book One.

68 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 11.3–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.29–37.

69 Syr. *reše*, corresponding to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, “headings”, the main points discussed in the introductory part of a treatise.

*The divisions of Book One are the following:*⁷⁰

First division

Philosophy is divided into two kinds, theory and practice.

Theory is divided into the knowledge of divine things, the mathematical sciences, and the knowledge of natural things.

The mathematical sciences are divided into geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.

Practice is divided into rule over all people, rule over one's own house, and rule over oneself; into the law-givers and the upright judges.

Second division

Aristotle's writings:

- some of them are written particularly; these are the letters;
- some of them are intermediary; these concern the constitutions of the nations and about the natures of animals;
- and some are universal: some are written as reminders, some are in the form of questions and answers, and some are as if spoken by one person⁷¹.

⁷⁰ All extant manuscripts containing Sergius' *Commentary* include after each one of the seven books tables which depict the division of the key-terms discussed in these books. Due to the technical limitations of a critical edition, it is impossible to represent these division in the same form. Instead, they are indicated as plain text. See the Appendix, where the divisions are presented in the diagram form.

⁷¹ Mss. BCD add: "Some of them are dedicated to divine things, some are written about natural things, and some are instrumental, namely logic. Some of the (latter) are before this craft, some are about this craft of demonstrations, and some are attached to this craft."

מִיּוֹם הַיּוֹם

וְהָיָה כִּי יִשְׁמַע הַיְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיָשׁוּבָנוּ אֵלָיו וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 5 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 10 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 C104r וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 15 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 50 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 P15r וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 20 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 B70r וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ

1 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ + וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 5 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P
 6 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 7 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 8 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD:
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P | וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P | וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ C: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ B:
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ D: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 9 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCP: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ D 10 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD:
 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P | וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCP: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ D 11 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 12 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ om. B
 15 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ om. B 18 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ + וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P 19 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ om. BCD | וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ om.
 P 20 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ P: וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ BCD 21 וְיִשְׁמַע אֶת-קוֹלֵנוּ om. BCD

BOOK TWO

[Introduction]

49 In the previous book, which was the first one of the present treatise, O brother Theodore, three points⁷² were discussed and examined in detail. The first one of them concerned the proper division of all philosophical knowledge. The last one of them was a refutation of those who present the logical craft as a certain part of philosophy or as both a part and an instrument. And in the intermediary point, which was the second one, we provided a precise division of all the writings of Aristotle. This division which properly proceeded and descended from the universal (works) to the particular ones ended with those writings that were composed about the logical craft which we have demonstrated to be an instrument (ὄργανον) of philosophy. These writings, in turn, we correctly divided into three parts and we properly stated that some of them precede the craft of demonstrations, some are written about this craft, and some are composed about those things that are in every respect useful for this craft⁷³.

50 Now, it seems to me, O brother, that it is necessary to dedicate this whole book, which is the second one of the present treatise, to the goal of those writings that closed this division, and particularly to those of them which are set as preceding this craft, for they come first and are therefore set before logic⁷⁴. However, in order to make this clear for those who encounter the present

72 Syr. *reše*, Gr. κεφάλαια, “headings”.

73 Cf. §28, above.

74 What Sergius means are the treatises *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*, which form the first group of Aristotle’s “instrumental” works and which Ammonius characterizes as focusing on the principles of the logical method (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου), see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–7.

כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב
לְחַלְמֵי רַב־חַיִּים .

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וְהַיּוֹם הַזֶּה לְחַדֵּשׁ הַחֵדֶשׁ הַזֶּה לְחַדֵּשׁ הַחֵדֶשׁ הַזֶּה
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
5 כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
C104v | D61r . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
10 כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל

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כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
15 כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
P15v כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
20 כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
C105r | B70v כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל
כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב מִיָּד רַב רַב . כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים חִיָּים :כֹּהֵל

1 כֹּהֵל כְּתוּב BCD: כֹּהֵל P | כַּלְהֵבָה רַב־חַיִּים] inv. BCD 4 כֹּהֵל BCD: כֹּהֵל P
P | כַּלְהֵבָה BCD: כַּלְהֵבָה P | כַּלְהֵבָה + כַּלְהֵבָה BCD 5 כַּלְהֵבָה] om. B 6 כֹּהֵל BCD:
כֹּהֵל P | כַּלְהֵבָה P: כַּלְהֵבָה CD: כַּלְהֵבָה B 7 כֹּהֵל BCD: כֹּהֵל P | כֹּהֵל BCD:
P | כַּלְהֵבָה] om. P 8 כַּלְהֵבָה BCD: כַּלְהֵבָה P | כֹּהֵל BCD: כֹּהֵל P | כֹּהֵל BCD:
כֹּהֵל P | כַּלְהֵבָה] om. B 9 כַּלְהֵבָה BCD: כַּלְהֵבָה P 10 כֹּהֵל BCD: כֹּהֵל P
12 כֹּהֵל BCD: כֹּהֵל P 13 כַּלְהֵבָה BCD: כַּלְהֵבָה P 21 כֹּהֵל BCD:
כֹּהֵל P

treatise, I have started to write about this issue a little bit above, so that it might be explained and revealed to the readers.

[The goal of logic]

51 Now, one should know that the goal of the whole logical craft is to produce true demonstrations by means of correctly aggregated statements⁷⁵ about each thing that is in the world. But since, as we have said, philosophy is divided into two parts, i.e. into theory and practice, we ought to know that the completion of practice is choosing what is good, while the completion of theory is the true comprehension and knowledge of all existing things. Thus, because a certain contrariety is associated with each of them, i.e. with the completion of both practice and of theory, we require logic as an intermediary in order to distinguish the true completion of each part of philosophy from what is contrary to it⁷⁶.

52 For if, as we have said, the completion of practice is choosing the good, it is obvious that what is opposite to good is bad. So, we need logic in this practical part in order to distinguish good from bad, so that while seeking the good we might not choose the bad and abandon the good because of our ignorance. It is clear, namely, that no one would by his own will prefer to turn to the bad and abandon the good. But it is what this craft demonstrates to be good that is truly good, and it is also what it demonstrates to be bad that is necessarily bad. Hence logic appears for us in this practical part as an instrument by means of which we distinguish between natural good and the bad that is truly bad⁷⁷.

75 I.e. syllogisms. Syr. *mamlla mqaṭṭra* literally renders the Gr. συλλογισμός as “aggregation of statements”, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.10–12: τὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὄνομα οὐχ ἀπλοῦν τι δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ σύνθετον (συλλογὴν γάρ τινα λόγων σημαίνει).

76 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.29–5.3: θεωρητικὰ μὲν ὅσα περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἔχει τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς, πρακτικὰ δὲ ὅσα περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν ὑποδύεται τινα ὡς ἀληθῆ μὲν δοκοῦντα μὴ ὄντα δὲ ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν ὁμοίως τινὰ τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κεχρωσμένα ὀνόματι μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθὰ, δεῖ ἡμῖν ὄργανον τινὸς τοῦ διακρίνοντος τὰ τοιαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.23–30.

77 Sergius’ text is very close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.10–18: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ θεωρητικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικὸν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν θεωρητικοῦ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ γνώσεως τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεύξις, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ παρουφισαται τὰ ἐναντία, τῆ μὲν ἀληθεία τὸ ψεῦδος τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, ἢ δὲ ἡμετέρα ψυχῇ ἄτε δι’ ἀτελῆς οὕσα αἰρεῖται πολλακίς ἀντὶ μὲν ἀληθείας τὸ ψεῦδος οἰομένη αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν οἰομένη αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐδέησε τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὄργανον τινὸς διακρίνοντος τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 10.15–22; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.19–25).

- 53 Concerning the other part too, i.e. theory, since theory is the true knowledge of all existing things, it is necessary to know that it has a contrary too, namely ignorance. That is why also here we are in great need of the logical craft that serves for us as a precise rule (κανών) by means of which we separate truth from falsehood⁷⁸. For it is what has been demonstrated by means of logic to be true that we may accept with sound confidence as knowledge of things. And also it is what has been revealed by means of demonstrations to be false that we may cast out from our memory of what is true. So, in this rational part there is logic too which always keeps us from taking falsehood as truth and from considering truth to be falsehood.
- 54 It is clear, therefore, that without logic nothing that we judge humanly may either be properly distinguished or comprehended. For unless a person speaks through the divine spirit, his teaching requires logical demonstrations to make listeners believe it⁷⁹. And since, as has been shown, logic is an instrument which in theory clearly separates truth from falsehood, while in practice differentiates good from bad, this Philosopher wished before his other writings about all this — i.e. about all the practice and about the theory of natures, mathematical sciences, and all spiritual beings — to produce this logical craft that would serve as an instrument to each one of them⁸⁰.
- 55 Now, because logic is a proper demonstration, while the proper demonstration results from syllogisms that are correctly formed, but what precedes syllogisms is another kind of composition, i.e. by two or three words⁸¹, and what in turn precedes it are simple words, because of this Aristotle began in his writ-

⁷⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 10.21–22: ὡςπερ γνώμονί τινι καὶ κανόνι χρώμενοι τὰ μὴ ἐφαρμόζοντα ἀπωθῶνται· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

⁷⁹ Sergius stresses this point again in §450, at the very end of his commentary, where he points out that logic is unnecessary only for those people who “through the exercise in righteousness would gain divine power”, but is consequently of paramount value for everyone else.

⁸⁰ Thus Sergius makes the point that logical treatises form the beginning of the study of philosophy, which is one of the introductory questions discussed in the *prolegomena* texts, cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.29–9.13 and 9.31–10.2.

⁸¹ I.e. premises (Gr. ἀι προτάσεις), cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 11.1–3: ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς, ὡς ἤδη εἴρηται, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ συλλογὴ ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ συντίθεται ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων, αἵπερ εἰσὶ προτάσεις. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.31–11.1.

ings on the logical craft with a teaching on these simple words. After that he taught about their first and simple composition⁸², and after that he consequently taught about syllogistic from which demonstrations result. So, further after that he provided the teaching on demonstrations, and further after that on those things that are in every way useful for the constitution of demonstrations⁸³. He did that not spontaneously or by chance but with skill and knowledge, and this will become quite obvious for you from what follows.

56 In any kind of craft the end of theory is the beginning of practice, and also the end of practice results in the beginning of theory⁸⁴. What I mean is this. If an architect is ordered to build a house, he will reflect about it in his mind by saying: “I was ordered to construct a roof that will serve for protection against wind, rain and any other kind of damage. But I will not be able to construct the roof unless I first establish bearing walls for it. And I will not be able to build the latter unless I first lay and make firm the foundation.” And thus he will first make the foundation, then build the walls, and then finally will put the roof above them which will be the end of the building. In this case the beginning of theory, i.e. of his reflection in mind, started from the roof and ended with the foundation, while the practice, which is the work of his hands, began from the foundation and resulted in the roof. Thus, as we have said a little earlier, the beginning of theory became the end of practice and the beginning of practice became the end of theory⁸⁵.

⁸² Sergius’ emphasis on premises being “first and simple composition” of words finds parallel in Ammonius’ commentary on Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* where he states that this treatise discusses “the first composition of simple words” (περί τῆς πρώτης συνθέσεως τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν). Further, Ammonius explains that he calls it “first”, since syllogisms should be considered as compositions of another kind, namely as “aggregation of statements” (οὐ μέντοι ἢ πρώτη, ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνθεσιν γεγονότων λόγων ἀποτελουμένη). See Ammonius, *In De Int.* 4.5–10.

⁸³ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 11.1–8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.24–11.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.33–15.4; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.11–28.

⁸⁴ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.5–6: καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως γίνεται, ἔμπαιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

⁸⁵ The same analogy is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.5–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.5–22. Cf. also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 2.10–15.

- 57 So that was the way in which Aristotle approached the logical craft. For first he reflected in his mind: “I wish to create an instrument for distinction that in practice will separate for me good from evil and in the knowledge of things will differentiate for me truth from falsehood. But since this instrument is a craft that brings forth all demonstrations constituted by means of words, it is evident that it is this demonstrative craft that I should create first. But because this demonstrative craft derives from syllogistic which is skilfully applied, I shall first teach about this. But since, further, it is from primary combination of words that syllogistic derives⁸⁶, I must first write about it. But since this is in turn preceded by simple words, it is necessary for me to teach about them first.”⁸⁷
- 58 So, in his reflection he started from the demonstrative craft and gradually descended to simple words. That is why he made simple words the beginning of the teaching about all these things⁸⁸. After them he taught about the first composition of words. Further after that, he wrote about syllogisms which should be formed correctly and properly. And thus he taught about the craft of demonstrations, and after it about all those things that are in every way useful for it⁸⁹. And he put the end of his practice with those things at the beginning of theory about them, just as he put the end of the theory of them at the beginning of the writings about them.
- 59 So, the book which he wrote about simple words is called *Q̄t̄gwrȳs* (Κατηγορίαι, “Categories”). The one which is about their first composition has the title *P̄rȳr̄mnys* (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, “On Interpretation”). The one which is about

⁸⁶ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.21–22: λόγοι μὲν γάρ τινές εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις, τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογὴ ἔστιν ὁ συλλογισμὸς.

⁸⁷ Sergius’ account is very similar to what one finds in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.16–28.

⁸⁸ Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 15.12–13: προηγείται οὖν ἡ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν θεωρία, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρκτέον τῷ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν δημιουργοῦντι.

⁸⁹ The expression “things that are in every way useful” (for demonstrations) refers to the last part of the *Organon*, cf. §28 above.

sylogisms is called *ἠλωτική* (Ἀναλυτικά, “Analytics”), prior and posterior. The one which is about the craft of demonstrations is designated as *ῥωδύκτης* (Ἀποδεικτικά, “Apodeictics”)⁹⁰. The one which comes together with the latter is called *Ἱωπηγία* (Τοπικά, “Topics”). And the one which is about the refutation of the sophists (σοφισταί) has the title *Σωπστηγῶ Ἰνκῶ* (Σοφιστικοὶ Ἐλεγχοί, “Sophistical Refutations”). With it, thus, the Philosopher completed the whole logical craft which is, as we have said, an instrument of philosophy and not its part⁹¹. Some people say, though, that the *Craft of Rhetoric* (ῥητορική) written by him also belongs to logic⁹².

60 But let us now turn to the subject matter and start speaking according to our ability about the goal of each one of these writings. Accordingly, we will start with the *Categories* which is about simple words and then approach each one of them in turn in the same manner. And afterwards, we will proceed to his other writings which pertain to the parts of practice, as well as to all natural and mathematical sciences, and other things that are called divine. In this way, we hope that we have brought out the goal of this treatise (i.e. the *Categories*), for this is what we intend to do when we speak briefly, as far as we are able, about all these matters, in accordance with our promise above.

[Obscurity of Aristotle's language]

61 After this, we shall additionally discuss the reason why the Philosopher employs obscure language in the greater part of his writings⁹³. Some people state, namely, that this is the sort of language that he has and that his whole

90 Thus Sergius refers twice to the same treatise, first calling it *Posterior Analytics* and then the *Apodeictics*.

91 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.28–33: πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ περὶ προτάσεων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἔρμηνείας, εἶτα περὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς Προτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς, εἶθ' οὕτως περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς· ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

92 Here Sergius shows his familiarity with the idea of the so called expanded *Organon*, which would also include the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*. The notion of the expanded *Organon* is characteristic of later Arabic scholars (e.g., of the writings of al-Farabi).

93 This is one of the preliminary points (*prolegomena*) which the commentators that followed Ammonius' exegesis discussed before turning to the text of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 7.7–14 (no. 8); Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.17–28 (no. 7); Simplicius, *In Cat.* 6.30–7.22 (no.7); Elias, *In Cat.* 124.25–127.2 (no. 9); Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.21–29 (no. 9).

disposition and his teaching has this kind of obscurity, so that even if he wanted he would not have been able to apply simple language in his writings. But they are clearly wrong because they do not comprehend the mentality of the Philosopher. For if the latter were like what they say then there would not even be a reason to make this inquiry. Indeed, if it were not deliberately that he employed this kind of obscurity but because that was his disposition, then it is obvious that there is no particular reason he chose this kind of path⁹⁴.

62 We say instead that if it were like that, he would be seen to employ the same obscurity everywhere. But because we see that some of his writings — e.g., all his letters and the treatise that he composed about all phenomena appearing in the air⁹⁵ — are written in simple language which is not far from what I am using here, it is obvious that it was not that his disposition was like this, but that he deliberately made use of obscure language on some occasions. For it is clear to everyone that, if his disposition were like that and the reason for obscure language were not his will, then he would have equally applied it everywhere. But from the fact that sometimes he speaks obscurely and sometimes he teaches plainly we understand that he deliberately employed obscurity. That is why it is necessary for us to seek for the reason he embarked on the path of obscurity of language.

63 Now, they say that, just as those who are initiated in certain mysteries do not reveal them in front of everyone but perform them secretly in inner chambers in order to make them known only for those who are partakers of mysteries, so also he covered his whole teaching of logic and natures with obscurity

94 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.21–22; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 7.10–22; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.22–24.

95 I.e. the *Meteorology*. Philoponus and Olympiodorus point to the *Meteorology* and the *Topics* as examples of Aristotle's clear style. Elias mentions the *Sophistical Refutations*. Simplicius refers to the *Constitutions* and the *Letters*.

of words in order to make it known not for common and frivolous people, but for those whose mind is worthy of this kind of teaching and who strive with all their strength for the good⁹⁶. Also, since he knew that those people whose mind is unstable, whose will is driven towards laziness, and whose inclination is towards bodily pleasures more than anything else, as soon as they see this kind of obscurity they will immediately shy away and cease their study of these matters. Conversely, when those who have a disposition for knowledge and are prepared for the study of existing things encounter obscurity, not only will they not shy away and cease, but will all the more strengthen their minds and apply themselves to great labour in order to enter the knowledge of those things which are spoken about⁹⁷.

64 That is why he veiled his doctrine in the obscurity of words, (namely) in order to examine the nature of the disciples right at the beginning of their learning, i.e. whether they are dedicated to knowledge and worthy of discipleship or not. Having done that, he immediately made known the true disciples as distinct from those who were not worthy of discipleship⁹⁸. So, this was the reason for his use of obscure language.

[*The goal of the Categories: Various interpretations*]⁹⁹

65 Those who interpreted the treatise *Categories*, which is the first in the whole logical craft, did not agree on its goal, but each one of them chose for himself a particular reason among those things which are discussed in this treatise and thus believed that he was better at discovering the goal of this

96 Ammonius (*In Cat.* 7.8–10) compares Aristotle's obscurity to a curtain in a temple which prevents persons who are uninitiated in the mysteries from entering it. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.26–28.

97 Here, Sergius reproduces Ammonius' argument, see his *In Cat.* 7.10–14, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.22–26 and Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.26–30.

98 The next preliminary question discussed by Philoponus and Simplicius (their order of the questions differ here from Ammonius and Olympiodorus, who discuss this point a little earlier) is what kind of person a student of Aristotle's writings should be. Ammonius answers it by saying that he should be educated and purified in soul (πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἦθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαμένον, see *In Cat.* 6.22–23), quoting later on *Phaedo* 67B where Plato points out that the pure should be separated from the impure. Sergius integrates this point into his discussion of Aristotle's obscurity of style. It is worth noting that Sergius quotes the same passage from *Phaedo* on another occasion, namely in his introduction to Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *On Nutriment*, see Bos & Langermann 2009.

99 Mss. BCD include the subtitle: "On the goal of the treatise *Categories*". The question of the goal of Aristotle's treatise opened the list of the preliminaries related not to all of his philosophy (as was the case with the previous points) but to the *Categories* specifically. Cf. Olympiodorus' list in *Prolegomena* 18.18–21.

book than his colleagues. It is about these things that I am going to speak from now on¹⁰⁰.

66 What is simple is three in number, and knowledge about them shall come before everything else. These are simple things that are in the world, simple concepts which we acquire about them, and also simple words by means of which we signify them¹⁰¹. What I mean is this. Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, or any other human being is said to be a simple thing, and likewise a stone, a piece of wood, and other objects. Subsequently, simple concepts of them are thoughts about each one of them that appear in us. And further, simple words that signify each one of them are names and designations which are imposed on them and by which they are known¹⁰².

67 So, things by their nature and concepts which we acquire about them exist naturally in the world, and therefore are the same everywhere. However, names and designations that signify these things do not exist naturally, but are established by communities of people who are gathered together; and because of that they are not the same in all nations¹⁰³. Thus, stone, man, life, plant and any other thing, and also the ideas of each one of them that we acquire, are the same in all places and in all nations. But the names that signify them are not the same in every place. For things are called in one way by the Greeks, in other

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 8.20–9.1; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.23–27; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 9.5–7; Elias, *In Cat.* 129.7–9; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.21–25.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.25: τριττὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἢ πράγματα ἢ νοήματα ἢ φωναί.

¹⁰² On the imposition of names, cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 57.20–59.2.

¹⁰³ Cf. Simplicius' note that Aristotle rejected the notion that names are established naturally (κατὰ φύσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπογινώσκει) in *In Cat.* 13.26.

way by the Persians, still in other way by the Indians, and still in other way by the Scythians, i.e., generally speaking, by each one of the nations. So names differ from each other, and you will not find a single name among two nations that signifies one and the same thing.

68 Now, some of those who have sought to reach understanding of the treatise *Categories* considered that it is to the simple things which we say to exist naturally that the goal of the treatise pertains, others stated that it is about simple concepts that the Philosopher had written this treatise, while still others that it is about simple words which, as we said, are signifiers of things¹⁰⁴.

69 But those who stated that those were simple things that Aristotle intended to teach about in this treatise led themselves astray by the passage that appears close to the beginning of the book, in which he wrote: “Of things some exist universally and some particularly; and further some have subsistence in themselves and some come to be through these ones.”¹⁰⁵ So they say: “Behold, it is the division of things that the Philosopher makes at the beginning of the book! Hence it is evident that in this book he teaches about simple things.”¹⁰⁶

70 Also those who assume that the teaching of the *Categories* is only about simple words derive this kind of assumption from another passage that is found at the beginning of the treatise. So, they say: “Behold, right at the beginning of the book he made a division of words when he said: ‘Of all things that are said, some are said in combination and some without combination.’”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.27–29: τινές οὖν περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν διηνέχθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασι περὶ φωνῶν μόνων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων.

¹⁰⁵ Sergius’ words are a sort of a summary of *Cat.* 1a20–1b9 formulated in accordance with his interpretation of this passage at the beginning of Book III of his *Commentary*.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.5–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.33–9.4. In contrast to Ammonius and Philoponus who first speak about simple words and after that about simple things, Sergius reverts this order.

¹⁰⁷ *Cat.* 1a16–17: τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς.

Consequently, because ‘things that are said’ are nothing else than words and because it is this division with which he begins, it is evident that he is teaching about simple words.”¹⁰⁸

- 71 Now, those who state that the goal of the treatise *Categories* concerns only simple concepts which we acquire about things receive a reason for what they want to say from various arguments¹⁰⁹. There is no other way to speak about them than to interrupt our narrative here and to discuss those issues which we have mentioned just above.

*[Genera, species, and Platonic forms]*¹¹⁰

- 72 Philosophers do not agree with each other in their research about genera (γένη) and species (εἶδη), but in their teachings on these issues they have introduced a number of different concepts¹¹¹. Now, Plato and all those from the Academy hold the following view on genera and species (εἶδη). They state that each thing that exists naturally in the world has a certain form (εἶδος) by itself, but it also possesses a form with its Creator¹¹² which gives subsistence to its essence and according to which it is imprinted and comes into being in the world. Additionally, when someone sees it, then he also receives its form in his memory, and it has subsistence in his mind. Thus, the same form appears in three ways, i.e. with the Creator, in the thing, and in the memory of the person who knows it¹¹³.
- 73 For example, they say that a carpenter or any other kind of craftsman first imprints inside his mind the forms (εἶδη) and shapes (σχήματα) of those things that are produced by him and then carves and furnishes them. And when someone else comes thereafter and sees his works, then he will bring them into his memory and capture and preserve them inside his mind. It will thus

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.29–33.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. the reference to *Cat.* 11b15 by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.8. Sergius discusses this point of view below, in §80.

¹¹⁰ This excursus by Sergius has a parallel in that section of Ammonius’ commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* which refers to *Isag.* 1.9–12. In the latter passage, Porphyry addresses the question of whether genera and species exist in reality or in bare thought. In answering this question, Ammonius turns to the Platonic teaching of Ideas, or Concepts, that are contained in the Intellect of the Demiurge, which Sergius associates with one of the interpretations of the *Categories*, namely the one that states that the scope of this treatise pertains to concepts alone.

¹¹¹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.24–26, who specifies that the disagreement is found between Plato and Aristotle.

¹¹² Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–6: δῆλον, ὡς ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ εἶδη. See also 41.20–21: ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς πάντα ἔχει παρ’ ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα.

¹¹³ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–13.

happen that they subsist in three ways, i.e. in the mind of the craftsman, in his works, and in the memory of another person who sees them.

74 In the same way, also the Creator of the universe (first) has essentially thought about the natural constitution of things¹¹⁴. When these thoughts emanated from the essence, they immediately became substances, and with them he imprinted, engraved, and established all things here. It is also through these primary thoughts that he is still constantly forming and constituting everything, applying his craft of creation. And we, humans, who come into being for a particular time, observe natural things, seek the knowledge of them, and retain concepts of them in our memory.

75 Now, they suppose that these thoughts which are considered to be substantially with the Creator are the primary genera and forms (εἶδη) of things. And those imprintings and engravings that are generated from them here in the matter of natures they designate as natural genera and species of things. And further, those concepts of things that are collected in our memory as knowledge of them they call posterior genera and species of things¹¹⁵.

76 In order to further explain this subject matter more clearly, I will immediately provide another example which they introduce. For instance, let there be a ring, they say, with an engraved image (εἰκὼν) of a particular person. Then someone takes a large amount of ordinary wax (κηρός) and make with that ring multiple imprints on all that wax. After that, also another person who has not seen the ring will come and see the imprints on the wax, put together the images of all of them, and save them in his memory. So, it is obvious that in this case the image will exist in three ways, namely first on the ring, after that on the wax, and then finally in the memory of the person who came and saw the

114 Thus, the Platonic Forms are associated by Sergius with the Demiurge's thoughts, the notion which apparently belonged to Ammonius, and later on (see §75) he also identifies the thoughts of Demiurge with the primary genera and species, or forms, of the existing things. This identification allows Sergius to further explicate the system of genera and species in the ontological terms, cf. his further excurses in ontology and logic in §§129–133 and 241–242.

115 Ammonius speaks in his commentary on the *Isagoge* of the forms that are in the Demiurge and that are “prior to the many” (πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν), forms that are “in the many” (ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς), and those which are imprinted in our thought and are “after the many and last-generated” (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ὑστερογενές), see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.6–13 (cf. Elias, *In Isag.* 48.15–30). Philoponus discusses this issue in the context of primary and secondary substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.13–21.

wax. While the image on the ring is one both in its form (εἶδος) and in number, what derives from it on the wax are multiple images that differ from each other, not in form but in number. And further, in the mind of the person who finally saw them on the wax it will again be united and become one image that is derived from many¹¹⁶.

77 Thus, also the genera and species (εἶδη) of things exist with the Creator of beings, like the image on the ring. They are imprinted and established in the natures of things through (his) activity¹¹⁷, like the images on the wax. And then we come to the knowledge of natures and collect inside our intellect genera and species (εἶδη) of each thing among natural beings. Just as the image on the ring is singular, so also all the forms (εἶδη) of things with the Creator are simple. And also, just as the singularity of the image which is on the ring is divided into multiplicity on the wax, so also each one of the simple forms (εἶδη) which are with the Creator is divided in the matter of natures into countless individual items¹¹⁸ which differ from one another not in form — for the form of all of them is one — but in number through which they are divided from one another in their unity. And inside our intellect, from multiple individual beings which are divided from one another only in number the species (εἶδη) of things are again summoned, and they appear as singulars which are acquired from the multitude.

78 So this is how all followers of Plato's ideas teach about these things. But Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, to whom also Alexander of Aphrodisias be-

116 The same example is used by Ammonius, see *In Isag.* 41.13–20.

117 Ms. P: “creation”. A marginal commentary in mss. BD: “matter”.

118 Syr. *qnome*, “individuals, persons”.

longs, do not acknowledge at all those primary forms (εἶδη) which are with the Creator. However, they completely accept those ones which are in matter and in our intellect, and it is about them that their whole teaching is. They name those (forms) which are in matter natural, and those ones which are in our intellect they call noetic and posterior. Thus, in all their writings about natures they teach about natural forms (εἶδη) because they are the nature and the subsistence of things. On the other hand, in those writings which they have composed on the whole craft of logic, they introduce those genera and species (εἶδη) which, as we have said, are called noetic and posterior, because they have subsistence only in intellect and in speech.

79 Therefore, in the teaching on the whole logical craft you ought to investigate those species (εἶδη) and genera whose subsistence is only in intellect, as we have said. These are the subject of all the books on logic, and it is about their divisions that I will speak shortly afterwards.

[The goal of the Categories: Conclusion]

80 But now we shall return to what we began to speak about. We began to say, namely, that some people consider the goal of the treatise *Categories* to pertain only to simple concepts. And when they intend to bring forth a proof for that, they do it in the following way. They state that, if it is the ten genera which comprise everything that exists in the world and which are also called “categories” that (the author) intended to speak about in this treatise, then, since the genera that are considered in the logical craft are those concepts which are

collected from things in the memory, it is evident that the goal of the whole treatise concerns simple concepts¹¹⁹.

81 However, those who correctly comprehended the goal of this treatise, among whom was also Iamblichus, stated that it was neither simple things only, nor simple words only, nor simple concepts only that the goal of this treatise concerned, but all of them together, i.e. it concerns simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts¹²⁰. So much for the goal of this treatise.

82 Now, since the teaching here is about simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts, does this mean that the Philosopher introduced at this point an endless number of words, things, or concepts? For, behold, there is such a number of them as would be impossible to encompass! However, this is not what the knowledge of philosophers aims at, because they always establish general rules (κανόνες) in order to encompass multiple things for the sake of proper understanding of their activities. Therefore, in his teaching on these things Aristotle too fled from the unlimited number of words, and elevated his teaching to their primary genera that he took as general rules by which he would be able to skilfully and intelligently accomplish his teaching¹²¹.

83 At this point, we will conclude what just above was intended to explain briefly for the reader what the general content of this book is.

119 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 9.4–8: οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων νομίσαντες διαλέγεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, οἷος ἐγένετο ὁ Πορφύριος, φασὶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος· ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς θεωροῦνται καὶ εἰσὶν ὑστερογενῆ, ἅτινά ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα ἐν τούτοις τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ὁ λόγος (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.7–11). Here, Philoponus applies the same terms which Ammonius used in his commentary on the *Isagoge* when speaking of the third kind of forms according to the Platonists, see §75.

120 Sergius' text corresponds nearly verbatim to Philoponus, *In Cat.* 9.12–15: οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.17–18; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 19.35–20.12.

121 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 12.1–4. Ammonius discusses this subject at length in the *prolegomena* part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 17.1–20.15.

[Kinds of speech]¹²²

- 84 There are four kinds (εἶδη) of speech¹²³: the imperative, e.g. when a man says authoritatively to someone who is subordinate to him: “Go, perform such-and-such action!”; the optative, when a man comes with a supplication and begs for something in a prayer; the interrogative, e.g. when someone asks another person: “Where do you come from and where are you going to?”; and the fourth and last type is the declaratory, e.g. when someone says: “Every human being that is alive has breath,” or “Every rational soul is immortal.”¹²⁴
- 85 Now, philosophers do not inquire into the first three types of speech, because they never express truth or falsehood. A discussion of them belongs to grammar. But it is the fourth and last one where truth and falsehood are involved with which they take all the pains. That truth and falsehood are distinguished only in it, this matter of fact proves to be obvious¹²⁵.
- 86 Indeed, neither the person who utters an imperative, nor the person who is praying, nor, further, the person who is asking, no one among them will be right or wrong. But the one who declares will necessarily say either truth or falsehood. For when he says, “Socrates is walking”, then it is clear that, if he declares this while (Socrates) is walking, he is true, but if (while Socrates) is not walking then he is false. Also, if, when one declares about him that he is not walking, (Socrates) is walking, he would speak falsely, and if (Socrates) is not walking, he will speak truly¹²⁶.
- 87 Now, this type of speech which expresses truth and falsehood is constructed in its primary composition from two utterances¹²⁷, namely from the subject

122 Mss. BCD have the subtitle, “On the kinds of speech, i.e. how many and what they are”.

123 Ammonius writes about “parts of speech” (μέρη τοῦ λόγου) in his commentary on the *Isagoge* right after his account of the Platonic Forms, and this was probably the reason for Sergius to deal with this topic in the same context. Ammonius mentions five “parts” which correspond to the list found by Sergius but adding also the vocative: τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλά εἰσι μέρη, ἀποφαντικὸν εὐκτικὸν κλητικὸν προστακτικὸν πνευματικὸν (*In Isag.* 43.4–5). Ammonius discusses this topic also in the introductory part of his commentary on Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* (*In De Int.* 2.9–25), where he calls them, similarly to Sergius, “kinds of speech” (εἶδη τοῦ λόγου) and gives concrete examples of each one of them.

124 Cf. the examples (deriving mostly from Homer) by Ammonius in *In De Int.* 2.10–20. The last example by Ammonius corresponds to that of Sergius.

125 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.6–12.

126 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.12–17.

127 Syr. *bat qale*, “utterances, words”, corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

that should be signified and from what signifies it¹²⁸. What I mean is this. When someone says, “Socrates is walking”, he makes a statement which is composed of two utterances, the name “Socrates” and the (phrase) “is walking”. While “Socrates” is the subject that is characterized, the words “is walking” are pronounced in order to signify what he is doing. Thus, the utterances which are subjects of these compositions are always signified by something, while other ones which are predicated of them in these compositions signify a particular time and some activity¹²⁹.

- 88 In the composition which I am here speaking about, “Socrates is walking”, the name “Socrates” signifies a certain person, while the (phrase) “is walking” informs us about his activity, i.e. what he is doing, and also about the time it takes place. For if you say, “Socrates is walking”, you signify the present time. But if you say, “Socrates walked”, you express the past time. And further, if you say, “Socrates will walk”, you point to the future time.

[The ten primary genera]¹³⁰

- 89 We ought to know that in these compositions species (εἶδη) are always subjects that are defined and genera are predicated of them¹³¹. What I mean is this. Universal human being, i.e. humanity, and also universal horse, universal dog, and other things like that are species of animal, and animal is their genus. For, as we have said above, we observe each one of them and combine them in our mind into one genus that is imprinted in all of them¹³².

128 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.17–20: περιέχει δὲ οὗτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύο τινά, τὸ τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἵνα δὲ σαφῆς γένηται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἴπωμεν οὕτως· δεῖ εἶδέναι ὅτι ὑποκείμενον λέγεται περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατηγορούμενον δὲ τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενον. Instead of using a Syriac equivalent for “predicate” (τό κατηγορούμενον), Sergius prefers to speak here of what signifies and what is signified, probably having the Gr. terms τι σημαίνει and τὸ σημαίνόμενον in mind. In accord with this, Sergius speaks in §88 of grammatical tenses of the verbs. However, he switches again to the logical terminology in §89.

129 The same examples appear in Ammonius, *In De Int.* 2.7–11.

130 Mss. BCD have the subtitle, “On the difference between genera and species”. The following section has a parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 13.12–19, where another introductory point is discussed, namely the reason for the title of Aristotle’s treatise (cf. further Philoponus, *In Cat.* 12.17–27 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 15.26–18.6). Sergius’ account, however, derives primarily from Ammonius’ description of the “ascent to the universal” (ἡ εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομή) and the ten primary genera in *In Isag.* 17.1–20.14. The accounts of both Sergius and Ammonius are based on the so-called “Tree of Porphyry” as described in the *Isagoge* 4.1–8.6. Sergius turns again to this subject matter in §§165–172, speaking of universal and particular.

131 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 13.12–15: λέγομεν τοῖνον ὅτι πρόκειται αὐτῷ διδάξαι περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἶδη τοῖς αὐτῶν γένεσιν ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ γένη κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν ἑαυτῶν.

132 On the three types of the universals, see §§78 and 80, above. Here Sergius speaks of only the third type, i.e. universals abstracted in human mind “after the many” (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς).

90 Further, regarding each one of these species, we observe particulars belonging to certain species and combine them in our memory into their species. What I mean is the following. When we observe this man, and that one, and the rest of them who are numerically distinguished from one another, we combine them in our memory into universal man, which is the nature of humanity, and we establish it as a species of all men. Similarly, also, when we observe all horses, dogs, and bulls, which are numerically distinguished from one another, we in the same way combine them in our intellect into universal horse and universal dog and subsume them under their species. And since such species are numerous and even countless, we further combine them into what someone might call one nature that contains them all, and this is what we call their genus.

91 Thus, animal is the genus for all these species. And this genus is in turn a species of animate body. For there is another genus of plants which comprises many species and which is also a species of animate body. And further, this animate body is a species of substance (οὐσία). For there is inanimate body which is a genus of all bodies that are inanimate and a species of substance.

92 So, substance is a genus which has no other (genus) that is prior to it. Below it, there are other genera, i.e. animate and inanimate body. And also, below the animate one there is a genus of animal. Below animal, then, there are species that are not further divided into genera, but into individual beings which differ from one another only numerically.

- 93 A species that has nothing below itself is therefore also called the most specific species¹³³, e.g. universal horse and universal dog. Their genus is animal, and animal is also the genus of horse, dog, and everything else like these, as we have said. It is a species of animate body, while animate body is in turn a genus of animal and a species of substance.
- 94 So, substance is always a genus, because there is no other genus above it, and hence it is called the most generic genus¹³⁴. Universal horse, on the other hand, is always a species, because there is no other species beyond it. And those between them, i.e. animal and animate body, are species and genera at the same time. But while they are species of those that are before them, they are genera for those that are after them¹³⁵.
- 95 Now, the Philosopher considered the genus of substance to be prior and superior, comprising multiple species and genera, and thus he put it in the first place in the treatise *Categories*. It is a simple word¹³⁶ that signifies countless simple things through mediating simple concepts of each one of them. When (people) define this word, they say the following: Substance is every thing that has subsistence in itself and has no need for something else through which it would come to be, for example, a man, a stone, a piece of wood, and all other things that have subsistence by themselves¹³⁷.
- 96 This may be better understood from the contraries: there are things in the world which cannot come into being by themselves but require something else through which their nature would subsist. These are, e.g., whiteness and black-

133 Lit. “species of species”. Sergius thus renders the Gr. ειδικώτατος.

134 Lit. “genus of genera”, cf. Gr. γενικώτατος.

135 Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.14–20.

136 Syr. *bat qala* “utterance, speech”, corresponds to Gr. φωνή.

137 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.9–10: ὅσα οὖν ἐστὶν αὐτὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενα καὶ μὴ δεόμενα πρὸς τὸ ὑποστῆναι ἄλλου τινός, οὐσίαι λέγονται.

ness, sweetness and bitterness, and all other figures (σχήματα), qualities, and colours. They cannot come to be just by themselves, but their subsistence is in something else. For whiteness exists in snow, or in milk, or in white lead, or in anything else like that¹³⁸. Likewise, also blackness exists in wool or in leather¹³⁹, sweetness exists in a fig or in honey, and bitterness exists in aloe or in wormwood (ἀψίνθιον). And in the same way, all colours, shapes, and other qualities have subsistence in other things, and their nature cannot subsist only by itself.

97 Thus, such things that have subsistence by themselves and do not require something else through which to subsist — whether they are corporeal or incorporeal — pertain to substance and are called substances. On the other hand, those things that cannot subsist by themselves apart from being in something else, as we have said, differ from substance, and the Philosopher discovered also their genera and species, placed them in the teaching and wrote generally about them too.

98 For he observed and saw that there is something in the world whose subsistence is in substance and which is spoken of by means of measures and numbers. For instance we are accustomed to speak of two cubits or three cubits, and also of one or two palms, of a period of ten months, or ten years, or of any other length. Such words he subsumed under one genus which comprises all of them in common and which he called quantity. For all

138 Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.3–9: μάθοιμεν δ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐστὶ τινὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃ μὴ δύναται αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἃ καὶ συμβεβηκότα καλεῖται, λευκότης μελανία γλυκύτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἢ λευκότης ἢ ἐν ψιμμουθίῳ ἢ ἐν γάλακτι σώμασιν οὔσιν ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

139 Mss. B and D add in the margins: “In a raven or in a Cushite (i.e. an Ethiopian)”.

measures, numbers, and calculations of times and years designate a certain quantity¹⁴⁰.

99 Thus he discovered two universal genera which encompass multiple things, i.e. substance and quantity. But beyond them, he also saw other words that do not pertain to these two genera. For instance, we have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. They neither pertain to substance nor signify any quantity, because they subsist not by themselves but only in other natures, and they also do not possess any dimension of quantity. All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus¹⁴¹ which he called *pw'tws* (ποιότης, “quality”)¹⁴². As for us, we call it sometimes *hayla* (“capacity”) and sometimes *muzzaga* (“mixture”), since up to this time we haven’t found among Syriac names one which would suit it perfectly¹⁴³.

