

BOOK THREE

[The fourfold division]

- 122 In the previous book, which was the second one of this treatise, O brother Theodore, the discussion of an inquiry into the goal of the whole logical craft has been set out. At its end, I turned to those terms which Aristotle provided before his teaching on the ten primary genera that are called “categories”. In this book, which is the third one of the same treatise, we are about to discuss those things that the Philosopher wrote after that in his treatise on the ten universal genera. 1a20–1b9
- 123 Now, those who are eager to chase the true understanding of this man ought to know, O brother, that before the general division of those ten primary categories, this Philosopher established another division of them which is more universal than this one and divided all of them into four parts that encompass the ten. So, ultimately, this fourfold division also includes the other one, for the tenfold one is born out of it, producing a perfect teaching on the nature of each one of the ten primary genera¹⁷³.
- 124 So, this is what he says¹⁷⁴ about the first division which is set out in a fourfold manner: Of all things that exist in any way some are substances and others accidents, and again, some of them are spoken of universally and some particularly. Thus, six pairings may be generated from this¹⁷⁵: the first one is that of substance and accident; another one is that of universal and particular;

173 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9. Both Ammonius and Philoponus speculate on the value of applying numbers from one to ten in this case. Sergius confines himself here to a short remark about the “perfect teaching”, but comes to the issues of numbers based on the Pythagorean teachings later on in a separate section (see §§129–134, below).

174 Sergius does not quote Aristotle’s text here, but rather presents the following teachings as a correct interpretation of chapter 2 of the *Categories*. While Ammonius stresses (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.14–15; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 29.1) that the terms he uses (substance, accident, universal, particular) are not applied by Aristotle, Sergius does not make such a remark, but uses the same terms as if they actually derive from Aristotle.

175 Sergius’ text is very close to the commentary of Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.5–7: ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαίρεσις αὐτῆ· τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστι καθόλου τὰ δὲ μερικά, καὶ πάλιν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν οὐσία τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα· γίνονται τοίνυν συζυγία ἕξ (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.17–20).


the third one is that of substance and universal; the fourth one is that of accident and particular; also the fifth one is that of accident and universal; and the last sixth one is that of substance and particular. You learn them clearly from the table below.

125 However, we ought to know that two pairings from these six, namely the first and the second one, may not come to be, for it is impossible both for the same thing to be a substance and an accident, and for the same thing to be in the same way universal and particular. Hence, only four pairings remain as in every way possible in this division, as we said. These are: universal substance, e.g. humanity as a whole; particular accident, e.g. whiteness in only one dress; particular substance, e.g. Socrates alone; and universal accident, e.g. whiteness as a whole¹⁷⁶.

126 Of these four pairings the Philosopher put first that of universal substance, for he considered it more honorable in both of its (elements), i.e. both because of substance and universality, than the other three. For substance is much more honorable than accident, because it is sufficient for its own subsistence, while an accident has no way to exist unless there is substance. And universal is honored much more among philosophers than particular, because they always leave particulars behind and seek after universals that provide a profound knowledge of things¹⁷⁷.

176 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 25.7–12: ὧν αἱ δύο ἀνυπόστατοι, αἱ δὲ λοιπαὶ τέσσαρες, φημί δὴ τὰς τε ὑπαλλήλους καὶ τὰς διαγωνίους, συνεστᾶσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ αὐταὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν καθόλου οὐσίαι τὰ δὲ μερικὰ συμβεβηκότα, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθόλου συμβεβηκότα τὰ δὲ μερικὰ οὐσίαι, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ τί λευκὸν ἢ τις ἐπιστήμη καὶ λευκὸν καὶ τις ἄνθρωπος (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.20–23). This passage in Ammonius (and Philoponus) is followed by a diagram, representing the afore-mentioned six combinations, which is nearly identical to the one found in Sergius. In all extant mss. of Sergius' *Commentary*, it appears after §126.

177 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.16–20: καὶ τοῦτοις τοῖς ὀνόμασι κεχρημένος ἐκτίθεται τὰς τέσσαρας συζυγίας, καὶ πρώτην τὴν καθόλου οὐσίαν, ὡς τιμιωτέραν, ἔπειτα τὸ ἀντικείμενον, λέγω δὴ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός, εἶτα προετίμησε τὸ καθόλου συμβεβηκός τῆς μερικῆς οὐσίας, διότι περὶ τῶν καθόλου τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.19–26).



127 After this pairing, it might be appropriate to place that of particular substance, since, as we have said, substance is more honorable than accident. But because every opposite is comprehended from what it is opposed to — for instance, if a man learns about whiteness or sweetness, he immediately gets the idea of blackness and bitterness — because of this, he placed after the pairing of universal substance the one which is opposite to its both (elements), namely particular accident¹⁷⁸. That accident is the opposite of substance and also that universal is the opposite of particular; I have no need to demonstrate.

128 Moreover, after that, he placed the third pairing, i.e. that of particular substance, since it is more valuable — because of the substance which is part of it — than another fourth one, which is that of universal and accident. Thus, it is in this orderly way that the Philosopher arranged them, although not many have comprehended this. So, let us turn to the reason of this fourfold division

¹⁷⁸ See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.22–24: ἔπειτα δευτέραν τίθησι τὴν ἀντικειμένην ταύτη, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μερικὸν συμβεβηκός· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῇ μὲν οὐσία τὸ συμβεβηκός τῷ δὲ καθόλου τὸ μερικόν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.28–31).

and discuss why he has established it as first, before the overall division of the ten genera.

[Pythagoras on numbers]¹⁷⁹

129 Now, Pythagoras, who was a man renowned for the practice and knowledge of philosophy, transmitted like a kind of mystery to his disciples that all powers and causes of everything that came to be and exists in the whole world derive from numbers and constitute things, while every knowledge and philosophy about the latter has its origin and reason in calculations and figures (σχήματα) which come forth by means of numbers.

130 So, he stated that the beginning of all numbers is called the one. It is a copy of the Creator who brings order to everything in that, similar to it, he is also single¹⁸⁰ and indivisible. And number two, which is born when the primary number doubles itself, serves also as a model (τύπος) for the universal substance of all bodies, which they call matter (ύλη), and for the nature that is singularly active in bodies, the one which they also call material (ύλικός) form (εἶδος). These two principles — i.e. form and matter, one of which is efficacious and the other effected, one is active and the other passive — are primary, according to Aristotle, after the Creator of the universe. From them at first the four customary elements (στοιχεῖα) are formed — i.e. the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry — from which in turn the adornment and constitution of the universe takes place.

131 Thus, they say that the second number contains the mystery of matter and form, which, as we have said, Aristotle sets as primary principles and causes of

179 Cf. §123, above. In the corresponding passage, Ammonius makes a brief note on the application of numbers by Aristotle, without mentioning the name of Pythagoras. The *prolegomena* treatises by David, Elias, and Olympiodorus frequently refer to the Pythagorean arithmology. Cf., e.g., Lectures 16–17 of David's *Introduction to Philosophy* (49.7–54.26), where he describes the following established tradition of Aristotle's commentators: "Since we have earlier on given an arithmetical explanation <...>, the commentators take their starting point from this and proceed to discuss the numbers up to the decad" (Gertz 2018: 133; the Greek text: ἐπειδὴ ἐν τοῖς προλαβοῦσιν εἰρήκαμεν ἀριθμητικὴν αἰτίαν δεικνύουσαν <...> ἐντεῦθεν λαβόντες οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ ἀφορμὴν ἔρχονται καὶ διαλαμβάνουσι περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ὄντων ἄχρι τῆς δεκάδος).

180 Syr. *ihidaya*, here probably corresponding to Gr. μοναχός. Sergius applies the same Syriac term in the meaning "particular, individual", cf., e.g., §168.

B87v :
 P34r :
 5

132

C130v :
 10

133

D74r :
 L13v :
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1 :
 6 :
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everything. For just like the singular and primary number which is similar to the Creator doubled itself and thus gave birth to this second number, in the same way, when the Creator in the beginning¹⁸¹ applied some sort of doubling which derived from the affinity between his creative activity and the creation, he first of all established matter and form that are necessary for the subsistence of all beings.

132 And just as from matter and form, as we said above, the four elements are primarily constituted, which are the secondary principles of beings, so also the number four is born from a doubling of the second number, for when the latter doubles itself it brings forth the subsistence of the former. And since also the number four originates from the primary number and makes the latter fourfold, it is clear that it gives birth to the ten. For one, two, three, and four together make ten.

133 That is why the number ten that is perfect in every respect is also a model (τύπος) for all things and beings of this world, which was made as a whole by the Creator. For just as the fourfold number gives birth to the number ten, which is perfect, as we have said, being the limit of all numbers, because there is no other number higher than it but there are those ones that are infinitely composed from themselves, in the same way from the four elements — i.e. fire, air, earth, and water — also this whole world was composed as an entity, and those things that are delivered into it and come to be remain the same, while not a single thing is ever created in it.

181 Syr. *b-rišit*. The same word appears in the Syriac translation of Gen. 1:1, i.e. opens the creation story.

134 So now, after this, it is time to look clearly at the cause for the fourfold division which we earlier presented above¹⁸². Thus, I say that just as the fourfold number gives birth from its composition to the number ten which serves as a perfect model for the universe that is composed from the four elements, so too Aristotle first encompassed the ten genera in a fourfold division which resembles the elements and after that introduced another, tenfold, division of these genera which is in itself a model of the universe. For, just as the number ten is complete, comprising all the numbers, so also the universe is complete, containing all the natures. In the same way, also the division of the ten genera of the categories is complete and perfect, encompassing all things that are in the world, for no one is ever able to find anything that would not fall under and be contained in one of these genera.

[Definition of accident]

135 Since, as it seems to me, these things have been clearly explained, let us further proceed to those ones that are after them, which is in this way also necessary for teaching them. That there are those things that are said universally and those whose subsistence is particular¹⁸³, is clear to everyone and there is no need for any definitions or long demonstrations. However, a definition of substance or accident themselves from the four pairings which have been previously set out above requires not a few inquiries as well as demonstrations that support it. Because these two terms, i.e. substance and accident, designate something that is unfamiliar to many from ordinary usage, and also what each

¹⁸² Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 24.22–25.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 28.3–9.

¹⁸³ Sergius speaks in one case in terms of predication (“said”) and in the other in terms of existence (“subsistence”). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.21–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.9–15.

one of them signifies is not apparent and comprehensible save for a few alone¹⁸⁴.

136 Therefore, an inquiry should be made into both of them, so that nothing will be missing in the interpretation of other things in this treatise. However, concerning substance we will make a proper inquiry into its meaning and definition later on, where it will completely correspond to Aristotle's account of it in the book *Categories*. Of accident, conversely, we will speak now, starting with a definition which the Philosopher gave for it. Thus, we require no small investigation about those things which we are about to discuss below.

