

תְּהָרָתְּךָ גְּזָרָה וְתְּהָרָתְּךָ גְּזָרָה וְתְּהָרָתְּךָ גְּזָרָה  
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BOOK TWO

*[Introduction]*

49 In the previous book, which was the first one of the present treatise, O brother Theodore, three points<sup>72</sup> were discussed and examined in detail. The first one of them concerned the proper division of all philosophical knowledge. The last one of them was a refutation of those who present the logical craft as a certain part of philosophy or as both a part and an instrument. And in the intermediary point, which was the second one, we provided a precise division of all the writings of Aristotle. This division which properly proceeded and descended from the universal (works) to the particular ones ended with those writings that were composed about the logical craft which we have demonstrated to be an instrument (öpyavov) of philosophy. These writings, in turn, we correctly divided into three parts and we properly stated that some of them precede the craft of demonstrations, some are written about this craft, and some are composed about those things that are in every respect useful for this craft<sup>73</sup>.

50 Now, it seems to me, O brother, that it is necessary to dedicate this whole book, which is the second one of the present treatise, to the goal of those writings that closed this division, and particularly to those of them which are set as preceding this craft, for they come first and are therefore set before logic<sup>74</sup>. However, in order to make this clear for those who encounter the present

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72 Syr. *reše*, Gr. κεφάλαια, “headings”.

73 Cf. §28, above.

74 What Sergius means are the treatises *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior Analytics*, which form the first group of Aristotle’s “instrumental” works and which Ammonius characterizes as focusing on the principles of the logical method (τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου), see Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–7.

51 [الطبعة الأولى](#) | [الطبعة الثانية](#) | [الطبعة الثالثة](#) | [الطبعة الرابعة](#) | [الطبعة الخامسة](#)

5 የዕለታዊ ሪፖርት የዕለታዊ ሪፖርት የዕለታዊ ሪፖርት የዕለታዊ ሪፖርት የዕለታዊ ሪፖርት  
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מִלְּאָמָר חַתְּמָה מִבְּרָכָה גַּם־בְּרָכָה לְמִתְּבָרָךְ מִתְּבָרָךְ:

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15 תְּמִימָם הַלְּלָלָה רְמִימָה תְּמִימָה גְּזִינָה תְּמִימָה לְמִימָה  
גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה גְּזִינָה

20 .**ଏମ୍ବେଟ୍, ଟାଟାର୍ ଏବଂ ଏଲ୍ଲାର୍ . ଏମ୍ବେଟ୍, ଟାଟାର୍ ଏବଂ ଟାଟାର୍**

כָּלְבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה  
כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה כְּלָבָּנָה

treatise, I have started to write about this issue a little bit above, so that it might be explained and revealed to the readers.

*[The goal of logic]*

51 Now, one should know that the goal of the whole logical craft is to produce true demonstrations by means of correctly aggregated statements<sup>75</sup> about each thing that is in the world. But since, as we have said, philosophy is divided into two parts, i.e. into theory and practice, we ought to know that the completion of practice is choosing what is good, while the completion of theory is the true comprehension and knowledge of all existing things. Thus, because a certain contrariety is associated with each of them, i.e. with the completion of both practice and of theory, we require logic as an intermediary in order to distinguish the true completion of each part of philosophy from what is contrary to it<sup>76</sup>.

52 For if, as we have said, the completion of practice is choosing the good, it is obvious that what is opposite to good is bad. So, we need logic in this practical part in order to distinguish good from bad, so that while seeking the good we might not choose the bad and abandon the good because of our ignorance. It is clear, namely, that no one would by his own will prefer to turn to the bad and abandon the good. But it is what this craft demonstrates to be good that is truly good, and it is also what it demonstrates to be bad that is necessarily bad. Hence logic appears for us in this practical part as an instrument by means of which we distinguish between natural good and the bad that is truly bad<sup>77</sup>.

75 I.e. syllogisms. Syr. *mamilla mqaṭṭra* literally renders the Gr. συλλογισμός as “aggregation of statements”, cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.10–12: τὸ τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὄνομα οὐχ ἀπλοῦν τι δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ σύνθετον (συλλογὴν γάρ τινα λόγων σημαίνει).

