234 ܡܫܬܬܚܟܬܐ ܡܠܟܐ ܥܡܘܪܝܐ ܕܡ ܒܪ ܒܪܝ ܠܚܡ ܡܝܬܝܢ
ܒܪ ܒܢ ܒܫܡ ܫܡܥ ܡܝܬܝ ܡܠܟ ܒܢ. ܡܝܢܐܢܝ ܥܡܪ ܐܢ ܢܝܡ
ܒܢܝܠ ܫܠܚ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܠܥܡ ܒܥܕܐ. ܡܫܡܥ ܠܐ ܐܡ ܡܝܐ
5 .ܐܒ ܒܐܡ ܡܩܒܠ ܐܒܪܗܡ ܠܘܛ ܡܫܒܝܐ ܐܡ ܦܐ ܡܝܐ
ܒܟ ܠܐ ܓܪ :ܐܡܪ ܠܠܘܛ ܒܥܕܘ ܐܡ ܒܥܕ ܡܝ ܐܫ ܠܐ ܡܢ
B111v ܢܝܩܡ ܐܢ ܡܝܐ .ܡܫܒܚܬܐ ܡܒܪܟ ܩܒܠ ܒܫܡ ܢܝ ܠܐ ܡܢ
.ܐܒܪܗܡ ܢܫܒܝܥܐ ܡܐ ܐܡ :ܡܠܟ ܒܢ ܒܢܝܠ ܩܒܥܐ ܠܚܡ
.ܒܟܝܠ ܢܫܡ ܡܠܟ ܢܝܥ ܢܝܥ ܠܥ ܓܪ ܫܡ

10 235 ܡܫܬܬܚܟܬܐ ܫܠ ܥܡܘܪܝܐ ܡܒܪ ܢܝ ܢܝܒܪܟ
ܒܢ ܫܠܚܡܢܝ ܓܪ ܠܟ .ܡܫܒܚ ܠ ܡܐ ܢܝܒܪ .ܢܝ
D92v :ܡܩܒܠ ܠܥ ܡܠܟ ܝܫ ܣ ܡ ܡܒܪ ܢܝ ܠܥ ܡܫܒܚ
ܫܡ ܐܠ :ܐܡܪ ܒܢ ܢܝ .ܫܡܥܢܝ ܠܥ ܐܡ ܢܝܒܪܟ
.ܫ ܫܠܚ ܡܠܟ ܩܒܠ :ܡܩܒܠ ܝܫ ܡܫܒܚ ܩܒ ܡܫ
15 ܝܫ ܒܪ ܠܫܒ ܡܐ :ܒܟ ܩܒ ܒܫ ܓܪ ܫܡ ܓܪ ܡܠ
:ܡܠܟ ܒ ܒܫ ܢܝ ܠܥ ܠ ܒ ܡܠ ܒܪܟ .ܒ ܢܝܡ ܡܫ
.ܫ ܢܫܒܚ ܒܫܡ ܥܡ ܩܒ

236 ܡܫܬܬܚܟܬܐ ܠܚ ܡܩܒ ܡܫܒܚ ܡܫܡܫ
.ܫ ܡܩܒܥ ܠܐ ;ܫ ܩܒܪ ܡܫ ܡܫܒ
ܒܢ ܠ ܩܒ .ܒܫܒ ܫܒ ܢܝ ܡܒܪ ܒܠ ܐܒ ܠ
20 ܒܐ .ܒܒܪ ܠܐ ܐܒ ܒܫ ܠ ܠܐ ܠ ܠܐ ܫ ܢ ܒ

1 ܩܒܥ ܢܝܒܪ scr.: ܫܝ ܡܐ ܩܒܒ ܫ ܩܒܥ ܢܝܒܪ ܒܐ P: ܢܝܒܪ
ܫܢܝ ܡܐ ܩܒܒ ܩܒ ܩܒܥ B: ܫܢܝ ܡܐ ܫ ܩܒ ܩܒܥ ܢܝܒܪ
B **3** ܢܝ ܢ ܫ P: ܢ ܢ ܫ BD **5** ܒ ܢ ܫ ܢ DP: ܐ ܢ ܫ ܢ B **10** ܢ ܒ ܢ ܒ BD: ܢ ܒ ܢ ܒ P
11 ܡ ܡ ܐ ܫ ܢ B: ܡ ܡ ܐ ܫ ܢ D: ܡ ܡ ܐ ܫ ܢ ܐ P | ܒܢ om. P **12** ܢ ܫ ܠ
DP: ܫ ܠ ܢ B **13** ܫ ܢ ܐ ܒ ܐ P: ܫ ܢ ܐ ܒ ܐ B: ܫ ܢ ܐ ܒ ܐ D | ܐ ܠ BD: ܫ ܐ ܠ P
14 ,ܫ DP: ܡ ܫ B **19** ܐ ܒ ܢ BDP: ܫ ܐ Epit., add. BDP in marg. | ܒ ܢ ܫ ܒ DP, Epit.: ܒ ܢ ܐ ܒ
B | ܠ] om. P **20** ܩ ܒ ܥ DP, Epit.: ܫ ܐ ܡ B

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111444536-008

BOOK FOUR

[Introduction]

234 In the previous book, which was the third one in this treatise, O brother Theodore, an account has been brought forth of how you should understand (Aristotle's) concept of substance. And it has been clearly demonstrated concerning it that, even if some people hold the opinion that it is extremely difficult, you should not think of refusing to give someone an explanation, especially about those things that prove to be not difficult to understand through listening. Thus we shall always be eager to explain clearly in words what we intend to say, so that even little children might not be confused by our answers.

235 Now, in the fourth book of this treatise we are going to speak about quantity. For this is what Aristotle too does in the *Categories*, turning to the teaching on it after his account of substance. In fact, we ought to know that it is not by chance that quantity is placed after substance and that the account of the latter is followed by the former, but that there is a certain logic in this which is revealed to those who consider it as having no small meaning[302]. Thus, I will now dwell on this issue for a while in order to make it apparent for those who have interest in it.

[On sequence of the categories][303]

236 The primary foundation of bodies is what they call "matter" (ὕλη) and what they say to be without form[304] and shape (σχῆμα) in its nature. It is thus only that its nature might be able to be receptive of all forms and all shapes, for the

---

302 For various interpretations of the order of the categories, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 120.27–122.1.

303 Ammonius gives a short excursus on prime matter at the beginning of that section of his commentary on the *Categories* which deals with quantity (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.3–10, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.14). This excursus follows Ammonius' note that quantity comes second in the order of the categories by Aristotle and apparently aims to provide an explanation for it. Philoponus also includes a lengthy account of prime matter in the section dealing with substance, while explaining the issue of differentiae, see *In Cat.* 65.8–66.25. In the same context, the discussion of prime matter appears in Ammonius' commentary on the *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 106.12–107.21. Commenting on *Isag.* 11.12, Ammonius suggests that in that passage "matter means genus, while form means differentiae" (τὸ μὲν γένος ὕλης ἔχει λόγον, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ εἴδους). Here, Ammonius (and after him, Sergius) applies the same analogy, which in this case justifies the order substance-quantity.

304 In the margins of all three mss. (BDP) in which this passage is extant the variant "without power" is added, and it is the latter variant which appears in the epitome.

ܣܘܢܩܢܐ ܕܥܒܘܕܘܬܐ. ܟܕ ܠܐ ܬܫܬܥܒܕ ܗܘܬ ܕܩܢܝܢܐ ܕܟܡܘܬܐ ܟܝܢܐܝܬ.
ܠܗ̇ ܗܟܝܠ ܠܗܕܐ ܗܘܠܐ. ܐܦ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܕܡܝܐ ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܡܢܝܢ ܠܗ̇. P51r
ܡܛܠ ܕܠܝܬ ܡܕܡ ܒܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܕܡܬܕܪܓ ܒܬܪܒܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܡܕܡܝܢܗ̇. ܗܕܐ
ܗܟܝܠ ܐܡܪܝܢ. ܕܡܕܡܐܝܬ ܡܬܚܙܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܡܠܐ ܕܠܐܘܪܟܐ ܘܠܦܬܝܐ
ܘܠܥܘܡܩܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܐܡܪ. ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܕܒܛܘܪ̈ܐ
ܡܬܦܫܛܐ ܫܒܝܩܐ ܗܘܬ ܒܗ̇. ܡܟܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܕܪܬ ܠܐܘܪܟܐ ܘܠܦܬܝܐ
ܘܠܥܘܡܩܐ: ܗܝܕܝܢ ܗܦܟܝܢ ܒܗ̇ ܬܠܬܝܗܘܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܦ̈ܢܝܐ. ܘܡܫܡܫܝܢ ܠܗ̇
ܗܝܕܝܢ ܡܕ̈ܡܝܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ. B112r

237 ܡܟܐ ܕܢܫܡܥܬ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܬܫ̈ܥܝܬܐ: ܗܝܕܝܢ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܡܬܪܢܝܢܐ
ܕܡܡܠܐ ܐܣ̈ܟܡܐ ܘܙ̈ܢܝܐ ܘܫ̈ܝܠܐ. ܘܡܒܕܐ ܠܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܡܕܡ̈ܝܐ ܐܪܥܢܐ:
ܗ̇ܢܘܢ ܕܐܣܛܘܟ̈ܣܐ ܡܫܬܡܗܝܢ ܒܫܝܕܐ. ܕܡܫܢܝܗܘܢ ܡܬܪܒܝܢ ܒܟܠܗܘܢ
ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܕܬܠܝܢ: ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܡܘܠܕܐ ܘܒܚܘܒܠܐ ܐܬܚܫܒܘܢ. ܐܡܪܝܢ ܒܓܢܣ
ܕܟܕ ܠܡ ܬܩܒܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܗܕܐ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܡܢܝܬ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܒܚܡܝܡܘܬܐ ܘܒܝܒܝܫܘܬܐ
ܢܘܪܐ ܗܘܝܐ. ܟܕ ܕܝܢ ܬܩܒܠ ܪܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܘܩܪܝܪܘܬܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܡܫܡܝܢܐ. ܐܢ
ܕܝܢ ܒܝܒܝܫܘܬܐ ܘܩܪܝܪܘܬܐ ܬܩܒܠ. ܗܝܕܝܢ ܐܪܥܐ ܡܒܝܢܐ. ܘܐܢ
ܚܡܝܡܘܬܐ ܘܪܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܒܗ̇ ܐܐܪ ܒܥܒܕܐ.

238 ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܗܦܟܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܠ ܬܫ̈ܥܝܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܡܬܚܙܝܢ.
ܐܡܪܝܢ ܗܟܢܐ. ܕܢܚܫܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܒܕܒܝܠ ܠܐ ܦܠܚ ܠܐܘܡܢܐ. ܠܗܘܠܐ ܗ̇ܝ
ܡܕܡܝܢܬܐ ܚܫܚܬܗ̇. ܗܢܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܟܕ ܢܬܢܣܒ ܡܢ ܐܘܡܢܐ ܘܢܫܬܠܛ
ܘܢܬܦܠܚ. ܗܝܕܝܢ ܢܣܒ ܘܡܬܦܬܬܐ ܒܗ ܒܦܘܠܚܢܐ: ܒܕܡܘܬ ܗܘܠܐ ܗ̇ܝ D93r
ܕܢܣܒܐ ܡܕܡܝܬ ܗ̇ܢܘܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܦ̈ܢܝܐ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܘ ܘܢܪܒܐ. ܘܡܢܐ
ܕܐܬܦܬܝ ܡܕܡܝܬ ܠܚܫܐ ܒܝܕ ܦܘܠܚܢܗ ܕܐܘܡܢܐ. ܗܝܕܝܢ ܡܩܒܠ
ܕܡ̈ܘܬܐ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܢܒܥܐ ܠܡܛܒܥ ܒܗ. ܘܗܦܟܝܢ ܡܢܗ ܡܐܢ̈ܐ ܡܫ̈ܚܠܦܐ P51v
ܒܐܣܟܡ̈ܝܗܘܢ ܘܒܚܫܚܬܗܘܢ. ܟܕ ܟܝܢܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܕܡܝܐ

---

1 ܬܫܬܥܒܕ BD, Epit.: ܬܫܥܒܕ P **6** ܠܐܘܪܟܐ BP, Epit.: ܠܥܘܡܩܐ D **7** ܘܠܥܘܡܩܐ BP, Epit.: ܘܠܐܘܪܟܐ D | ܠܗ̇] om. D **9** ܕܢܫܡܥܬ ܕܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܬܫ̈ܥܝܬܐ ܗܝܕܝܢ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܡܬܪܢܝܢܐ] om. P
18 ܗ̇ܝ BP: ܗ̇ܢ D **21** ܡܕܡܝܬ DP: ܡܕܡܝܬܗ B | ܕܐܬܐܡܪܘ P: ܕܐܬܐܡܪ BD | ܘܡܢܐ BD: ܘܡܢ P
23 ܠܡܛܒܥ] om. B | ܡܐܢ̈ܐ BD: ܡܐܠ̈ܐ P **24** ܒܐܣܟܡ̈ܝܗܘܢ P: ܒܐܣܟ̈ܡܝܗܘܢ BD

need for activity demands that it cannot possess form naturally[305]. They also call this matter the first nature of bodies, since there is nothing in bodies that can be conceived in mind prior to it. Thus, they say that it first receives some extension into length, breadth, and depth in order to gain volume, for otherwise no dimension in space might be possible in it. But when it extends into length, breadth, and depth, then these three dimensions exist in it. That is why the ancients called it the second nature of bodies[306].

237 So, once it has received these three dimensions, then, they say, it is considered to be receptive of shapes, qualities, and faculties, and it produces the four primary bodies, which are customarily called elements (στοιχεῖα). From them all bodies here are composed which undergo coming-to-be and passing-away[307]. For they say that when matter which has gained size receives dryness and hotness it becomes fire; when it receives wetness and coldness water appears; if it acquires dryness and coldness then earth is formed; and if heat and wetness appear in it then it produces air[308].

238 However, should one need some visual demonstration of this, we may say the following[309]. Prime matter may be compared to bronze that has not yet been treated by a craftsman. But when a craftsman takes it, and beats and shapes it, then due to his treatment it becomes large and extended similar to matter which at first acquires the afore-mentioned three dimensions and gains volume. And when bronze is first extended through the treatment of the craftsman, then it receives images which he wants to imprint on it, and there appear vessels from it which differ in their shapes and utility. Just as the

---

305 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.10–17: τὴν πρώτην ὕλην φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀσώματον εἶναι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἀσχημάτιστόν τε καὶ ἀμεγέθη καὶ πάσης ποιότητος κεχωρισμένην· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνείδεός ἐστι, δείκνυται σαφῶς τῷ πάντων τῶν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν αὐτὴν εἶναι δεκτικήν <...> ἡ ὕλη ὑποβάθρα τις οὖσα καὶ δεκτικὴ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι θεωρουμένων, οὐδὲ ἓν ἔξει οἰκεῖον εἶδος. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–5.

306 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.17–18: αὕτη οὖν ἐξογκωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.5–6). Sergius calls matter the "second nature" (apparently because he has called it "first nature" just above) instead of "second subject" like Ammonius and Philoponus (following Aristotle, *De gen. et cor.* 329a33–34).

307 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.4–7: ἡ γὰρ πρώτη ὕλη ἀνείδεος οὖσα καὶ ἀσώματος πρότερον τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις δέχεται καὶ γίνεται τριχῇ διαστατὸν τὸ καλούμενον δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, εἶθ' οὕτως τὰς ποιότητας καὶ γίνεται σύνθετον ποσόν.

308 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 65.22–25: τούτῳ οὖν κατά τι μὲν μέρος προσγενομένη ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ ποιότης ἐποίησε τὸ πῦρ, κατά τι δὲ ἡ ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸ ὕδωρ, κατά τι δὲ πάλιν ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν, κατά τι δὲ ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸν ἀέρα. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.7–9.

309 The same example appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 106.19–23.

ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ܂ ܠܚܫܐ ܚܕ ܗܘ܂ ܗܟܢܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܘܐܦ ܒܢܝܐ ܡܕܡܝܐ ܕܓ̈ܫܡܐ
ܕܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܗܘܠܐ: ܕܠܐ ܐܣܟܝܡ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܐܝܟ ܠܚܫܐ ܕܠܐ ܦܠܝܓ܂
ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ: ܠܚܫܐ ܡܕܡܝܢܘܬ ܡܢܐ ܕܐܝܬܐ ܠܒܣܪܐ ܫܘܟܠܐ
ܘܦܘܬܐ ܢܗܘܐ: ܘܡܢ ܡܬܬܠܒ̈ܫܝܢ ܒܗ ܕܡ̈ܫܘܬܐ ܘܐܣ̈ܟܝܡܐ܂ ܗܟܢܐ ܘܐܦ
B112v ܗܘܠܐ ܪܒܘܬܐ ܢܣܒܐ ܡܕܡܝܢܘܬ ܠܐܘܪ̈ܟܐ ܘܠܦܬܝܐ ܘܠܥܘܡܩܐ: ܘܡܢ
ܡܬܬܠܒ̈ܫܝܢ ܒܗ̇ ܟܠ ܙ̈ܢܝܢ ܘܫܠܝܡ܂

239 ܗܠܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܐܬܐܡܪ̈ ܠܘܬܢ܂ ܡܛܠ ܕܬܬܝܕܥ ܢܩܦܘܬܐ ܕܡܠܬܐ
ܕܥܠ ܒܪܝܘܬܐ܂ ܕܡܫܚܠܦܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܛܒ ܠܡܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ: ܘܟܕ ܓܒܠܗ̇
ܗ̇ܝ ܙܢܝܐ ܕܬܬܦܫܩ ܒܗ̇ ܗ̣ܝ܂ ܒܥܠܬܐ ܓܒܪ ܕܟܠ ܗܘܠܐ ܒܬܕܝܪܝܢ
ܠܡܐܡܪ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܘܕܝܐ ܘܠܝܬܐ: ܕܐܝܠܝܢ ܐܝܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܦܫ̈ܝܛܬܐ ܘܡܬ̈ܝܢܐ
ܕܐܬܚܙܘ ܠܦܓܪ̈ܢܝܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܗܘܠܐ܂ ܟܕ ܫܡܥܝܢ ܒܟܠ ܕܘܟܐ ܠܐܢܫܐ
ܕܦܪܐ: ܕܗ̣ܘ ܢܗܘܐ ܦܘܫܩܐ ܘܕܝܠܐ ܕܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܡܬܐܡ̈ܪܢ: ܘܗܘ ܢܦܪܘܫ
ܕܐܝܠܝܢ ܫܪ̈ܝܪܐ ܘܐܝܠܝܢ ܠܐ܂ ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܐܡܪܝܢܐ ܘܫܡܥ ܐܢܫ ܐܘ ܐܢ̈ܫܐ܂
ܠܐ ܗܡܟܐ ܠܝ ܒܡܬܟܬܒܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܢܚܘܐ ܠܟ: ܐܘ ܕܢܦܪܘܫ ܕܐܝܠܝܢ
ܕܫܪ̈ܝܪܐ ܘܐܝܠܝܢ ܠܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܐܝܢ܂

240 ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦܫܘܬ ܠܝ ܠܡܟܬܒ ܡܬܟܬܒܢܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܠܘܬܟ: ܐܝܟ
ܕܬܬܕܪܫ ܒܗ̇ ܐܝܬ ܘܡܫ̈ܬܟܠܢܐ ܕܡܢܟ: ܘܐܬܚܙܝܬ ܐܦ ܠܝ ܕܠܘ ܕܠܐ
ܘܬܦܪ̈ܫ ܗܘܝܐ ܕܦܘܪܫܐ ܕܐܦ ܗܠܝܢ܂ ܗܫܬ ܟܬܒܢ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܘܗ̇ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܗܢܐ
P50r ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܝܨܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܡܩ̈ܒܠܢܐ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܘܢ ܘܡܬܐܪܝܬ ܡܢ
ܕܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ܂ ܐܫܬܥܝܐ ܠܝ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܬ܂ ܘܠܐ ܐܟܣܪ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܟ ܚܠܦ:
ܡܢ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܐܬܦܪܫܘ ܠܡܬܟܬܒܘ ܥܠ ܐܘܡܢܘܬܐ ܕܡܠܠܘܬܐ܂ ܐܢ
D93v ܕܢܗܘܐ ܠܝ ܙܒܢܐ: ܘܬܘܡܪ ܐܦ ܠܘܬ ܡܬܟܬܒܢܘ̈ܬܗܘܢ ܕܥܠ ܒܢܝܐ:
ܘܠܘܬ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܥܠ ܠܗ ܡܫܘ̈ܚܬܐ܂ ܒܬܪ ܬܠܡ ܡܫܬܕܪܝܢ ܒܕܘܟܐ ܕܘܟܐ
ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܗ̣ܘܝܘ ܫܠܡܘ ܒܗ ܠܫܪ̈ܒܐ: ܘܠܐ ܠܝ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ

---

1 ܘܐܦ P: ܐܦ BD   4 ܘܐܦ BD: ܐܦ P   6 ܘܫܠܝܡ P: ܘܟܠ ܫܠܝܡ BD   7 ܗܠܝܢ BD: ܒܗܠܝܢ P   ܐܬܐܡܪ̈ ܠܘܬܢ BD: ܐܬܐܡ̈ܪܝܢ P   8 ܗ̣ܝ] om. B | ܠܡܠܦܢܘܬܐ DP: ܡܠܦܢܘܬܐ B | ܕܥܠ² BD: ܘܥܠ P   11 ܠܡܐܡܪ ܥܠ ܗܘܠܐ P: ܥܠ ܗܘܠܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ BD   16 ܕܐܦܫܘܬ ܠܝ DP: ܕܐܦܫܘܬ ܠܝ ܡܛܠܬܐ B   18 ܘܗ̇] om. P   20 ܕܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ B: ܕܐܪܣܛܘܛܐܠܝܣ D: ܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ P   22 ܠܘܬ] om. P   ܡܬܟܬܒܢܘ̈ܬܗܘܢ BD: ܠܡܬܟܬܒܢܘ̈ܬܗܘܢ P   23 ܘܠܘܬ BD: ܘܠܘ P

primary nature of all of them, i.e. bronze, is singular, so also the primary nature of bodies, i.e. matter which is shapeless like untreated bronze. And just as bronze, as we have said, when it first undergoes treatment, becomes thin and extended so that images and shapes might be imprinted on it, in the same way also matter first acquires size and (extends) into length, breadth, and depth so that all qualities and faculties may be imprinted in it.

239 We have discussed these issues here in order to show that the account of quantity is closely related to the teaching on substance and hence should be properly placed after it in the order of exposition[310]. In the discussion of matter, we are going to explain in the proper way all those demonstrations and notions that the ancients seem to have expressed about matter[311], while (now) we are urging the readers always to be prudent and to judge those things which are said, thus discerning between what is true and what is not. But, as you understand, O brother, it is not our goal in this treatise to refute anyone or to distinguish between what is true and what is not like that[312].

240 But since you have convinced us to produce this treatise for you, so that you and many with you might be instructed by it, and it also appeared to me that study of these issues would not be useless, I made up my mind to elucidate clearly to you what I recall from the ideas of all the ancients and particularly from Aristotle and as far as I can not to neglect anything from what they have written about the science of logic. But if time allows us, we will also approach their treatises on nature and those which are on the invisible things[313]. Then we will be able to demonstrate in detail that they do not agree with one another

310 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.4–5: ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων δευτέραν ἔχει τάξιν τὸ ποσόν. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.9–10.

311 As Sergius notes in the following paragraph, after having commented on the logical treatises, he planned to turn to Aristotle's natural philosophy (cf. §256, where he mentions that he aims to write a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*). It is possible that the outcome of Sergius' work in this field became his translation of the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* and his adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De Universo*. Both treatises in their Syriac versions bear the name of Aristotle in the title.

312 Here, Sergius points out potential difficulties which Christian students of Aristotle's natural philosophy might have. He further comments on this point in §256.

313 Thus, after commenting on the logical treatises, Sergius intends to write about physics and theology (i.e. metaphysics). Cf. §11, where Sergius suggests a division of philosophy (derived from Ammonius).

ܠܟ ܠ ܡܢ ܡܢ ܡܢ .ܡܠܟ ܒ ܡܫܬܩ ܡܢ ܡܫܡܫ
.ܐܡܪ ܠ ܢܦܠ ܡܢ ܡܢ

B113r ܠܟ ܐܢ ,ܐ ܡܢ .ܫܡܫ ܒܟ ܡܥܡ ܠܡ ܡܢ 241
ܡܫܡ ܡܥ .ܐܡܪ ܒ ܡܫܡ ܒ ܡܢ .ܡܫܡ
5 ܠ .ܫܡ ܡܫܡ ܒ ܡ ܠ .ܡܥܡ ܡܫ
.ܡܫܡ ܒ ܡܫ ܡ ܫܡ ܡܫ ܒ ܡܫ
.ܡܫܡ ܠ ܡܫ ܡ ܡ ܠ ܡ
ܡܫ ܫ ܡ ܡ ܫ ,ܐ ܒ ܡ
10 ܡ ܐ ܡ ܡ ܐ .ܡ ܫ ܡ ܐ
ܡ ܡ ܡ ܐ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܠ ܡ
.ܡ ܫ ܡ ܡ ܡ

P50v ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ 242
:ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
15 ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ .ܡ ܡ ܡ
ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
.ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ

20 ܡ ܡ ܡ .ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ 243
ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ .ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
ܡ ܡ ܡ ,ܡ ܡ ܡ .ܡ ܡ ܡ

B113v ܡ ܡ ,ܡ .ܡ ܡ ,ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ
ܡ ,ܡ ܡ ,ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ ܡ

6 ܡ BD: ܡ P **11** ܡ D: ܡ B: ܡ P **12** ܡ] + ܡ B in marg.: + ܡ D in marg. **13** ܡ P: ܡ B: ܡ D **16** ܡ] + ܡ ܡ BD in marg. |] + ܡ B in marg.: + ܡ ܡ D in marg. | ܡ DP: ܡ B **18** ܡ BD: ܡ P |] + ܒ B **19**] + ܡ BD in marg. **22** ܡ BD: ܡ P | ܡ P: ܡ BD

and that many of them may be easily rebuked[314]. But for now, let us turn to what we intend to say.

241 Now, matter is a certain substance, for it is mother of all bodies. As we have said, it is considered first to receive extension into length, breadth, and depth. These, however, pertain to quantity, for each one of them is either some quantity or a part of a quantity[315]. That is why it is proper that the account of substance is followed by the teaching on quantity, for the latter is closely related to it and thus precedes everything else. And since after quantity, the substance of bodies receives all qualities, faculties, images, and shapes, it is therefore fitting that we place the teaching on quality after the section on quantity, for in it all shapes (σχήματα), forms (εἴδη)[316] and images that are in bodies are encompassed.

242 The other seven categories follow these three and are generated from them, similar to how all bodies come to be whose generation takes place in due order from the four elements. Their generation is the third one from matter, i.e. (the first one is) from it, then from quantity, and then from qualities, faculties, and images which are considered in it at the end[317]. However, what has been said about the order of the exposition should suffice. Next we will turn to the teaching on quantity, and again start with the division that is proper to it.

[Division of quantity]

243 So, first of all, there are two kinds of quantity. One of them has parts that 4b20–25
are separate and delimited from one another, while the other is a unified whole and is not made up of distinct parts[318]. But also that whose parts are separate from one another is in turn divided into two types, number and language. And further, that whose parts are not separate, but united and joined to one another,

314 Here Sergius takes up the tradition of Christian apologists who were eager to stress that non-Christian ("pagan" or "outer") philosophers disagree on nearly every question and thus may easily be refuted, cf. for instance Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* II.6.22.

315 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.21–84.4.

316 A marginal note in mss. BD specifies that this term should be understood as εἰκόνες (Syr. *yuqne*) here.

317 Thus, Sergius draws a parallel between the ontological order and the order of the categories as follows: matter (= substance) generates three-dimensionality (= quantity), which in turn generates forms and shapes (= quality), which finally produce all bodies from the four elements (= other seven categories). Marginal notes in mss. BD aim at making clear these parallels. Ammonius' account differs slightly from what we find in Sergius in that Ammonius makes relatives fourth in the list and after it places the rest of the categories, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.10-12, more explicitly in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 83.18–20.