137 Now, Aristotle states that accident is “that which is in something else not as a part of it, it being impossible to exist without that thing which it is in”¹⁸⁵. This is a defining account of accident given to us by the Philosopher in the treatise on the ten genera. Thus, an accident is what exists in something else, while it is in it not as its part, and its subsistence is never possible by itself, apart from what it is in.

138 Now, it is necessary to know that there are altogether eleven ways of speaking about being-in-something¹⁸⁶. These are: as in a time; or as in a place; or as in a container; or as parts in what they are parts of; or as a whole in its parts; or as

184 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 31.29–32: ἐπειδὴ ἦσθετο ἑαυτοῦ ὁ φιλόσοφος φωναῖς τισι χρησαμένου ἀγνώστοις ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας, τῷ τε καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, βούλεται λοιπὸν διδάξαι ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν. Thus, Philoponus refers to the actual expressions used by Aristotle, while Sergius substitutes them with “substance” and “accident”.

185 See *Cat.* 1a24–25: ὃ ἐν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. Aristotle thus defines the expression “in a subject” (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ) which is associated by Sergius with the term “accident”.

186 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2 (cf. 29.5–23) and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.7–26. Both lists contain 11 types that are equivalent to Sergius' list, but differ from one another in their sequence. Also Sergius' sequence does not fully correspond to either of them. These lists ultimately go back to *Phys.* 210a14–24, where Aristotle suggests eight ways of being-in-something.

species in a genus; or as a genus in species (εἶδη); or as forms (εἶδη) in matter; or as the governing of those who are under someone's rule is in the person who governs them; or as in an end; or as an accident in a substance¹⁸⁷. However, since these are probably not clearly comprehensible for the readers, let us further turn to them and suggest examples to each one from what is known by everyone.

139 1. So, we say that something is in a time, e.g. when we state about the War of Ilion¹⁸⁸ that it occurred in the time of Alexander Paris, or when we say that any other particular thing was in the year of such-and-such (a ruler) or in the day of so-and-so. Everything like this is said to have happened or to be happening in some time.

140 2. Further, we say that something is in a place, just as each one of us is inside the limits of air that surrounds our bodies from outside, or when we say about water or wine that they are inside the inner limits of an earthen vessel or anything else that contains them.

141 3. Also, we say that something is in a container, as water in a pitcher, or as wine in a wineskin, or as any kind of body that is inside another body. This type differs from the previous one in that place has only two dimensions, namely length and breadth, while a container always has three dimensions, namely length, breadth, and depth. Hence, place is such a limit of a body that encloses in its interior part what is placed into it. A container, on the other hand, is a

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 26.32–27.2: λέγεται γὰρ τὸ ἐν τινι ἐνδεκαχῶς, ἐν χρόνῳ ἐν τόπῳ ἐν ἀγγείῳ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὄλῳ ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν ὡς εἶδος ἐν γένει ὡς γένος ἐν εἶδει ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἀρχοντι ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς ἐν τέλει ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ οἷον τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ.

¹⁸⁸ I.e. the Trojan War. The same example appears by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.5–6 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.17–18.

body itself which possesses two limits, the interior one which contains what is in it and, as we said, is called its place, and the exterior one which is seen to everyone from outside. Provided this is so, then it is obvious that the way how something is in a place differs from the way of being in a container in that the former is the inner limit of a body, as we said, while the latter is itself a body¹⁸⁹.

142 4. But we also say that things are (in something) as parts in what they are parts of, for example a hand, or a leg, or any other member of human body. For these are in a body as its parts.

143 5. Also, it is said that the whole human body is in its parts, i.e. in the head, in the belly, in the hands and legs, and in all other members of it. In this way, as we said, we state that a whole is in its parts.

144 6. Things are said to be in something as species in a genus, when we see that they derive from one and the same genus and say that they are in their common genus. E.g., we say that a horse, a dog, and a bull are in the genus of animal, while a vine, an olive tree, and a cedar are in the genus of plant.

145 7. But a thing is also said to be in something as a genus in species, e.g. when one says that animal is in the species of dog, horse, and any other animal, or, further, plant is in fig-tree, plane-tree, and all the species of plant.

146 8. A thing is also said to be in something as form (εἶδος) in matter (ύλη), e.g. when one says that the image of a statue (ἀνδριάνς) is in bronze, or the shape

189 In points 2 and 3, Sergius suggest a different kind of explanation than what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.6–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.18–22.

- (σχῆμα) of a chair is in wood, or something else like that¹⁹⁰.
- 147 9. But we also say sometimes that one thing is in another as the govern-
ment of those who are governed is in the governor; as we have a custom to say
that the government of a house is in the power of the master of the house, or
that the government of a city lies in the one who rules over the city¹⁹¹.
- 148 10. Also, as in an end, we say that the construction of a house is in its
conclusion, that the design of a ship is in its completion, and everything else
like this¹⁹².
- 149 11. Also, as an accident in a substance, we say that whiteness is in milk,
blackness in a rock, sweetness in honey, and everything else like that¹⁹³.
- 150 So, Aristotle writes that accident is “what is in something else not as a part
of it” and thus distinguishes accident from all those things that are in
something that they are in as parts. He also adds that “it can never have subsist-
ence all by itself without that thing which it is in”, in order to distinguish it
from all other cases of how a thing is said to be in something. Because all of
them, even if they are not said to be in something as a part of it, can however
have subsistence without it. An accident, on the contrary, is neither in
something as its part, nor can it ever exist without it.
- 151 As for the other ten types, some of them are said to be in something as part
of it, while others can subsist by themselves without it. And since an accident is

¹⁹⁰ See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22: ἡ ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ, ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.15–16: ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ ὡς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ τὸ τρίγωνον ἢ τετράγωνον σχῆμα ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.13–15: ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι (λέγομεν γὰρ ὅτι τὸδε τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐν τῷδε τῷ ἄρχοντί ἐστιν) (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.22–24).

¹⁹² Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.16–17 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.24–25.

¹⁹³ Ammonius and Philoponus speak in the last case of being “as in a subject”, see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 29.17: ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.25–26). Since Sergius completely abstains from using the terms applied by Aristotle himself, he modifies this point accordingly.

in something like the other ten types, the Philosopher added that it is in something not as its part, in order to distinguish it from those things that are (in something) as a part of it. And he further added that it can never have subsistence by itself without that what it is in, in order to distinguish it from all other cases which can exist without that thing which they are in, even if they are not in it as a part¹⁹⁴.

- 152 For example, whiteness is an accident. It has subsistence either in milk, or in white lead, or in any other kind of body. It is in the body that is receptive of it not as its part. Neither can it have subsistence outside the body in which it is, for it will perish at that very moment when it is separated from it.

[*Criticism of Aristotle's definition*]

- 153 Now, it is necessary, as it seems to me, to discuss some enquiries (ζητήματα) and objections which one may hear just after this defining account of accident from those who are judging things without precision. For, since, as we said, any definition of a particular thing ought to suit only this thing which is made known by it, also the defining account of accident must serve for expressing it alone. Thus, there are two ways of making a mistake in a definition: either by enlarging it so that it will comprise not the whole nature of what is defined, or by reducing it and thus including in it other things that are outside of what is defined¹⁹⁵. For a balanced and accurate definition of a particular thing is the one which serves for signification of this thing alone, separating and differentiating it from everything else.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.2–8 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 32.26–32.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.6–10: κακίζουσι δέ τινες τὸν ὀρισμὸν τοῦτον, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἐλλείπειν· αὕτη γὰρ κακία ὀρισμοῦ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ἀλλ' ἢ πλείονα περιλαμβάνειν ἢ ἐλάττονα. καὶ οἱ μὲν πλεονάζειν λέγοντές φασι μὴ μόνον τὰ συμβεβηκότα περιλαμβάνειν τὸν ὀρισμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σώματα. See also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.9–13. Ammonius characterizes the first kind of criticism (i.e. for being superfluous, cf. ἐκ τοῦ πλεονάζειν by Philoponus) as κατὰ τὸ ὑπεραίρειν καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν.

154 What I mean is this. A correct definition of man that defines only the human nature and separates it from everything else is “rational mortal animal”. So everyone who is a man is a rational mortal animal, and also every rational mortal animal is a man. For a correct interpretation of definitions implies that they are convertible with what they define¹⁹⁶. If, however, someone reduces this definition and says only “rational animal”, it is obvious that together with the nature of man he will encompass with this expression also other natures, namely angels and demons, for all of them are also rational animals. If, on the contrary, one enlarges this definition and says that man is “rational mortal animal rhetor”, then he will reduce the nature that is made known by the definition, because this expression will encompass not the whole nature of men, but only the rhetors.

155 So, these are the two ways of corrupting the teaching of definitions which someone may bring forth as accusations after the defining account of accident. First of all, one might say that it defines and encompasses not only accidents, but also other things that pertain to substance and not to accidents. For, if accident matches the description proposed above, i.e. “what is in something not as a part of it, while it cannot have subsistence without it”, since also Socrates and each one of us are in a place, while not being part of the place, and while neither of us, further, is able to exist without place, hence, according to the meaning of that description, we too are accidents. But since it is evident that

196 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.13–15: οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· τοῦτο ἀντιστρέφει· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν, τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος.

each one of us is also a substance, substance appears to be at the same time substance and accident, which is impossible¹⁹⁷.

156 To this we reply, then, that, even if each one of us is in a place while not being a part of the place we are in, it is still possible for our nature to be thought of outside place, because place is not complete of our nature but is attached to us as a concomitant, like a shadow to a body. But what is receptive of an accident is complete of its nature, since (an accident) may never subsist without it, as we have said above. Now, if this is how things stand, it is evident that the definition of accident which is given above does not encompass anything else save it alone¹⁹⁸.

157 Further, one might say that the defining account of accident does not encompass its nature on the whole but suits only those accidents which cannot be separated at all from what they are in. For, behold, the fragrance of apples or any kind of spices (ἄρωμα), which is an accident, may nevertheless be separated from what it is in, for even when these things are moved far away their fragrance reaches us. So, if an accident is something that cannot subsist without what it is in, while fragrances which are said to be accidents may be separated from what they are in and reach us, it is evident that the account quoted above does not define all accidents¹⁹⁹.

158 What we shall first of all say to this is that it is not stated in this definition that it is completely impossible for an accident to exist for some time apart from what it is in, but that it may not exist at the present moment apart from

197 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.15–21: φασίν οὖν οἱ μὲν τὸν ἀποδεδομένον ὀρισμὸν μὴ πᾶσι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἐφαρμόζειν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶ παρὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα· λέγουσι γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὧν ἐν τινὶ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος ἐν ὄλῳ (οὐ γὰρ μέρος ἐστὶ τοῦ τόπου) καὶ ἀδύνατον χωρὶς αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶν (ἀδύνατον γὰρ χωρὶς εἶναι τόπου), ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ὁ Σωκράτης συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἄτοπον (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.10–12).

198 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 27.21–30; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 33.12–20.