76 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.29–5.3: θεωρητικά μὲν ὅσα περὶ τὴν διάκρισιν ἔχει τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψευδοῦς, πρακτικά δὲ ὅσα περὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ. ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ τὸ θεωρητικὸν ὑποδύεται τινὰ ὡς ἀληθῆ μὲν δοκοῦντα μὴ ὄντα δὲ ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν ὁμοίως τινὰ τῷ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κεχρωσμένα ὄντα μὴ ὄντα ἀγαθά, δεῖ ἡμῖν ὄργάνου τινὸς τοῦ διακρίνοντος τὰ τουαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.23–30.

77 Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.10–18: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ὡς ἔφαμεν, τὸ μὲν ἔστι θεωρητικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν, καὶ τοῦ μὲν θεωρητικοῦ τέλος ἔστι τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τεῦξις, ἀμφοτέροις δὲ παρυφίσταται τὰ ἐναντία, τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ τὸ ψεῦδος τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ψυχὴ ἄτε δὴ ἀτελῆς οὖσα αἰρεῖται πολλάκις ἀντὶ μὲν ἀληθείας τὸ ψεῦδος οἰομένη αὐτὸ δὲ ἀληθές εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακὸν οἰομένη αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἐδέησε τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὄργάνου τινὸς διακρίνοντος τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψεύδους τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 10.15–22; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.19–25).

காந்தி காலங்கள் : காந்தி காந்தி காலங்கள் 53

ମୁହଁ ରେଣ୍ଡା କରିବାର ପାଇଁ କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା

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תְּהִלָּה, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ هُمُ الْأَوَّلُونَ إِنَّمَا يُنْهَا إِلَيْهِمْ مُّنْهَى الْأَوَّلِينَ

الله يحيي الموتى والحياة يحيي الموتى

so called the central and the outer cities.

କବ୍ୟଶର୍ମ, ପ୍ରକାଶକ କାନ୍ତିକ କବିତା କବିତାକୁ କାନ୍ତିକ କବିତାରେ ଲାଗିଥାଏଇଲା

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53     Concerning the other part too, i.e. theory, since theory is the true knowledge of all existing things, it is necessary to know that it has a contrary too, namely ignorance. That is why also here we are in great need of the logical craft that serves for us as a precise rule (*κανών*) by means of which we separate truth from falsehood<sup>78</sup>. For it is what has been demonstrated by means of logic to be true that we may accept with sound confidence as knowledge of things. And also it is what has been revealed by means of demonstrations to be false that we may cast out from our memory of what is true. So, in this rational part there is logic too which always keeps us from taking falsehood as truth and from considering truth to be falsehood.

54     It is clear, therefore, that without logic nothing that we judge humanly may either be properly distinguished or comprehended. For unless a person speaks through the divine spirit, his teaching requires logical demonstrations to make listeners believe it<sup>79</sup>. And since, as has been shown, logic is an instrument which in theory clearly separates truth from falsehood, while in practice differentiates good from bad, this Philosopher wished before his other writings about all this — i.e. about all the practice and about the theory of natures, mathematical sciences, and all spiritual beings — to produce this logical craft that would serve as an instrument to each one of them<sup>80</sup>.

55     Now, because logic is a proper demonstration, while the proper demonstration results from syllogisms that are correctly formed, but what precedes syllogisms is another kind of composition, i.e. by two or three words<sup>81</sup>, and what in turn precedes it are simple words, because of this Aristotle began in his writ-

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 10.21–22: ὡσπερ γνώμονί τινι καὶ κανόνι χρώμενοι τὰ μὴ ἐφαρμόζοντα ἀπωθῶνται· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις.

<sup>79</sup> Sergius stresses this point again in §450, at the very end of his commentary, where he points out that logic is unnecessary only for those people who “through the exercise in righteousness would gain divine power”, but is consequently of paramount value for everyone else.

<sup>80</sup> Thus Sergius makes the point that logical treatises form the beginning of the study of philosophy, which is one of the introductory questions discussed in the *prolegomena* texts, cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.29–9.13 and 9.31–10.2.