318 I.e. continuous and discrete, see *Cat.* 4b20: τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές.

ܡܬܦܠܓܐ. ܡܢܗ̇ ܓܝܪ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܣܘܪܛܐ ܘܡܢܗ̇ ܫܛܝܚܘܬܐ: ܘܡܢܗ̇ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܬܘܒ ܡܢܗ̇ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ: ܘܡܢܗ̇ ܙܒܢܐ. D94r

244 ܐܝܟ ܕܢܫܬܟܚܘܢ ܡܢ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܗܢܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܕ̈ܫܘܗ̇ ܕܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܫܒܥܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܘܣܘܪܛܐ ܘܫܛܝܚܘܬܐ ܘܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܐܬܪܐ ܘܙܒܢܐ. ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܠܡܫܟܚܗ ܒܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ. ܐܠܐ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܚܒܝܫܝܢ ܘܡܚܒܫܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܕ̈ܫܘܗ̇: ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܚܘܝܬ ܠܗ ܠܗ̇ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܗܘܐ ܐܒܘܗ̇ ܘܡܫܒܚܢܗ̇ ܕܡܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܗ̇. ܡܕܝܢ P58r ܡܛܠ ܕܫܦܝܪ ܐܬܚܫܒܘ ܗܟܢܐ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ ܕܚܒܝܢ ܠܗ̇ ܠܟܠܗ̇ ܒܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ: ܢܣܒ ܗܫܐ ܥܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ̇ ܡܢܗ̇ ܘܠܗ̇: ܘܢܚܙܐ ܥܠܝܗ̇ ܒܣܘܡܟܐ ܕܦܫܐ ܠܗ̇ ܐܝܟ ܬܪܒܝܬܗ ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ. ܒܪ ܡܟܪܢܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܕ̈ܡܝܐ.

245 ܥܠ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢܚܘܐ: ܕܐܢ ܒܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ, ܐܘ ܠܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܐܡܝܪܬ ܠܟܠܗܘܢ ܒܢܝ̈ܢܫܐ ܢܚܫ ܕܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܝ. ܒܥܠܡܐ ܓܝܪ ܗܢܐ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܥܠܝ: ܐܡܪܬܝ ܕܬܚܘܝܢ ܗܘܝ ܦܬܓܡܐ ܡܢ ܐܚܕ ܥܠ ܗܠܝܢܘܬܗ ܐܘ ܥܠ ܟܘܢܫܐ ܕܬܚܘܝܬܐ. ܒܪ ܡܟܪܢܝܢ ܐܢܫܘ ܕܗܘܝܐ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܡܬܚܐ ܐܢܫܝܢ ܐܝܬ ܒܡܬܚܐ: ܐܘ ܕܒܡܟܐ ܩܠܝܠ ܐܝܬ ܒܡܬܚܐ ܗܢܐ. ܘܡܬܡܢܝܢ ܕܒܡܢܝܢ ܐܘ ܒܡܢܝܢ ܐܘ ܬܠܬܝܢ: ܐܘ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܫܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܪܬܝܢ ܘܬܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܬܚܫܒܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܕܐܝܟ ܒܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܠܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܫܐܠܘ. ܐܠܐ ܚܙܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܝܢ ܦܪ̈ܝܫܝܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܘܡܬܚܫܒ̈ܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܡܐܢܐ ܐܬܦܠܓܬ. B114r

246 ܐܡܪܝܢܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ ܡܬܦܠܓܐ ܗ̇ܝ, ܠܟܠ ܐܢܫܐ ܕܢܐܡܪ ܒܗ̇ ܥܒܕܐ. ܐܦ ܓܝܪ ܡܬܚܫܒܢܐ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܚܕ ܢܐܡܪ ܕܡܕܡܐ ܐܘ ܕܐܠܦ ܕܡܚܫܢ ܥܠܗ̇: ܒܗ̇, ܕܡܫܡܪܐ ܒܪܬ ܡܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܦܪ̈ܝܫܝܢ ܐܢܘܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܘܠܐ ܐܚ̈ܝܢ ܒܫܪ̈ܪܐ. ܐܚܪܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܚܕܘܬܐ ܡܢܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܠܘܬ P58v

---

3 ܟܠܗܘܢ BD: ܟܠܗܝܢ P | ܐܕ̈ܫܘܗ̇ ܕܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ BD: ܐܕ̈ܫܐ ܘܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ P 5 ܓܝܪ] om. B 7 ܠܗ] om. B 10 ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ BD: ܕܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܐ P 12 ܕܐܢ BD: ܘܐܢ P | ܐܘ BP: ܘܐܢ D 15 ܐܘ ܥܠ BP: ܘܥܠ D | ܐܢܫܘ DP: ܕܐܢܫܘ B 18 ܘܒܥܠܐ DP: ܥܠ B | ܗ̇ܘ DP: ܕܡܟܐܠ B | ܗ̣ܘ P: ܐܝܬܘܗܝ BD 21 ܐܡܪܝܢܢ DP: ܐܡܪܝܢ B 22 ܢܐܡܪ BP: ܕܢܐܡܪ D 23 ܕܡܚܫܢ BP: ܕܡܚܫܫܢ D 24 ܚܕܘܬܐ D, corr. P in marg.: ܐܚܕܘܬܐ P: ܚܕܝܘܬܐ B

is in turn divided into five types, for one of them is line, another is surface, still another is body, another is place, and the final one is time[319].

244 As it becomes apparent from this division, the species of quantity are together seven, which are: number, language, line, surface, body, place, and time. And it is not possible to find any quantity beyond them, but all its species are encompassed and comprehended by them, as it seemed to the one who was the father and discoverer of this science. Now that we have thus properly outlined the species and differentiae[320] which embrace all quantities, let us set out each one of its parts separately and make an inquiry about it that is fitting to it according to the teaching of the Philosopher, starting with the first species.

[Number]

245 Concerning number, it is not necessary to prove whether it is quantity or not, since it is evident to everyone that it is a quantity[321]. In fact it is this name that all of us apply when we await an answer from someone on how big or how small some number is; for instance, when it happens that we ask how many people are in the house or how many measures fit in a particular vessel, and we hear that they are ten, or twenty, or thirty, or any other number, depending on circumstances and on what the respondent says. That is why it is not necessary to prove that number is a quantity, but it is proper to investigate whether its parts are separate and delimited from one another, since this is what constitutes this kind of quantity[322]. 4b25–31

246 Now, we say that this is also obvious to anyone who correctly regards it. And even if it seems that numbers are completely unified when someone says "hundred" or "thousand", since they are pronounced as one word, their parts, however, are separate and not joined to one another. For what kind of unity

---

319 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.5–9: διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸ ποσὸν εἰς τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ τὸ διωρισμένον. συνεχὲς δέ ἐστι ποσὸν τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια ἡνωμένα καὶ συμπεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα, διωρισμένον δὲ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχον, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἔχον τὰ μόρια διῃρημένα ἀλλήλων. τοῦ δὲ συνεχοῦς πέντε φησὶν εἴδη, γραμμὴν ἐπιφάνειαν σῶμα τόπον χρόνον, τοῦ δὲ διωρισμένου δύο, ἀριθμὸν καὶ λόγον. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 54.16–18.

320 Simplicius notes that the outlined seven kinds of quantity should be considered its differentiae (διαφοραί) rather than species, which are magnitude and amount, see Simplicius, *In Cat.* 122.35–123.1. Also Porphyry in his question-and-answer commentary designates the continuous and the discrete as two differentiae of quantity, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 100.29.

321 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–23.

322 I.e. it is proper to prove that number is a discrete quantity, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.3–5 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.22–24. According to Aristotle (*Cat.* 4b24–25), numbers share the characteristics of discrete quantities in that they "have no common boundary at which their parts meet" (κοινὸς ὅρος πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ), a point which is not elaborated upon by Sergius.

ܫܒܥܐ: ܐܘ ܥܣܪܐ ܠܘܬ ܐܪ̈ܒܥܐ: ܐܘ ܫܒܥܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܫܒܥܐ: ܐܘ
ܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܕܗܘ ܠܘܬ ܡܢܝܢܐ ܚܒܪܗ. ܐܠܐ ܢܩܒܐ ܗ̣ܝ
ܕܦܪܫܐ ܠܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܠܘ̈ܬܗ ܡܢܗ̇ ܘܠܗ̇ ܘܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܚܕܐ. ܘܡܬܦܫܛܬܐ
ܗ̇ܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ. ܡܬܦܪ̈ܫܢ ܥܠ ܚ̈ܕܕܐ ܘܩ̈ܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܟܪ̈ܝܢ ܘܪ̈ܘܝܚܢ. ܠܐ ܗܟܝܠ
D94v ܐܚ̈ܪܢ ܡܠܘ̈ܬܗ ܒܚ̈ܕܕܐ: ܘܚܠܦ̈ܝܢ ܚܕܐ ܥܠܬܘܬܐ ܘܫܘܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ
ܡܠܘ̈ܬܐ ܕܚܕ ܡܐܢܐ ܐܘ ܕܚܕ ܢܘܩܫܐ: ܐܘ ܕܚܕ ܠܡܫܡܥܢ ܐܝܠܢܐ ܕܗܘ.
247 ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܙܢܐ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇.
ܢܚܘܪ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܗܕܐ. ܟܕ ܡܦܪܫܝܢ ܡܕܡܝܬ ܕܐܝܕܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇
ܡܢ ܙܢܐ ܕܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ. ܐܢ ܟܢ ܬܥܬܐܒܘܢ ܗܕܐ ܕܠܐ ܒܚܘܕ. ܠܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ
ܕܠܐ ܒܪܘܚ ܚܕܐ ܕܒܚܘܬ ܥܒܕܐ ܠܐܢܫܐ ܕܦܪܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܠܘ ܚܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܗܘ ܙܢܐ
ܕܡܠܬܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܠܐ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܐ. ܐܝܬ ܓܝܪ ܡܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܡܡܠܠܐ
ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܡܢ ܥܡܗ̈ܐ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܘܡܢ ܦܬܓ̈ܡܐ. ܘܐܝܬ ܡܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ
ܡܬܢܕܢܝܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܒܟܠܗ̇ ܬܪܥܝܬܐ: ܘܒܟܠܗܐ ܥܠܝܐܝܬ ܒܟܠܗ
ܡܕܒܪܐ: ܕܒܗ̇ ܡܬܦܢܝܢ ܘܐܝܬܝܢ ܬ̈ܠܝܬܐ. ܘܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ
ܐܘܡܢܝܬܐ. ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܬܒܥܝܢܐ ܘܡܬܠܒܒܢܐ ܒܟܠܗ ܙ̈ܢܝܗܘܢ ܕܐܘܡܢܘܬܐ: ܕܒܗ̇
B114v ܒܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܫ̈ܝܢ ܕܐܢܫ ܕܒܫܘܪܐ: ܘܢܚܫܒ ܡܢܗ̇ ܕܡܒܢܐ ܕܐܘܡܢܘܬܗ.
ܘܒܦܫܡܗ̇ ܩܪܒ ܥܠ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܒܥܐ ܡܢܗ.
248 ܡܛܠ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܬܠܬܐ ܐܘܡܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܗ̇ܠܝܢ ܐܡ̈ܪܢܐ ܒܩܘ̈ܢܝܐ ܕܡܠܬܐ: ܙܕܩ
ܠܡܕܒܪ ܕܗܢܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܗܘ̇ ܡܫܚ̈ܠܦܐ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܘܡܢܘܬܗܘܢ.
ܡܛܠ ܒܢܦܫܐ ܠܐ ܠܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܘܡܢܘܬܗܝ، ܡܟܝܠ ܕܗܡܬܬܘܗܘܢ. ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ
ܡܕܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܒܥܐ ܡܢ ܡܡܠܠܐ: ܡܛܠ ܕܒܥܡܗ̈ܐ ܘܒܦܬܓ̈ܡܐ ܕܐܪ̈ܒܥܝܢ

---

4 ܘܪ̈ܘܝܚܢ BD: ܘܪܘ̈ܚܝܢ P **13** ܡܬܢܕܢܝܬܐ] + ܡܬܪܒܢܝܬܐ BDP in marg. **15** ܙ̈ܢܝܗܘܢ DP: ܙ̈ܢܝܐ B
16 ܘܢܚܫܒ BD, Epit., corr. P in marg.: ܘܢܗܫܒ P, corr. D in marg. | ܕܡܒܢܐ BD, Epit.: ܕܡܒܢܗ̇ P
17 ܩܪܒ DP, Epit.: ܡܩܪܒ B | ܥܠ ܡܢܐ DP, Epit.: ܐܝܢܐ B **18** ܒܩܘ̈ܢܝܐ DP, Epit.: ܒܩܘ̈ܢܐ B **20** ܕܝܢ P, Epit.: ܓܝܪ BD

does three form with seven, or ten with four, or fifty with five, or any kind of number with another number? But it is obvious that every part of it is separate and exists singularly by itself, and it is only through addition and combination with one another that they increase, or through subtraction that they are reduced. Thus, its parts are not unified with one another, but they maintain one composition and unity like parts of a vessel, or a piece of wood, or any particular body[323].

[Language]

247 But since we have said that the second kind of quantity is language[324], we shall also inquire into it, by distinguishing first what kind of language pertains to quantity. For if we pass over this without investigation, then synonymous words might bring confusion of no small amount to the reader, as there is not one single kind of language but many. There is, namely, spoken language which is composed of many words and of phrases, and there is rational language that is in the intellect, which arises silently in the mind and because of which we are rational beings and are called like that[325]. But there is also another, professional language that is collected and imprinted in the mind of a craftsman. By means of it he always contemplates a sort of prototype from which he receives an example for his craftsmanship and in whose image he produces everything that is done by him[326]. 4b32–37

248 So, while there are these three general species of language, we ought to know that the last and the middle ones do not pertain to quantity, since they are firmly rooted in the incorporeal soul[327]. The first one, on the other hand, that is composed of utterances is one of the kinds of quantity because its nature

323 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.8–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 89.25–27.

324 Syr. *mellta* corresponding to Gr. λόγος.

325 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 57.22–24: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ λόγος πολλαχῶς λέγεται (λέγεται γὰρ καὶ ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, λέγεται καὶ ὁ ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), νῦν περὶ τοῦ προφορικοῦ λόγου φησίν. See Porphyry's question-and-answer commentary (*In Cat.* 101.26–27), concerning the second kind of language: ὁ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ὃς καὶ σιωπώντων ἡμῶν ἐγγίνεται. Cf. also Simplicius, *In Cat.* 124.8–10. All these commentators distinguish only two kinds of language, the spoken and the internal, and do not mention the third kind discussed by Sergius.

326 This kind of language is not mentioned by other commentators. It is likely that here Sergius is elaborating upon the Platonic teachings on Forms, or prototypes, which he presented in §§72–79. It is also possible that Sergius had in mind Aristotle's theory of language in *De Int.* 16a3–8.

327 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.2–7. Philoponus speaks of only one kind of language, which is the second in Sergius, i.e. the unspoken one.

ܐܘ ܒܢܝܢ ܐܠܗܘܬܗ ܒܟܠܗ. ܗܘܘ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܩܢ̈ܘܡܗ ܕܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ. ܒܗ̇ ܒܪ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ̇ ܡܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܡܬܝܚܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܕܒܪܝܘܬܐ: ܘܡܬܒܥܐ ܡܢ ܦܬܓ̈ܡܐ ܘܡܫܡ̈ܗܐ ܡܫܠܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܩܢܝܢ ܐܘ ܘܒܘܩ̈ܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܪܒܥܘܬܐ ܘܒܪܝܘܬܐ. ܘܡܬܠܐܡܘܬܐ ܘܕܒܝܪܘܬܐ ܕܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܠܗܘܬܗܝܢ: ܢܕܒܪܐ ܗܘ ܕܐܦ ܡܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܒܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܘ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܠܗܘܬܗ.

249 P59r ܟܠܗ ܗܘ ܒܪ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܢܘܬܗ ܕܡܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܐܣܝ̈ܐ ܒܣܕ̈ܪܐ: ܘܠܝܬ ܠܗܝܢ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܕܦܫܝܩ ܘܡܕܡ ܒܗ. ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܟܠܗ ܥܒܕܐ ܡܫܬܡܥ ܕܚܕܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܠܗܘܬܗ ܗܝ ܘܗܘ. ܐܠܐ ܦܪܝܫܝܢ ܘܦܫܝܩܝܢ ܥܒܕ̈ܘܗܝ ܘܦܬܓܡ̈ܘܗܝ ܡܢ ܚ̈ܕܕܐ. ܘܪܒܝܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܘܡܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܕܡܬܒܥܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ. ܘܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܚܕ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܟ ܚܕܐ ܥܠܝܠܘܬܐ ܐܚܕ ܒܗܘܢ: ܘܣܝ̈ܪܢ D95r ܡܢܘܬܗ ܒܣܕ̈ܪܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܠܐ ܢܬܦܫܐ ܒܗܘܢ ܦܘܫܩܐ ܐܘ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܕܡ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܡܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܡܬܡܠܠܢܘܬܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܬ ܢܗܝܪܐܝܬ ܕܒܡ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܠܗܘܬܗ. ܘܡܢ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܗܘܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܢ B115r ܗܘ ܒܦܘܠܓܗ ܡܕܡܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܢܦ̈ܠܢ ܡܢܘܬܗ ܚܕܐ ܐܚܝܕܘܬܐ ܘܡܠܘܬܘܬܐ ܠܘܬ ܚ̈ܕܕܐ.

250 ܘܡܛܠ ܕܗܢ ܠܝ ܠܡܬܡܪܒܘ ܐܦ ܠܗ̇ ܘܠܐ ܐܣܪܢܐ ܕܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ: ܕܥܒ̈ܕܝܢ ܡܢܘܬܗ ܘܐܣܝ̈ܐ ܒܣܕ̈ܪܐ ܕܠܐ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܕܡ ܘܕܠܐ ܦܘܫܩܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ: ܦܠܓܗ ܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܠܫܡܥ ܟܝ̈ܢܐ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܠܗܘܦܟܐ ܘܠܐܝܬܝܘܬܐ ܘܠܚܘܫܒܢܐ ܘܠܐܬܪܐ ܘܠܙܒܢܐ. ܡܬܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܟܠ ܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܠܡܐܡܪ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܦܫܩܐ ܘܠܝܬܗ ܕܫܟܝܚܐ ܗܘܠܐ ܕܦܫܝܩ ܠܝ ܗܟܢܐ.

251 ܢܗܝܪܬܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܬܬܪܝܢܐ ܒܟܠ ܣܘܥܪܢܐ: ܘܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ. ܗܢܝ̈ܢ ܡܫܡܗܢ ܠܗ̇ ܡܢ̈ܝܢܐ. ܘܠܗ̇ ܠܗܕܐ ܕܠܐ

1 ܐܘ ܒܢܝܢ BD, Epit.: ܘܐܒܢ̈ܝܢ P **2** ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ BD: ܘܐܢܫܘܬܐ P **4** ܘܡܬܠܐܡܘܬܐ ܘܕܒܝܪܘܬܐ] inv. P **5** ܕܐܦ DP: ܕܐܦܠܐ B **7** ܒܪ] om. P **8** ܠܗܝܢ] + ܕܝܢ P **9** ܘܗܘ] om. BD **17** ܘܠܐ BD: ܘܠܗ̇ P ܕܥܒ̈ܕܝܢ BD: ܥܒܕܝܢ P **19** ܕܐܦ ܗܘ P: ܕܗܘ BD | ܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ BP: ܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܗܝܣ D **22** ܘܠܝܬܗ BD: ܘܠܝܬ ܠܗ P **23** ܢܗܝܪܬܐ DP: ܕܢܗܝܪܬܐ B **24** ܡܫܡܗܢ] + ܡܬܚܙܝܢܐ BD add. in marg.

consists in words and phrases which are long and short[328]. Thus, it includes that kind of language which is measured, as we have said, by length and shortness and which is composed of different phrases and words that are multiple or few and are either long or short. And since being multiple and few is a characteristic of quantity, it is apparent that also this kind of language which includes them pertains to quantity.

249 It is also evident that parts of this language are not unified to one another without separation that would set them apart and distinguish them. For even if the whole treatise is considered to be one utterance[329], its words and phrases may be separated and distinguished from one another. Neither the idea nor the sense that is formed from them are completely unified as one line or as one surface, and its parts are not strung together in such a way that no division or separation between them is seen. Hence, it has become apparent that the spoken language pertains to quantity, namely to the first differentia of quantity, the one whose parts do not maintain complete unity and conjunction to one another.

[Line, surface, and body]

250 Now it is necessary for us to approach also another kind of quantity whose parts are equal and unified with one another without any division and without separation[330]. But since Aristotle divides this quantity too into five items, as we have said, namely into line, surface, body, place, and time, we ought to speak about each one of them according to our knowledge and following the goal that is set before us now[331]. 5a1–6

251 Now, the point may be grasped in thought but is not found in any body. Geometers call it *simeyon* (σημεῖον)[332], considering it to be without parts and

328 Aristotle explains how language pertains to quantity by the fact that it is measured by long and short syllables: καταμετρεῖται γὰρ συλλαβῇ μακρᾷ καὶ βραχείᾳ (*Cat.* 4b33–34). The same characteristic appears in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.1. Sergius speaks of *śmahe* and *petgame* which both may have the meaning "words", although the second term refers rather to constructions of words, hence "phrases". Cf. Porphyry, the question-and-answer commentary, *In Cat.* 101.30–32: πᾶς λόγος ἐξ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ λέγεται εἶναι τοῦ λόγου μέρη. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐκ συλλαβῶν συνέστηκεν· αἱ δὲ συλλαβαὶ ἢ μακραί εἰσιν ἢ βραχεῖαι.

329 Syr. *mellta*, Gr. λόγος.

330 I.e. continuous quantity.

331 For the following paragraphs, see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.15–24; idem, *In Cat.* 57.26–58.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.11–91.15.

332 A marginal note in mss. BD suggests a synonym *qenṭima* which is a transliteration of the Gr. κέντημα.

ܡܢܬܐ ܘܕܠܐ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܫܘܝܢ ܠܗ̇. ܘܐܝܟ ܐܢܫ ܢܐܡܪ: ܪܫܐ ܡܕܡ ܠܐ
ܒܫܡܐ ܕܟܠ ܒܫܡ. ܟܠ ܗܕܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܟܕ ܠܡ ܬܪܕܐ ܒܟܠܗ
L20r ܡܫܒܚܬܐ ܘܬܘܣܦ ܐܪܒܥܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܠܐ ܦܐܝܐ: ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܢ ܦܘܪܫܐ
ܡܫܬܡܗܐ. ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܪܒܥܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܦܐܝܐ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܗ̣ܘ ܦܘܪܫܐ
ܗܢܐ ܢܣܒ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܠܬܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܠܬܠܬܗܘܢ. ܗܕܝܢ ܐܢܫܘܬܐ
ܡܬܩܢܝܐ: ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܪܒܥܐ ܘܦܐܝܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܠܡܫܝܚܐ
ܬܬܡܗܘܢ ܗܕܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܘܗܡܐ ܡܬܪܓܡܢܐ. ܗܕܝܢ ܠܡܫܝܚܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ
ܕܗܢܐ ܬܠܬܐ ܬܘ̈ܒܐ: ܠܐܪܒܥܐ ܘܠܦܐܝܐ ܘܠܡܫܝܚܐ. ܘܡܫܝܚܘܢ ܠܟܠ
ܠܡܫܝܚܐ ܐܢܫܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ. ܕܬܠܬܐ ܡܢܝ̈ܢܘܗܝ ܡܫܬܡܗܝܢ ܠܗ.

ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܟܠܢܐ ܗ̇ܝ. ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܪܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܦܘܪܫܐ. ܗ̣ܘ 252
ܕܝܢ ܦܘܪܫܐ. ܪܫܐ ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܪܫܐ
P59v ܘܡܪܝܐ ܕܟܠ ܒܫܡ. ܘܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܗ ܬܪ̈ܬܝܢ ܡܢ ܠܡܫܝܚܐ
ܘܬܦܢܐ ܠܟܠ. ܚܕ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܫܡܝܢ ܡܢ ܣܒܪܗ̇. ܘܡܢܗܘܢ ܢܣܒܬܐ ܕܠܐ
B115v ܡܫܝܚܐ ܡܬܡܫܚܐ ܠܡܪܢ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܢܐ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢܝܢܐ.
ܐܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܪܫܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܡܢܝܐ ܕܠܐ ܒܫܡ.

D95v ܐܢ ܚܢܢ ܠܡܫܝܚܐ ܬܠܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܡܢܝ̈ܢܐ: ܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ 253
ܫܘܪܝܗ ܬܪܝܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܢܝܢܐ: ܘܦܘܪܫܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܪܫܗ̇ ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ
ܚܕ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܫܡܝܢ ܡܢ ܗܕܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܡܫܚ ܡܢܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܚܕ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܗ̇ܘ
ܕܐܪܒܥܘܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܗܘܐ ܠܗ ܠܐܢܫܗ ܕܦܘܪܫܐ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ
ܠܡܫܝܚܘܢ: ܕܢܦܫܐ ܫܡܝܢ ܡܫܝܚܗ ܚܕ ܡܫܝܚܐ. ܝܚܝܕܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܕܠܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ
ܡܫܬܡܗ. ܘܐܢ ܕܠܐ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܗ̇ܘ. ܟܠܢܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܪܒܘܬܐ ܡܢܐ.
ܘܡܛܠ ܗܕܐ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.

ܗܢܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܬܐ ܕܡܫܝܚܗ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܦܘܪܫܐ ܘܐܢܫܘܬܐ 254
ܘܒܫܡܐ. ܠܝܬ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܘܢ ܫܪܝܐ ܠܡܪܢ ܕܠܗ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܝܚܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ.

---

1 ܘܐܝܟ BP, Epit.: ܐܝܟ D **2** ܕܟܠ] + ܕܠܐ corr. D in marg. **4** ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ BDL, Epit.: ܕܐܪܝܬܘܗܝ P
6 ܘܦܐܝܐ] + ܡܕܡ BD **10** ܕܐܢܫܘܬܐ BDL, Epit.: ܘܐܢܫܘܬܐ P | ܪܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ DLP: ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܪܫܐ B | ܗ̣ܘ LP, Epit.: ܗܘܐ BD **15** ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܪܫܐ DLP, Epit.: ܪܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ B **16** ܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܡܢܝ̈ܢܐ P: ܡܢܝ̈ܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܗ BD: ܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ L | ܐܢܫܘܬܐ] + ܗ̇ܝ P **18** ܚܕ^2] om. B
20 ܕܕܠܐ DLP, Epit.: ܕܠܐ B **22** ܗܕܐ L, Epit.: ܗܢܐ BDP **23** ܬܠܬܐ DLP, Epit.: ܗܢܘ B

indivisible, and, as someone might say, a kind of incorporeal principle of all bodies. Though it remains inside their mind[333], they say about it that when it receives certain length without breadth, it is called line, which has length but no breadth. And if the line receives another extension into breadth, then surface appears, which has length and breadth only[334]. And if it is further extended into depth becoming perceptible, then body appears, which has three dimensions, i.e. length, breadth, and depth. That is why any particular body is called three-dimensional.

252 From this, it becomes clear that the point is the origin of the line, while the line is the origin of the surface, and the surface is in turn the origin and the beginning of all bodies. And each one of them, if you start from the body and proceed upwards, will have one fewer dimension than the other. Thus, the point turns out to have no dimension at all, and because of this it does not have parts either, but is a sort of incorporeal first principle[335].