100 There are also other words which do not fall under one of those three genera that have been discussed. They have a certain relation to one another¹⁴⁴, so that one of them may not be considered without the other. It is in the way of their existence that we call them, e.g. father and son, servant and master, double and half. For neither may a son be considered without a father, nor a servant without a master, nor a half without a double. But also, one may not say that a father, or a master, or a double exists without a son, a servant, or a half. It is all such things that the Philosopher further subsumed under one of the universal genera that he called *prostī* (πρός τι) which means “to something”¹⁴⁵. Because, as we have said, when any of these things is spoken of, it receives its

140 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.13–18.

141 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.18–25. Ammonius speaks here of τὸ ποιόν, “the qualified”. Sergius does not seem to make a clear distinction in his commentary between quality and things qualified (see particularly Book VI), although in some passages he speaks rather of the latter than of the former.

142 Ms. B adds in the margins the Syriac equivalent *zna*, “quality”.

143 Cf. §§354–355 and 365, below. In §355, Sergius writes that he considers the Syriac term *zna* as the most fitting equivalent to the Greek ποιότης, although the two other terms, *hayla* and *muzzaga*, also appear in his work (see, e.g., §108), thus corroborating Sergius’ statement that all three of them were used synonymously at his time. It is also worthy to note that in ms. E, which contains a selection of passages from Sergius’ *Commentary* dating from the 8th century, the term *muzzaga* appears as the only variant in the passage which corresponds to §99.

144 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29: σχέσις ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον.

145 Sergius consistently applies the expression *lwat meddem*, “(in relation) to something”, which renders the Greek πρὸς τι. Though it seems possible sometimes (e.g., here) to translate it literally, in what follows, I will use the terms “relation” and “relatives”.

אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם
וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם.

101 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

P27v וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

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102 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

C121r | B81r אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

10 וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

103 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

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104 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

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L8v | D69r 105 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם וְעַתָּה אֲנִי מִן הַיָּמִים הַהֵם

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2 ,אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCDP: ,אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ L | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCDL: P, + B sup. lin., + D in marg.; + tit. חָלַל
אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 5 ,אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 7 LP, Epit.: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 8 LP:
אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 10 BCD + tit. חָלַל אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 11 BCDP: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ L 12 BCDL: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ
P | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ om. B 14 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ om. P 15 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ B CDLP: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ B 16 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ + tit.
אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 19 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ om. BCDEP | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ + tit. אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD 20 BCDL: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ
P 21 CDELP: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ B | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCEL: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ D | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ om. P 22 אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ om. BCDEP
אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCDL: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ P | אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ L: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ P: אִם הָיָה אֵלֶּיךָ BCD, Epit.; + tit. חָלַל BCD

name from its relation to something, which (in turn) has its name¹⁴⁶ through its relation to it¹⁴⁷.

101 And further, there are other words that are not found under any of these genera, which signify place. For instance, when someone says, “Socrates is in the theatre (θέατρον)”, or “Plato is in the market”, and everything else like that. He also subsumed them under one universal genus which he called “where”, for each one of them appears as an answer to (the question) “where?”¹⁴⁸.

102 Now, these are five universal genera that encompass many of those things that exist in the world, i.e. substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, and where.

103 Further, there are other words that do not pertain to the afore-mentioned five genera, which signify certain time. For instance, we are accustomed to say, “yesterday”, “today”, “ten years ago”, or “after so-and-so many years”. All of them he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called “when”¹⁴⁹. Because if someone is asked this (question), he gives one of the suitable answers which all pertain to the genus of “when”.

104 There are other words which signify something that a person possesses. E.g., we are accustomed to say, “he is dressed up”, “he has his shoes on”, or “he wears a ring”. All these too he subsumed under one universal genus which he called “having”¹⁵⁰.

105 And further, all other (words) that signify certain position — e.g., when we say, “standing”, “sitting”, or “lying” — he subsumed under one universal genus which he called “being-in-a-position”¹⁵¹.

146 In ms. P and in the marginal notes of mss. B and D: “its nature”. This variant, however, is most likely a scribal mistake.

147 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.28–29.

148 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29–20.2: πάλιν δὲ ἔστι τι τὸ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τόπου σημαντικόν. Ammonius, however, does not mention that the name of this category should be understood as an answer to a question.

149 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.2–4: πάλιν ἔστι τι χθὲς πέρυσιν αὔριον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποτέ, ὅπερ ἐστὶ χρόνου σημαντικόν. As in the previous case, Ammonius does not mention that Aristotle’s title for this category derives from an answer to a certain question.

150 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.6–7. Ammonius interprets this category as “placing of one substance around another” (ἔχειν γάρ ἐστιν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις). Sergius omits this interpretation, just as he does in his account of having in §404.

151 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.4–6. Ammonius discusses it before having.

106 And further, all those words that signify some activity — e.g., when we say, “writing”, or “striking”, or “cooling”, or “heating” — he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called “acting”. For, as we said, it is some activity that each one of them signifies¹⁵².

107 And further, all the words which are opposite to them — e.g., when we say, “written”, or “struck”, or “cooled”, or “heated” — he also collected into one universal genus which he called “being-affected”¹⁵³.

108 So, these are the ten primary and principal genera that are also called the most generic genera. They comprise all things that came to be, are existing, and will appear, and it is not possible to find anything that will not fall under one of them. They are: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, and the last one of them is being-affected¹⁵⁴.

109 However, before we speak concisely about the division of each one of them according to Aristotle’s view, we shall discuss something that is very necessary, namely whether there is anything which turns out to pertain to two genera¹⁵⁵. Let speculation (θεωρία) concerning it not lead us astray into thinking that Aristotle subsumes one genus within another. For none of the words which remain one and the same may fall under two of the afore-mentioned genera, neither, obviously, under three or four, or anything like that.

110 So, even if it may seem to us that the size of one cubit, or two, or anything else which we determine in a piece of wood or in a stone which pertain to

152 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.7–9: πάλιν ἔστι τι τύπτειν θερμαίνειν ψύχειν· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποιεῖν· ποιεῖν δέ ἐστι τὸ δρᾶν περὶ τι.

153 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.9–10.

154 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.11–12: ἔσχον οὖν δέκα τοιαύτας κοινότητας· οὐσίαν ποσὸν ποιὸν πρὸς τι ποῦ ποτὲ κεῖσθαι ἔχειν ποιεῖν πάσχειν.

155 Sergius discusses this question in the context of the genus of relatives, see §§391–393, where his account is based on Aristotle’s text.

substance therefore also pertains to substance, this is not how we shall think, for the nature of a piece of wood, or a stone, or anything else like that pertains to substance; because they are wood and stone. That they are of two or three cubit, on the other hand, because of this they pertain to quantity.

111 Also, concerning sweetness or whiteness we may not conclude from the fact that they exist in honey or milk, since honey and milk pertain to substance, that they too pertain to substance. For honey or milk pertain to substance not because they are sweet or white but because they are certain bodies, while because they are sweet or white, they are considered to pertain to quality.

112 Therefore, if some entities appear to be subsumed under two genera, we should know that it is not in one and the same manner that they do this, but, as we have said, they appear in two genera in different ways. For if it were not comprehended like that, then also nine other genera would become idle, and only one genus would remain, namely substance, while all the others would come to be through it, since it alone has subsistence by itself and does not require anything else through what it would be generated, as we have said above.

[Homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, and polynoms]¹⁵⁶

113 Since Aristotle himself before teaching about the ten genera defined certain terms that appeared to him useful for the knowledge of these genera¹⁵⁷, 1a1–15 it is also proper for us, if we are eager to follow the order of his teaching, to discuss them according to our capacity, before the division of the genera. Hence here we also begin with it.

¹⁵⁶ The previous paragraph concludes the *prolegomena* part of Sergius' treatise. In what follows, Sergius provides a commentary on Aristotle's text, stating that he is "eager to follow the order of his teaching". Hence the passages from the *Categories* which Sergius apparently comments on are indicated in the outer margins of the text. However, in some cases these references have a conjectural character.

¹⁵⁷ Sergius thus refers to the *antepaedicamenta* section of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.4–5: τὰ δὲ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν συμβαλλόμενα ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰς τὴν τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν.

114 All things that fall under our knowledge become known sometimes through one simple name and sometimes through a certain account that defines them¹⁵⁸. And such a definitory account is sometimes derived from what a thing naturally is and sometimes from what is accidentally concomitant to it. What I mean is this. Naturally man is a certain being which we signify by means of a simple name when we call it “man”. But when we compose a statement in order to signify it and call it “rational, mortal animal”, we define it by means of a statement which derives from what it naturally is. If, instead, we compose a statement in order to signify it from what is accidentally concomitant to it, e.g. when we say that he is capable of speaking and is skilled in crafts, we determine it from what is accidentally concomitant to it. For we call accidental everything what a man acquires but may exist without it¹⁵⁹.

115 So, we say of a simple word which signifies a certain subject matter that it is its name. A statement which signifies a thing and is derived from its nature is called a definition. Also, another kind of statement which is composed from what is accidentally present in things we call a characterization from accidents, or a description¹⁶⁰.

116 Thus, since, as we have said, things are comprehended sometimes through simple names and sometimes through a definitory account, we ought to know that some things share with one another only name but differ in their definitory accounts; sometimes they have in common their definitory account but differ in name; and further, sometimes they have in common both, i.e. name

158 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.4: δηλοῦνται δὲ πάντα καὶ δι’ ὀνομάτων καὶ διὰ λόγων (see in general 15.4–16, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.5–6). See also David, *Prolegomena* 11.15–12.18, discussing as one of the introductory questions what a definition (ὀρισμός) is. Like Ammonius, David makes a distinction between a name (ὄνομα) and an account (λόγος) both of which may provide a definition of a subject matter.

159 Cf. the same example in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.10–16; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.7–8.

160 Cf. the next main point of David’s *Prolegomena* (12.19–13.6) dealing with the distinction between a definition (ὀρισμός), a description (ὕπογραφή), and a descriptive definition (ὕπογραφικός ὀρισμός).

and definition; and sometimes they differ in both, having in common nothing at all, i.e. neither name nor definition¹⁶¹.

117 One may also express it as follows. Since, as we have said, things have a name and a descriptive definition, what follows from this is that either they share with one another both name and definition; or they differ from one another both in name and in definition; or they have one of them in common but differ in another, while this in turn may happen in two ways, i.e. either they have name in common but differ in definition, or they share definition but differ in name¹⁶².

118 Thus, when things have only a name in common but differ in their descriptive definition, they are called “of similar name” (i.e. homonyms)¹⁶³, for it is only in the name that the similarity between them shows up. For instance, we use the name “dog” to designate dissimilar natures. For there is a water-dog¹⁶⁴ and a land-dog, there is a star called like that, the one which ascends after the Orion¹⁶⁵, there is also a philosophical writer who is called like that¹⁶⁶, and finally a painted or carved image may be called like that too¹⁶⁷. So, it is only the name that makes these things similar to one another while the definitions of each one of them are different.

119 When things have definition in common but differ in name, then they are called “of similar kind”¹⁶⁸, for they belong to one and the same kind. E.g., we have the custom to call a stone also “rock” and “flint”. While the definition of their nature is one, they differ from one another only in names and they are of the same kind.

161 The taxonomy which Sergius presents here is close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.11–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 22.15–31, who both attribute each case to homonyms, polyonyms, synonyms, and heteronyms.

162 Here, Sergius’ account concurs nearly verbatim with what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.16–22: τοῦτων τοίνυν οὕτως εἰρημένων εἰ λάβοιμεν δύο πράγματα, ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ ἀμφοτέρα κοινωνοῦσι, λέγω δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἢ κατ’ ἀμφω διαφέρουσι, ἢ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἐν κοινωνοῦσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον διαφέρουσι· καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς ἢ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσι, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέρουσι.

163 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.29–16.1: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνοῦσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέρουσιν, ὁμώνυμα λέγεται.

164 Probably, a kind of shark, cf. Chase 2003: 115.

165 I.e. Sirius, Gr. Σείριος, also called the “dog-star”.

166 I.e. a Cynic philosopher whose name derives from the term κύων, “dog”.

167 Cf. the same example by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 24.9–13.

168 Greek commentators (including Ammonius and Philoponus) designate these cases as polyonyms (πολυώνυμοι). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 16.4–5: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνοῦσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ὀνομάζεται πολυώνυμα. The term suggested by Sergius would correspond to Gr. ὁμοειδής.

B83v 120 מִשְׁמַרְתִּים אֵל מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק בְּעֵינֵי הַמַּלְאָכִים: מִלֵּוּי הָיָה

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

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P30v מִלֵּוּי הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

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וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

10 חַל מִלֵּוּי מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי 121

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי וְיִצְחָק הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

15 עַל מִלֵּוּי הָיָה מִלֵּוּי

1 BCDP: מִלֵּוּי L 3 + אֵל P 7 BCDP: מִלֵּוּי L | DP: מִלֵּוּי L | BCL: מִלֵּוּי 8 LP: מִלֵּוּי BCD 10 in marg. D | BCDL: מִלֵּוּי P | BCD: מִלֵּוּי 13 P BCDL: מִלֵּוּי L 15 BCDP: מִלֵּוּי L; + מִלֵּוּי D

120 As for those that differ from one another in both, i.e. in name and in definition, they are designated in various and diverse ways¹⁶⁹. For those things that have nothing in common at all, e.g. when someone says, “man”, “stone”, and “wood”, they differ from one another both in name and in definition¹⁷⁰. While other things have both in common, i.e. name and definition, and are also of the same kind, e.g. when someone says “Alexander the Macedonian” and “Alexander Paris”¹⁷¹. For these have in common both the name and also the definition which is a natural characteristic of man.

121 So, these are things about which the Philosopher spoke abundantly before the teaching on the ten genera which have been outlined above. We, instead, have suggested a brief account of it in the form of a helpful division. For we promised at the beginning of this treatise that we will discuss the ideas of this man as concisely as possible. Therefore we (have provided) an account of these things which here we bring to end.

End of Book Two.

169 Here, Sergius combines two types, heteronyms and synonyms. The first sentence of this paragraph finds a close parallel in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.22–23, where Philoponus explicates the meaning of the term “homonym” that may be applied in multiple ways (έν διαφόροις τόποις).

170 I.e. they are heteronyms. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.26: εἰ δὲ κατ’ ἄμφω διαφέρουσιν, ὀνομάζεται ἕτερόνυμα.

171 I.e. they are synonyms (thus Sergius seems to believe that both designations refer to the same person). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.22–23: εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ’ ἄμφω κοινωνοῦσιν, ὀνομάζεται συνώνυμα. Philoponus, Elias, and Simplicius suggest the same example with the name of Alexander; when speaking of homonyms, which would be more appropriate in this case, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.23–24; Elias, *In Cat.* 139.33; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 31.24–25.

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19 ḥāḏīḥ BCDL: ḥāḏīḥ P 20 ḥāḏīḥ BCDL: ḥāḏīḥ P | ḥāḏīḥ CDL: ḥāḏīḥ P:
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Divisions of Book Two

First division

Writings about the craft of logic:

- some of them are before the craft of demonstrations:
 - some are about simple words: the treatise *Categories* which is about the ten genera;
 - some are about their first composition: the book *On Interpretation*;
 - and some are about syllogisms which derive from this composition: the book *Prior and Posterior Analytics*;
- some are composed about demonstrations: the book of demonstrations which is called *Apodeictics* and the one about topics (of an argument)¹⁷² which is called *Places*, i.e. *Topica*;
- and some are written about those things that are useful for this craft: the book *Refutation of Sophists* and also the one about the craft of rhetoric.

Second division

Of what is simple in the world:

- there are simple words; they do not exist naturally;
- concepts which are signified; they exist naturally;
- things that are known; they exist as natures.

¹⁷² Syr. *reše*, corresponding most likely to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, the main points discussed in an argument.

B84v |
C126v | D71v
| L11r

אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת

אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן

אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת

אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

5

לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן - אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן - אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן - אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת

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אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

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אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ

לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן

אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְיָ אֱלֹהֵינוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת וְלֹא לְהַחֲזִיק בָּהֶן

3 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת L 6 אֵלֶּה LP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCD 7 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת L
אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת B | אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת L: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת P: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCD 8 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת B
אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת L 10 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDP: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCD 12 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת BCDL: אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת P 14 אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת
om. L

Third division

There are four kinds of speech:

- imperative,
- optative,
- interrogative,
- and making a statement.

Fourth division

Species/forms and genera:

- some of them are with the Creator; they are called simple and primary;
- some are in matter; they are designated as material and natural;
- and some are in our mind; they are called posterior and noetic.

Fifth division

Substance is a most generic genus.

Body is a species and a genus.

Animate body is a species and a genus.

Animal is a species and a genus.

Universal man is only a species and thus a most specific species.

Sixth division

Of things:

- some have only a name in common, they are called “of similar name”, e.g. land-dog and water-dog, dog of Orion, and philosopher-dog;
- some have only a definition in common, they are called “of similar kind”, e.g. stone, rock, flint;
- some have both a name and a definition in common, they are of one kind, e.g. Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris;
- and some have in common neither a name nor a definition, they are different in every respect, e.g. wood, stone, man.

* * *

The ten genera of the *Categories* with which Aristotle’s entire account is concerned are the following: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, being-affected.

BOOK THREE

[The fourfold division]

- 122 In the previous book, which was the second one of this treatise, O brother Theodore, the discussion of an inquiry into the goal of the whole logical craft has been set out. At its end, I turned to those terms which Aristotle provided before his teaching on the ten primary genera that are called “categories”. In this book, which is the third one of the same treatise, we are about to discuss those things that the Philosopher wrote after that in his treatise on the ten universal genera. 1a20–1b9
- 123 Now, those who are eager to chase the true understanding of this man ought to know, O brother, that before the general division of those ten primary categories, this Philosopher established another division of them which is more universal than this one and divided all of them into four parts that encompass the ten. So, ultimately, this fourfold division also includes the other one, for the tenfold one is born out of it, producing a perfect teaching on the nature of each one of the ten primary genera¹⁷³.
- 124 So, this is what he says¹⁷⁴ about the first division which is set out in a fourfold manner: Of all things that exist in any way some are substances and others accidents, and again, some of them are spoken of universally and some particularly. Thus, six pairings may be generated from this¹⁷⁵: the first one is that of substance and accident; another one is that of universal and particular;

173 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9. Both Ammonius and Philoponus speculate on the value of applying numbers from one to ten in this case. Sergius confines himself here to a short remark about the “perfect teaching”, but comes to the issues of numbers based on the Pythagorean teachings later on in a separate section (see §§129–134, below).

174 Sergius does not quote Aristotle’s text here, but rather presents the following teachings as a correct interpretation of chapter 2 of the *Categories*. While Ammonius stresses (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.14–15; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 29.1) that the terms he uses (substance, accident, universal, particular) are not applied by Aristotle, Sergius does not make such a remark, but uses the same terms as if they actually derive from Aristotle.

175 Sergius’ text is very close to the commentary of Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.5–7: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαίρεσις αὐτῆ· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστί καθόλου τὰ δὲ μερικά, καὶ πάλιν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν οὐσία τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα· γίνονται τοίνυν συζυγίαί ἕξ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.17–20).

the third one is that of substance and universal; the fourth one is that of accident and particular; also the fifth one is that of accident and universal; and the last sixth one is that of substance and particular. You learn them clearly from the table below.

125 However, we ought to know that two pairings from these six, namely the first and the second one, may not come to be, for it is impossible both for the same thing to be a substance and an accident, and for the same thing to be in the same way universal and particular. Hence, only four pairings remain as in every way possible in this division, as we said. These are: universal substance, e.g. humanity as a whole; particular accident, e.g. whiteness in only one dress; particular substance, e.g. Socrates alone; and universal accident, e.g. whiteness as a whole¹⁷⁶.

126 Of these four pairings the Philosopher put first that of universal substance, for he considered it more honorable in both of its (elements), i.e. both because of substance and universality, than the other three. For substance is much more honorable than accident, because it is sufficient for its own subsistence, while an accident has no way to exist unless there is substance. And universal is honored much more among philosophers than particular, because they always leave particulars behind and seek after universals that provide a profound knowledge of things¹⁷⁷.

176 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.7–12: ὧν αἱ δύο ἀνυπόστατοι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέσσαρες, φημί δὴ τὰς τε ὑπαλλήλους καὶ τὰς διαγωνίους, συνεστᾶσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ αὐταὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθόλου οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ μερικὰ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου συμβεβηκότα τὰ δὲ μερικὰ οὐσίαι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ τί λευκὸν ἢ τις ἐπιστήμη καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τις ἄνθρωπος (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.20–23). This passage in Ammonius (and Philoponus) is followed by a diagram, representing the afore-mentioned six combinations, which is nearly identical to the one found in Sergius. In all extant mss. of Sergius' *Commentary*, it appears after §126.

177 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.16–20: καὶ τοῦτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι κεχρημένος ἐκτίθεται τὰς τέσσαρας συζυγίας, καὶ πρώτην τὴν καθόλου οὐσίαν, ὡς τιμιωτέραν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἀντικείμενον, λέγω δὴ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός, εἶτα προετίμησε τὸ καθόλου συμβεβηκός τῆς μερικῆς οὐσίας, διότι περὶ τῶν καθόλου τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.19–26).

and discuss why he has established it as first, before the overall division of the ten genera.

[Pythagoras on numbers]¹⁷⁹

129 Now, Pythagoras, who was a man renowned for the practice and knowledge of philosophy, transmitted like a kind of mystery to his disciples that all powers and causes of everything that came to be and exists in the whole world derive from numbers and constitute things, while every knowledge and philosophy about the latter has its origin and reason in calculations and figures (σχήματα) which come forth by means of numbers.

130 So, he stated that the beginning of all numbers is called the one. It is a copy of the Creator who brings order to everything in that, similar to it, he is also single¹⁸⁰ and indivisible. And number two, which is born when the primary number doubles itself, serves also as a model (τύπος) for the universal substance of all bodies, which they call matter (ύλη), and for the nature that is singularly active in bodies, the one which they also call material (ύλικός) form (εἶδος). These two principles — i.e. form and matter, one of which is efficacious and the other effected, one is active and the other passive — are primary, according to Aristotle, after the Creator of the universe. From them at first the four customary elements (στοιχεῖα) are formed — i.e. the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry — from which in turn the adornment and constitution of the universe takes place.

131 Thus, they say that the second number contains the mystery of matter and form, which, as we have said, Aristotle sets as primary principles and causes of

179 Cf. §123, above. In the corresponding passage, Ammonius makes a brief note on the application of numbers by Aristotle, without mentioning the name of Pythagoras. The *prolegomena* treatises by David, Elias, and Olympiodorus frequently refer to the Pythagorean arithmology. Cf., e.g., Lectures 16–17 of David's *Introduction to Philosophy* (49.7–54.26), where he describes the following established tradition of Aristotle's commentators: "Since we have earlier on given an arithmetical explanation <...>, the commentators take their starting point from this and proceed to discuss the numbers up to the decad" (Gertz 2018: 133; the Greek text: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἰρήκαμεν ἀριθμητικὴν αἰτίαν δεικνύουσαν <...> ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντες οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ἀφορμὴν ἔρχονται καὶ διαλαμβάνουσι περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ὄντων ἄχρι τῆς δεκάδος).

180 Syr. *ihidaya*, here probably corresponding to Gr. μοναχός. Sergius applies the same Syriac term in the meaning "particular, individual", cf., e.g., §168.

B87v :
 P34r :
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C130v :
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D74r :
 L13v :
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everything. For just like the singular and primary number which is similar to the Creator doubled itself and thus gave birth to this second number, in the same way, when the Creator in the beginning¹⁸¹ applied some sort of doubling which derived from the affinity between his creative activity and the creation, he first of all established matter and form that are necessary for the subsistence of all beings.

132 And just as from matter and form, as we said above, the four elements are primarily constituted, which are the secondary principles of beings, so also the number four is born from a doubling of the second number, for when the latter doubles itself it brings forth the subsistence of the former. And since also the number four originates from the primary number and makes the latter fourfold, it is clear that it gives birth to the ten. For one, two, three, and four together make ten.

133 That is why the number ten that is perfect in every respect is also a model (τύπος) for all things and beings of this world, which was made as a whole by the Creator. For just as the fourfold number gives birth to the number ten, which is perfect, as we have said, being the limit of all numbers, because there is no other number higher than it but there are those ones that are infinitely composed from themselves, in the same way from the four elements — i.e. fire, air, earth, and water — also this whole world was composed as an entity, and those things that are delivered into it and come to be remain the same, while not a single thing is ever created in it.

181 Syr. *b-rišit*. The same word appears in the Syriac translation of Gen. 1:1, i.e. opens the creation story.

134 So now, after this, it is time to look clearly at the cause for the fourfold division which we earlier presented above¹⁸². Thus, I say that just as the fourfold number gives birth from its composition to the number ten which serves as a perfect model for the universe that is composed from the four elements, so too Aristotle first encompassed the ten genera in a fourfold division which resembles the elements and after that introduced another, tenfold, division of these genera which is in itself a model of the universe. For, just as the number ten is complete, comprising all the numbers, so also the universe is complete, containing all the natures. In the same way, also the division of the ten genera of the categories is complete and perfect, encompassing all things that are in the world, for no one is ever able to find anything that would not fall under and be contained in one of these genera.

[Definition of accident]

135 Since, as it seems to me, these things have been clearly explained, let us further proceed to those ones that are after them, which is in this way also necessary for teaching them. That there are those things that are said universally and those whose subsistence is particular¹⁸³, is clear to everyone and there is no need for any definitions or long demonstrations. However, a definition of substance or accident themselves from the four pairings which have been previously set out above requires not a few inquiries as well as demonstrations that support it. Because these two terms, i.e. substance and accident, designate something that is unfamiliar to many from ordinary usage, and also what each

¹⁸² Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9.

¹⁸³ Sergius speaks in one case in terms of predication (“said”) and in the other in terms of existence (“subsistence”). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.21–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.9–15.

one of them signifies is not apparent and comprehensible save for a few alone¹⁸⁴.

136 Therefore, an inquiry should be made into both of them, so that nothing will be missing in the interpretation of other things in this treatise. However, concerning substance we will make a proper inquiry into its meaning and definition later on, where it will completely correspond to Aristotle's account of it in the book *Categories*. Of accident, conversely, we will speak now, starting with a definition which the Philosopher gave for it. Thus, we require no small investigation about those things which we are about to discuss below.

137 Now, Aristotle states that accident is “that which is in something else not as a part of it, it being impossible to exist without that thing which it is in”¹⁸⁵. This is a defining account of accident given to us by the Philosopher in the treatise on the ten genera. Thus, an accident is what exists in something else, while it is in it not as its part, and its subsistence is never possible by itself, apart from what it is in.

138 Now, it is necessary to know that there are altogether eleven ways of speaking about being-in-something¹⁸⁶. These are: as in a time; or as in a place; or as in a container; or as parts in what they are parts of; or as a whole in its parts; or as

184 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.29–32: ἐπειδὴ ἦσθετο ἑαυτοῦ ὁ φιλόσοφος φωναῖς τισι χρησαμένου ἀγνώστοις ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, τῷ τε καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, βούλεται λοιπὸν διδάξαι ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν. Thus, Philoponus refers to the actual expressions used by Aristotle, while Sergius substitutes them with “substance” and “accident”.

185 See *Cat.* 1a24–25: ὃ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. Aristotle thus defines the expression “in a subject” (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) which is associated by Sergius with the term “accident”.

186 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2 (cf. 29.5–23) and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.7–26. Both lists contain 11 types that are equivalent to Sergius' list, but differ from one another in their sequence. Also Sergius' sequence does not fully correspond to either of them. These lists ultimately go back to *Phys.* 210a14–24, where Aristotle suggests eight ways of being-in-something.

species in a genus; or as a genus in species (εἶδη); or as forms (εἶδη) in matter; or as the governing of those who are under someone's rule is in the person who governs them; or as in an end; or as an accident in a substance¹⁸⁷. However, since these are probably not clearly comprehensible for the readers, let us further turn to them and suggest examples to each one from what is known by everyone.

139 1. So, we say that something is in a time, e.g. when we state about the War of Ilion¹⁸⁸ that it occurred in the time of Alexander Paris, or when we say that any other particular thing was in the year of such-and-such (a ruler) or in the day of so-and-so. Everything like this is said to have happened or to be happening in some time.

140 2. Further, we say that something is in a place, just as each one of us is inside the limits of air that surrounds our bodies from outside, or when we say about water or wine that they are inside the inner limits of an earthen vessel or anything else that contains them.

141 3. Also, we say that something is in a container, as water in a pitcher, or as wine in a wineskin, or as any kind of body that is inside another body. This type differs from the previous one in that place has only two dimensions, namely length and breadth, while a container always has three dimensions, namely length, breadth, and depth. Hence, place is such a limit of a body that encloses in its interior part what is placed into it. A container, on the other hand, is a

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2: λέγεται γὰρ τὸ ἐν τινι ἐνδεκαχῶς, ἐν χρόνῳ ἐν τόπῳ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὄλῳ ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ὡς εἶδος ἐν γένει ὡς γένος ἐν εἶδει ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντι ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς ἐν τέλει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οἷον τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ.

¹⁸⁸ I.e. the Trojan War. The same example appears by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.5–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.17–18.

body itself which possesses two limits, the interior one which contains what is in it and, as we said, is called its place, and the exterior one which is seen to everyone from outside. Provided this is so, then it is obvious that the way how something is in a place differs from the way of being in a container in that the former is the inner limit of a body, as we said, while the latter is itself a body¹⁸⁹.

142 4. But we also say that things are (in something) as parts in what they are parts of, for example a hand, or a leg, or any other member of human body. For these are in a body as its parts.

143 5. Also, it is said that the whole human body is in its parts, i.e. in the head, in the belly, in the hands and legs, and in all other members of it. In this way, as we said, we state that a whole is in its parts.

144 6. Things are said to be in something as species in a genus, when we see that they derive from one and the same genus and say that they are in their common genus. E.g., we say that a horse, a dog, and a bull are in the genus of animal, while a vine, an olive tree, and a cedar are in the genus of plant.

145 7. But a thing is also said to be in something as a genus in species, e.g. when one says that animal is in the species of dog, horse, and any other animal, or, further, plant is in fig-tree, plane-tree, and all the species of plant.

146 8. A thing is also said to be in something as form (εἶδος) in matter (ύλη), e.g. when one says that the image of a statue (ἀνδριάνς) is in bronze, or the shape

189 In points 2 and 3, Sergius suggest a different kind of explanation than what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.6–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.18–22.

(σχῆμα) of a chair is in wood, or something else like that¹⁹⁰.

147 9. But we also say sometimes that one thing is in another as the govern-
ment of those who are governed is in the governor; as we have a custom to say
that the government of a house is in the power of the master of the house, or
that the government of a city lies in the one who rules over the city¹⁹¹.

148 10. Also, as in an end, we say that the construction of a house is in its
conclusion, that the design of a ship is in its completion, and everything else
like this¹⁹².

149 11. Also, as an accident in a substance, we say that whiteness is in milk,
blackness in a rock, sweetness in honey, and everything else like that¹⁹³.

150 So, Aristotle writes that accident is “what is in something else not as a part
of it” and thus distinguishes accident from all those things that are in
something that they are in as parts. He also adds that “it can never have subsist-
ence all by itself without that thing which it is in”, in order to distinguish it
from all other cases of how a thing is said to be in something. Because all of
them, even if they are not said to be in something as a part of it, can however
have subsistence without it. An accident, on the contrary, is neither in
something as its part, nor can it ever exist without it.

151 As for the other ten types, some of them are said to be in something as part
of it, while others can subsist by themselves without it. And since an accident is

190 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22: ἡ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.15–16: ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ τὸ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον σχῆμα ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ.

191 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.13–15: ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι (λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι τόδε τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄρχοντί ἐστιν) (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22–24).

192 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.16–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.24–25.

193 Ammonius and Philoponus speak in the last case of being “as in a subject”, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.17: ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.25–26). Since Sergius completely abstains from using the terms applied by Aristotle himself, he modifies this point accordingly.

in something like the other ten types, the Philosopher added that it is in something not as its part, in order to distinguish it from those things that are (in something) as a part of it. And he further added that it can never have subsistence by itself without that what it is in, in order to distinguish it from all other cases which can exist without that thing which they are in, even if they are not in it as a part¹⁹⁴.

- 152 For example, whiteness is an accident. It has subsistence either in milk, or in white lead, or in any other kind of body. It is in the body that is receptive of it not as its part. Neither can it have subsistence outside the body in which it is, for it will perish at that very moment when it is separated from it.

[*Criticism of Aristotle's definition*]

- 153 Now, it is necessary, as it seems to me, to discuss some enquiries (ζητήματα) and objections which one may hear just after this defining account of accident from those who are judging things without precision. For, since, as we said, any definition of a particular thing ought to suit only this thing which is made known by it, also the defining account of accident must serve for expressing it alone. Thus, there are two ways of making a mistake in a definition: either by enlarging it so that it will comprise not the whole nature of what is defined, or by reducing it and thus including in it other things that are outside of what is defined¹⁹⁵. For a balanced and accurate definition of a particular thing is the one which serves for signification of this thing alone, separating and differentiating it from everything else.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.2–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.26–32.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.6–10: κακίζουσι δέ τινες τὸν ὀρισμὸν τοῦτον, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείπειν· αὕτη γὰρ κακία ὀρισμοῦ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ἀλλ' ἢ πλείονα περιλαμβάνειν ἢ ἐλάττωνα. καὶ οἱ μὲν πλεονάζειν λέγοντές φασι μὴ μόνον τὰ συμβεβηκότα περιλαμβάνειν τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.9–13. Ammonius characterizes the first kind of criticism (i.e. for being superfluous, cf. ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν by Philoponus) as κατὰ τὸ ὑπεραίρειν καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

154 What I mean is this. A correct definition of man that defines only the human nature and separates it from everything else is “rational mortal animal”. So everyone who is a man is a rational mortal animal, and also every rational mortal animal is a man. For a correct interpretation of definitions implies that they are convertible with what they define¹⁹⁶. If, however, someone reduces this definition and says only “rational animal”, it is obvious that together with the nature of man he will encompass with this expression also other natures, namely angels and demons, for all of them are also rational animals. If, on the contrary, one enlarges this definition and says that man is “rational mortal animal rhetor”, then he will reduce the nature that is made known by the definition, because this expression will encompass not the whole nature of men, but only the rhetors.

155 So, these are the two ways of corrupting the teaching of definitions which someone may bring forth as accusations after the defining account of accident. First of all, one might say that it defines and encompasses not only accidents, but also other things that pertain to substance and not to accidents. For, if accident matches the description proposed above, i.e. “what is in something not as a part of it, while it cannot have subsistence without it”, since also Socrates and each one of us are in a place, while not being part of the place, and while neither of us, further, is able to exist without place, hence, according to the meaning of that description, we too are accidents. But since it is evident that

196 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.13–15: οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τοῦτο ἀντιστρέφει· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος.

each one of us is also a substance, substance appears to be at the same time substance and accident, which is impossible¹⁹⁷.

156 To this we reply, then, that, even if each one of us is in a place while not being a part of the place we are in, it is still possible for our nature to be thought of outside place, because place is not complete of our nature but is attached to us as a concomitant, like a shadow to a body. But what is receptive of an accident is complete of its nature, since (an accident) may never subsist without it, as we have said above. Now, if this is how things stand, it is evident that the definition of accident which is given above does not encompass anything else save it alone¹⁹⁸.

157 Further, one might say that the defining account of accident does not encompass its nature on the whole but suits only those accidents which cannot be separated at all from what they are in. For, behold, the fragrance of apples or any kind of spices (ἄρωμα), which is an accident, may nevertheless be separated from what it is in, for even when these things are moved far away their fragrance reaches us. So, if an accident is something that cannot subsist without what it is in, while fragrances which are said to be accidents may be separated from what they are in and reach us, it is evident that the account quoted above does not define all accidents¹⁹⁹.

158 What we shall first of all say to this is that it is not stated in this definition that it is completely impossible for an accident to exist for some time apart from what it is in, but that it may not exist at the present moment apart from

197 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.15–21: φασίν οὖν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἀποδεδομένον ὀρισμὸν μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμόζειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶ παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὧν ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὄλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.10–12).

198 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.21–30; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.12–20.

199 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.10–21.

what it is in²⁰⁰. So, even if every fragrance of spices can be separated from them and reach our nostrils, it still cannot reach us without another substance which they are in. For even if it is separated from the spices, it is nonetheless in the air as in a certain body which is receptive of it and without which it cannot subsist²⁰¹.

159 Also, from what follows we shall comprehend that fragrances do not reach our nostrils without certain substance. For, behold, if somebody places an apple in a house for many days it will shrivel and shrink, and from this it is clear that together with its fragrance, a certain substance wastes away and disperses from it. Also, when a man puts some vessel over his nostrils, even if there were spices, he will not sense their fragrance because he will breath clear air. This too makes apparent that when fragrances come into contact with a substance that is much denser than air, they are not perceived any more. So, it has become clear now that fragrances may never exist without some substance which they are in. Consequently, they also fit the above-mentioned account that defines universally the whole nature of accident²⁰².

160 Others, among whom was also Porphyry, since they saw in the definition of accident proposed by Aristotle a certain contradiction with his teaching, sought to formulate it clearly and comprehensibly. Thus, they said that accident is “what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it”²⁰³. However, there are quite a few contradictions also in this definition proposed by them. For of accidents some may be separated from what they

200 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.12–13: πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ᾧ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, “first of all, Aristotle did not say ‘in which it was’, but ‘in which it is.’” (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.22–23). Thus, Ammonius stresses the present tense in Aristotle’s words.

201 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.11–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.21–24.

202 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.16–29.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.24–36.13, Simplicius, *In Cat.* 49.10–14.

203 Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–25: συμβεβηκός δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.

P39r אכלם כשתם שלפניכם. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם כגון אדם
הוא ידעם לו.

B93r אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
אלו ידעו אתכם בלילה. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
5 אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

D78r אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
אלו ידעו אתכם בלילה. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

L31r אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

C138v אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
10 אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
אלו ידעו אתכם בלילה. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

15 אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
אלו ידעו אתכם בלילה. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
20 אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם
אלו ידעו אתכם בלילה. ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

P39v אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

C139r אכלתם לחם בלילה ואתם לא תהיו כחכם

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4 בCDL, Epit.: יחיה P | אכלתם LP, Epit.: אכלתם BCD 5 אכלתם LP, Epit.:
אכלתם CD: אכלתם B 8 אכלתם BCDL: אכלתם P: אכלתם Epit. | אכלתם BCLP, D
corr in marg., Epit.: אכלתם D 10 אכלתם] om. L 11 אכלתם BCLP, Epit.: אכלתם D 14 אכלתם]
om. B 16 אכלתם LP, Epit.: אכלתם BCD 17 אכלתם] + אכלתם BCD 19 אכלתם] om. B,
Epit. | אכלתם] om. D 20 אכלתם LP, Epit.: אכלתם BCD 21 אכלתם] om. P, Epit. 22 אכלתם LP: אכלתם BCD,
Epit. 23 אכלתם] om. P | אכלתם...196,12, אכלתם] om. P

occur in and destroyed by being replaced by another ones, while others may never be separated from what they occur in.

161 For instance, the blackness which occurs in the body of a man who has remained for a long time in the sun and which becomes his accident may be separated and removed from him after he has spent a considerable time washing himself in water and staying in the shade. But the blackness of an Ethiopian²⁰⁴ or a raven which is also their accident may never be separated and removed from the Ethiopian's skin or from raven's feathers. Thus, one may say that the definition formulated by Porphyry — i.e. that accident is “what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it” — does not encompass all the accidents, but only those which may be separated and removed from what they are in, because the other ones, as we have said, are not separable from whose accidents they are²⁰⁵.

162 However, instead of this we shall rather bring forth the following argument. Even if those accidents which may not be removed from what they occur in, such as the blackness of an Ethiopian and also of a raven, are in actuality not separable from those bodies which they occur in, they nevertheless can be separated from them in speech and in thought without causing any destruction of them. For it is possible to imagine both an Ethiopian and a raven as white without bringing any harm to the substance of any of them²⁰⁶. Hence, they are also encompassed by the descriptive account that has been quoted above just now.

163 It is also possible for someone to say against what is stated in this definition — i.e. that accident is “separable from what it is in without destroying

204 Syr. “the Cushite”.

205 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.7–18.

206 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.11–15: εἶπομεν δὲ ἤδη ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀπογίνεται, ἀλλ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὁ κόραξ καὶ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ χωρίσαι δυνατόν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ νοῆσαι ἀνθρώπον μὴ εἶναι ζῶον φθειρόμεν αὐτόν, ἐπινοήσαντες δὲ τὸν κόρακα μὴ εἶναι μέλανα ἢ τὸν Αἰθίοπα οὐ φθειρόμεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς κόρακος ἢ ἀνθρώπου.

it” — the following²⁰⁷. Fever is a sort of accident too, but it certainly destroys the body in which it occurs. Also, baldness happens to hair, and it destroys the substrate in which it occurs. Further, one may say about these things the following. Just as the strings of a lyre (κιθάρα), when they are stretched either more tightly or more loosely than is required, destroy the harmony (ἁρμονία) and the coherence of the melody, without however destroying the lyre, so also fever does not destroy the body but the coherent harmony of its constitution. And only when the constitution itself is destroyed, is the body necessarily destroyed with it too. So, even here the accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs. For baldness does not exist in the hair which it destroys but its nature occurs to the skull, so that even from this case it may be seen that an accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs.

164 So, speaking concisely, everything that is in the world most of all desires the subsistence of its essence²⁰⁸ and flees always from its destruction. Thus, if none of the accidents can come to be without the substrate in which it occurs, it is obvious that there are no accidents that would destroy the thing to which they occur unless it would bring itself to destruction. What (has been said) about accident is sufficient for hearers.