<sup>81</sup> I.e. premises (Gr. *αἱ προτάσεις*), cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 11.1–3: ὁ δὲ συλλογισμός, ὃς ἥδη εἴρηται, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν πρᾶγμα ἀλλὰ συλλογή ἐστι λόγων καὶ συντίθεται ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ρήματων, αὕτερον εἰσὶ προτάσεις. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.31–11.1.



ings on the logical craft with a teaching on these simple words. After that he taught about their first and simple composition<sup>82</sup>, and after that he consequently taught about syllogistic from which demonstrations result. So, further after that he provided the teaching on demonstrations, and further after that on those things that are in every way useful for the constitution of demonstrations<sup>83</sup>. He did that not spontaneously or by chance but with skill and knowledge, and this will become quite obvious for you from what follows.

56

In any kind of craft the end of theory is the beginning of practice, and also the end of practice results in the beginning of theory<sup>84</sup>. What I mean is this. If an architect is ordered to build a house, he will reflect about it in his mind by saying: “I was ordered to construct a roof that will serve for protection against wind, rain and any other kind of damage. But I will not be able to construct the roof unless I first establish bearing walls for it. And I will not be able to build the latter unless I first lay and make firm the foundation.” And thus he will first make the foundation, then build the walls, and then finally will put the roof above them which will be the end of the building. In this case the beginning of theory, i.e. of his reflection in mind, started from the roof and ended with the foundation, while the practice, which is the work of his hands, began from the foundation and resulted in the roof. Thus, as we have said a little earlier, the beginning of theory became the end of practice and the beginning of practice became the end of theory<sup>85</sup>.

<sup>82</sup> Sergius' emphasis on premises being “first and simple composition” of words finds parallel in Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's *On Interpretation* where he states that this treatise discusses “the first composition of simple words” (περὶ τῆς πρώτης συνθέσεως τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν). Further, Ammonius explains that he calls it “first”, since syllogisms should be considered as compositions of another kind, namely as “aggregation of statements” (οὐ μέντοι ἡ πρότι, ἀλλ' ἡ διὰ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνθεσιν γεγονότων λόγων ἀποτελουμένη). See Ammonius, *In De Int.* 4.5–10.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 11.1–8; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 10.24–11.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.33–15.4; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 8.11–28.

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.5–6: καθόλου γὰρ τῆς μὲν θεωρίας τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως γίνεται, ἐμπαλιν δὲ τῆς πράξεως τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

<sup>85</sup> The same analogy is found in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.5–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 14.5–22. Cf. also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 2.10–15.

କ୍ଷେତ୍ରକାରୀ ପରିବହନ ଓ ପ୍ରକାଶକ କମିଶନ୍ 57

57

محللها. مراجعته ينبع من مساعده تضليلنا. ونحوه ينبع لغة لاجدة.

የአዲስ አበባ የአዲስ አበባ ለ ማስተዳደር የኩል የኩል

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## تَعْلِمُ الْمُهَاجِرَاتِ

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الله يحيى العرش بحسب ما في المصحف والروايات

11. *Urticaria pigmentosa* (Hodgkin's disease)

1. *W. C. G. (1980) The role of the state in the development of the economy. In: J. A. C. G. van der Linde (ed.), *State and market in the development of the economy*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.*

لِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ هُمُ الْأَوَّلُونَ مَنْ يَنْهَا فَلَا يُنْهَى وَمَنْ يَنْهَى فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ

وَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ يَرَهُ وَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِنْ كُبُرَيْنِ أَكْبَارَيْنِ يَرَهُ

57 So that was the way in which Aristotle approached the logical craft. For first he reflected in his mind: “I wish to create an instrument for distinction that in practice will separate for me good from evil and in the knowledge of things will differentiate for me truth from falsehood. But since this instrument is a craft that brings forth all demonstrations constituted by means of words, it is evident that it is this demonstrative craft that I should create first. But because this demonstrative craft derives from syllogistic which is skilfully applied, I shall first teach about this. But since, further, it is from primary combination of words that syllogistic derives<sup>86</sup>, I must first write about it. But since this is in turn preceded by simple words, it is necessary for me to teach about them first.”<sup>87</sup>

58 So, in his reflection he started from the demonstrative craft and gradually descended to simple words. That is why he made simple words the beginning of the teaching about all these things<sup>88</sup>. After them he taught about the first composition of words. Further after that, he wrote about syllogisms which should be formed correctly and properly. And thus he taught about the craft of demonstrations, and after it about all those things that are in every way useful for it<sup>89</sup>. And he put the end of his practice with those things at the beginning of theory about them, just as he put the end of the theory of them at the beginning of the writings about them.