253 For, if the body has three dimensions, while the surface which is its origin has only two, and furthermore the line which is the beginning of the surface has one dimension less than it, so that it acquires only one dimension, i.e. length, consequently, since it is necessary for the origin of the line which is the point (σημεῖον) to have one dimension less than it, it is apparent that it is without dimension. And if it is without dimension, then it is clear that it has no size, and because of this it does not pertain to quantity[336].

254 However, concerning the three things that derive from it, i.e. the line, the surface, and the body, there is no dispute at all whether they pertain to quant-

333 I.e. it may be considered in theory, but does not actually happen. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.1: δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν τὴν διαίρεσιν νῷ καὶ μὴ ἐνεργείᾳ.

334 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 90.18–22.

335 Ammonius remarks (*In Cat.* 33.23–34.2) that a point may not be subsumed under one of the ten categories since it is not something that has independent existence, but is "a principle of things in general": τὸ δέ γε σημεῖον αὐτὸ μέν τι πρᾶγμα ὑφεστηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὅλως πραγμάτων.

336 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 7.17–24: ἐπειδὴ γάρ φησι πᾶν τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἥτις ἔχει δύο διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος (βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ᾧ λείπεται τοῦ σώματος), ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια δύο ἔχουσα διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμμῆς, ἥτις μίαν ἔχει διάστασιν τὸ μῆκος μόνον, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ περατοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ σημείου, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ ἕξει οὐδεμίαν διάστασιν, ἀλλ' ἔσται ἀμερές, εἴ γε, ὡς εἴρηται, πᾶν πέρας τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει.

ܟܬܝܪܐ ܕܥܠ ܐܝܡܐ ܕܟܝܠܐ ܫܡܫܐ ܡܛܐ ܟܬܝܪܐ ܐܢ ܫܡܫܐ
ܫܡܫܐ ܟܬܝܪܐ ܐܝ ܒܪܝܫܐ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܡܫܬܠܐ ,ܡܥܕܪܐ ܫܡܫܐ
ܡܢ ܫܡܫܐ .ܟܪܥܐ ܩܕ ܫܡܫܐ .ܟܪܥܐ ܕܐܪܥܐ ܥܠܡܐ
ܫܡܫܐ ܩܒܠ ܡܐ ܕܐ ܠܐ ܟܬܝܒ ܒܟ ,ܐܡ ܐܡܪ ܠܐ
ܡܫܬܠܐ ܒܟ ܐܡ ܠܐ ܟܬܝܒ ܒܟ ܐܝ ,ܐܡ ܐܡܪ ܠܐ 5
ܡܫܬܠܐ ܒܟ ܐܡ ܠܐ ܟܬܝܒ ܒܟ ܐܝ ,ܐܡ ܐܡܪ ܠܐ

P60r ܒܟ .ܟܪܥܐ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܕܐܝܡܐ ,ܡܥܕܪܐ ܠܥܠܡ ܫܡܫܐ 255
L20v ܡܢ ܫܡܫܐ ܩܒܠ ܒܝ ܒܢ ܒܪܝܬ ܐܢ :ܒܝܕ ܡܠܝ ,ܐ ܟܬܝ ܡܠܝ
ܐܡ ܒܝ .ܫܡܫܐ ܕܐܪܥܐ ܒܝܬ ܩܒܠ ܫܡ ܐܡܪ :ܐܡܪ ܒܟ ܡܠܝ ܒܟ
ܐܡܪ ܒܝ ,ܐ ܟܬܝ .ܫܡܫܐ ܡܫܬܠܐ ܒܝ ܡܠܝ .ܒܪܟܬܐ ,ܐ ܐܠ
ܐܡܪ ܒܝ .ܫܡܫܐ ܡܫܬܠܐ ܒܝ ܒܟ .ܟܬܝ ܐܢ ܐܠ ܫܡܫܐ ܒܝ 10
ܫܡ ܡܫܬܠܐ ܫܡܫܐ ܐܡܪ .ܐܡ ܐܢ ܐܠ ܟܬܝܒ ܒܝ ܐܢ
B116r ܫܡܫܐ ܒܟ ܒܟ ܟܬܝ ܒܝ ܐܝܡܐ ܒܟ ܐܠ :ܒܝܬ ܩܒܠ ܒܝ
ܒܟ ܐ :ܫܡܫܐ ܟܬܝܒ ܒܝ ܫܡܫ ܒܟ ܒܟ ,ܫܡ :ܡܫܬܠ
ܟܬܝ ܩܒܠ ܒܝ ܡܠܝ ܠ ܒܝ .ܐܡ ܐܢ ܐܡܪ ܠܐ ܫܡܫܐ
ܡܠܝ .ܟܬܝ ,ܐ 15

256 ܒܟ .ܫܡܫܐ ܟܬܝܒ ܠܐ ܫܡܫ ܐܝܡܐ ܫܡܫ ܩܒܠ ܠܐ
ܠܐ ܒܝ ܒܝܬ ܫܡ ܩܒܠ ܒܟ :ܟܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܡ ܠ ܩܒܠ
ܒܪܝܫܐ ܩܒܠ ܠܐ ܡܫ ܟܐ .ܩܒܠ ܫܡܫܐ ܫܡܫܐ ܟܬܝ ܒܝ
D96r ܟܬܝ ܫܡܫ ܟܐ :ܟܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܡ ܠ :ܡ ܩܒܐ ܫܡܫܐ ܩܒܠ
20 ܡ ܒܟ ܫܡܫ ܟܬܝ ܠܐ ܐܡ ܟܫܟ .ܩܒܠ ܫ ,ܠ ܡܥܕܪ
ܟܫܟ ܠ ܒܪܩܒ ܡܫ ܒܟ .ܒܪܟܠܟ ܒܪܟܐ ܡܠܟܐ
ܠ ܒܪܩܒ ܩܒܠ ܒܝܬ .ܐܡ ܟܫܟ ܡܒܪܟ ܒܟ
ܒܝ ܒܟ ܐܡ .ܫܡ ܟܐ ܒܝܬ ܫܡ ܐܡ ܠ .ܐ ܫܡ ܟ
ܡܠܝ :ܫܡܟܬ ܡܠ ܠ ܐܡ ܫܒܪ ܫܒ ܒܝ ܟܬܝ ܩܒܠ

1 ܫܡܫ DLP: ܫܡܫ B **2** ܫܡܫܐ ܟܬܝܪܐ ܐܝ ܒܪܝܫܐ ܫܡܫܐ] om. B **4** ܒܟ BLP: ܒܟ D **8** ܡܠܝ ܒܝ] om. hom. P | ܫܡ BDP: ܫܡ L | ܩܒܠ BDP: ܩܒܠ L **10** ܩܒܠ BDP: ܩܒܠ L **11** ܒܟ LP: ܒܟ BD | ܠ BDL: ܠ P **20** ܒܟ DLP: ܒܟ B **21** ܡܫܬܠܐ LP: ܫܡܫ B: ܡܫܬܠ D **23** ܫܡ LP: ܫܡ BD **24** ܩܒܠ BDL: ܩܒܠ P

ity or not. For the dimensions of length in which the line appears, and also those of length and breadth which bring up the surface, and most of all those of length, breadth and depth which generate the body, signify a certain magnitude. And magnitudes of any kind, even if they are considered in theory, are always a quantity, since their size is grasped through the latter.

255 Now, from the fact that the line, the surface, and the body pertain to quantity, it becomes clear to the readers, that parts of each one of them are not divided or separated from one another, like the (parts) of number and language are separate. This is quite evident, since all the parts of a line are unified from one end to its other end without separation, and the same holds for the surface. Also, any particular body is unified in virtue of the unity of its parts and has its subsistence from them, so that there is neither division nor separation between one part and another, as between words and phrases in language or between parts of any particular number. So much for these matters.

[Place]

256 In order to make our discourse on quantity complete, let us now talk about 5a6–14 place and time, which, as we have said above, belong to the division of quantity. A full account, including all necessary examples, of place and of time, i.e. what and of what kind each one of them is, is given in subtle and excellent fashion by Aristotle in his treatise *Physics*[337]. If we proceed so far as to speak about his views in this treatise, we will sufficiently explain everything what we have learned not only from this man, but also from other philosophers and from our Christian writers who have diligently searched for truth[338]. However, lest the

337 See Aristotle's *Physics*, book IV, chapters 1–5 (on place) and 10–14 (on time). The commentaries of both Ammonius and Philoponus contain brief notes on place with a reference to Aristotle's *Physics* as the proper source of information on this subject matter.

338 Philoponus, who belonged to the same Alexandrian group of Christian students of philosophy as Sergius, included the so-called *Corollaries* in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. However, no commentaries on the latter work written by Christian authors are known prior to Philoponus. It is possible that Sergius meant not only commentaries in the proper sense, but also another Christian works (e.g., the Hexaemeron literature) which dealt with issues of natural philosophy and provided criticism of Arostotle's views.

P60v ܕܢܣܒܘ ܝܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܟܠ ܥܪܝܪܬܐ. ܐܦ ܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ
ܒܦܛܐ ܘܒܫܝܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ. ܡܬܦܪܢܣܝܢ ܠܗ ܠܟܘܡܟܘܗܘܢ ܐܝܟ
ܕܬܟܟ ܘܠܬܐ ܕܬܝܡ. ܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܓܝܪ ܥܠ ܟܝܢܗܘܢ ܗܦܝܟ ܠܡ ܠܡܐܡܪ
ܗܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܢܫܘܐ ܕܐܦ ܗܢܘܢ ܡܢ ܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ: ܡܢ ܗܕܐ
ܕܠܐ ܦܪ̈ܝܫܝܢ ܡܢܝ̈ܢܬܗ̇ ܘܠܐ ܦܣ̈ܝܩ ܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ.
257 ܟܠ ܐܬܪܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܟܢܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܒܘܟܪ ܐܝܬ ܒܝܬ ܡܬܬ̈ܟܢܐ.
ܡܕܡܝܘܬ ܕܐܝܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ̇ ܠܐ. ܘܒܬܪܝܢ ܕܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܐܝܟܢܐ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܛܠ ܐܪܝܟܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܐܬ̈ܦܠܛܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܪܢܝܢ
L21r ܠܡܐܡܪ ܟܠܗܘܝ ܐܝܟ ܡܐ ܕܕܗܡ. ܡܛܠ ܕܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܟܠ ܟܝܢܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
ܥܒܕܡ ܗܢܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ. ܐܠܐ ܟܠ ܐܢܫܘܬܗ ܕܟܡ ܒܟܝܢܘܬܐ.
B116v 258 ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܟܝܠ ܟܝܢܗ ܕܐܬܪܐ. ܡܟܕܝܢܐ ܐܦ ܬܪܒܝܬܐ ܕܟܠܘܐ
ܕܪ̈ܒܒܐ ܒܐܬܪܐ ܒܟܠܢ ܒܝܢܝܐܝܬ. ܟܠܗܘܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܝ̈ܢܝܐ ܡܫܬܟܚܝܢ ܕܟܠ
ܡܕܡ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܬܪܟܒܢܐ ܘܡܬܦܪܫܢܐ: ܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܘܐܝܟܢܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܦ ܟܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܩܪ̈ܒܢܐ ܕܝܢ. ܠܗ̇ ܟܕ ܠܗ̇ ܠܡܬܬܪܝܡܢܘܬܐ ܦܠܝܢ
ܡܢ ܕܘܟܝܐ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܡܬܚܫܒܢܘܬܐ: ܒܗ̇ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܕܪܟ ܡܬܕܒܗܘܢ ܠܡܬܕܪܟܘ.
ܕܟܠܡܕܡ ܕܕܠܐ ܫܘܚܠܦ ܗ̇ܘ ܒܟܠ ܕܗܘܝ ܗ̇ܘ.
259 ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܡܢ ܡܬܬܪܟܒܢܘܬܐ ܘܬܦܪܫܬܐ ܘܒܣܬܪܐ ܕܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ
ܡܬܕܪܟܢܐ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܬܬܪܝܡܢ ܗܘܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ
ܕܟܠܐ ܠܕܟܠܐ: ܐܘ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܪܒܐ ܗܘܐ ܐܘ ܚܣܝܪ. ܐܠܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ
ܟܝܢܗ ܕܐܬܪܐ ܕܒܗ ܗܠܝܢ ܗܘܝܢ. ܥܒܝܕܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܗܘ̇ܐ ܟܕ ܘܒܟܠܐ ܡܢ
P61r | D96v ܕܟܠܐ ܠܕܟܠܐ. ܡܫܟܚ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܝܐܝܬ ܥܠ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܬܪܝܡܢ ܕܒܐܬܪܐ
ܗ̇ܘܐ ܥܒܝܕܗ.

---

1 ܕܝܢ] om. P **2** ܠܗ] om. BD **5** ܡܢܝ̈ܢܬܗ̇ BDL: ܡܢܝ̈ܢܬܗܘܢ P **6** ܟܢܬܐ] + ܠܡ ܐܝܬ L | ܐܝܬ] om. L **8** ܕܝܢ] om. P | ܕܐܬ̈ܦܠܛܐ L: ܕܐܬܦ̈ܠܛܐ PD: ܕܐܬܦܠ̈ܛܐ B | ܡܬܪܢܝܢ L: ܡܬܡܐܢܝܢ BDP: ܡܬܪܢܝܢ ܡܬܗܡܢܝܢ corr. BD in marg. **10** ܗܢܐ DLP: ܗܢܝ B | ܐܢܫܘܬܗ BDP: ܫܢܘܬܗ L ܕܟܡ BDL: ܕܟܠ P | ܒܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܟܝܠ ܟܝܢܗ ܕܐܬܪܐ ܡܟܕܝܢܐ ܐܦ ܬܪܒܝܬܐ] om. P **14** ܘܐܦ BDL, Epit.: ܘܐܦܠܐ P **17** ܘܒܣܬܪܐ BDP, Epit.: ܘܒܣܬܪ L **19** ܗܘܐ^2 BDL, Epit.: ܘܗܘܐ P **20** ܕܒܗ ܗܠܝܢ BDL, Epit.: ܕܒܗܠܝܢ P | ܡܢ BDL, Epit.: ܕܡܢ P

account of them (i.e. place and time) become obscure and mysterious, we shall make an inquiry about them as it is necessary and proper at this moment. For it is not our task now to speak about their nature, but to demonstrate that they also belong to quantity, namely to that type whose parts are not divided and not at all separated from one another.

257 Now, concerning place there are not a few debates among writers, first of all with regard to whether it exists or not, and next to that with regard to what it is and how it exists[339]. But while these inquiries (ζητήματα) are extensive, we will remain brief and say what is necessary about it, for as we have said, the subject of our discussion now is not its nature but its relation to quantity[340].

258 That the nature of place exists is testified already by the common sense that is implanted naturally in everybody[341]. For all people understand that every thing that is perceptible and intelligible exists in space and in some place. And even their concept of incorporeals is the same, bearing likeness to the visible phenomena, since their mind is not capable of comprehending that everything that is incorporeal is omnipresent.

259 One may also understand that there is place from motion and from the increase and decrease of the bodies. For how would something be able to move from one point to another[342] and become bigger or smaller, unless there were the nature of place in which this would happen? But the change that occurs in virtue of motion from one point to another clearly testifies that the change of what is moved happens in place.

---

339 Cf. the questions formulated by Aristotle in *Phys.* 208a28–29: εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἐστιν.

340 In spite of this remark, Sergius provides a much longer account of place than we find in Ammonius and Philoponus and than one might deem necessary in view of Aristotle's very brief notion of space in the *Categories*. The following paragraphs by Sergius are in fact based on Aristotle's *Physics* IV, ch. 1–5, rather then on the *Categories*. According to §261, Sergius was aware of a possible criticism that his excursus might be out of place here but was still eager to include it.

341 Cf. Simplicius, *In Phys*. 521.6–7: τὸ μὲν ἔνδοξον εἶναι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ὑπολήψεως εἰλημμένον.

342 I.e. locomotion, Gr. φορά. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b31–32.

260 ܐܦ ܡܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܪܓܫܝܢ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܥܒܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܕܘܟܝ̈ܬܗܘܢ ܘܡܦܢܝܢ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܫ̈ܐܕܐ. ܓܠܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ. ܗܐ ܓܝܪ ܫܐܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܟܐ ܕܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ ܫ̈ܐܕܐ ܡܥܡܪܬ: ܐܐܪ ܡܫܬܡܥ ܒܗ ܢܪܓܫܘܢ. ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܝܬ ܗܘܐ ܐܐܪ ܒܗ ܢܬܬܢܝܚܘܢ ܫ̈ܐܕܐ: ܡܫܢܝܐ ܘܢܦ̇ܩ ܠܗܘܢ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܢܪܓܫܘܢ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܡܢ ܩܕܡ ܫ̈ܐܕܐ: ܒܗ̇ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܐܬܬܢܝܚܘܢ ܗܘܘ ܥܡ ܗܘܘ ܒܗ ܗܘܐ. ܢܕܥܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܡܘܬܒܗ ܕܐܬܪܐ. ܘܓܠܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܬܘܒ ܠܥܠܡ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܫܬܟܚܐ ܥܡ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ. ܐܠܐ ܒܗ̇ ܗ̇ܘ ܩܐܡ ܒܕܘܟܬܗ ܡܫܢܝܢ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܘܢܦ̇ܩܝܢ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܫ̈ܐܕܐ.

261 ܘܡܢ ܐܫܬܢܝܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܗܦܟ̈ܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܟܝܢ ܡܨܝܐ ܗܘܬ ܠܡܫܘܝܘ B117r ܕܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܐܡܪܬ. ܠܘ ܗܢܘ ܢܣܒܗ̇ ܕܡܠܬܘܢ ܬܘܒ. ܢܕܥ ܐܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܐܦ ܡܛܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܚܫܒ ܠܝ ܐܢܐ ܒܪܡ: ܡܢ ܗܢܘܢ ܕܡܛܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܡܢܘܬܐ ܦܠܓܝܢ ܒܡܫܡܫܢ̈ܘܬܐ ܕܐܢ̈ܫܝܐ. ܘܪܓܫܝܢ ܠܗ L21v ܥܒܪ. ܐܝܟ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܢܩܦܘܬܐ ܕܡܠܟܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ ܗܠܝܢ. ܐܠܐ ܣܡ ܒܕܬܒܠܝܢ ܕܠܗܦܐ ܘܕܫܪܪܐ ܕܠܐ ܒܪܗܘܪ ܗ̇ܘܐ: ܠܬܪܒܝܬܐ ܕܐܢܫܝܢ ܕܩܘܪܝܢ ܡܢ ܫ̈ܠܐ ܕܕܐܢܫ ܗܠܝܢ. ܡܬܦܢܝܢ ܒܕܘܟܐ ܕܗܘܐ ܟܠ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܬܫ̈ܡܫ ܒܬ̈ܠܝܐ ܘܢܦܩܝܢ ܡܠܝܠ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܢܝܫܢ. ܒܗ ܠܗ ܕܠܐ ܒܡܠܝܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܦܪܢܣܝܢ.

262 ܐܡܪ ܐܢܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܕܡܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ. ܐܬܬܢܝܚܬ ܠܗ̇ ܕܐܝܬ P61v ܐܬܪܐ. ܡܬܬܢܝܚܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܕܣܓܝܐ ܪܒܐ ܡܢܝܐ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܢ ܓܝܪ ܠܐ ܡܫܟܚܐ ܥܡ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܐܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܡܬܝ، ܕܐܦ ܡܫܬܟܚܝܢ ܒܗ ܘܠܐ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܡܢܗܘܢ: ܘܟܠ ܙܒܢ ܫܒܩ ܠܗܘܢ ܘܠܐ ܡܫܬܟܚܝܢ ܡܢܗܘܢ. ܢܕܥܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܦ ܡܫܬܪܐ ܒܢܘܗ ܡܢ ܕܠܝܬܘܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܕܡܟܠܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܕܢܣܒܘܢ ܡܕܡ ܠܡܕܡ ܘܠܐ ܢܬܚܒܫ: ܘܕܠܐ ܢܣܒ ܡܢ ܫܒܠܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܢ ܕܡܫܬܟܚܝܢ ܒܗ.

---

1 ܡܢ¹] om. B   5 ܢܪܓܫܘܢ L, Epit.: ܡܪܓܫܝܢ BDP | ܕܐܬܬܢܝܚܘܢ ܗܘܘ ܥܡ ܗܘܘ ܒܗ ܗܘܐ ܢܕܥܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܡܘܬܒܗ] post ܠܥܠܡ transp. P   6 ܗ̇ܝ¹] om. L | ܗ̇ܝ²] om. P, Epit.   12 ܘܪܓܫܝܢ LP: ܪܓܫܝܢ BD   15 ܕܩܘܪܝܢ] om. P   18 ܐܬܬܢܝܚܬ BDL: ܕܐܬܬܢܝܚܬ P   19 ܗܕܐ BDL, Epit.: ܗܪܟܐ P   21 ܘܠܐ¹ BDL, Epit.: ܘܗ̇ܘ ܠܐ P | ܙܒܢ] om. B   23 ܠܡܕܡ] om. L | ܫܒܠܐ BDL, Epit.: ܫܘܒܠܐ P

260 It also becomes apparent that there is place from the fact that bodies sometimes depart from their position and are replaced by other bodies[343]. For, behold, we see how air intrudes where originally water was as soon as the latter departs, and also how the change occurs when water is poured into where air was while the latter makes room for it. Thus, if bodies replace one another while that in which they were remains the same, it becomes apparent that place has subsistence. It is also obvious to everybody that it does not transform together with the bodies but remains unmoved, while bodies transform and make room for one another.

261 There are innumerable other things by means of which one may demonstrate that place exists but, as we have said, this is not the point of our account here. I am aware that certain people, who turn to the writings of others for the sake of reproach rather then profit, sometimes criticize us for this. They might blame us for talking about things that are unrelated to the discussion. However, since we are sure that there is no small instruction and learning for the minds of those who will read these kind of things, we will occasionally ignore the lovers of criticism and, when this seems suitable to us, wander away a little from our subject.

262 So, I mean that it has become apparent from what has been said that place exists. It has also become obvious from this that place has great power[344]. For since it does not change together with bodies but exists even if they are corrupted in it, not being corrupted by them, and always encompasses them while not being encompassed by them, it is clear that its nature is greater than theirs, since there is more excellence in encompassing something than in being encompassed, and in remaining unaffected by corruption of those things which are corrupted in it.

343 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 208b1–11. Aristotle speaks of ἀντιμετάστασις, "mutual replacement" of the bodies.

344 Aristotle stresses that place has a "power", or "potency" (δύναμις), which is prior to everything else: εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάντων (*Phys.* 208b33–35).

263 ܦܠܛܘܢ ܕܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܚܪ ܕܪܚܫ ܐܬܪܐ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܚܫ ܒܕܡܘܬ ܐܪܥܐ:
ܘܬܘܒ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܒܕܡܘܬ ܗܘܠܐ. ܐܣܒܪ ܒܠܘܗܝ
D97r ܕܗܘܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܒܕܓܘܢ ܓܠܝܐܝܬ ܠܐܬܪܐ
ܗܘܠܐ ܦܢܐ ܠܗ. ܪܟܒ ܗܘܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܬܚܘܫܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܗܕܐ ܗܘܠܐ.
ܕܐܬܪܐ ܠܡ ܪܚܫ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܚܫ. ܘܐܪܥܐ ܪܚܫ ܘܠܐ ܡܬܚܫ. ܡܕܝܢ
ܐܬܪܐ ܐܪܥܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܘܬܘܒ ܗܘܠܐ. ܐܬܪܐ ܠܡ ܡܫܡܠܝܐ ܗ̣ܘ
ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ. ܘܗܘܠܐ ܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܟܠ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܬܪܐ ܗܘܠܐ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.

264 ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܫܦܝܪ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܢ. ܡܛܠ ܕܠܘ ܐܢ ܐܝܬ ܡܕܡ
B117v ܕܢܦܩ ܠܬܪܬܝܢ ܦ̈ܢܝܢ: ܗܐ ܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܠܗ ܬܪܬܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܚܝܠ ܐܠܐ
ܚܕܐ. ܘܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ ܢܚܫܒ ܗܘܐ ܚܟܝܡܐ ܗܢܐ: ܕܡܛܠ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ
ܗ̣ܘ ܘܡܠܐܟܐ ܡܠܝܠܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܠܝܠܘܬܗ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܠܐܟܐ ܗ̣ܘ.
P62r ܘܡܛܠ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܝܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܘܚܡܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܝܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܡܕܝܢ ܒܪܢܫܐ
ܚܡܪܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܡܬܚܫܢܬ ܐܬܚܫܘܬ ܕܒܪܢܫܐ ܡܠܐܟܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܡܬܚܫ
ܐܢܐ ܡܚܝܠ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܢܦܩܐ.

265 ܘܙܕܩ ܗܘܐ ܠܗ ܕܝܢ ܠܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܗܢܐ ܠܡܣܒܪ. ܕܐܪܥܐ ܘܗܘܠܐ ܚܕ
L22r ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܡܫܢܝܢ ܘܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܒܫܡܗܘܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ. ܐܬܪܐ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ
ܒܫܡܗܘܢ ܡܫܢܐ. ܘܐܦ ܠܐ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܒܕܓܘܢ ܠܐ
ܐܪܥܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܘܠܐ ܗܘܠܐ. ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܕܡ. ܐܠܐ
ܣܘܟܡܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ. ܒܗ̇ ܕܣܝܡ ܒܗ ܐܬܪܐ
ܠܣܕ̈ܪܐ ܘܡܚܝܠܝܢ ܡܢ ܦܘܡ ܣܕ̈ܪܐ ܒܗ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܠ ܕܡܚܝܠܘܬܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.

266 ܡܡܫܡܢ ܕܝܢ ܒܩ̈ܘܠܝܢܬܐ ܐܦ ܟܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܚܝܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ.
ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܓܠܝܐ

---

1 ܐܪܥܐ] + ܐܪܥܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܥܡ ܗܘܠܐ D add. in marg. **2** ܕܡܫܡܠܝܐ] + ܡܫܡܠܝܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܘܡܘܬܒܐ D add. in marg. **3** ܐܘ] om. P | ܠܐܬܪܐ BDL: ܐܬܪܐ P **4** ܕܝܢ] om. BD **8** ܐܝܬܘܗܝ DLP: ܗܘ B **11** ܕܡܛܠ] LP: ܡܛܠ BD **12** ܗ̣ܘ²] om. P **13** ܘܡܛܠ BDP: ܡܛܠ L **14** ܘܡܛܠ BDL: ܡܛܠ P **16** ܠܗ] om. P | ܕܝܢ] om. BD | ܠܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ BDL: ܠܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܐ P **17** ܠܐ] + ܗܘܐ BD **22** ܕܝܢ BDL, Epit.: ܒܪܡ P | ܟܠ] om. BD **23** ܓܘܫܡܐ¹] + ܗܘ BD, Epit. | ܓܠܝܐ LP: ܓܘܫܡܐ BD, Epit.

263 Thus, because Plato saw that place is similar to form (εἶδος)[345] in that it encompasses but is not encompassed, and also that similar to matter (ὕλη) it is receptive[346] of bodies, he considered it to be either matter or form. It is because of this that he openly called matter "place"[347]. The argument which he constructed about it run like this: Place encompasses but is not encompassed, and form encompasses but is not encompassed, hence place is form. And further in this way: Place is receptive of bodies, and matter is receptive of everything, hence place is matter.

264 But this has not been stated correctly, because if there is something which is characteristic of two objects, it does not follow from this that they are not two any more but one. For if it were not like that, this sage might say: Since man is rational and angel is rational, hence, according to his word, man is angel. And since man is mortal and also ass is mortal, thus man is ass. And since it has been proven already that man is angel, I am ashamed of saying what follows from this.

265 In fact, it would be proper for this philosopher to see that form and matter are changing together with bodies and are parts of them. Place, instead, does not change with them and is no part of them. Thus, it is neither form nor matter. But neither is it a certain body, for its subsistence is apart from bodies which make room for one another in it and are mutually replaced while it remains in its place.