[Universals and particulars]²⁰⁹

165 Since the universal and the particular were also included in the fourfold division above, we shall also speak briefly about them, although they are evident to everyone. We ought to know that in substance, quantity and other genera we have certain genera that are primary and principal, which are the

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²⁰⁷ The following arguments and examples illustrating them are found in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.18–113.28. Cf. also Elias, *In Isag.* 91.5–93.8.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 112.12: ἕκαστον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι ἐφέρεται.

²⁰⁹ For the description of the hierarchical structure of genera, species, and particulars known as the “Tree of Porphyry”, see Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.1–8.6; Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.5–71.11 and 77.15–79.14; Elias, *In Isag.* 63.6–34. The image of a tree appears in the treatise *On Genus, Species, and Individuality* that is ascribed to Sergius in the only manuscript in which it is preserved and in all likelihood indeed goes back to him. In this treatise, the division of the most generic genera into further genera, species, and particulars is presented in the image of a tree that has large boughs divided into branches and further into twigs and shoots, cf. Furlani 1925.

ten categories. There are also other ones that are subordinated to them, and still other ones that are subsumed below the latter ones, and all the way down until the last species and the separate individuals²¹⁰ that are encompassed by all lower species. In order to explain this to readers, let us take substance and quantity as examples.

166 Now, substance is a certain genus, for there are multiple things that are subsumed beneath it. It is divided primarily into two differentiae, i.e. into body and incorporeal. Body in turn is further divided into other differentiae that are beneath it, namely into animate and inanimate body and into percipient and deprived of perception. In the same way, also animate body is divided into other differentiae, namely into living body and lifeless body and into moving and deprived of motion. Now, living and moving body is further divided into other differentiae which are below it, namely into rational and non-rational and into man and animal. As for man, it is divided only into individuals that are separate and confined by one nature, namely into Plato, Alcibiades, and any other single person²¹¹.

167 Now, we ought to know, since each one of those differentiae that are said to be positioned between man below and universal substance above subsumes under itself multiple things that differ from one another either through the division of individuals or through species, that those differentiae that stand higher than others are also called more universal because each one of them

210 *Syr. qnome.*

211 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 77.16–78.4: τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ σῶμα τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμψυχον τὸ δὲ ἄψυχον, καὶ τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ μὲν ζῶον τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δὲ ζώοφυτον <...> πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ζώου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν θεὸς τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν Σωκράτης τὸ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

contains all those that are lower than it and shares with them both its name and its nature²¹².

168 What I mean is this. Man is a differentia and a species of living body, as we have said. Thus, this man is called universal, since he encompasses every particular individual from all the human beings. And individuals are called particular²¹³, because there is nothing else that they subsume under themselves and they are not further divided into parts and species. Also, living body is said to be universal, since it encompasses universal man and animal — which differ from one another not only in number but also in species — and shares with them also its name and its nature, for both man and animal are said to be living due to their partaking in its name. Further, also animate body is said to be universal, since it subsumes under itself living being and all its parts, and they partake in its name, for both man and animal are called living. In the same way, body and substance are universals, since they encompass all differentiae below and make them partakers in their name. For body, animate body, animal, and man, as well as other differentiae that are in substance and particular individuals below that are not divided into anything else, are all called substances.

169 To sum this up: All lower differentiae partake in the name of those above them, while the higher ones are not called by the name of the lower ones. So, every man is living, animate, and substance. But not every living being is a man, e.g. animals, neither is every animate being living, e.g. plants. And further, not everything that is substance is animate, e.g. stones and wood, for they are

212 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 78.5–15.

213 Syr. *iḥidaya*, “single”, here probably reflecting the Gr. ἄτομος (cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 6.13), since Sergius stresses that particulars may not be further divided into parts.

substances but they are not called animate. Similarly, every living being is called animate and substance, and everything animate is also designated as substance. But not everything that is substance is necessarily body, or animate, or living, or man. Hence, what was stated has become clear, i.e. that all genera that are higher than others share their name and their nature with the lower species all the way down to particular individuals which are not further divided, while the lower ones never provide with their name or with their nature either those which are immediately above them or those which are further elevated and remote from them.

170 In the same way we also speak about the genus of quantity. For it too is originally divided into two differentiae, i.e. into the one which is continuous and contains no portions and another one which is discrete and divisible. Also, the one which is continuous and has no portions is further divided into line which is comprehended only through length, into surface whose subsistence is through length and breadth, and also into body whose nature exists in three dimensions, i.e. in length, breadth, and depth. As for the other differentia of quantity which is discrete and divisible, it is further divided into number and time. Each one of them is subdivided into other parts contained in it which are called particulars.

171 Now, all the higher differentiae which the genus of quantity has are also said universally, since they encompass each one of those things that are beneath them, i.e. either their parts that are particulars or other differentiae which differ from each other in species. Particulars, then, are all the lower parts of the species which differ from each other only in number. Universals, on

the other hand, are called all those species and genera which encompass not only particulars that are beneath them, but also other differentiae that encompass the latter.

172 So, what (has been said) thus far should be sufficient for anyone in order to understand what is called universal and what exists particularly²¹⁴. We ought to know, however, that although four terms have been applied in the table (above) — namely substance, accident, universal, and particular — from which four combinations derive, up to this point we have sufficiently spoken about accident, about universal, and about particular. Thus, from now on let us speak, according to our ability, about substance which is established as the head of the ten genera in the book *Categories*²¹⁵.

[On substance]²¹⁶

173 First of all, we shall investigate in how many ways substance is spoken of, 2a11–34 for the teaching of this book is not about every kind of substance. So, we say that of substances some are simple and others composite. The simple ones are either superior to the composite ones or inferior to them²¹⁷. The simple substances which are superior to the composite ones are subjects of the whole science that is called theology (θεολογία), which means “on the divine”. It is concerning these simple substances that are exalted above the composite ones and, being remote from matter and corruption, abide always in the beatitude which does not pass away that the word is (directed) to everyone who desires to ascend in his knowledge above the visible natures and to be taught what is exalted above many²¹⁸.

214 Sergius leaves Chapter 4 of the *Categories* (1b25–2a10) out of his *Commentary*, since he has already suggested an overview of the ten categories in §§95ff. as one of the subject matters among the *prolegomena*.

215 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–13: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.8–9).

216 Ms. L has the subtitle “On substance”. Mss. BCD: “On substance and in what ways it is said”. Ammonius notes (*In Cat.* 66.14–19) that the version of Aristotle’s *Categories* which he used contained two subtitles, “On substance” and “On relatives”. It is thus possible that Sergius himself included this rubric in the text of his *Commentary*. On the rubrics, see further Philoponus, *In Cat.* 133.21–23 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 207.27–208.21.

217 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.18–19: τῆς δὲ οὐσίας ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῆ ἡ δὲ σύνθετος, καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς ἡ μὲν κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ δὲ χείρων (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.23–24).

218 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.25–29: ἀπλῆ δὲ καὶ κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ἀγγελικὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχικὴ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται <...> διαλέγεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (οὐ γὰρ πρόκειται αὐτῷ θεολογεῖν).

174 Now, the simple substances of another kind, namely those which are inferior to the composite ones, are matter (ὕλη) and material form (ἔνυλον εἶδος)²¹⁹, when each of them is considered separately by itself, while their combination generates composite substance. It is this substance (composed) of matter and natural form that all of natural philosophy deals with. All those who, like Aristotle, were zealous in this part (of philosophy), wrote books on natures and studied those of them that fall under perception. It was matter and natural form as well as those things which appear from them that they took pains to inquire into²²⁰.

175 So, the composite substance, which is, as we have said, between the simple divine one that is superior to it and the simple natural one that is inferior to it, forms the subject of discussion for all those who apply the discipline of logic. And since this is how these things are established in all the writings on the rules (κανόνες) of logic, it was this (substance) that was placed in the teaching as primary among the ten genera of the *Categories*.

176 Thus, O brother, it was not the intention of the Philosopher to speak in this book about the simple substance which is superior to the composite one, for it shall be the concern of someone who teaches about the divine. Neither is he writing here about the other simple (substance) which is inferior and lower than the composite one, for he speaks about it, as we have said, in the treatises on natures. Instead, his goal here is to teach about the composite substance

219 For ἔνυλον εἶδος, cf. Dexippus, *In Cat.* 40.30.

220 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.21–22: ἀπλῆ δὲ καὶ χείρων τῆς συνθέτου ἢ ὕλη ἢ πρώτη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν συνθέτων ἕνεκα παραλαμβάνονται.

which we make use of in the whole discipline of logic, making it comprehensive and clear for those who have recently approached this kind of sciences²²¹.

177 We also ought to investigate why we teach about substance before the other nine genera, i.e. before quantity, quality and others. We shall say that this is because those nine genera require substance in order to subsist, while the latter does not require any of them in order to exist. Thus, the account of substance is esteemed as prior also because, if it were taken away from the nine other genera, they will disappear as well, but if they vanish, then substance will not cease to exist. So, everything is destroyed together with it, but it is not destroyed by anything²²².

178 Now, substance is classified in (Aristotle's) teaching (as follows): some of it are primary and others secondary. He called primary substance each one of the particular individuals and parts which have been discussed above and with which the divisions of species end, e.g., when one speaks of Socrates alone, or separately of Plato, or of any other thing, animate or inanimate, which has individual subsistence²²³. All things like that the Philosopher designates in his treatise on the ten genera as primary substances. What he calls secondary substances, on the other hand, are their species and genera, namely universal man and universal horse, and also the genus of the latter, e.g. when one says, "what is living and animate".

221 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.27–36.2: διαλέξεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ θεολογίας) οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ χείρονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ φυσιολογίας), ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς συνθέτου καὶ σχετικῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.27–50.1).

222 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–18: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν· αὕτη γὰρ συνεισφέρεται μὲν ταῖς λοιπαῖς κατηγορίαις, οὐ συνεισφέρει δὲ αὐτάς, καὶ συναρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ συναρεῖται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι αὕτη ἀθύποστατός ἐστιν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὔσης οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι κατηγορίας, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐ δυνατόν τὰς ἄλλας ὑποστῆναι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.5–22).

223 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.2–4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–3.

179 So, in a nutshell, primary substances are all particular things which have self-subsistence, while all their species and genera are called secondary substances. Here arises not a small problem of how substance is divided into primary and secondary. But before we proceed with this question properly, we shall first outline all possible ways in which division of any kind becomes possible.

[Types of division]²²⁴

180 Now, everything that is divided is divided either as (a whole) into its parts, or as a genus into species, or as an ambiguous word into different objects (signified by it)²²⁵. Also, when something is divided as (a whole) into its parts, sometimes it is divided into parts that are similar to one another, and sometimes into such ones that are dissimilar. What I mean is this. Bone, wood, bronze, and everything else like that are divided into similar parts, since the parts into which each thing of this kind is divided are in every way similar to each other, save for their large or small size only. Everything that is composed of objects that are not similar is divided into dissimilar parts. E.g., man's and animal's body is divided into head, breast, arms, belly, and legs, i.e. into parts that are dissimilar both to the whole and to one another²²⁶.

181 Now, a genus is divided into species, as we usually divide substance into body and incorporeal, and further into animate body, living being, plants, and all other species like that. Also, an ambiguous word may be divided into different objects that are signified by it, just as we said above that the name

224 The same classification appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–82.4; idem, *In Cat.* 38.1–2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.19–22.

225 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.1–2: τῶν γὰρ διαιρουμένων τὰ μὲν ὡς γένος εἰς εἶδη διαιρεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς φωνῆ ὁμώνυμος εἰς διάφορα σημαίνόμενα. The Syriac adjective *šhima*, “dusky”, is an uncommon rendering for ὁμώνυμος, “ambiguous (or homonymous)”, and Sergius probably applies it here in order to explicate the meaning of the Greek term.

226 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–23: ...ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται ἢ εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (καὶ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν διαιροῦνται φλέβες, ἀρτηρίαι, ὅστ᾽ αὐτὰ γὰρ διαιρούμενα ἔχει τὰ μέρη καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ δέ, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστί κεφαλή τὸ δὲ χεῖρ τὸ δὲ πούς)...

“dog” is divided into the astral, the terrestrial, and the marine one, and finally into a painted or carved image of it²²⁷. These are all things that differ from one another in their nature, while the word signifying them is the same.

182 Thus, since everything that admits of division is divided by means of one of those three types, and it is impossible to find anything divisible that will not fall beneath one of them, it is therefore worth considering which of these types is applied in the division of substance into primary and secondary. Now, I state that (substance) is divided not as (a whole) into parts, neither into those that are similar nor into those that are dissimilar. For otherwise, it would be necessary that there should be another substance that would be divided into them as into its parts, and it would be proper that our teaching about it would be prior to them²²⁸.

183 Neither is substance divided here into the primary and secondary one as a genus into species. For among species that derive from the same genus there are no such ones that are prior or posterior; but one may make their division starting from where one wishes, since all species are related (to a certain genus) without any notion of prior and posterior. Therefore, if some substance is primary and another secondary, it is obvious that this division may not be established like that of (a genus into) species²²⁹.

184 Neither is it possible to state that the division of substance is like that of an ambiguous word into objects whose natures are not similar to one another. For substances are not only similar to one another in name, but their definition and their nature is also the same in every respect²³⁰.

227 See §118. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.23–82.1: ἡ ὡς ὁμόνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαίνοντα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, τοῦ κυνὸς ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ χερσαῖος ὁ δὲ θαλάττιος ὁ δὲ ἀστρῶος.

228 Thus, Sergius states that primary and secondary substance may not be considered as parts of other entity which would equally be called substance and be prior to them. Cf. a rather different argument in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.7–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.9–14.

229 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.2–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.24–54.9. Just as in the previous paragraph, Sergius’ argumentation differs considerably from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

230 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.15–22; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.25–31.

185 Thus, since it is neither as (a whole) into parts, nor as a genus into species, nor as an (ambiguous) word into different objects (signified by it) that substance is divided into primary and secondary, it seems that the problem remains to a large extent without solution. Therefore we shall say that it is not a division of substance that Aristotle makes when he says that one of it is primary and another secondary, but only suggests an order (τάξις) of what comes first and what comes second in it²³¹. For numerical order differs from division made of a universal thing that is consequently divided into particulars.

[Primary and secondary substances]

186 However, after this, it is time to raise the following puzzle: Why, in fact, if 2a34–2b6 universal things are more honored everywhere among the philosophers than the particulars, does the Philosopher place here particular substance first and after that at the second place write about the universal one? One may answer to this that those things that are primary by nature are posterior to us, while those ones that are posterior by nature are primary to us²³². Thus, he calls particular substance primary not because this is what it naturally is but because it is primary to our senses. For this is what we see first and thus proceed to inquire into the universal ones which are naturally primary. He also calls particular substance primary because, since his account here is addressed to those who have recently started education, it is obvious that it is primary for those who have not yet learned to comprehend anything beyond their senses²³³.

187 Now, after he has made the composite substances subject to his talk here and has shown that some of them are primary and particular and some are secondary and universal, he further gives praise (καλῶς) to the primary

²³¹ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.21–22: φαμέν οὖν ὅτι τάξιν παραδίδωσιν αὐτῆς, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.1).

²³² Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* I 1, 184a10–b14 and *An. Post.* I 2, 71b32–72a5. Cf. also §20 of Porphyry's treatise *On Principles and Matter* preserved in Syriac (Arzhanov 2021: 90–91).

²³³ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.10–13: ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ὡς πρὸς εἰσαγομένους, τοῖς δὲ εἰσαγομένοις σαφέστερα τὰ προσεχῆ, εἰκότως τὴν μερικὴν πρώτην εἶπεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν μερικῶν ἀναγόμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–14).

substance as to something that is more honorable than everything else²³⁴. For he says that the other nine genera of the categories are all its accidents that acquire subsistence in it and may never come to be apart from it, because if it is taken away from them they will also disappear and perish. Thus, since it is the reason for their subsistence, it is obvious that it is more honorable than they. For if there were no individuals or bodies which may be seen and grasped and which pertain to the primary substance, how would any quantity or qualification and quality²³⁵ appear, e.g., the size of one or two cubits, or any kind of number and measure, or white and red colour, or hot and cold, or any other accident at all, since all of them and everything like them acquire their subsistence in particular bodies, which are primary substances, and may never exist without them. That is why the primary substance is more honorable than all accidents, for it is set for them as a certain nature in which they subsist. Moreover, he says that the primary substance is also greater than the secondary one, since if the former did not exist than there would be nothing that might be predicated of it²³⁶.

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Now, secondary substance, as we have said above, is further divided into species and genera. And he demonstrates to us many times that genera are predicated of species, while species in turn (are predicated) of particular individuals that are subsumed beneath each one of them. E.g., we are accustomed to say that Socrates is a man, just as Plato and each one of us, and also that every man is a living being, while every living being is an animate body. Thus we consider Socrates to be a particular individual and a primary

2b7–28

²³⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–29. Philoponus states that Aristotle wishes “to sing praise (ἐξυμνήσαι) to primary substance and to demonstrate that it is properly (καλῶς) said to be substance primarily”.

²³⁵ Cf. §§91, 354–355, and 365, where Sergius discusses various Syriac terms for quality. Here, he applies both *zna* and *muzzaga* as synonyms.

²³⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–41.17; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–56.12. Ammonius stresses (*In Cat.* 41.16–17) that, while Aristotle makes primary substance more honorable than both universals and accidents, the philosopher makes a distinction between them, applying the expression “to be said of” to universals and “to subsist in” to accidents (καλῶς ἔταξεν ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου τὸ λέγεται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι τὸ ἔσται). Since in the whole Book III Sergius does not comment on these expressions which appear in the text of the *Categories*, but speaks instead of universals, particulars, accidents etc., he does not focus on the distinction between predication and subsistence.

substance and predicate a general species of him, i.e. that he is a man, and further predicate a general genus of the general species, i.e. that a man is a living being or that a man is animate²³⁷.

189 Thus, as we have said, genera are predicated of species, while species (are predicated) of particular individuals which are primary substances. The secondary substances, on the other hand, are genera and species that are predicated of primary substances. This makes it apparent to everyone that, if there were no primary substance, then there would be nothing of which secondary substance might be predicated. That is why Aristotle states that primary substance is greater than all accidents, and also greater than secondary substances, which are genera and species. It is greater than accidents, on the one hand, since they have their subsistence in it, and it is greater than the secondary substances, on the other, since, even though they are universals, they are predicated of the primary (substances), and if the latter did not exist, there would be nothing that they might be predicated of, so that they would remain as if non-existent²³⁸.

190 So, after he has praised primary substance as superior to everything, he says that, since secondary substance is divided into species and genera, we ought to know that something that exists as a species is in turn greater than what exists as a genus. Though it is inferior to primary (substance), since it is proximate to it, it is superior to the one which is remote from it²³⁹.

237 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 41.26–42.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 57.24–25.

238 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.7–13.

239 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 42.10–20; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.5–17.

191 That species stands closer to primary substance than genus is evident to everyone. For if someone is asked what is Socrates, he will naturally answer that he is a man. If, in turn, he is asked what is man, then he will give an answer that it is animated and rational living being. Thus, for the first question he will take a species in order to characterize Socrates, who is a primary substance, while for the second one he will make use of a certain genus. This makes apparent that species are closer to primary substance than genera, and because of this he stated that the former are greater than the latter²⁴⁰. Further, he said that (species) are greater than (genera) due to the fact that genera require species of which they are predicated, while species do not require genera, for they are not predicated of the latter but are only encompassed by them.

[Accidents are not tertiary substances]

192 So after that, one may be inclined to turn back to what (Aristotle) has stated before and perhaps raise the following puzzle: If particular individuals are primary substances, while species and genera are secondary substances, why are accidents not also called tertiary substances? He resolves this puzzle in an indirect and obscure manner²⁴¹. However, as we have expounded above, we shall not simply repeat without understanding what has been written by him, but shall try to interpret it with the power of our intellect by means of reasonable demonstrations, so that what is written might become clear to everyone. 2b29–3a6

193 Now, the puzzle which we just mentioned may be solved in two ways which make apparent that it is not proper to call accidents substances. One way of solving this puzzle is the following. Species and genera are naturally predicated

²⁴⁰ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.21–25.

²⁴¹ Aristotle does not explicitly mention this puzzle. However, as is explained in the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, its solution may be deduced from the philosopher's words. For the solution's two approaches, the one from the relation of accidents to primary substances and the other from analogy, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–44.4 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–63.9. Sergius' account turns out in some details to be closer to Philoponus rather than to Ammonius.

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1 ושלום CLP, Epit.: ושלום BD 2 כחכמה BCDL, Epit.: כחכמה P 3 ושלום P,
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 CDLP, Epit.: ושלום B 15 ושלום LP, Epit.: ושלום BCD 16 ושלום BDL: ושלום P 17 ושלום¹ LP, Epit.:
 ושלום BD | ושלום² LP, Epit.: ושלום BD 19 ושלום BDP, Epit.: ושלום L

of substances, which are primary in the proper and principal sense, and they resolve questions about them by signifying them, but accidents never work like that. What I mean is this. Socrates, Alcibiades, and others like them are particular individuals and they are called primary substances. So, when someone asks what Socrates or Alcibiades is, the immediate answer would be that each one of them is a man, and also living and animate. Thus, it is by means of species and genera, which are secondary substances, that you pose questions about primary substances and by means of them you signify them²⁴².

194 But if to that person who asked what is Socrates or what is Alcibiades an answer were given that he is white, or black, or bald, or tall, or any of those things that are concomitant (for them) accidentally and not by nature, then it will be apparent that it does not signify what the person is about whom the question was raised. So it has become evident by now that species and genera signify by nature particular individuals that are primary substances, while accidents never work like that. That is why the Philosopher has properly established species and genera as secondary substances, but he does not call accidents substances, since, as we have said, they are naturally unable to signify for us what is found in species and genera, when we ask about a primary substance²⁴³.

242 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–26: νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν λέγει δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη δευτέραι οὐσίαι λέγονται, οὐκέτι δὲ τρίτας οὐσίας λέγει τὰ συμβεβηκότα. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν κατασκευάζει διχῶς, ἕκ τε τῆς σχέσεως τῆς πρὸς τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς σχέσεως, ὅτι τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας ἀποδιδόντες οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν διὰ μόνου τοῦ γένους ἢ τοῦ εἶδους ἀποδιδόντες· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτην ἀνθρωπῶν εἰρηκότες ἢ ζῶον οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν καὶ γνωριμώτερον... (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–20).

243 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.26–29: ...ἐὰν δὲ ὅτι λευκὸς ἢ τρέχει ἢ τι τοιοῦτον εἴπωμεν, ἀλλοτρίως καὶ ἀγνωστῶς ἀποδώσομεν. εἰκότως οὖν τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη δευτέρας οὐσίας λέγομεν ἅτε μόνα σημαίνοντα τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ὅλως οὐ φαμεν οὐσίας ἅτε μὴ δηλοῦντα τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.20–22).

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1 om L, Epit.: BDP | רישׁו] om. B | אֶחָד] om. BD 2 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD
 3 יָרֵךְ LP, Epit.: יָרֵךְ BD | אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ BLP, Epit.: אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ D | נִמְצֵא LP, Epit.: נִמְצֵא BDP, Epit.: נִמְצֵא L 4 נִמְצֵא BLP, Epit.: נִמְצֵא D 6 אֶרְבָּעָה L: אֶרְבָּעָה BD:
 אֶרְבָּעָה Epit.: אֶרְבָּעָה P 9 אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ] + אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ LP, Epit.: אֶרְבָּעָה BD
 10 אֶחָד] om. P 13 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD 15 אַרְבָּעָה¹ LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD
 אַרְבָּעָה² LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD 18 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD 19 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.:
 אַרְבָּעָה BD 20 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD | אֶל L, Epit.: אֶל P: אֶל P: אֶל BD
 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD 21 אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ BDL: אֶלְעֵלֶיךָ P | אֶחָד LP: אֶחָד BD

195 Another way, then, to solve this puzzle is the following. Particular individuals are called principle and primary substances, because, as he states, they are subjects for species and genera which are always attached to them, since, if there is a particular individual of any kind, then genera and species are always attached to it. For instance, if there is Plato or Aristophanes, it is obvious that there is also man, living being, and animate, which are species and genera. Thus, particular individuals serve as subjects for species and genera through which they are made known and which are predicated of them. Also, species and genera, which are secondary substances, are subjects for accidents which occur to them. Accidents, on the other hand, do not appear to be subjects of anything else that would occur to them or be known through them²⁴⁴.

196 So, from this, it becomes apparent that, while particular individuals are called primary and principle substances, since they are subjects to species and genera which subsist in them, and further species and genera are called secondary substances, since they are naturally predicated of primary substances and since they serve as subjects for accidents which subsist in them and are made known through them, accidents, on the other hand, are subjects for nothing else that would subsist in them but they themselves always require substances in order to subsist in them, — it is reasonable, then, that species and genera are called secondary substances after the primary ones, while accidents are not considered to be tertiary substances and not even mentioned in the order (τάξις) of substance²⁴⁵.

[Definition of substance]

197 Now, having established the order of substance, having explained which 3a7 kind of it is primary and which one is secondary, and having demonstrated

244 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.3–10: οὗτο τὸ δεῦτερον ἐπιχείρημα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. φησὶ δὲ ὅτι ὄν τρόπον αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται πᾶσι τοῖς παρ' αὐτάς, οὕτως καὶ αἱ δεῦτεραι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν Σωκράτην φιλόσοφον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον φιλόσοφον λέγομεν καὶ ζῶον φιλόσοφον. ὥστε καὶ αἱ δεῦτεραι οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι, καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορεῖται, ὡς φησι καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος, κατὰ δεῦτερον δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν. τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐδέποτε ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπόκεινται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.24–44.4).

245 Cf. a more elaborated version of the same argument in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.10–63.9. See particularly Philoponus' conclusion in 63.6–9: εἰκότως οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἐκλήθησαν τρίται οὐσίαι τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἅτε μὴ ὑποκείμενά τινα πρὸς ὑπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν οὐσία κατὰ συμβεβηκότος κατηγορῆται, παρὰ φύσιν <φαιμέν> εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην κατηγορίαν.

clearly that the primary one is principal and the secondary one is second in the order in its subsistence, while accidents may in no way be called substances, — after that, the Philosopher wishes to give a definition of the substance about which he teaches in the treatise *Categories*²⁴⁶. For the proper sequence of this teaching requires that one first makes divisions of that issue which he wants to speak about and after that precisely defines it by carefully drawing its limits based on everything that was firmly established in the divisions²⁴⁷.

198 This is also the order in which he proceeds, for he first teaches on substance by way of division and in so doing he always consequently defines it. But since every definition that is correctly made always sets a genus as its principle and foundation, it is obvious that one is not able to provide a proper definition of substance, which is not only a genus but a most generic genus, for it is impossible for a man to find another genus that might be set as a principle of its definition²⁴⁸.

199 For if, as we have said, every definition takes genera of things as its beginning and foundation, it is apparent for everyone that in that case where no genus of a thing may be taken, it becomes impossible to make a definition either. And because there is no other genus above substance which may be predicated of it, since it is a most generic genus, it is obvious that a man is never able to provide its proper definition, as he does not have another genus which he might take and make a foundation of the definition.

200 What then? Since the sequence of teaching required that Aristotle provide after the division of substance also a defining account of it, but we have just

246 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.6–8: διελών τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς τε τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν δευτέραν καὶ παραβαλὼν αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας, νῦν εὐτάκτως ποιῶν τὸν ὀρισμὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.12–14).

247 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. While commenting on *Isag.* 1.5, Ammonius talks about four methods of reasoning: division, definition, demonstration, and analysis/synthesis.

248 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.14–17: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ οὐσία γένος ἐστὶ γενικώτατον, ὀρισμὸν αὐτῆς οὐ δύναται ἀποδοῦναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς ἐκ γενῶν καὶ διαφορῶν λαμβάνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ἀπλῆς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι γένος εὐρεῖν διὰ τό, ὡς εἴρηται, γένος εἶναι αὐτὴν γενικώτατον (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.8–10). Sergius does not mention differentiae here, but does below, in §513.

shown that it is impossible to carry out a definition of substance, has his teaching about it become crippled and obstructed, or has the order of his account that requires that one always provide a definition after a division become confused? Not at all. But since he truly grasped that no definition of substance is possible, he reasonably refrained from giving a definition — which is, as we have said, always composed of genus and of other things which are concomitant to it²⁴⁹ — and turned to the property²⁵⁰ of substance which serves here in the function of a definition²⁵¹.

201 And this is what he did not by chance but with great skill, since property in its nature more than anything else resembles definition. For a definition, as we have already said above²⁵², does not exist unless it is convertible with what it defines. For instance, everything that is a man is a mortal rational animal, and everything that is a mortal rational animal is a man. In the same way as definition a property always converts with that whose property it is²⁵³. We will explain this by means of examples shortly afterwards.

202 Thus, since property, as we have said, always resembles a definition, the Philosopher gives the property of substance instead of its definition in his whole teaching on it. In so doing, he provides us with a general rule (κανών), that every time when we are compelled to give a definition of something but are unable to do it, we shall refrain from a defining account and turn to the property of things, which will in case of insufficiency perform sufficient service. But since we mentioned property but have not until now explained at all what it is, it is necessary for us not to pass by hastily but to dwell on it, lest the order (τάξις) of the exposition of the teaching be confused.

249 The last expression by Sergius refers to the constitutive differentia. Cf. the quotation from Philoponus in the previous footnote.

250 Or a distinctive feature, Gr. τὸ ἴδιον, Lat. *proprium*.

251 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–18.

252 See §154.

253 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–24.

[Property]²⁵⁴

203 So, let us now bring our account of substance to a halt, going briefly beyond it, and turn to the division of the property, also explaining clearly what it is, how many types of it are defined, and when and where it comes to be, so that, after we have explained in general the whole notion of it, then we will apply it without fear, since we will properly understand it. It appears not only in the teaching on substance, but also in all other treatises and writings produced by the Philosopher, as well as by certain other authors. Thus, as soon as we learn what property is in general and of what kind it is, we may obviously make concrete use of it, while nothing will hinder us in understanding it, since general knowledge is easily and without obstacle combined with particular cases.

204 Now, we find in the writings of the ancients that types of property are altogether four²⁵⁵. However, only one of them is fully and precisely property, while the other three are used in a secondary and more common sense everywhere without distinction. So, the first kind of property is what occurs to one species alone as a whole, while it turns out not to exist actually in every particular individual that is encompassed by it. For instance, knowledge of medicine, philosophy, geometry, and any other particular discipline occurs only to the whole species of men, although it does not pertain to every person but only to those who have received particular education. Thus, it is called a

254 After §203, mss. BD have the subtitle: “On what property is and how many types of it exist, which one is called (property) in the strict sense and which one figuratively.”

255 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–22 as commented by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 108.22–110.6 and Elias, *In Isag.* 89.4–90.28. Sergius’ account follows closely what we find in the commentary on the *Isagoge* ascribed to Ammonius.

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בְּיָדָם וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר בְּיָדָם.

וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר בְּיָדָם וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר
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בְּיָדָם וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר בְּיָדָם. 25
וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר בְּיָדָם וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר
בְּיָדָם וְעַתָּה הוּא מְעוֹרָר בְּיָדָם.

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1 [מִתְּחִלָּה] om. B 5 [מְעוֹרָר] DLP, Epit.: [מְעוֹרָר] B 6 [וְעַתָּה] + [וְעַתָּה] BD 9 [וְעַתָּה] + [וְעַתָּה] BD | [וְעַתָּה] L 12 [וְעַתָּה] om. hom. B 14 [וְעַתָּה] om. D
[וְעַתָּה] om. BD 17 [וְעַתָּה] LP, Epit.: [וְעַתָּה] BD | [וְעַתָּה] + [וְעַתָּה] BD 19 [וְעַתָּה] + [וְעַתָּה] P
20 [וְעַתָּה] BDE: [וְעַתָּה] P: [וְעַתָּה] L: [וְעַתָּה] Epit. 23 [וְעַתָּה] DLP, Epit.: [וְעַתָּה] B | [וְעַתָּה] BDP, Epit.: [וְעַתָּה] L

property of the human species, because it belongs to it alone and does not occur to any other species²⁵⁶.

205 Further, the second kind of property is what occurs to all individuals that are in a species, while it pertains not only to them but also to some other species. For instance, man is biped and this is what occurs to all men. Thus, we say that this is proper to them for it belongs to all of them, although there are many birds that are biped as well²⁵⁷.

206 Further, the third kind of property is what occurs to the whole species and also to individuals in it, although it occurs to them not always but at a certain time only, for instance turning grey in old age. For this is what occurs to the species of men alone and to all of them, although not always but during old age, as we have said. Hence, this is also proper to men alone, for it does not occur to any other species save for it²⁵⁸.

207 So, the fourth kind of property, which is truly property in the strict sense, contains all of it at once, i.e. it occurs to the whole species and to all individuals in it, and also not sometimes but always, while it is not attributed to any other species or individual except those ones that it is spoken of. For example, laughing for men, neighing for horses, barking for dogs, and other things like that occur to one species alone and to all individuals in this species, and it occurs to them not sometimes but always. For even if a man is not actually

256 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–14. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.13–15: καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μὲν σημαινόμενον καὶ πρῶτον ὁ μόνῳ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεῦειν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν τὸ γεωμετερεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων.

257 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.14–15. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.15–17: δεῦτερον δὲ ὁ παντὶ μὲν, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πετεινοῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ δίποσιν εἶναι.

258 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.16–17. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.17–19: τρίτον δὲ ὁ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ ἀλλὰ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιούσθαι· μόνῳ γὰρ καὶ παντὶ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεὶ πεπολιώται, ἀλλ’ ἐν γήρᾳ.

laughing, he is nevertheless called capable of laughter, since he has this ability potentially and any time he wants can make it actual²⁵⁹.

208 Thus, we say that the first kind of property is the one which occurs to one particular species but not to all of it. For instance, sciences belong to the nature of human beings, even if not all of them learn them. The second kind is the one which occurs to all of a species but not only to it, as being a biped belongs to human beings. For although this is characteristic of all human beings, it occurs also to birds. Furthermore, the third kind is the one that occurs to one species alone and to all of it, however not always but at a certain time, as turning grey in old age. For this is characteristic of the species of man alone and also of all of the species, though it occurs to them not always but when they grow old. The fourth kind, which is the property in the strict sense, is the one which occurs to one species only, and to all of it, and always, as when we speak of human beings being capable of laughter or of horses being capable of neighing. For each one of these occurs to one species alone, to all of a species, and always²⁶⁰.

209 So, for the sake of learning and training in words, let us put it also as follows. The first kind of property is what occurs to one species but not to all of it. The second one is what occurs to all of a species but not to it alone. Further, the third one is what belongs to one species and to all of it but not always. And property in the strict sense is the fourth one, in which all these things coincide, namely that it occurs to one species alone, and to all of it, and not at a certain time but always. So, this is the property strictly and truly²⁶¹.

259 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.17–20. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.19–23: τέταρτον δὲ ἐφ’ οὗ συνδεδράμηκε καὶ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικόν καὶ κυνὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν. τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν· οὐ γὰρ καθὼς γελᾷ ἢ χρεμετίζει, γελαστικόν λέγεται ἢ χρεμετιστικόν, ἀλλὰ καθὼς πέφυκε.

260 In this paragraph, Sergius’ summary of the four kinds of property is particularly close to Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.19–23, quoted above.

261 Cf. the schematic division suggested by Ammonius in *In Isag.* 109.9–12.

210 Similar to definition, property always converts in the figure (σχῆμα) of speech with what it relates to²⁶². For every human being is capable of laughter, and all that is capable of laughter is a human being. Similarly, all that is capable of neighing is a horse, and everything that is a horse is capable of neighing. And in all other cases like that properties are in the same way reciprocally related to what they belong²⁶³. But (the figures of speech of) three other kinds of property do not reciprocate in themselves like that, and thus they should be called properties not in the true and strict sense like this one, but rather figuratively. And that these figures of speech do not reciprocate will be clear from what follows.

211 So, the first (kind of property) is what belongs to one species but not to all of it, as sciences to human nature, and it does not reciprocate. For everyone who has knowledge of sciences is a human being, but not every human being has knowledge of sciences, since there are many who have not learned them. Likewise, the second (kind) which belongs to all of a species but not to it alone, as when a man is called a biped: all that is man is designated as biped, but not every biped is a man. And similarly also with the third kind which belongs to one species and to all of it at a certain time, for all that turns grey is a man but not every man necessarily turns grey.

212 Hence, as we have said, none of these kinds converts in itself and because of this they are called properties in a loose sense. The fourth one, on the other hand, since it converts in itself, as we have shown, is truly property. It is in every respect similar to the nature of definitions because it pertains exclusively

262 Cf. Ammonius and David on definitions: Ammonius, *In Isag.* 88.22–26; David, *Prolegomena* 15.27. In his commentary on *Isag.* 12.13–22, Ammonius does not go into the question how properties may be applied for definitions. However, Elias dwells on this issue in Elias, *In Isag.* 89.9–11: ὀρισμὸν γὰρ μιμεῖται καὶ ὑπογραφὴν τῷ ἀντιστρέφειν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὀρισμὸν μιμεῖται, οὐσιῶδες, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑπογραφὴν, ἐπεισοδιῶδες· ἢ γὰρ ὑπογραφὴ ἐκ συμβεβηκότων.

263 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.20–22. Elias in his commentary on this passage again elaborates the question of the application of properties in definitions, since it is both characteristic of definitions and of some of the properties that they reciprocate with what they are related to, see Elias, *In Isag.* 90.14–28.

to one species, to all of it, and always, as it is also the case with definitions, and further, it is always convertible in the figure of speech, as they do too²⁶⁴. Hence, since nothing else appears as akin to the nature of definitions as the property in the strict sense, Aristotle instructs us that every time when we are compelled to give definitions but are unable to do this we ought to apply this kind of property instead of defining method²⁶⁵. For it is what he applies here for the first time, in the teaching on substance, making use of it in the whole account instead of a definition and by means of it defining and establishing the concept of substance.

[*Properties of substance*]

- 213 Now that we have explained why it was necessary that Aristotle made use of the properties of substance instead of defining it, we shall return to the order of the exposition. So, the first property²⁶⁶ which Aristotle sets out is the following: substance is what is not in something else but everything is in it²⁶⁷. Further, its nature does not need to be subsistent in something else, but all other things, which are generally speaking accidents and speaking particularly are nine other genera of the categories, have subsistence in it. For substance is truly subject for everything else whose nature is beyond it and it is receptive to all accidents, while nothing else is a subject for it (as something) in which its nature might subsist, but it is sufficient for its own subsistence, and hence there are also things that may have subsistence in it. 3a7–21
- 214 However, someone critically examining what has been said may polemically suggest a counter-argument by saying²⁶⁸: “Look, the secondary substances, which are genera and species, have subsistence of their nature in the primary 3a21–28

264 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–21: διὰ τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἀποδίδωσιν· ἔοικε γὰρ τοῦτο ὀρισμῶ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὀρισμὸς μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἔστιν ὀρισμὸς, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ἀντιστρέφει, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἴδιον μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἔστιν ἴδιον, καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα. διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15).

265 Cf. §§200–201, above.

266 Aristotle is speaking of what is “common” (κοινὸν) to all substances, admitting later on (see *Cat.* 3a21) that this characteristic is also shared by differentiae. Ammonius suggests, however, that there is no contradiction here, since what Aristotle meant at this point was “belonging to all substances” (*In Cat.* 44.19–21, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.24–31). Sergius apparently accepts Ammonius’ interpretation of this passage.

267 Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 3a7–8: κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι.

268 Aristotle himself anticipates the counter-argument mentioned by Sergius in *Cat.* 2a21–28, suggesting a distinction be made between the substance and the differentia (διαφορά). In so doing, according to Ammonius, Aristotle states that differentiae are not accidents but substances (see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.7–46.19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 64.9–68.9).

substances, which are particular individuals. Do not we assume from this that the nature of the secondary substances has subsistence in the primary ones, which brings to nought the statement which has been made that substance does not subsist in anything else but is self-sufficient for its own subsistence?"²⁶⁹

215 In response to this we shall say the following. If secondary substances have their own subsistence in the primary ones, it becomes necessary to take also accidents into account, thus (assuming that Aristotle) intended to say in this passage also how they subsist. But this is clearly wrong, for it is obvious to everyone that, when species and genera are predicated of a primary substance, they share with it their names and definitions. Accidents, however, are never able to have this effect, but some of them do not even share their name with the substance which they are predicated of. And even if there are among them such ones that sometimes provide (a substance) with their name, no accident is ever able to share the definition of its nature with the substance which it is predicated of.

216 What I mean is this. Universal man, which is a species, and also animate, which is the genus of this species, are predicated of Socrates, who is a particular individual and a particular substance, and they provide him with their name and their definition, for Socrates is called man and animate, and also the definitions of man and animate are said of Socrates. Whiteness or blackness, on the other hand, or any other accident sometimes do not even provide the substance of which they are predicated with their names, neither do they ever provide it with their definitions. For even if a body is called white or black due to some whiteness or blackness in it, the definition of each one of these colours

269 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.21–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.13–16.

is different from that of the thing which they are predicated of, and it is never possible that the definition of one of these qualities will fit the substance it is predicated of. For otherwise, substance and accident will prove to be one and the same thing, which cannot be.