199 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.8–12; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.10–21.

what it is in²⁰⁰. So, even if every fragrance of spices can be separated from them and reach our nostrils, it still cannot reach us without another substance which they are in. For even if it is separated from the spices, it is nonetheless in the air as in a certain body which is receptive of it and without which it cannot subsist²⁰¹.

159 Also, from what follows we shall comprehend that fragrances do not reach our nostrils without certain substance. For, behold, if somebody places an apple in a house for many days it will shrivel and shrink, and from this it is clear that together with its fragrance, a certain substance wastes away and disperses from it. Also, when a man puts some vessel over his nostrils, even if there were spices, he will not sense their fragrance because he will breath clear air. This too makes apparent that when fragrances come into contact with a substance that is much denser than air, they are not perceived any more. So, it has become clear now that fragrances may never exist without some substance which they are in. Consequently, they also fit the above-mentioned account that defines universally the whole nature of accident²⁰².

160 Others, among whom was also Porphyry, since they saw in the definition of accident proposed by Aristotle a certain contradiction with his teaching, sought to formulate it clearly and comprehensibly. Thus, they said that accident is “what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it”²⁰³. However, there are quite a few contradictions also in this definition proposed by them. For of accidents some may be separated from what they

200 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.12–13: πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ᾧ ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, “first of all, Aristotle did not say ‘in which it was’, but ‘in which it is.’” (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.22–23). Thus, Ammonius stresses the present tense in Aristotle’s words.

201 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.11–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.21–24.

202 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 28.16–29.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 35.24–36.13, Simplicius, *In Cat.* 49.10–14.

203 Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.24–25: συμβεβηκός δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς.

occur in and destroyed by being replaced by another ones, while others may never be separated from what they occur in.

161 For instance, the blackness which occurs in the body of a man who has remained for a long time in the sun and which becomes his accident may be separated and removed from him after he has spent a considerable time washing himself in water and staying in the shade. But the blackness of an Ethiopian²⁰⁴ or a raven which is also their accident may never be separated and removed from the Ethiopian's skin or from raven's feathers. Thus, one may say that the definition formulated by Porphyry — i.e. that accident is “what comes to be in something and is separable from it without destroying it” — does not encompass all the accidents, but only those which may be separated and removed from what they are in, because the other ones, as we have said, are not separable from whose accidents they are²⁰⁵.

162 However, instead of this we shall rather bring forth the following argument. Even if those accidents which may not be removed from what they occur in, such as the blackness of an Ethiopian and also of a raven, are in actuality not separable from those bodies which they occur in, they nevertheless can be separated from them in speech and in thought without causing any destruction of them. For it is possible to imagine both an Ethiopian and a raven as white without bringing any harm to the substance of any of them²⁰⁶. Hence, they are also encompassed by the descriptive account that has been quoted above just now.

163 It is also possible for someone to say against what is stated in this definition — i.e. that accident is “separable from what it is in without destroying

204 Syr. “the Cushite”.

205 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.7–18.

206 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.11–15: εἶπομεν δὲ ἤδη ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἀπογίνεται, ἀλλ' οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὁ κόραξ καὶ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός, τοῦ δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῶον οὐδὲ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ χωρίσαι δυνατόν· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ νοῆσαι ἄνθρωπον μὴ εἶναι ζῶον φθειρόμεν αὐτόν, ἐπινοήσαντες δὲ τὸν κόρακα μὴ εἶναι μέλανα ἢ τὸν Αἰθίοπα οὐ φθειρόμεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς κόρακος ἢ ἀνθρώπου.

it” — the following²⁰⁷. Fever is a sort of accident too, but it certainly destroys the body in which it occurs. Also, baldness happens to hair, and it destroys the substrate in which it occurs. Further, one may say about these things the following. Just as the strings of a lyre (κιθάρα), when they are stretched either more tightly or more loosely than is required, destroy the harmony (ἁρμονία) and the coherence of the melody, without however destroying the lyre, so also fever does not destroy the body but the coherent harmony of its constitution. And only when the constitution itself is destroyed, is the body necessarily destroyed with it too. So, even here the accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs. For baldness does not exist in the hair which it destroys but its nature occurs to the skull, so that even from this case it may be seen that an accident does not destroy the substrate in which it occurs.

164 So, speaking concisely, everything that is in the world most of all desires the subsistence of its essence²⁰⁸ and flees always from its destruction. Thus, if none of the accidents can come to be without the substrate in which it occurs, it is obvious that there are no accidents that would destroy the thing to which they occur unless it would bring itself to destruction. What (has been said) about accident is sufficient for hearers.

[Universals and particulars]²⁰⁹

165 Since the universal and the particular were also included in the fourfold division above, we shall also speak briefly about them, although they are evident to everyone. We ought to know that in substance, quantity and other genera we have certain genera that are primary and principal, which are the

1b10–24

²⁰⁷ The following arguments and examples illustrating them are found in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 111.18–113.28. Cf. also Elias, *In Isag.* 91.5–93.8.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 112.12: ἕκαστον γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι ἐφέρεται.

²⁰⁹ For the description of the hierarchical structure of genera, species, and particulars known as the “Tree of Porphyry”, see Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.1–8.6; Ammonius, *In Isag.* 70.5–71.11 and 77.15–79.14; Elias, *In Isag.* 63.6–34. The image of a tree appears in the treatise *On Genus, Species, and Individuality* that is ascribed to Sergius in the only manuscript in which it is preserved and in all likelihood indeed goes back to him. In this treatise, the division of the most generic genera into further genera, species, and particulars is presented in the image of a tree that has large boughs divided into branches and further into twigs and shoots, cf. Furlani 1925.

ten categories. There are also other ones that are subordinated to them, and still other ones that are subsumed below the latter ones, and all the way down until the last species and the separate individuals²¹⁰ that are encompassed by all lower species. In order to explain this to readers, let us take substance and quantity as examples.

166 Now, substance is a certain genus, for there are multiple things that are subsumed beneath it. It is divided primarily into two differentiae, i.e. into body and incorporeal. Body in turn is further divided into other differentiae that are beneath it, namely into animate and inanimate body and into percipient and deprived of perception. In the same way, also animate body is divided into other differentiae, namely into living body and lifeless body and into moving and deprived of motion. Now, living and moving body is further divided into other differentiae which are below it, namely into rational and non-rational and into man and animal. As for man, it is divided only into individuals that are separate and confined by one nature, namely into Plato, Alcibiades, and any other single person²¹¹.

167 Now, we ought to know, since each one of those differentiae that are said to be positioned between man below and universal substance above subsumes under itself multiple things that differ from one another either through the division of individuals or through species, that those differentiae that stand higher than others are also called more universal because each one of them

210 *Syr. qnome.*

211 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 77.16–78.4: τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ σῶμα τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμψυχον τὸ δὲ ἄψυχον, καὶ τοῦ ἐμψύχου τὸ μὲν ζῶον τὸ δὲ φυτὸν τὸ δὲ ζώοφυτον <...> πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ζώου τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ λογικὸν τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, καὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ τὸ μὲν θεὸς τὸ δὲ ἄνθρωπος, πάλιν δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ μὲν Σωκράτης τὸ δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

contains all those that are lower than it and shares with them both its name and its nature²¹².

168 What I mean is this. Man is a differentia and a species of living body, as we have said. Thus, this man is called universal, since he encompasses every particular individual from all the human beings. And individuals are called particular²¹³, because there is nothing else that they subsume under themselves and they are not further divided into parts and species. Also, living body is said to be universal, since it encompasses universal man and animal — which differ from one another not only in number but also in species — and shares with them also its name and its nature, for both man and animal are said to be living due to their partaking in its name. Further, also animate body is said to be universal, since it subsumes under itself living being and all its parts, and they partake in its name, for both man and animal are called living. In the same way, body and substance are universals, since they encompass all differentiae below and make them partakers in their name. For body, animate body, animal, and man, as well as other differentiae that are in substance and particular individuals below that are not divided into anything else, are all called substances.

169 To sum this up: All lower differentiae partake in the name of those above them, while the higher ones are not called by the name of the lower ones. So, every man is living, animate, and substance. But not every living being is a man, e.g. animals, neither is every animate being living, e.g. plants. And further, not everything that is substance is animate, e.g. stones and wood, for they are

212 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 78.5–15.

213 Syr. *iḥidaya*, “single”, here probably reflecting the Gr. ἄτομος (cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 6.13), since Sergius stresses that particulars may not be further divided into parts.

substances but they are not called animate. Similarly, every living being is called animate and substance, and everything animate is also designated as substance. But not everything that is substance is necessarily body, or animate, or living, or man. Hence, what was stated has become clear, i.e. that all genera that are higher than others share their name and their nature with the lower species all the way down to particular individuals which are not further divided, while the lower ones never provide with their name or with their nature either those which are immediately above them or those which are further elevated and remote from them.

170 In the same way we also speak about the genus of quantity. For it too is originally divided into two differentiae, i.e. into the one which is continuous and contains no portions and another one which is discrete and divisible. Also, the one which is continuous and has no portions is further divided into line which is comprehended only through length, into surface whose subsistence is through length and breadth, and also into body whose nature exists in three dimensions, i.e. in length, breadth, and depth. As for the other differentia of quantity which is discrete and divisible, it is further divided into number and time. Each one of them is subdivided into other parts contained in it which are called particulars.

171 Now, all the higher differentiae which the genus of quantity has are also said universally, since they encompass each one of those things that are beneath them, i.e. either their parts that are particulars or other differentiae which differ from each other in species. Particulars, then, are all the lower parts of the species which differ from each other only in number. Universals, on

the other hand, are called all those species and genera which encompass not only particulars that are beneath them, but also other differentiae that encompass the latter.

172 So, what (has been said) thus far should be sufficient for anyone in order to understand what is called universal and what exists particularly²¹⁴. We ought to know, however, that although four terms have been applied in the table (above) — namely substance, accident, universal, and particular — from which four combinations derive, up to this point we have sufficiently spoken about accident, about universal, and about particular. Thus, from now on let us speak, according to our ability, about substance which is established as the head of the ten genera in the book *Categories*²¹⁵.

[On substance]²¹⁶

173 First of all, we shall investigate in how many ways substance is spoken of, 2a11–34 for the teaching of this book is not about every kind of substance. So, we say that of substances some are simple and others composite. The simple ones are either superior to the composite ones or inferior to them²¹⁷. The simple substances which are superior to the composite ones are subjects of the whole science that is called theology (θεολογία), which means “on the divine”. It is concerning these simple substances that are exalted above the composite ones and, being remote from matter and corruption, abide always in the beatitude which does not pass away that the word is (directed) to everyone who desires to ascend in his knowledge above the visible natures and to be taught what is exalted above many²¹⁸.

214 Sergius leaves Chapter 4 of the *Categories* (1b25–2a10) out of his *Commentary*, since he has already suggested an overview of the ten categories in §§95ff. as one of the subject matters among the *prolegomena*.