266 They also make a detailed inquiry into what place is, i.e. whether it is a body or incorporeal[348]. That it is not a body is clear from the fact that it is

345 Ms. D adds in the margin: "That form which is with matter."

346 Ms. D adds in the margin: "It contains every (thing) and image (εἰκών)."

347 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b11.

348 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 209a2–7. See also Philoponus, *In Phys.* 504.28–506.20.

ܗ̣ܝ ܡܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܩܒܠܢܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܠܒܘ̈ܫܐ. ܐܠܐ ܠܒܪ ܠܒܘܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘܐ ܘܡܩܒܠ ܗܘܐ ܒܗ ܠܒܘܫܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ. ܠܒܘܫܐ ܒܠܒܘܫܐ ܡܫܬܟܚ ܗܘܐ. ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܫܡܫܢܐ ܗܘܬ ܠܒܪ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܡܬܘܣܦ ܠܒܘܫܐ ܒܠܒܘܫܐ. ܡܨܝܐ ܗ̣ܘܬ ܕܐܦ ܠܒܘܫܐ P62v ܪܒܐ ܒܠܒܘܫܐ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܟܕ ܠܐ ܡܬܐܠܨ ܒܗ. ܐܦ ܠܒܪ ܠܐ ܐܚܕ ܒܗ ܕܘܟܬܐ: ܕܟܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܡܙܕܪܒ ܒܗ ܣܦ. ܠܗܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܢܦܫܐ ܕܐܦ ܥܠܗ̇ ܫܝܐ ܒܠܒܘܫܐ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܬܬܚܫܒ ܗ̣ܘܬ. ܘܙܥܘܪܘܬܐ D97v | B118r ܚܕܐ ܙܥܘܪܬܐ ܬܐܚܕ ܗ̣ܘܬ ܥܠܗ̇ ܡܟܐ.

267 ܡܕܡ ܠܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܕܠܒܘ̈ܫܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܠܐ ܐܦܠܐ ܕܢܫܬܡܫܘܢܝܗܝ، ܐܝܟ ܠܐ ܠܒܘܫܐ ܡܨܝܐ. ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܕܠܐ ܠܒܘܫ ܗܘ ܠܗܢ ܒܗ ܠܐ ܡܬܚܣܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܠܒܪܝܐ: ܐܦܠܐ ܩܛܝܢܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ. ܐܬܪܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܬܚܬܝܢ ܘܡܬܦܬܝܬܐ ܚܕܐ ܠܒܘ̈ܫܐ ܕܒܗܘܢ: ܘܡܘܗܒܐ ܢܦܫܐ ܠܗܘܢ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܬܥܒܕ. ܕܠܗܘܬܗ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܠܐ ܠܒܘܫܐ. ܐܠܐ ܠܒܪ ܠܡܕܪܢܐ ܡܨܝܐ ܗ̣ܝ: ܕܠܒܘ̈ܫܐ ܒܡܕܡ ܕܕܠܐ ܠܒܘܫ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܬܠܒܫܝܢ. ܗܘ ܠܒܪ ܡܢܗ ܕܢܦܫ ܠܗܘܢ. ܠܘܬ ܡܬܠܒܫܝܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܢܘܗܪܐ ܡܬܚܙܝܢ ܘܡܕܒܪܝܢ.

268 ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܟܝܠ. ܐܦ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܓܒܪ ܡܫܡܫܢܐ ܐܝܟܢ. ܘܡܕܒܢ. ܐܦ ܘܗܢܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܬܦܠܐܘܗܝ. ܐܝܟ ܕܒܚܕܝܗܘܢ ܡ̈ܬܩܢܬܐ ܐܫܬܝܬܐ L22v ܡܢܝܢܐ ܠܡܕܡ ܕܡܠܬܐ ܠܡܩܒܠ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܬ̈ܠܝܢ ܕܢ̈ܦܫܢ. ܐܦ ܬܠܝܢ ܒܗ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ. ܐܡܪ ܠܒܪ ܕܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ. ܘܡܕܒܪ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܕܐ. ܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܠܗ ܒܕܘܟܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܦ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ: ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܗܘ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܦ ܗܘ ܒܕܘܟܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.

---

1 ܗ̣ܝ] om. P **3** ܐܠܐ] + ܠܒܪ BDP | ܠܒܪ] om. BDP **7** ܬܬܚܫܒ DLP: ܬܬܚܫܒܝ B **9** ܢܗܘܐ LP, Epit.: ܕܢܗܘܐ BD **12** ܘܡܘܗܒܐ LP, Epit.: ܕܡܘܗܒܐ BD **13** ܗܠܝܢ BDL, Epit.: ܗܕܐ P **14** ܒܡܕܡ BDL, Epit.: ܡܕܡ P **15** ܡܬܠܒܫܝܢ DLP, Epit.: ܡܠܒܫܝܢ B | ܐܝܠܝܢ] + ܗܘܬ BD **17** ܕܠܐ LP, Epit.: ܠܐ BD **18** ܐܦ BDL, Epit.: ܘܐܦ P | ܡܬܦܠܐܘܗܝ BDP: ܡܬܦܠܐܘܗ L: ܡܬܦܐܠܘܗ Epit. | ܕܒܚܕܝܗܘܢ BDL: ܕܒܚܕܗܘܢ P **19** ܡܢܝܢܐ BDP: ܕܡܢܝܢܐ L | ܕܡܠܬܐ] om. B **21** ܘܐܦ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬ ܐܬܪܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܗܘ ܡܕܡ ܡܢ ܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ] om. hom. P **22** ܗܘ¹] om. L

receptive of bodies. For if it were a body and received in itself another body, then body would be in body, which is impossible[349]. If, in fact, a body were ever be in a body, then it would be possible for a big body to be inside a small body that cannot contain it. But if something does not have enough room in itself (for something else), then it is obvious that it will not contain it at all. From this would follow that the whole sky might be enclosed in a small body and that one small eggshell might encompass the whole sea.

267 Thus, it is impossible that place should be a body. But one cannot state that it is incorporeal either, since if something is without body then it cannot be expanded, occupy space, and have any extension. Place, however, is expanded and occupies space together with the bodies that are in it, thus containing them. This makes apparent that place is not incorporeal, for we may never believe that bodies are encompassed by something that is without body, for what encompasses them must necessarily be extended and enlarged according to their size[350].

268 Now, based on this one may even conclude that there is no place at all. Thus Zeno of Citium[351], who always tried to posit in his statements different things which contradicted what is clearly known, acted the same way also in this case. So, he said that there is no place, constructing his argument as follows: Each thing is in a place. So, if place exists, since it is also a thing among other things, it is in a place too. Thus we find a place in a place, and the latter is

349 Sergius slightly modifies the argument of Aristotle as formulated in *Phys.* 209a6–7: "But it is impossible for place to be a body, for then two bodies would be in the same thing" (ἀδύνατον δὲ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν τόπον· ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ ἂν εἴη δύο σώματα).

350 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 505.1–11.

351 I.e. Zeno of Elea. Aristotle mentions Zeno's paradox in *Phys.* 209a23–24.

P63r ܘܡܬܟܬܫ ܠܗ ܐܬܪܐ ܒܐܬܪܐ. ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܒܐܚܪܢܐ. ܘܐܚܪܢܐ
ܒܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܗܕܐ ܕܠܐ ܫܦܝܪ. ܡܕܝܢ ܠܝ ܠܘܬ ܠܓܒܪ ܐܬܪܐ.

269 ܢܦܩܬ ܕܝܢ ܡܠܘܬܗ ܡܢ ܗܿܝ ܕܡܕܝܢܬ ܕܓܠܘܬܐ ܢܦܫܗ: ܘܡܠܝܗ̇ ܪ̈ܟܒ
ܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܪ̈ܟܐ. ܘܡܕܝܢܬ ܓܝܪ ܠܗ ܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܒܐܬܪܐ ܗܿܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܩܕܡ ܐܡܪܢ.
ܐܠܐ ܗܝ̈ܡܢܘܬܐ ܘܬܘܕܝܬܐ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܕܠܐ ܓܥܘܡ ܐܢ̈ܫ. ܠܘܬ ܠܗܘܢ
ܐܬܪܐ ܘܠܘܬ ܐܢܫ ܒܙܘܥܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܬܬܗܝܡ ܒܙܘܥܐ. ܠܘ ܒܣܪ
B118v ܕܝܠ ܐܬܬܗܝܡ ܗܟܢܐ: ܐܝܟ ܕܓܠܝܡ ܒܐܬܪܐ ܢܬܬܒܫܝ. ܐܡܪ ܠܝ ܓܝܪ
ܡܢ ܠܟܠ ܒܡܬܬܒܠܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ: ܕܒܚܕܒܫܒܐ ܕܝܠܝܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܗܘ ܗܘ ܡܟܐ
ܕܡܬܬܪܝܢܐ ܒܙܘܥܐ. ܘܡܢ ܬܡܢ ܡܬܬܚܝܐ ܓܠܝܐܝܬ. ܕܠܘ ܒܠ ܡܟܐ
ܕܒܙܘܥܐ ܐܬܬܗܝ. ܒܐܬܪܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܢ ܐܡܪܢ. ܐܠܐ ܒܠ ܗܿܝ
ܕܐܬܗܘܢ ܐܬܪܐ ܘܕܐܬܒܠܐ ܐܬܬܗܘܢ. ܫܦܩܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ. ܕܡܠܐ ܕܝܢ
ܐܬܗܘܢ ܘܕܡܢ ܒܡܚܘܬܐ ܗܘ ܗܟܢܐ ܐܡܪܢܢ.

270 D98r ܒܦ̈ܣܝܩܬܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܠܡܐܡܪ. ܐܬܪܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܐܬܗܘܢ ܘܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ
ܕܟܠ ܡܕܡ ܕܣܒܪ: ܗܿܝ ܕܠܘܬ ܗܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܡܬܬܒܪ ܡܢܗ. ܒܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ
ܓܝܪ ܐܢܫܐ ܕܗܘ. ܐܝܬ ܠܗ ܗܟܢܐ ܘܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ ܕܐܬܗܘܢ ܒܒܪܗ ܒܪܢܐ.
ܐܠܐ ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕܓܘܫܡܢܐ ܐܬܗܘܢ. ܚܕܐ ܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗ. ܗܿܝ ܕܡܢ
ܠܒܪ ܚܕܪܐ ܠܗ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܣܓܝܐܐ ܐܘ̇ ܡܫܒܚܐ ܐܬܗܘܢ. ܬܪ̈ܬܝܢ ܡܬܐ
ܥܠܝܡ̈ܘܬܐ. ܗܟܘ ܕܝܢ ܚܕܐ ܒܪܝܬܐ ܘܚܕܐ ܓܘܫܡܐ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ
ܣܓܝ ܡܕܡ ܒܥܠܡܐ. ܗܘܝܢ ܥܠܝܡܘܬܗ ܗܿܝ ܒܪܝܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܐܪ ܣܕܝܢܐ.
P63v ܘܒܕܓܡܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܕܐܐܪ ܗܘ ܕܢܦܩ ܠܗ ܠܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܒܪܝܬܐ. ܗܘ
L23r ܐܬܗܘܢ ܐܬܪܗ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗܘ. ܥܠܝܡܘܬܗ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܗ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗܘܐ
ܗܿܝ ܓܘܫܬܐ: ܕܢܦܩܐ ܠܗܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܣܓܝ ܒܥܠܡܐ. ܐܬܪܐ ܐܬܗܘܢ ܕܠܗ
ܕܗܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܣܓܝ ܒܗ. ܡܛܠ ܕܗܘ ܢܦܩܐ ܠܥܠܡܘܗܝ ܘܣܕܪܐ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܠܒܪ.

1 ܘܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܒܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܒܐܚܪܢܐ] om. hom. P **2** ܘܗܕܐ LP, Epit.: ܘܗܟܢܐ BD **3** ܡܢ BDL, Epit.: ܘܡܢ P **4** ܗܠܝܢ BDL: ܗܢܝܢ P **5** ܠܗܘܢ] + ܓܝܪ B **8** ܡܟܐ] om. B **9** ܒܙܘܥܐ BDL: ܒܡܕܡ P, Epit. **14** ܕܣܒܪ BDP, Epit.: ܣܒܪ L | ܗܿܝ LP: ܗܘ BD **15** ܕܐܬܗܘܢ BDL, Epit.: ܕܐܬܗܘܢ P **16** ܚܕܐ BDL, Epit.: ܚܕ P **18** ܚܕܐ] om. B **21** ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗܘܐ BDP: ܕܗܘܐ L **22** ܐܬܪܐ BDP: ܕܐܬܪܐ L

in turn in another (place), which is in another one, and so on without end. Therefore, no place exists at all.

269 However, his argument follows a false assessment which is made at the beginning and on which the rest is built up. So, first of all, not everything is in a place, as Zeno assumes, for there are many things, and most of all those which are incorporeal, that have no place and are not in space, while those that are in space do it not in the same manner, not every one of them being in a place. For, as we have explained earlier in this treatise, there are eleven ways of saying that something is in space[352]. This makes it apparent that not everything which is in space is also in a place, as Zeno believes. However, on whether place exists and how it exists enough (has been said). Now we will discuss what it is and whether it pertains to quantity.

270 To put it briefly: place is a limit and a surface of every container that surrounds what is contained by it[353]. Now, any particular body has a limit and a surface which is its outer boundary. However, if it is solid, it has one surface which surrounds it from the outside; but if it is hollow or vaulted, it has two surfaces, i.e. the outer and the inner. And if something is contained in its cavity, then its outer surface is surrounded by air. In this case, the limit of air which adjoins its outer surface will be the place of this body. The inner surface of the same body, on the other hand, which adjoins something that it contains in its cavity will be the place of what is contained in it, since the latter adjoins its limit and is surrounded by it from the outside.

352 In §§138–149, Sergius lists eleven ways of being-in-something (cf. the reading of ms. P and of the epitome, which is probably a later correction of the text), and one of them (no. 2) is "as in a place". In both passages, Sergius uses the Syriac word *ʾatra* for "place" (i.e. a concrete position), while "space" is expressed by the term *dukkta*. Thus, the point which Sergius makes here is that there are eleven ways of saying that something is in something else, i.e. in space, and only one of them means to be in a concrete place. Aristotle lists eight ways of being-in-something in *Phys.* 210a14–24, where being in a place is combined with being in a vessel to yield the eighth way.

353 See Aristotle, *Phys.* 209b1–7 and 212a5–6. Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 519.12–13: εἰ δὲ τὸ προσεχῶς ἕκαστον περιέχον ὁ τόπος ἐστί, πέρας τί ἐστι δηλονότι ὁ τόπος· περατοῖ γὰρ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–17.

271 ܐܬܪܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܗܢܐ ܓܘܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܕܡܩܦ
ܠܒܘܗ ܒܪܝܐ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܚܒܝܫ ܒܗ. ܗܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ ܕܠܐ
ܓܘܫܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܗܢܘ ܓܘܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ. ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ
ܕܠܐ ܓܘܫܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ: ܡܛܠ ܕܗܘܐ ܡܬܚܙܝܐ ܕܠܐܘܪܟܐ ܘܠܦܬܝܐ ܠܦܘܬ
B119r ܪܒܘܬܗ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܕܚܒܝܫ ܒܗ. ܗܟܢܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܐܬܪܐ ܕܫܪܝܐ ܠܗ
ܡܬܐܡܪ ܡܕܫܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܗ: ܡܛܠ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗ̇ܘ. ܐܠܐ
ܗܢܗ ܓܘܐ ܕܡܕܫܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܢܦܫ ܠܗܘܢ ܠܚ̈ܫܐ ܕܒܗ: ܗܘܢܗ ܐܬܪܗܘܢ.
ܘܐܣܦܝܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܘܙܠܬܐ. ܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܗ̇ܝ ܗ̇ܝ ܐܬܪܗ ܕܐܐܪ. ܐܠܐ
ܫܠܝܛܘܬܗ̇ ܗ̇ܝ ܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܢܦܫܐ ܠܩ̈ܢܘܡܗܝ ܒܢ̈ܝܐ ܕܐܐܪ. ܗ̇ܝ
ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܬܗ̇ ܐܬܪܗ. ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܗ̇ܘ ܐܐܪ ܕܐܬܬܣܝܡ ܒܗ:
ܐܬܪܗܘܢ ܕܫܡ̈ܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܪ̈ܝܐ. ܐܦ ܡܫܘܚܬܗ ܗܘܐ ܐܠܐ
ܗܕ̈ܡܘܗܝ ܗܢܘܢ ܕܠܘܩܕܡ ܡܢ ܠܒܪ ܠܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܒܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ: ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ
ܐܬܘܪ̈ܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܒ̈ܢܝܢܫܐ ܕܫܪܝܢ ܠܗ ܡܥܡܪܗܘܢ. ܐܬܪܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܐܝܟ
P64r ܕܒܩܘܡܬܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܗܘܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܘܢܐ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ
ܕܫܕܪ ܠܗܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܚܒܝܫ ܒܗ.

272 ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܕܡ̈ܠܝܢ ܘܡܕܡ ܠܟܠ ܐܢܫ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܫܬܟܚܐ
ܠܗ. ܐܦ ܕܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ. ܐܢ ܗ̇ܘ ܒܪ ܕܫܕܪ ܠܟܠ
D98v ܒܓܘ̈ܫܡܝܢ: ܘܠܝܬ ܡܬܘܡ ܠܡܕܢܐ ܚܒܢܐ ܡܬܬܟܝܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܒܐܬܪܐ ܗ̣ܘ.
ܢܕܥܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܡܣܟܢܐ ܡܬܬܚܡܐ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܪܒܘܬܗ ܕܟܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ
ܐܢܫܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ: ܘܡܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܬܚܡܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܐܝܬܘܬܗ ܕܒܪ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܒܗ.
ܡܕܡ ܐܢ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܟܠܗ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܬܪܐ ܡܢܗ̇
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܢ ܡܣܬܟܠܐ ܚܕ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܕܠܐܘܪܟܐ ܒܟܠܗ ܡܢܐ: ܡܛܠ
L23v ܡܬܘܡ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ. ܠܐ ܗܟܢ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܡܬܘܚܐ ܐܬܪܐ ܕܗܢܐ
ܬܚܘܡ ܡܬܬܚܡ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܠܐܘܪܟܐ ܘܠܦܬܝܐ: ܕܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.

273 ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܢܫ ܢܐܡܪ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܬܚܡ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܦܘܬ ܟܠܗ ܩܘܡܐ
ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ. ܗܢܐ ܡܬܐܠܨ ܕܢܐܡܪ. ܕܠܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܫܘ̈ܚܬܗܘܢ ܕܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ

---

4 ܕܠܐܘܪܟܐ BDL, Epit.: ܕܠܐ ܐܘܪܟܐ P **5** ܗܟܢܐ DLP, Epit.: ܗܢܐ B **12** ܚܕ] + ܚܕ BD **15** ܠܗܘ BDP, Epit.: ܠܘܬ ܗܘ L **18** ܗܘ BDL, Epit.: ܗܘܝ P **24** ܠܐܘܪܟܐ DLP, Epit.: ܕܠܐܘܪܟܐ B

271 So, place is the inner limit of a certain body that adjoins the outer limit of what is contained in it. That is why it turns out that place is not a body but the inner limit of a body. But neither is it incorporeal, since it acquires extension into length and breadth, according to the size of the body which is contained in it. Thus, it is not the cup (κάδος) that is called the place of the water which is in it, since this is a body, but it is the inner limit of the cup which adjoins the water contained in it that is the place of the latter. Moreover, it is not the celestial sphere (σφαῖρα) that we say is the place of the air, but it is its inner surface which adjoins the outer limit of the air that is said to be the place of it. Moreover, it is not the air in which we are that is really the place of natures, even if it is thought of like that, but it is its limits which from outside adjoin each one of the bodies that are the places of each nature which are contained inside them. So, to put briefly what place is: it is the inner limit of that which surrounds something that is contained in it.

272 From what has been said, as it seems to me, it also becomes evident and comprehensible to everyone that place pertains to quantity. For if it surrounds all bodies and there is not a single perceptible nature which might be thought not to be in a place, it is evident that place in some cases will be extended according to the large size of any particular body and in other cases will be contracted according to the small size of bodies that are in it. Thus, if body pertains to quantity, it is apparent that place pertains to it too. And if line which has only one dimension, i.e. that of length, due to its dimension pertains to quantity, place turns out to pertain to quantity much more, since it has two dimensions, i.e. those of length and breadth[354].

273 If someone, however, were to say that place does not extend according to the whole constitution of bodies, then he would be compelled to state that not

354 Sergius' conclusion that place is two-dimensional agrees with his notion that it is not a body, but a surface of a container. Since a surface is two-dimensional (cf. §§250–255, above), the same holds for place. In the next paragraph, Sergius raises a puzzle which naturally comes up in this context, without going into detail about it. It seems that this point was not the Sergius' main concern in this section, but a way to show that place pertains to quantity, similar to Ammonius, *In Cat.* 58.16–26.

B119v ܟܝܟ ܐܢ ܒܫܡܐ ܕܐܠܗܐ ܫܡܥ ܐܢ ܘ ܡܫܡܥ ܐܝܟܐ
ܡܠܐ ܗܘ ܐܝܟܐ ܐܢ ܫܡܥ ܠܟ ܒܢܝ ܐܒܗܬܟ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܒܪܡ
ܗܘ ܐܝܟܐ ܐܢ ܐܠܗܐ ܐܢ ܐܠܗܐ ܗܘ ܫܡܥ ܐܒܗܬܟ
P64v ܕܐܒ ܘ ܒܪ ܐܝܟܐ ܐܢ ܐܢܐ ܐܢܐ ܐܦܐ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܠ
5 ܐܢ ܒܢܝ ܐܒܗܬܟ ܗܘ ܐܢ ܐܝܟ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ
ܐ ܒܠܐ ܐܢ ܒܢܝ ܐܒܗܬܟ ܠܟ ܒܪܡ ܐܒ ܒܫܡ ܐ
ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐܢ ܐ ܐܢ ܐ ܐ
ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
10 ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
274 ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
15 ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
D99r ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
ܐ.
20 275 ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
P65r ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ
L24r | B120r ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ

2 ܕܒܪܟ] + ܕܐܒ ܐܦܐ ܐܢ P **6** ܕܒܝܬ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܕܒܝܫ B, Epit. **8** ܕܐܠܗܐ BDL: ܕܐܠܗܐ P **10** ܐܒܗܬ] om. BD, Epit. **12** ܕܒܪ BDP: ܕܒܪ L **17** ܕܒܪܟ BDL: ܕܒܪܟ P **23** ܒܫܡ BDP: ܒܫܡܝܢ L | ܕܐܠܗܐ BDL: ܕܐܠܗܐ P

all parts of bodies are in a place[355]. But this is impossible, first of all, because if it happens that some parts of a body have no place, then all of it might be without place as well; and if this were true, then any particular body might be without place. This, in turn, will necessarily require the one who says this to introduce a certain void into the nature of creatures and to postulate something that is empty of bodies and contains no natures at all[356]. But that this is something that may not exist has been demonstrated through many investigations and through powerful arguments by all natural philosophers. And even those who introduce empty space and admit that there is void in the creation do not state that it exists naturally, but that it is completely beyond nature. But so much will suffice for it.

[Time][357]

274 Now is the moment we should turn to time and discuss this subject matter in the same concise manner, since this is the last among the seven kinds of quantity left for us to speak about. So, you ought to know that just as place is considered prior to body, so also body is comprehended prior to motion, while motion in turn (is considered) prior to time. For just as a body is a concomitant of the place which always contains it, and just as natural motion is a concomitant of a body, so also time is a concomitant of any particular natural motion[358].

275 So, above we have said enough on whether place and body pertain to quantity, while about time we are going to speak now. Concerning motion[359], however, one might rightfully raise a puzzle as to why the Philosopher did not mention it in the chapter on quantity. We shall say in response to this that, since

---

355 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 505.1–5. Based on the same arguments, Philoponus comes to the conclusion that place is three-dimensional and not two-dimensional, as Sergius states in the previous paragraph. However, in his commentary on the *Categories* which is based on Ammonius' lectures, Philoponus admits that the "limit" of a body, which is actually the place it occupies, must have one dimension less than body itself and thus be two-dimensional (see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 84.24–25).

356 Aristotle discusses void in chapters 6–9 of Book IV of the *Physics*, ultimately rejecting its existence. A number of puzzles that may be raised in this context are discussed by Philoponus in the *Corollaries on Void*, which have been preserved as a part of his commentary on the *Physics*.

357 The following paragraphs are not based on the text of the *Categories*, where Aristotle mentions time only briefly but in contrast to place does not further elaborate on this issue. Instead, Sergius explicates the contents of Book IV of the *Physics* where Aristotle deals with time in chapters 10–14, right after the discussion of place and void.

358 Cf. Philoponus, *In Phys.* 702.13–14: καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς πράγμασι.

359 Syr. *zaw'a* corresponding to Gr. κίνησις which might be understood as either "motion" or "change".

ܕܡܐܡܪܐ ܗܢܐ ܕܥܠ ܦܝܛܓܘܪܘܣ ܐܝܟ ܕܠܘܬ ܠܘ̈ܩܐ ܥܒܝܕ: ܘܫܘܪܝܐ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܕܘܪܫܐ ܕܒܡܠܠܘܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܗܢܐ ܠܐ ܐܥܠ ܬܢ ܡܠܬܐ
ܕܥܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ. ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܥܠܝ ܗ̣ܘ ܛܒ ܫܪܟܐ ܕܥܠܝܗ̇ ܡܢ
ܡܫܡܥܬܐ ܕܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܒܚܝܠ ܠܐ ܡܬܕܪܫܝܢ.

276 ܒܦ̈ܘܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܣ̈ܓܝܐܐ ܘܒܥܒܕܬܐ ܒܡܫܡܫܘܬܐ ܗܘܬ ܥܠܝܗ̇ ܡܢ
ܡܕ̈ܡܝܐ. ܘܐܦ ܡܢܗ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ. ܗܟܢ ܡܢ ܒܩ̈ܘܫܝܐ ܐܣ̈ܛܘܟܐ
ܕܥܠܝܗ̇ ܕܥܒܕܝܢ ܠܗ ܒܡܬܬܟܠܢܘܬܗ ܣ̈ܓܝܐܬܐ. ܐܪܒܥܐ ܡܐܡܪ̈ܐ
ܥܠܝܗܘܢ ܣܝܡܝܢ ܡܢܗ ܥܠ ܒܘܡܒܐ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ. ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ
ܐܩܦ ܐܢܘܢ ܠܡܬܬܟܠܢܘܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ. ܥܠ ܚܢܝܢܘܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܗܟܝܠ ܒܡܫܡܫܘܬܗ̇
ܕܨܒܘܬܐ ܘܒܥܠܠܬܐ ܕܬܐܘܪ̈ܝܬܐ ܕܗ̈ܘܝ. ܥܠܝܗ̇ ܡܢ ܡܕ̈ܡܝܐ. ܚܣ ܥܠ
ܠܘ̈ܩܐ ܘܣܡܥܗ̇ ܠܡܬܬܟܠܡܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܕܥܒܕܬܐ: ܡܢ ܒܡܫܡܫܘܬ ܠܐܘܬܐ
ܕܐܟܘܬ ܗܕܐ. ܒܬܪ ܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܡܛܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܢܕܒ ܗܘܐ ܕܠܡܣܦ ܙܘܥܐ
ܠܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ: ܘܠܘܬ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܙܘܥܐ: ܘܬܪܝܨܘܗܘܢ
ܐܚܝܘܬܐ ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܦܫܝܛ ܠܗܘܬ ܚܕ̈ܪܐ. ܥܠ ܗܕܐ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ
P65v ܐܬܚܙܝ: ܗܘ ܕܦܫܝܛ ܗܘܐ ܢܛܪ ܡܢ ܣܒܪܗ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܙܘܥܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܡ
ܕܥܠܝܗ̇ ܗ̇ܝ. ܡܢ ܡܠܦܢܘܬܐ ܕܥܠܝܗܘܢ. ܕܐܦ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܘܬܐ ܡܢ
ܒܡܫܡܫܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇.