217 Thus, another property concomitant of substance is²⁷⁰, as we have just said, 3a33–3b9 that it shares its name and its definition with everything it is predicated of²⁷¹. This is characteristic, namely, of none of the other nine genera, save for substance alone. For quantity, quality, and the rest of them sometimes do not even provide with their names what they are predicated of, and sometimes, even if they do provide it with their names — for instance, the body containing whiteness is called white or the one containing sweetness is called sweet — still they never share their definitions with what is receptive of them. Substance, on the other hand, makes everything it is predicated of a partaker in both its name and its definition²⁷². Thus, universal man that is predicated of Socrates makes him a partaker in both its name and definition, for Socrates is called a man, and the definition of man fits him. And in the same way every substance that is predicated of something provides it with its name and its definition.

218 However, this property does not seem to pertain to all substances, but only to the secondary ones, namely species and genera, for they are predicated of primary substances, which are particular individuals. The latter, however, have nothing else beneath them of which they might be predicated. For Socrates and Plato are not predicated of anything else, while universal man that is a species,

270 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 69.22–23: ἐπὶ δεύτερον παρακολούθημα μεταβαίνει τῆς οὐσίας καταγνούς τοῦ προτέρου (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.19).

271 In the corresponding passage, Aristotle says that it is a characteristic of both substances and differentiae that things predicated of them are called synonymously (συνωνύμως). Sergius neither applies this term in his commentary nor mentions the differentiae, but stresses instead that the property in question is exclusively characteristic of substance. Ammonius and Philoponus are eager to stress that differentiae here should be understood as substances too and not as accidents, so it is natural that Sergius apparently subsumes them under the category of substance and does not mention them explicitly.

272 See *Cat.* 2a20. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.27–28: τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορουμένοις τὸ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. See also §120 where Sergius speaks of synonyms as things which share both name and definition.

living being and animate that are genera and species, and on up until substance that is a universal genus are predicated of them and of each other²⁷³. That is why we shall put it as follows: it is a characteristic of every substance which is predicated of something that it provides the latter with its name and its definition. In this way, our account will become correct and it will be universal.

219 After this²⁷⁴, Aristotle solves a certain problem which someone might wish to raise against him, when he says that we should not be confused by the fact that the parts of substance are in substance. One might state that, since accidents are in substance and also the parts of substance are in substance, the parts of substance are therefore accidents as well. But, although substance is composed of parts, substance would thus become one of the accidents, which is impossible²⁷⁵. 3a29–32

220 Now, let us recall what we have defined above when we stated that one says that a thing can be in something else in eleven ways, and one of them was as parts of something in the whole, while another one was as accidents in substance²⁷⁶. Thus, even though parts of substance are in substance and also accidents have subsistence in substance, nevertheless the mode (of being in something) as parts and the one (of being in something) as accidents differ from one another. For parts are something through what and from what is constituted the nature of substance in which they are. Accidents, on the other hand, are not complete of the substance they are in, but on the contrary, they are completed by the substance and have their subsistence in it²⁷⁷.

221 However, it should be known that some parts of substance are intelligible and some are perceptible²⁷⁸. The perceptible parts of primary substance are what become subject to sense. For instance, the feet, the thighs, the belly, the

273 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.26–48.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.3–22.

274 In the transmitted text of the *Categories*, this argument precedes the characteristic of substance discussed by Sergius in §§217–218. Philoponus, however, notes that “some of the commentators” suggest that this passage of the *Categories* should be placed before 3a21–28, where Aristotle makes a distinction between substance and differentia (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.23–29). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.5–13 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 97.2–23. Both Ammonius and Simplicius reject this suggestion and defend the order of Aristotle’s text. However, their notes make it possible that Sergius’ remark is based on an alternative commentary tradition.

275 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.25–47.24 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.16–69.19.

276 See §§138–149, above.

277 Cf. Philoponus on substances, differentiae, and accidents: ὅτι δὲ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ὁμολογουμένως αἱ διαφοραὶ, δῆλον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ συμπληρωτικῆς αὐτὰς εἶναι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ οὐσιωδῶς κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ συμπληροῦσι τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ δηλονότι· οὐ γὰρ συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα (*In Cat.* 66.13–16).

278 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17: φαμέν οὖν ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ νοηταὶ αἱ δὲ αἰσθηταί.

breast, the hands, and the head are such parts of the body. The intelligible parts of both a particular and universal man, on the other hand, are being reasonable, living, and animate. For both a particular and universal man is composed of them and they are his parts which are completive of the subsistence of his nature. Thus, while both intelligible and perceptible parts are in substance, they are not in the same way in it as accidents are, but in a different one, as we have said shortly before²⁷⁹.

222 Further, another property concomitant of substance is, as the Philosopher says, that it “signifies a particular this”²⁸⁰. It is an expression of pointing out, as if one would point with a finger at something which has individual subsistence²⁸¹. So, “a particular this” points out an individual which falls under our senses and is clearly perceived²⁸². But this is not characteristic of accidents, since they are comprehended and differentiated from substance by means of intellect only and not by means of senses. But neither does it seem to be a concomitant of every substance, since secondary substance, which is, as has been shown, species and genera, does not fall under sensation, and it does not signify one thing either, since it is multiple things that a species encompass, (to say nothing of) a genus (which encompasses) many more than it. Thus, it turns out that this property too is a concomitant not of every substance, but only of the primary, which is particular individuals, as we have demonstrated earlier²⁸³.

223 After this, he sets out another property as a concomitant of substance, when he says that it seems that “it is also characteristic of substance that there is nothing contrary to it”²⁸⁴. No substance, indeed, has a contrary. For what

279 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17–46.10.

280 *Cat.* 3b10: τὸδε τι σημαίνειν. The quotation by Sergius does not correspond to the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* (which is generally the case with Sergius’ text), but matches exactly with the version that George bishop of the Arabs produced in the early 8th century, which makes possible that George was familiar with Sergius’ *Commentary*.

281 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 48.15–16: καὶ ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ τὸδε τῆς δειξέως σημαντικόν, τὸ δὲ τὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.18–19.

282 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.1–2: τὸ γὰρ τὸδε τι λέγεται ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῆς ἀτόμου τῆς φαινομένης. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.20–21.

283 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.3–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 72.1–4.

284 See *Cat.* 3b24–25: ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. The quotation by Sergius again does not match fully with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*, although both versions apply here the term *dalqubla* as an equivalent to the Gr. ἐναντίος, “contrary”. In §419, where Sergius makes a distinction between opposition and contrariety, he applies this term as a translation of the Gr. ἀντικείμεθα, “being opposite”, with the term *saqqublay* for ἐναντίος. However, both here and in what follows (see §304) Sergius makes use of the term *dalqubla* in the sense of contrary, which reflects the same tradition that is found in the anonymous Syriac translation.

might someone think of as contrary to Socrates in that he is Socrates, or contrary to Aristotle in that he is Aristotle, or in general contrary to man in that it is man? For it is not as hotness is contrary to coldness, or as whiteness to blackness, or as sweetness to bitterness that a man is contrary to a man in that he is man, or to any other particular thing. Neither is anything else contrary to him in that he is man. For every contrariety and opposition²⁸⁵ exists among qualities, i.e. among colours, tastes, and other things like that, while substance is receptive of all them. Thus, nothing is contrary to it and it is not contrary to anything²⁸⁶.

224 However, this too seems to be characteristic not of substance alone, but of quantity as well, since there is nothing contrary to it either, unless someone says that large is contrary to small, or that the number fifteen is contrary to the number ten because the former is bigger than the latter. For, as the Philosopher demonstrates later on, these things are not contrary to each other but belong to the genus of relatives, since each one of them is said in this way due to their relation to something else, and they do not have any subsistence as contraries. Thus, since they are not contraries either, as we are going to demonstrate in the account of them, it is obvious that, as we have said, not only do contraries not pertain to substance, but neither (do they pertain) to quantity²⁸⁷.

225 Further, he states that it is a concomitant of substance that it is not said to be more and less²⁸⁸. It follows from the previous one, because, if there is nothing contrary to substance, than it is obvious that neither does it admit of a 3b33–4a9

285 Syriac *dalqublayuta w-saqqublayuta*. Sergius applies these Syriac terms the other way around in §419, while defining contrariety as one of the types of opposition.

286 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.13–27.

287 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.13–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.27–75.10.

288 Cf. *Cat.* 3b33–34: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχασθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

more and a less. For it is always through the lessening of one of the contraries that another one becomes more²⁸⁹. For instance, every time that black changes into white or bitter into sweet, it is through the lessening of blackness that the increase of whiteness happens, and also it is through the lessening of bitterness that the increase of sweetness happens. And likewise, the lessening of whiteness and sweetness leads to the enlargement and increase of bitterness and blackness. Hence, what is sweet or white admits of more and less even without what is contrary to them. For it is said of one and the same thing that it is white and that it became more white, and also that it is sweet and became more sweet, and in the same way of every quality. It becomes obvious from this that more and less appear where there is opposition²⁹⁰.

226 But this is not the case for substance. For Socrates is never said to be more or less Socrates or to be more or less a man. Neither is Plato said to be more a man than Socrates or that Socrates is less than Plato, since each one of them is a man. However, it is possible to say that one and the same man is sometimes greater in virtue, wisdom and any other qualities and sometimes not. And in the same way, it is possible to say about different things that one of them is more or less than the other. But about being a man, one may never apply a more and a less speaking of himself, neither may this be said of another person. Hence it becomes clear that substance does not admit of a more and a less²⁹¹.

227 Though, as he says, it is not the case that one substance is not greater than the other — since he established the primary substance as greater and more

289 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.10–13: ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἐν τούτοις τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐναντιότης: ὑφέσει γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τίκεται τὸ μαχόμενον. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 75.14–17.

290 Philoponus (*In Cat.* 75.17–30) specifies that not all contraries admit of a more and a less, but only “those which are naturally able to be mixed with one another” (ὅσα τῶν ἐναντίων πέφυκε μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις).

291 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.18–51.3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 76.2–77.9.

principle than the secondary one — still it becomes apparent that in relation to itself the same substance is never said to be more and less. However, I suppose that this too is not a property of substance only, but of quantity as well. For number ten too does not admit of a more and a less in that it is number ten. But if one adds to it or subtracts from it, it will become another number and not remain the same number ten which becomes more or less²⁹².

228 The last of all properties which he sets out as an attendant of substance is the fact that “what is one and the same is receptive of contraries”²⁹³. Substance is indeed receptive of all contraries but not simultaneously. For it is not possible that one and the same substance be receptive of whiteness and blackness or sweetness and bitterness simultaneously, but rather (it may be receptive) at some time of one thing and at another time of the other. And it will be receptive of them not in the same way as qualities, for qualities are not receptive of one another, but when one of them perishes the other one comes to be. For instance, blackness is not receptive of whiteness, but when the former perishes the latter comes to be. Similarly, hotness too is not receptive of coldness, but the dissolution of the former results in the appearance of the latter. 4a10–21

229 This, however, is not the case for substance. Rather, while its nature by itself remains without change²⁹⁴, it receives all the contraries, as we have said, though not simultaneously but one at a time. Thus, Socrates, who always remains one and the same, is able to be sometimes white and sometimes black, sometimes warm and sometimes cold, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise, and similarly with everything else. Hence, it is an attendant feature of substance only that, while it is the same and one, it may be receptive of contraries²⁹⁵.

292 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 77.10–24.

293 See *Cat.* 4a10–11: τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὄν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. As was previously the case, the quotation does not match with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*. It has no equivalent for the word ἀριθμῷ, and it is thus likely that the quotation derives from the Greek commentary which Sergius utilized for his work, cf. the omission of ἀριθμῷ by Ammonius in *In Cat.* 52.12.

294 Literally: “without corruption”. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.6–7: ταῦτόν δὲ ἵνα μὴ μεταβάλλῃ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–10).

295 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.5–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–80.12.

- 230 Here, however, one might object that this is not only attendant on substance, but also on any statement uttered by means of words and also of a belief²⁹⁶. For when someone states that Socrates is sitting or believes it about him, if the latter happens to be sitting then the statement and the belief about it will be true, but if he happens not to be sitting then both of them will be false. Hence both a statement and a belief, while each one of them remains the same and one, are receptive of contraries, namely of truth and falsity²⁹⁷. 4a22–27
- 231 However, it is not in the same way that substance is receptive of contraries and that one speaks here of a statement and a belief. For substance remains by itself when it receives contraries²⁹⁸, as we have said, but this does not hold at all for statements and beliefs. A statement, namely, perishes in the same moment when it is uttered, and also a belief has no independent existence at all. That is why they are not receptive of contraries either, but each one of them becomes associated with the truth and falsity of real things, because if the thing really is as a statement or a belief say then they are true, but if it is not then they are false²⁹⁹. 4a28–4b19

[Conclusion]

- 232 Now, with all that has been said thus far, the Philosopher fulfilled the need for a definition of substance, as we have said above. So, since it proves impossible for a person to provide its definition, because it is a primary genus, he ought to turn to the properties attendant on it through which he should

²⁹⁶ Aristotle himself anticipates this objection, so that Sergius' text looks as a paraphrase of the corresponding passage of the *Cat.* 4a22–23: εἰ μὴ τις ἐνίστατο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

²⁹⁷ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 52.16–53.6; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 80.24–81.9.

²⁹⁸ Sergius again paraphrases Aristotle's text, see *Cat.* 4a29–30: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

²⁹⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 53.20–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 81.22–82.23.

teach about it according to his ability. For it is distinctive property, as we have shown in this book³⁰⁰, that is more similar to definition than anything else.

233 Also, you shall always remember that our teaching here pertains not to all substances which exist but to those ones which are composite and visible, and it skilfully contributes to the knowledge of those who have recently started their education³⁰¹.

End of Book Three.

Further, the divisions of Book Three

First division

Everything that is in something else is said:

- either as in a time,
- or as in a place,
- or as in a container,
- or as parts in a whole,
- or as a whole in its parts,
- or as species in a genus,
- or as a genus in species,
- or as forms in matter,
- or as the governing in the governor,
- or as in an end,
- or as an accident in a substance.

³⁰⁰ I.e. in Book III of the *Commentary*.

³⁰¹ See §§173–176, where Sergius explains in detail the types of substances and specifies which ones among them are the subject of the *Categories*. Cf. also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17–46.10, where Ammonius explains why Aristotle made no mention of differentiae in the *Categories*.

P55r

פאלך ד.ה.ז.י.מ

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ:

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ

אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

5 אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים
טובות וחסד

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ

מלכותו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

אשר לא יראו עינינו - אהבה ורחמים

B110v |
D91v

פאלך ד.ה.ז.י.מ

הנהגתו כדרכו

אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

אשר לא יראו עינינו - אהבה ורחמים

אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

15

אשר לא יראו עינינו

אין הנהגתו כדרכו

אשר לא יראו עינינו - אהבה ורחמים

אשר לא יראו עינינו

אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

20

אשר לא יראו עינינו

1 פאלך BP: פאלך D | +ד.ה.ז.י.מ BD 2 הענין P: הענין BD 3 הענין
הענין P: הענין BD 4 הענין P: הענין BD 5 הענין BP: הענין D
8 הענין B: הענין DP 9 הענין P: הענין BD 12 אין הנהגתו] om. P 13 אהבה
אשר לא יראו עינינו] om. BD 17 אין BP: אין D 18 אין הענין BP: אין D 19 לענין] om.
BD | הענין] om. B

Second division

Of substances:

- some are simple:
 - either superior to the composite ones, i.e. divine substances,
 - or inferior to them, i.e. matter and form as considered separately by themselves;
- and some are composite:
 - particular individuals, e.g. Plato and Socrates,
 - genera and species, e.g. universal man, living, animate.

Third division

Everything is divided:

- either as an ambiguous word into different objects, e.g., into the terrestrial, the marine, and the astral dog, and the one which is painted or carved;
- or as a genus into species, e.g. animal into man and all other animals;
- or as (a whole) is divided into parts:
 - either into parts that are similar to one another, like bone, wood, and other things like this;
 - or such ones that are dissimilar to one another, like feet, hands, head, and so on.

Fourth division

Property:

- either occurs to one species but not to all of it, as all sciences;
- or to all of a species but not only to it, as being biped;
- or to one species and to all of it but not always, as turning gray in old age;
- or to one species, to all of it and always, as man being capable of laughter or horse being capable of neighing; this is property in the strict sense.

Fifth division

Properties that are attendant on substance are:

- that it is not in something else but everything else is in it;
- that it provides everything it is predicated of with its name and its definition;
- that it clearly signifies a particular this;
- that nothing is contrary to it;
- that it does not admit of a more and a less;
- that, being the same and one, it is receptive of contraries.

BOOK FOUR

[Introduction]

234 In the previous book, which was the third one in this treatise, O brother Theodore, an account has been brought forth of how you should understand (Aristotle's) concept of substance. And it has been clearly demonstrated concerning it that, even if some people hold the opinion that it is extremely difficult, you should not think of refusing to give someone an explanation, especially about those things that prove to be not difficult to understand through listening. Thus we shall always be eager to explain clearly in words what we intend to say, so that even little children might not be confused by our answers.

235 Now, in the fourth book of this treatise we are going to speak about quantity. For this is what Aristotle too does in the *Categories*, turning to the teaching on it after his account of substance. In fact, we ought to know that it is not by chance that quantity is placed after substance and that the account of the latter is followed by the former, but that there is a certain logic in this which is revealed to those who consider it as having no small meaning³⁰². Thus, I will now dwell on this issue for a while in order to make it apparent for those who have interest in it.

[On sequence of the categories]³⁰³

236 The primary foundation of bodies is what they call “matter” (ὕλη) and what they say to be without form³⁰⁴ and shape (σχῆμα) in its nature. It is thus only that its nature might be able to be receptive of all forms and all shapes, for the

³⁰² For various interpretations of the order of the categories, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 120.27–122.1.

³⁰³ Ammonius gives a short excursus on prime matter at the beginning of that section of his commentary on the *Categories* which deals with quantity (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.3–10, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.14). This excursus follows Ammonius' note that quantity comes second in the order of the categories by Aristotle and apparently aims to provide an explanation for it. Philoponus also includes a lengthy account of prime matter in the section dealing with substance, while explaining the issue of differentiae, see *In Cat.* 65.8–66.25. In the same context, the discussion of prime matter appears in Ammonius' commentary on the *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 106.12–107.21. Commenting on *Isag.* 11.12, Ammonius suggests that in that passage “matter means genus, while form means differentiae” (τὸ μὲν γένος ὕλης ἔχει λόγον, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ εἶδους). Here, Ammonius (and after him, Sergius) applies the same analogy, which in this case justifies the order substance-quantity.

³⁰⁴ In the margins of all three mss. (BDP) in which this passage is extant the variant “without power” is added, and it is the latter variant which appears in the epitome.

.שׁוֹמְרֵי תְּוֹרָתוֹ וְכֹהֲנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל
 P51r לְיִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
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 5 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 B112r וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל

10 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
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 15 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל

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20 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 25 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
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 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל
 P51v וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל

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1 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל BD, Epit.: וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל P 6 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל BP, Epit.: וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל D 7 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל BP, Epit.:
 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל D | וְכָל] om. D 9 וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל וְכָל יִשְׂרָאֵל] om. P
 18, וְכָל BP: וְכָל D 21 וְכָל DP: וְכָל B | וְכָל P: וְכָל BD | וְכָל BD: וְכָל P
 23 וְכָל] om. B | וְכָל BD: וְכָל P 24 וְכָל P: וְכָל BD

need for activity demands that it cannot possess form naturally³⁰⁵. They also call this matter the first nature of bodies, since there is nothing in bodies that can be conceived in mind prior to it. Thus, they say that it first receives some extension into length, breadth, and depth in order to gain volume, for otherwise no dimension in space might be possible in it. But when it extends into length, breadth, and depth, then these three dimensions exist in it. That is why the ancients called it the second nature of bodies³⁰⁶.

237 So, once it has received these three dimensions, then, they say, it is considered to be receptive of shapes, qualities, and faculties, and it produces the four primary bodies, which are customarily called elements (στοιχειᾶ). From them all bodies here are composed which undergo coming-to-be and passing-away³⁰⁷. For they say that when matter which has gained size receives dryness and hotness it becomes fire; when it receives wetness and coldness water appears; if it acquires dryness and coldness then earth is formed; and if heat and wetness appear in it then it produces air³⁰⁸.

238 However, should one need some visual demonstration of this, we may say the following³⁰⁹. Prime matter may be compared to bronze that has not yet been treated by a craftsman. But when a craftsman takes it, and beats and shapes it, then due to his treatment it becomes large and extended similar to matter which at first acquires the afore-mentioned three dimensions and gains volume. And when bronze is first extended through the treatment of the craftsman, then it receives images which he wants to imprint on it, and there appear vessels from it which differ in their shapes and utility. Just as the

305 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.10–17: τὴν πρώτην ὕλην φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀσώματων εἶναι τῷ οικείῳ λόγῳ ἀσχημάτιστόν τε καὶ ἀμεγέθη καὶ πάσης ποιότητος κεχωρισμένην· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνείδεός ἐστι, δείκνυται σαφῶς τῷ πάντων τῶν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν αὐτὴν εἶναι δεκτικὴν <...> ἢ ὕλη ὑποβάθρα τις οὐσα καὶ δεκτικὴ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι θεωρουμένων, οὐδὲ ἐν ἔξει οικεῖον εἶδος. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–5.

306 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.17–18: αὐτὴ οὖν ἐξογκωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.5–6). Sergius calls matter the “second nature” (apparently because he has called it “first nature” just above) instead of “second subject” like Ammonius and Philoponus (following Aristotle, *De gen. et cor.* 329a33–34).

307 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–7: ἢ γὰρ πρώτη ὕλη ἀνείδεος οὐσα καὶ ἀσώματος πρότερον τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις δέχεται καὶ γίνεται τριχῆ διαστατὸν τὸ καλούμενον δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, εἴθ' οὕτως τὰς ποιότητας καὶ γίνεται σύνθετον ποσόν.

308 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.22–25: τοῦτω οὖν κατὰ τι μὲν μέρος προσγενομένη ἢ θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ ποιότης ἐποίησε τὸ πῦρ, κατὰ τι δὲ ἢ ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸ ὕδωρ, κατὰ τι δὲ πάλιν ἢ ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν, κατὰ τι δὲ ἢ θερμὴ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸν ἀέρα. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.7–9.

309 The same example appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 106.19–23.

primary nature of all of them, i.e. bronze, is singular, so also the primary nature of bodies, i.e. matter which is shapeless like untreated bronze. And just as bronze, as we have said, when it first undergoes treatment, becomes thin and extended so that images and shapes might be imprinted on it, in the same way also matter first acquires size and (extends) into length, breadth, and depth so that all qualities and faculties may be imprinted in it.

239 We have discussed these issues here in order to show that the account of quantity is closely related to the teaching on substance and hence should be properly placed after it in the order of exposition³¹⁰. In the discussion of matter, we are going to explain in the proper way all those demonstrations and notions that the ancients seem to have expressed about matter³¹¹, while (now) we are urging the readers always to be prudent and to judge those things which are said, thus discerning between what is true and what is not. But, as you understand, O brother, it is not our goal in this treatise to refute anyone or to distinguish between what is true and what is not like that³¹².

240 But since you have convinced us to produce this treatise for you, so that you and many with you might be instructed by it, and it also appeared to me that study of these issues would not be useless, I made up my mind to elucidate clearly to you what I recall from the ideas of all the ancients and particularly from Aristotle and as far as I can not to neglect anything from what they have written about the science of logic. But if time allows us, we will also approach their treatises on nature and those which are on the invisible things³¹³. Then we will be able to demonstrate in detail that they do not agree with one another

³¹⁰ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.4–5: ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν τὸ ποσόν. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.9–10.

³¹¹ As Sergius notes in the following paragraph, after having commented on the logical treatises, he planned to turn to Aristotle's natural philosophy (cf. §256, where he mentions that he aims to write a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*). It is possible that the outcome of Sergius' work in this field became his translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* and his adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Universo*. Both treatises in their Syriac versions bear the name of Aristotle in the title.

³¹² Here, Sergius points out potential difficulties which Christian students of Aristotle's natural philosophy might have. He further comments on this point in §256.

³¹³ Thus, after commenting on the logical treatises, Sergius intends to write about physics and theology (i.e. metaphysics). Cf. §11, where Sergius suggests a division of philosophy (derived from Ammonius).

and that many of them may be easily rebuked³¹⁴. But for now, let us turn to what we intend to say.

241 Now, matter is a certain substance, for it is mother of all bodies. As we have said, it is considered first to receive extension into length, breadth, and depth. These, however, pertain to quantity, for each one of them is either some quantity or a part of a quantity³¹⁵. That is why it is proper that the account of substance is followed by the teaching on quantity, for the latter is closely related to it and thus precedes everything else. And since after quantity, the substance of bodies receives all qualities, faculties, images, and shapes, it is therefore fitting that we place the teaching on quality after the section on quantity, for in it all shapes (σχήματα), forms (εἶδη)³¹⁶ and images that are in bodies are encompassed.

242 The other seven categories follow these three and are generated from them, similar to how all bodies come to be whose generation takes place in due order from the four elements. Their generation is the third one from matter, i.e. (the first one is) from it, then from quantity, and then from qualities, faculties, and images which are considered in it at the end³¹⁷. However, what has been said about the order of the exposition should suffice. Next we will turn to the teaching on quantity, and again start with the division that is proper to it.

[Division of quantity]

243 So, first of all, there are two kinds of quantity. One of them has parts that are separate and delimited from one another, while the other is a unified whole and is not made up of distinct parts³¹⁸. But also that whose parts are separate from one another is in turn divided into two types, number and language. And further, that whose parts are not separate, but united and joined to one another, 4b20–25

314 Here Sergius takes up the tradition of Christian apologists who were eager to stress that non-Christian (“pagan” or “outer”) philosophers disagree on nearly every question and thus may easily be refuted, cf. for instance Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* II.6.22.

315 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.21–84.4.

316 A marginal note in mss. BD specifies that this term should be understood as εἰκόνες (Syr. *yuqne*) here.

317 Thus, Sergius draws a parallel between the ontological order and the order of the categories as follows: matter (= substance) generates three-dimensionality (= quantity), which in turn generates forms and shapes (= quality), which finally produce all bodies from the four elements (= other seven categories). Marginal notes in mss. BD aim at making clear these parallels. Ammonius’ account differs slightly from what we find in Sergius in that Ammonius makes relatives fourth in the list and after it places the rest of the categories, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.10–12, more explicitly in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.18–20.

318 I.e. continuous and discrete, see *Cat.* 4b20: τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.

is in turn divided into five types, for one of them is line, another is surface, still another is body, another is place, and the final one is time³¹⁹.

244 As it becomes apparent from this division, the species of quantity are together seven, which are: number, language, line, surface, body, place, and time. And it is not possible to find any quantity beyond them, but all its species are encompassed and comprehended by them, as it seemed to the one who was the father and discoverer of this science. Now that we have thus properly outlined the species and differentiae³²⁰ which embrace all quantities, let us set out each one of its parts separately and make an inquiry about it that is fitting to it according to the teaching of the Philosopher, starting with the first species.

[Number]

245 Concerning number, it is not necessary to prove whether it is quantity or not, since it is evident to everyone that it is a quantity³²¹. In fact it is this name that all of us apply when we await an answer from someone on how big or how small some number is; for instance, when it happens that we ask how many people are in the house or how many measures fit in a particular vessel, and we hear that they are ten, or twenty, or thirty, or any other number, depending on circumstances and on what the respondent says. That is why it is not necessary to prove that number is a quantity, but it is proper to investigate whether its parts are separate and delimited from one another, since this is what constitutes this kind of quantity³²². 4b25–31

246 Now, we say that this is also obvious to anyone who correctly regards it. And even if it seems that numbers are completely unified when someone says “hundred” or “thousand”, since they are pronounced as one word, their parts, however, are separate and not joined to one another. For what kind of unity

319 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.5–9: διαρεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν εἰς τὸ συνεχές καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον. συνεχές δέ ἐστι ποσὸν τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια ἠνωμένα καὶ συμπεφυκότα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, διωρισμένον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια διηρημένα ἀλλήλων. τοῦ δὲ συνεχοῦς πέντε φησὶν εἶδη, γραμμὴν ἐπιφάνειαν σῶμα τόπον χρόνον, τοῦ δὲ διωρισμένου δύο, ἀριθμὸν καὶ λόγον. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.16–18.

320 Simplicius notes that the outlined seven kinds of quantity should be considered its differentiae (διαφοραί) rather than species, which are magnitude and amount, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 122.35–123.1. Also Porphyry in his question-and-answer commentary designates the continuous and the discrete as two differentiae of quantity, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 100.29.

321 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–23.

322 I.e. it is proper to prove that number is a discrete quantity, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–24. According to Aristotle (*Cat.* 4b24–25), numbers share the characteristics of discrete quantities in that they “have no common boundary at which their parts meet” (κοινὸς ὄρος πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ), a point which is not elaborated upon by Sergius.

does three form with seven, or ten with four, or fifty with five, or any kind of number with another number? But it is obvious that every part of it is separate and exists singularly by itself, and it is only through addition and combination with one another that they increase, or through subtraction that they are reduced. Thus, its parts are not unified with one another, but they maintain one composition and unity like parts of a vessel, or a piece of wood, or any particular body³²³.

[Language]

- 247 But since we have said that the second kind of quantity is language³²⁴, we shall also inquire into it, by distinguishing first what kind of language pertains to quantity. For if we pass over this without investigation, then synonymous words might bring confusion of no small amount to the reader, as there is not one single kind of language but many. There is, namely, spoken language which is composed of many words and of phrases, and there is rational language that is in the intellect, which arises silently in the mind and because of which we are rational beings and are called like that³²⁵. But there is also another, professional language that is collected and imprinted in the mind of a craftsman. By means of it he always contemplates a sort of prototype from which he receives an example for his craftsmanship and in whose image he produces everything that is done by him³²⁶.
- 248 So, while there are these three general species of language, we ought to know that the last and the middle ones do not pertain to quantity, since they are firmly rooted in the incorporeal soul³²⁷. The first one, on the other hand, that is composed of utterances is one of the kinds of quantity because its nature

323 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.8–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.25–27.

324 *Syr. mella* corresponding to Gr. λόγος.

325 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.22–24: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος πολλαχῶς λέγεται (λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), νῦν περὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου φησίν. See Porphyry's question-and-answer commentary (*In Cat.* 101.26–27), concerning the second kind of language: ὁ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ὅς καὶ σιωπῶντων ἡμῶν ἐγγίνεται. Cf. also Simplicius, *In Cat.* 124.8–10. All these commentators distinguish only two kinds of language, the spoken and the internal, and do not mention the third kind discussed by Sergius.

326 This kind of language is not mentioned by other commentators. It is likely that here Sergius is elaborating upon the Platonic teachings on Forms, or prototypes, which he presented in §§72–79. It is also possible that Sergius had in mind Aristotle's theory of language in *De Int.* 16a3–8.

327 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.2–7. Philoponus speaks of only one kind of language, which is the second in Sergius, i.e. the unspoken one.

consists in words and phrases which are long and short³²⁸. Thus, it includes that kind of language which is measured, as we have said, by length and shortness and which is composed of different phrases and words that are multiple or few and are either long or short. And since being multiple and few is a characteristic of quantity, it is apparent that also this kind of language which includes them pertains to quantity.

249 It is also evident that parts of this language are not unified to one another without separation that would set them apart and distinguish them. For even if the whole treatise is considered to be one utterance³²⁹, its words and phrases may be separated and distinguished from one another. Neither the idea nor the sense that is formed from them are completely unified as one line or as one surface, and its parts are not strung together in such a way that no division or separation between them is seen. Hence, it has become apparent that the spoken language pertains to quantity, namely to the first differentia of quantity, the one whose parts do not maintain complete unity and conjunction to one another.

[Line, surface, and body]

250 Now it is necessary for us to approach also another kind of quantity whose parts are equal and unified with one another without any division and without separation³³⁰. But since Aristotle divides this quantity too into five items, as we have said, namely into line, surface, body, place, and time, we ought to speak about each one of them according to our knowledge and following the goal that is set before us now³³¹. 5a1–6

251 Now, the point may be grasped in thought but is not found in any body. Geometers call it *simeyon* (σημειον)³³², considering it to be without parts and

328 Aristotle explains how language pertains to quantity by the fact that it is measured by long and short syllables: καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῆ μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ (*Cat.* 4b33–34). The same characteristic appears in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.1. Sergius speaks of *šmahe* and *petgame* which both may have the meaning “words”, although the second term refers rather to constructions of words, hence “phrases”. Cf. Porphyry, the question-and-answer commentary, *In Cat.* 101.30–32: πᾶς λόγος ἐξ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ λόγου μέρη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκ συλλαβῶν συνέστηκεν· αἱ δὲ συλλαβαὶ ἢ μακραὶ εἰσιν ἢ βραχεῖαι.

329 *Syr. mellta*, Gr. λόγος.

330 I.e. continuous quantity.

331 For the following paragraphs, see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.15–24; idem, *In Cat.* 57.26–58.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.11–91.15.

332 A marginal note in mss. BD suggests a synonym *qentima* which is a transliteration of the Gr. κέντημα.

indivisible, and, as someone might say, a kind of incorporeal principle of all bodies. Though it remains inside their mind³³³, they say about it that when it receives certain length without breadth, it is called line, which has length but no breadth. And if the line receives another extension into breadth, then surface appears, which has length and breadth only³³⁴. And if it is further extended into depth becoming perceptible, then body appears, which has three dimensions, i.e. length, breadth, and depth. That is why any particular body is called three-dimensional.

252 From this, it becomes clear that the point is the origin of the line, while the line is the origin of the surface, and the surface is in turn the origin and the beginning of all bodies. And each one of them, if you start from the body and proceed upwards, will have one fewer dimension than the other. Thus, the point turns out to have no dimension at all, and because of this it does not have parts either, but is a sort of incorporeal first principle³³⁵.

253 For, if the body has three dimensions, while the surface which is its origin has only two, and furthermore the line which is the beginning of the surface has one dimension less than it, so that it acquires only one dimension, i.e. length, consequently, since it is necessary for the origin of the line which is the point (σημείον) to have one dimension less than it, it is apparent that it is without dimension. And if it is without dimension, then it is clear that it has no size, and because of this it does not pertain to quantity³³⁶.

254 However, concerning the three things that derive from it, i.e. the line, the surface, and the body, there is no dispute at all whether they pertain to quant-

333 I.e. it may be considered in theory, but does not actually happen. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.1: δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν νῶ καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖα.

334 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.18–22.

335 Ammonius remarks (*In Cat.* 33.23–34.2) that a point may not be subsumed under one of the ten categories since it is not something that has independent existence, but is “a principle of things in general”: τὸ δὲ γε σημεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν τι πρᾶγμα ὑφεστηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἔστιν ὅλως πραγμάτων.

336 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.17–24: ἐπειδὴ γάρ φησι πᾶν τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἣτις ἔχει δύο διαστάσεις, μήκος καὶ πλάτος (βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ὃ λείπεται τοῦ σώματος), ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια δύο ἔχουσα διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμμῆς, ἣτις μίαν ἔχει διάστασιν τὸ μήκος μόνον, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ περατοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ σημείου, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἔξει οὐδεμίαν διάστασιν, ἀλλ’ ἔσται ἀμερές, εἴ γε, ὡς εἴρηται, πᾶν πέρασ τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει.

ity or not. For the dimensions of length in which the line appears, and also those of length and breadth which bring up the surface, and most of all those of length, breadth and depth which generate the body, signify a certain magnitude. And magnitudes of any kind, even if they are considered in theory, are always a quantity, since their size is grasped through the latter.

255 Now, from the fact that the line, the surface, and the body pertain to quantity, it becomes clear to the readers, that parts of each one of them are not divided or separated from one another, like the (parts) of number and language are separate. This is quite evident, since all the parts of a line are unified from one end to its other end without separation, and the same holds for the surface. Also, any particular body is unified in virtue of the unity of its parts and has its subsistence from them, so that there is neither division nor separation between one part and another, as between words and phrases in language or between parts of any particular number. So much for these matters.

[Place]

256 In order to make our discourse on quantity complete, let us now talk about place and time, which, as we have said above, belong to the division of quantity. 5a6–14
A full account, including all necessary examples, of place and of time, i.e. what and of what kind each one of them is, is given in subtle and excellent fashion by Aristotle in his treatise *Physics*³³⁷. If we proceed so far as to speak about his views in this treatise, we will sufficiently explain everything what we have learned not only from this man, but also from other philosophers and from our Christian writers who have diligently searched for truth³³⁸. However, lest the

³³⁷ See Aristotle's *Physics*, book IV, chapters 1–5 (on place) and 10–14 (on time). The commentaries of both Ammonius and Philoponus contain brief notes on place with a reference to Aristotle's *Physics* as the proper source of information on this subject matter.

³³⁸ Philoponus, who belonged to the same Alexandrian group of Christian students of philosophy as Sergius, included the so-called *Corollaries* in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. However, no commentaries on the latter work written by Christian authors are known prior to Philoponus. It is possible that Sergius meant not only commentaries in the proper sense, but also another Christian works (e.g., the Hexaemeron literature) which dealt with issues of natural philosophy and provided criticism of Aristotle's views.

account of them (i.e. place and time) become obscure and mysterious, we shall make an inquiry about them as it is necessary and proper at this moment. For it is not our task now to speak about their nature, but to demonstrate that they also belong to quantity, namely to that type whose parts are not divided and not at all separated from one another.

257 Now, concerning place there are not a few debates among writers, first of all with regard to whether it exists or not, and next to that with regard to what it is and how it exists³³⁹. But while these inquiries (ζητήματα) are extensive, we will remain brief and say what is necessary about it, for as we have said, the subject of our discussion now is not its nature but its relation to quantity³⁴⁰.

258 That the nature of place exists is testified already by the common sense that is implanted naturally in everybody³⁴¹. For all people understand that every thing that is perceptible and intelligible exists in space and in some place. And even their concept of incorporeals is the same, bearing likeness to the visible phenomena, since their mind is not capable of comprehending that everything that is incorporeal is omnipresent.

259 One may also understand that there is place from motion and from the increase and decrease of the bodies. For how would something be able to move from one point to another³⁴² and become bigger or smaller, unless there were the nature of place in which this would happen? But the change that occurs in virtue of motion from one point to another clearly testifies that the change of what is moved happens in place.

339 Cf. the questions formulated by Aristotle in *Phys.* 208a28–29: εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἔστιν.

340 In spite of this remark, Sergius provides a much longer account of place than we find in Ammonius and Philoponus and than one might deem necessary in view of Aristotle's very brief notion of space in the *Categories*. The following paragraphs by Sergius are in fact based on Aristotle's *Physics* IV, ch. 1–5, rather than on the *Categories*. According to §261, Sergius was aware of a possible criticism that his excursus might be out of place here but was still eager to include it.

341 Cf. Simplicius, *In Phys.* 521.6–7: τὸ μὲν ἔνδοξον εἶναι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ὑπολήψεως εἰλημμένον.

342 I.e. locomotion, Gr. φορά. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b31–32.

260 It also becomes apparent that there is place from the fact that bodies sometimes depart from their position and are replaced by other bodies³⁴³. For, behold, we see how air intrudes where originally water was as soon as the latter departs, and also how the change occurs when water is poured into where air was while the latter makes room for it. Thus, if bodies replace one another while that in which they were remains the same, it becomes apparent that place has subsistence. It is also obvious to everybody that it does not transform together with the bodies but remains unmoved, while bodies transform and make room for one another.

261 There are innumerable other things by means of which one may demonstrate that place exists but, as we have said, this is not the point of our account here. I am aware that certain people, who turn to the writings of others for the sake of reproach rather than profit, sometimes criticize us for this. They might blame us for talking about things that are unrelated to the discussion. However, since we are sure that there is no small instruction and learning for the minds of those who will read these kind of things, we will occasionally ignore the lovers of criticism and, when this seems suitable to us, wander away a little from our subject.

262 So, I mean that it has become apparent from what has been said that place exists. It has also become obvious from this that place has great power³⁴⁴. For since it does not change together with bodies but exists even if they are corrupted in it, not being corrupted by them, and always encompasses them while not being encompassed by them, it is clear that its nature is greater than theirs, since there is more excellence in encompassing something than in being encompassed, and in remaining unaffected by corruption of those things which are corrupted in it.

³⁴³ Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b1–11. Aristotle speaks of ἀντιμετάστασις, “mutual replacement” of the bodies.

³⁴⁴ Aristotle stresses that place has a “power”, or “potency” (δύναμις), which is prior to everything else: εἰ δ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάντων (*Phys.* 208b33–35).

263
 חַלְלָהּ דַּם חַלְלָהּ יִשָּׂא דְנִשְׁבַּח רְלוּ רִיחֵהּ כְּנֹשֶׁבַע בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה :
 אֲחִיבָה דְנִחְמַלְלָהּ אִם דְּנִחְמַלְלָהּ בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 D97r רִיחֵהּ לְחַלְלָהּ חַלְלָהּ . וְכֹהֵל אֲדָרָה אֲחִיבָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 רִיחֵהּ לְחַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ חַלְלָהּ .
 5 אֲחִיבָה לְחַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .

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 חַלְלָהּ דַּם חַלְלָהּ יִשָּׂא דְנִשְׁבַּח רְלוּ רִיחֵהּ כְּנֹשֶׁבַע בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה :
 B117v אֲחִיבָה דְנִחְמַלְלָהּ אִם דְּנִחְמַלְלָהּ בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 P62r אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 15 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .

265
 חַלְלָהּ דַּם חַלְלָהּ יִשָּׂא דְנִשְׁבַּח רְלוּ רִיחֵהּ כְּנֹשֶׁבַע בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה :
 L22r אֲחִיבָה דְנִחְמַלְלָהּ אִם דְּנִחְמַלְלָהּ בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 20 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .

266
 חַלְלָהּ דַּם חַלְלָהּ יִשָּׂא דְנִשְׁבַּח רְלוּ רִיחֵהּ כְּנֹשֶׁבַע בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה :
 אֲחִיבָה דְנִחְמַלְלָהּ אִם דְּנִחְמַלְלָהּ בְּנֹשֶׁבַע אֲדָרָה . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ . אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ
 אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ אֲחִיבָה חַלְלָהּ .

1 חַלְלָהּ D add. in marg. 2 חַלְלָהּ + חַלְלָהּ BDL: חַלְלָהּ P 4 חַלְלָהּ om. BD 8 חַלְלָהּ DLP: חַלְלָהּ BDL: חַלְלָהּ P 11 חַלְלָהּ LP: חַלְלָהּ BD 12 חַלְלָהּ om. P 13 חַלְלָהּ BDP: חַלְלָהּ L 14 חַלְלָהּ BDL: חַלְלָהּ P 16 חַלְלָהּ om. P | חַלְלָהּ om. BD | חַלְלָהּ BDL: חַלְלָהּ P 17 חַלְלָהּ + חַלְלָהּ BD 22 חַלְלָהּ BDL, Epit.: חַלְלָהּ P | חַלְלָהּ om. BD 23 חַלְלָהּ + חַלְלָהּ BD, Epit. | חַלְלָהּ LP: חַלְלָהּ BD, Epit.

263 Thus, because Plato saw that place is similar to form (εἶδος)³⁴⁵ in that it encompasses but is not encompassed, and also that similar to matter (ὕλη) it is receptive³⁴⁶ of bodies, he considered it to be either matter or form. It is because of this that he openly called matter “place”³⁴⁷. The argument which he constructed about it run like this: Place encompasses but is not encompassed, and form encompasses but is not encompassed, hence place is form. And further in this way: Place is receptive of bodies, and matter is receptive of everything, hence place is matter.

264 But this has not been stated correctly, because if there is something which is characteristic of two objects, it does not follow from this that they are not two any more but one. For if it were not like that, this sage might say: Since man is rational and angel is rational, hence, according to his word, man is angel. And since man is mortal and also ass is mortal, thus man is ass. And since it has been proven already that man is angel, I am ashamed of saying what follows from this.

265 In fact, it would be proper for this philosopher to see that form and matter are changing together with bodies and are parts of them. Place, instead, does not change with them and is no part of them. Thus, it is neither form nor matter. But neither is it a certain body, for its subsistence is apart from bodies which make room for one another in it and are mutually replaced while it remains in its place.

266 They also make a detailed inquiry into what place is, i.e. whether it is a body or incorporeal³⁴⁸. That it is not a body is clear from the fact that it is

345 Ms. D adds in the margin: “That form which is with matter.”

346 Ms. D adds in the margin: “It contains every (thing) and image (εἰκῶν).”

347 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b11.

348 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209a2–7. See also Philoponus, *In Phys.* 504.28–506.20.

receptive of bodies. For if it were a body and received in itself another body, then body would be in body, which is impossible³⁴⁹. If, in fact, a body were ever be in a body, then it would be possible for a big body to be inside a small body that cannot contain it. But if something does not have enough room in itself (for something else), then it is obvious that it will not contain it at all. From this would follow that the whole sky might be enclosed in a small body and that one small eggshell might encompass the whole sea.

267 Thus, it is impossible that place should be a body. But one cannot state that it is incorporeal either, since if something is without body then it cannot be expanded, occupy space, and have any extension. Place, however, is expanded and occupies space together with the bodies that are in it, thus containing them. This makes apparent that place is not incorporeal, for we may never believe that bodies are encompassed by something that is without body, for what encompasses them must necessarily be extended and enlarged according to their size³⁵⁰.

268 Now, based on this one may even conclude that there is no place at all. Thus Zeno of Citium³⁵¹, who always tried to posit in his statements different things which contradicted what is clearly known, acted the same way also in this case. So, he said that there is no place, constructing his argument as follows: Each thing is in a place. So, if place exists, since it is also a thing among other things, it is in a place too. Thus we find a place in a place, and the latter is

349 Sergius slightly modifies the argument of Aristotle as formulated in *Phys.* 209a6–7: “But it is impossible for place to be a body, for then two bodies would be in the same thing” (ἀδύνατον δὲ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν τόπον· ἐν ταύτῳ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δύο σώματα).

350 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 505.1–11.

351 I.e. Zeno of Elea. Aristotle mentions Zeno's paradox in *Phys.* 209a23–24.

in turn in another (place), which is in another one, and so on without end. Therefore, no place exists at all.

269 However, his argument follows a false assessment which is made at the beginning and on which the rest is built up. So, first of all, not everything is in a place, as Zeno assumes, for there are many things, and most of all those which are incorporeal, that have no place and are not in space, while those that are in space do it not in the same manner, not every one of them being in a place. For, as we have explained earlier in this treatise, there are eleven ways of saying that something is in space³⁵². This makes it apparent that not everything which is in space is also in a place, as Zeno believes. However, on whether place exists and how it exists enough (has been said). Now we will discuss what it is and whether it pertains to quantity.

270 To put it briefly: place is a limit and a surface of every container that surrounds what is contained by it³⁵³. Now, any particular body has a limit and a surface which is its outer boundary. However, if it is solid, it has one surface which surrounds it from the outside; but if it is hollow or vaulted, it has two surfaces, i.e. the outer and the inner. And if something is contained in its cavity, then its outer surface is surrounded by air. In this case, the limit of air which adjoins its outer surface will be the place of this body. The inner surface of the same body, on the other hand, which adjoins something that it contains in its cavity will be the place of what is contained in it, since the latter adjoins its limit and is surrounded by it from the outside.

352 In §§138–149, Sergius lists eleven ways of being-in-something (cf. the reading of ms. P and of the epitome, which is probably a later correction of the text), and one of them (no. 2) is “as in a place”. In both passages, Sergius uses the Syriac word *’atra* for “place” (i.e. a concrete position), while “space” is expressed by the term *dukkta*. Thus, the point which Sergius makes here is that there are eleven ways of saying that something is in something else, i.e. in space, and only one of them means to be in a concrete place. Aristotle lists eight ways of being-in-something in *Phys.* 210a14–24, where being in a place is combined with being in a vessel to yield the eighth way.

353 See Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b1–7 and 212a5–6. Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 519.12–13: εἰ δὲ τὸ προσεχῶς ἕκαστον περιέχον ὁ τόπος ἐστί, πέρασ τί ἐστί δηλονότι ὁ τόπος· περατοῖ γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–17.

271 So, place is the inner limit of a certain body that adjoins the outer limit of what is contained in it. That is why it turns out that place is not a body but the inner limit of a body. But neither is it incorporeal, since it acquires extension into length and breadth, according to the size of the body which is contained in it. Thus, it is not the cup (κάδος) that is called the place of the water which is in it, since this is a body, but it is the inner limit of the cup which adjoins the water contained in it that is the place of the latter. Moreover, it is not the celestial sphere (σφαῖρα) that we say is the place of the air, but it is its inner surface which adjoins the outer limit of the air that is said to be the place of it. Moreover, it is not the air in which we are that is really the place of natures, even if it is thought of like that, but it is its limits which from outside adjoin each one of the bodies that are the places of each nature which are contained inside them. So, to put briefly what place is: it is the inner limit of that which surrounds something that is contained in it.

272 From what has been said, as it seems to me, it also becomes evident and comprehensible to everyone that place pertains to quantity. For if it surrounds all bodies and there is not a single perceptible nature which might be thought not to be in a place, it is evident that place in some cases will be extended according to the large size of any particular body and in other cases will be contracted according to the small size of bodies that are in it. Thus, if body pertains to quantity, it is apparent that place pertains to it too. And if line which has only one dimension, i.e. that of length, due to its dimension pertains to quantity, place turns out to pertain to quantity much more, since it has two dimensions, i.e. those of length and breadth³⁵⁴.

273 If someone, however, were to say that place does not extend according to the whole constitution of bodies, then he would be compelled to state that not

³⁵⁴ Sergius' conclusion that place is two-dimensional agrees with his notion that it is not a body, but a surface of a container. Since a surface is two-dimensional (cf. §§250–255, above), the same holds for place. In the next paragraph, Sergius raises a puzzle which naturally comes up in this context, without going into detail about it. It seems that this point was not the Sergius' main concern in this section, but a way to show that place pertains to quantity, similar to Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–26.

all parts of bodies are in a place³⁵⁵. But this is impossible, first of all, because if it happens that some parts of a body have no place, then all of it might be without place as well; and if this were true, then any particular body might be without place. This, in turn, will necessarily require the one who says this to introduce a certain void into the nature of creatures and to postulate something that is empty of bodies and contains no natures at all³⁵⁶. But that this is something that may not exist has been demonstrated through many investigations and through powerful arguments by all natural philosophers. And even those who introduce empty space and admit that there is void in the creation do not state that it exists naturally, but that it is completely beyond nature. But so much will suffice for it.

[Time]³⁵⁷

274 Now is the moment we should turn to time and discuss this subject matter in the same concise manner, since this is the last among the seven kinds of quantity left for us to speak about. So, you ought to know that just as place is considered prior to body, so also body is comprehended prior to motion, while motion in turn (is considered) prior to time. For just as a body is a concomitant of the place which always contains it, and just as natural motion is a concomitant of a body, so also time is a concomitant of any particular natural motion³⁵⁸.

275 So, above we have said enough on whether place and body pertain to quantity, while about time we are going to speak now. Concerning motion³⁵⁹, however, one might rightfully raise a puzzle as to why the Philosopher did not mention it in the chapter on quantity. We shall say in response to this that, since

355 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 505.1–5. Based on the same arguments, Philoponus comes to the conclusion that place is three-dimensional and not two-dimensional, as Sergius states in the previous paragraph. However, in his commentary on the *Categories* which is based on Ammonius' lectures, Philoponus admits that the "limit" of a body, which is actually the place it occupies, must have one dimension less than body itself and thus be two-dimensional (see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.24–25).

356 Aristotle discusses void in chapters 6–9 of Book IV of the *Physics*, ultimately rejecting its existence. A number of puzzles that may be raised in this context are discussed by Philoponus in the *Corollaries on Void*, which have been preserved as a part of his commentary on the *Physics*.

357 The following paragraphs are not based on the text of the *Categories*, where Aristotle mentions time only briefly but in contrast to place does not further elaborate on this issue. Instead, Sergius explicates the contents of Book IV of the *Physics* where Aristotle deals with time in chapters 10–14, right after the discussion of place and void.

358 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 702.13–14: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς πράγμασι.

359 Syr. *zaw'a* corresponding to Gr. κίνησις which might be understood as either "motion" or "change".

the treatise *Categories* has been written for students and it forms the beginning of the study of logic, for this reason he has not included there a section on motion, for an account of this would not be suitable for the ears of those who have not been previously trained³⁶⁰.

276 There have been many investigations and profound studies of it by the ancients, and also by Aristotle himself, apart from the constant inquiries into it which he carried out in his many writings. There are four whole books which he dedicated to the issue of motion and which others included in his treatise on physics³⁶¹. But because of the complexity of this subject matter and the confusion in the opinions of the ancients concerning it, let it remain far from the students and let their ears be spared at this moment³⁶² from this kind of hard labour! It is also probable that, since he knew that time is a concomitant of motion and that there is no motion without time so that both of them have great affinity to each other, he mentioned only the one which was easier to explain than the other, namely time, for from its account it becomes apparent that also motion pertains to quantity.

277 So, let us turn to time and carry out a fitting inquiry into it³⁶³. Now, it is possible that someone would say regarding these issues that there is no time at all. For one part of time, the past, has already gone for good and perished, while another, the future, has not yet happened. Thus, it does not exist at all, for how can something exist that has perished and does not exist in one part, and in another part has not yet come to be?³⁶⁴

360 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.10–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 87.21–88.2. In his commentary on the *Isagoge* (*In Isag.* 53.1–2), Ammonius discusses the question why Porphyry does not include motion (or change) in his account of genera and answers that it was not Porphyry's task to speak "naturally" (i.e. as a natural philosopher) about these issues, but rather "in a way appropriate to the issues of logic" (ἀλλ' οὐ πρόκειται τῷ Πορφύριῳ περὶ τούτων φυσικῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρεπόντως τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ).

361 I.e. Books V–VIII of the *Physics*. According to Simplicius, Porphyry considered these four books as a separate treatise *On motion* (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 802.7–13).

362 An extensive account of motion, or change, appears in the last, seventh, book of Sergius' *Commentary* dedicated to what is called the *postpraedicamenta* (i.e. chapters 10–15 of the *Categories*). Since Aristotle himself considers this issue in the 14th chapter of the *Categories*, Sergius comments on it in the corresponding paragraphs (§§445–448). But additionally, he also turns to the question of change at the beginning of Book VII (§§409–418), thus breaking the order of Aristotle's narrative and including an additional excursus on the six types of change.

363 The following paragraphs are either a literal rendering of chapters 10–11 of the fourth book of the *Physics* (as is the case with §§280, 283, and 284) or a periphrastic account of Aristotle's text.

364 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 217b32–218a8.

278 Now, everything that exists should acquire its subsistence either in respect of itself or in respect of something else. If time is something composite and it has subsistence, it is necessary that also those things should exist which it is composed of. But one part of it has perished and the other does not yet exist. So, how can one think about something that is composed of what does not exist? And further, everything that exists contains certain parts out of which it is constituted. But there are no parts of time at all, neither the ones of the past, for they have already perished, nor the ones of the future, since they do not yet exist³⁶⁵.

279 Some people say that time is the movement of the heavenly sphere, because they observe that the whole extent of the world is moving without ceasing, while its parts only move from one place to another. But they do not comprehend that, although time and motion are related to one another, each one of them is something different from its counterpart, and they only have an affinity to one another, but it is not that both of them have one and the same nature. Indeed (ἄρα), provided that there are many spheres, because their motions seem to be multiple, time too should turn out to be of many kinds. But behold, there is one time which remains the same while its parts are changeable. But, since they say that the motion of the whole sphere goes from the east to the west, while the motion of the five stars and the two luminaries, which are called “deceivers”³⁶⁶, proceeds from the west to the east, then, if indeed time were movement, it would necessarily mean that the nature of time is not one, but rather there are times which are contrary to one another in their nature³⁶⁷.

280 But you may also argue as follows: Every change and any particular movement exists in what is moved by it, and its movement occurs in that fashion of which it is naturally capable. Time, on the other hand, is the same at

365 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a9–30.

366 Sergius has the term *πλανητός* in mind, which he explains as deriving from the verb *πλανᾶω*, “to wander”, but also “to lead astray, deceive”. The same rendering of the Greek *τὰ πλανητά* appears in the Syriac version of Ps.-Aristotle’s *De Mundo*, which is considered to have been prepared by Sergius, see 392a14.

367 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a33–218b9.

every place and to everything and it is not different in different things. Thus, time is something other than motion. And this is furthermore what one should see from the fact that the quickness and slowness characteristic of particular movements are determined by time. For we say that something is moving quickly when it moves a great deal in a short time. And we further say that something moves slowly when it moves a little during a long time. But time is not determined by time. Thus movement is not the same as time³⁶⁸.

281 Indeed, we say that something is moving quickly or slowly when we attach time to its nature and not when we take those things which are not of similar kind and make them equal to one another. For it would be not correct to make equal a person running on foot to the running of a horse, even if (that person) were superior in running. But it would be proper to say that a (man's) foot runs a great deal, while the running of a horse is superior. It is apparent that the movement of each one of these is determined according to the kind of its nature and it is called superior or quick from the firmness or superiority which is in its nature and which is determined by the time which suits it. From these and similar (examples) it becomes apparent that time is not movement.

282 So, in order to see what (time) is, let us consider the statement which we are accustomed to pronounce that the now should be defined by the past and the future. Indeed, the now has no persistence, since when it is spoken it is already gone and does not exist. Thus, it is not a time but what we consider in our intellect as a certain now and what is extended by our intellect to another certain now, and it is this interval in between that we call time. So, it seems that

368 This paragraph appears to be a quotation, with some alterations, of *Phys.* 218b9–20: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὐ ἂν τύχη ὄν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μὲν ἐστὶ θάπτων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὤρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὤρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν.

it is in something before and after that time is. But since the before and after pertain to number, time is some number, i.e. it is not motion but a number of motion³⁶⁹.

283 Now, an indication of this is that we discriminate between many and few by number, but more and less motion we discern by time. Hence, time is a number of motion and not motion itself. But since number is said in two ways — namely of what is numbered and of that by which we number — we ought to know that time is number not in the sense of that with which we count, but in the sense of what is counted³⁷⁰. So, it is the duration of such motion that contains extension and is counted gradually through various parts that we call time. Thus we have also determined what time is, namely that it is the number of the motion.

284 What has been said makes it clear that time belongs to quantity. For since its subsistence is in the extension of motion, while every particular extension is a part of quantity, it is obvious that time is also a quantity. And since there is no division or separation between its parts but all of them are joined to one another, so that the end of what passes by brings into existence what comes after it, it is apparent that time pertains to that type of quantity whose parts are not separate and set apart from one another rather than to that which is definable and divisible and each part of which does not hold the same position with respect to the others³⁷¹. However, let what has been explained thus far concerning all seven kinds of quantity suffice.

369 This paragraph is a periphrasis of *Phys.* 219a22–219b3, which appears in some parts to be a very literal rendering of Aristotle's text: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὀρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὀρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὕστερου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν· ὀρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπη ἢ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτο φαμέν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὀριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν τῷ νῦν αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἦτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὕστερου τίνος, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐδεὶς, ὅτι οὐδὲ κινήσις, ὅταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγομεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. οὐκ ἄρα κινήσις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ἢ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κινήσις.

370 The Syriac text follows very closely (with some explicative elements) *Phys.* 219b3–8: σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλείον καὶ ἐλάττων κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κινήσιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνω· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶ διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ὧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ὧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. While Aristotle actually suggests three terms for the ways of speaking about number, Sergius subsumes them under two categories, as also does Philoponus in *In Phys.* 723.15–24.

371 I.e. time is a continuous and not a discrete kind of quantity. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 220a4–26.

[Aristotle's other division of quantity]

285 We shall also not forget to mention that some of the Stoics and even Plato himself divided all of quantity into three kinds, namely into number, magnitude, and weight³⁷². For they said that language is a certain number which is composed of the multitude of words, so that number and language are one kind of quantity. Also, line, surface, and body, although they differ from one another in their subsistence, designate a certain magnitude, and hence they (constitute) one kind of quantity. And because they saw that the inclination towards heaviness and lightness also signifies a certain quantity, they also established this kind which they called weight. And thus, as we have said, they divided all of quantity into number, magnitude, and inclination³⁷³.

286 But Aristotle who was diligent in precise divisions of various things, also provided one for quantity. So, as we have said above, he divided it into seven kinds, namely, at first, into two, i.e. into that kind whose parts may be separated through division from one another and into that one whose parts are joined and bound to one another without separation; but also each one of these he further divided as far as it was possible. I mean that the quantity whose parts are separable from one another he sub-divided into number and such language that is spoken, while the quantity whose parts may not be separated from one another he divided into line, surface, body, and also place and time.

287 Then, after having made this division, since he wanted the student to be instructed in multiple ways, he also provided another division of the same seven parts of quantity. Thus, he said that there are some quantities whose parts have position in relation to one another so that it is obvious where each

372 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–5: τινές δὲ τὰ κυρίως εἶδη τοῦ ποσοῦ φασιν εἶναι τρία, ἀριθμὸν ὄγκον δύναμιν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ῥοπήν.

373 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–10.

one of them is situated; and there are some whose parts do not have position but each one of them is generated gradually one after another. So the parts of time, number, and language do not have position, so that each one of them might be seen in its place and they all would be fastened and fixed in that whose parts they are.

288 As for time, it has no parts at all which would have position in it and be seen, but the generation of each one of its parts always comes together with the destruction of the previous one. The same holds for language and number: when their first parts pass away then those after them are generated one after another by way of succession, while the preceding ones do not persist. Line, surface, body, and place, on the other hand, contain parts which have position in relation to one another, each one of them being fixed in its place and comprehended through that whose part it is, and it is not such that after the destruction of the first ones the successive ones are generated one after another³⁷⁴.

289 Now, this division of quantity differs from the first one only by mode and it does not contribute anything more or less to the nature of quantity. So, in the first division, number and language came together, while line, surface and body were combined with place and time. In the second division, on the other hand, time was separated from place, body, surface, and line, and attached to language and number, since according to the principle of the second division its position should be with the latter and not with the former³⁷⁵.

[Quantities in the strict sense and per accidens]

290 Now, after these two divisions, the Philosopher wished to provide a definition of quantity. It has been told to us and clearly demonstrated in other

374 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 59.11–13.

375 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 91.28–92.6.

treatises³⁷⁶ that the craft of dividing is prior to that of defining, since it is first necessary to have a proper division of things and then from the division to derive what is suitable for definitions. Hence, the Philosopher and all other authors who have received from him this rule (κανών) always first employed division and after that defined the subject of their discussion.

291 That is why he first properly divided quantity, as he also did with substance, and now defines it. However, since it has been said to us above that definitions derive from a genus and those differentiae which constitute species³⁷⁷, but none among the categories has a genus, since each one of them is a primary genus that is called the most generic genus, it is apparent that for this reason no definition of any of them may be a perfect definition in the strict sense. What remains for us is to draw, as if we paint a certain image, a definition based on their properties, i.e. those things which are individual concomitants of particular entities and through which they may be separated from everything else. So, it is from them that we shall try to produce a description of quantity which we may use instead of a definition. Just as we described substance not by means of a definition, but by means of those things which are its individual concomitants, so is it also proper for us to try to define quantity according to our capacity from those things which are concomitant of it³⁷⁸.

292 However, since it is the job of the scholar to investigate not only those things which exist in reality but also those which are believed and to reveal that their nature is contrary to that³⁷⁹, he (i.e. Aristotle) considered in his account not only what pertains to quantity in reality, but also included in it what is believed to be quantity when it is not and demonstrated where such a

5a38–5b10

376 It is possible that Sergius means Porphyry's *Isagoge* here, for it is in the commentary on the latter by Ammonius that we find the discussion of the sequence between division and definition, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. See also §197, above.

377 In §§197–199, where Sergius discusses this issue, he in fact does not mention differentiae. See however, Philoponus, *In Cat.* 19.26: πᾶς γὰρ ὀρισμὸς ἐκ γένους ἐστὶ καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν.

378 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 61.7–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.15–27.

379 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.14–16: ἔργον ἐπιστήμονος μὴ μόνον τὰ ὑποβεβλημένα αὐτῷ πράγματα σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα μὲν εἶναι, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐκ ὄντα διεξέρχασθαι καὶ καὶ διελέγχειν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.11–13).

belief about it comes from. Now, since of any particular colour, e.g. a certain white, it is said that there are three cubits of it, or four, or something else; and furthermore, of some action it is said that it is long or short, e.g. one usually speaks about length when talking about a war that lasted ten years or something like that, — based on this one believes that colours and actions also pertain to quantity. However, they do not fall beneath any of the kinds of quantity which have been established above, but in reality they belong to quality, as we are going to demonstrate in the section on it³⁸⁰.

293 Now, we shall consider that of things that are said, some exist primarily and in the strict sense, and some of those things that are said exist secondarily and accidentally³⁸¹. In the Syriac language, we are accustomed to call these two kinds “truly” and “seemingly”, so that what the ancients named “strictly” and “primarily” we usually call “truly”, while what we designate as “seemingly” they referred to as “accidentally” and “secondarily”. Thus, there are quantities in the true and strict sense, namely those which have been divided and discussed thus far, and there are those of another kind, seeming and derivative, of which we say that they are quantities only in belief and not in reality.

294 Now, when some colour — e.g., white, or black, or any other — is said to have three or four cubits or any other particular amount, it is said not in respect of the colour which is measured, but since the body in which it is contained happens to have some size, that is how the colour which is in it is

³⁸⁰ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.16–19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.13–20.

³⁸¹ Cf. *Cat.* 5a38–39: κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνον λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

said to have size. Also, if an action is said to be long or short, it is not because the action itself is like that, but because the time over which it took place was either lengthy or not. In fact, if an action which was believed to last long time occurs briefly, then due to the briefness of time taken for it this action will be called brief. But if the action which was believed to be over briefly were to extend over a long time, then again the length of time taken for it would make this action seemingly long. Hence, it is the body receptive of colours that is truly measured and not colours themselves; and it is also the time that is short or long and not the action which happens in it. It is thus obvious that body and time pertain to quantity, as it has been explained above, while colours and actions are called like that seemingly and accidentally, since they occur to one of the kinds of quantity, as we have said³⁸².

295 So, if someone states about a small body that the white in it, as one says, is more white than that of a bigger body and falls into error by trying to measure it by means of measures and saying that the white in the small body is greater than that in a body larger than it, so that such a person will deduce from it that it is whiteness that pertains to quantity and not the body which is receptive of it, then it is obvious that he merely corrupts the proper meaning of the words and is led astray with respect to the rest. In fact, he should not say that one white is greater than the other; but that it is more (white) in one case than in the other³⁸³. For the terms “great” and “small” are related to quantity, while the “more” and the “less” are also applied to colours, shapes (σχήματα) and all

³⁸² Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.20–29; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.20–93.2.

³⁸³ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.29–61.5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.8–13.

kinds of quality. Thus, if someone would like to study this subject but will resist knowing the precise meaning of the terms, he will be rebuked, as we have said. But if being unaware of this, he would study, then he will learn and will not resist in a quarrelsome way those things which are evident to everyone.

[Whether quantity admits of contraries]

296 So, after this, Aristotle defines quantity by means of its distinctive features. 5b11–16

And he first says that a concomitant of quantity is that there is nothing contrary to it³⁸⁴. For, indeed, none among its kinds — i.e. number, language, time, line, surface, body, and place — seems to truly admit of contraries. Now, someone might wish to say that large and small, plenty and few are contrary to one another, and since they pertain to quantity and are contrary to one another, it is obvious that quantity admits of contraries. However, if we demonstrate that they are not contraries, but in their subsistence they pertain to the genus of relatives, this will prove correct the statement of the Philosopher that a concomitant of quantity is that it has no contrary³⁸⁵.

297 Since we have already discussed large and small and plenty and few in the section on substance³⁸⁶, it would be proper to say now only a few things about them, in order to demonstrate that, if they are contraries they do not belong to quantity, and if they do belong to quantity they are not contrary to one another, but the subsistence of their nature belongs rather to the genus of relatives³⁸⁷. So, in order to make our account of them comprehensive, let us start our inquiry into them, making it as brief as possible.

³⁸⁴ See *Cat.* 5b11: ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Sergius paraphrases Aristotle's text rather than quoting it.

³⁸⁵ In the second half of this paragraph, Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 5b14–16: εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι.

³⁸⁶ Sergius probably means §224, where he mentioned that not admitting of contraries is characteristic not only of substance but also of quantity. Philoponus points out that it is Aristotle himself who mentioned large and small briefly in the section of the *Categories* dealing with substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.6–7: ἐν γὰρ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ μνημονεύσας αὐτῶν μόνον παρήλθε, συγχωρήσας αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι.

³⁸⁷ This is what Aristotle himself implies, as Philoponus stresses in *In Cat.* 94.9–10: καὶ δείκνυσι πάλιν διχῶς, διὰ τε τῆς ἐνστάσεως ὅτι οὐκ εἰσι ποσά, καὶ τῆς ἀντιπαραστάσεως ὅτι εἰ καὶ ποσὰ συγχωρηθεῖ εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.15–18).

298 Now, we say that one kind of quantity is definite and concrete and another is indefinite and may be grasped generally. As for the definite and concrete kind of quantity, it has been set out through the division discussed above. That which is indefinite may be comprehended through another division, when one takes the whole nature of quantity and divides it by saying that one part of it is regarded in terms of large and small and other in terms of many and few. About all bodies, surfaces and lines we say that some of them are larger or smaller than others. About time, language and number, on the other hand, we say that some of them are more or less than others. Thus, large and small apply to that kind of quantity whose parts have position, while many and few apply to that kind of quantity whose parts do not remain in one established position with respect to one another³⁸⁸.

299 That is why the Philosopher used the following examples for the two kinds of quantity and based his whole discussion of them on these. As examples for body, line and surface he took a mountain and a certain small grain, saying that any particular body is called large and small through comparison to other things of the same genus³⁸⁹. Concerning time, number and language, on the other hand, all things belonging to them are said to be many or few also through comparison to one another. Hence, if these things pertain to quantity, as we have shown, then they are not contrary to one another, but this comes from the category (κατηγορία) of relatives. So, from these and other (examples) one is able to see that they are not contraries³⁹⁰. 5b16–29

300 There is nothing at all that is called large or small simply, i.e. in its own right, but rather it is called thus in relation to something else. Thus, the same

³⁸⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.2–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20. Ammonius divides quantities into “definite” (ὀρισμένα), which are quantities in the strict sense, and “indefinite” (ἀόριστα), to which large and small belong and which are not quantities in the proper sense. Philoponus provides a more detailed analysis of these two kinds.

³⁸⁹ See *Cat.* 5b16–20: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρόν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τήν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν.

³⁹⁰ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.2–18, particularly 62.15–18: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐναντία εἰσὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶ ποσά, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι· <...> ὕστερον δὲ δείκνυσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐναντία εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται.

mountain will be called large with regard to one (mountain) and small with regard to another. And also a grain will be called large as compared to one (grain) and small as compared to another. For if things were called large or small in virtue of themselves, then neither would something large ever be called small, nor would something small ever be called large, but each thing would always maintain the order of its nature. Thus, a grain which is incomparably smaller than any mountain could never be called large, nor could a mountain be called small³⁹¹. But since a grain is called large as compared to a smaller (grain), while a mountain is named small as compared to a bigger (mountain), it is apparent that these terms are applied only by way of comparison and do not derive from the nature of things³⁹².

301 Moreover, things that are contraries first have their own existence and only then fight with one another. But as for relatives, they are said of by way of reference (to one another) and it is in this reference that their names subsist³⁹³. 5b30–33
 What I mean is this. Black and white are contrary to one another, but each one of them has subsistence by itself and exists in its own right. Large and small, on the other hand, and plenty and few do not exist in their own right, but each one of these terms appears by way of reference to the other, while what is signified by them in itself is different from what is grasped from these namings. Hence, they do not belong to contraries, but to the category of relatives, in which we usually include a slave and a master, a son and a father, a half and a double, and other things like that.

391 Cf. *Cat.* 5b20–22: οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἶγε καθ’ αὐτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἢ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.

392 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.16–25.

393 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.15–18: δεῖ τὰ ἐναντία πρῶτον εἶναι καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἀπολελυμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν, εἶτα οὕτως συνέρχασθαι καὶ τὴν μάχην ἀναδέχασθαι, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς τι ἀδύνατον, διὸ οὔτε πολεμεῖ ἀλλήλοισι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ συνεισάγει (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.10–12).

302 In this way, then, each of those things which are contraries persists even after the perishing of its counterpart. E.g., black exists apart from white, and also white does not perish if there is no black. But there is neither large apart from small nor few apart from many, since their subsistence is based on their reference to one another. Thus, if there is no father, then the word “son” may not be applied any more, and if a slave is taken away, the name “master” perishes together with him³⁹⁴.

303 One may also argue like this³⁹⁵. There is nothing that is able to be receptive of those things that are contraries at the same time. E.g., white and black may not be present in the same body at once. However, what is called large and small may be receptive of both (characteristics) at once, since, as we have said, for a mountain, for a grain and for many other things it is possible at the same time to be both large and small, many and few. Thus, the same mountain turns out to be large in relation to one (mountain) which is smaller than it, and small in relation to another which is bigger than it. Also, e.g., the number fifty is considered many in relation to twenty and few in relation to one hundred. Hence, also from this it becomes obvious that large and small do not belong to things which are contraries but to those that are grasped in relation to something else³⁹⁶.

304 In order to make this completely apparent, I am saying that there is nothing at all that might be contrary to itself or become its own opposite³⁹⁷. For what is receptive of contrariety remains one and the same at different times. But a person who states that large and small are among contraries, since each

394 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.20–25.

395 Ammonius notes that this argument of Aristotle proceeds by way of *reductio ad impossibile*, see *In Cat.* 63.27: ἕτερον ἐπιχείρημα διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.16).

396 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.28–64.9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20.

397 Here, as also above (cf. §223), Sergius applies both the term *dalqubla* and the adjective *saqqubla* synonymously for rendering the Gr. ἐναντίος, “contrary”. Porphyry, in his question-and-answer commentary, makes a distinction between opposites and contraries, affirming that some quantities may be opposed to one another but not as contraries, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 108.5–12.

one of them is applied to the same subject by way of reference, as we have shown, to what is large or small, such a person is saying that the same thing is contrary to itself, thus being obviously wrong in stating what is impossible³⁹⁸.

305 Thus, the Philosopher demonstrates that, if they were contraries then they could not belong to quantity, and if they belonged to quantity then they could not be contraries. The truth is, however, that neither do they belong to quantity nor are they contraries, but rather they are associated with quantity through what is receptive of them³⁹⁹. Just as we have shown earlier that substance is receptive of contraries, so too we state about quantity that it is also receptive of them. Thus, as we have said, the truth is that their nature belongs to that genus which is grasped through relation to something else.

306 Now, if someone is absolutely bent on asserting that there is contrariety in quantity, he deduces it from the constitution of place⁴⁰⁰. Indeed, up and down are parts of space, and they are easily grasped as contraries. For a definition of what is contrary goes like this: they are those things that are most distant from one another⁴⁰¹. And this most of all applies to up and down, for these are furthest apart from one another. That is why someone might state, that they are contraries and occur in place, and since place belongs to quantity, they too belong to quantity. Thus, it turns out that there is contrariety in the division of quantity. 6a11–18

307 Now, up and down shall not be understood here as particular things in this world⁴⁰². But even if they were, they should still be grasped through their relation to something else. In fact, people are generally inclined to understand up as the heavenly sphere, above which there is no other physical place, and

398 Ammonius comments that with this argument Aristotle “increases the absurdity”: ἐπιτείνων οὖν τὸ ἀτοπὸν φησιν ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, συμβήσεται οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ μάχεσθαι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.11–13; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.26–29).

399 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.16–18: πρότερον ὑποθέμενος αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι ἔδειξεν ὅτι ποσὰ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔπειτα ὑπέθετο ποσὰ καὶ ἔδειξεν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντία. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὔτε ποσὰ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐναντία, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.31–98.1.

400 Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 6a12–13: μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

401 See *Cat.* 6a17–18: τὰ γὰρ πλείστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὀρίζονται. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.25–65.1 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.22–23. Sergius omits the expression “in the same genus” in the definition (Ammonius, on the contrary, stresses this point, see 65.5–8).

402 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.23–24: κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω.

down as the earth, below which there is no other place. This is how human reason naturally understands up and down rather than through their relation to something else. But it is not this way that the ancients wished to explain the contrariety in the nature of things. For they did not define up as heaven, nor did they apply down to earth. Instead, they spoke of the outer limits and centre in the world, thus defining heaven as the limit and the boundary of everything, while placing earth in the centre of everything that exists⁴⁰³.

308 Thus, if there is no up and down in the world but (only) outer limits and centre, it is apparent that contrariety is neither in the world nor in quantity, since limits and centre are spoken of in relation to something else. For a limit is a limit of something, namely of what is limited by it; and also a centre is a centre of something, namely of what surrounds it as a sphere⁴⁰⁴. So, what has been said thus far concerning the fact that no contrariety is in quantity should suffice. Next, we will turn to other concomitants which the Philosopher considered to be peculiar to it.

[Other properties of quantity]

309 So, there is another property of quantity, namely that it does not admit of more and less, because none of its parts may be called more quantity than the other, but all of them equally possess its name and general nature. For number is not more quantity than language, neither is language less (quantity) than number. Similarly, number or language are no less quantity than line or body. So also, time, or place, or surface are called quantity to no greater or lesser an 6a19–25

⁴⁰³ Periphrasis of *Cat.* 6a11–12: τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῶ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.28–100.29.

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.1–3.

extent than them. But, as we have said, all its kinds are equally quantity, and none among them is more or less than the others⁴⁰⁵.

310 And this is plausible, for we have said above that there is no contrariety in quantity, it being from a mixture of contraries that more and less arise⁴⁰⁶. But since there are no contraries in quantity, it is apparent that more and less are not applied to it. However, although this property is characteristic of all of quantity, it is not found only in it. For it has been shown to us in the previous section that substance does not admit of more and less either⁴⁰⁷, but all parts of substance are equally said to be substance.

311 Now, the property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it alone and does not happen to occur to any other genera is being equal and unequal⁴⁰⁸. For this is characteristic of all parts of quantity and appears only in them⁴⁰⁹. A number is said to be equal to another number or unequal to it. Also, an utterance⁴¹⁰ is sometimes called equal to another utterance which is like it and sometimes unequal. Line, surface, and body, and also time and place — each one of them is called either equal to something of its kind or unequal⁴¹¹. What we obviously mean by this is that, when each one of them is compared to something else, we characterize it either as equal or as unequal. That is why an individual property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it alone, as we have said, is that it is always and by everyone called equal and unequal.

405 This argument does not appear in Ammonius and Philoponus. Instead, Philoponus stresses that, similar to substance, quantity is receptive of contraries (τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὴν), but does not have the contrariety itself, see *In Cat.* 101.1–19.

406 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.13–16: καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ὅπου γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐναντιότης, ἐκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὅπου δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον εὐρίσκεται· τὸ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων μίξεως γίνεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.23–25).

407 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.20–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.25–26.

408 See *Cat.* 6a26: ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

409 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.29–102.1: τοῦτο κυρίως ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ ποσοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνω ὑπάρχει καὶ παντί.

410 *Syr. mella*, Gr. λόγος.

411 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.1–3.

312 These remarks bring to an end this book, which is the fourth of the treatise that I wrote on the study of logic, where I described quantity according to the teaching of Aristotle based on what I could remember⁴¹².

End of Book Four.

Divisions of Book Four

First division

Of quantities:

- some have parts that are separate and delimited from one another, i.e. number, language;
- others are in a single unity which has no parts separate from one another, i.e. line, surface, body, place, time.

Second division

Also, of quantities:

- some contain parts which have position and remain at their place, i.e. line, surface, body, place;
- others contain parts which are not fixed and are brought forth one by one, i.e. time, language, number.

⁴¹² It is possible that here Sergius refers to his notes (ὕπομνήματα) written on the basis of Ammonius' lectures.

BOOK FIVE

[Introductory questions]

313 In the previous book, *O brother Theodore*, which was the fourth of the present treatise, we devoted our entire discussion to quantity by means of examples and divisions that were proper to it, and in it we have clearly explicated, as it seems to me, the whole concept of quantity in Aristotle. Now, in this book, which we are about to write and which is the fifth one, we will consequently discuss and explain what comes after this teaching according to the meaning which the Philosopher put into his words. Indeed, in his treatise *Categories* (κατηγορίαι), after the teaching on quantity, he speaks about the genus of relation⁴¹³, though from the contents of what we have said above it might seem appropriate that he should have taught first about the genus of quality⁴¹⁴.

314 Because of this, before starting to expound this genus, we ought to talk about those things which appear useful and quite necessary to know. First, why (Aristotle) leaves aside the genus of quality and after quantity teaches on relation. Second, what kind of nature this genus has. Third, what the order (τάξις) of his teaching is in the section on this genus. And fourth, what the correct division is that encompasses all those things that are said in relation to something⁴¹⁵. These four points we shall properly consider, and I believe that we cannot leave them out in our discussion of the genus of relatives, for otherwise the latter might be difficult (to understand) for readers.

413 The Syriac expression *lwat meddem*, “(related) to something”, is a literal rendering of the Greek πρὸς τι. In those cases where the plural is implied, I will translate it as “relatives”, while in those cases where it appears in the singular as “relation”.

414 For various notions of the sequence of the categories and the place of the category of relatives in it, cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 155.33–159.8. Sergius’ words about the “contents of what we have said above” probably refer to §§129–133 and 241–242, where he discussed the order of the categories as compared to the order of nature. The same argument appears in Simplicius, who states that based on it qualities should be considered prior to relation. Cf. also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.17–22.

415 Ammonius suggests discussing five introductory questions: (1) the sequence of the categories, (2) explanation of the title, (3) the independent existence, (4) the order of teaching, (5) division into species. See *In Cat.* 66.5–7: πρὸ τῆς τῶν πρὸς τι διδασκαλίας πέντε ταῦτα χρή ζητεῖν· τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τὸν τρόπον τῆς διδασκαλίας τὴν εἰς τὰ εἶδη διαίρεσιν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.13–16, who reverses the order of nos. 4 and 5). Sergius leaves out the second point by Ammonius, since it has apparently turned out to be irrelevant in Syriac.

315 So, it is necessary to start with the first point. Then we say that, since in the section on quantity Aristotle mentioned the genus of relation not once but several times, so as not to leave the mind of the hearer to wander about for too long trying to find out what this genus is, he provided the account of it straight away after his teaching on quantity. Indeed, it was not possible that something that has been applied to quantity in order to explain it could itself remain without explanation, so that pupils remain unaware of what it is. Otherwise, he would have brought the previous discussion into confusion and ruined its coherence. But since he referred to the genus of relation in the section on quantity, while explaining that there is no contrariety in quantity, it seemed (proper) for the Philosopher to put off for a moment the genus of quality and to turn to the teaching on this, so that the explanation which has been made about quantity would also become clear to those who learn it in close proximity to what they have just learned⁴¹⁶.