215 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–13: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν (see also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.8–9).

216 Ms. L has the subtitle “On substance”. Mss. BCD: “On substance and in what ways it is said”. Ammonius notes (*In Cat.* 66.14–19) that the version of Aristotle’s *Categories* which he used contained two subtitles, “On substance” and “On relatives”. It is thus possible that Sergius himself included this rubric in the text of his *Commentary*. On the rubrics, see further Philoponus, *In Cat.* 133.21–23 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 207.27–208.21.

217 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.18–19: τῆς δὲ οὐσίας ἡ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῆ ἡ δὲ σύνθετος, καὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς ἡ μὲν κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ δὲ χείρων (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.23–24).

218 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.25–29: ἀπλῆ δὲ καὶ κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ἀγγελικὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχικὴ καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται <...> διαλέγεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (οὐ γὰρ πρόκειται αὐτῷ θεολογεῖν).

174
 אַרבעטן פון אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער
 D80v און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער. און אונזערע
 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.
 5 און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.
 און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.

175
 10 און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 C143v פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.
 P42v און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 B96v פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 15 פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.

176
 און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 L34r פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.
 און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע
 20 פאליטישע פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע
 פארטרעטער און אונזערע פאליטישע פארטרעטער.

1 אַרבעטן CL: אַרבעטן BD: אַרבעטן P | אַרבעטן BCDL: אַרבעטן P 2 אַרבעטן CLP: אַרבעטן BD
 אַרבעטן LP: אַרבעטן BCD 4 אַרבעטן BCDL: אַרבעטן P 5 אַרבעטן BCDP: אַרבעטן L
 אַרבעטן BDLP: אַרבעטן C | אַרבעטן BCDP: אַרבעטן L | אַרבעטן BCDL: אַרבעטן P
 6 אַרבעטן CL: אַרבעטן B: אַרבעטן D: אַרבעטן P 7 אַרבעטן om. L
 8 אַרבעטן LP: אַרבעטן BCD 9 אַרבעטן LP: אַרבעטן BCD 13 אַרבעטן BCDL:
 אַרבעטן P 14 אַרבעטן CDP: אַרבעטן BL 15 אַרבעטן BL: אַרבעטן CDP
 אַרבעטן L: אַרבעטן B: אַרבעטן C: אַרבעטן D: אַרבעטן P
 17 אַרבעטן BCDP: אַרבעטן L 18 אַרבעטן CLP: אַרבעטן D: אַרבעטן B 21 אַרבעטן
 BDLP: אַרבעטן C

174 Now, the simple substances of another kind, namely those which are inferior to the composite ones, are matter (ὕλη) and material form (ἔνυλον εἶδος)²¹⁹, when each of them is considered separately by itself, while their combination generates composite substance. It is this substance (composed) of matter and natural form that all of natural philosophy deals with. All those who, like Aristotle, were zealous in this part (of philosophy), wrote books on natures and studied those of them that fall under perception. It was matter and natural form as well as those things which appear from them that they took pains to inquire into²²⁰.

175 So, the composite substance, which is, as we have said, between the simple divine one that is superior to it and the simple natural one that is inferior to it, forms the subject of discussion for all those who apply the discipline of logic. And since this is how these things are established in all the writings on the rules (κανόνες) of logic, it was this (substance) that was placed in the teaching as primary among the ten genera of the *Categories*.

176 Thus, O brother, it was not the intention of the Philosopher to speak in this book about the simple substance which is superior to the composite one, for it shall be the concern of someone who teaches about the divine. Neither is he writing here about the other simple (substance) which is inferior and lower than the composite one, for he speaks about it, as we have said, in the treatises on natures. Instead, his goal here is to teach about the composite substance

219 For ἔνυλον εἶδος, cf. Dexippus, *In Cat.* 40.30.

220 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.21–22: ἀπλῆ δὲ καὶ χείρων τῆς συνθέτου ἢ ὕλη ἢ πρώτη καὶ τὸ εἶδος· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν συνθέτων ἔνεκα παραλαμβάνονται.

which we make use of in the whole discipline of logic, making it comprehensive and clear for those who have recently approached this kind of sciences²²¹.

177 We also ought to investigate why we teach about substance before the other nine genera, i.e. before quantity, quality and others. We shall say that this is because those nine genera require substance in order to subsist, while the latter does not require any of them in order to exist. Thus, the account of substance is esteemed as prior also because, if it were taken away from the nine other genera, they will disappear as well, but if they vanish, then substance will not cease to exist. So, everything is destroyed together with it, but it is not destroyed by anything²²².

178 Now, substance is classified in (Aristotle's) teaching (as follows): some of it are primary and others secondary. He called primary substance each one of the particular individuals and parts which have been discussed above and with which the divisions of species end, e.g., when one speaks of Socrates alone, or separately of Plato, or of any other thing, animate or inanimate, which has individual subsistence²²³. All things like that the Philosopher designates in his treatise on the ten genera as primary substances. What he calls secondary substances, on the other hand, are their species and genera, namely universal man and universal horse, and also the genus of the latter, e.g. when one says, "what is living and animate".

221 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.27–36.2: διαλέξεται δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐ περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ κρείττονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ θεολογίας) οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀπλῆς καὶ χείρονος τῆς συνθέτου (τοῦτο γὰρ φυσιολογίας), ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς συνθέτου καὶ σχετικῆς (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.27–50.1).

222 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 35.12–18: πρώτην τάξιν ἔχει ἡ οὐσία ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων αὐτὴν προέταξεν· αὕτη γὰρ συνεισφέρεται μὲν ταῖς λοιπαῖς κατηγορίαις, οὐ συνεισφέρει δὲ αὐτάς, καὶ συναρεῖ μὲν αὐτάς, οὐ συναρεῖται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅτι αὕτη ἀθύποστατός ἐστιν, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐσης οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι κατηγορίας, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὐσης οὐ δυνατόν τὰς ἄλλας ὑποστῆναι (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 49.5–22).

223 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.2–4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–3.

179 So, in a nutshell, primary substances are all particular things which have self-subsistence, while all their species and genera are called secondary substances. Here arises not a small problem of how substance is divided into primary and secondary. But before we proceed with this question properly, we shall first outline all possible ways in which division of any kind becomes possible.

[Types of division]²²⁴

180 Now, everything that is divided is divided either as (a whole) into its parts, or as a genus into species, or as an ambiguous word into different objects (signified by it)²²⁵. Also, when something is divided as (a whole) into its parts, sometimes it is divided into parts that are similar to one another, and sometimes into such ones that are dissimilar. What I mean is this. Bone, wood, bronze, and everything else like that are divided into similar parts, since the parts into which each thing of this kind is divided are in every way similar to each other, save for their large or small size only. Everything that is composed of objects that are not similar is divided into dissimilar parts. E.g., man's and animal's body is divided into head, breast, arms, belly, and legs, i.e. into parts that are dissimilar both to the whole and to one another²²⁶.

181 Now, a genus is divided into species, as we usually divide substance into body and incorporeal, and further into animate body, living being, plants, and all other species like that. Also, an ambiguous word may be divided into different objects that are signified by it, just as we said above that the name

224 The same classification appears in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–82.4; idem, *In Cat.* 38.1–2; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.19–22.

225 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.1–2: τῶν γὰρ διαιρουμένων τὰ μὲν ὡς γένος εἰς εἶδη διαιρεῖται, τὰ δὲ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς φωνῆ ὁμώνυμος εἰς διάφορα σημαίνόμενα. The Syriac adjective *šhima*, “dusky”, is an uncommon rendering for ὁμώνυμος, “ambiguous (or homonymous)”, and Sergius probably applies it here in order to explicate the meaning of the Greek term.

226 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.17–23: ...ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται ἢ εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (καὶ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ μὲν διαιροῦνται φλέβες, ἀρτηριαί, ὅστ᾽ αὐτὰ γὰρ διαιρούμενα ἔχει τὰ μέρη καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοια καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ δέ, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, ὅτι τοῦ σώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστί κεφαλή τὸ δὲ χεῖρ τὸ δὲ πούς)...

“dog” is divided into the astral, the terrestrial, and the marine one, and finally into a painted or carved image of it²²⁷. These are all things that differ from one another in their nature, while the word signifying them is the same.

182 Thus, since everything that admits of division is divided by means of one of those three types, and it is impossible to find anything divisible that will not fall beneath one of them, it is therefore worth considering which of these types is applied in the division of substance into primary and secondary. Now, I state that (substance) is divided not as (a whole) into parts, neither into those that are similar nor into those that are dissimilar. For otherwise, it would be necessary that there should be another substance that would be divided into them as into its parts, and it would be proper that our teaching about it would be prior to them²²⁸.

183 Neither is substance divided here into the primary and secondary one as a genus into species. For among species that derive from the same genus there are no such ones that are prior or posterior; but one may make their division starting from where one wishes, since all species are related (to a certain genus) without any notion of prior and posterior. Therefore, if some substance is primary and another secondary, it is obvious that this division may not be established like that of (a genus into) species²²⁹.

184 Neither is it possible to state that the division of substance is like that of an ambiguous word into objects whose natures are not similar to one another. For substances are not only similar to one another in name, but their definition and their nature is also the same in every respect²³⁰.

227 See §118. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 81.23–82.1: ἡ ὡς ὁμόνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαίνοντα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν, τοῦ κυνὸς ὁ μὲν ἐστὶ χερσαῖος ὁ δὲ θαλάττιος ὁ δὲ ἀστρῶος.

228 Thus, Sergius states that primary and secondary substance may not be considered as parts of other entity which would equally be called substance and be prior to them. Cf. a rather different argument in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.7–10 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.9–14.

229 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.2–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 53.24–54.9. Just as in the previous paragraph, Sergius’ argumentation differs considerably from what we find in Ammonius and Philoponus.

230 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.15–22; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 54.25–31.

185 Thus, since it is neither as (a whole) into parts, nor as a genus into species, nor as an (ambiguous) word into different objects (signified by it) that substance is divided into primary and secondary, it seems that the problem remains to a large extent without solution. Therefore we shall say that it is not a division of substance that Aristotle makes when he says that one of it is primary and another secondary, but only suggests an order (τάξις) of what comes first and what comes second in it²³¹. For numerical order differs from division made of a universal thing that is consequently divided into particulars.

[Primary and secondary substances]

186 However, after this, it is time to raise the following puzzle: Why, in fact, if 2a34–2b6 universal things are more honored everywhere among the philosophers than the particulars, does the Philosopher place here particular substance first and after that at the second place write about the universal one? One may answer to this that those things that are primary by nature are posterior to us, while those ones that are posterior by nature are primary to us²³². Thus, he calls particular substance primary not because this is what it naturally is but because it is primary to our senses. For this is what we see first and thus proceed to inquire into the universal ones which are naturally primary. He also calls particular substance primary because, since his account here is addressed to those who have recently started education, it is obvious that it is primary for those who have not yet learned to comprehend anything beyond their senses²³³.