277 ܢܦܫܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܠܘܬ ܚܝܐ. ܘܠܟܠ ܒܡܫܡܫܐ ܕܗܘܝܐ ܠܗ ܡܫܡܫܐ. ܒܬܪ
ܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܫܢܐ ܐܢܫ ܒܥܠܡ. ܐܦ ܠܐ ܕܐܬܐ ܚܝܐ ܠܦܓܪܐ ܐܚܪܢ. ܡܛܠܗ
ܠܘ ܕܘܟܬܐ ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܕܗܘܐ ܡܢ ܒܬܪ ܚܕ ܠܗ ܘܐܬܚܙܝ. ܗܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܢܐ
ܕܬܐܪ ܠܚܡܪܐ. ܠܐ ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܡܟܝܠ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܟܢ.
B120v ܐܢܫܐ ܟܕ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܗܘ ܗܢܐ ܕܒܗܘܢ ܐܬܚܙܝ ܒܠܚܘܕܘܗܝ: ܘܡܛܠܗ ܠܐ
ܒܪܢܫܐ ܐܬܝ ܠܚܡܪܐ.

---

1 ܦܝܛܓܘܪܘܣ LP: ܦܝܛܐ ܓܘܪ̈ܘܣ B: ܦܝܛܗ ܓܘܪ̈ܘܣ D **3** ܡܢ BDL: ܡܛܠ P **4** ܠܐ] om. L | ܡܬܕܪܫܝܢ BDL: ܡܕܪܫܝܢ P **5** ܒܡܫܡܫܘܬܐ L: ܒܡܫܠܡܢܘܬܐ BDP **6** ܕܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ LP: ܕܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܗܠܝܣ B: ܕܐܪܝܣܛܘܛܗܠܝܣ D | ܐܣ̈ܛܘܟܐ BDL: ܐܣܛܘܟ̈ܝܐ P **7** ܣ̈ܓܝܐܬܐ LP: ܣ̈ܓܝܐܐ BD **14** ܐܚܝܘܬܐ BDP: ܚܝܘܬܐ L **15** ܢܛܪ BDP: ܛܠܒ L

the treatise *Categories* has been written for students and it forms the beginning of the study of logic, for this reason he has not included there a section on motion, for an account of this would not be suitable for the ears of those who have not been previously trained[360].

276 There have been many investigations and profound studies of it by the ancients, and also by Aristotle himself, apart from the constant inquiries into it which he carried out in his many writings. There are four whole books which he dedicated to the issue of motion and which others included in his treatise on physics[361]. But because of the complexity of this subject matter and the confusion in the opinions of the ancients concerning it, let it remain far from the students and let their ears be spared at this moment[362] from this kind of hard labour! It is also probable that, since he knew that time is a concomitant of motion and that there is no motion without time so that both of them have great affinity to each other, he mentioned only the one which was easier to explain than the other, namely time, for from its account it becomes apparent that also motion pertains to quantity.

277 So, let us turn to time and carry out a fitting inquiry into it[363]. Now, it is possible that someone would say regarding these issues that there is no time at all. For one part of time, the past, has already gone for good and perished, while another, the future, has not yet happened. Thus, it does not exist at all, for how can something exist that has perished and does not exist in one part, and in another part has not yet come to be?[364]

---

360 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.10–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 87.21–88.2. In his commentary on the *Isagoge* (*In Isag.* 53.1–2), Ammonius discusses the question why Porphyry does not include motion (or change) in his account of genera and answers that it was not Porphyry's task to speak "naturally" (i.e. as a natural philosopher) about these issues, but rather "in a way appropriate to the issues of logic" (ἀλλ' οὐ πρόκειται τῷ Πορφυρίῳ περὶ τούτων φυσικῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πρεπόντως τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ).

361 I.e. Books V–VIII of the *Physics*. According to Simplicius, Porphyry considered these four books as a separate treatise *On motion* (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 802.7–13).

362 An extensive account of motion, or change, appears in the last, seventh, book of Sergius' *Commentary* dedicated to what is called the *postpraedicamenta* (i.e. chapters 10–15 of the *Categories*). Since Aristotle himself considers this issue in the 14th chapter of the *Categories*, Sergius comments on it in the corresponding paragraphs (§§445–448). But additionally, he also turns to the question of change at the beginning of Book VII (§§409–418), thus breaking the order of Aristotle's narrative and including an additional excursus on the six types of change.

363 The following paragraphs are either a literal rendering of chapters 10–11 of the fourth book of the *Physics* (as is the case with §§280, 283, and 284) or a periphrastic account of Aristotle's text.

364 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 217b32–218a8.

278 ܙܕܩ ܓܝܪ ܕܟܠ ܡܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܢܗܘܐ ܗܢܐ ܩܘܝܡܐ ܐܘ̇ ܒܫܘܠܡܗ D99v
ܐܘ̇ ܒܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܝܢ. ܘܬܘܒ ܐܝܟ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܡܪܟܒܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܙܒܢܐ. ܙܕܩ ܕܐܝܟ
ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܩܘܝܡܗ ܢܗ̈ܘܝܢ ܐܝܬܝ̈ܗܝܢ ܐܦ ܗ̈ܠܝܢ ܕܐܬܪܟܒ ܡܢܗܝܢ. ܐܠܐ L24v
ܡܢܗ ܟܝܪ ܠܗ: ܘܡܢܗ ܠܐ ܒܕܒܝܠ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܡܟܝܠ ܝܬܪܢܐ:
ܗ̇ܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܢ ܗܕ̈ܡܝܢ ܕܠܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܡܪܟܒ. ܘܬܘܒ ܟܠ ܡܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ.
ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܗܢܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܒܗ: ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܡܫܠܡܝܢ ܡܫܠܡ. ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ
ܕܝܢ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܠܝܬ ܐܝܢ ܗܘܝ. ܠܐ ܫ̈ܘܝܢ ܕܗܘ̈ܝ: ܡܛܠ ܕܐܬܚܒܠ ܠܗܝܢ. ܘܠܐ
ܬܘܒ ܫ̈ܘܝܢ ܕܒܝܬܝ̈ܢ: ܡܛܠ ܕܠܐ ܒܕܒܝܠ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ.

279 ܐܢܫ̈ܝܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܕܡܗܘܠܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ. ܒܕܚܝܢ ܕܟܠܗ
ܡܬܚܫܐ ܕܟܠܡܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܫܠܘܐ. ܒܪ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܫܚܚܝܢ
ܡܢ ܕܗܘܐ ܠܗܘܐ. ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܫܬܟܚܘ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܡܪ ܢܦܫܝܢ ܙܒ̈ܢܐ ܘܙܒ̈ܢܐ P66r
ܠܙܒ̈ܢܐ: ܐܠܐ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܚܒܪܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ:
ܘܐܚܝܕܘܬܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܡܢܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܙܒ̈ܢܐ. ܘܠܘ ܗܘܘ ܒܪ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܚܠܐ
ܕܬܪܝܗܘܢ. ܐܪܐ ܒܪ ܘܐܝܟ ܦܚ̈ܡܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܝ ܡܢܘ̈ܠܬܐ. ܡܛܠ
ܕܦܠܓܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܗܘܘ ܘܡ̈ܫܚܝܢ: ܐܦ ܙܒ̈ܢܐ ܦܠܓ̈ܝ ܐܪ̈ܙܐ
ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܗܘܘ. ܘܗܘܐ ܙܒܢܐ ܚܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܘܗ̣ܘ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܪ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ
ܡܬܚܫܚܢܘܬܐ. ܘܐܠܐ ܒܪ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܕܟܠܗ ܡܗܘܠܬܐ ܡܢ
ܡܕܢܚܐ ܠܡܥܪܒܐ ܗ̇ܘܐ: ܘܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܫܡܫܐ ܒܡܪ̈ܟܒܐ ܘܕܬܪ̈ܝܢ ܠܗܘܢܪ̈ܐ
ܗܢܘܢ ܕܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܡܢ ܡܕܢܚܐ ܠܡܥܪܒܐ ܕܒܪ: ܐܦ ܙܒ̈ܢܐ B121r
ܐܝܬ ܕܡܩܘܒܠܝܢ ܒܚܝܗܘܢ ܠܙܒ̈ܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܘ̇ܐ ܚܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܚܘܫܒܗ ܕܙܒܢܐ.
ܘܗܐ ܐܠܘ ܘܙܒܢܐ ܗܘ̇ܐ ܕܟܠܗ. ܙܕܩܐ ܗܘܬ ܗܕܐ ܠܡܗܘܐ.

280 ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܗܟܢܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܒܥܐ ܬܘܒ. ܕܟܠ ܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܘܙܘܥܐ ܐܝܢܐ
ܗ̣ܘ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܡܐ ܕܡܬܬܝܪܒ ܒܗ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܐܝܟ ܕܡܥܡ ܠܡܬܬܝܪܒܘ.
ܗܟܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܐܦ ܙܘܥܗ. ܙܘܥܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܟܠ ܕܗܘܐ ܗܘܝܘ ܒܪ ܗ̣ܘ ܘܠܟܠ

---

4 ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܡܟܝܠ L: ܘܡܟܝܠ ܐܝܟܢܐ BDP **6** ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ BDP: ܡܢܘ̈ܬܐ L **7** ܕܗܘ̈ܝ] + ܗܘܝ B
8 ܕܒܝܬܝ̈ܢ BDP: ܕܒܝܬ̈ܝܢ L **13** ܘܐܚܝܕܘܬܐ BDP: ܘܚܝܕܘܬܐ L | ܗ̣ܘ¹ LP: ܬܘܒ BD | ܗ̣ܘ² LP: ܗܘܝܘ BD **14** ܒܪ BDL: ܒܕ P **15** ܘܡ̈ܫܚܝܢ LP: ܘܡ̈ܫܚܘܢ BD **16** ܗܘܘ] om. BD **17** ܒܪ BDL: ܒܕ P
19 ܙܒ̈ܢܐ] + ܕܝܢ BD **20** ܕܡܩܘܒܠܝܢ BDL: ܕܡܩܘ̈ܒܠܝܢ P **22** ܬܘܒ] om. BDP **23** ܕܡܥܡ] + ܬܘܒ BDP
24 ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ BD | ܙܘܥܐ BDL: ܘܙܘܥܐ P

278 Now, everything that exists should acquire its subsistence either in respect of itself or in respect of something else. If time is something composite and it has subsistence, it is necessary that also those things should exist which it is composed of. But one part of it has perished and the other does not yet exist. So, how can one think about something that is composed of what does not exist? And further, everything that exists contains certain parts out of which it is constituted. But there are no parts of time at all, neither the ones of the past, for they have already perished, nor the ones of the future, since they do not yet exist[365].

279 Some people say that time is the movement of the heavenly sphere, because they observe that the whole extent of the world is moving without ceasing, while its parts only move from one place to another. But they do not comprehend that, although time and motion are related to one another, each one of them is something different from its counterpart, and they only have an affinity to one another, but it is not that both of them have one and the same nature. Indeed (ἄρα), provided that there are many spheres, because their motions seem to be multiple, time too should turn out to be of many kinds. But behold, there is one time which remains the same while its parts are changeable. But, since they say that the motion of the whole sphere goes from the east to the west, while the motion of the five stars and the two luminaries, which are called "deceivers"[366], proceeds from the west to the east, then, if indeed time were movement, it would necessarily mean that the nature of time is not one, but rather there are times which are contrary to one another in their nature[367].

280 But you may also argue as follows: Every change and any particular movement exists in what is moved by it, and its movement occurs in that fashion of which it is naturally capable. Time, on the other hand, is the same at

365 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a9–30.

366 Sergius has the term πλανητός in mind, which he explains as deriving from the verb πλανάω, "to wander", but also "to lead astray, deceive". The same rendering of the Greek τὰ πλανητά appears in the Syriac version of Ps.-Aristotle's *De Mundo*, which is considered to have been prepared by Sergius, see 392a14.

367 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 218a33–218b9.

ܡܕܡ: ܘܠܘ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܝܚܝܕ̈ܘܬܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܚܪܢܐ
L25r | D100r ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܙܘܥܐ. ܬܘܒ ܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܒܗܕܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܐܡܪ
ܕܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܘܬܘܚܪܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܙܘ̈ܥܐ ܡܕܡ ܒܙܒܢܐ ܡܬܬܚܫ̈ܢ.
P66v ܡܠܠܐܝܬ ܠܒܪ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ ܘܒܐܬܪܐ ܦܠܓ
ܡܬܬܙܝܥ: ܘܡܫܘܚܪܐܝܬ ܬܘܒ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܐ ܕܒܙܒܢܐ
ܦܠܓܐ ܡܠܝܠ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܙܒܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܒܙܒܢܐ ܠܐ ܡܬܬܙܝܥ. ܡܕܝܢ
ܐܚܪܢܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܙܘܥܐ ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܙܒܢܐ.

281 ܡܠܠܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܘܡܫܘܚܪܐܝܬ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܡܬܬܙܝܥ ܡܕܡ: ܡܐ
ܕܡܠܘܬܝܢ ܙܒܢܐ ܠܚܕܗ ܘܠܘ ܡܐ ܕܢܩܦܝܢ ܠܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܕܩ̈ܕܡܝܢ
ܒܐܕ̈ܫܝܗܘܢ: ܘܡܒܕ̈ܠܝܢ ܦܣܘܩܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܣ̈ܒܪܐ. ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܦܣܩ ܐܢܐ
ܬܪܝܨܐܝܬ ܪܘܡܐ ܕܪܓܠܐ ܠܙܘܥܐ: ܘܐܦ ܢܣܒ ܗܘܐ ܢܣܒ ܒܪܘܡܗ. ܒܪ
ܛܒ ܐܢܬ ܐܡܪܬܝ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ. ܕܪܓܠܐ ܦܠܓ ܪܘܡܗ ܘܕܙܘܥܐ ܢܣܒ
ܪܘܡܗ. ܘܡܕܒܪܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܠܘܬ ܐܕܫܐ ܕܢܦܫܗ ܡܬܬܚܫܡ
ܘܒܗ: ܘܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܢܦܫ ܐܦ ܕܡܠܝܠ. ܡܢ ܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܦ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܕܐܝܬ
ܒܚܝܘܬܗ. ܕܡܬܬܚܫܒܐ ܒܙܒܢܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܠܫܡ ܠܗ̇. ܕܠܘ ܗܟܝܠ ܙܘܥܐ
B121v ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ. ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܘܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܢܕܒܟܐ ܗ̣ܝ.

282 ܕܙܒܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܟܢܐ ܡܚܘܝܢܐ ܐܢܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ. ܣܝܡ ܠܒܪܬ ܡܠܐ
ܗܕܐ ܕܡܬܒܥܝܢ ܒܗ̇ ܕܐܠܗܐ ܗܘܐ. ܡܬܚܫܒܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܕܒܟܪ
ܘܡܘܬܐ ܕܒܬܪ ܠܡܫܡܫܐ. ܗ̣ܘ ܓܝܪ ܗܘܐ. ܠܝܬ ܠܗ ܩܢܘܡܐ ܡܕܡ: ܒܪ
ܡܬܐܡܪ ܓܝܪ ܗܘ ܒܬܪ ܠܗ ܘܠܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܪܟܒܐ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܙܒܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ.
P67r ܐܠܐ ܡܐ ܕܢܣܒ ܒܙܒܢܝܢ ܒܪ ܗܘܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܗ̇ܘ: ܘܡܬܚܘܝܐ ܙܒܢܝܢ ܡܢܗ
ܒܙܒܢܐ ܠܙܘܥܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܘ. ܠܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܠܗ ܕܡܬܚܫܒܢܘܬܐ ܠܗ
ܡܬܚܫܒܢܝܢ ܙܒܢܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܒܡܕܡ ܕܡܕܡ ܘܐܚܪܝ ܡܬܚܫܒܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ

---

4 ܡܠܠܐܝܬ LP: ܡܠܠ BD | ܦܠܓ] om. BD **5** ܘܡܫܘܚܪܐܝܬ L: ܘܡܫܬܘܚܪܐܝܬ BDP **8** ܕܝܢ BDL: ܓܝܪ P | ܘܡܫܘܚܪܐܝܬ L: ܘܡܫܬܘܚܪܐܝܬ BDP **9** ܠܐܝܠܝܢ L: ܕܐܝܠܝܢ BD: ܐܝܠܝܢ P **10** ܒܐܕ̈ܫܝܗܘܢ LP: ܐܕ̈ܫܝܗܘܢ BD | ܓܝܪ BDP: ܕܝܢ L **11** ܕܪܓܠܐ L: ܕܓܠܐ BDP **12** ܕܪܓܠܐ L: ܕܓܠܐ BDP | ܪܘܡܗ L: ܪܘܡܐ BDP **14** ܡܢ BDL: ܘܡܢ P **15** ܕܡܬܬܚܫܒܐ BDL: ܘܡܬܬܚܫܒܐ P **16** ܗܠܝܢ[2]] om. P **17** ܡܚܘܝܢܐ BDL: ܡܚܘܝܐ P **18** ܗܕܐ BDP: ܕܗܕܐ L **19** ܩܢܘܡܐ DLP: ܘܩܢܘܡܐ B **21** ܡܢܗ LP: ܒܗ BD **22** ܐܚܪܢܐ] om. P | ܗ̇ܘ] om. L | ܟܠܗ BDL: ܕܟܠܗ P

every place and to everything and it is not different in different things. Thus, time is something other than motion. And this is furthermore what one should see from the fact that the quickness and slowness characteristic of particular movements are determined by time. For we say that something is moving quickly when it moves a great deal in a short time. And we further say that something moves slowly when it moves a little during a long time. But time is not determined by time. Thus movement is not the same as time[368].

281 Indeed, we say that something is moving quickly or slowly when we attach time to its nature and not when we take those things which are not of similar kind and make them equal to one another. For it would be not correct to make equal a person running on foot to the running of a horse, even if (that person) were superior in running. But it would be proper to say that a (man's) foot runs a great deal, while the running of a horse is superior. It is apparent that the movement of each one of these is determined according to the kind of its nature and it is called superior or quick from the firmness or superiority which is in its nature and which is determined by the time which suits it. From these and similar (examples) it becomes apparent that time is not movement.

282 So, in order to see what (time) is, let us consider the statement which we are accustomed to pronounce that the now should be defined by the past and the future. Indeed, the now has no persistence, since when it is spoken it is already gone and does not exist. Thus, it is not a time but what we consider in our intellect as a certain now and what is extended by our intellect to another certain now, and it is this interval in between that we call time. So, it seems that

368 This paragraph appears to be a quotation, with some alterations, of *Phys.* 218b9–20: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὗ ἂν τύχῃ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μέν ἐστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὥρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστιν κίνησις, φανερόν.

ܙܒܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܡܕܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܘܐܢܫܘܬܐ ܕܡܫܝܚܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ: ܡܫܝܚܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ ܘܠܘ ܝܘܡܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܫܝܚܗ ܕܝܘܡܐ.

283 ܡܥܘܕܒܐ ܓܒܪ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ. ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܫܠܛܢ ܘܟܝܢ ܒܡܫܝܚܐ ܦܪܥܝܢ ܠܗ. ܠܝܘܡܐ ܕܝܢ ܪܒܐ ܘܡܘܪܐ. ܒܪܒܐ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܠܗ. ܡܕܝܢ L25v ܡܫܝܚܗ ܕܝܘܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܙܒܢܐ ܘܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܝܘܡܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ D100v ܕܐܦ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܒܬܪܝܢ ܟܝ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܝܕܥ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܒܗ̇ܘ ܡܕܡ ܕܟܬܒܐ ܘܒܗ̇ܘ ܡܢ ܕܡܬܝܠܕܢܐ. ܘܗܘ ܠܡܕܒܪ. ܕܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܕܟܬܒܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܬܡܠܟܐ. ܠܝܠܘܕܗ ܓܒܪ ܕܝܘܡܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܘܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܫܒܚ ܒܡܬܝܚܐ: ܘܡܬܡܠܟܐ ܒܡܠܘܬܐ ܡܫܝܚܝܬܐ ܕܒܐܝܕܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܦܬܝܡ ܙܒܢܐ. ܘܡܕܒܪܢ ܘܐܦ ܡܫܝܚܗ ܕܝܘܡܐ ܡܫܬܡܥ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ.

284 ܕܡܬܝܠܕܢܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ. ܓܠܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܡܫܡܠܝ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܬܡܠܝ. ܐܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܡܬܝܚܐ ܕܝܘܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܘܡܬܗ: ܟܠ ܕܝܢ ܡܬܘܚܐ ܐܢܫܐ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܫܝܚܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܢ ܒܡܬܘܡܬܐ. ܘܡܬܘܡܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܦ ܙܒܢܐ ܒܡܬܘܡܬܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܠܝܬ ܦܪܨܘܦܐ ܐܘ ܩܢܘܡܐ ܒܝܢܬ ܡܫܘܚܬܗ. ܐܠܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܐܚܝ̈ܢ ܒܫܪ̈ܪܐ: ܐܝܟ ܕܥܒܝܕܗ̇ ܕܗ̇ܝ ܕܟܬܒܬ B122r | P67v ܡܘܡܬܗ̇ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܬܝܕܥܐ. ܓܠܝܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܢ ܢܗܘܐ ܕܡܬܘܡܬܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܠܐ ܦܬܝܡ ܘܡܦܣܩܝܡ ܡܘܡܬܗ̇ ܡܢ ܚܝ̈ܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ. ܘܠܘ ܡܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܬܝܕܥܬܐ ܘܡܬܦܪܫܐ: ܘܠܐ ܢܣܒ̈ ܡܘܡܬܗ̇ ܐܢܫܝܢܐ ܚܕܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܠܗܘܬ ܚܝ̈ܐ. ܐܠܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܦܩܝܢ ܠܗܘܬ ܚܕܬܐ ܟܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܥܒܕܐ ܦܩ̈ܘܠܓܗ̇ ܕܡܬܘܡܬܐ: ܗܢܘܢ ܕܐܬܦܪܥܘ ܡܢ ܠܟܠ.

---

1 ܕܡܕܒܪܢܘܬܐ BDL: ܕܡܕܒܪܘܬܐ P | ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ BDL: ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ P **2** ܡܫܝܚܗ LP: ܡܫܝܚܐ BD **4** ܦܪܥܝܢ LP: ܡܦܪܥܝܢ BD **7** ܗܘܐ] om. BD **8** ܗ̇ܘ[1]] + ܡܢ B | ܕܝܘܡܐ BDL: ܕܙܒܢܐ P **10** ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD | ܙܒܢܐ[2]] om. L **11** ܗ̇ܝ] om. L **15** ܟܠܗܘܢ DLP: ܒܟܠܗܘܢ B **16** ܡܘܡܬܗ̇ BDP: ܡܘܡܬܐ L **17** ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܙܒܢܐ ܘܠܘ ܡܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܬܝܕܥܬܐ ܘܡܬܦܪܫܐ ܘܠܐ ܢܣܒ̈ ܡܘܡܬܗ̇ ܐܢܫܝܢܐ ܚܕܐ ܒܚܕܐ ܠܗܘܬ ܚܝ̈ܐ] om. hom. P **18** ܐܢܫܝܢܐ ܚܕܐ ܒܚܕܐ L: ܐܢܫܝܢܐ ܚܕ BD

it is in something before and after that time is. But since the before and after pertain to number, time is some number, i.e. it is not motion but a number of motion[369].

283 Now, an indication of this is that we discriminate between many and few by number, but more and less motion we discern by time. Hence, time is a number of motion and not motion itself. But since number is said in two ways — namely of what is numbered and of that by which we number — we ought to know that time is number not in the sense of that with which we count, but in the sense of what is counted[370]. So, it is the duration of such motion that contains extension and is counted gradually through various parts that we call time. Thus we have also determined what time is, namely that it is the number of the motion.

284 What has been said makes it clear that time belongs to quantity. For since its subsistence is in the extension of motion, while every particular extension is a part of quantity, it is obvious that time is also a quantity. And since there is no division or separation between its parts but all of them are joined to one another, so that the end of what passes by brings into existence what comes after it, it is apparent that time pertains to that type of quantity whose parts are not separate and set apart from one another rather than to that which is definable and divisible and each part of which does not hold the same position with respect to the others[371]. However, let what has been expained thus far concerning all seven kinds of quantity suffice.

---

369 This paragraph is a periphrasis of *Phys.* 219a22–219b3, which appears in some parts to be a very literal rendering of Aristotle's text: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν. ὁρίζομεν δὲ τῷ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ὑπολαβεῖν αὐτά, καὶ μεταξύ τι αὐτῶν ἕτερον· ὅταν γὰρ ἕτερα τὰ ἄκρα τοῦ μέσου νοήσωμεν, καὶ δύο εἴπῃ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ νῦν, τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, τότε καὶ τοῦτό φαμεν εἶναι χρόνον· τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ· καὶ ὑποκείσθω. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ὡς ἓν τὸ νῦν αἰσθανώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἤτοι ὡς πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει ἢ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προτέρου δὲ καὶ ὑστέρου τινός, οὐ δοκεῖ χρόνος γεγονέναι οὐδείς, ὅτι οὐδὲ κίνησις. ὅταν δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, τότε λέγομεν χρόνον· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον. οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις ὁ χρόνος ἀλλ' ᾗ ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἡ κίνησις.

370 The Syriac text follows very closely (with some explicative elements) *Phys.* 219b3–8: σημεῖον δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον κρίνομεν ἀριθμῷ, κίνησιν δὲ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνῳ· ἀριθμὸς ἄρα τις ὁ χρόνος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὴ χρόνος ἐστὶν τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. While Aristotle actually suggests three terms for the ways of speaking about number, Sergius subsumes them under two categories, as also does Philoponus in *In Phys.* 723.15–24.

371 I.e. time is a continuous and not a discrete kind of quantity. Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* 220a4–26.

285 ܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܣܓܝܐ ܕܬܬܠܒܐ ܠܝ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ: ܕܐܢ̈ܫܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܣܛܘܐܝ̈ܩܘ
ܗܘܘ ܦܠܓܝܢ ܡܘܡܘܗ ܠܬܠܬܐ ܪ̈ܝܫܐ ܦܠܓܘܬܗ̇ ܠܟܠܗ̇ ܚܟܡܬܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ
ܠܟܝܢܝܐ ܘܠܕܘܒܪܘܬܐ ܘܠܡܠܠܐ. ܗܠܝܢ ܟܕ ܐܡܪܬܘ. ܕܡܠܬܐ ܠܡ ܡܥܢܝܐ
ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܕܡܬܒܥܐ ܡܢ ܗܕܝܘܛܘܬܐ ܕܦܬܓ̈ܡܐ. ܘܟܕܟܡܐ ܚܕ
ܘܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ، ܒܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܚܟܝܡܐ ܘܕܡܠܠܬܐ. ܘܗܘܢܪܬܐ ܠܡ
ܘܫܠܝܚܘܬܐ ܘܟܢܘܫܝܐ ܙܒܢܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܥܘܕܢܝܢ. ܐܦܢ ܦܪܝܫܝܢ
ܒܫܡܗܘܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܗܢܐ ܚܕ ܗ̇ܘ ܗܢܐ ܕܒܫܡܗܘܢ. ܡܛܠ
ܕܝܢ ܕܣܓܝ ܗܘܘ ܕܢܬܒܥܐ ܕܡܫܪܪܘܬܐ ܘܕܡܠܠܘܬܐ: ܐܦ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܝܢܘܬܐ
ܡܕܡ ܡܥܘܕܒ. ܗܟܢ ܒܗ̇ ܐܦ ܗܢܐ ܗܘܐ ܘܡܥܒܕܢܘܬܗܘܢ، ܢܠܐ. ܘܗܟܢܐ
ܦܠܓܗ̇ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܢ ܠܟܠܗ̇ ܚܟܡܬܐ. ܠܟܝܢܝܐ ܘܠܕܘܒܪܘܬܐ ܘܠܡܠܠܐ. L19r

286 ܐܠܐ ܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܩܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܣܬܝܟܘܬܐ ܣܒܝܛ ܟܠ ܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ
ܬܠܬܐ. ܗܟܢܐ ܐܦ ܟܠ ܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܟܘܬ ܠܗ. ܘܦܠܓܗ̇ ܐܝܟ D101r
ܕܐܡܪܢ ܡܢ ܠܥܠ ܠܬܠܬܐ ܪ̈ܝܫܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܕܡܘܬ ܠܬܠܬܝܢ: ܠܗܢܐ ܗܘ
ܕܦܪ̈ܝܫܝܢ ܒܫܡܗܐ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܠܗܘܢ ܕܐܝܬ̈ܝܗ̇ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܕܠܐ P68r
ܦܫܝܛܘܬܐ ܘܐܦܫܛ̈ܗ ܚܕܐ ܒܚܕܐ. ܐܠܐ ܠܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܦܠܓܗ̇
ܐܝܟ ܡܟܐ ܕܡܬܝܚܕܐ ܗܘܬ. ܐܡܪܢ ܐܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܦܫܝܩ̈ܢ
ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܦܠܓ ܠܟܝܢܝܐ ܘܠܡܠܠܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܡܬܡܠܠܢܘܬܐ. ܠܗ̇،
ܕܝܢ ܟܝܢܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܦܫܝܩܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܦܠܓܗ̇ ܠܡܘܪܛܐ B122v
ܘܠܫܠܝܚܘܬܐ ܘܠܟܢܘܫܝܐ ܘܠܐܬܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܠܙܒܢܐ.