316 About the nature of this genus we should know the following. Some writers state that it does not exist by nature at all, but only by a postulation which appears in our mind⁴¹⁷. They say that of a particular person who may happen to be standing either on the right side or on the left of someone else we would say that he is on the right or on the left. It is not, however, the nature of this person that makes him to be on the right or on the left, but we define him this way in our mind. Now, they do not comprehend that the genus of relation is also known to nature, as the parts of the body are naturally placed according to it. Thus, e.g., the liver has been naturally created on the right and spleen on the

⁴¹⁶ Cf. the same argument by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.10–12: φαμέν οὖν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ποσοῦ διδασκαλίᾳ ἐμνήσθη τῶν πρὸς τι, ἵνα μὴ ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἔαση τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀγνοοῦντα περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ τοῦτο εὐθέως περὶ αὐτῶν ποιεῖται τὴν διδασκαλίαν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.13–16).

⁴¹⁷ Ammonius discusses the problem of ὑπόστασις of relatives, i.e. whether they have independent existence and thus exist naturally (φύσει) or should be considered a construct of the human mind and thus exist only by convention (θέσει). In general, Sergius' account is very close to that of Ammonius.

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1 הַפְּסָלִים BDL: הַפְּסָלִים P | הַפְּסָלִים BDL: הַפְּסָלִים P 4 הַפְּסָלִים LP: הַפְּסָלִים LP
BD 8]לר[om. BD 11 הַפְּסָלִים LP: הַפְּסָלִים BD 12 הַפְּסָלִים] om. BD | הַפְּסָלִים +]לר[BD 13
om. L 14 הַפְּסָלִים BDP: הַפְּסָלִים L 15 הַפְּסָלִים LP: הַפְּסָלִים BD | הַפְּסָלִים LP: הַפְּסָלִים BD
16 הַפְּסָלִים LP: הַפְּסָלִים BD 17 הַפְּסָלִים DLP: הַפְּסָלִים B | הַפְּסָלִים BDP: הַפְּסָלִים
L 20 הַפְּסָלִים] + הַפְּסָלִים add. BD in marg. 21 הַפְּסָלִים om. BD 23 הַפְּסָלִים BDL: הַפְּסָלִים P
הַפְּסָלִים BDL: הַפְּסָלִים P

left, and it never comes about that the spleen is on the right or the liver on the left, or that both of them are found on one side⁴¹⁸. From this, it is apparent that this genus is also known to nature.

317 Others claimed just the opposite of this, i.e. that everything in this world is constituted by this genus, one of them being Protagoras the sophist. Now, this sophist together with others like him used to say that whatever a person states is true, even if in reality it is the opposite of what he states. So, the one who says that honey is sweet is speaking truly, for it is sweet to those who taste it while being healthy. But also the one who states that honey is bitter is speaking truly too, for it is bitter for those whose sense of taste is unhealthy because they suffer from the illness called jaundice⁴¹⁹. And about all other things he was eager to state in the same way that some of them are true in relation to one thing and others in relation to something else.

318 But Plato refuted him, telling him the following: “Protagoras, either you speak truly when you say this or you speak falsely. Now, if you are speaking falsely, then we shall not believe you, since you are lying. And if you are speaking truly, stating that everything what one says is true, then, if we say that what you state is not true, we will be speaking truly and you again will be proven a liar.”⁴²⁰

319 Now, those who teach correctly state that some things exist firmly being self-subsistent, while others appear in some relation to one another, and it is the nature of the latter things that belongs to the genus of relation. E.g., a man in that he is a man, or a stone in that it is a stone, and other things like that

418 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.21–26: *περὶ δὲ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτῶν τινὲς μὲν ἔλεγον μὴδὲν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τὴ φύσει ἀλλὰ θέσει, οἷον τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οἵτινες οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐγνωσται ταῦτα τῇ φύσει, ὡς καὶ τὰ μόρια τοῦ σώματος σχέσει τινὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα θεωρεῖται, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἦπαρ δεξιὸν ὁ δὲ σπλὴν ἀριστερός, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὔτε τὸ ἦπαρ ἀριστερὸν οὔτε ὁ σπλὴν δεξιός (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 103.20–28).*

419 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 66.26–67.2: *τινὲς δὲ πάντα πρὸς τὴ ἔλεγον, ὧν εἷς ἐστὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ σοφιστής· οὗτος γὰρ ἔλεγεν ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὅτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων ὅτι τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ἐστὶν ἀληθεύει (πρὸς τινὰς γὰρ γλυκὺ ἐστὶ), καὶ ὁ λέγων αὐτὸ πικρὸν ἀληθεύει· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἰκτεριῶντας πικρὸν ἐστὶ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 103.31–104.13).*

420 Sergius’ account finds a close parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.2–7: *τοῦτον οὖν Πλάτων ἐλέγχεον φησὶν ὅτι ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἀληθεύεις λέγων, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὅτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει, ἢ ψεύδῃ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ψεύδῃ, εἰκότως διὰ τοῦτο σοὶ οὐ πιστεύσομεν, εἰ δ’ ἀληθεύεις λέγων ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὅτιοῦν λέγων ἀληθεύει, λέγομεν δὲ περὶ σοῦ ὅτι ψεύδῃ, ἀληθεύομεν ἄρα, ὥστε πάλιν ψεύδῃ, καὶ οὐ πάντα τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶ.* (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 104.18–25). Plato’s words derive from *Theaetetus* 170C. However, Ammonius paraphrases this passage, and it is Ammonius’ version that Sergius quotes instead of the text of the *Theaetetus*.

have firm existence of their own. But for someone to be a slave or a master, or for something to be a half or a double, such things appear in their being linked to one another, and each of them does not exist separately on its own. Thus, according to their opinion, it is obvious and reasonable that neither all things belong to this genus, as Protagoras believed, nor are they completely deprived of it, as it seemed to those (about whom we spoke) at first. Instead, a true notion about this has been proposed by the Peripatetics, according to which not all of the natures turn out to be encompassed by this genus⁴²¹.

320 The mode of teaching on this genus which the Philosopher employs is this. First he gives the definition of it that has been suggested by those who were before him, while refuting those statements which seem wrong to him and accepting those which have been made correctly. To this end, he gives his own definition of this genus in all accuracy and consequently reports what relates to the account of it⁴²².

321 The correct division that is appropriate for this genus is this. Some (relatives) are signified by means of similar names, while others by means of dissimilar names⁴²³. Those signified by means of similar names are when we say that what is similar is similar to what it is similar to, or what is equal is equal to what it is equal to. And other things like that which belong to the genus of relation are signified by means of those names that are similar to each other.

322 By means of dissimilar names, on the other hand, things pertaining to this genus may be grasped in multiple ways. What I mean is this. First, by way of (relating) a container of something and what is contained, e.g. a half and a

⁴²¹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.7–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 104.25–36.

⁴²² See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.11–14: τρόπον δὲ διδασκαλίας κέχρηται τοιῶδε: πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι τὸν ὀρισμὸν αὐτῶν, ὃν οἱ παλαιοὶ ἔθεντο, εἶτα δείκνυσιν ἄτοπα πολλὰ τῷ ὀρισμῷ τούτῳ ἐπόμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἕτερον αὐτὸς ἴδιον αὐτῶν ἀποδίδωσιν, ὃ καὶ μόνοις καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.12–16).

⁴²³ I.e. by means of homonymy and heteronymy. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.16–18: ἢ δὲ διαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶν αὐτῆ· τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ μὲν καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν <...> τὰ δὲ καθ' ἑτερονυμίαν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.1–2).

double. For a half is a half of some double, and also a double is a double of a half. Further, the other way is (to relate) the one who is ruled and the ruler, e.g. a master and a slave. For a master is a master of a slave, and also a slave is a slave of a master. Also, (what relates) the one who discerns and what is discerned, e.g. everything perceptible is perceptible by perception. Further, something that pertains to learning, e.g. an intelligent person becomes intelligent through certain intelligence, or a knowledgeable person becomes knowledgeable through knowing something. Further, (what relates) a cause and what is caused by it, e.g. a father to a son or a son to a father. Further, (what relates) that which affects something and what is affected by it, e.g. the striker strikes a person who is struck, while the one who is struck is struck by the striker. Also, according to a position in certain place, e.g. how one person who is on the right appears related to the person on the left, and the one on the left is understood in relation to the one on the right⁴²⁴.

323 In all such types of this genus, one applies names that differ from one another rather than the same name that designates two things standing in relation to one another, while in the first kind of relatives, as we have explained, one applies to them names which are in every respect similar to one another. So, these things (that should be said) before⁴²⁵ the teaching on the genus of relation are sufficient for the moment. Hence, we may turn now to a descriptive account of it which we are accustomed to call its definition.

[Properties of the genus of relatives]

324 So, the Philosopher at first provides the definition of this genus which has 6a36–37 been proposed (by others) and later on defines it himself in the proper way by making apparent what is not correct, as we have said above. One should be aware that also this genus may not be grasped through exact definition, since it

⁴²⁴ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.16–26; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 105.1–11. The types of relatives which are based on heteronymy as listed by Ammonius and Philoponus differ in some aspects from one another and both in turn differ from what we find in Sergius. It is thus probable that no fixed list of these types was known in Ammonius' school.

⁴²⁵ Here Sergius apparently has the Greek term τὰ προλεγόμενα in mind.

is one of the most generic genera. Instead, both Aristotle and those who were before him gave a definition of it in the same way as in case of the other such genera, i.e. deriving it from what is particularly concomitant of it. Thus, the ancients defined it in the following way, as he reports it: “Those things which are said to pertain to the genus of relation are called in what they are from other things or named in any other way as being relative to something else.”⁴²⁶

325 This is what the Philosopher says on how the ancients defined the genus of relatives. By saying that they “are called” instead of stating that they “are” he made clear that he is speaking as one who does not support this definition, as if someone said: “This is how they are named by the ancients but this is not how they actually are”. Indeed, later on he proposes a definition which is fitting⁴²⁷. And the words “in what they are from other things” mean the following. E.g., it is not as man that a man is said to be in this genus but he is named (as being) in it as the one standing on the right or on the left. So if he is on the right, he is said to be on the right of the left, but if he is on the left, he is said to be on the left of the right⁴²⁸.

326 He (i.e. Aristotle) suggests other examples, lest one assume that this genus comes to be from substance only and not from all the categories. Neither does it originate from quantity only, but also from quality. In reality, this genus is found in all the genera of the categories and is generated from the affinity of their species⁴²⁹. 6a37–6b2

327 That is why the Philosopher says that also each of the following things is spoken of as relative: affection, position, knowledge, and perception⁴³⁰. For 6b2–10

426 See *Cat.* 6a36–37: πρὸς τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐστὶν ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὅπως οὖν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον. As in the previous cases, the quotation in Sergius differs from the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*.

427 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 67.28–30: τῷ λέγεται ἐχρήσατο ὡς μὴ ἀρεσκόμενος τῷ λόγῳ· παρακατιῶν γὰρ δείκνυσιν ἄτοπα πολλὰ τοῦτω τῷ ὀρισμῷ ἐπόμενα, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλον τίθησιν ὀρισμόν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.2–3).

428 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.2–3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.5–6.

429 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.5–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.8–11. While commenting on this passage, Ammonius stresses that the category of relatives is expressed not only by means of the genitive but also by the dative, a point which Sergius apparently found irrelevant for Syriac readers.

430 See *Cat.* 6b2: ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι οἶον ἕξις, διάθεσις, αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις. The same list appears in Ammonius and Philoponus. Sergius seems to render, though in different order, the three last terms (αἴσθησις, ἐπιστήμη, θέσις), but to omit the first two, instead using the example of “affection”. In the early anonymous Syriac version of the *Categories*, the terms ἕξις and διάθεσις are not translated but transliterated, while the rest of the list is close to the terminology of Sergius.

affection is an affection of something affected, and what is affected is affected by some affection. And knowledge is a knowledge of what is known, while what is known is known through knowledge. But also perception is a perception of something perceived, while what is perceived is perceived through perception. Further, position is a position of something positioned, while what is positioned is said to be positioned in some position. Hence, some (relatives) pertain to substance, such as what is perceived; others pertain to quality, such as knowledge; and still others belong to the genus of position, like what is positioned⁴³¹.

328 After that, he says that there is a certain contrariety in the genus of relation, e.g. righteousness and wickedness are contraries of one another⁴³². For wickedness is wickedness of a wicked person, and a wicked person is called wicked because of wickedness. Likewise, righteousness is a righteousness of a righteous person, and a righteous person is called righteous from righteousness. 6b15–18

329 However, among things pertaining to this genus, as the Philosopher stated, some are receptive of contrariety and some are not⁴³³. For, as we have said, since the genus of relatives is attached to any category, it is reasonable that among them some may have contraries and some not, thus imitating those categories which they are attached to. So, when something is considered in association with substance or quantity, since there is no contrariety in them as we have said above, then no (contrariety) is found in it either. If, on the other hand, (relatives are) considered in association with quality, since quality fully admits of contrariety, then there will be contraries in them too in the same way as in the genus with which they are associated. Hence, when a half and a double which belong to quantity are relatives, i.e. when they are spoken in relation to one another, they contain no contraries at all. But righteousness and

431 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 68.14–19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 106.14–24.

432 See *Cat.* 6b15–16: ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι, οἷον ἀρετὴ κακία ἐναντίον, ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τι ὄν. Here, Sergius renders the Gr. ἐναντιότης as *saqqublayuta* and this term is used alongside *dalqubla*, which in §419 is reserved for the Gr. ἀντικείμεθα, “opposite”.

433 See *Cat.* 6b17: οὐ πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τι ὑπάρχει ἐναντίον.

התעוררתי מן השינה: חלף דגם ואלו ארבעה עשר
השנים. חצו עממלתי ארבעה עשר שנים.

330

אשר נשאלתי על ידיך. אל תהי, ואל תהי
עצמי גם לך. כחך לך גם ואלו ארבעה עשר

P80v

לשנה. אל תהי, ואל תהי אלא שנה עשרה
העשרה לך שנה עשרה. ארבעה עשר שנים

B133v

העשרה שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים: ארבעה עשר
שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים

10

לשנה עשרה: ארבעה עשר שנים: ארבעה עשר
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שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים:
שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים: ארבעה עשר שנים

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3 | ארבע עשר | inv. B 7 | ארבע עשר | om. BD 12 | ארבע עשר | BD: אל P 14 | ארבע עשר | BD: ארבע עשר P
17 | ארבע עשר | P: ארבע עשר D: ארבע עשר B; + ארבע עשר add. P in marg. | ארבע עשר | BD: ארבע עשר P
18 | ארבע עשר | om. P 19 | ארבע עשר | om. B 21 | ארבע עשר | DP: ארבע עשר B 24 | ארבע עשר | om. B

wickedness which belong to quality and are opposite to one another produce a certain contrariety also in the genus of relatives⁴³⁴.

330 One ought to know, however, that they turn out to belong to this genus not in that they are righteousness and wickedness, for this makes them belong to quality as we are going to demonstrate, but each one of them is a relative in that it is said in relation to something which is associated with it. Thus, we say that righteousness is righteousness of someone, i.e. of a righteous person, and wickedness is also wickedness of someone, i.e. of a wicked person. So, this is how they pertain to the genus of relatives. And it is through the contrariety in quality that righteousness is contrary to wickedness and also righteous is contrary to wicked. That is why it is reasonable that contrariety appears in this genus but not in all things that belong to it⁴³⁵, since each one of them exists in that it is said with reference to something else⁴³⁶.

331 You should also be aware that all those who consider that Plato believed that this genus exists only in what is said and not naturally certainly misinterpret this philosopher. For concerning this one can establish from what he says in the treatise which is called *Gorgias*⁴³⁷ that this genus should be characterized in terms of being. Now, this is what he writes: “If there is something active, there must also be something passive”⁴³⁸. Here he says “is” and not “said of” or “called”, which makes apparent that he characterizes it not as what is said but also as actual being⁴³⁹.

332 So, after this, he moves to another property which is distinctive of this genus and says that it “seems to admit of more and less”⁴⁴⁰. This (concomitant)

6b19–27

434 Cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 114.8–18; Ammonius, *In Cat.* 69.23–70.8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 108.10–30.

435 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 108.29–30: εικότως τοίνυν και ἐναντιότης θεωρεῖται ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι και οὐ πᾶσι τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖ.

436 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 109.25–26: ἐν τούτῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι τῷ ἑτέρου λέγεσθαι.

437 A marginal note in ms. P translates the title of Plato’s dialogue as “agriculture”.

438 Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 476B: ἄρα εἰ τίς τι ποιεῖ, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι και πάσχον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ ποιούντος. It is clear that Sergius quoted Plato not directly, but in that version which was known to him from Ammonius’ lectures, see the next footnote.

439 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.10–14: ἰστέον ὅτι ὅσοι λέγουσι τὸν Πλάτωνα οὕτως ὀρίζεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τι και ἐν τῷ λέγεσθαι οἰεσθαι αὐτὸν εἶναι τὴν τῶν πρὸς τι ὑπόστασιν, συκοφαντοῦσι τὸν φιλόσοφον· και γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐν τῷ Γοργία ἐστι γινῶναι ὅτι τῷ αὐτὰ εἶναι χαρακτηρίζει· φησὶ γὰρ ‘εἰ ἔστι τὸ ποιῶν, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι και τὸ πάσχον’· εἶναι γὰρ εἶπε, και οὐ λέγεσθαι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 109.26–30).

440 See *Cat.* 6b19–20: δοκεῖ δὲ και τὸ μᾶλλον και τὸ ἧττον ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὰ πρὸς τι.

is quite similar to the one which has been discussed just now, because it is not the whole genus which is like that but some parts of it⁴⁴¹. From what we have said, i.e. that it is considered in association with other genera, it is obvious that, if something gains its subsistence from quality, since the latter admits of more and less as we will demonstrate later, it will admit of them too. If, however, something is considered in association with substance or quantity, then more and less do not occur in it⁴⁴².

333 Then he sets out another property which is distinctive of (this genus) as follows: “All things that are spoken of in relation (to something else) reciprocate in speech with their correlatives.”⁴⁴³ To learn what it means that something “reciprocates”, let us say that it signifies the equality of those things that are spoken of which they maintain towards each other while being said of one another without disadvantage to any of them⁴⁴⁴. E.g., we say that a master is the master of a slave, but this may equally reciprocate, i.e. that a slave is the slave of a master. And further, that a father is the father of a son and that a son is the son of a father. And all other things which belong to this genus reciprocate in the same way. 6b28–35

*[Relatives being simultaneous]*⁴⁴⁵

334 After that, he also introduces another property which is distinctive of the genus of relation. There is no small puzzle concerning it, and if he had left it without clarification, it might have brought about a confusion of no small measure in the teaching on this genus. Now, the Philosopher says that all things which are said of in relation are simultaneous⁴⁴⁶, and neither of them is prior to another. Further, he also states that they are associated with one another in such a way that when one of them perishes the other also perishes together with it⁴⁴⁷. 7b15–8a12

441 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.16–18: ἕτερον παρακολούθημα τῶν πρὸς τί φησι, τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ὁμοιον τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ· ὑπάρχει γὰρ τοῖς πρὸς τι, οὐ πᾶσι δέ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 110.4–9).

442 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 110.20–24.

443 See *Cat.* 6b28: πάντα δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται. Sergius’ quotation is periphrastic.

444 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 70.24–71.1: ἵνα δὲ μάθωμεν τί ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεσθαι, μάθωμεν πρότερον τί ἐστὶν ἀντιστροφή <...> ἀντιστροφή δὲ ἐστὶν ἰσοστροφή. Ammonius stresses thus that ἀντιστροφή should be understood in terms of equality (τὸ ἴσον).

445 Unlike Ammonius and Philoponus, Sergius does not comment on *Cat.* 6b36–7b14.

446 Cf. *Cat.* 7b15: δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει εἶναι. Sergius seems not to quote Aristotle’s text, but rather to paraphrase it (leaving, e.g., τῇ φύσει untranslated).

447 Cf. *Cat.* 7b19: συναναρεῖ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλληλα.

- 335 To this one might say⁴⁴⁸: Provided that father and son belong to the genus of relatives, does this mean that a father is not prior to his son, nor is a master to his slave or a slave to his master? And if one of them perishes then the other one must perish as well? But it does not look like that! For it is possible at certain times for one of them to be prior to the other and also to persist after the destruction of its correlative.
- 336 Further, one may argue as follows: Everything that is known is known by knowledge and hence is spoken of in relation. Also, everything that is understood is understood through understanding it, and because of this it belongs to relatives too. Does this mean that nothing is prior among them? We see, however, that there are many things (that are prior to others); in particular, everything that is known and understood is prior to its knowledge and understanding.
- 337 For instance, eclipses of the sun and the moon had existed in the world before the philosopher Thales was born. But the knowledge of the eclipses, understanding and the discovery of their cause came about and became known to people through this man⁴⁴⁹. Or take as a further example the squaring of the circle, if this is possible, since until now it has not been discovered by anyone. So many geometers and philosophers tried to square the circle but failed. Even Archimedes, who became the first one to discover many other things, also made an attempt to square the circle, and discovered anything at all close. Despite the accuracy and soundness of his squaring, even he proved unable to find it out⁴⁵⁰.

448 Aristotle himself raises this objection in *Cat.* 7b22–23.

449 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 118.7–29.

450 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 75.11–19.

338 Now, we may provide further arguments corroborating that what Aristotle states is indeed so, i.e. that all things which pertain to the genus of relatives exist simultaneously and that neither of them may appear without its correlate, by saying the following. Everything that is prior to something else precedes it either in time or by nature. One thing is prior to the other in time when the period which it occupied is somewhat more distant (from us) than the time in which happened what is spoken in relation to it. Thus we usually say that the Median war was prior to the Peloponnesian⁴⁵¹ and that Pythagoras precedes Plato the Athenian.

339 Prior by nature, on the other hand, is that which (when eliminated) eliminates what is said in relation to it along with itself but which is not eliminated along with the other; and that which, when what is spoken in relation to it comes to be, is necessarily introduced along with it but when it comes to be itself its correlate does not necessarily follow it⁴⁵². I am talking, for instance, about animal and horse. For if animal is eliminated then it is clear that also horse is eliminated along with it. But if horse did not exist, then animal would not disappear along with it, for there are plenty of animals which are not horses. Hence animal is naturally prior to horse, for it is necessary that (first) it exists by itself and then particular animals. Further, if there is man, this brings forth along with it also rationality, but once rationality appears than it is not at all necessary for man to exist, since there are other rational beings, e.g. angels and demons.

340 So, while everything may be said to be prior in these two ways, i.e. either in time or by nature, we are now going to demonstrate that among things that are

451 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 74.12–15: τὸ μὲν οὖν πρότερον διττόν, τὸ μὲν χρόνῳ τὸ δὲ φύσει. καὶ πρότερον μὲν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν οὐ πρὸς τὸ νῦν πλείων ἢ ἀπόστασις ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ Μηδικὰ πρότερα τῶν Πελοποννησιακῶν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 117.20–24).

452 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 74.19–20: τὸ δὲ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι τὸ συναναιροῦν μὲν μὴ συναναιρούμενον δὲ καὶ τὸ συνεισφερόμενον μὲν μὴ συνεισφέρων δέ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 118.2–4).

B135v רבנן: לך בוכר ולא חסד: וכן נהגו דהכחשתו כח לטוהר. רב
 אשתא אשתאם חל וכן נהגו אנתם לטוהר. אפ' לך מנה
 בוכר וכן נהגו לטוהר נהגו דהכחשתו חסד. רב לך רב
 אפ' מנה: ולא חסד אפ' אפ' מנה לביטול חסד. רב לך אפ'
 5 בינה אשתאם חסדא דאפ' אפ' בינה. לך חסד אשתאם
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 D111r חסד אשתאם לביטול. רב אשתאם, חסד אשתאם, חסד אשתאם
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 15 חסד L: חסד BDP 16 חסד L: חסד BDP 17 חסד L: חסד BDP
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 חסד BDP | חסד BDP, Epit.: חסד L 24 חסד¹ om. B, Epit. | חסד² om. L

said in relation to one another none can be said to be prior to its correlate, neither in time nor by nature, but that they are always simultaneous and bound to one another. For even if the one who begets is prior in time to the one who is born from him, this is not because he is the one who gives birth, i.e. it is not being a father that makes him prior to his son and his child but simply being man, and in being man he pertains not to the genus of relatives but to substance. Also, if a master is prior to his slave or a slave to his master, this is not because they are master and slave which are spoken of in relation to one another, since because of it their subsistence is simultaneous, but if one of them is prior in time to the other, he is prior because he is a man, which makes him belong to the genus of substance⁴⁵³.

341 The same holds for eclipses of the sun and the moon and the squaring of the circle. Even if they are prior in time to the knowledge of those persons who discovered them, they are, however, prior merely as particular things and not as something known and perceived. For things that are known are not prior to the knowledge of the one who knows them, but objects of knowledge are simultaneous with the knowledge of the person who discovers them, just as perceived things (are simultaneous) with the perception of the one who perceives them. Hence, when these things are considered as belonging to the genus of relatives they are in no way prior to one another, but when they are considered simply as things then they are prior to the perception of them, since in this case they do not belong to this genus but to that of substance.

342 Now, things that are said of in relation to one another may not be prior by nature either, since they are bound to one another, and if one of them is eliminated the other is eliminated along with it. Thus, if there is no son, then a father is no longer father but just a man. Also, if there is no father, then a son is no longer son but just a man. So, both of them are bound to one another. In the

453 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 76.10–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 122.24–31. Ammonius notes that Aristotle himself did not provide a solution to the problem which he addressed, so that the suggested argument appears as his own solution of Aristotle's puzzle which Sergius replicates in his treatise without noting that it is not actually found by Aristotle.

same way, if there were no perception of eclipses of the sun and the moon, they would not be something perceived and understood, even if they exist in the world. For if they were not perceived and also not known, then there would be no perception or knowledge of them among men either. Hence, it is apparent that all these things and similar ones which belong to the genus of relatives are simultaneous in their subsistence and, being always bound to one another, they come to be and perish together. So the way that Aristotle defined them was fitting.

[Controversy concerning parts of substance]

343 Now, after that, he says that there is no small problem⁴⁵⁴ connected with the definition which we have discussed above, i.e. the one provided by the ancients⁴⁵⁵. This problem, he states, one is unable to solve or may solve only with difficulty⁴⁵⁶. It deals with the parts of every substance, i.e. both universal and particular⁴⁵⁷, which are also considered to pertain to the genus of relatives and to be encompassed by the defining account that has been discussed above.

344 Now, the parts of universal substance are, e.g., man, horse, bull, and dog, while the parts of a particular substance are those which constitute a body, e.g. head, hands, and legs. Since all of them are parts of substances, each one of them is a substance. But all of them are also spoken of as relatives. E.g., a horse, a bull, and even a man, each one of them may sometimes be spoken of in their relation to a man. Also, a head is a head of someone, and a hand is a hand of

454 Cf. *Cat.* 8a12: ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν..

455 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 77.4–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 124.16–21.

456 See *Cat.* 8a28–31: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἰκανῶς ὁ τῶν πρὸς τι ὀρισμὸς ἀποδέδοται, ἢ τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν ἢ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τὸ λῦσαι ὡς οὐδεμία οὐσία τῶν πρὸς τι λέγεται.

457 This statement contradicts both what Aristotle says in *Cat.* 8a14–15 (τοῦτο ἐνδέχεται κατὰ τινὰς τῶν δευτέρων οὐσιῶν) and Ammonius' commentary on it (*In Cat.* 77.6–16). Both of them specify that the aforementioned problem concerns secondary substances, i.e. the universals, and not particulars.

someone. It turns thus out that they pertain at the same time to substance and to the genus of relatives, which is impossible.

345 The Philosopher introduced this misconception and others of this sort after the definition which had been proposed by the ancients for the sake of explaining the genus of relatives⁴⁵⁸. But in order to allow everyone to properly evaluate these arguments, it is necessary to say about them that, even if parts of substance are said as relatives, it is not because they are substances that they are said with reference to other things but because of a certain affinity to them⁴⁵⁹.

346 Now, we ought to know that all things that are said to pertain to the genus of relatives turn out to have subsistence sometimes as particular entities and sometimes through their association with something else. Thus, when any of them is considered independently by itself then it does not belong to this genus. If, instead, it appears in association with other things then it is this association that makes it a relative and not its own nature. Thus, it is not because one might say that Sophroniscus is a man that this makes him the father of Socrates. It is because he begat (Socrates) and thus bound himself by relation to him that he is said to be his father. Hence, as father he is spoken of in the genus of relation, while as Sophroniscus he is a particular substance.

347 Therefore, we also state that when a horse or a bull are said to be *of* someone, we say this not because they are horse and bull but because they are a kind of property. For a horse in that it is horse and a bull in that it is bull belong to universal substance, while in that they are property, since every

458 Ammonius notes (*In Cat.* 77.6) that Aristotle intends to show “some absurdities” (τινα ἄτοπα) which follow from the definition proposed by the ancients.

459 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 77.29–78.2: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ μόνον πρὸς ἄλλο σημαίνει ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σχέσιν ἔχειν αὐτὰ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται.

property is a property of a proprietor, because of this they pertain to the genus of relation. Also, a head and a hand are parts of a particular substance, but not because each one of them is *of* something else, for because of that they belong to the genus or relation, while being a head and being a hand makes them belong to substance. But as long as they are parts, due to this they pertain to the genus of relation, since any particular part is a part of some whole whose part it is, while its whole is something that exists in its parts and is composed of its parts.

348 It is probably because the Philosopher took heed of this that he has not stated that the problem concerning the definition which has been given earlier may not be solved at all, but added to “impossible” also “difficult”, thus saying that it is either impossible to solve it or its solution is difficult⁴⁶⁰.

[New definition]

349 Now, having rebuked the definition which has been quoted above and by means of which the ancients defined this category, he sets out another definition which suits it more than the former one, saying that what is called a relative is everything “for which being lies in being in relation to something”⁴⁶¹. So, one might say that it is not how things exist by themselves that makes them belong to this genus, but their relation and connection to one another is what defines their subsistence in the genus of relatives. 8a31–35

350 So, as it becomes clear from this, if someone knows one of the relatives in a definite way, he will also know the other one in a definite way.⁴⁶² For if a person completely and straightforwardly knows one of them, he will completely and straightforwardly understand the other as well. Thus, if someone is sure that one particular virtue, e.g. chastity, is superior to something, he also knows defi- 8a35–8b15

⁴⁶⁰ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 129.10–20.

⁴⁶¹ See *Cat.* 8a31–32: ἔστι τὰ πρὸς τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταυτόν ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν. The quotation by Sergius does not explicitly translate the adverb πως and renders ταυτόν as “in” (Syr. *b*-) thus reflecting the equivalence between the two modes of being. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 130.6: τούτου καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον λέγεσθαι.

⁴⁶² Cf. *Cat.* 8a35–37: φανερόν μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν· εἰ γὰρ οἶδέ τις τόδε τι ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστίν. Sergius paraphrases Aristotle’s text. Cf. the periphrastic quote found in Ammonius’ commentary: φησὶ τοίνυν ὅτι ἐάν τις τῶν πρὸς τι τὸ ἕτερον εἰδῆ ὠρισμένως, καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ὠρισμένως εἴσεται (*In Cat.* 78.29–31).

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nately what it is superior to, namely to depravity. And further, if he understands that temperance is superior to something, he also knows precisely what it is superior to, namely to debauchery. If, on the contrary, one does not know definitely and straightforwardly that virtue is superior to something, he will also not understand definitely what it is superior to, namely to vice. Thus, as we have said, knowledge of one of the relatives always brings along with itself understanding of its correlate and its whole subsistence hangs on it.

351 Now, one might say that, when a person puts a veil on a man, e.g. on Socrates, but leaves his hand unveiled, then the hand will be known definitely, yet it will be unclear whose hand it is. And he might think that this refutes the argument offered, but let him see that his way of thinking is not correct. For even if Socrates were not covered but unveiled and known, his hand would be considered a relative not because it is a hand but because it is a part. For any part is a part of some whole. That is why both if Socrates were unveiled and if he were covered, it would still be definitely known that his hand is a part of some whole, namely of a human body, and this (knowledge) would in no way suffer from the fact that Socrates is veiled⁴⁶³.

352 Indeed, in these issues, as the Philosopher himself says, as well as in many others in philosophy, it proves impossible to go into defining them without also spending a lot of effort on raising puzzles about them. For in sciences there are many things which have not yet been found out by people, while some of them, although they have been found out, still contain many puzzles and unsolved

463 Same example appears in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 79.16–23 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 131.12–21.

problems (ζητήματα), and some of them require explanations and commentaries from the side of others in order to be comprehended by those who learn them. In all these issues, one should always be ready to raise a puzzle about them, for thus he may be sure that doing proper research on them will at any rate bring him some profit and lead to understanding of them⁴⁶⁴.

End of Book Five.

The Division of Book Five

Of relatives:

- some are applied by means of similar names:
 - as what is similar,
 - as what is equal,
 - as love of a lover,
 - and as other things like that;
- and some are called by means of dissimilar names:
 - as a container and what is contained,
 - as the one who rules something,
 - as the one who discerns something,
 - as the one who acquires some learning,
 - as some cause,
 - as what affects something,
 - as what is found in some position.

⁴⁶⁴ In this paragraph, Sergius suggests a paraphrasis (with an addition in the middle part) of Aristotle's words in *Cat.* 8b21–24: ἴσως δὲ χαλεπὸν περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σφοδρῶς ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴ πολλακίς ἐπεσκεμμένον, τὸ μὲντοι διηπορηκέναι ἐφ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ἐστίν. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 79.25–80.13 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 132.23–133.4.

BOOK SIX

[Introduction]

353 In the previous book, O brother Theodore, which was the fifth one in our treatise, we made an inquiry into the genus of relation, and we finished our account by outlining the difficulties connected with this genus. In the present book, which is the sixth one (dedicated) to the same discipline (i.e. logic), our objective will be to speak about the genus of quality.

354 So, first of all, you ought to know that concerning this genus there has been no established teaching and knowledge among those who spoke the Syriac tongue in the old days, since their notions of it are quite different everywhere. Also, those who earlier translated particular writings from the Greek language into the tongue of the Syrians interpreted the name of this genus in many different ways, sometimes calling it *hayla* (“capacity”) and sometimes designating it as *zna* (“quality”), while some of them who, as it seems to me, were completely ignorant of the meaning of this name rendered it as *muzzaga* (“mixture”)⁴⁶⁵.

355 For myself, I am sure that one term seems to be particularly suitable for rendering it, so that I will call it *zna* (“quality”)⁴⁶⁶. However, I believe that we should not quarrel about words, and everyone may designate it as he wishes, but he only should pay attention to what is meant by a certain term and that he understands it correctly. For errors and misunderstandings appear not from quarrels about words, but from ignorance of things which these words are spoken of. Thus, in order to make the word *zna* (“quality”) familiar to you and to allow you to exactly comprehend what is meant by it, I will first tell you about it clearly and briefly, so that it might become apparent to every reader how I understand it when I am speaking about it.

465 Cf. §99 above and §365 below, where Sergius merely notes that Syriac authors (former and contemporary) mostly make use of two words, *hayla* and *muzzaga*, and this is corroborated by his own treatise, since in it we find the same terms as full synonyms. However, in the next §355 he states that he is eager to establish the word *zna* as the correct translation of the Greek ποιότης, and it is this word that appears in this book and which is consequently translated as “quality”.

466 In the following paragraphs, Sergius sometimes uses the adj. *znaya* which might reflect ποιός, but in general, it seems, he does not make a distinction between ποιότης and ποιός in his treatise. Neither does he dwell on these two terms in his introduction to Book VI, while Ammonius discusses this point at length, see *In Cat.* 80.15–81.3.

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 P87r חפזיסוה א חל אפס: אבן סג דגחזכר סגדג זיכ אפזיס.
 B139v אפס דגד חפזיסוה א חללל. וחסזכר א חללל. סגד חזיסס חל
 חל חפזיסוה. סגזיסוה סל דמסחלל.

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D114r אבן דמ חזכר אבן לחללסו סג דלחללל. ספסל אב
 דגד אב חלללסו סג סגדג דאזי אב. א עלר לס סג. ל
 10 עלר לס. א חל לין אב חפסס אבן א חל חזיסוה א חל
 חללל דודס לס לרנז דגזיסוה חסס. אבן סגדא חפססו אבן חול
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 לסס א חפססוה חפזיסוה: דג עלר לחללל דגזיסוה א חלללל
 15 דאפס דעזיסוה דגזיסוה. חזיס אבן א חל חפססו אבן דמס.
 סג סגדג דגזיסוה אבן. חזיסוה אבן א חללל א חלללל, חללל
 אבן.

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1 א BD: חזיסוה P 10 חל] om. B 14 א BD: א P 16 חזיסוה] om. P 18 א BD: חזיסוה P
 21 א חזיסוה BD: חזיסוה P

356 For I assure you, O brother, that I always pay heed to this, namely to explaining clearly what I am about to say. Also, I always flee from what people usually do when they bring about confusion in their speech and use words in different ways, believing that by means of this they create such an image of themselves as if they are talking about something grandiose. Those who speak much teach little, and those who make their explanation very complicated reduce the strength of their arguments.

357 But as for me, I wish to teach more than to speak, and — whether I succeed in that or not — I am eager to explain clearly to anyone what I am speaking about. On the other hand, I also do not cut short my talk on all those things which one should investigate, and I always state that it is quite necessary to learn everything that scholars have said about a particular subject. But in order to distinguish among these things what is really necessary, one should test them with much diligence concerning whether they are in accord with the nature of creation and with the opinion of those who share our faith. In this way, I will tell what I consider (appropriate) about the genus of quality, starting from now on my account of it.

[Division of beings]⁴⁶⁷

358 Now, it seems to me that the nature of the whole creation and its ranks falls apparently under one of the two general divisions⁴⁶⁸, i.e. some beings exist as bodies and some are incorporeals, while among the latter some have beginning in time and some do not. It would not be proper for me to speak here about the origin of those that are beyond time. But according to the opinion of some of the ancients, among whom seems to be also Plato, the subsistence of every body is considered to be in time and from a particular time onward and its perishing is also set in time.

⁴⁶⁷ Like the beginning of Book VI, the following paragraphs (§§358–365) find no parallels in the extant commentary on the *Categories* by Ammonius. In contrast to Ammonius (see also Philoponus and Elias), Sergius does not discuss here the title of the section, the place of this category in the order of discussion, its division, and other *prolegomena* issues. Instead, he suggests an excursus, similar to what we find at the beginning of Book IV, which elucidates the ontological status of the category of quality.

⁴⁶⁸ Syr. *pulage*, cf. Gr. διαίρεσεις.

359 Others, however, among whom was Aristotle and all his followers, when dividing the nature of bodies, stated that there is a certain body which is simple and not complex and which is beyond coming-to-be and perishing. They call it fifth and celestial, since it is other than the four traditional elements (στοιχεῖα), and it is what the heavens and the luminaries in them originate from⁴⁶⁹. However, we may speak about these things here only in passing, since a discussion of them would require a separate book of great volume, and one should make long inquiries into them, in order to prove whether they are all true or whether some of them are true and some not, and because of what and that by means of which one may be motivated to speak about them in one way or another, and whence one may get initial guidance towards true understanding of them.

360 Now, those who are concerned about truth divide entities that are incorporeal as follows. They state that some of them exist by themselves, i.e. they are able to exist apart from the subsistence of other things, for instance angels, souls, and demons, while others do not have subsistence of their essence by themselves, but their nature has subsistence in other things. Further, concerning the latter, it seems to those who do proper research on them that some of them exist in bodies, while others exist in incorporeals.

361 Now, all colours, e.g. black and white, as well as shapes (σχήματα) and forms, e.g. the circle, the sphere (σφαῖρα), and all impressions, and also tastes, e.g. sweetness and bitterness, as well as other innumerable things like these are in bodies. And while they are not bodies themselves, they exist in bodies as one thing in another. Thus, we see that every body of any kind, while it remains one

⁴⁶⁹ Aristotle speaks of aether (αιθήρ) in *De Caelo* I 3, 270b20–24, and *Meteorologica* I 3, 339b21–27.

and the same in its own subsistence, may acquire different colours, tastes, and shapes. E.g., it may happen that honey, while preserving its substance⁴⁷⁰ as it exists, should lose sweetness and acquire bitterness because of a long period of storage or because of some other reason. Also, wool, and white lead, and many other things may acquire different colours, while their essence remains the same.

362 So, it becomes apparent from this that such things which occur to bodies differ from them. Neither are they corporeal, for otherwise they could not occur to bodies and be separated from them, since they do not produce increase or decrease of their essence. It is also apparent that they do not possess subsistence apart from the bodies to which they occur, since their separation from bodies means their destruction and, when being removed from the latter, they are not able to exist by themselves. Thus, while they are not embodied as we have said, their subsistence is in bodies.

363 Now, there are also other things of this kind which appear not in bodies, but in those incorporeals which have subsistence essentially by themselves. Examples are virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, which have subsistence in souls and not by themselves. They are also something different and separate from the nature of the soul which is receptive of them, since it remains the same in its nature, sometimes possessing virtue and sometimes vice, sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance. They enter it and leave it, depending on whether it is treated with diligence or negligence, while its nature remains the same.