187 Now, after he has made the composite substances subject to his talk here and has shown that some of them are primary and particular and some are secondary and universal, he further gives praise (καλῶς) to the primary

231 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 38.21–22: φαμέν οὖν ὅτι τάξιν παραδίδωσιν αὐτῆς, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.1).

232 Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* I 1, 184a10–b14 and *An. Post.* I 2, 71b32–72a5. Cf. also §20 of Porphyry's treatise *On Principles and Matter* preserved in Syriac (Arzhanov 2021: 90–91).

233 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 36.10–13: ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ὡς πρὸς εἰσαγομένους, τοῖς δὲ εἰσαγομένοις σαφέστερα τὰ προσεχῆ, εἰκότως τὴν μερικὴν πρώτην εἶπεν ἐν τῷ παρόντι· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν μερικῶν ἀναγόμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 50.1–14).

substance as to something that is more honorable than everything else²³⁴. For he says that the other nine genera of the categories are all its accidents that acquire subsistence in it and may never come to be apart from it, because if it is taken away from them they will also disappear and perish. Thus, since it is the reason for their subsistence, it is obvious that it is more honorable than they. For if there were no individuals or bodies which may be seen and grasped and which pertain to the primary substance, how would any quantity or qualification and quality²³⁵ appear, e.g., the size of one or two cubits, or any kind of number and measure, or white and red colour, or hot and cold, or any other accident at all, since all of them and everything like them acquire their subsistence in particular bodies, which are primary substances, and may never exist without them. That is why the primary substance is more honorable than all accidents, for it is set for them as a certain nature in which they subsist. Moreover, he says that the primary substance is also greater than the secondary one, since if the former did not exist there would be nothing that might be predicated of it²³⁶.

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Now, secondary substance, as we have said above, is further divided into species and genera. And he demonstrates to us many times that genera are predicated of species, while species in turn (are predicated) of particular individuals that are subsumed beneath each one of them. E.g., we are accustomed to say that Socrates is a man, just as Plato and each one of us, and also that every man is a living being, while every living being is an animate body. Thus we consider Socrates to be a particular individual and a primary

2b7–28

²³⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–29. Philoponus states that Aristotle wishes “to sing praise (ἐξυμνήσαι) to primary substance and to demonstrate that it is properly (καλῶς) said to be substance primarily”.

²³⁵ Cf. §§91, 354–355, and 365, where Sergius discusses various Syriac terms for quality. Here, he applies both *zna* and *muzzaga* as synonyms.

²³⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 40.23–41.17; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 55.26–56.12. Ammonius stresses (*In Cat.* 41.16–17) that, while Aristotle makes primary substance more honorable than both universals and accidents, the philosopher makes a distinction between them, applying the expression “to be said of” to universals and “to subsist in” to accidents (καλῶς ἔταξεν ἐν μὲν τοῖς καθόλου τὸ λέγεται, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι τὸ ἔσται). Since in the whole Book III Sergius does not comment on these expressions which appear in the text of the *Categories*, but speaks instead of universals, particulars, accidents etc., he does not focus on the distinction between predication and subsistence.

substance and predicate a general species of him, i.e. that he is a man, and further predicate a general genus of the general species, i.e. that a man is a living being or that a man is animate²³⁷.

189 Thus, as we have said, genera are predicated of species, while species (are predicated) of particular individuals which are primary substances. The secondary substances, on the other hand, are genera and species that are predicated of primary substances. This makes it apparent to everyone that, if there were no primary substance, then there would be nothing of which secondary substance might be predicated. That is why Aristotle states that primary substance is greater than all accidents, and also greater than secondary substances, which are genera and species. It is greater than accidents, on the one hand, since they have their subsistence in it, and it is greater than the secondary substances, on the other, since, even though they are universals, they are predicated of the primary (substances), and if the latter did not exist, there would be nothing that they might be predicated of, so that they would remain as if non-existent²³⁸.

190 So, after he has praised primary substance as superior to everything, he says that, since secondary substance is divided into species and genera, we ought to know that something that exists as a species is in turn greater than what exists as a genus. Though it is inferior to primary (substance), since it is proximate to it, it is superior to the one which is remote from it²³⁹.

237 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 41.26–42.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 57.24–25.

238 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.7–13.

239 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 42.10–20; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.5–17.

191 That species stands closer to primary substance than genus is evident to everyone. For if someone is asked what is Socrates, he will naturally answer that he is a man. If, in turn, he is asked what is man, then he will give an answer that it is animated and rational living being. Thus, for the first question he will take a species in order to characterize Socrates, who is a primary substance, while for the second one he will make use of a certain genus. This makes apparent that species are closer to primary substance than genera, and because of this he stated that the former are greater than the latter²⁴⁰. Further, he said that (species) are greater than (genera) due to the fact that genera require species of which they are predicated, while species do not require genera, for they are not predicated of the latter but are only encompassed by them.

[Accidents are not tertiary substances]

192 So after that, one may be inclined to turn back to what (Aristotle) has stated before and perhaps raise the following puzzle: If particular individuals are primary substances, while species and genera are secondary substances, why are accidents not also called tertiary substances? He resolves this puzzle in an indirect and obscure manner²⁴¹. However, as we have expounded above, we shall not simply repeat without understanding what has been written by him, but shall try to interpret it with the power of our intellect by means of reasonable demonstrations, so that what is written might become clear to everyone. 2b29–3a6

193 Now, the puzzle which we just mentioned may be solved in two ways which make apparent that it is not proper to call accidents substances. One way of solving this puzzle is the following. Species and genera are naturally predicated

²⁴⁰ Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 59.21–25.

²⁴¹ Aristotle does not explicitly mention this puzzle. However, as is explained in the commentaries of Ammonius and Philoponus, its solution may be deduced from the philosopher's words. For the solution's two approaches, the one from the relation of accidents to primary substances and the other from analogy, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–44.4 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–63.9. Sergius' account turns out in some details to be closer to Philoponus rather than to Ammonius.

of substances, which are primary in the proper and principal sense, and they resolve questions about them by signifying them, but accidents never work like that. What I mean is this. Socrates, Alcibiades, and others like them are particular individuals and they are called primary substances. So, when someone asks what Socrates or Alcibiades is, the immediate answer would be that each one of them is a man, and also living and animate. Thus, it is by means of species and genera, which are secondary substances, that you pose questions about primary substances and by means of them you signify them²⁴².

194 But if to that person who asked what is Socrates or what is Alcibiades an answer were given that he is white, or black, or bald, or tall, or any of those things that are concomitant (for them) accidentally and not by nature, then it will be apparent that it does not signify what the person is about whom the question was raised. So it has become evident by now that species and genera signify by nature particular individuals that are primary substances, while accidents never work like that. That is why the Philosopher has properly established species and genera as secondary substances, but he does not call accidents substances, since, as we have said, they are naturally unable to signify for us what is found in species and genera, when we ask about a primary substance²⁴³.

242 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.20–26: νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν λέγει δι' ἣν τὰ μὲν γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη δευτέραι οὐσίαι λέγονται, οὐκέτι δὲ τρίτας οὐσίας λέγει τὰ συμβεβηκότα. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν κατασκευάζει διχῶς, ἕκ τε τῆς σχέσεως τῆς πρὸς τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς σχέσεως, ὅτι τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας ἀποδιδόντες οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν διὰ μόνου τοῦ γένους ἢ τοῦ εἶδους ἀποδιδόντες· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτην ἀνθρώπου εἰρηκότες ἢ ζῶον οἰκείως ἀποδώσομεν καὶ γνωριμώτερον... (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.16–20).

243 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 61.26–29: ...ἐὰν δὲ ὅτι λευκὸς ἢ τρέχει ἢ τι τοιοῦτον εἴπωμεν, ἀλλοτρίως καὶ ἀγνώστως ἀποδώσομεν. εἰκότως οὖν τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τὰ γένη δευτέρας οὐσίας λέγομεν ἅτε μόνα σημαίνοντα τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα ὅλως οὐ φαμεν οὐσίας ἅτε μὴ δηλοῦντα τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.20–22).

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 10 אֶחָד] om. P 13 אַרְבָּעָה LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD 15 אַרְבָּעָה¹ LP, Epit.: אַרְבָּעָה BD
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195 Another way, then, to solve this puzzle is the following. Particular individuals are called principle and primary substances, because, as he states, they are subjects for species and genera which are always attached to them, since, if there is a particular individual of any kind, then genera and species are always attached to it. For instance, if there is Plato or Aristophanes, it is obvious that there is also man, living being, and animate, which are species and genera. Thus, particular individuals serve as subjects for species and genera through which they are made known and which are predicated of them. Also, species and genera, which are secondary substances, are subjects for accidents which occur to them. Accidents, on the other hand, do not appear to be subjects of anything else that would occur to them or be known through them²⁴⁴.

196 So, from this, it becomes apparent that, while particular individuals are called primary and principle substances, since they are subjects to species and genera which subsist in them, and further species and genera are called secondary substances, since they are naturally predicated of primary substances and since they serve as subjects for accidents which subsist in them and are made known through them, accidents, on the other hand, are subjects for nothing else that would subsist in them but they themselves always require substances in order to subsist in them, — it is reasonable, then, that species and genera are called secondary substances after the primary ones, while accidents are not considered to be tertiary substances and not even mentioned in the order (τάξις) of substance²⁴⁵.

[Definition of substance]

197 Now, having established the order of substance, having explained which 3a7 kind of it is primary and which one is secondary, and having demonstrated

244 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.3–10: οὗτο τὸ δεῦτερον ἐπιχείρημα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας. φησὶ δὲ ὅτι ὄν τρόπον αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται πᾶσι τοῖς παρ' αὐτάς, οὕτως καὶ αἱ δεῦτεραι τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ λέγομεν Σωκράτην φιλόσοφον, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον φιλόσοφον λέγομεν καὶ ζῶον φιλόσοφον. ὥστε καὶ αἱ δεῦτεραι οὐσίαι ὑπόκεινται τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι, καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα κατ' αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως μὲν τῶν ἀτόμων κατηγορεῖται, ὡς φησι καὶ ὁ Πορφύριος, κατὰ δεῦτερον δὲ λόγον καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν. τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐδέποτε ταῖς οὐσίαις ὑπόκεινται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 43.24–44.4).

245 Cf. a more elaborated version of the same argument in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 62.10–63.9. See particularly Philoponus' conclusion in 63.6–9: εἰκότως οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἐκλήθησαν τρίται οὐσίαι τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἅτε μὴ ὑποκείμενά τινα πρὸς ὑπαρξιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν οὐσία κατὰ συμβεβηκότος κατηγορεῖται, παρὰ φύσιν <φαιμέν> εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην κατηγορίαν.