287 ܡܢ ܒܬܪ ܬܘܒ ܕܦܠܓ ܗܟܢܐ. ܐܝܟ ܟܡ ܕܡܬܚܙܐ ܕܕܪ̈ܫܝܗ ܠܝܠܘܦܐ
ܗܘܠܝܐܘܬ. ܐܦ ܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܦܣܩ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܟܕ ܕܠܗܘܢ ܕܗܠܝܢ ܥܒܕ
ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܕܟܝܢܘܬܐ. ܐܡܪ ܟܕ ܕܡܟܝܢ ܠܡ ܕܟܝܢܘܬܐ. ܐܝܬ ܗܘܝܐ
ܠܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ ܠܘܬ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܐܝܟܢܐ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ. ܘܡܟܢܗ̇

---

1 ܐܣܛܘܐܝ̈ܩܘ BDP: ܐܪܣܛܘܝܩܘ L **2** ܡܘܡܘܗ DLP: ܒܡܘܡܘܗ B | ܠܟܠܗ̇ ܚܟܡܬܐ] inv. B
3 ܐܡܪܬܘ BDL: ܐܡܪܬܝܢ P **6** ܐܦܢ BDL: ܘܐܦܢ P **7** ܗܢܐ DLP: ܗܕܐ B **8** ܕܝܢ] om. P **9** ܗܟܢ BDL: ܗܟܢܘ P | ܢܠܐ DLP: ܢܘܢܐ B **11** ܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܩܘ BLP: ܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܗܝܩܘ D **13** ܠܬܠܬܝܢ] + ܪ̈ܝܫܐ BP
15 ܚܕ BDP: ܚܕܐ L **16** ܕܠܟܝܢܘܬܐ LP: ܠܟܝܢܘܬܐ BD **17** ܡܬܡܠܠܢܘܬܐ BDP: ܡܡܠܠܢܘܬܐ L
18 ܟܝܢܘܬܐ LP: ܕܠܟܝܢܘܬܐ BD **20** ܬܘܒ ܕܦܠܓ] inv. L | ܟܡ BDP: ܟܡܐ L | ܕܕܪ̈ܫܝܗ L: ܕܕܪ̈ܫܗ DP: ܕܕܪ̈ܫ B **23** ܐܝܬܘܗܝ LP: ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ BD

[Aristotle's other division of quantity]

285 We shall also not forget to mention that some of the Stoics and even Plato himself divided all of quantity into three kinds, namely into number, magnitude, and weight[372]. For they said that language is a certain number which is composed of the multitude of words, so that number and language are one kind of quantity. Also, line, surface, and body, although they differ from one another in their subsistence, designate a certain magnitude, and hence they (constitute) one kind of quantity. And because they saw that the inclination towards heaviness and lightness also signifies a certain quantity, they also established this kind which they called weight. And thus, as we have said, they divided all of quantity into number, magnitude, and inclination[373].

286 But Aristotle who was diligent in precise divisions of various things, also provided one for quantity. So, as we have said above, he divided it into seven kinds, namely, at first, into two, i.e. into that kind whose parts may be separated through division from one another and into that one whose parts are joined and bound to one another without separation; but also each one of these he further divided as far as it was possible. I mean that the quantity whose parts are separable from one another he sub-divided into number and such language that is spoken, while the quantity whose parts may not be separated from one another he divided into line, surface, body, and also place and time.

287 Then, after having made this division, since he wanted the student to be instructed in multiple ways, he also provided another division of the same seven parts of quantity. Thus, he said that there are some quantities whose parts have position in relation to one another so that it is obvious where each 5a15–37

372 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–5: τινὲς δὲ τὰ κυρίως εἴδη τοῦ ποσοῦ φασιν εἶναι τρία, ἀριθμὸν ὄγκον δύναμιν, τοῦτ' ἔστι ῥοπήν.

373 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 55.4–10.

ܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܣܟܐ ܠܡ̈ܠܘܬܗ. ܐܠܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܡ̈ܬܠܘܗܝ ܥܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܩܦܝܢ ܒܬܪ ܚܒܪܬܗ. ܘܒܢܝܐ ܐܝܟ ܘܡܒܝܢܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ. ܠܝܬ ܣܟܐ ܠܡ̈ܠܘܬܗܝ: ܕܬܬܚܙܐ ܥܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܕܘܟܬܗ: ܟܕ ܐܘܫ̈ܦܝ ܥܠܡܝܢ ܘܡܒܝܢ̈ܝ ܒܫܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܐܬܚܙܝܢ ܡ̈ܠܘܬܗ.

288 ܘܒܠܐ ܓܒܪ ܠܐ ܩܢܐ ܡ̈ܠܘܬܐ ܗܟܢ ܕܫܒܝ̈ܚܢ ܒܗ ܘܡ̈ܬܚܙܝܢ. ܐܠܐ ܡܦܠܓܐ ܕܥܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡ̈ܠܘܬܗ. ܥܒܕܐ ܗܘܐ ܒܥܠܡܢ ܕܗܢܝ ܕܩܕܡܝܢܗ. ܗܒܘܬ ܕܘܟܬ ܐܦ ܡܠܬܐ ܘܡܒܝܢܐ ܟܕ ܢܒܝ̈ܐ ܡ̈ܠܘܬܗܘܢ ܡܕܡܝܢܬܐ:

P68v ܬ̈ܬܠܝ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܒܬܪܝܢ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܒܝܘܒܠܐ. ܟܕ ܠܐ ܡܒܬ̈ܪܢ ܗܢܝܢ ܡܕܒ̈ܪܢܘܬܐ. ܫܘܪܝܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܥܠܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܠܚܘܪܡܐ ܘܐܬܪܐ. ܡ̈ܠܘܬܐ ܩܠܝܢ ܕܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ ܫܘܡܠܝܐ ܠܘܬ ܚܕ̈ܕܐ. ܘܡܒܝܢܐ ܥܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܕܘܟܐ. ܘܡܕܒܪܐ ܒܫܘ ܡܟܐ ܕܐܬܚܙܝܗ ܡܢܗܘܢܗ. ܘܠܐ ܡܢ ܒܬܪ ܫܪܪܐ ܕܡܕܒ̈ܪܢܘܬܐ ܬ̈ܬܠܝ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܒܬܪܝܢ ܒܐܝܕܐ ܒܐܝܕܐ.

L19v 289 ܡܕܡ ܐܦ ܦܘܠܘܣ ܗܢܐ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ: ܟܕ ܗܘܘ ܗܘ ܡܕܡܝܢܐ. ܒܗܢܐ ܗܘ ܒܠܫܢܗ ܦܪܫ: ܘܠܐ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܢܛܪ ܐܘ ܒܝܬ ܐܦܠܐ ܚܕ ܚܕܢܗ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ. ܒܗܘ ܓܒܪ ܦܘܠܘܣ ܡܕܡܝܢܐ. ܡܒܝܢܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ. ܘܫܘܪܝܐ ܘܥܠܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܠܚܘܪܡܐ ܘܐܬܪܐ ܘܒܠܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ.

D101v

B123r ܒܗܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܦܘܠܘܣ ܕܬܒܪܝܢ. ܘܒܠܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ ܡܢ ܠܗ ܠܘܬ ܐܬܪܐ ܘܠܚܘܪܡܐ ܘܥܠܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܫܘܪܝܐ: ܘܐܬܬܚܙܝܘ ܠܘܬ ܡܠܬܐ ܘܡܒܝܢܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܐܝܟ ܚܠܝܗ ܕܦܘܠܘܣ ܗܢܐ ܕܬܒܪܝܢ. ܒܗ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܬܚܙܝܗܝ، ܫܘܡܠܝܐ ܘܠܐ ܒܗ ܗܢܘܢ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ.

290 ܡܢ ܒܬܪ ܗܟܝܠ ܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ. ܢܦ̈ܩܢ ܦܠܚܘܬܐ ܬܫܒܘܚܬܗ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ ܠܡܡܠܠܘ. ܐܡܪ ܠܗ ܓܒܪ ܒܥܬ̈ܝܢܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܘܡܢܗܘܢ، ܠܗ ܚܠܝܘܬ. ܕܐܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ ܗܝ، ܡܬܠܚܡܢܘܬܐ ܡܕܡܝܢܐ ܠܗܝ، ܡܬܚܫܒܢܘܬܐ.

---

1 ܒܐܝܕܐ¹ L: ܐܝܕܐ BDP | ܡ̈ܬܠܘܗܝ BDL: ܡܬܠܝܐ P **2** ܒܬܪ DLP: ܒܗ B **5** ܐܠܐ DLP: ܕܠܐ B **6** ܗܘܐ DLP: ܗܐ B **7** ܢܒܝ̈ܐ DLP: ܢܒ̈ܝܐ B **8** ܒܐܝܕܐ¹ L: ܐܝܕܐ BDP **11** ܚܕܐ] + ܚܕܐ BDP ܒܕܘܟܐ BDL: ܒܕܘܟܬܗ P | ܡܢ] om. B **12** ܒܐܝܕܐ¹ DLP: ܐܝܕܐ B **13** ܦܘܠܘܣ BDL: ܦܘܠܘܣ P **14** ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ L: ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܢ BDP **15** ܐܬܚܙܝܘ BDP: ܐܬܚܙܝ L **16** ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ¹ BDP: ܐܚܪܢ L **17** ܕܬܒܪܝܢ] + ܒܗ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܬܚܙܝܗܝ، ܫܘܡܠܝܐ P **19** ܫܘܡܠܝܐ DLP: ܘܡܫܠܡܐ B **21** ܡܢ DL: ܘܡܢ BP | ܗܠܝܢ] om. P ܦܠܚܘܬܐ BDL: ܦܠܠܚܘܬܐ P **23** ܡܬܠܚܡܢܘܬܐ BDP: ܡܬܬܠܚܡܢܘܬܐ L

one of them is situated; and there are some whose parts do not have position but each one of them is generated gradually one after another. So the parts of time, number, and language do not have position, so that each one of them might be seen in its place and they all would be fastened and fixed in that whose parts they are.

288 As for time, it has no parts at all which would have position in it and be seen, but the generation of each one of its parts always comes together with the destruction of the previous one. The same holds for language and number: when their first parts pass away then those after them are generated one after another by way of succession, while the preceding ones do not persist. Line, surface, body, and place, on the other hand, contain parts which have position in relation to one another, each one of them being fixed in its place and comprehended through that whose part it is, and it is not such that after the destruction of the first ones the successive ones are generated one after another[374].

289 Now, this division of quantity differs from the first one only by mode and it does not contribute anything more or less to the nature of quantity. So, in the first division, number and language came together, while line, surface and body were combined with place and time. In the second division, on the other hand, time was separated from place, body, surface, and line, and attached to language and number, since according to the principle of the second division its position should be with the latter and not with the former[375].

[Quantities in the strict sense and per accidens]

290 Now, after these two divisions, the Philosopher wished to provide a definition of quantity. It has been told to us and clearly demonstrated in other

374 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 59.11–13.

375 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 91.28–92.6.

P69r ܡܛܠ ܕܙܕܩ ܩܕܡܝܬ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܫܦܝܪ ܦܘܠܚܗܘܢ ܕܝܨܝ̈ܦܘܬܐ. ܘܗܕܝܢ
ܢܬܚܫ̈ܚܢ ܡܢ ܦܘܠܚܐ ܗ̈ܢܝܢ ܕܠܚ̈ܡܢ ܠܬܫܡ̈ܫܬܐ. ܘܟܕܟܢ ܒܟܠ ܕܘܟܐ
ܐܦ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܒܗܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܡܟܬ̈ܒܢܐ ܐܚܪ̈ܢܐ ܕܩܒܠܘ ܡܢܗ ܩܢܘܢܐ
ܗܢܐ. ܒܦܘܠܓܐ ܩܕܡܝܬ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ. ܘܗܕܝܢ ܡܬܚܫܚܝܢ ܠܗ ܠܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ
ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܟܠܗ̇ ܡܠܬܗܘܢ.

291 ܫܦܝܪ ܡܕܝܢ ܦܠܓܗ̇ ܩܕܡܝܬ ܠܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܟܒܪ. ܐܦ ܟܠ
ܐܘܣܝܐ: ܘܡܢ ܗܢܐ ܡܬܗܦܟ ܠܗ̇. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܬܫܡ̈ܫܬܐ ܐܡܝܢܐ
ܕܐܡܪܢ ܠܢ ܡܢ ܠܟܠ ܡܢ ܒܢܝܢܐ ܘܡܢ ܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܐ ܗܢܘܢ ܕܡܫܡܫܝܢ
ܠܒܢ̈ܝܢܐ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ: ܠܗܠ ܕܝܢ ܠܫܪܐ ܡܢ ܡܫܠܡܪܢܘܬܗܘܢ ܒܢܝܢܐ: ܡܛܠ ܕܗ̇ܝ
ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܒܢܝܢܐ ܩܕܡܝܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܡܫܬܡܫܢܘܬܗ ܒܢܝܢܐ
ܒܢܝ̈ܢܝܢ. ܢܝܚܢܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܐ ܡܟܝܠ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܬܫܡܫܬܗ̇ ܕܚܕܐ
ܡܢܗܘܢ ܚܬܝܬܐܝܬ ܬܫܡܫܬܐ ܠܒܢܝܢܐ. ܘܡܢܐ ܡܟܝܠ ܐܝܬ ܠܬܫܡܫܬܐ.
ܡܛܠ ܕܬܠܝܬܝܬܐ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܕܢܦܩ̈ܢ ܚܫܒܐܝܬ. ܐܦ ܗ̈ܘܝܢ ܒܕܡܘܬ
ܢܘܢܐ ܡܕܝܩ ܕܫܘܡܬܐ ܢܦܩ̈ܢ: ܒܗ̇ ܕܡܬܦܫܩܐ ܒܗܘܢ ܟܠ ܨܒܘ ܡܢ
ܐܚܪ̈ܢܝܬܐ. ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܟܝܠ ܒܢܝܢܐ ܠܡܥܒܕ ܥܘܕܪܢܗ̇ ܕܡܫܡܫܢܘܬܐ: ܗ̇ܘ
B123v | L18r ܕܢܠܦ ܬܫܡܫܬܗ̇ ܢܦܩ ܠܗ. ܘܐܦ ܠܐܘܣܝܐ ܒܝܢ ܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܒܪ ܬܫܡܫܬܐ
ܥܘܕܪܢܗ̇. ܐܠܐ ܒܪ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܢܦܩ ܠܗ̇ ܚܫܒܐܝܬ. ܡܕܝܢ ܙܕܩܐܝܬ ܒܢܝܢܐ
P69v ܕܬܫܡܫܬܗ̇ ܠܡܫܡܫܢܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܐ ܕܐܡܝܪܐ: ܡܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܢܦܩ ܠܗ̇.

292 ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܚܕܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܢܐ ܕܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ: ܕܠܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܟܠ
D102r ܨܒܘܬܐ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܡܫܪ̈ܪܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܢܗܝܪ̈ܢ. ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܟܠ ܐܝܠܝܢ
ܕܡܫܬܡܥ̈ܢ ܒܗ̇ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܐܫܬܢܝܐܝܬ ܕܡܫܪܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܚܝܠܝܢ ܢܗܪܐ.
ܠܐ ܗܘܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܟܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܒܡܫܡܠܝܘܬܐ ܒܪ̈ܝܬܐ ܚܒܪ̈ ܡܠܟܬܐ.
ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܠܗ̇ܝ ܕܡܫܬܘܕܥܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܒܪ ܠܝܬܝܗ̇ ܡܠܟ̈ܐ ܒܡܠܬܐ

---

3 ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ BDL: ܦܝܠܣܘܣܘܦܐ P | ܟܠܗܘܢ] om. BP **6** ܡܕܝܢ] + ܫܦܝܪ D | ܐܦ] om. P **9** ܡܫܠܡܪܢܘܬܗܘܢ L: ܡܫܠܡܪܢܘܬܗܘܢ P: ܡܐܫܠܡܪܢܘܬܗ B: ܡܐܫܠܡܪܢܘܬ D **11** ܡܟܝܠ ܡܟܢܫܢܐ] inv. BP | ܬܫܡܫܬܗ̇ LP: ܬܫܡܫܬܐ BD **12** ܡܢܗܘܢ BDL: ܡܢܗ̇ P | ܠܒܢܝܢܐ] + ܐܠܐ P, D surpa lin. **13** ܐܦ DLP: ܐܦܢ B **15** ܗܠܝܢ BDL: ܗܟܝܠ P | ܠܡܥܒܕ] + ܐܢܐ B **16** ܬܫܡܫܬܗ̇ LP: ܬܫܡܫܬܐ BD ܘܐܦ LP: ܐܦ BD **17** ܐܝܠܝܢ DLP: ܗܠܝܢ B **18** ܕܢܦܩ BDP: ܕܢܦܩܝܢ L **19** ܗܢܐ] om. L | ܟܠ BLP: ܕܟܠ D **21** ܕܡܫܬܡܥ̈ܢ DLP: ܕܡܫܬܡܥܝܢ B **23** ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P | ܠܗ̇ܝ BDL: ܟܠܗ̇ P

treatises[376] that the craft of dividing is prior to that of defining, since it is first necessary to have a proper division of things and then from the division to derive what is suitable for definitions. Hence, the Philosopher and all other authors who have received from him this rule (κανών) always first employed division and after that defined the subject of their discussion.

291 That is why he first properly divided quantity, as he also did with substance, and now defines it. However, since it has been said to us above that definitions derive from a genus and those differentiae which constitute species[377], but none among the categories has a genus, since each one of them is a primary genus that is called the most generic genus, it is apparent that for this reason no definition of any of them may be a perfect definition in the strict sense. What remains for us is to draw, as if we paint a certain image, a definition based on their properties, i.e. those things which are individual concomitants of particular entities and through which they may be separated from everything else. So, it is from them that we shall try to produce a description of quantity which we may use instead of a definition. Just as we described substance not by means of a definition, but by means of those things which are its individual concomitants, so is it also proper for us to try to define quantity according to our capacity from those things which are concomitant of it[378].

292 However, since it is the job of the scholar to investigate not only those things which exist in reality but also those which are believed and to reveal that their nature is contrary to that[379], he (i.e. Aristotle) considered in his account not only what pertains to quantity in reality, but also included in it what is believed to be quantity when it is not and demonstrated where such a 5a38–5b10

376 It is possible that Sergius means Porphyry's *Isagoge* here, for it is in the commentary on the latter by Ammonius that we find the discussion of the sequence between division and definition, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. See also §197, above.

377 In §§197–199, where Sergius discusses this issue, he in fact does not mention differentiae. See however, Philoponus, *In Cat.* 19.26: πᾶς γὰρ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους ἐστὶ καὶ συστατικῶν διαφορῶν.

378 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 61.7–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.15–27.

379 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.14–16: ἔργον ἐπιστήμονος μὴ μόνον τὰ ὑποβεβλημένα αὐτῷ πράγματα σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα μὲν εἶναι, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ οὐκ ὄντα διεξέρχεσθαι καὶ καὶ διελέγχειν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.11–13).

ܘܡܚܘܐ ܡܫܒܪܢܘܬܐ ܕܟܠܗ̇ ܕܡܢ ܐܝܡܟܐ ܗܘܬ. ܡܛܠ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܟܠ ܓܘܢܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ: ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܐܡ̈ܝܢ ܬܠܬ ܐܘ ܐܪܒܥ ܐܘ ܟܡܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ. ܘܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܪܝܟ ܘܟܪܐ: ܐܝܟ ܕܡܟܕܝܢ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܐܪܝܟ ܐܝܟ ܐܢܐ ܢܐܡܪ ܗܪܟܐ ܫܢ̈ܝܐ ܓܒܪ ܐܢܫ ܒܫܢ̈ܐ ܐܘ ܟܡܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ. ܡܫܡܫ ܐܢܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܦ ܓܘ̈ܢܐ ܘܡܫܘܚ̈ܬܐ ܡܢ ܒܚܘܫܒܬܐ ܐܬܬܣܝܡܘ. ܐܠܐ ܗܠܝܢ ܠܐ ܢܩܒܠܘܢ ܬܫܡܫܬ ܚܕ ܡܢ ܦܘܠܓܗ̇ ܕܡܢܝܢܘܬܐ: ܗܢܘܢ ܕܐܬܬܣܝܡܘ ܡܢ ܠܟܠ. ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܗܢܐ ܐܬܬܣܝܡܘ ܐܝܟ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܒܥܝܢ ܠܡܫܘܚܘ ܒܫܪܪܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ.

293 ܐܡܪܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ. ܕܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܣ̈ܝܡܬܐ ܡܩܝܡܢܬ ܘܫܬܐܣܐܝܬ ܐܬܬܣܝܡ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ: ܘܡܢܗܘܢ ܬܪܝܨܐܝܬ ܘܓܘܫܡܐܝܬ ܐܬܬܣܝܡܘܗܝ ܠܗܘܢ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܒܠܚܘܕܝܗܘܢ. ܟܠܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ: ܠܗܠܝܢ ܬܪܝܢ ܙܢ̈ܝܐ ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܘܫܠܡܐܝܬ ܡܫܡܫܝܢ ܕܡܢܝܢܐ ܐܢܘܢ. ܠܗ̇ܘ ܓܒܪ ܡܢܐ P70r ܕܫܬܐܣܐܝܬ ܘܡܩܝܡܢܬ ܡܫܡܫܝܢ ܠܗ ܡܩ̈ܝܡܢܐ. ܬܪܝܨܐܝܬ ܡܫܡܫܝܢ B124r ܕܢܩܦܘܗܝ. ܘܠܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܫܠܝܠܬܐ ܣܡ ܡܫܡܫܝܢ ܠܗ. ܗܢܘܢ ܒܓܙܝܪܬܐ ܘܬܪܝܨܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܠܗ. ܡܕܡ ܐܦ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܡܢܗ̇ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܬܪܝܨܬܐ ܘܫܘܬܬܐ: ܗܕܐ ܕܐܬܦܠܓܬ ܘܐܬܡܫܚܬ ܒܡܫܘܚܐ ܠܗܢܐ. ܘܡܫܘܚܗ̇ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܫܠܡܬܐ ܘܓܙܝܪܬܐ: ܗܕܐ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܒܡܫܡܫܢܘܬܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ L18v ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܘܠܘ ܒܫܪܪܐ.

294 ܟܠ ܓܘܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܚܘܪܐ ܐܘ ܐܘܟܡܐ ܐܘ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܐܡ̈ܝܢ ܬܠܬ ܐܘ ܐܪܒܥ ܐܘ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܐܝܕܐ ܕܗ̣ܘ. ܠܘ ܡܛܠ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܓܘܢܐ ܡܬܡܫܚ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܗܟܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܗ ܡܬܡܫܚ ܕܗ̇ܘܐ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܗ. ܐܝܟ

---

1 ܘܡܚܘܐ DLP: ܘܡܚܘܝܐ B | ܡܫܒܪܢܘܬܐ LP: ܡܫܬܒܪܢܘܬܐ BD | ܐܝܡܟܐ BL: ܐܝܟܐ DP **2** ܡܕܡ] om. L **4** ܘܟܪܐ scr.: ܐܘܟܪܐ BDP: ܐܘܪܟܐ L | ܕܡܟܕܝܢ LP: ܕܡܟܚܕܝܢ BD **5** ܓܒܪ] om. B **8** ܡܢܐ] om. BDP | ܕܡܬܒܥܝܢ BDL: ܕܡܬܕܒܥܝܢ P **10** ܡܩܝܡܢܬ L: ܡܩܝܡܢܐܝܬ BDP **12** ܦܘܪܫܢܐ L: ܕܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܐ BDP **13** ܡܫܡܫܝܢ] + ܕܢܩܦܘܗܝ P **14** ܘܡܩܝܡܢܬ L: ܘܡܩܝܡܢܐܝܬ BDP | ܠܗ BLP: ܠܗܘܢ D ܡܩ̈ܝܡܢܐ] + ܣܡ P **18** ܕܒܡܫܡܫܢܘܬܐ] + ܗ̣ܘ BP **20** ܐܘ²] om. BD

belief about it comes from. Now, since of any particular colour, e.g. a certain white, it is said that there are three cubits of it, or four, or something else; and furthermore, of some action it is said that it is long or short, e.g. one usually speaks about length when talking about a war that lasted ten years or something like that, — based on this one believes that colours and actions also pertain to quantity. However, they do not fall beneath any of the kinds of quantity which have been established above, but in reality they belong to quality, as we are going to demonstrate in the section on it[380].

293 Now, we shall consider that of things that are said, some exist primarily and in the strict sense, and some of those things that are said exist secondarily and accidentally[381]. In the Syriac language, we are accustomed to call these two kinds "truly" and "seemingly", so that what the ancients named "strictly" and "primarily" we usually call "truly", while what we designate as "seemingly" they referred to as "accidentally" and "secondarily". Thus, there are quantities in the true and strict sense, namely those which have been divided and discussed thus far, and there are those of another kind, seeming and derivative, of which we say that they are quantities only in belief and not in reality.

294 Now, when some colour — e.g., white, or black, or any other — is said to have three or four cubits or any other particular amount, it is said not in respect of the colour which is measured, but since the body in which it is contained happens to have some size, that is how the colour which is in it is

380 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.16–19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.13–20.