59 So, the book which he wrote about simple words is called *Q̄gwrys* (Κατηγορίαι, “Categories”). The one which is about their first composition has the title *Pryrmnys* (Περὶ ἐρμηνείας, “On Interpretation”). The one which is about

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.21–22: λόγοι μὲν γάρ τινές εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις, τῶν δὲ τοιούτων λόγων συλλογή ἔστιν ὡς συλλογισμός.

<sup>87</sup> Sergius' account is very similar to what one finds in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.16–28.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Simplicius, *In Cat.* 15.12–13: προηγεῖται οὖν ἡ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν θεωρία, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρκτέον τῷ τὴν ἀπόδεξιν δημιουργοῦντι.

<sup>89</sup> The expression “things that are in every way useful” (for demonstrations) refers to the last part of the *Organon*, cf. §28 above.

לְפָנָיו וְלִפְנֵי כָּל־עַמּוֹד אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְלִפְנֵי  
P18r כָּל־עַמּוֹד אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ וְלִפְנֵי כָּל־עַמּוֹד אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ וְלִפְנֵי  
L3v כָּל־עַמּוֹד אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ וְלִפְנֵי כָּל־עַמּוֹד אֶת־מִזְבֵּחַ וְלִפְנֵי

syllogisms is called *'nlwtyq'* (Αναλυτικά, “Analytics”), prior and posterior. The one which is about the craft of demonstrations is designated as *'pwdyqtyq'* (Αποδεικτικά, “Apodeictics”)<sup>90</sup>. The one which comes together with the latter is called *Twryq'* (Τοπικά, “Topics”). And the one which is about the refutation of the sophists (σοφισταί) has the title *Swpstyqw lnkw* (Σοφιστικοὶ Ἐλεγχοι, “Sophistical Refutations”). With it, thus, the Philosopher completed the whole logical craft which is, as we have said, an instrument of philosophy and not its part<sup>91</sup>. Some people say, though, that the *Craft of Rhetoric* (ρότορική) written by him also belongs to logic<sup>92</sup>.

60 But let us now turn to the subject matter and start speaking according to our ability about the goal of each one of these writings. Accordingly, we will start with the *Categories* which is about simple words and then approach each one of them in turn in the same manner. And afterwards, we will proceed to his other writings which pertain to the parts of practice, as well as to all natural and mathematical sciences, and other things that are called divine. In this way, we hope that we have brought out the goal of this treatise (i.e. the *Categories*), for this is what we intend to do when we speak briefly, as far as we are able, about all these matters, in accordance with our promise above.

*[Obscurity of Aristotle's language]*

61 After this, we shall additionally discuss the reason why the Philosopher employs obscure language in the greater part of his writings<sup>93</sup>. Some people state, namely, that this is the sort of language that he has and that his whole

<sup>90</sup> Thus Sergius refers twice to the same treatise, first calling it *Posterior Analytics* and then the *Apodeictics*.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 11.28–33: πρότερον γὰρ διαλέγεται περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν φωνῶν ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις, εἴθ' οὕτως περὶ ὄνομάτων καὶ ὥρμάτων καὶ περὶ προτάσεων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας, εἴτα περὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς συλλογισμοῦ ἐν τοῖς Προτέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς, εἴθ' οὕτως περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐν τοῖς Υστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς: ἐνταῦθα οὖν τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως, ὅπερ ἦν ἀρχὴ τῆς θεωρίας.

<sup>92</sup> Here Sergius shows his familiarity with the idea of the so called expanded *Organon*, which would also include the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*. The notion of the expanded *Organon* is characteristic of later Arabic scholars (e.g., of the writings of al-Farabi).