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 3 מטהר L: מטהר P: מטהר B: מטהר D 7 מטהר BDL:
 מטהר P 9 מטהר BL: מטהר DP 15 מטהר BDL: מטהר P 17 מטהר BDL: מטהר P
 מטהר LP: מטהר BD 18 מטהר + מטהר B 19 מטהר LP: מטהר BD 20 מטהר BDL: מטהר
 P 21 מטהר BDL: מטהר P 23 מטהר B: מטהר L: מטהר
 D: מטהר P | מטהר BDP: מטהר L

clearly that the primary one is principal and the secondary one is second in the order in its subsistence, while accidents may in no way be called substances, — after that, the Philosopher wishes to give a definition of the substance about which he teaches in the treatise *Categories*²⁴⁶. For the proper sequence of this teaching requires that one first makes divisions of that issue which he wants to speak about and after that precisely defines it by carefully drawing its limits based on everything that was firmly established in the divisions²⁴⁷.

198 This is also the order in which he proceeds, for he first teaches on substance by way of division and in so doing he always consequently defines it. But since every definition that is correctly made always sets a genus as its principle and foundation, it is obvious that one is not able to provide a proper definition of substance, which is not only a genus but a most generic genus, for it is impossible for a man to find another genus that might be set as a principle of its definition²⁴⁸.

199 For if, as we have said, every definition takes genera of things as its beginning and foundation, it is apparent for everyone that in that case where no genus of a thing may be taken, it becomes impossible to make a definition either. And because there is no other genus above substance which may be predicated of it, since it is a most generic genus, it is obvious that a man is never able to provide its proper definition, as he does not have another genus which he might take and make a foundation of the definition.

200 What then? Since the sequence of teaching required that Aristotle provide after the division of substance also a defining account of it, but we have just

246 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.6–8: διελὼν τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς τε τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν δευτέραν καὶ παραβαλὼν αὐτὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλας, νῦν εὐτάκτως ποιῶν τὸν ὀρισμὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.12–14).

247 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 35.10–13. While commenting on *Isag.* 1.5, Ammonius talks about four methods of reasoning: division, definition, demonstration, and analysis/synthesis.

248 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.14–17: ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ οὐσία γένος ἐστὶ γενικώτατον, ὀρισμὸν αὐτῆς οὐ δύναται ἀποδοῦναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς ἐκ γενῶν καὶ διαφορῶν λαμβάνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ ἀπλῆς οὐσίας οὐκ ἔστι γένος εὐρεῖν διὰ τό, ὡς εἴρηται, γένος εἶναι αὐτὴν γενικώτατον (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.8–10). Sergius does not mention differentiae here, but does below, in §513.

shown that it is impossible to carry out a definition of substance, has his teaching about it become crippled and obstructed, or has the order of his account that requires that one always provide a definition after a division become confused? Not at all. But since he truly grasped that no definition of substance is possible, he reasonably refrained from giving a definition — which is, as we have said, always composed of genus and of other things which are concomitant to it²⁴⁹ — and turned to the property²⁵⁰ of substance which serves here in the function of a definition²⁵¹.

201 And this is what he did not by chance but with great skill, since property in its nature more than anything else resembles definition. For a definition, as we have already said above²⁵², does not exist unless it is convertible with what it defines. For instance, everything that is a man is a mortal rational animal, and everything that is a mortal rational animal is a man. In the same way as definition a property always converts with that whose property it is²⁵³. We will explain this by means of examples shortly afterwards.

202 Thus, since property, as we have said, always resembles a definition, the Philosopher gives the property of substance instead of its definition in his whole teaching on it. In so doing, he provides us with a general rule (κανών), that every time when we are compelled to give a definition of something but are unable to do it, we shall refrain from a defining account and turn to the property of things, which will in case of insufficiency perform sufficient service. But since we mentioned property but have not until now explained at all what it is, it is necessary for us not to pass by hastily but to dwell on it, lest the order (τάξις) of the exposition of the teaching be confused.

249 The last expression by Sergius refers to the constitutive differentia. Cf. the quotation from Philoponus in the previous footnote.

250 Or a distinctive feature, Gr. τὸ ἴδιον, Lat. *proprium*.

251 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–18.

252 See §154.

253 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–24.

[Property]²⁵⁴

203 So, let us now bring our account of substance to a halt, going briefly beyond it, and turn to the division of the property, also explaining clearly what it is, how many types of it are defined, and when and where it comes to be, so that, after we have explained in general the whole notion of it, then we will apply it without fear, since we will properly understand it. It appears not only in the teaching on substance, but also in all other treatises and writings produced by the Philosopher, as well as by certain other authors. Thus, as soon as we learn what property is in general and of what kind it is, we may obviously make concrete use of it, while nothing will hinder us in understanding it, since general knowledge is easily and without obstacle combined with particular cases.

204 Now, we find in the writings of the ancients that types of property are altogether four²⁵⁵. However, only one of them is fully and precisely property, while the other three are used in a secondary and more common sense everywhere without distinction. So, the first kind of property is what occurs to one species alone as a whole, while it turns out not to exist actually in every particular individual that is encompassed by it. For instance, knowledge of medicine, philosophy, geometry, and any other particular discipline occurs only to the whole species of men, although it does not pertain to every person but only to those who have received particular education. Thus, it is called a

254 After §203, mss. BD have the subtitle: “On what property is and how many types of it exist, which one is called (property) in the strict sense and which one figuratively.”

255 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–22 as commented by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 108.22–110.6 and Elias, *In Isag.* 89.4–90.28. Sergius’ account follows closely what we find in the commentary on the *Isagoge* ascribed to Ammonius.

property of the human species, because it belongs to it alone and does not occur to any other species²⁵⁶.

205 Further, the second kind of property is what occurs to all individuals that are in a species, while it pertains not only to them but also to some other species. For instance, man is biped and this is what occurs to all men. Thus, we say that this is proper to them for it belongs to all of them, although there are many birds that are biped as well²⁵⁷.

206 Further, the third kind of property is what occurs to the whole species and also to individuals in it, although it occurs to them not always but at a certain time only, for instance turning grey in old age. For this is what occurs to the species of men alone and to all of them, although not always but during old age, as we have said. Hence, this is also proper to men alone, for it does not occur to any other species save for it²⁵⁸.

207 So, the fourth kind of property, which is truly property in the strict sense, contains all of it at once, i.e. it occurs to the whole species and to all individuals in it, and also not sometimes but always, while it is not attributed to any other species or individual except those ones that it is spoken of. For example, laughing for men, neighing for horses, barking for dogs, and other things like that occur to one species alone and to all individuals in this species, and it occurs to them not sometimes but always. For even if a man is not actually

256 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.13–14. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.13–15: καὶ ἔστιν ἐν μὲν σημαινόμενον καὶ πρῶτον ὁ μόνῳ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεῦειν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν τὸ γεωμετρῆν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων.

257 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.14–15. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.15–17: δεῦτερον δὲ ὁ παντὶ μὲν, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πετεινοῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ δίποσιν εἶναι.

258 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.16–17. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.17–19: τρίτον δὲ ὁ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ ἀλλὰ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιουῖσθαι· μόνῳ γὰρ καὶ παντὶ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεὶ πεπολιώται, ἀλλ’ ἐν γήρᾳ.

laughing, he is nevertheless called capable of laughter, since he has this ability potentially and any time he wants can make it actual²⁵⁹.

208 Thus, we say that the first kind of property is the one which occurs to one particular species but not to all of it. For instance, sciences belong to the nature of human beings, even if not all of them learn them. The second kind is the one which occurs to all of a species but not only to it, as being a biped belongs to human beings. For although this is characteristic of all human beings, it occurs also to birds. Furthermore, the third kind is the one that occurs to one species alone and to all of it, however not always but at a certain time, as turning grey in old age. For this is characteristic of the species of man alone and also of all of the species, though it occurs to them not always but when they grow old. The fourth kind, which is the property in the strict sense, is the one which occurs to one species only, and to all of it, and always, as when we speak of human beings being capable of laughter or of horses being capable of neighing. For each one of these occurs to one species alone, to all of a species, and always²⁶⁰.

209 So, for the sake of learning and training in words, let us put it also as follows. The first kind of property is what occurs to one species but not to all of it. The second one is what occurs to all of a species but not to it alone. Further, the third one is what belongs to one species and to all of it but not always. And property in the strict sense is the fourth one, in which all these things coincide, namely that it occurs to one species alone, and to all of it, and not at a certain time but always. So, this is the property strictly and truly²⁶¹.

259 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.17–20. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.19–23: τέταρτον δὲ ἐφ’ οὗ συνδεδράμηκε καὶ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικόν καὶ κυνὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν. τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον λέγεται κατὰ δύναμιν, οὐ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν· οὐ γὰρ καθὸ γελᾷ ἢ χρεμετίζει, γελαστικόν λέγεται ἢ χρεμετιστικόν, ἀλλὰ καθὸ πέφυκε.

260 In this paragraph, Sergius’ summary of the four kinds of property is particularly close to Ammonius, *In Isag.* 109.19–23, quoted above.

261 Cf. the schematic division suggested by Ammonius in *In Isag.* 109.9–12.

210 Similar to definition, property always converts in the figure (σχῆμα) of speech with what it relates to²⁶². For every human being is capable of laughter, and all that is capable of laughter is a human being. Similarly, all that is capable of neighing is a horse, and everything that is a horse is capable of neighing. And in all other cases like that properties are in the same way reciprocally related to what they belong²⁶³. But (the figures of speech of) three other kinds of property do not reciprocate in themselves like that, and thus they should be called properties not in the true and strict sense like this one, but rather figuratively. And that these figures of speech do not reciprocate will be clear from what follows.

211 So, the first (kind of property) is what belongs to one species but not to all of it, as sciences to human nature, and it does not reciprocate. For everyone who has knowledge of sciences is a human being, but not every human being has knowledge of sciences, since there are many who have not learned them. Likewise, the second (kind) which belongs to all of a species but not to it alone, as when a man is called a biped: all that is man is designated as biped, but not every biped is a man. And similarly also with the third kind which belongs to one species and to all of it at a certain time, for all that turns grey is a man but not every man necessarily turns grey.

212 Hence, as we have said, none of these kinds converts in itself and because of this they are called properties in a loose sense. The fourth one, on the other hand, since it converts in itself, as we have shown, is truly property. It is in every respect similar to the nature of definitions because it pertains exclusively

262 Cf. Ammonius and David on definitions: Ammonius, *In Isag.* 88.22–26; David, *Prolegomena* 15.27. In his commentary on *Isag.* 12.13–22, Ammonius does not go into the question how properties may be applied for definitions. However, Elias dwells on this issue in Elias, *In Isag.* 89.9–11: ὀρισμὸν γὰρ μιμεῖται καὶ ὑπογραφὴν τῷ ἀντιστρέφειν, καὶ ἐπειδὴ ὀρισμὸν μιμεῖται, οὐσιῶδες, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑπογραφὴν, ἐπεισοδιῶδες· ἢ γὰρ ὑπογραφὴ ἐκ συμβεβηκότων.