364 When, however, some of the Stoics, who assume that there is nothing incorporeal and to whom also Bardaişan the Syrian adheres in his treatise on qualities⁴⁷¹, state that such things whose subsistence has been said to be in

470 Literally “its body”, cf. the use of *qnoma* at the end of the paragraph in the same context translated as “essence”.

471 Bardaişan (154–222), “the philosopher of the Syrians” (as Ephrem the Syrian labels him), of whose multiple philosophical and scholarly writings only the *Book of the Laws of the Countries*, which was revised by one of his pupils, has survived. References to Bardaişan by later Syrian authors (who considered him mostly as a heretic) demonstrate the influence of his ideas and writings even many centuries after his death.

bodies are also corporeal, they are clearly refuted by everything that has been taken for their refutation. E.g., colour is not corporeal, for if it were not like that, i.e. if its nature were one of the bodies, no colours could ever be altered. In the same way, shape or form are not corporeal, for if it were not like that, then no wax, or bronze, or any other thing of this kind could receive shapes and forms of any sort which one would like to imprint on them. Thus, since there is no need to talk longer about something that is known to everyone, it is apparent that all those things which appear in bodies and perish when being taken away from them, while the nature of the latter remains the same, are different and separate from the nature of the bodies.

365 So, those incorporeals, O brother, whose subsistence is in something else, 8b25
namely in bodies or in rational natures, where they at one time appear and at another time depart and also perish, are usually called in Greek *ῥωτῆτες* (ποιότητες). As I said above⁴⁷², we will refer to them as *znaya* (“qualifications”), while some other Syrians call them *ḥayle* (“capacities”) and *muzzage* (“mixtures”). The genus that encompasses all these things, I will designate as *zna* (“quality”)⁴⁷³. In what follows, I am going to explain it in accordance to Aristotle’s notion of it which is established in the treatise *Categories*. The Philosopher sets it there as the fourth and grants it the name “category” (κατηγορία), because it is also a most generic genus, just like substance, quantity, and the other genus of relation.

[First kind of quality]

366 So, in our teaching on it we will begin with its division, as it is fitting to it. 8b25–9a13
One kind of this genus is that of being stable and unstable⁴⁷⁴. I call as being

472 See §§99 and 354–355.

473 Cf. *Cat.* 8b25: ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται.

474 Cf. *Cat.* 8b26–27: ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις λεγέσθωσαν. In rendering the terms ἕξις, “state”, and διάθεσις, “condition”, Sergius applies the words which also appear in the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*. The latter renders ἕξις as *msattuta*, “being stable”, and διάθεσις as *syama*, “being in a position”. Later, Jacob of Edessa in his version of the *Categories* transliterated both terms, while George of the Arabs translated ἕξις as *qanyuta* (“possession”, from *qna*, “to possess”) and transliterated διάθεσις. Sergius’ terminology thus turns out to stand close to the early Syriac interpretation of the *Categories* as reflected in the anonymous translation but does not fully match with it.

stable what occurs to something and enters it so profoundly that it either cannot be separated from it at all any more or may leave it with great difficulty. And I call as being unstable what, when it occurs to something, is not firmly bound to it but may be separated from it by any particular reason which is opposed to it⁴⁷⁵. E.g., about someone who has learned a particular craft or science thoroughly and remains firm and diligent in it we say that he is stable in it; whereas about someone who knows one of the sciences only from hearing and not from much learning we say that he is unstable in what he comprehends⁴⁷⁶. Also, when fever is present in a body in such a way that the latter is consumed by it, so that a person is no longer able to fight against its strength and make it leave, then we say that it is stable in what it occurs to. If, on the contrary, it occurs to it outwardly so that (the body) may quickly get rid of it, then we say that it is unstable in it⁴⁷⁷.

367 So, this is the kind which the Philosopher places first in his division of the genus of quality and which, as we have said, has the differentia in that it is either long-lasting in what it occurs and may be separated from it only with difficulty, or it does not remain in this way for long but any kind of reason makes it depart from that in which it is. Thus, knowledge which has not become stable is entirely destroyed by forgetfulness within a short time and may thus be easily lost. Those things, on the other hand, which one learns gradually, strongly, and firmly, are either not at all separable by any cause from the soul which has received them, or only something great and very mighty can remove them from it.

475 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 134.27–135.2: πολυχρόνιοι μὲν οὖν οὔσαι καὶ δυσαπόβλητοι λέγονται ἔξεις <...> ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δὲ οὔσαι καὶ εὐαπόβλητοι λέγονται διαθέσεις (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 81.7–10).

476 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 135.4–10.

477 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 81.34–35.

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368 I am saying this because some physicians state that there are mighty diseases which cause forgetfulness in those whom they befall, so that they cannot recall anything of what they had learned before they became ill. This is also what the writer Thucydides describes in his account of the plague that happened to the Athenians during the war with the Peloponnesians⁴⁷⁸. He writes, namely, that most of them died, when during summer time they were exposed to great suffering inside their houses, while those of them who survived, as he says, forgot not only their sciences and crafts, but also their place and city, their house and relatives, and even themselves and their own names, and everything that they had known before their disease, and thought like persons who had just been born and appeared into this world⁴⁷⁹.

369 So, when hot and cold or anything like that occurs to something briefly on the surface but suddenly some reason brings what is opposite to it, it perishes. But when it goes deep and becomes stable⁴⁸⁰, then it either cannot be removed at all or remains for a long time and a powerful reason is necessary to oppose it and drive it away. However, enough has been said about the first kind of this genus.

[Second kind of quality]

370 Another kind which comes after it consists, as the Philosopher says, of capacity and incapacity, that is from what one is capable to be or not capable to be⁴⁸¹. Thus, we shall consider here such capability and incapability that come from nature and not from some training. E.g., we are accustomed to say about those whose body is strong that they are athletes (ἀθληταί) and wrestlers, and

478 I.e. the Peloponnesian war fought between Athens and Sparta in 431–404 BC.

479 Cf. Thucydides, *Historiae* II.49. Sergius paraphrases the account of the Athenian plague by Thucydides and his paraphrasis is obviously second-hand. Neither Ammonius nor other extant commentary from his school recalls this passage in this context. It is possible that this example was known to Sergius not from commentaries on the *Categories* but from the texts of Galen (or commentaries on them), who refers to Thucydides' description of the Athenian plague several times in his works. One of these references appears in Galen's commentary on Book VI of Hippocrates' *Epidemics*, which Sergius himself translated into Syriac (see Galen, *In Epid. VI* 52.3–7, 53.19–54.1).

480 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 82.28–29: εἰ δὲ μήτε τελειωτικὴ εἶη μήτε κακωτικὴ, ἢ περὶ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν θεωρεῖται ἢ διὰ βάρους κεχώρηκε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 136.23–27).

481 See *Cat.* 9a14–16: ἕτερον δὲ γένος ποιότητος <...> ὅσα κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται. Sergius' rendering of δύναμις and ἀδυναμία as *metmaṣyanuta* and *la metmaṣyanuta* does not find parallels in any extant Syriac translation of the *Categories* and apparently reflects an attempt at interpretation by Sergius.

about those who are constituted proportionally and have light feet that they are runners and jumpers. These and plenty of other similar things we state about various people when we see in their constitution and natural disposition that they are apt for executing one or the other craft or activity. So, such quality which derives from natural aptness constitutes its second species, for when we observe it, as we have said, we define something that one executes being naturally apt for it.

371 Now, this species seems to differ from the previous one in that the latter exists actually in what it is, while the former exists in potentiality and in aptness and not in actuality⁴⁸². For if someone actually becomes a runner or an athlete and proves to be good in this craft, we say that he is stable in it, while if he does not practice a lot in it, it is considered to be unstable in him⁴⁸³. Hence, we attribute it to the previous species which exists, as we have said, according to what actually is. But if someone makes no effort at all to learn one of the crafts, while his temperament and the constitution of his body make him apt for it, then he has the potentiality to naturally possess any one of them but is not actually in it. Similarly, one says that a man is actually healthy or sick in one of the two ways of the previous kind (of quality), i.e. that this is either stable or unstable. But whether the constitution of one's body has affinity to and aptness for health or sickness relates to the second kind, i.e. to capability and incapability.

482 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 84.23–25: καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶδος τῆς ποιότητος ἐνεργεῖα θεωρεῖται ἢ τε ἔξις καὶ ἡ διάθεσις, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον δυνάμει. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 143.20–23.

483 Ammonius writes that in these cases we are speaking about either state (Sergius: “being stable”) or condition (Sergius: “being unstable”) rather than natural capacity or incapacity. See *In Cat.* 84.25–28: οἱ γὰρ δυνάμει πύκται ἢ δρομικοὶ ἐπιτηδειότητα εἰς τοῦτο ἔχειν λέγονται κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν. ἐὰν δὲ πύκτης ἢ δρομεὺς ἐνεργεῖα ἢ, οὐκέτι κατὰ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀδυναμίαν λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἔξιν καὶ διάθεσιν.

5
 D117r
 L49v

מְחַבְּרֵי חַיֵּי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ חַל אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי הַיְסוּס. הַיְסוּס
 חַיֵּי לְחַיֵּי: מִיָּד הֵם פְּעֻמָּה שֶׁנִּכְרַס. חַל אֵלֶיךָ הֵם הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי
 אֲבוֹתֵינוּ. דֵּלֵךְ חַיֵּי לְחַיֵּי אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס. אֵלֶיךָ אֵלֶיךָ נִכְרַס: דֵּלֵךְ
 פְּעֻמָּה לְחַיֵּי מִיָּד כִּי חַלֵּה אֲבוֹתֵינוּ שֶׁנִּכְרַס. מְחַבְּרֵי מִיָּד אֵלֶיךָ
 הַיְסוּס לְחַיֵּי: לֵךְ חַיֵּי דֵלֵךְ נִכְרַס. מִיָּד אֲבוֹתֵינוּ הַיְסוּס דֵּלֵךְ נִכְרַס.
 לֵךְ חַיֵּי הַיְסוּס. אֵלֶיךָ נִכְרַס מְחַבְּרֵי הַיְסוּס דֵּלֵךְ נִכְרַס. מִיָּד אֲבוֹתֵינוּ
 חַל אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ חַל אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ.
 הַיְסוּס פְּעֻמָּה מִיָּד אֲבוֹתֵינוּ לְחַיֵּי אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס: אֵלֶיךָ דֵּלֵךְ
 נִכְרַס פְּעֻמָּה לְחַיֵּי.

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 B143v
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 P91v
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אֵלֶיךָ אֲבוֹתֵינוּ חַל אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי הַיְסוּס. אֵלֶיךָ אֵלֶיךָ
 בְּיָדֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי: מִיָּד הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ. מְחַבְּרֵי הַיְסוּס
 מְחַבְּרֵי לְחַיֵּי הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי: מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מִיָּד אֵלֶיךָ נִכְרַס.
 חַל אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי לְחַיֵּי הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי
 מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי לְחַיֵּי לְחַיֵּי מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי
 תִּלְחַץ לְחַיֵּי לְחַיֵּי: מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מִיָּד אֵלֶיךָ נִכְרַס.
 מְחַבְּרֵי מִיָּד לְחַיֵּי: חַל אֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי לְחַיֵּי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי
 מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי: אֵלֶיךָ אֵלֶיךָ הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי
 מְחַבְּרֵי: מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי אֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי
 מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי. וְאֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי
 הַיְסוּס מְחַבְּרֵי לְחַיֵּי אֵלֶיךָ לְחַיֵּי: חַל אֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ
 מְחַבְּרֵי אֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ מְחַבְּרֵי. מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי.
 חַל אֵלֶיךָ מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי מְחַבְּרֵי.

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DLP באתר 11 om. P [משה ל 9 חייך BDP: חייך 5 P פעם 4 om. P 3
 Epit.: BDL, Epit.: מְחַבְּרֵי | LP: מְחַבְּרֵי | BD: מְחַבְּרֵי | LP, Epit.: מְחַבְּרֵי, B 13 באתר.
 P למלך BDL, Epit.: למלך 15 P חייך BDL, Epit.: חייך | P מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ + [לחייך 14 P
 מְחַבְּרֵי אֲבוֹתֵינוּ LP, Epit., add. BD in marg.: מְחַבְּרֵי | BD, add. P in marg. | DL: מְחַבְּרֵי
 BL מְחַבְּרֵי 22 P חייך BDL: חייך 21

372 Now, we are accustomed to say about someone whose natural constitution is weak that he is capable of suffering, or that he suffers easily. About someone, on the other hand, whose constitution is sound we say that he is incapable of suffering by chance, so that one would state that such person does not suffer easily if it were not for a great and mighty reason. Hence, the one who is capable of suffering is incapable of not suffering. And also, the one who is capable not to suffer is incapable of suffering. So, since this kind (of quality which is the one) of capability and incapability has to do with the natural disposition of each particular thing, it manifests itself in that something is either inclined and prone to be affected and perform any kind of activity or is not inclined at all⁴⁸⁴.

[Third kind of quality]

373 Another, third species of the genus of quality is also constituted by those 9a28–10a10 qualities⁴⁸⁵ that are called affections and affective⁴⁸⁶. They are so named because they appear in bodies and produce certain alterations in our senses. So, when they occur to things and influence them so that they acquire particular properties, these qualities are called affections. When, on the other hand, our senses approach things and, while perceiving them, receive alteration, one calls (such qualities) affective, since they affect the senses in some way producing alteration in them. What I mean is this. Since fire and honey, and all other things that are hot or sweet like them, contain hotness and sweetness in their nature, they are called qualified by possessing affections. But when they approach our body or mouth and cause alteration in our perception of hotness and sweetness, because of that their faculties are called affective qualities, since they produce a certain affection in our perception⁴⁸⁷.

484 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 85.6–9: ἰστέον ὅτι λέγεται δύναμις ἢ τῷ πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, καθάπερ λέγομεν πύκτην τὸν δυνάμενον πλήττειν, ἢ τῷ πεφυκέναι μὴ πάσχειν, καθάπερ λέγομεν τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ πάσχειν καὶ πάλιν τὸν νοσοῦντα λέγομεν δύναμιν ἔχειν τοῦ πάσχειν. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 143.28–144.4.

485 Or “qualifications”, Syr. *znaya*, which, however, in this case reflects the Gr. ποιότητες.

486 Cf. *Cat.* 9a28: τρίτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος παθητικαὶ ποιότητες καὶ πάθη. Sergius reverses the order of the two terms. Besides, he applies the term *zna* for the name of the whole genus and *znaya* for particular qualities of this kind. But it seems that he does that for stylistic reasons and that in both cases one may speak of quality and not of qualification in the second case.

487 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 86.13–19: διχῶς δὲ αἱ παθητικαὶ ποιότητες ἦτοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὰ πεπονθέναι καὶ διὰ πάθους πεποιῶσθαι παθητικὴν ἔχειν ποιότητα λέγεται ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἡμῶν πάσχειν κατὰ τὴν τούτων ἀντίληψιν, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρός· οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ πέπονθεν, ἵνα θερμανθῇ, ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς τοῦτο πάσχομεν κατὰ τὴν ἀντίληψιν αὐτοῦ θερμαινόμενοι, καὶ τὸ μέλι ὁμοίως, καὶ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα ποιότητές εἰσιν ὡς εἶδος καὶ οὐσία ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ,

374 Now, this third species (which includes) affections and affective faculties is subdivided into four parts. For either it is present to one whole species of things, like whiteness to snow, white lead, and swan (κύκνος); or it is found not in one whole species but in its parts, like whiteness and blackness in horses, men, and other living beings; or, further, it is present in things naturally from birth, like blackness of Ethiopians and ruddiness of Illyrians; or, finally, it appears but may be easily lost, like redness caused by shame or pallor caused by fear⁴⁸⁸.

375 These qualities, however, occur not only to human bodies and to other bodies, but also to the soul. For just as blackness is present in an Ethiopian from birth, so too anger, or madness, or anything like that sometimes appear in the soul from the first birth of a man. And also, just like pallor appears in the body in result of fear and redness in result of shame, so too the soul may become irascible, or mad, or change in other ways from some affection⁴⁸⁹.

[Fourth kind of quality]

376 Now, after these, there comes another, fourth species of the genus of quality, which comprises figures (σχήματα) and shapes⁴⁹⁰. It also requires a definition, since it is not provided by the Philosopher. So, you ought to know that everything that receives a shape also has a figure, but not everything in which a figure is present also has a shape. Thus, there are more figures than 10a11–16

καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν πάσχειν ὑπὸ τούτων παθητικὰς ποιότητας ἔχειν λέγεται. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 147.24–30.

⁴⁸⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 86.2–12 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 147.9–23. Sergius' classification, although clearly deriving from that of Ammonius, differs from it in some details in the second and third types.

⁴⁸⁹ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 148.8–149.10.

⁴⁹⁰ See *Cat.* 10a11: τέταρτον δὲ γένος ποιότητος σχῆμά τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ἕκαστον ὑπάρχουσα μορφή. Sergius' rendering of the first term as *'eskema* (i.e. by a loanword) and the second term as *dmuta* is characteristic of all Syriac versions of the *Categories* and thus reflects a well-established tradition.

בג דתורה. כן, דתלמ לה כל חגג אשכח דמ כל
יפה עמם.

אזכרנן מכל כפיקחא מילא. דכל חגג דנפח אפ
אזכרנן בג אפיקא יצילא חר, דמלא אשכחא. אזכרנן
דאזכרנן למ אפ דתורה. כל חגג דמ דתלמ נפ אשכחא, ממשכא:
אזכרנן דתורה דמלא דממשכא דתורה דאשכחא. כל תלמ
אשכחא תלמא. אזכרנן: דן יסמ בג אשכחא דתורה. חגג
כל תלמא נפיקחא. דתורה אשכחא אזכרנן. כל תלמ דמ
דתלמ נפ אשכחא. אשכחא תלמא. אזכרנן: אכל אפ
אזכרנן דתורה דתורה. בג אדעא דמ דאשכחא אשכחא:
אזכרנן אפ תלמ כל תלמא יצילא נפיקחא אכל תלמ דתלמ
נפ.

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P92v

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כל ממשכא דמ אזכרנן: מנה דמ כל אשכחא
אזכרנן. אזכרנן אשכחא תלמא דתלמא אפ דממשכא
אשכחא. כל אפיקא בג דתלמ. דמ אפיקא. דמ אפיקא
דאזכרנן אשכחא אזכרנן אשכחא דתורה. חגג. ממשכא
בג אשכחא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא
ללכא אזכרנן אשכחא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא
אזכרנן דתלמא דתלמא: אכל אפיקא דתלמא דתלמא. ממשכא
אזכרנן דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא
אזכרנן. חגג.

B144v

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D118r

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L50v

ממשכא דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא. חגג דתלמא
אזכרנן בג דתלמא דתלמא דתלמא: אפיקא דתלמא דתלמא

379

2 L, Epit.: יפה BDP 3 L, Epit.: דתלמ BDP 4 om. BDP, Epit. 5 דתלמ om. BD, Epit. | LP: דתלמ | LP, Epit.: דתלמ BD 6 כל BDP: חר L, Epit. 7 אשכחא תלמא: inv. B | LP: יסמ: BD, Epit. 8 אשכחא BDL: אשכחא P, Epit. 10 אשכחא LP: אשכחא BD 11 תלמ LP: תלמ BD 13 דתלמ] om. P 14 אשכחא תלמא P: אשכחא תלמא BD: אשכחא תלמא L 15 דתלמ BDL: דתלמ P 16 תלמא דתלמא om. P 18 אשכחא BDP: אשכחא L 19 אשכחא BDL: אשכחא P

shapes, for the latter are not present in all things, while figures are found in everything⁴⁹¹.

377 So, we may briefly put it as follows. Concerning all things which are animate and moved through voluntary motion one says not only that they have figure but that there is a shape in them; while about everything that is inanimate in its subsistence, e.g. a bronze or a stone vessel and the rest of other things, one speaks only about figure, but they are far from being related to a shape. Thus, shape and figure are said of all animate things, while of those things that are inanimate only figure is said⁴⁹². Also, straightness and curvedness of something belong to this species (of quality, i.e. that) of figure, and they are said of all animate things as well as about those which are inanimate⁴⁹³.

378 Concerning porosity and density, i.e. opacity and transparency, Aristotle says⁴⁹⁴ that they belong to the genus of being-in-a-position and not to that of qualifications⁴⁹⁵. We, however, shall say that if one takes such porosity and density which are caused by something, then they belong to the genus of being-in-a-position, as the Philosopher states. If, on the other hand, (one takes) such opacity and transparency which exist naturally — as we say about earth that it is firm and dense and about air that it is light and transparent — then they turn out to be qualifications and not some states which signify positions⁴⁹⁶. 10a16–24

379 Now, we say that there is porosity in a body when its parts are spread out at small distances from one another, so that they may admit another body

491 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 87.23–88.2: ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς μορφῆς· πᾶσα γὰρ μορφή καὶ σχῆμα ἔχει, οὐ πᾶν δὲ σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν ἔχει. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 151.14–17.

492 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.3–4: ἡ γὰρ μορφή ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων μόνον λέγεται, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 151.18–19.

493 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.6–8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 152.3–5.

494 See *Cat.* 10a16–19: τὸ δὲ μανὸν καὶ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον δόξετε μὲν ἂν ποῖον σημαίνειν, ἔοικε δὲ ἀλλότρια τὰ τοιαῦτα εἶναι τῆς περὶ τὸ ποῖον διαιρέσεως.

495 *Syr. znaya.*

496 Philoponus points out that this differentiation goes back to Aristotle who treats this issue in a different way in the fourth book of the *Physics* (cf. 216b30–35), see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 153.25–26: ἐν δὲ τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει ποιότητα εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φυσικὴν μάνωσιν ἢ πύκνωσιν τὴν περὶ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καταγινόμενῃν ὑποκείμενον.

between them which is not of the same kind. Further, we say that there is density in something when its parts are arranged close to one another, so that no other body may enter between them. So, it is the position which the parts have that the Philosopher considered when he stated that porosity and density belong to the genus of being-in-a-position and do not belong to that of quality⁴⁹⁷. We should say, however, that such permeability and density that are generated by some affection or by men, indeed belong to the genus of being-in-a-position, so that those who assume that they should be situated in the genus of quality err. But when one of them exists naturally in something, just as we said about earth and air, then they are natural qualities, for their capacities⁴⁹⁸ may not be separated from what they are in.

380 Now, concerning the four kinds of the genus of quality enough has been said for now. If, however, someone prolongs an account of them more than it is fitting for students to hear, he will obstruct the goal of this treatise, which is the beginning of the exercise and study of logic. But further speaking about quality, Aristotle adds that perhaps some other type of this genus might some time be found⁴⁹⁹. It is, however, applicable not only to these issues, but rather he establishes it for us as some sort of rule (κανών) for plenty of things in philosophy, admonishing us not to settle down and come to rest making our minds content with what has been said only, indulging in laziness, as if it were not necessary for us to search and to find for ourselves something else than what has been said to us⁵⁰⁰.

381 Indeed, if I myself had preserved in this treatise only the words of the Philosopher, I would have composed one rather short book instead of all that I

497 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.10–14: πυκνὸν γὰρ ἐστὶν οὗ τὰ μόρια σύνεγγυς κείται ὡς μὴ δύνασθαι δέξασθαι ἑτερογενῆς σῶμα, μανὸν δὲ τὸ διεστηκότεν ἔχον τὰ μόρια ὡς δύνασθαι δέξασθαι ἑτερογενῆς σῶμα. οὐκοῦν θέσιν τινὰ μᾶλλον φαίνεται τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν δηλοῦντα.

498 *Syr. hayle* may render the Gr. αἱ δυνάμεις, but, as Sergius himself notes (see §§99 and 354), this term was also applied in his time for translating the term ποιότης.

499 See *Cat.* 10a25: ἴσως μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλος ἂν τις φανείη τρόπος ποιότητος. Sergius' quotation is periphrastic.

500 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 156.8–10: βυλόμενος δὲ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐπαναπαύεσθαι τοῖς παρ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένοις μηδὲ ἀργοῦς μένειν καὶ ἑτεροκινήτους, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τι αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ καὶ ζητεῖν.

have written concerning the categories, since the length of his account in this teaching would not exceed one book instead of six which I have compiled thus far to this end.

[*Properties of quality*]

382 After the division of the species of quality that was suitable and that has revealed to us all types (τύποι) in which this genus brings forth its capacity, he (i.e. Aristotle) consequently proceeds in his account to a general definition which differentiates it from all other genera. However, the definitions of genera, as we have said multiple times⁵⁰¹, do not match the model (κανών) of definitions but derive from those properties that are particularly concomitant of each one of the genera. As we have also said plenty of times about (the use of) properties in a particular definition, since a property is suitable only to something to which it belongs, it is also applicable as a definitory description of what is to be defined⁵⁰². Hence, a definition of the genus of quality is constituted by its properties too, which we are now about to turn to, explicating each one of them according to our ability.

383 Now, it is distinctive of this genus⁵⁰³ that almost all things which participate 10a27–10b11 in it are called paronymously⁵⁰⁴. I say “almost all”, since not all things pertaining to it without exception but most of them are said paronymously. Thus, a wicked person is characterised in this way paronymously from wickedness, while a virtuous person is called virtuous paronymously from virtue. Also, an intelligent or a prudent person is designated like that paronymously from intelligence and prudence, while someone is called foolish and ignorant because of the qualities of foolishness or ignorance that are in him.

384 But a runner and an athlete (ἀθλητής), or a healthy and an ill person — all of them are <not>⁵⁰⁵ called paronymously from the natural disposition of their

501 See §§198–202, 290–291, and 324.

502 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.23–24.

503 In *Cat.* 10a27–29, Aristotle makes a distinction between the qualities proper and the things which participate in them and are thus “qualified”, which Sergius does not make explicit in his commentary. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 88.25–89.3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 156.16–23.

504 See *Cat.* 10a29–30: ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πλείστων καὶ σχεδὸν ἐπὶ πάντων παρωνύμως λέγεται. In rendering the term παρωνύμως, Sergius applies the expression *ba-nsibuta* in the sense of “derivatively”, which appears also in the anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* in combination with the noun *šma*, i.e. *ba-nsibut šma*. As in many other cases, we see that Sergius was familiar with the terminology reflected in the latter but does not fully replicate it.

505 This sentence in the form which has been transmitted to us by all extant manuscripts contradicts both what Aristotle writes in *Cat.* 10a34–10b1 and how Aristotle’s words are interpreted by Ammonius (see *In Cat.* 89.5–9). It is thus probable that this passage came down to us in a corrupted form and that a negative particle has been omitted in it at a very early phase of the transmission of Sergius’ text.

bodies which fits each one of them and determines them as being what they are. Nor does anything seem to be characterized by being called paronymously from a figure (σχῆμα) or a shape, or from being stable or unstable. But if one were to state that being figurative is said because of figure, just like being virtuous is because of virtue, this (in fact) is said metaphorically and not literally, since in the discussions of this kind we are speaking about such figures as are in natural bodies and not about those which are considered metaphorically because of some external similarity. Thus, one of the properties characteristic of the genus of quality is that most of the things pertaining to it, although not all of them, are called paronymously.

385 Now, the Philosopher says that another property which is distinctive of it is that there are contraries in it⁵⁰⁶. Indeed, there is contrariety in quality but not in any other genera⁵⁰⁷. Although substance, as we have said above in the discussion of it, is receptive of contraries, this does not come from it but, as we shall say now, every contrariety belongs to the genus of quality. For white and black, cold and hot, vice and virtue, knowledge and ignorance, and all other things which are opposed to one another belong to the genus of quality, while they occur in substances as one thing in another. Hence, it is obvious that their nature belongs to quality, while substance is receptive of them as of something having a different nature⁵⁰⁸.

386 But contrariety belongs not to every quality but to most of them, as we shall say now. For if it were not like that, what would be contrary to red or blue colour⁵⁰⁹, or further to a figure (σχῆμα), e.g. the circle, the triangle (τρίγωνον),

506 See *Cat.* 10b12: ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὸ ποιόν.

507 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.15–16: φησὶν οὖν ἴδιον τῆς ποιότητός ἐστι τὸ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἐναντιότητα.

508 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.23–24: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἡ ἐναντιότης κατὰ τὴν ποιότητα ἐθεωρεῖτο· καὶ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία διὰ ταύτην τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι τὰ ἐπιδεχόμενα τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ποιοῦ ἐλαμβάνοντο κατηγορίας.

509 Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 10b15–17: οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· τῷ γὰρ πυρρῷ ἢ ὠχρῷ ἢ ταῖς τοιαύταις χροιαῖς οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον ποιοῖς οὔσιν.

or the square (τετράγωνον)? Apparently, nothing. For things that are contrary to one another change into one another so that the destruction of each one of them means the generation and subsistence of its counterpart, and they also belong to same genus and are more distant from one another in the same genus than all other things which are between them⁵¹⁰.

387 So, it becomes apparent from this that the contraries belong to the same genus⁵¹¹ and that if one of them is subsumed under some species (εἶδος) then the other is subsumed under it too. Thus, e.g., if white is a colour, it is necessary that black which is contrary to it should be a colour as well. And if hot is a faculty, then cold shall necessarily be a faculty as well. Similarly, also all other things like that are subsumed under the same species together with what is contrary to them⁵¹². 10b17–25

388 Further, the Philosopher states that another concomitant which is distinctive of the genus of quality is that it may be said to be more and less⁵¹³. For instance, the whiteness of one thing is said to be greater than that of another, or less than it. Similarly, also the righteousness and virtue of someone may be said to be more or less than those of another person. However, a definition of this subject matter should be given⁵¹⁴. In fact, it is not one of these things by itself that admits of a more and a less, but what is receptive of it is said to be more or 10b26–11a14

510 Thus contrariety is present only in those qualities which are opposed to one another but not to something that lies between the opposites. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 157.30–158.3: οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τῇ ποιότητί ἐστὶν ἐναντιότης· ταῖς γὰρ μεταξὺ τῶν ἐναντίων ποιότητων ποιότησιν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, οἷον τῷ πυρρῷ ἢ τῷ ὠχρῷ ἢ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις· ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῖς σχήμασιν οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, τῷ τριγῶνῳ λέγω καὶ τῷ κύκλῳ καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις.

511 Ms. D here adds a scholion which is inserted in a slightly different form in the main text in ms. P and which turns out to be a quotation from *Cat.* 14a19–20: (ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία) ἢ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει εἶναι ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ἢ αὐτὰ γένη εἶναι, “(all contraries must) either be in the same genus or in contrary genera or be genera themselves” (ms. D differs in the last part of the sentence: “or be contrary genera themselves”, while ms. P is closer to the Greek text). The quotation is based on the Syriac version of the *Categories* produced by Jacob of Edessa (d. 708) and is thus a product of an unknown (probably West Syriac) commentator of Sergius’ work who must have lived after the 7th century.

512 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.18–21: δῆλον δὲ ἐστὶ, φησὶν, ὅτι ὅφ’ ἦν κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεται ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὑπὸ ταύτην ἀνάγεται καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡμᾶς ὑπὸ ἄλλην κατηγορίαν αὐτὸ ἀναφέρειν. See also Porphyry, *In Cat.* 137.5–14.

513 See *Cat.* 10b26: ἐπιδέχεται δὲ καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τὰ ποιᾶ. Sergius paraphrases the text of Aristotle similarly to what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 89.23–24 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 158.14–15, but refers to “the genus of quality (*znā*)”, while Aristotle himself and both Ammonius and Philoponus use the term τὰ ποιᾶ, “qualified things”.

514 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 158.25–26: ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ διήρθρωσεν ἡμῖν τὸν περὶ τούτων λόγον· ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτά φαμεν (“but Aristotle has not given us a detailed account of these matters, so that we shall say the following”).

less than another thing which partakes of it⁵¹⁵. Indeed, virtue is by no means more or less than virtue, neither is justice more or less than justice, but rather it is someone who partakes of them by being virtuous or just who is said to be more or less in the degree of partaking of each one of them.

389 Also, of such things as white, black, and suchlike, one also does not say that one of them is more or less than the other. For white in that it is white is not more than any other white. Nor is black in that it is black any less than something else that is black. Rather it is the body which is receptive of them that is said to be more or less white than another one, and also more or less black than another. Likewise, in regard to everything else pertaining to this genus, we shall not assume that they themselves admit of a more and a less, but those things in which they occur⁵¹⁶.

390 Now, a property in the strict sense which is particularly characteristic of the genus of quality is that it may always be called similar or dissimilar⁵¹⁷. It 11a14–19 applies to all its species and is always concomitant of them. Thus, we are accustomed to say that this white is similar to that one, or that this black is dissimilar to that one, that this figure (σχήμα) is similar to that one, while this shape is dissimilar to that one. Also, about hot and cold, wet and dry, virtue and vice, and about all other things without exception which belong to the genus of quality we are accustomed to say that they are similar or dissimilar to one another. Hence, this is particularly characteristic of this genus much more than of all other ones. Now, what has been said thus far is sufficient for a definition (of quality) which derives from its concomitants.

515 *Syr. ba-nsibuta*. Sergius applies here the same expression for rendering the Gr. μετέχω, which he used while speaking about paronyms above, see §§383–384. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.3–5: δικαιοσύνην γὰρ δικαιοσύνης οὐ πάνυ φασὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον λέγεσθαι, ἥττον μέντοι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχειν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας λέγεται.

516 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.10–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 159.1–17.

517 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 90.28–91.2: μεταβαίνει δὲ εἰς τὸ κυρίως ἴδιον καὶ φησιν ὁμοία δὲ καὶ ἀνόμοια· ἐπ' οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν ἀρμόζει τοῦτο τὸ ἴδιον.

[Puzzle concerning relatives]

- 391 One should not be disturbed if many of those things which have been discussed in this genus turn out to belong also to the genus that has been discussed before, namely to that of relation⁵¹⁸. Nor should one believe that we have forgotten what has been stated plenty of times above, i.e. that same thing may not pertain to two genera⁵¹⁹. But every reader should examine what is said with due consideration. Thus, we ought to know that one thing may not be found in two genera in the same way, i.e. what is said of it would come from various genera. However, in modes (τύποι) which differ from one another a particular thing may belong not to one genus only but to many.
- 392 What I mean is this. The same piece of wood may be said to belong to substance and to quantity, to relation and to quality, but it is not in the same mode (τύπος) that it is said to pertain to all of them. For it belongs to substance in that it has subsistence in virtue of itself and does not exist in something else, like hot in a body. But it also pertains to quantity in that it is long or short, or has any particular size. Similarly, it is also said as relative when it belongs to someone who has the power to sell or to burn it. And further, it is referred to quality in that it is either dry or wet, either white or black, either small or big, for all these and suchlike pertain to the genus of quality. So the statement has been made clear which we make all the time that the nature of one thing may not pertain in the same mode to two genera, but every nature turns out to belong to different genera in different ways.

⁵¹⁸ Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 11a20–22: οὐ δεῖ δὲ ταραττεσθαι μὴ τις ἡμᾶς φήσῃ ὑπὲρ ποιότητος τὴν πρόθεσιν ποιησαμένους πολλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι συγκαταριθμεῖσθαι. Ammonius makes clear that it is Aristotle himself who articulates this puzzle and consequently suggests a solution to it, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 91.4–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 161.31–162.4.

⁵¹⁹ See §§109–112, above. Porphyry refers in his question-and-answer commentary to Aristotle's own statement in *Cat.* 1b15–16 that the differentiae of genera that are different and not subordinate one to the other are different in species, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 139.26–27.

393 Thus, even though one may consider many things which have been discussed in the genus of quality to belong also to the genus of relation, it is however not in one and same mode that they pertain to the former and to the latter. For even if both figure, since a figure is in something, and understanding, since also understanding is in someone who understands, pertain to the genus of relation, still essentially⁵²⁰ each one of them belongs to the genus of quality. Thus, one says that they are species of quality which have affinity to and participation in the former genus, but each one of them seems to essentially⁵²¹ belong to quality apart from participating in something to what it is said to be related⁵²². And since enough has been said about it, we shall now turn to the teaching about the remaining (categories).

[Division of the categories]

394 As it has been explained in the previous books, there are all together ten primary genera that are designated as “categories” (κατηγορία). About the four principle ones among them⁵²³ we have taught until now. About the remaining six, on the other hand, there is no need to give an account, since even the Philosopher who invented them taught nothing about them, but confined himself to merely mentioning them and spared (the reader) an account of them, as if it were obvious and apparent from what has been said⁵²⁴. So, let us also here briefly discuss this subject. The principle and primary genera, which appear as elements (στοιχεῖα) and the foundation of the other six, are the four about which we have taught, namely substance, quantity, relation, and quality. The remaining six, on the contrary, are generated and arise from the combination of substance with the (other) three⁵²⁵.

520 Syr. *quyyameh*, “what concerns their subsistence”. Cf. the use of *qnoma* in the next sentence.

521 Syr. *qnoma*.

522 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 91.10–92.2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 162.7–28. Sergius’ *Commentary* differs here from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

523 Ammonius calls them αἱ κυρίως καὶ πρῶται κατηγορίαί, see *In Cat.* 92.6. The following account by Sergius finds a close parallel in Ammonius and clearly derives from the latter.

524 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.12–16: ἀποδοὺς δὲ τῶν τεσσάρων κατηγοριῶν τοὺς τε ὄρους καὶ τὰ παρακολουθήματα τῶν λοιπῶν ἔξ οὗτε τὰ ἴδια εἶπεν οὕτε τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς ἀπέδωκεν οὕτε τὴν εἰς τὰ εἶδη διαίρεσιν ὡς δυναμένων ἡμῶν ἐκ τῶν ῥηθέντων καὶ ταύταις ἐπιστῆσαι.

525 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.6–8: δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι αἱ κυρίως καὶ πρῶται κατηγορίαί τέσσαρές εἰσιν αἱ εἰρημέναι, οὐσία ποσὸν ποῖον πρὸς τι, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ἔξ γίνονται ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.4–10.

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 14 | om. B | חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים P
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 17 | LP: חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים BD | חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים P | BDL: אֶת־הַיָּמִים P
 18 | om. P | חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים BDL: אֶת־הַיָּמִים P
 19 | BD: חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים P | om. BDP | חַל אֶת־הַיָּמִים BDL: אֶת־הַיָּמִים P
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395 We ought to correctly understand the division of them as follows. Some natures exist in virtue of themselves and are called substances, while some do not have subsistence by themselves and are called three other genera. Further, of those which have subsistence in other things and do not subsist in virtue of themselves, some arise and are generated through their reference to something else, which is the genus of relation, and some exist without reference to and participation in something else. Further, of the latter, some are indivisible and always equally extended, and they are called qualities, and some admit of division and segmentation into parts, constituting the genus of quantity⁵²⁶.

396 Thus, as we have said, from this division and from the combination of these three genera with substance the other six genera are generated. Now, from the combination of substance and quantity arise two of them, namely that of where and that of when, since the first of them indicates place and space, while the other points to a particular time. From the combination of substance with quality arise two others of them, namely that of acting and that of being-affected, since action and affection designate some quality which happens in a substance. And further, from the combination of substance with the (genus) of relation the two remaining genera are produced, i.e. that of being-in-a-position and that of having⁵²⁷.

397 But as I have said, the teaching about each one of them has become apparent — so that we are in no need of further definitions which we should learn about them — from the explanation given to us in the discussion just above, when we spoke about the meaning of the ten genera, and particularly from

526 The same classification is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.10–15: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκεν, ὡς ἡ οὐσία, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἑτέροις ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. τῶν δὲ ἐν ἑτέροις ἐχόντων τὸ εἶναι τὰ μὲν ἐν σχέσει θεωρεῖται, οἷον τὰ πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ ἄσχετά εἰσι. καὶ τῶν μὴ ἐχόντων σχέσιν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μεριστά, οἷον τὰ ποσά (τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ἐλέγομεν τοῦ ποσοῦ εἶναι, τὸ μεριστόν), τὰ δὲ ἀμέριστα, οἷον αἱ ποιότητες.

527 Sergius' division reflects what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.7–12: αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ἐξ γίνονται ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς: ἐκ γὰρ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ἐγένοντο δύο κατηγορίαι ἢ τε ποῦ καὶ ἢ ποτέ, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς μίξεως τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ γίνονται ἕτεραι δύο τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι γίνονται αἱ λοιπὴν δύο κατηγορίαι τὸ κεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ἔχειν. Cf. an extended version in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 163.16–164.5.

what we said on how the six genera are generated from the combination between the four genera about which we had taught at greater length, so that the concept of the former is encompassed by the whole teaching that has been established about the latter⁵²⁸.

398 But since, as I have said above, we always ought to seek more than anything else in our teaching to clearly explain what we intend to say, also now we will briefly give the definition and the division of each one of them separately. For as you know very well, I am always concerned about the composition of my account, trying to make it straightforward (*ιδιώτης*) in its structure and to manifest clearly to everyone in what way something is explained.

[Definition of the remaining six categories]⁵²⁹

399 So, the genus of acting is what does something and operates in some way. It is divided into two species, for everything that is acting either acts on itself, e.g. the soul when it turns to itself and knows itself, or it acts on another, e.g. when fire heats another body or when snow cools a particular body⁵³⁰.

400 As for the next genus, being-affected is being changed by something. There are likewise two species of it. For what is affected may either be brought to destruction when the change in it is too great, e.g. when what is affected by heat is burned; or it may be brought to perfection, e.g. we say that vision is affected and changed by what is visible⁵³¹.

401 Further, the genus of being-in-a-position is an accident that occurs to a body. It is divided into three species. For either the whole body is reclining and

528 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.12–17; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.6–10.