<sup>93</sup> This is one of the preliminary points (*prolegomena*) which the commentators that followed Ammonius' exegesis discussed before turning to the text of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 7.7–14 (no. 8); Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.17–28 (no. 7); Simplicius, *In Cat.* 6.30–7.22 (no. 7); Elias, *In Cat.* 124.25–127.2 (no. 9); Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.21–29 (no. 9).

62 **សំណើនៅក្នុងប្រព័ន្ធរៀបចំនិងការងារ** សំណើនៅក្នុងប្រព័ន្ធរៀបចំនិងការងារ

63 **اکنہم کو حل کر دیتے ہیں معلم و معلمی کر دیتے ہیں: لہ میں  
حلہ ملے لگے۔ اگر کتابوں کو ملکہ تھام لگے، گھر  
گلے کلے کلے: گورنمنٹ کے بھروسے تھام لگے۔**

disposition and his teaching has this kind of obscurity, so that even if he wanted he would not have been able to apply simple language in his writings. But they are clearly wrong because they do not comprehend the mentality of the Philosopher. For if the latter were like what they say then there would not even be a reason to make this inquiry. Indeed, if it were not deliberately that he employed this kind of obscurity but because that was his disposition, then it is obvious that there is no particular reason he chose this kind of path<sup>94</sup>.

62 We say instead that if it were like that, he would be seen to employ the same obscurity everywhere. But because we see that some of his writings — e.g., all his letters and the treatise that he composed about all phenomena appearing in the air<sup>95</sup> — are written in simple language which is not far from what I am using here, it is obvious that it was not that his disposition was like this, but that he deliberately made use of obscure language on some occasions. For it is clear to everyone that, if his disposition were like that and the reason for obscure language were not his will, then he would have equally applied it everywhere. But from the fact that sometimes he speaks obscurely and sometimes he teaches plainly we understand that he deliberately employed obscurity. That is why it is necessary for us to seek for the reason he embarked on the path of obscurity of language.

63 Now, they say that, just as those who are initiated in certain mysteries do not reveal them in front of everyone but perform them secretly in inner chambers in order to make them known only for those who are partakers of mysteries, so also he covered his whole teaching of logic and natures with obscurity

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<sup>94</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.21–22; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 7.10–22; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.22–24.

<sup>95</sup> I.e. the *Meteorology*. Philoponus and Olympiodorus point to the *Meteorology* and the *Topics* as examples of Aristotle's clear style. Elias mentions the *Sophistical Refutations*. Simplicius refers to the *Constitutions* and the *Letters*.



of words in order to make it known not for common and frivolous people, but for those whose mind is worthy of this kind of teaching and who strive with all their strength for the good<sup>96</sup>. Also, since he knew that those people whose mind is unstable, whose will is driven towards laziness, and whose inclination is towards bodily pleasures more than anything else, as soon as they see this kind of obscurity they will immediately shy away and cease their study of these matters. Conversely, when those who have a disposition for knowledge and are prepared for the study of existing things encounter obscurity, not only will they not shy away and cease, but will all the more strengthen their minds and apply themselves to great labour in order to enter the knowledge of those things which are spoken about<sup>97</sup>.

64 That is why he veiled his doctrine in the obscurity of words, (namely) in order to examine the nature of the disciples right at the beginning of their learning, i.e. whether they are dedicated to knowledge and worthy of discipleship or not. Having done that, he immediately made known the true disciples as distinct from those who were not worthy of discipleship<sup>98</sup>. So, this was the reason for his use of obscure language.

*[The goal of the Categories: Various interpretations]<sup>99</sup>*

65 Those who interpreted the treatise *Categories*, which is the first in the whole logical craft, did not agree on its goal, but each one of them chose for himself a particular reason among those things which are discussed in this treatise and thus believed that he was better at discovering the goal of this

<sup>96</sup> Ammonius (*In Cat.* 7.8–10) compares Aristotle's obscurity to a curtain in a temple which prevents persons who are uninitiated in the mysteries from entering it. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.26–28.

<sup>97</sup> Here, Sergius reproduces Ammonius' argument, see his *In Cat.* 7.10–14, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 6.22–26 and Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 11.26–30.