263 See Porphyry, *Isag.* 12.20–22. Elias in his commentary on this passage again elaborates the question of the application of properties in definitions, since it is both characteristic of definitions and of some of the properties that they reciprocate with what they are related to, see Elias, *In Isag.* 90.14–28.

to one species, to all of it, and always, as it is also the case with definitions, and further, it is always convertible in the figure of speech, as they do too²⁶⁴. Hence, since nothing else appears as akin to the nature of definitions as the property in the strict sense, Aristotle instructs us that every time when we are compelled to give definitions but are unable to do this we ought to apply this kind of property instead of defining method²⁶⁵. For it is what he applies here for the first time, in the teaching on substance, making use of it in the whole account instead of a definition and by means of it defining and establishing the concept of substance.

[*Properties of substance*]

- 213 Now that we have explained why it was necessary that Aristotle made use of the properties of substance instead of defining it, we shall return to the order of the exposition. So, the first property²⁶⁶ which Aristotle sets out is the following: substance is what is not in something else but everything is in it²⁶⁷. Further, its nature does not need to be subsistent in something else, but all other things, which are generally speaking accidents and speaking particularly are nine other genera of the categories, have subsistence in it. For substance is truly subject for everything else whose nature is beyond it and it is receptive to all accidents, while nothing else is a subject for it (as something) in which its nature might subsist, but it is sufficient for its own subsistence, and hence there are also things that may have subsistence in it. 3a7–21
- 214 However, someone critically examining what has been said may polemically suggest a counter-argument by saying²⁶⁸: “Look, the secondary substances, which are genera and species, have subsistence of their nature in the primary 3a21–28

264 See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.17–21: διὰ τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἀποδίδωσιν· ἔοικε γὰρ τοῦτο ὀρισμῶ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ὀρισμὸς μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἔστιν ὀρισμὸς, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὀριστὸν ἀντιστρέφει, οὕτως καὶ τὸ ἴδιον μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, οὗ ἔστιν ἴδιον, καὶ ἀντιστρέφουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα. διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι βούλεται (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 44.10–15).

265 Cf. §§200–201, above.

266 Aristotle is speaking of what is “common” (κοινὸν) to all substances, admitting later on (see *Cat.* 3a21) that this characteristic is also shared by differentiae. Ammonius suggests, however, that there is no contradiction here, since what Aristotle meant at this point was “belonging to all substances” (*In Cat.* 44.19–21, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 63.24–31). Sergius apparently accepts Ammonius’ interpretation of this passage.

267 Sergius paraphrases *Cat.* 3a7–8: κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι.

268 Aristotle himself anticipates the counter-argument mentioned by Sergius in *Cat.* 2a21–28, suggesting a distinction be made between the substance and the differentia (διαφορά). In so doing, according to Ammonius, Aristotle states that differentiae are not accidents but substances (see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.7–46.19; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 64.9–68.9).

577r: 215
 5
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577r: 215
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577v: 216
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3 BDP: 5 L 6 BDL: P 7 BDL: P 8 BDL: P 9 BDL: P 10 BDP: L | LP: BD 11 LP: BD | BDL: P 12 BDL: P 14 BDL: P 15 om. P | om. B 18 BD: P: L 20 BDL: P 21 om. BD 22 BDL: P

substances, which are particular individuals. Do not we assume from this that the nature of the secondary substances has subsistence in the primary ones, which brings to nought the statement which has been made that substance does not subsist in anything else but is self-sufficient for its own subsistence?"²⁶⁹

215 In response to this we shall say the following. If secondary substances have their own subsistence in the primary ones, it becomes necessary to take also accidents into account, thus (assuming that Aristotle) intended to say in this passage also how they subsist. But this is clearly wrong, for it is obvious to everyone that, when species and genera are predicated of a primary substance, they share with it their names and definitions. Accidents, however, are never able to have this effect, but some of them do not even share their name with the substance which they are predicated of. And even if there are among them such ones that sometimes provide (a substance) with their name, no accident is ever able to share the definition of its nature with the substance which it is predicated of.

216 What I mean is this. Universal man, which is a species, and also animate, which is the genus of this species, are predicated of Socrates, who is a particular individual and a particular substance, and they provide him with their name and their definition, for Socrates is called man and animate, and also the definitions of man and animate are said of Socrates. Whiteness or blackness, on the other hand, or any other accident sometimes do not even provide the substance of which they are predicated with their names, neither do they ever provide it with their definitions. For even if a body is called white or black due to some whiteness or blackness in it, the definition of each one of these colours

269 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.21–25; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.13–16.

is different from that of the thing which they are predicated of, and it is never possible that the definition of one of these qualities will fit the substance it is predicated of. For otherwise, substance and accident will prove to be one and the same thing, which cannot be.

217 Thus, another property concomitant of substance is²⁷⁰, as we have just said, 3a33–3b9 that it shares its name and its definition with everything it is predicated of²⁷¹. This is characteristic, namely, of none of the other nine genera, save for substance alone. For quantity, quality, and the rest of them sometimes do not even provide with their names what they are predicated of, and sometimes, even if they do provide it with their names — for instance, the body containing whiteness is called white or the one containing sweetness is called sweet — still they never share their definitions with what is receptive of them. Substance, on the other hand, makes everything it is predicated of a partaker in both its name and its definition²⁷². Thus, universal man that is predicated of Socrates makes him a partaker in both its name and definition, for Socrates is called a man, and the definition of man fits him. And in the same way every substance that is predicated of something provides it with its name and its definition.

218 However, this property does not seem to pertain to all substances, but only to the secondary ones, namely species and genera, for they are predicated of primary substances, which are particular individuals. The latter, however, have nothing else beneath them of which they might be predicated. For Socrates and Plato are not predicated of anything else, while universal man that is a species,

270 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 69.22–23: ἐπὶ δεύτερον παρακολούθημα μεταβαίνει τῆς οὐσίας καταγνούς τοῦ προτέρου (see also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.19).

271 In the corresponding passage, Aristotle says that it is a characteristic of both substances and differentiae that things predicated of them are called synonymously (συνωνύμως). Sergius neither applies this term in his commentary nor mentions the differentiae, but stresses instead that the property in question is exclusively characteristic of substance. Ammonius and Philoponus are eager to stress that differentiae here should be understood as substances too and not as accidents, so it is natural that Sergius apparently subsumes them under the category of substance and does not mention them explicitly.

272 See *Cat.* 2a20. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.27–28: τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὐσιωδῶς κατηγορουμένοις τὸ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος μεταδίδοναι τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ. See also §120 where Sergius speaks of synonyms as things which share both name and definition.

living being and animate that are genera and species, and on up until substance that is a universal genus are predicated of them and of each other²⁷³. That is why we shall put it as follows: it is a characteristic of every substance which is predicated of something that it provides the latter with its name and its definition. In this way, our account will become correct and it will be universal.

219 After this²⁷⁴, Aristotle solves a certain problem which someone might wish to raise against him, when he says that we should not be confused by the fact that the parts of substance are in substance. One might state that, since accidents are in substance and also the parts of substance are in substance, the parts of substance are therefore accidents as well. But, although substance is composed of parts, substance would thus become one of the accidents, which is impossible²⁷⁵. 3a29–32

220 Now, let us recall what we have defined above when we stated that one says that a thing can be in something else in eleven ways, and one of them was as parts of something in the whole, while another one was as accidents in substance²⁷⁶. Thus, even though parts of substance are in substance and also accidents have subsistence in substance, nevertheless the mode (of being in something) as parts and the one (of being in something) as accidents differ from one another. For parts are something through what and from what is constituted the nature of substance in which they are. Accidents, on the other hand, are not complete of the substance they are in, but on the contrary, they are completed by the substance and have their subsistence in it²⁷⁷.

221 However, it should be known that some parts of substance are intelligible and some are perceptible²⁷⁸. The perceptible parts of primary substance are what become subject to sense. For instance, the feet, the thighs, the belly, the

273 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.26–48.11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 70.3–22.

274 In the transmitted text of the *Categories*, this argument precedes the characteristic of substance discussed by Sergius in §§217–218. Philoponus, however, notes that “some of the commentators” suggest that this passage of the *Categories* should be placed before 3a21–28, where Aristotle makes a distinction between substance and differentia (Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.23–29). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 47.5–13 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 97.2–23. Both Ammonius and Simplicius reject this suggestion and defend the order of Aristotle’s text. However, their notes make it possible that Sergius’ remark is based on an alternative commentary tradition.

275 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 46.25–47.24 and Philoponus, *In Cat.* 68.16–69.19.

276 See §§138–149, above.

277 Cf. Philoponus on substances, differentiae, and accidents: ὅτι δὲ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ὁμολογουμένως αἱ διαφοραὶ, δῆλον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ συμπληρωτικῆς αὐτὰς εἶναι τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ οὐσιωδῶς κατ’ αὐτῶν κατηγορεῖσθαι· εἰ γὰρ συμπληροῦσι τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ οὐσίαι εἰσὶ δηλονότι· οὐ γὰρ συμπληροῖ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ συμβεβηκότα (*In Cat.* 66.13–16).

278 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17: φαμέν οὖν ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ νοηταὶ αἱ δὲ αἰσθηταί.

breast, the hands, and the head are such parts of the body. The intelligible parts of both a particular and universal man, on the other hand, are being reasonable, living, and animate. For both a particular and universal man is composed of them and they are his parts which are completive of the subsistence of his nature. Thus, while both intelligible and perceptible parts are in substance, they are not in the same way in it as accidents are, but in a different one, as we have said shortly before²⁷⁹.

222 Further, another property concomitant of substance is, as the Philosopher says, that it “signifies a particular this”²⁸⁰. It is an expression of pointing out, as if one would point with a finger at something which has individual subsistence²⁸¹. So, “a particular this” points out an individual which falls under our senses and is clearly perceived²⁸². But this is not characteristic of accidents, since they are comprehended and differentiated from substance by means of intellect only and not by means of senses. But neither does it seem to be a concomitant of every substance, since secondary substance, which is, as has been shown, species and genera, does not fall under sensation, and it does not signify one thing either, since it is multiple things that a species encompass, (to say nothing of) a genus (which encompasses) many more than it. Thus, it turns out that this property too is a concomitant not of every substance, but only of the primary, which is particular individuals, as we have demonstrated earlier²⁸³.

223 After this, he sets out another property as a concomitant of substance, when he says that it seems that “it is also characteristic of substance that there is nothing contrary to it”²⁸⁴. No substance, indeed, has a contrary. For what

279 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17–46.10.

280 *Cat.* 3b10: τόδε τι σημαίνειν. The quotation by Sergius does not correspond to the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories* (which is generally the case with Sergius’ text), but matches exactly with the version that George bishop of the Arabs produced in the early 8th century, which makes possible that George was familiar with Sergius’ *Commentary*.