529 See also §§95–108, above.

530 This paragraph, as also the following ones, reflects what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.17–19: ἔστιν οὖν ποιεῖν μὲν τὸ εἰς τι ἐνεργεῖν. τούτου δὲ εἶδη δύο· τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἢ εἰς ἑαυτὸ ποιεῖ ὡσπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἑαυτὴν γινώσκουσα ἢ εἰς ἕτερον ὡς τὸ θερμαίνειν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.10–12).

531 See the same account in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 92.19–22: πάσχειν δὲ ἔστι τὸ ὑπὸ τινος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τούτου εἶδη δύο· ἢ γὰρ ὡς εἰς φθορὰν ἀγόμενον πάσχει ὡς τὸ καίεσθαι ἢ ὡς εἰς τελειότητα ἀναγόμενον, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν πάσχειν τὴν ὄρασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.13–17).

its position is called lying, or the whole of it is elevated and it is called standing, or its position is between these two and is called sitting⁵³².

402 Now, the genus of when is indicative of time, and it also has three species. For sometimes it refers to the past, sometimes to the future, and sometimes it signifies what is present⁵³³.

403 Similarly, the genus of where is indicative of place, and it is also divided into six species. For of things some may be said to be up, some down, some on the right, some on the left, some in front, and some behind⁵³⁴.

404 And finally, there is another genus called having, which designates something being in something⁵³⁵. There is no need to repeat the account of its division and to prolong uselessly our discussion. We have provided you with the division of it in that section where we showed in how many ways something is said to be in something else. There, we clearly demonstrated that everything may be called being in something in eleven modes (τάξεις). So, I will refrain from talking about it here, and thus conclude our introduction into those things which we are about to discuss.

End of Book Six.

532 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.18–22: κείσθαι δέ ἐστι τὸ θέσιν τινὰ ἔχειν. τούτου δὲ εἶδη τρία, τὸ ἀνακεκλίσθαι τὸ καθῆσθαι τὸ ἐστάναι· ἢ γάρ, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, τὸ ὅλον σῶμα κέκλιται καὶ λέγεται ἀνακεκλίσθαι, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι κέκλιται τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται καθῆσθαι, ἢ ὅλον ὀρθὸν ἐστὶ καὶ λέγεται ἴστασθαι (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.1–2). Sergius is closer to the account preserved by Philoponus, although he deviates from it in some details.

533 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.2–3: ποτὲ δὲ ἐστὶ χρόνου δηλωτικόν, καὶ τούτου εἶδη τρία, ἐνεστῶς παρεληλυθῶς μέλλον (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.22–23).

534 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.3–4: ποῦ δὲ ἐστὶ τόπου δηλωτικόν, καὶ τούτου εἶδη ἕξ, ἄνω κάτω δεξιὰ ἀριστερὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὀπισθεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 164.23–25).

535 Sergius' description of the last remaining category differs from what we find in Ammonius, who defines it as "placing one substance around another substance", cf. *In Cat.* 93.5–6: ἔχειν δὲ ἐστὶν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ ὑποδεδέσθαι τὸ ὠπλίσθαι καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 165.17–19). Thus, Ammonius shifts the focus from being-in-something, i.e. what is contained, to being-around-something, i.e. to the container, and does not refer to the eleven modes of being-in-something found also in his commentary.

L53r

فألقى دابة من دابة

B150r |

فألقى دابة

D122v

فألقى دابة

5

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

10

فألقى

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

فألقى دابة

1 DP: فألقى B | P: دابة BD | P: دابة D: دابة D: فألقى B
B 3 DP: دابة B 4 DP: دابة B 5 DP: دابة B 9 [دابة] + دابة BD
11 DP: دابة B 12 P: دابة BD 13 P: دابة BD

*Divisions of Book Six**First division*

The genus of quality is divided:

- into being stable and unstable,
- into capacity and incapacity,
- into affections and affective qualities,
- into figures and shapes.

(Second division)

The affections and affective qualities are divided as follows:

- either they are present in one whole species, as whiteness in all swans;
- or they are found not in the whole species, as whiteness in men;
- or they are present from birth, as blackness of an Ethiopian;
- or they occur by chance, as pallor resulting from sickness.

BOOK SEVEN

[Introduction]

405 The previous, sixth, book which has just been completed, O brother Theodore, was dedicated to the teaching on quality and on the remaining six genera. I have finished in it the systematic account of all doctrines which have been taught to us by Aristotle and by all other philosophers relating to the teaching on the ten highest genera, which are principle and primary for the study of and training in logic⁵³⁶.

406 But as we learn from the books of the ancients, the Philosopher divided his treatise *Categories* into three sections, i.e. the first one that is about particular words used for the instruction about these genera, the next, second one that includes the discussion of each one of the ten categories, and also the third one that deals with those words which (Aristotle) mentioned in the teaching of these genera but which he left without definition⁵³⁷. If you recall what has been discussed above, you should know that we taught about the first section of this treatise in the second book⁵³⁸, while in books three, four, five, and six we gave an account of the second section of Aristotle's treatise.

407 Now, in the present, seventh, book we are going to explain what is necessary about the third section of the treatise *Categories*, which is, as we

536 I.e. the previous book concluded the part on the *praedicamenta*, and the last, seventh book focuses on the so-called *postpraedicamenta*. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 168.21–22: πεπλήρωται ὁ τῶν κατηγοριῶν λόγος καὶ ἄρχεται τοῦ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας τμήματος (“the account of the categories has been completed and now begins the section of what comes after the categories”).

537 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 167.22–168.2: εἰς τρία μέρη διήρηται τοῦτο τὸ βιβλίον, εἰς τε τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν καὶ τὸ μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας, καὶ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν διαλέγεται, αἷς μέλλει χρῆσασθαι ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἀγνώστων ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας οὐσῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ τμήματι περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τῷ προκειμένῳ, περὶ τινων φωνῶν ὧν παρέλαβεν ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ὧν ἐννοίαν μὲν τινα ἔχομεν οὐ μὴν διηρθρωμένην. Ammonius (and Philoponus) discusses this issue in the *prolegomena* part, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.2–5 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 13.6–18; cf. also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 25.5–9. However, similar to Sergius, Philoponus finds it necessary to recall this division at the beginning of the *postpraedicamenta* part.

538 The *antepraedicamenta* discussed briefly in §§113–121.

have already said above, about particular terms that have been mentioned in the teaching on genera, for instance change, contrariety, movement, and suchlike. Thus, it is our task now to discuss them, i.e. contrariety, change, movement, as well as those things that are similar to them, what each one of them signifies, and into how many species they are divided.

408 So, let us say briefly about them what we have learned in many places and what we recall about them. If someone would be able to find out something else that would exceed or prove more useful than what I am writing, then you shall listen to it, O brother, rather than to us. But let us now turn to an inquiry into the remaining subject matters, beginning with change⁵³⁹.

[Change]

409 We learn from nature and from philosophy⁵⁴⁰ that there are six kinds of change in this world which encompass every particular change that ever takes place in any object⁵⁴¹. The first one of them is seen in generation and destruction. The second one takes place through growth and diminution. These two pairs arise from the doubling of something that occurs in things and thus bringing forth the four (kinds). The fifth is that one which produces alteration, and the sixth appears through movement from one place to another⁵⁴². 15a13–15b16

410 However, in order to make clear the account of what we discuss, we shall further explain each one of them by itself, making in our speech the following distinction⁵⁴³. As we have said above, substance is in multiple things that have individual subsistence, e.g. Socrates, or a particular stone, or a piece of wood, or anything else like that. When something that did not exist comes to be in the

539 Sergius deals with the remaining questions not in that order in which they appear in the *Categories* or in the commentaries by Ammonius and Philoponus. In contrast to them, he first considers the issue of change, or motion, which appears at the very end of the *Categories* and to which he turns once again at the end of Book VII, thus following Aristotle's text. In the first case (in §§409–418), he renders the Gr. κίνησις as *šugnaya*, “change”, while in the second case (§§445–448) as *zaw'a* and *mettzi'anuta*, “motion, movement”. Thus he aims to differentiate these two terms and to treat them separately.

540 Philoponus points out that the issue of change, or motion, is fitting for a natural scientist, or physiologist: ὁ περὶ κινήσεως λόγος πρέπων μὲν ἐστὶν ἀνδρὶ φυσιολόγῳ· πάντα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ πράγματα ἐν κινήσει ἔχει τὸ εἶναι (*In Cat.* 197.12–13).

541 In §§275–276, Sergius raises a puzzle as to why motion (Syr. *zaw'a*) is not mentioned by Aristotle among the species of quantity and solves it by pointing out that this issue is not suitable for those who are beginning the study of logic (i.e. for the readers of the *Categories*).

542 See *Cat.* 15a13–14: κινήσεως δὲ ἐστὶν εἶδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

543 For the following account, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.10–16 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 197.12–199.24. Ammonius divides the kinds of change first into substantial and accidental: ἡ οὖν κίνησις μεταβολή ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν μεταβάλλει ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (105.10–11).

world, its birth is called generation. And since it cannot persist forever, for the subsistence of everything after some time comes to an end, it is clear that it is also dissolved and perishes, and this dissolution is called destruction.

411 Consequently, they say, generation takes place when an unworthy thing perishes and brings forth subsistence of something else which is much more manifest and worthy than it. They call destruction, on the other hand, what happens to something apparent and worthy when it is dissolved into what is despised and unseen. Thus, we say that from a worthless and despised seed, which is a kind of moisture, appears a human body that has much greater appearance and dignity than it. In turn, the destruction of the latter produces the former, for we also state that the human body which is worthy and apparent becomes soil that is despised and unseen, and we say that the destruction (of the body) resulted in it.

412 So, the first kind of change is the one which appears in generation and destruction and whose subsistence is in the nature of substance⁵⁴⁴. For when some substance changes completely into another substance, this is called generation and destruction, as we have said. When, on the one hand, something unseen is destroyed and produces something apparent, then people call this sort of change generation. When, on the other hand, something apparent is changed into something unseen, then we usually call this sort of change destruction. While these two kinds of change occur in the nature of a substance, as we have said, the other two which are revealed in growth and diminution do not take place in the nature of a substance but in the quantity which is in it⁵⁴⁵.

413 So, we call growth such an increase as occurs to a certain body by means of numerical addition, either in the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth (all at once), or in any of them particularly. For if a small number is multiplied by any other number, e.g. ten by twenty, then we say that growth happens in that

544 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.11–13: καὶ εἰ μὲν κατ' οὐσίαν, γίνεται γένεσις καὶ φθορά (εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν, ἔσται γένεσις, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, γίνεται φθορά).

545 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.13–14: εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ μεταβολὴ ἢ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ περὶ αὐτό. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐν αὐτῷ, καλεῖται αὐξησις καὶ μείωσις.

quantity whose parts are separate⁵⁴⁶. So, if a particular body of three cubits is increased by four or five cubits in its length, breadth, or depth, or in all three (dimensions) at once, then the change that happens in them is called growth. When this species (of change) takes place, then, as we have said, it occurs not to the nature of a substance, but to the quantity which is in it, for what grows does not itself change and become something else, but its nature receives a certain increase while it remains one and the same.

414 Similarly with diminution, which is contrary to growth. For we say that diminution occurs to something which apparently becomes less than the original number or to a particular body which has certain decrease either in length, or in breadth, or in depth, or in all three (dimensions) at once. This change too takes place in the quantity which is in a substance and not in the substance itself, since the latter remains one and the same, while a diminution or a decrease of any kind occurs to it.

415 The fifth kind of change is the one which occurs to the outer parts of a substance and not to all of it⁵⁴⁷. E.g., if Socrates who was previously black becomes white because of a quiet way of life or becomes black from any particular reason, while being white before that, or becomes warm, having been cold (previously), or cold, while he was warm before, then the change that happens to him is called alteration. Thus, we properly say that this change occurs to the outer part of a substance, while the latter itself persists and remains the same.

546 Cf. §243, above.

547 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.15: εἰ δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, (sc. καλεῖται) ἀλλοίωσις.

416 Now, this kind, i.e. that of alteration, differs from the previous one, which is seen in growth and diminution, in that the latter cause some increase or decrease in the quantity to which they occur, while alteration neither changes the substance itself nor causes in it any increase or decrease but is spread out in it while it is preserved in its subsistence and size. Thus, it pertains neither to substance nor to quantity, but to the genus of quality, and it is found especially in the following species (of it): figures, shapes, colours, and affections. For all changes of these kinds produce certain outward alterations of a substance without extension or reduction from any side. Hence they are called alterations, as we have said, that belong to the genus of quality.

417 Now, another kind of change which shows itself in the movement from one place to another⁵⁴⁸, is further subdivided into species, about which we will say a little later when we will give an account of motion, as we have said above⁵⁴⁹. And since it is not proper for us to tell the same things twice, we will therefore omit here the account of this kind of change, for (what has been said) is sufficient for listeners.

418 This is how you can clearly explain and make apparent to the students the teaching on the six kinds (of change) which have been discussed thus far. Two of them take place in substance, namely generation and destruction. Another two occur to quantity which is in substance, namely growth and diminution. And the other two of them which remain have their birth in the genus of quality, namely alteration and movement from one place to another⁵⁵⁰. Now I am going to tell you also about opposition.

548 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.15–16: εἰ δὲ περὶ αὐτό, καλεῖται ἢ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή.

549 Thus Sergius differentiates between motion (Syr. *metzi'anuta*) and change (Syr. *šugnaya*), and this turns out to be the reason to treat these two issues at different places of his commentary.

550 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.16–19: ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τέτρασι κατηγορίαις, ἐν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ αὐξησιν καὶ μείωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποιῷ ἀλλοίωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ποῦ τὴν κατὰ τόπον μεταβολήν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 199.5–7. Thus, Ammonius differentiates the two last species in that he attributes one of them to quality and another to the category of where. Sergius himself sets aside locomotion in §417 just above as a separate kind of change.

[Opposition]

419 Many people believe that opposition and contrariety are the same thing, so that there is no difference between them⁵⁵¹. But this is not true, because opposition is greater than contrariety. In fact, all contraries are said to be in opposition, but not everything that seems to be in opposition is contrary to something. Hence, contrariety is one of the species of opposition. But let us discuss all kinds of opposition, in order to make clear for us what it is and how contrariety happens to be only one of its species. Now, opposites exist either as capacity and privation, or as relatives, or as constructions of speech which signify affirmation or negation, or as things that are contrary to one another. Thus, there are four species of opposition⁵⁵².

420 In order to give you a more clear understanding of them, let us put it as follows. Some of the opposites are found in statements, e.g. when one says “Socrates is running”, “Socrates is not running”, and all other things like that, so that this species turns out to appear in the construction of speech. Some of them, on the other hand, occur to things. And among those opposites which appear in things, some are comprehended as being in some relation, e.g. left and right, above and below, and the rest like that, so that this species appears as relatives; and some are without reference to anything else. Further, among those (opposites) that have no relation to something else, some change into one another in those things to which they occur, e.g. white and black, cold and hot,

551 In the following paragraphs, Sergius systematically applies the noun *dalqublayuta* as an equivalent to Gr. ἀντικείμεθα, “being opposite”, and *saqqublayuta* as a translation of the Gr. ἐναντιότης, “contrariety”, although in the earlier parts of his commentary these two terms appear as synonyms. The same differentiation is characteristic of the 7th century Syriac versions of the *Categories* produced by Jacob of Edessa and George of the Arabs, but is not found in the early anonymous translation which uses *dalqubla* with both meanings.

552 Cf. *Cat.* 11b17–19: λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικείμεθα τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ ἔξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις. Sergius alters the order of Aristotle’s text and seems to have paraphrased it rather than translating it directly. That this alteration of the order was deliberate is shown by Sergius’ note in §421 below that capacity and privation appear first in the list.

and other things like that, thus constituting the species of contrariety; and some do not change into one another, e.g. sight and blindness — of which one may change into its counterpart, while the other does not reciprocate, — and produce another species, namely that of capacity and privation⁵⁵³.

421 Now let us suggest a characteristic for each species of the opposition 12a26–34 separately and thus clearly distinguish them from each other. So, capacity⁵⁵⁴ and privation, which are called first among those things that are opposed to one another⁵⁵⁵, refer to some activity that is present in us or to its opposite, e.g. sight and blindness. For sight is some natural capacity that operates in us, while blindness is a privation and destruction of this capacity, and both of them are spoken of in opposition to one another.

422 Now, one should always consider privation not as something occasional, when a person is simply (ἀπλῶς) deprived of something, but when he is deprived of what he ought to possess at that time and to such an extent that is necessary for him. Hence, there are three things concerning privation that one should inquire into, namely whether someone is of a nature to receive that capacity which is opposed to something, at what time someone may naturally receive what he is deprived of, and also in which part of his body it is natural to receive the capacity that is missing⁵⁵⁶.

553 Sergius' division has a close parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 93.18–94.3: τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἢ ἐν λόγοις ἀντίκειται ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, οἷον Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ—Σωκράτης οὐ περιπατεῖ, ἢ ἐν πράγμασι, καὶ τούτοις ἢ σχέσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ὡς καθ' αὐτὰ θεωρουμένοις· καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ σχέσιν λέγονται ἀντικεῖσθαι ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι οἷον δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν, τὰ δὲ οὐ κατὰ σχέσιν ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀντίκειται, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα ἢ οὐ μεταβάλλει, καὶ εἰ μὲν μεταβάλλει, ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ ἐναντία οἷον τὸ μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ, εἰ δὲ μὴ μεταβάλλει, ἀντίκειται κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἔξιν οἷον ὡς ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 168.18–27.

554 Syr. *hayla*, Sergius translates thus the Gr. ἔξις, “possession”, which the anonymous Syriac translation renders as *'ituta* that derives from *'it l*, “to have”. Jacob and Georg both translate ἔξις as *qanayuta* which derives from another verb meaning “to possess”, *qna*. Sergius' interpretation thus appears quite unique, although his note that *hayla* refers to “something present in us” (*ma d-'it leh ban*) makes apparent that he was familiar with that terminology which we find in the anonymous translation.

555 This statement is supported neither by the transmitted Greek text of the *Categories* nor by the commentary tradition. Ammonius corroborates the order which we find in Aristotle by stating that the division starts with a milder kind of opposition (in relatives) and ends with the most strong kind (in affirmation and negation), see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 94.4–17, cf. a much more detailed account by Philoponus, *In Cat.* 169.3–170.16.

556 The same three points are described by Ammonius and Philoponus: τρία δὲ δεῖ παρατηρεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἔξεως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως, τὸ τε πεφυκὸς δέχεσθαι καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε δέχεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε, καὶ ἐν ᾧ μέρει πέφυκε (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.3–5, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 96.11–14). Sergius' version turns out to be closer to that of Philoponus, and the same holds for the following paragraphs.

423 What I mean is this. We do not say that a stone is deprived of sight, i.e. is blind, since it is not in its nature to admit of the faculty of sight⁵⁵⁷, but we speak of privation of it concerning men. And we do not say that this occurs to their hands or feet, since these members are not instruments for sight⁵⁵⁸, but to their eyes. Further, we do not say about a baby that it is deprived of sight, for the time has not come yet for it to be naturally capable of having it. Similarly, a newborn puppy is not said to be blind or deprived of sight, because the time has not arrived yet for it to receive it⁵⁵⁹. Further, we do not say about a baby which is less than six months old that it is deprived of teeth, since time has not arrived yet for it to have the natural capacity for them⁵⁶⁰. So, to sum up, one speaks of privation when there is a proper time for something to receive a particular natural capacity which turns out to be missing and by which point one does not have what he is naturally capable of.

424 Another species of opposition is that which is manifested in the construction of speech. When we take two things and say of one of them that it either has or does not have the other, then we make statements that are opposed to one another. So, if one takes Plato, Alcibiades, or any other particular person and states about one of them that he is running, walking, reading, or anything else like that, and further states that he is not running, not walking, or not reading, then one will construct opposite statements. About this kind of compositions we will extensively and properly speak, when we move to the treatise on the first compositions of simple words, which in order comes just after the one on the ten categories in whose last section we are now⁵⁶¹. 12b5–16

557 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.6–7: οὐ γὰρ λέγομεν τὸν λίθον ἐστερηθῆαι ὄψεως, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲ ὄλως πέφυκεν ἔχειν ὄψιν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 96.15–16).

558 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.7–9: οὕτε τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοὺς πόδας λέγομεν ἐστερηθῆαι ὄψεως, ἐπειδὴ μὴ κατ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος πέφυκεν ἔχειν τὴν ὄψιν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 96.19–21).

559 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.9–10: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ σκυλάκιον ἐστερηθῆαι ὄψεως λέγομεν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ καιρῷ πέφυκεν ἔχειν (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 96.21–25).

560 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 175.12–14: ὁμοίως καὶ νωδὸν λέγομεν οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα ὀδόντας (οὐ γὰρ δὴπου καὶ τὸν ἄρτι τεχθέντα· οὐ γὰρ τῆνικαῦτα πέφυκεν ἔχειν).

561 I.e. *De Interpretatione*. No commentary by Sergius on this treatise has come down to us.

425 Further, another species of opposition is the one based the genus of 12b16–25
 relatives, for instance right and left, above and below, half and double, and all
 other things similar to them. For all these things and suchlike whose subsist-
 ence is in the genus of relation are also spoken of in opposition to one another.

426 Also, another species of opposition called contrariety has its subsistence in 12b26–32
 all faculties and colours which transform into one another. Those things that
 are contrary to one another either have something intermediate between them,
 or there is nothing else which is somehow known to be intermediate between
 them. Those contraries which have nothing intermediate between them are for
 instance even and odd numbers, for there are no other numbers between them
 which are neither even nor odd. Similarly, also about light and darkness and
 about many other things we say that there is nothing else between them what
 would be neither light nor darkness. Although there are many people who
 believe that the light coming from the shining of the rays of the sun which
 breaks out at dawn before the rise of the sun occupies an intermediate position
 between light and darkness.

427 There are also other things that are contrary to one another and have
 something intermediate between them, for instance white and black. For there
 are grey, reddish, pale, and many other colours between them. Also, between
 virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance there are other ranks (τάξεις) which
 are set either precisely in the middle or a little bit closer to one side than to the
 other. Therefore, in some cases we are able to find names for the things which
 are between the contraries, as we have said about colours that are intermedi-

ate, and in some cases there are no names for them, but they may be distinguished only intellectually, as we have just said about the degrees that lie between virtue and vice or between knowledge and ignorance.

428 Let what (has been said) concerning the subsistence of the four types of opposition suffice for the ears of those who study logic. Next we will explain the differences between them.

[Differences between the types of opposition]⁵⁶²

429 So, the type of capacity and privation differs from that of relation in that capacity and privation are never said of one another. For sight is not called (the sight) of blindness, neither is blindness (the blindness) of sight⁵⁶³. Most of the relatives, on the other hand, are said of one another, for instance the right of the left and the left of the right, and also the half of a double and the double of a half. Further, capacity and privation are attributed to a particular member of the body, for only one member is naturally capable of them, while things that are said as relatives may neither both be in one and the same thing nor do they usually occur to the same part⁵⁶⁴. 13a3–13

430 The opposition of capacity and privation differs from things that are contrary to one another in that one of the contraries may always change into the other, for instance white into black and black into white, cold into hot and also hot into cold. But this is not what we see in the capacity and privation, for a capacity sometimes changes into privation, for instance sight into blindness, but privation never changes into capacity⁵⁶⁵. Thus, blindness never turns back into sight as long as we are speaking about natural understanding of it. For we 13a13–36

562 As references to the *Categories* in the margins make clear, in this section of his commentary, Sergius does not follow strictly Aristotle's text, but prefers to deal with various topics in the order which he considered more appropriate. This order does not find parallels in the commentaries by Ammonius and Philoponus that are based on the sequence of the *Categories*.

563 Here, Sergius turns to *Cat.* 12b16–19, partly quoting partly paraphrasing Aristotle's text: ὅτι δὲ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἕξις οὐκ ἀντίκειται ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, φανερόν· οὐ γὰρ λέγεται αὐτὸ ὅπερ ἔστι τοῦ ἀντικειμένου· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐκ ἔστι τυφλότητος ὄψις, οὐδ' ἄλλως οὐδαμῶς πρὸς αὐτὸ λέγεται.

564 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 99.5–100.2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 182.13–183.15. Sergius differs from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus in that he distinguishes here what is opposed as state and privation to relatives, while Ammonius, following Aristotle's text, compares state and privation with those opposites that have something intermediate between them.

565 The first part of the paragraph is very close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 183.20–24: τὰ ἐναντία μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα (τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν εἰς ψυχρὸν μεταβάλλει καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν εἰς θερμὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν εἰς λευκὸν καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς μέλαν), τὰ δὲ κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ ἕξιν οὐ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄψις εἰς τύφλωσιν μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ τύφλωσις εἰς τὴν ὄψιν.

הענין הזה נשקל עליו. כל מה שיש בו חסרון
לפי שיש לו חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
הוא.

431 כל מה שיש בו חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
5 ויש בו חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
הוא. כל מה שיש בו חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
הוא. כל מה שיש בו חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
הוא.

432 10 חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
והוא חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
L58r חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
P106v חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול

433 15 חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
B154r | חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
D126r חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
20 חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
B154v חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול
חסרון גדול ויש בו חסרון גדול

10 חסרון גדול L, Epit.: חסרון גדול P 17 חסרון גדול L, Epit.: חסרון גדול P | חסרון גדול om. L 18 חסרון גדול P, Epit.: חסרון גדול L
19 חסרון גדול om. L | חסרון גדול om. P 21 חסרון גדול om. P 22 חסרון גדול L: חסרון גדול BDP, Epit. 23 חסרון גדול
BDL, Epit.: חסרון גדול P

will refrain from speaking about those things that may happen by the will of God, since our discourse aims at the study of logic⁵⁶⁶.

431 But the opposition of the contraries differs from that of capacity and privation also in the following. Most of the contraries have other things that are intermediate between them, as we have said above, for instance there are plenty of colours which are between black and white, and there are not a few grades between virtue and vice. Between capacity and privation, on the other hand, there is nothing at all which comes in between. 12b33–13a3

432 One (type of opposition) differs from the other also in the following. It is necessary for most of the contraries that one of them is found in that thing to which it occurs and that it perishes in that moment when it departs from it, e.g. hot in fire and cold in snow. But privation and capacity are not like that, for as we have said they always occur to one and the same thing.

433 Now, things that are contraries differ from those which are opposed as relatives in the following⁵⁶⁷. When one of the relatives exists then it is necessary for the other to be present too, and when one of them perishes then the other one perishes together with it. For if there is a father, it is necessary for a son to exist, but if there is no son, there is no more father together with him. And the same applies to all other relatives. But it is not like that with things that are contraries. For if one of them exists, this does not necessarily bring forth the other. Neither, if it perishes, does what is contrary to it always perish along with it. For if there is white in something, there should not be black. Neither is it 14a6–14

566 A similar note, which reflects the Christian interpretation of this passage is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 169.18–19 and 184.17–18, in Elias, *In Cat.* 242.11, and in a number of marginal scholia to *Cat.* 13a35, see the additional critical apparatus *ad loc.* in Bodéüs 2002: 241.

567 Here, Sergius provides a commentary on some portions of Chapter 11 of the *Categories* focused on contraries, which Ammonius and Philoponus treat in separate sections of their commentaries. Sergius prefers to deal with this subject matter in the context of opposition.

necessary, if cold disappears, that hot will disappear together with it; instead, it will probably come to be.

434 They also differ from each other in the following. Things (that are contraries) occur naturally to the same thing at different times, while those which are said in relation do not have their subsistence in the same thing, but in two objects, as we have said multiple times. 14a15–19

435 Now, this is how the three species of opposition, i.e. that of capacity and privation, that of relation, and that of contrariety, differ from each other. As for the other, fourth, species of opposition which is constituted, as we have said, by combination of words, it differs from the other three, to put it briefly, in that it appears only in words, while those three are not in words but in things. Thus, if one says, “Socrates is writing” — “Socrates is not writing”, this opposition is said to exist in words. If, on the other hand, one speaks of sight and blindness, or hot and cold, or right and left, he is speaking of things themselves and not combining words. Thus, as we have said, this species of opposition differs from the other ones in that it exists in words, while those (exist) in objects themselves. 13a37–13b35

436 If, however, someone would suggest that what we learn from a combination of words, e.g. “Socrates is writing”, is also a thing and not only a sound which signifies nothing, then we shall respond as follows. Not all combinations of words signify something. In fact, statements can often be made about things that do not exist. For instance, when we say, “Socrates is flying” or “Every man is writing”, neither the former nor the latter is something which is happening.

For all men cannot be present at once, and even if they could, they would not be writing. Similarly, neither does Socrates exist, since he has died long ago, and even if he were present, he would not fly.

437 Thus, this species of opposition which is in the combination of words differs from the three which we have discussed also in that it always indicates truth or falsehood, while none among the other ones signifies them. For if one says, “Socrates is running” or “He is sleeping” — “Socrates is not running” or “He is not sleeping”, then this is either true or false. So, if Socrates happens to be doing what is said about him then it turns out to be true, but if he is not doing what is said about him then it proves false. But if someone says a thousand times “sight” and “blindness” or “hot” and “cold” without combination with something else, he will indicate no truth or falsehood. So, this is also how this species differs from the other ones. So much for the distinction between the species of opposition.

[Priority]⁵⁶⁸

438 Since the Philosopher mentioned what is prior too in his treatise on the categories, we shall also briefly discuss what the term priority signifies⁵⁶⁹. Now, priority is said of in five ways⁵⁷⁰, namely in time, in nature, in sequence, in order (τάξις) of greatness⁵⁷¹, and in the way that one thing (is prior) to another which is equal to it and follows it in its subsistence⁵⁷². In order to explain each one of these kinds through a clear account, let us discuss them, starting with the first one where priority is manifested in time. 14a26–14b23

568 Mss. BD contain a subtitle: “On priority”.

569 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 103.3–4: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίᾳ ἐμνημόνευσε τοῦ προτέρου, εἰκότως τούτου ἀπαριθμεῖται τὰ σημαίνόμενα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.17–18.

570 Aristotle speaks in *Cat.* 14a26 of four ways, but later, in 14b10–13, adds the fifth one, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 103.4–5.

571 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.20–22: ...πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῇ φύσει τρίτον τὸ τῇ τάξει τέταρτον τὸ τῇ ἀξίᾳ. It is worth noting that Sergius applies the loanword *taksa* (τάξις) not for the third but for the fourth kind, and the same holds for the paragraphs below.

572 Sergius thus interprets Aristotle’s words in *Cat.* 14b11–13: τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθίᾳ τὸ αἰτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν (“for of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other’s existence might reasonably be called prior by nature”, trans. in Ackrill 1963: 39).

439 So, we say that one thing is prior to another in time when the former is older and more ancient than the latter⁵⁷³. We use the word “older” when we speak of the priority of animate beings, but “more ancient” (when we speak of) the priority of those things that are inanimate⁵⁷⁴. So, when one thing comes to be at any particular time and there is another thing which appears after it, then the former is said to be prior to the latter, and its priority is in time, for it is comprehended in terms of time.

440 One thing is said to be prior to another naturally in that case, when its generation does not necessarily bring into being along with itself what it is prior to, but the generation of the latter makes it necessary for the former to exist as well⁵⁷⁵. Take animal and horse as an example: if animal exists it is not absolutely necessary that also horse exists, but if horse exists there is no way that animal would not exist too. Hence, animal is naturally prior, for it is necessary for animal to exist (first), so that it may be divided into horse, dog, and all other animals⁵⁷⁶.

441 One thing is said to be prior to another in sequence, when it is set first in a row and immediately after it comes something else⁵⁷⁷. As an example take anything standing generally at the beginning, for instance a preface (προοίμιον) of any kind of treatise or a history⁵⁷⁸. These things and suchlike are said to be prior in sequence. Prior in order (τάξις) and in greatness, on the other hand, is what is more high and worthy, for instance a king, a ruler (ἄρχων), and suchlike.

442 Now, the fifth kind of priority is in a way unknown to us in customary usage. It encompasses all kinds of properties which are properties in the strict sense. For even if a property is equal to the subject in which it is found, it

573 Cf. *Cat.* 14a26–28: πρώτον μὲν καὶ κυριώτατα κατὰ χρόνον, καθ’ ὃ πρεσβύτερον ἕτερον ἕτερον καὶ παλαιότερον λέγεται.

574 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 103.7–8: εἰδέναι δὲ χρή ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρεσβύτερον ἐπὶ ἐμψύχων τὸ δὲ παλαιότερον ἐπὶ ἀψύχων λέγεται. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 191.26–192.2.

575 See *Cat.* 14a29–30: δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολουθήσιν (“secondly, what does not reciprocate as to implication of existence”, trans. in Ackrill 1963: 39). Sergius follows the interpretation of Ammonius, see *In Cat.* 103.9–10: ἤγουν τὸ συνεισφερόμενον μὴ συνεισφέρων δέ. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 192.5–9.

576 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 103.13–18; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 192.14–17. Ammonius suggests animal and human being as an example.

577 Cf. *Cat.* 14a35–37: τρίτον δὲ κατὰ τινα τάξιν πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων. As noted above, Sergius does not apply the term τάξις (Syr. *ṭaksa*) here, reserving it for the fourth kind of priority. All Syriac translations of the *Categories*, on the contrary, render τάξις as *ṭaksa*. In this case, we again see Sergius’ primary concern to interpret Aristotle’s text in particular way rather than to literally translate it or use any extant translation.

578 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 103.18–19: τρίτον δὲ τῇ τάξει ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ προοίμιον πρότερον τῆς διηγήσεως.

follows the latter and is said to be after it. Take capable of laughing and human being as an example. Every human being is capable of laughter, and all that is capable of laughter is a human being. Thus, they are equal to one another, for none of them is greater than the other⁵⁷⁹. But it is capable of laughing that follows a human being, since it is necessary for a human being to exist first in virtue of itself that his ability to laugh may also be considered, and because of that he is also said to be prior.

443 Now that we have seen that there are five kinds of priority, we shall understand that the kinds of posteriority are also five. For it is apparent that each type of priority is opposed by a type of posteriority⁵⁸⁰. Hence, one kind of posteriority is said to be in time, another by nature, still another in sequence, next one in order and greatness, and the last one in virtue of a property which follows something.

[*Simultaneity*]⁵⁸¹

444 Since Aristotle mentioned also the term “simultaneous”, let us further explain what it means⁵⁸². Again⁵⁸³, one speaks of it in two ways, i.e. in time and by nature. Those two things are said to be simultaneous in time whose generation and subsistence occur in one and the same time. For instance, when the sun rises over the earth the light shines if there is nothing that hinders it. Those two things are said to be simultaneous by nature, on the other hand, which are mutually conjoined in such a way that one may not become the cause of existence for the other⁵⁸⁴. For instance when one speaks of the aquatic, terrestrial, and aerial animals, they are simultaneous with respect to nature. If, however, one divides each one of them into species then a genus is not said to

14b24–15a12

579 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 88.24–26: τὰ δ' ἐξισάζοντα καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται· ὡς γὰρ λέγομεν, πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν, οὕτως καὶ πᾶν γελαστικόν ἄνθρωπος.

580 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 104.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 194.28–195.4. Ammonius argues that priority and posteriority are relatives and thus the account of one of them is understood from the account of the other.

581 Mss. BD have the subtitle: “On the simultaneous”.

582 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 104.16–17: ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἅμα ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίᾳ, διδάσκει καὶ περὶ τούτου.

583 I.e. similar to the term “priority” whose first two meanings were in respect to time and nature, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 104.17–19.

584 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 104.21–105.1: οὐκ ἔστιν τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι.

be simultaneous with its species but to be naturally prior to them⁵⁸⁵. Also, about the four elements (στοιχεῖα), i.e. air, fire, earth, and water, one says that they are simultaneous with respect to nature because their activity produces equal effect on the general existence of the universe.

[Motion]

445 Since we have said above that motion too had been mentioned in the teaching on the ten genera of the *Categories*, we shall also discuss it now briefly⁵⁸⁶. A full account of it will be given by us in a commentary on the *Physics*⁵⁸⁷. For now, however, it will be sufficient for us to learn about it the following. 15a13–15b1

446 Any kind of change is movement and is called motion⁵⁸⁸. Thus, as we have said above⁵⁸⁹ concerning change that sometimes it happens in substance and is called generation and destruction, sometimes it occurs to quantity and is called growth and diminution, and sometimes it takes place in quality and is called alteration and movement from one place to another, we ought to consider with regard to motion the very same things which we have said with regard to change. But since about all these kinds of change we have spoken sufficiently above and only about one of them, which is movement from one place to another, we have not taught properly, it is about the latter that we shall speak now, dividing it as follows.

447 Every movement that goes from one place to another sometimes goes round in a circle and sometimes proceeds straightforwardly. Further, when the movement goes in a circle, then sometimes the whole body which is subject to it moves from one place to the other, as the wheel of a wagon which changes its place while moving in a circle, and sometimes the body which is its subject remains in the same place while its parts only are affected and move from one position to the other. E.g., while the whole heavenly sphere remains in its place and does not shift to another position, only its parts change their location in a

585 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.1–6; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 196.28–197.8.

586 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.9–10: πάλιν περὶ κινήσεως φησιν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτης ἐμνημόνευσεν ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν.

587 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 197.12–15. Aristotle discusses motion and change (κίνησις καὶ μεταβολή) in chapters 1–3 of the third book of the *Physics*, where he defines change as the entelechy, and in books V–VIII where he speaks of three kinds of change instead of six as in the *Categories* (cf. §276 where Sergius speaks of the latter as Aristotle's separate treatise on motion).

588 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 105.10: ἡ οὖν κίνησις μεταβολή ἐστὶ.

589 See §§409–418.

circular way, sometimes rising up and appearing above our heads and sometimes going down. Similarly, a mill also turns around an axle and does not change its place for another, while its parts constantly move from one spot to the other in circular way.

448 Now, the movement which proceeds straightforwardly is also further divided into six kinds⁵⁹⁰. For what is moved either goes up as fire, or goes down as water, or (goes) into one of the two directions, i.e. right or left, as something that was cast away with much force, or moves forward or backwards as the one who is walking or as something driven back⁵⁹¹.

[Conclusion]

449 Thus, O brother, I have described to you everything I was able to recall about the ten genera of all simple words⁵⁹² which in the Greek language are called “categories” (κατηγορία) and about which Aristotle has written a short treatise that is an introduction into and a beginning of the study of logic⁵⁹³. However, what you understand and what also truth testifies to me is that, even if I had not this treatise at my disposal while I was writing down these things, I would still have urged you to meditate about them in order to comprehend and remember them, so that they would become profitable for you in the whole teaching on natures and in other sciences that are useful for those who seek the truth.

450 So, if time permits us and we compose all the treatises, one after another, about the discipline of logic, it will become clear to you that without them neither will one be capable of studying the books on medicine nor will the arguments of the philosophers be comprehensible. Nor will one have the correct understanding of the divine books in which the hope of life has been

590 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 204.12–15.

591 Similar to the commentary attributed to Ammonius (but contrary to that of Philoponus), Sergius does not comment on the last, 15th, chapter of the *Categories* focused on the category of having.

592 Syr. *bat qale*, “utterances”, corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

593 Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 1.3–6: τὸ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίον <...> προοίμιόν ἐστι τῆς ὅλης φιλοσοφίας εἴπερ αὐτὸ μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πραγματείας, ἡ δὲ λογικὴ τῆς ὅλης προλαμβάνεται δικαίως φιλοσοφίας.

revealed, unless through the exalted character of his way of life he would gain divine power, so that he would have no need in human knowledge. But through human abilities no progress or guidance to any knowledge is possible without training in logic.

End of Book Seven.

First division

Change:

- sometimes occurs to substance: it is called generation and destruction;
- sometimes to quantity: it is designated as growth and diminution;
- and sometimes to quality: it is named alteration and movement.

Second division

Opposition is:

- either as relatives,
- or as contraries,
- or as capacity and privation,
- or as constructions of speech in affirmation and negation.

Third division

Priority is:

- either in time, as yesterday to today;
- or naturally, as animal to horse;
- or in sequence, as the highest in rank;

- or in order of greatness, as a king and a ruler;
- or as something followed by its property, as human being to laughter.

Also, opposition is:

- either in words: “Socrates is running”/“Socrates is not running”;
- or in things:
 - either in association with another thing or by itself;
 - they either change into one another, e.g. the contraries, or do not change, e.g. relatives, capacity and privation.

Fourth division

Simultaneity is:

- either in time, e.g. when the sun rises over the earth also the light shines;
- or in nature, e.g. the aquatic, terrestrial, and aerial animals, and the rest⁵⁹⁴.


⁵⁹⁴ Explicit in ms. D: “Finished is the composition of a certain commentary (σχόλιον) concerning the goal of the *Categories* of Aristotle the Peripatetic composed by Sergius of Reshayna, the sophist and archiater. Let the true glory be (to God)! Amen and amen!”

Appendix


Divisions Presented in the Diagram Form

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


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


The divisions of Book One are the following:

First division




Second division




Divisions of Book Two


First division




Second division




Third division





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
Sixth division






Divisions of Book Three

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


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
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


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
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


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
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Divisions of Book Four

First division

Of quantities

some have parts that are separate and delimited from one another

number, language

others are in a single unity which has no (parts) separate from one another

line, surface, body, place, time

Second division

Also, of quantities


some contain parts which have position and remain at their place

line, surface, body, place


others contain parts which are not fixed and are brought forth one by one

time, language, number

פולקס דערמאנציע דעטעלס



The division of Book Five



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

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
Divisions of Book Six

First division




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
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


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


Book Seven


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


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


Third division





Fourth division



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