<sup>98</sup> The next preliminary question discussed by Philoponus and Simplicius (their order of the questions differ here from Ammonius and Olympiodorus, who discuss this point a little earlier) is what kind of person a student of Aristotle's writings should be. Ammonius answers it by saying that he should be educated and purified in soul (*πεπαιδευμένον τὰ ἡθη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κεκαθαρμένον*, see *In Cat.* 6.22–23), quoting later on *Phaedo* 67B where Plato points out that the pure should be separated from the impure. Sergius integrates this point into his discussion of Aristotle's obscurity of style. It is worth noting that Sergius quotes the same passage from *Phaedo* on another occasion, namely in his introduction to Galen's commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *On Nutriment*, see Bos & Langermann 2009.

<sup>99</sup> MSS. BCD include the subtitle: "On the goal of the treatise *Categories*". The question of the goal of Aristotle's treatise opened the list of the preliminaries related not to all of his philosophy (as was the case with the previous points) but to the *Categories* specifically. Cf. Olympiodorus' list in *Prolegomena* 18.18–21.

ملکہ تھیں ای ملک و وطنی۔ ملکے صیاد حلقہ حاصل کر کریں۔

لہ ہم میں تھے اور ملکہ ہم کا شہر تھا۔ ملکہ فتح علیہ رحمۃ اللہ علیہ

L4v      አጭዣ ስጠመ ስጠመ ተስተዋዋ ተስተዋዋ ተስተዋዋ ተስተዋዋ ተስተዋዋ

ପ୍ରମାଣର ପାଇଁ ହାତ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ

15 حمله. علّت نهاده زاده حم لکم لیسته له حمله

P19v      **לְאַתְּנָא גַּם חֲלֹתָה וְתִלְתָּה וְתִלְתָּה לְזִבְחָה.** וְתִלְתָּה

ତା ରୋମର ପାଇଁ ତ ପାଇଁ ଲ ରାଜ ପିଲାଙ୍କା ଉତ୍ସବରେ

የአዲስ አበባ የስነ ማመልከት በትኩረም ተስፋል የስነ ማመልከት

20 . የመስና ስለ ዘመኑ በዚህ ተ ለማስተካከል ተስተካክሏል

حَتَّىٰ كَمْ يَعْلَمُ حَلْمُهُ لَهُ لَمْ يَرَ حَدَّهُ حَلْمُهُ حَلَّ

book than his colleagues. It is about these things that I am going to speak from now on<sup>100</sup>.

66 What is simple is three in number, and knowledge about them shall come before everything else. These are simple things that are in the world, simple concepts which we acquire about them, and also simple words by means of which we signify them<sup>101</sup>. What I mean is this. Socrates, Plato, Alcibiades, or any other human being is said to be a simple thing, and likewise a stone, a piece of wood, and other objects. Subsequently, simple concepts of them are thoughts about each one of them that appear in us. And further, simple words that signify each one of them are names and designations which are imposed on them and by which they are known<sup>102</sup>.

67 So, things by their nature and concepts which we acquire about them exist naturally in the world, and therefore are the same everywhere. However, names and designations that signify these things do not exist naturally, but are established by communities of people who are gathered together, and because of that they are not the same in all nations<sup>103</sup>. Thus, stone, man, life, plant and any other thing, and also the ideas of each one of them that we acquire, are the same in all places and in all nations. But the names that signify them are not the same in every place. For things are called in one way by the Greeks, in other

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 8.20–9.1; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.23–27; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 9.5–7; Elias, *In Cat.* 129.7–9; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.21–25.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 18.25: τριτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἡ πράγματα ἡ νοήματα ἡ φωναί.

<sup>102</sup> On the imposition of names, cf. Porphyry, *In Cat.* 57.20–59.2.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Simplicius' note that Aristotle rejected the notion that names are established naturally (κατὰ φύσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀπογινώσκει) in *In Cat.* 13.26.

ગુરુદાલાલ હાલ કુલાં

وَالْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ

କମାର ଗାନ୍ଧାର ରାଜ୍ୟ କାଳେ କମାର ରାଜ୍ୟ କାଳେ କମାର ରାଜ୍ୟ 70

ମାତ୍ରାରେ ପରିପାତ ହେଲା ଏହାରେ କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା

way by the Persians, still in other way by the Indians, and still in other way by the Scythians, i.e., generally speaking, by each one of the nations. So names differ from each other, and you will not find a single name among two nations that signifies one and the same thing.