281 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 48.15–16: καὶ ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὸ τόδε τῆς δειξέως σημαντικόν, τὸ δὲ τὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.18–19.

282 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.1–2: τὸ γὰρ τόδε τι λέγεται ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσίας, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τῆς ἀτόμου τῆς φαινομένης. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 71.20–21.

283 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.3–9; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 72.1–4.

284 See *Cat.* 3b24–25: ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. The quotation by Sergius again does not match fully with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*, although both versions apply here the term *dalqubla* as an equivalent to the Gr. ἐναντίος, “contrary”. In §419, where Sergius makes a distinction between opposition and contrariety, he applies this term as a translation of the Gr. ἀντικείμεθα, “being opposite”, with the term *saqqublay* for ἐναντίος. However, both here and in what follows (see §304) Sergius makes use of the term *dalqubla* in the sense of contrary, which reflects the same tradition that is found in the anonymous Syriac translation.

might someone think of as contrary to Socrates in that he is Socrates, or contrary to Aristotle in that he is Aristotle, or in general contrary to man in that it is man? For it is not as hotness is contrary to coldness, or as whiteness to blackness, or as sweetness to bitterness that a man is contrary to a man in that he is man, or to any other particular thing. Neither is anything else contrary to him in that he is man. For every contrariety and opposition²⁸⁵ exists among qualities, i.e. among colours, tastes, and other things like that, while substance is receptive of all them. Thus, nothing is contrary to it and it is not contrary to anything²⁸⁶.

224 However, this too seems to be characteristic not of substance alone, but of quantity as well, since there is nothing contrary to it either, unless someone says that large is contrary to small, or that the number fifteen is contrary to the number ten because the former is bigger than the latter. For, as the Philosopher demonstrates later on, these things are not contrary to each other but belong to the genus of relatives, since each one of them is said in this way due to their relation to something else, and they do not have any subsistence as contraries. Thus, since they are not contraries either, as we are going to demonstrate in the account of them, it is obvious that, as we have said, not only do contraries not pertain to substance, but neither (do they pertain) to quantity²⁸⁷.

225 Further, he states that it is a concomitant of substance that it is not said to be more and less²⁸⁸. It follows from the previous one, because, if there is nothing contrary to substance, than it is obvious that neither does it admit of a 3b33–4a9

285 Syriac *dalqublayuta w-saqqublayuta*. Sergius applies these Syriac terms the other way around in §419, while defining contrariety as one of the types of opposition.

286 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.13–27.

287 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 49.13–21; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 74.27–75.10.

288 Cf. *Cat.* 3b33–34: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἐπιδέχασθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

more and a less. For it is always through the lessening of one of the contraries that another one becomes more²⁸⁹. For instance, every time that black changes into white or bitter into sweet, it is through the lessening of blackness that the increase of whiteness happens, and also it is through the lessening of bitterness that the increase of sweetness happens. And likewise, the lessening of whiteness and sweetness leads to the enlargement and increase of bitterness and blackness. Hence, what is sweet or white admits of more and less even without what is contrary to them. For it is said of one and the same thing that it is white and that it became more white, and also that it is sweet and became more sweet, and in the same way of every quality. It becomes obvious from this that more and less appear where there is opposition²⁹⁰.

226 But this is not the case for substance. For Socrates is never said to be more or less Socrates or to be more or less a man. Neither is Plato said to be more a man than Socrates or that Socrates is less than Plato, since each one of them is a man. However, it is possible to say that one and the same man is sometimes greater in virtue, wisdom and any other qualities and sometimes not. And in the same way, it is possible to say about different things that one of them is more or less than the other. But about being a man, one may never apply a more and a less speaking of himself, neither may this be said of another person. Hence it becomes clear that substance does not admit of a more and a less²⁹¹.

227 Though, as he says, it is not the case that one substance is not greater than the other — since he established the primary substance as greater and more

289 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.10–13: ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἡ ἐναντιότης, ἐν τούτοις τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον, ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἐναντιότης: ὑφέσει γὰρ τοῦ ἐναντίου τίκεται τὸ μαχόμενον. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 75.14–17.

290 Philoponus (*In Cat.* 75.17–30) specifies that not all contraries admit of a more and a less, but only “those which are naturally able to be mixed with one another” (ὅσα τῶν ἐναντίων πέφυκε μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις).

291 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 50.18–51.3; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 76.2–77.9.

principle than the secondary one — still it becomes apparent that in relation to itself the same substance is never said to be more and less. However, I suppose that this too is not a property of substance only, but of quantity as well. For number ten too does not admit of a more and a less in that it is number ten. But if one adds to it or subtracts from it, it will become another number and not remain the same number ten which becomes more or less²⁹².

228 The last of all properties which he sets out as an attendant of substance is the fact that “what is one and the same is receptive of contraries”²⁹³. Substance is indeed receptive of all contraries but not simultaneously. For it is not possible that one and the same substance be receptive of whiteness and blackness or sweetness and bitterness simultaneously, but rather (it may be receptive) at some time of one thing and at another time of the other. And it will be receptive of them not in the same way as qualities, for qualities are not receptive of one another, but when one of them perishes the other one comes to be. For instance, blackness is not receptive of whiteness, but when the former perishes the latter comes to be. Similarly, hotness too is not receptive of coldness, but the dissolution of the former results in the appearance of the latter. 4a10–21

229 This, however, is not the case for substance. Rather, while its nature by itself remains without change²⁹⁴, it receives all the contraries, as we have said, though not simultaneously but one at a time. Thus, Socrates, who always remains one and the same, is able to be sometimes white and sometimes black, sometimes warm and sometimes cold, sometimes foolish and sometimes wise, and similarly with everything else. Hence, it is an attendant feature of substance only that, while it is the same and one, it may be receptive of contraries²⁹⁵.

292 Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 77.10–24.

293 See *Cat.* 4a10–11: τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὄν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν. As was previously the case, the quotation does not match with the early anonymous Syriac translation of the *Categories*. It has no equivalent for the word ἀριθμῷ, and it is thus likely that the quotation derives from the Greek commentary which Sergius utilized for his work, cf. the omission of ἀριθμῷ by Ammonius in *In Cat.* 52.12.

294 Literally: “without corruption”. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.6–7: ταῦτόν δὲ ἵνα μὴ μεταβάλλῃ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν (= Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–10).

295 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 51.5–13; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 79.9–80.12.

- 230 Here, however, one might object that this is not only attendant on substance, but also on any statement uttered by means of words and also of a belief²⁹⁶. For when someone states that Socrates is sitting or believes it about him, if the latter happens to be sitting then the statement and the belief about it will be true, but if he happens not to be sitting then both of them will be false. Hence both a statement and a belief, while each one of them remains the same and one, are receptive of contraries, namely of truth and falsity²⁹⁷. 4a22–27
- 231 However, it is not in the same way that substance is receptive of contraries and that one speaks here of a statement and a belief. For substance remains by itself when it receives contraries²⁹⁸, as we have said, but this does not hold at all for statements and beliefs. A statement, namely, perishes in the same moment when it is uttered, and also a belief has no independent existence at all. That is why they are not receptive of contraries either, but each one of them becomes associated with the truth and falsity of real things, because if the thing really is as a statement or a belief say then they are true, but if it is not then they are false²⁹⁹. 4a28–4b19

[Conclusion]

- 232 Now, with all that has been said thus far, the Philosopher fulfilled the need for a definition of substance, as we have said above. So, since it proves impossible for a person to provide its definition, because it is a primary genus, he ought to turn to the properties attendant on it through which he should

²⁹⁶ Aristotle himself anticipates this objection, so that Sergius' text looks as a paraphrase of the corresponding passage of the *Cat.* 4a22–23: εἰ μὴ τις ἐνίστατο τὸν λόγον καὶ τὴν δόξαν φάσκων τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

²⁹⁷ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 52.16–53.6; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 80.24–81.9.

²⁹⁸ Sergius again paraphrases Aristotle's text, see *Cat.* 4a29–30: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.

²⁹⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 53.20–24; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 81.22–82.23.

teach about it according to his ability. For it is distinctive property, as we have shown in this book³⁰⁰, that is more similar to definition than anything else.

233 Also, you shall always remember that our teaching here pertains not to all substances which exist but to those ones which are composite and visible, and it skilfully contributes to the knowledge of those who have recently started their education³⁰¹.

End of Book Three.

Further, the divisions of Book Three

First division

Everything that is in something else is said:

- either as in a time,
- or as in a place,
- or as in a container,
- or as parts in a whole,
- or as a whole in its parts,
- or as species in a genus,
- or as a genus in species,
- or as forms in matter,
- or as the governing in the governor,
- or as in an end,
- or as an accident in a substance.

³⁰⁰ I.e. in Book III of the *Commentary*.

³⁰¹ See §§173–176, where Sergius explains in detail the types of substances and specifies which ones among them are the subject of the *Categories*. Cf. also Ammonius, *In Cat.* 45.17–46.10, where Ammonius explains why Aristotle made no mention of differentiae in the *Categories*.

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פאלך ד.ה.ז.י.מ

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ:

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ

אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

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טובותיו

הענין ד.ה.ז.י.מ

מלכותו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

למען אהבה ורחמים - אהבה ורחמים

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פאלך ד.ה.ז.י.מ

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אין הנהגתו כדרכו

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אין הנהגתו כדרכו - אהבה ורחמים

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אהבה ורחמים

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אהבה] om. BD 17 הענין BP: הענין D 18 הענין הענין BP: הענין D 19 הענין] om.
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Second division

Of substances:

- some are simple:
 - either superior to the composite ones, i.e. divine substances,
 - or inferior to them, i.e. matter and form as considered separately by themselves;
- and some are composite:
 - particular individuals, e.g. Plato and Socrates,
 - genera and species, e.g. universal man, living, animate.

Third division

Everything is divided:

- either as an ambiguous word into different objects, e.g., into the terrestrial, the marine, and the astral dog, and the one which is painted or carved;
- or as a genus into species, e.g. animal into man and all other animals;
- or as (a whole) is divided into parts:
 - either into parts that are similar to one another, like bone, wood, and other things like this;
 - or such ones that are dissimilar to one another, like feet, hands, head, and so on.

Fourth division

Property:

- either occurs to one species but not to all of it, as all sciences;
- or to all of a species but not only to it, as being biped;
- or to one species and to all of it but not always, as turning gray in old age;
- or to one species, to all of it and always, as man being capable of laughter or horse being capable of neighing; this is property in the strict sense.

Fifth division

Properties that are attendant on substance are:

- that it is not in something else but everything else is in it;
- that it provides everything it is predicated of with its name and its definition;
- that it clearly signifies a particular this;
- that nothing is contrary to it;
- that it does not admit of a more and a less;
- that, being the same and one, it is receptive of contraries.