381 Cf. *Cat*. 5a38–39: κυρίως δὲ ποσὰ ταῦτα μόνα λέγεται τὰ εἰρημένα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

D102v ܒܡܐ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܓܘܢܐ ܕܒܗ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ. ܘܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܬܘܒ
ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܪܝܢ ܘܒܝܪܐ. ܠܐ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
ܗܟܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܛܠ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܕܗ̇ܘܐ ܒܗ ܢܓܝܪ ܐܘ ܠܐ. ܐܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܩܠܝܠ
ܙܒܢܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܐܝܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܚܪ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܕܐܢܫ ܙܒܢܐ ܢܓܝܪܐ. ܡܢ
ܒܪܘܬܗ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܒܠܚܘܗܝ ܕܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܐܬܡܪ. ܘܐܢ ܬܘܒ
ܢܐܡܪ ܙܒܢܐ ܢܓܝܪܐ: ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܚܪ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܕܒܩܠܝܠ ܡܫܬܚܪܐ.
ܗܢܝܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܪܒܥܬܗ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܒܥܕܢܐ ܠܗ ܠܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܕܐܝܠܝܢ
ܥܠܬܐܝܬ. ܘܕܓܘܢ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܡܫܡܠܝܢܘܢ ܕܓܘ̈ܢܐ ܡܬܚܫܒ
ܥܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܘܠܘ ܚܘ̣ܠܢ ܠܓܘ̈ܢܐ. ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܒܪܐ ܐܘ̇ ܒܪܝܢ. ܘܠܘ
ܦܘܪܫܢܐ ܕܗ̇ܘܐ ܒܗ. ܘܐܬܝܕܥܬ ܠܗ̇ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ
ܐܬܝܕܥܘܢ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܬܐܡܪܬ ܡܢ ܠܥܠ. ܓܘ̈ܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܐ
P70v ܥܠܬܐܝܬ ܘܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ ܗܢܝܢ. ܡܛܠ ܕܠܝܬ ܡܢ ܕܢܩܦ
ܕܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܠܓܘܫܡ̈ܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܡܪܝܢ.

B124v 295 ܐܢ ܓܝܪ ܢܐܡܪ ܐܢܫ ܟܠ ܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܚܘܪܐ: ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܐܝܟ ܐܢܫ
ܢܐܡܪ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܕܝܬܝܪܐ ܡܢ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܕܪܒ
ܡܢܗ: ܘܢܩܦܐ ܡܛܠܚܢܐܝܬ ܠܡܫܡܫ ܐܝܟ ܕܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܘܠܡܐܡܪ.
ܕܫܘܪܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܓܘܫܡܐ ܘܚܘܪܐ ܪܒܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܡܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܒܗ̇ܘ ܕܪܒ ܡܢܗ:
ܐܝܟ ܕܡܢ ܗܕܐ ܠܗ̇ ܠܫܘܪܬܐ ܢܩܦ ܒܟܡܝܘܬܐ ܘܠܘ ܠܓܘܫܡܐ ܗ̇ܘ
ܡܫܡܠܝܗ̇. ܗܢܐ ܢܒ̈ܕ ܗ̣ܘ. ܕܫܡܫܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܫܠܦ ܠܒܪ ܡܢ ܡܢܐ
ܕܪ̈ܘܡ: ܘܡܢ ܗܪܟܐ ܐܫܒܪܝ ܕܐܬܓܠܝ. ܘܐܦ ܗܘܐ ܠܗ ܓܝܪ ܕܠܘ ܕܪܟܐ
ܫܘܪܬܐ ܡܢ ܫܘܪܬܐ ܢܩܦܐ. ܐܠܐ ܕܬܢܝܢܐ ܐܦ ܕܡܫܠܡܢܐ ܗܕܐ ܡܢ
L26r ܗ̇ܝ. ܒܥܬܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܙܒܢܐ ܘܕܪܒܘܬܐ. ܠܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܠܚܘܕ. ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ
ܕܬܢܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܕܝ̈ܪܘܬܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܗ̣ܘ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܓܘ̈ܢܐ ܘܐܣܟܡ̈ܐ.

---

1 ܒܡܐ LP: ܡܐ BD | ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ DL: ܐܝܬ ܒܗ B: ܐܝܬܘܗܝ P **2** ܕܐܪܝܢ BDL: ܕܐܝܢ P **3** ܕܙܒܢܐ BDP: ܙܒܢܐ L | ܢܓܝܪ BDP: ܢܓܪ L **5** ܡܬܐܡܪ LP: ܐܬܐܡܪ BD **9** ܘܠܘ^2] + ܗ̣ܘ B **10** ܦܘܪܫܢܐ] + ܗ̇ܘ P | ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܐܬܝܕܥܘܢ BDP: ܐܬܝܕܥܘܢ ܡܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ L **14** ܓܝܪ LP: ܕܝܢ BD **16** ܡܢܗ BDL: ܡܢܗܐ P **17** ܗ̣ܝ] om. L **19** ܗ̣ܘ ܢܒ̈ܕ BDP: ܢܒ̈ܕ L | ܡܢܐ] om. P **20** ܕܪܟܐ DLP: ܪܟܐ B **22** ܘܕܪܒܘܬܐ BDL: ܘܪܒܘܬܐ P | ܗ̇ܘ DLP: ܗܢܘ B

said to have size. Also, if an action is said to be long or short, it is not because the action itself is like that, but because the time over which it took place was either lengthy or not. In fact, if an action which was believed to last long time occurs briefly, then due to the briefness of time taken for it this action will be called brief. But if the action which was believed to be over briefly were to extend over a long time, then again the length of time taken for it would make this action seemingly long. Hence, it is the body receptive of colours that is truly measured and not colours themselves; and it is also the time that is short or long and not the action which happens in it. It is thus obvious that body and time pertain to quantity, as it has been explained above, while colours and actions are called like that seemingly and accidentally, since they occur to one of the kinds of quantity, as we have said[382].

295 So, if someone states about a small body that the white in it, as one says, is more white than that of a bigger body and falls into error by trying to measure it by means of measures and saying that the white in the small body is greater than that in a body larger than it, so that such a person will deduce from it that it is whiteness that pertains to quantity and not the body which is receptive of it, then it is obvious that he merely corrupts the proper meaning of the words and is led astray with respect to the rest. In fact, he should not say that one white is greater than the other, but that it is more (white) in one case than in the other[383]. For the terms "great" and "small" are related to quantity, while the "more" and the "less" are also applied to colours, shapes (σχήματα) and all

382 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.20–29; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 92.20–93.2.

383 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 60.29–61.5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 93.8–13.

ܘܥܠ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܕܐܬܝܗ̈ܒܘܗܝ ܕܘܝܐ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܗܘ ܕܝܢܐ ܠܡܗܦܟ ܗܘܐ ܒܡܠܬܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܕܪܘܡܐܝܬ: ܐܝܟ ܕܒܪ ܚܢܢ ܠܗ ܠܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܥܡܡ̈ܐ ܡܬܘܣܪܐ. ܢܬܒܣܣ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܢܢ. ܐܝܟ ܕܝܢ ܕܒܪ ܠܐ ܚܢܢ ܕܪ̈ܢ. ܢܐܠܦ ܬܘܒ ܘܠܐ ܢܬܒܥܐ ܫܢܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܒܠ ܐܢܫ ܕܢܦܠ ܠܚܒܪܗ.

296 ܡܢ ܟܬ̈ܒ ܗܠܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ. ܡܬܚܙܐ ܠܗ ܐܪܣܛܛܠܝܣ ܠܡܚܘܝܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܢܦܩܝܢ ܠܗ ܡܣܓܝܐܝܬ. ܘܐܡܪܢ ܡܕܡܝܘܬ ܕܢܦܩܐ ܠܗ ܠܡ
D103r ܠܡܚܘܝܘܬܐ. ܘܐܦ ܗܘ ܕܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܒܗ ܡܕܡ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ. ܟܕ ܪܪܐ ܠܒܢ
P71r ܘܠܐ ܒܣܝ ܡܢ ܦܘܠܚ̈ܢܗ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܒܡܫܝܚܐ ܘܒܡܠܬܐ ܘܒܪܒܢܐ ܐܘ ܒܣܘܦܠܐ ܘܒܦܠܚܘܬܐ ܘܒܡܥܒܕܢܐ ܘܒܐܬܪܐ: ܡܬܚܙܝܐ ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܝܘܬܐ. ܐܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܐܢܐ ܢܝܟܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܪܒܘܬܐ ܘܪܡܘܬܐ ܘܡܫܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܡܟܝܪܘܬܐ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ ܕܣܓܝܐܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ: ܗܠܝܢ ܠܒܢ
B125r ܒܡܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ: ܘܐܝܟ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܣܓܝܐܐ. ܡܕܝܟܐ ܗܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ ܒܡܚܝܘܬܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܝܢ ܕܡܫܝܢ ܕܠܝܬ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ: ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܗܘ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ، ܘܡܚܡܢܝܢ. ܗܕܝܢ ܡܬܚܙܝܢܐ ܒܡܚܝܘܬܐ ܐܝܟ ܡܠܬܗ ܕܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܕܢܦܩܐ ܠܗ. ܗܝ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܝܘܬܐ ܡܕܡ.

297 ܡܕܝܢ ܡܛܠ ܕܐܦ ܒܥܢܝܢܐ ܕܟܠ ܐܢܫܝܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ: ܪܒܘܬܐ ܘܪܡܘܬܐ ܘܡܫܝܢܘܬܐ ܘܡܟܝܪܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܥܛܝܪܐ ܡܕܡ ܕܢܡܠܠ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܬܘܒ ܦܠܠ ܡܢ ܗܟܢ. ܡܚܘܬ ܕܢܫܘܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ. ܠܘܬ ܐܟܡܐ ܒܡܚܝܘܬܐ. ܘܐܝܟ ܐܬܚܙܝܘ ܒܡܚܝܘܬܐ. ܠܘܬ ܐܟܡܐ ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ ܕܣܓܝܐܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܬ ܡܢ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܗܘ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ، ܘܡܚܡܢܐ ܕܒܝܢܝܢ. ܕܬܗܘܐ ܕܝܢ ܡܕܝܢܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܟܠ ܗܠܝܢ. ܢܣܒ ܬܘܒ ܥܘܕܪܢܐ ܠܡܠܬܢ ܘܢܒܥܐ ܒܠܚܘܕ ܐܝܟ ܕܬܒܥܐ ܚܫܝܚܬܐ ܕܦܘܢܩ̈ܝܬܐ.

1 ܕܘܝܐ BDP: ܕܘܒܐ L | ܠܡܗܦܟ DLP: ܠܡܗܦܠ B **3** ܢܬܒܣܣ LP: ܡܬܒܣܣ BD | ܕܝܢ] om. BD **4** ܫܢܐܝܬ LP, corr. D in marg.: ܫܢܝܐܝܬ BD **5** ܐܪܣܛܛܠܝܣ LP: ܐܪܣܛܘܛܠܝܣ BD **6** ܠܡ] om. P **9** ܘܒܡܥܒܕܢܐ] om. D **10** ܢܝܟܐ LP: ܢܟܐ D: om. B **11** ܠܒܢ LP: ܕܝܢ BD **13** ܕܠܡܘܬܠܐ[1]] + ܢܘܬ add. D in marg. (sc. ܕܠܡܘܬܠܝܘܬܐ) **14** ܕܠܘܬ BDP: ܠܘܬ L **16** ܕܠܡܘܬܠܝܘܬܐ LP: ܕܠܡܘܬܠܝܐܬܐ BD **18** ܡܕܡ DL: ܡܕܝܢ BP

kinds of quality. Thus, if someone would like to study this subject but will resist knowing the precise meaning of the terms, he will be rebuked, as we have said. But if being unaware of this, he would study, then he will learn and will not resist in a quarrelsome way those things which are evident to everyone.

[Whether quantity admits of contraries]

296 So, after this, Aristotle defines quantity by means of its distinctive features. 5b11–16
And he first says that a concomitant of quantity is that there is nothing contrary to it[384]. For, indeed, none among its kinds — i.e. number, language, time, line, surface, body, and place — seems to truly admit of contraries. Now, someone might wish to say that large and small, plenty and few are contrary to one another, and since they pertain to quantity and are contrary to one another, it is obvious that quantity admits of contraries. However, if we demonstrate that they are not contraries, but in their subsistence they pertain to the genus of relatives, this will prove correct the statement of the Philosopher that a concomitant of quantity is that it has no contrary[385].

297 Since we have already discussed large and small and plenty and few in the section on substance[386], it would be proper to say now only a few things about them, in order to demonstrate that, if they are contraries they do not belong to quantity, and if they do belong to quantity they are not contrary to one another, but the subsistence of their nature belongs rather to the genus of relatives[387]. So, in order to make our account of them comprehensive, let us start our inquiry into them, making it as brief as possible.

---

384 See *Cat*. 5b11: ἔτι τῷ ποσῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον. Sergius paraphrases Aristotle's text rather than quoting it.

385 In the second half of this paragraph, Sergius paraphrases *Cat*. 5b14–16: εἰ μὴ τὸ πολὺ τῷ ὀλίγῳ φαίη τις εἶναι ἐναντίον ἢ τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ. τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι ποσὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι.

386 Sergius probably means §224, where he mentioned that not admitting of contraries is characteristic not only of substance but also of quantity. Philoponus points out that it is Aristotle himself who mentioned large and small briefly in the section of the *Categories* dealing with substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.6–7: ἐν γὰρ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ μνημονεύσας αὐτῶν μόνον παρῆλθε, συγχωρήσας αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι.

387 This is what Aristotle himself implies, as Philoponus stresses in *In Cat.* 94.9–10: καὶ δείκνυσι πάλιν διχῶς, διά τε τῆς ἐνστάσεως ὅτι οὔκ εἰσι ποσά, καὶ τῆς ἀντιπαραστάσεως ὅτι εἰ καὶ ποσὰ συγχωρηθείη εἶναι, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντία (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.15–18).

298 ܐܡܪܝܢ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܛܝܒܗ̇ ܕܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܐ ܘܡܕܒܪܐ. ܘܛܝܒܗ̇ ܕܠܐ ܬܘܚܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܘܠܓܘܐܝܬ ܡܬܚܡܢܐ. ܒܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܡܬܚܡܐ L26v ܘܡܕܒܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܗܕܐ ܕܐܬܬܦܫܛܬ ܒܦܘܠܓܐ ܗܘܐ ܕܐܬܐܡܪ ܡܢ P71v ܠܟܠ. ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܚܡܐ. ܒܦܘܠܓܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܬܕܒܪܐ. ܐܝܟ ܕܢܦܫ ܐܝܟ ܟܠܗ ܟܝܢܗ̇ ܘܦܠܓܗ̇ ܟܕ ܐܡܪ. ܕܛܝܒܗ̇ ܕܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܒܪܡܘܬܐ ܘܒܪܒܘܬܐ ܡܬܚܡܢܐ: ܘܛܝܒܗ̇ ܒܡܠܝܘܬܐ ܘܡܝܬܪܘܬܐ. ܠܥܠܡܐ ܡܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܘܡܫܠܡܢܘܬܐ ܘܡܫܪܝܬܐ. ܕܟܪ̈ܘܒܝܢ ܘܣܪ̈ܦܝܢ ܡܢ ܫ̈ܐܕܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ. ܘܕܝܠܗ ܗܘܬ ܘܡܠܬܐ ܘܡܚܝܢܐ. ܕܡܠܟ̈ܝܢ ܗܘܬ ܘܡܝܬܪ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܫ̈ܐܕܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ. ܡܕܝܢ ܙܕܩܘܬܐ ܘܡܝܬܪܘܬܐ. ܢܦܩܘ ܠܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܝܬ ܦܫܝܛܐ ܠܡܛܠܬܗ̇. ܘܦܠܓܘܬܐ ܗܘܬ ܘܡܝܬܪܘܬܐ ܠܗ̇ܝ ܒܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܬܚܡܢܐ ܡܠܘܬܗ̇ ܒܝܕ ܐܣܝܪܐ ܠܘܬ D103v ܫ̈ܐܕܐ ܢܦܩܘ.

B125v 299 ܡܛܠ ܗܢܐ ܗܟܝܠ. ܬܫܒܘܚܬܐ ܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܢܣܒ ܦܝܠܘܣܘܦܐ ܡܢ ܬܪ̈ܥܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܢ ܕܛܝܒܘܬܐ. ܘܡܛܠܗܘܢ ܡܣܬܟܠ ܠܗ ܠܟܠܗ ܥܒܕܐ ܕܟܠ B126r ܗܠܝܢ. ܠܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܠܥܠܡܐ ܘܡܫܪܝܬܐ ܘܡܫܠܡܢܘܬܐ. ܢܣܒ ܠܓܒܪܐ ܘܦܘܪ̈ܫܢܐ ܘܝܘܬܪܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܒܗ̇. ܘܐܡܪ ܕܟܠ ܠܥܠܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܘ ܕܗܘ ܡܬܐܡܪ ܪܒܐ ܘܒܪܒܘܬܐ. ܒܡܫܚܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܒܪ ܟܠܗܘܢ. ܘܟܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܡܫܟܚܐ ܘܡܠܬܐ. ܡܬܐܡܪ ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܫܡܗܘܢ ܕܦܫܛ ܘܡܝܬܪ ܒܡܫܚܐ ܗܘܬ ܕܠܘܬܗ. ܡܕܝܢ ܐܦ ܒܡܫܚܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܝܟ ܡܢ ܕܚܘܝܢ: ܠܘܬ ܐܝܠܝܢ ܕܠܡܘܣܐ ܕܫ̈ܐܕܐ. ܐܠܐ ܡܢ ܡܠܟܘܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ. ܕܠܐ ܕܝܢ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ ܕܠܡܘܣܐ. ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܘܕܐܝܟ ܗܠܝܢ ܡܚܝܠܐ ܐܝܟ ܠܚܝܠܐ.

300 ܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܡܕܡ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܪܒܐ ܐܘ ܙܥܘܪܐ ܦܫܝܛܐܝܬ: ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܗܘ ܒܡܘܡܗ. ܐܠܐ ܒܡܫܚܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܬܡܠܠܐ ܗܟܢܐ. ܠܐ

---

1 ܘܛܝܒܗ̇ ܕܠܐ ܬܘܚܡܐ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܘܠܓܘܐܝܬ ܡܬܚܡܢܐ ܒܛܝܒܘܬܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܡܬܚܡܐ ܘܡܕܒܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇] om. hom. B **6** ܡܬܚܡܢܐ] + ܡܬܚܡܐ add. D in marg. **10** ܦܫܝܛܐ BDL: ܦܫܛܐ P **13** ܦܝܠܘܣܘܦܐ BDL: ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ P **19** ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ BLP: ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ D **20** ܡܠܟܘܬܐ P: ܡܠܟܘܬܝ L: ܡܠܟܘܬܗܘܢ D: ܡܐܠܟܘܬܗܘܢ B **22** ܠܚܝܠܐ BDL: ܠܚܐܝܠ P **23** ܕܡܬܐܡܪ BDL: ܘܡܬܐܡܪ P **24** ܗܘ] om. B | ܠܐ scr.: ܗܐ BDLP

298 Now, we say that one kind of quantity is definite and concrete and another is indefinite and may be grasped generally. As for the definite and concrete kind of quantity, it has been set out through the division discussed above. That which is indefinite may be comprehended through another division, when one takes the whole nature of quantity and divides it by saying that one part of it is regarded in terms of large and small and other in terms of many and few. About all bodies, surfaces and lines we say that some of them are larger or smaller than others. About time, language and number, on the other hand, we say that some of them are more or less than others. Thus, large and small apply to that kind of quantity whose parts have position, while many and few apply to that kind of quantity whose parts do not remain in one established position with respect to one another[388].

299 That is why the Philosopher used the following examples for the two kinds of quantity and based his whole discussion of them on these. As examples for body, line and surface he took a mountain and a certain small grain, saying that any particular body is called large and small through comparison to other things of the same genus[389]. Concerning time, number and language, on the other hand, all things belonging to them are said to be many or few also through comparison to one another. Hence, if these things pertain to quantity, as we have shown, then they are not contrary to one another, but this comes from the category (κατηγορία) of relatives. So, from these and other (examples) one is able to see that they are not contraries[390]. 5b16–29

300 There is nothing at all that is called large or small simply, i.e. in its own right, but rather it is called thus in relation to something else. Thus, the same

388 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.2–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20. Ammonius divides quantities into "definite" (ὡρισμένα), which are quantities in the strict sense, and "indefinite" (ἀόριστα), to which large and small belong and which are not quantities in the proper sense. Philoponus provides a more detailed analysis of these two kinds.

389 See *Cat.* 5b16–20: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται, οἷον ὄρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχρος δὲ μεγάλη τῷ τὴν μὲν τῶν ὁμογενῶν μεῖζον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον τῶν ὁμογενῶν.

390 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 62.2–18, particularly 62.15–18: εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐναντία εἰσὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶ ποσά, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρός τι· <...> ὕστερον δὲ δείκνυσιν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐναντία εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεται.

ܫܝܡ ܒܗܠ ܠܗ .ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܝ ܫܘܒܚܐ ܐܦ ܥ ܐܦ ܫܘܠ ܝܟ
ܡܗܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܒܝ ܫܡܒܫܐ ܐ ܒܝ ܒܘܟ ܡܗܝܒܐ .ܫܝܡ
P72r ܟܬ ܫܒܘܒ ܐܦ ܠ ܥ ܠܗ .ܡܗܝܡ ܡܗܝܡ ܒܗܠ ܫܒܡ
ܥܡ ܫܒܟܐ ܟܬ ܕ .ܐܝܬܘ ܐܝ ܕܝ ܥܡ ܫܒܟܐ
5 ܥܡܫ ܥ ܒ ܠܗ .ܕܝ ܥܡ ܫܒܟܐ ܫܘܬ ܒܘ :ܫܘܬ
L27r ܠܗ ܐ ܡܗܝܒ ܒܘ ܠܗ .ܥܡ ܝܢ ܫܝ ܒܝ ܒܘ
ܡܒܝ ܒܥ ܫܡܒܫܐ .ܐܦ ܠܗ ܫܘܬ ܥܡ ܟ ܫܘܬ ܫܝ
ܫܘܦܒܐ ܠ ܠܗ .ܫܘܬ ܥܡ ܫܒܟܐ ܫܘܥ :ܒܘܟ
ܫܒܟܐ ܒܘܟ ܫܘܥ :ܒܐ ܫܘܬ ,ܐ ܫܒܟ ܡܗܝ ܡܗܝ
10 ܫܒܟ ܟ ܠܡ ܫܘܒ ,ܐ ܫܒ .ܒܐ ܒܝ ܐ ܫܒܟ ܫܘܬ
.ܡܗܝܒ ܒܐ ܥ ܐ ܠܒ ܒܐ ܒܘ ܠܒ ܒܐ

ܫܒܐ ܒܒܐ ܐ .ܐ ܒ ܐ ܠܒ ܐ ܡ ܡ ܒ ܒ ܒ 301
B126v ܟ ܒ ܒ ܐ ܐ .ܐ ܟ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
ܐ ܠ ܒ .ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
D104r ܒ ܒ ܒ .ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
20 ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
P72v ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ
ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ ܒ

1 ܐ[2]] + ܒ P **2** ܒ DL: ܒ BP **3** ܒ BLP: ܒ D **4** ܒ BDL: ܒ P | ܒ BDL: ܒ P |] om. B **5**] inv. BDP **7** ܒ BDP: ܒ L |] DLP:] B |] BDL:] P **9**] DLP:] B **10**] + ܐ BD **12**] DLP:] B **13**] DLP:] B **17** BDL:] P **18**] L:] BDP **21**] DLP:] B |] BD:] L:] P

mountain will be called large with regard to one (mountain) and small with regard to another. And also a grain will be called large as compared to one (grain) and small as compared to another. For if things were called large or small in virtue of themselves, then neither would something large ever be called small, nor would something small ever be called large, but each thing would always maintain the order of its nature. Thus, a grain which is incommensurably smaller than any mountain could never be called large, nor could a mountain be called small[391]. But since a grain is called large as compared to a smaller (grain), while a mountain is named small as compared to a bigger (mountain), it is apparent that these terms are applied only by way of comparison and do not derive from the nature of things[392].

301 Moreover, things that are contraries first have their own existence and only then fight with one another. But as for relatives, they are said of by way of reference (to one another) and it is in this reference that their names subsist[393]. What I mean is this. Black and white are contrary to one another, but each one of them has subsistence by itself and exists in its own right. Large and small, on the other hand, and plenty and few do not exist in their own right, but each one of these terms appears by way of reference to the other, while what is signified by them in itself is different from what is grasped from these namings. Hence, they do not belong to contraries, but to the category of relatives, in which we usually include a slave and a master, a son and a father, a half and a double, and other things like that. 5b30–33

391 Cf. *Cat*. 5b20–22: οὐκοῦν πρὸς ἕτερον ἡ ἀναφορά, ἐπεὶ εἴγε καθ' αὑτὸ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἐλέγετο, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τὸ μὲν ὄρος μικρὸν ἐλέγετο, ἡ δὲ κέγχρος μεγάλη.

392 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 94.16–25.

393 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.15–18: δεῖ τὰ ἐναντία πρῶτον εἶναι καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀπολελυμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ὑπόστασιν, εἶτα οὕτως συνέρχεσθαι καὶ τὴν μάχην ἀναδέχεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἀντικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι ἀδύνατον, διὸ οὔτε πολεμεῖ ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ συνεισάγει (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.10–12).

ܘܬܘܒ ܗܟܢܐ. ܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ ܗܢܝܢ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ. ܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܩܢܘܡܐ 302
ܗܝ ܐܢܫܘ ܕܬܬܟܦܠ ܚܒܪܘܬܗ̇. ܐܘܟܝܡܘܬܐ ܒܪ ܐܝܬܘܬܗ̇ ܗܦܟܬ ܡܢ
ܚܘܪܘܬܐ. ܘܬܘܒ ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܡܪܐ ܐܢ ܗܘ ܕܠܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐܝܬ
ܐܘܟܝܡܘܬܐ. ܪܒܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܟܠܟܕ ܘܟܘܪܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܐܝܬ. ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ
ܟܝܪܘܬܐ ܟܠܟܕ ܡܢ ܡܫܟܢܘܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܟܡܫܚܐ ܕܫ̈ܪܪܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ
ܩܘܡܗܘܢ. ܗܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦܢ ܠܐ ܢܗܘܐ ܐܝܬ ܐܒܐ. ܡܬܝܗܒ ܠܗ
ܐܦ ܒܗܘܢܐ ܕܒܪܘܬܐ. ܘܐܢ ܒܒܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܢܬܝܠ ܡܢ ܡܝܒܠܬܐ. ܡܛܠ
ܠܗ ܒܗܢܐ ܐܦ ܫܘܡܗܐ ܕܐܒܗܘܬܐ.

ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܗܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܫܝܐ ܐܢܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ. ܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܡܕܡ 303
L27v ܕܡܫܝܐ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܟܝܢܐ ܘܟܠܢܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܒܗ ܗ̇ܘ ܡܟܠܢܐ ܕܗ̈ܘܝܢ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ.
ܚܘܪܘܬܐ ܒܪ ܐܘܟܝܡܘܬܐ. ܠܐ ܡܫܝܐ ܐܦܫܪܐ ܕܢܗ̈ܘܘܢ ܒܢܝ
ܠܟܘܫܡܐ. ܗ̇ܘ ܕܝܢ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܬܐܡܪ ܪܟܢܐ ܘܟܘܪܐ. ܐܦܫܪܐ ܡܫܝܐ
ܕܢܗܘܐ ܡܟܠܢܐ ܕܗܘܝܢ. ܠܦܘܪܐ ܒܪ ܐܢܫ ܕܐܡܪܝܢ ܘܦܪܕܬܐ
B127r ܘܐܫܝ̈ܬܐ ܡܫܟ̈ܢܬܐ. ܒܪ ܕܟܠܢܐ ܐܝܬ ܠܗܘܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܢܗ̈ܘܘܢ ܪܘܟܒ̈ܬܐ
ܘܟܝ̈ܢܬܐ: ܘܡܫܟ̈ܢܬܐ ܘܟܘܪ̈ܬܐ. ܗ̣ܘ ܒܪ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܠܦܘܪܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ
ܪܟܢܐ ܠܗܘ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܪܟܒ ܡܢܗ. ܘܟܘܪܐ ܠܗܘ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܟܪ ܡܢܗ. ܘܡܫܝܚܐ
ܬܘܒ ܐܝܟ ܐܢܐ ܢܡܪܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܡܫܝܚܝܢ. ܡܬܐܡܪ ܕܦܫܟ ܠܗܘ ܗ̣ܘ
P73r ܕܡܫܝܚ: ܘܕܪܟܒ ܐܝܟ ܕܠܗܘ ܗ̣ܘ ܕܪܟܒܐ. ܡܕܡ ܐܦ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܠܗܝܢ
ܗ̇ܝ ܕܪܟܒܘܬܐ ܘܟܘܪܘܬܐ ܠܗ ܡܢ ܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܝܢ. ܐܠܐ
ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܕܟܡܫܚܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ.

D104v ܕܫܘܚܠܦܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܝܢ ܬܠܬ ܡܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ. ܐܡܪ ܐܢܐ ܗܕܐ. ܕܠܝܬ ܚܕ ܡܕܡ 304
ܡܬܘܡ ܕܢܗܘܐ ܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ ܕܩܢܘܡܗ: ܐܘ ܕܗ̣ܘ ܠܗ ܢܗܘܐ ܗܘܘܟܠܐ.
ܒܡܟܠܢܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܗ̈ܘܝܢ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ. ܗ̇ܘܐ ܗ̣ܘ ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ ܡܕܡ ܒܝܢܝܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ
ܘܐܚܪܢܐ. ܡܕܡ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܡܪܢ ܕܟܘܪܘܬܐ ܘܪܟܘܒܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܗ̈ܘܝܢ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ

1 ܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ BDP: ܕܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ L 2 ܕܬܬܟܦܠ DL: ܕܬܟܦܠ BP 6 ܘܐܦܢ DLP: ܘܐܦ B 9 ܐܦ BDL: ܘܐܦ P 11 ܡܫܝܐ BDL: ܡܫܐ P 12 ܡܢܐ] om. P 15 ܘܟܝ̈ܢܬܐ DLP: ܘܟܝ̈ܢܘܬܐ B 17 ܢܡܪܐ DLP: ܕܢܡܪܐ B | ܕܦܫܟ BDL: ܦܫܟ P 18 ܕܠܗܘ ܗ̣ܘ DLP: ܗ̣ܘ ܕܠܗܘ B | ܕܪܟܒܐ DLP: ܪܟܒܐ B ܐܦ] + ܗ̇ܘ B | ܟܠܗܝܢ...19 ܗ̇ܝ BDL: ܟܠܗܝܢܐܝܬ P 21 ܗ̇ܝ] om. L 23 ܕܗ̈ܘܝܢ BDL: ܕܗܘܝܢ P ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ BDP: ܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ L | ܗ̇ܘܐ] + ܕܝܢ B | ܟܕ ܗ̣ܘ] om. L

302 In this way, then, each of those things which are contraries persists even after the perishing of its counterpart. E.g., black exists apart from white, and also white does not perish if there is no black. But there is neither large apart from small nor few apart from many, since their subsistence is based on their reference to one another. Thus, if there is no father, then the word "son" may not be applied any more, and if a slave is taken away, the name "master" perishes together with him[394].

303 One may also argue like this[395]. There is nothing that is able to be receptive of those things that are contraries at the same time. E.g., white and black may not be present in the same body at once. However, what is called large and small may be receptive of both (characteristics) at once, since, as we have said, for a mountain, for a grain and for many other things it is possible at the same time to be both large and small, many and few. Thus, the same mountain turns out to be large in relation to one (mountain) which is smaller than it, and small in relation to another which is bigger than it. Also, e.g., the number fifty is considered many in relation to twenty and few in relation to one hundred. Hence, also from this it becomes obvious that large and small do not belong to things which are contraries but to those that are grasped in relation to something else[396]. 5b33–6a4

304 In order to make this completely apparent, I am saying that there is nothing at all that might be contrary to itself or become its own opposite[397]. For what is receptive of contrariety remains one and the same at different times. But a person who states that large and small are among contraries, since each 6a4–11

394 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.20–25.

395 Ammonius notes that this argument of Aristole proceeds by way of *reductio ad impossibile*, see *In Cat.* 63.27: ἕτερον ἐπιχείρημα διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.16).

396 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 63.28–64.9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 95.4–96.20.

397 Here, as also above (cf. §223), Sergius applies both the term *dalqubla* and the adjective *saqqubla* synonymously for rendering the Gr. ἐναντίος, "contrary". Porphyry, in his question-and-answer commentary, makes a distinction between opposites and contraries, affirming that some quantities may be opposed to one another but not as contraries, see Porphyry, *In Cat.* 108.5–12.

ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ: ܡܛܠ ܕܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܗ̇ܝ ܟܕ ܗ̇ܝ ܚܕܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܐܝܟ ܕܚܫܝܒܝܢ ܕܪܒܐ ܘܒܘܪܐ. ܗܠܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܚܕ ܡܕܡ ܐܡܪ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܩܢܘܡܗ. ܘܡܬܒܣܣ ܓܠܝܐܝܬ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܠܐ ܡܢܝܐ ܠܚܡܫܐ ܐܡܪ.

305 ܗܠܝܢ ܡܟܝܠ ܐܢ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ. ܡܚܘܐ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܕܠܝܬ ܐܬ̈ܝܢ ܡܢ ܒܪܝܬܐ. ܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ ܡܢ ܒܪܝܬܐ. ܠܝܬ ܐܬ̈ܝܢ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ. ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܓܝܪ ܠܐ ܡܢ ܒܪܝܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ. ܐܠܐ ܢܦܩ ܠܡܚܘܬܐ: ܒܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܬܘܬܗ̇ ܡܡܠܠܘܬܗܝܢ. ܐܝܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܣܝܡܢ ܥܠ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܕܡܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗ̇ ܕܗܘ̈ܝܢ ܕܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ. ܗܟܢܐ ܐܦ ܥܠ ܒܪܝܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܕܐܦ ܗ̇ܝ ܡܡܠܠܘܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗ̇ ܕܗܠܝܢ. ܐܬܘܬܗܝ ܕܝܢ ܒܟܠܗܝܢ ܫܪܝܪܐܝܬ ܐܝܟ ܐܡܝܢܝܢ. ܡܢ ܓܠܝܢܐ ܗ̇ܘ B127v ܕܒܚܫܒܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܬܝܕܥ.

306 L28r ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ ܕܝܢ ܐܢ ܐܢܫ ܢܨܒܐ ܠܡܬܚܪܝܘ ܡܢ ܩܘܡܒܐ ܕܐܚܪܬܐ P73v ܡܪܟܒ ܕܐܝܬ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܒܡܚܘܬܐ. ܠܟܠ ܓܝܪ ܘܠܘܬ. ܒܡܠ̈ܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ ܡܢ ܐܚܪܬܐ. ܘܗܠܝܢ ܦܫܩܐܝܬ ܡܣܬܒܪ̈ܢ ܕܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ. ܬܫܡܫܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܢܨܒ̈ܬܐ ܕܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܗܢܐ ܐܬܘܗܝ. ܕܢܦ̈ܩܝܢ ܬ̈ܫܡܫ ܗܟܢ ܡܢ ܚܕ̈ܪܐ. ܥܒܝܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܗܕܐ ܬܪܝܢܐܝܬ ܠܘܬ ܠܟܠ ܘܠܘܬ. ܗܠܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܒܢܘܣܚܐ ܗ̇ܘ ܕܐܠܦ ܦܢܝܢ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ ܠܘܬ ܚܕ̈ܪܐ. ܐܡܪ ܐܢܫ ܡܟܝܠ. ܕܗܠܝܢ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ ܘܕܐܚܪܬܐ ܬ̈ܠܝܢ: ܘܡܛܠ ܕܐܚܪܬܐ ܡܢ ܒܪܝܬܐ ܗܘ. ܐܦ ܗܠܝܢ ܒܒܪܝܬܐ ܐܬܘܬܗܝܢ. ܘܡܫܬܟܚܐ ܠܗ̇ ܡܟܝܠ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܐܬܘܬܗ̇ ܒܗܠܝܢ ܕܒܒܪܝܬܐ.

307 ܠܟܠ ܕܝܢ ܘܠܘܬ ܡܟܝܠ ܗܟܢܐ ܙܕܩ ܠܚܫܒ. ܠܘ ܐܝܟ ܕܢܨܒ̈ܬܐ ܚܫ̈ܝܚܬܐ ܕܬܠܝܢ. ܘܐܢ ܕܝܢ ܠܐ. ܒܚܘܫܒܐ ܕܐܢܫ̈ܝܬܐ ܡܬܚܫܒ̈ܢ ܐܦ ܗܢܝܢ. ܡܕܝܢ D105r ܓܘܢܐܝܬ ܚܫܒܐ ܠܚܫܒ ܠܟܠ. ܗ̇ܝ ܡܗܘܠܠܬܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܝܬ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܚܝܠܐ ܠܟܠ ܡܢܗ̇: ܘܠܘܬ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܝܬ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܕܡܬܚܫܒܝ

5 ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ L: ܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܐ P: ܗܢܐ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ BD 7 ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ[2] BDL: ܕܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ P 9 ܕܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ BDP: ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ L 12 ܕܒܚܫܒܐ BDP: ܕܚܫܒܐ L 15 ܡܣܬܒܪ̈ܢ] om. B 16 ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ] + ܒܒܪܝܬܐ P 20 ܗܘ LP: ܐܬܘܗܝ BD 24 ܗ̇ܝ BDP: ܗܝ L | ܐܚܪܬܐ BDL: ܐܚܪܢܐ P

one of them is applied to the same subject by way of reference, as we have shown, to what is large or small, such a person is saying that the same thing is contrary to itself, thus being obviously wrong in stating what is impossible[398].

305 Thus, the Philosopher demonstrates that, if they were contraries then they could not belong to quantity, and if they belonged to quantity then they could not be contraries. The truth is, however, that neither do they belong to quantity nor are they contraries, but rather they are associated with quantity through what is receptive of them[399]. Just as we have shown earlier that substance is receptive of contraries, so too we state about quantity that it is also receptive of them. Thus, as we have said, the truth is that their nature belongs to that genus which is grasped through relation to something else.

306 Now, if someone is absolutely bent on asserting that there is contrariety in quantity, he deduces it from the constitution of place[400]. Indeed, up and down are parts of space, and they are easily grasped as contraries. For a definition of what is contrary goes like this: they are those things that are most distant from one another[401]. And this most of all applies to up and down, for these are furthest apart from one another. That is why someone might state, that they are contraries and occur in place, and since place belongs to quantity, they too belong to quantity. Thus, it turns out that there is contrariety in the division of quantity. 6a11–18

307 Now, up and down shall not be understood here as particular things in this world[402]. But even if they were, they should still be grasped through their relation to something else. In fact, people are generally inclined to understand up as the heavenly sphere, above which there is no other physical place, and

---

398 Ammonius comments that with this argument Aristotle "increases the absurdity": ἐπιτείνων οὖν τὸ ἄτοπόν φησιν ὅτι εἰ ἔστι τὸ μέγα τῷ μικρῷ ἐναντίον, συμβήσεται οὐ μόνον τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ μάχεσθαι, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.11–13; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.26–29).

399 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.16–18: πρότερον ὑποθέμενος αὐτὰ ἐναντία εἶναι ἔδειξεν ὅτι ποσὰ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔπειτα ὑπέθετο ποσὰ καὶ ἔδειξεν ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐναντία. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς οὔτε ποσά ἐστιν οὔτε ἐναντία, τῶν δὲ πρός τι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 97.31–98.1.

400 Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 6a12–13: μάλιστα δὲ ἡ ἐναντιότης τοῦ ποσοῦ περὶ τὸν τόπον δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

401 See *Cat.* 6a17–18: τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 64.25–65.1 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.22–23. Sergius omits the expression "in the same genus" in the definition (Ammonius, on the contrary, stresses this point, see 65.5–8).

402 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.23–24: κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω.

ܡܢܗ̇. ܗܟܢܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܫܬܒܪܐ ܡܠܬܐ ܕܟܝܢܐܝܬ ܢ̇ܦܩܐ ܠܥܠ ܘܠܬܚܬ. ܘܠܐ ܒܦܫܛܐ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܚܪܢܐ. ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܗܟܢܐ ܨܒܝܢ ܡܕ̈ܥܐ ܠܡܐܡܪ ܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ ܒܒܢܝܢܗܘܢ ܕܨܒܘ̈ܬܐ. ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܠܥܡܩܐ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ P74r ܠܥܠ. ܘܠܐ ܠܐܪܥܐ ܦ̇ܫܛܝܢ ܠܬܚܬ. ܐܠܐ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܡܨܥܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܒܗ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܚܕ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܠܡܘܙܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܡܥܒܪܐ ܕܟܠ. ܠܐܪܥܐ ܕܝܢ ܦܫܛܝܢ ܒܡܨܥܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܘ̈ܝܐ.

308 ܡܕܝܢ ܐܢ ܠܝܬ ܠܥܠ ܘܠܬܚܬ ܒܥܠܡܐ. ܐܠܐ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܡܨܥܬܐ. B128r ܗܕܟܐ ܗ̣ܝ ܕܠܝܬ ܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ ܠܐ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܘܠܐ ܒܡܒܘܥܘܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܡܨܥܬܐ ܘܗܦܟܐ ܒܦܫܛܐ ܕܠܘܬ ܐܚܪܢܐ ܡܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ. ܗܦܟܐ ܓܝܪ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗܦܟܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܡܫܬܦܝܢ ܠܗܘܢ ܡܢܗ. ܘܡܨܥܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܕܡ ܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܡܨܥܬܐ. ܗܢܘ ܕܝܢ ܕܗ̇ܘ ܡܢܐ ܕܒܣܘܕ̈ܪܐ ܒܨܝܪ ܠܗ. ܟܠ ܗ̇ܝ ܗܟܝܠ ܕܠܝܬ ܕܠܡܘܒܠܐ ܒܡܒܘܥܘܬܐ ܦܣܩ ܗܠܝܢ. ܘܐܝܬܐ ܠܢ ܡܛܠ ܠܘܬ ܐܫܬܥܝܬܐ ܕܦܐܝܢ ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ ܕܢܦܩ ܠܗ̇ ܚܕܐܝܬ.

309 L28v ܥܒܝܕܐ ܕܝܢ ܕܠܝܬܘܬܐ ܐܫܪܝܬܐ ܒܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ. ܗ̇ܝ ܕܠܝܬ ܒܗ̇ ܝܬܝܪܘܬܐ ܘܒܨܝܪܘܬܐ. ܡܛܠ ܕܠܝܬܘܗ̇ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܡܠܘܬܗ̇ ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܒܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܣܓܝܐܘܬܗ̇. ܐܠܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܒܚܕܐ ܥܒܕܘܬܐ ܩܝܡܢ ܥܒܕܐ ܘܚܣܝܐ ܕܨܒܐ. ܠܐ ܓܝܪ ܡܚܘܝܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܒܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܡܠܬܐ: ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܠܬܐ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ ܡܚܘܝܢܐ. ܒܗ ܕܝܢ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ. ܐܦ ܠܐ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ ܦܘܪܥܢܐ ܐܘ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ ܠܡܥܒܕܐ ܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܡܚܘܝܢܐ ܐܘ ܡܠܬܐ ܒܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ. ܗܟܢܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܕܟܝܐ ܐܘ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܐܘ ܥܠܝܡܘܬܐ

---

2 ܕܡܕܡ BLP: ܡܕܡ D | ܐܦ DLP: ܘܐܦ B **3** ܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ LP: ܕܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ BD **4** ܘܡܨܥܬܐ ܐܡܪܝܢ ܒܗ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܚܕ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܠܡܘܙܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܗܦܟܐ] om. hom. L | ܐܡܪܝܢ ܒܗ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܚܕ ܡܬܚܫܒܝܢ ܠܡܘܙܠܬܐ ܕܐܝܬܘܗ̇ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܡܥܒܪܐ ܕܟܠ ܠܐܪܥܐ ܕܝܢ ܦܫܛܝܢ ܒܡܨܥܬܐ ܕܟܠܗܘܢ ܗܘ̈ܝܐ ܡܕܝܢ ܐܢ ܠܝܬ ܠܥܠ ܘܠܬܚܬ ܒܥܠܡܐ ܐܠܐ ܗܦܟܐ ܘܡܨܥܬܐ] om. hom. P **6** ܕܝܢ ܦܫܛܝܢ] inv. B **8** ܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ LP: ܕܠܡܘܒܠܐ BD | ܠܐ] om. D **9** ܡܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ L: ܡܬܐܡܪܝܢ BDP **10** ܕܗ̇ܘ DLP: ܗ̇ܘ B **12** ܕܒܣܘܕ̈ܪܐ] + ܘܗ̣ܘ B | ܕܠܡܘܒܠܐ LP: ܕܠܡܘܒܠܘܬܐ BD **13** ܘܐܝܬܐ LP: ܐܝܬܐ BD | ܦܝܠܣܘܦܐ BDL: ܦܝܠܠܣܘܦܐ P **16** ܒܡܒܝܢܘܬܐ] om. P **17** ܥܒܕܐ DLP, corr. B in marg.: ܘܡܥܒܕܐ B | ܘܚܣܝܐ LP: ܘܚܣܝܢܐ BD **18** ܘܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܡܠܬܐ] ditt. in P **19** ܡܚܘܝܢܐ ܒܗ ܕܝܢ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܐܦ ܠܐ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ] om. hom. B | ܐܦ LP: ܘܐܦ D **20** ܐܘ ܒܨܝܪ BDP: ܘܒܨܝܪ L

down as the earth, below which there is no other place. This is how human reason naturally understands up and down rather then through their relation to something else. But it is not this way that the ancients wished to explain the contrariety in the nature of things. For they did not define up as heaven, nor did they apply down to earth. Instead, they spoke of the outer limits and centre in the world, thus defining heaven as the limit and the boundary of everything, while placing earth in the centre of everything that exists[403].

308 Thus, if there is no up and down in the world but (only) outer limits and centre, it is apparent that contrariety is neither in the world nor in quantity, since limits and centre are spoken of in relation to something else. For a limit is a limit of something, namely of what is limited by it; and also a centre is a centre of something, namely of what surrounds it as a sphere[404]. So, what has been said thus far concerning the fact that no contrariety is in quantity should suffice. Next, we will turn to other concomitants which the Philosopher considered to be peculiar to it.

[Other properties of quantity]

309 So, there is another property of quantity, namely that it does not admit of more and less, because none of its parts may be called more quantity than the other, but all of them equally possess its name and general nature. For number is not more quantity than language, neither is language less (quantity) than number. Similarly, number or language are no less quantity than line or body. So also, time, or place, or surface are called quantity to no greater or lesser an 6a19–25

403 Periphrasis of *Cat.* 6a11–12: τὴν πρὸς τὸ μέσον χώραν κάτω λέγοντες, διὰ τὸ πλείστην τῷ μέσῳ διάστασιν πρὸς τὰ πέρατα τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 99.28–100.29.

404 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.1–3.

ܡܬܩܪܝܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܐܘ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢܗܘܢ. ܐܠܐ ܟܠܗܘܢ ܦܘ̈ܠܓܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܕܐܡܪܬ. ܗ̇ܘ ܒܕܡܘܬܐ ܐܝܬܝܗܘܢ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ. ܘܠܐ ܐܝܬ ܚܕ ܡܢܗܘܢ ܕܐܝܬܘܗܝ ܗ̇ܘ ܝܬܝܪ ܐܘ ܒܨܝܪ ܡܢ ܚܒܪܗ.

310 ܘܗܕܐ ܕܪܗܘܡܐܝܬ ܐܬܐܡܪܬ. ܐܡܪܝܢ ܓܝܪ ܡܢ ܠܟܠ. ܕܠܝܬ ܕܠܡܘܟܠܘܬܐ P74v | D105v ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ. ܝܬܝܪܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܘܒܨܝܪܬܐ ܡܢ ܫܒܥܐ ܕܬܪܝܢ ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ ܡܬܝܠܕܐ. ܘܡܛܠ ܕܠܝܬ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ. ܝܕܝܥܐ ܗ̇ܝ ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܘܒܨܝܪܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ. ܐܠܐ ܐܦ ܠܟܠܗ̇ ܒܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܢܦܩܐ ܗܕܐ. ܠܗ ܗ̇ܘ ܟܠܗ ܕܥܡܘܪܐ. ܡܫܘܝ ܠܡ ܓܝܪ ܒܥܕܪܐ ܕܗܘܐ ܗܘܐ. ܕܐܦ ܠܐ ܐܘܣܝܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܝܬܝܪܐܝܬ ܘܒܨܝܪܐܝܬ. ܐܠܐ ܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ̇ ܫܘܝܐܝܬ ܡܬܐܡܪ̈ܢ ܐܘܣܝܐ.

311 B128v ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܝܢ ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܢܦܫܐ ܠܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܒܠܫܢܗ̇: ܘܠܐ ܥܒܝܕܐ ܒܚܕ ܡܢ ܓܘ̈ܫܡܐ ܐܝܟܢܐ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇. ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܘܠܐ ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ. ܗܕܐ ܓܝܪ ܠܟܠܗܝܢ ܡܢܘ̈ܬܗ̇ ܕܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܢܦܩܐ. ܘܒܗܝܢ ܒܠܫܢܗܝܢ ܡܬܝܠܕܐ. ܡܬܐܡܪ ܓܝܪ ܡܫܘܚܐ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܥܡ ܡܫܘܚܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܘܕܠܐ ܫܘܝܐ ܥܡܗ̇. ܘܬܘܒ ܡܠܬܐ ܟܝܢ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܥܡ ܡܠܬܐ ܐܚܪܬܐ ܕܐܝܟܘܬܗ̇. ܘܟܝܢ ܕܠܐ ܫܘܝܐ. ܘܗܘܪܓܐ ܘܫܘܠܡܢܘܬܐ ܘܠܫܘܝܘܬܐ: ܘܡܬܠܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܬܪܐ. ܟܠ ܚܕ ܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܥܡ ܒܪ ܐܕܫܗ ܘܕܠܐ ܫܘܝܐ. ܟܠܡ ܓܝܪ ܡܬܕܪܝܢ ܒܗܕܐ ܓܠܝܐܝܬ. ܕܟܠ ܚܕܐ ܡܢ ܗܠܝܢ ܟܕ ܡܬܦܫܩܐ ܥܡ ܚܒܪܬܗ̇ ܠܡܬܐܡܪܘ ܕܫܘܝܐ ܐܘ ܠܐ ܫܘܝܐ. ܡܕܡ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ ܕܢܦܫܐ ܚܕܐܝܬ ܠܡܫܘܚܬܐ ܒܠܫܢܗ̇. ܗܕܐ L40r ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܐܝܟ ܕܐܡܪܢ. ܕܡܬܐܡܪܐ ܒܟܠ ܙܢ ܡܢ ܟܠܗ ܫܘܝܘܬ ܘܠܐ ܫܘܝܘܬ.

---

5 ܕܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ BDP: ܕܠܡܘܟܠܐ L **8** ܕܐܦ BDP: ܐܦ L **11** ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ BDL: ܫܘܬܐܦܘܬܐ P
13 ܘܒܗܝܢ LP: ܘܡܢܗܝܢ BD **14** ܡܫܘܚܐ[1]] om. P | ܘܕܠܐ BLP: ܘܠܐ D **18** ܟܠܡ DLP: ܟܠ B
19 ܕܫܘܝܐ BDL: ܕܫܘܝܘܬ P | ܐܘ ܠܐ L: ܘܕܠܐ BDP **20** ܫܘܬܦܘܬܐ BDL: ܫܘܬܐܦܘܬܐ P
ܚܕܐܝܬ] om. B **21** ܐܝܟ] om. P | ܕܐܡܪܢ DLP: ܕܐܡܪܝܢ B

extent than them. But, as we have said, all its kinds are equally quantity, and none among them is more or less then the others[405].

310 And this is plausible, for we have said above that there is no contrariety in quantity, it being from a mixture of contraries that more and less arise[406]. But since there are no contraries in quantity, it is apparent that more and less are not applied to it. However, although this property is characteristic of all of quantity, it is not found only in it. For it has been shown to us in the previous section that substance does not admit of more and less either[407], but all parts of substance are equally said to be substance.

311 Now, the property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it alone and does not happen to occur to any other genera is being equal and unequal[408]. For this is characteristic of all parts of quantity and appears only in them[409]. A number is said to be equal to another number or unequal to it. Also, an utterance[410] is sometimes called equal to another utterance which is like it and sometimes unequal. Line, surface, and body, and also time and place — each one of them is called either equal to something of its kind or unequal[411]. What we obviously mean by this is that, when each one of them is compared to something else, we characterize it either as equal or as unequal. That is why an individual property of quantity in the strict sense which is concomitant for it alone, as we have said, is that it is always and by everyone called equal and unequal. 6a26–35

405 This argument does not appear in Ammonius and Philoponus. Instead, Philoponus stresses that, similar to substance, quantity is receptive of contraries (τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικήν), but does not have the contrariety itself, see *In Cat.* 101.1–19.

406 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.13–16: καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως· ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ἐναντιότης, ἐκεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ὅπου δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον εὑρίσκεται· τὸ γὰρ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων μίξεως γίνεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.23–25).

407 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 65.20–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.25–26.

408 See *Cat.* 6a26: ἴδιον δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ ἴσον τε καὶ ἄνισον λέγεσθαι.

409 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 101.29–102.1: τοῦτο κυρίως ἴδιόν ἐστι τοῦ ποσοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ παντί.

410 Syr. *mellta*, Gr. λόγος.

411 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 102.1–3.

P75r ܐܡܪ ܠܗ ܐܒ ܒܪܝ ܒܪܡܫܝܐ ܒܐܪ ܫܡ ܠܡܐ ܡܠܐ 312
ܠܗ ܐܒ ܐܡ ܒܐ ܠܡܐ. ܐܠܗܐ ܫܠܚ ܐܒܪܝܟ ܫܡ
ܐܒܪܗܡ ܟܝ ܐܒ ,ܐܡܪ ܐܝܟ ܐܠܗܐ ܐܡ ܐܒܪܗܡ
ܐܡܪ: ܐܠܗܐ ܐܒ ܠܐ ܒܪܟ ܒܪܟ ܒܪܟ.

5 ܐܡܪ ܐܝܟ ܐܠ.

B129r ܐܡܪ ܐܝܟ ܐܠ ܐܠܗ

ܐܡܪ ܐܠ ܐܠ

ܐܒܪܗܡ

ܐܠ ܐܡܪ – ܐܡܪ ܠܐ ܫܡܥ ܐܠ ܐܠܗ ܐܒܪܗܡ

10 ܐܒܪܗܡ ܐܠ – ܐܡܪ ܠܐ ܐܒܪ ܐܠ ܐܡܪ ܐܠ

ܐܠ ܐܝܟ ܐܡܪ

D106r ܐܝܟ ܐܠ ܐ

ܐܒܪܗܡ ܒܐ

ܐܠ – ܐܒܪܗܡ ܐܠ ܐܠ ܐܠ ܐܡܪ ܐܠ ܐܡ

15 ܐܝܟ ܐܡܪ ܐܒܪܗܡ

– ܐܡܪ ܐܡܪ ܐܝܟ ܐܠ ܐܠ ܐ ܐ ܐ

ܐܡܪ ܐܠ ܐ

1 ܡܠ LP: ܐܠ BD | ܒܐ ܫܡ LP: ܐܡ BD **2** ܐܠ BDP: ܐ L |] om. D | ܐ LP: ܐ B: ܐ D **5**] + ܐ P] om. D |] + ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ ܐ B **6** L: ܐ P: om. BD **9** BDL: P |] om. L; +]] +] **11**] om. L; +] BD **14** BDP: L | DLP: B **16** [1] DL: BP

312 These remarks bring to an end this book, which is the fourth of the treatise that I wrote on the study of logic, where I described quantity according to the teaching of Aristotle based on what I could remember[412].

End of Book Four.

Divisions of Book Four

First division

Of quantities:

— some have parts that are separate and delimited from one another, i.e. number, language;
— others are in a single unity which has no parts separate from one another, i.e. line, surface, body, place, time.

Second division

Also, of quantities:

— some contain parts which have position and remain at their place, i.e. line, surface, body, place;
— others contain parts which are not fixed and are brought forth one by one, i.e. time, language, number.

412 It is possible that here Sergius refers to his notes (ὑπομνήματα) written on the basis of Ammonius' lectures.