68 Now, some of those who have sought to reach understanding of the treatise *Categories* considered that it is to the simple things which we say to exist naturally that the goal of the treatise pertains, others stated that it is about simple concepts that the Philosopher had written this treatise, while still others that it is about simple words which, as we said, are signifiers of things<sup>104</sup>.

69 But those who stated that those were simple things that Aristotle intended to teach about in this treatise led themselves astray by the passage that appears close to the beginning of the book, in which he wrote: “Of things some exist universally and some particularly; and further some have subsistence in themselves and some come to be through these ones.”<sup>105</sup> So they say: “Behold, it is the division of things that the Philosopher makes at the beginning of the book! Hence it is evident that in this book he teaches about simple things.”<sup>106</sup>

70 Also those who assume that the teaching of the *Categories* is only about simple words derive this kind of assumption from another passage that is found at the beginning of the treatise. So, they say: “Behold, right at the beginning of the book he made a division of words when he said: ‘Of all things that are said, some are said in combination and some without combination.’<sup>107</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.27–29: τινὲς οὖν περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν διηγέχθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰρήκαστ περὶ φωνῶν μόνων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων.

<sup>105</sup> Sergius' words are a sort of a summary of *Cat.* 1a20–1b9 formulated in accordance with his interpretation of this passage at the beginning of Book III of his *Commentary*.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.5–7; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.33–9.4. In contrast to Ammonius and Philoponus who first speak about simple words and after that about simple things, Sergius reverts this order.

<sup>107</sup> *Cat.* 1a16–17: τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δὲ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς.

حَمَدَهُ اللَّهُ عَزَّ ذِيْلَهُ لِعَلَّهُ فَلَمَّا فَرَأَهُ لَسْرَهُ: 72

አዕላም ቤት የዕለም የዕለም ቤት የዕለም የዕለም ቤት 73

2 مَحَلٌ D 5 بَعْدَ BCDP: بَعْدَ L | مَلَكَتْ لِلَّهِ L: مَلَكَتْ لِلَّهِ C: مَلَكَتْ لِلَّهِ D:  
 6 بَعْدَ BDLP: بَعْدَ P: بَعْدَ B in textu, بَعْدَ بَعْدَ B in marg. 7 بَعْدَ BDLP: بَعْدَ C  
 8 بَعْدَ C 9 بَعْدَ om. L | بَعْدَ فَعَلَهُ BCDL: بَعْدَ فَعَلَهُ P 10 بَعْدَ [+] + وَمَن P  
 11 بَعْدَ مَلِمْ + بَعْدَ BCD | بَعْدَ L, Epit.: بَعْدَ CDP: بَعْدَ B 12 بَعْدَ  
 13 بَعْدَ om. L 14 بَعْدَ LP, Epit.: بَعْدَ BCD | بَعْدَ بَعْدَ  
 15 CDLP: بَعْدَ بَعْدَ B 19 بَعْدَ DLP: بَعْدَ BC 22 بَعْدَ وَمَن LP, Epit.: وَمَن بَعْدَ  
 BCD 23 بَعْدَ LP, Epit.: بَعْدَ BCD | بَعْدَ BCD, Epit.: بَعْدَ LP

Consequently, because ‘things that are said’ are nothing else than words and because it is this division with which he begins, it is evident that he is teaching about simple words.”<sup>108</sup>

71 Now, those who state that the goal of the treatise *Categories* concerns only simple concepts which we acquire about things receive a reason for what they want to say from various arguments<sup>109</sup>. There is no other way to speak about them than to interrupt our narrative here and to discuss those issues which we have mentioned just above.

*[Genera, species, and Platonic forms]<sup>110</sup>*

72 Philosophers do not agree with each other in their research about genera (*γένη*) and species (*εἴδη*), but in their teachings on these issues they have introduced a number of different concepts<sup>111</sup>. Now, Plato and all those from the Academy hold the following view on genera and species (*εἴδη*). They state that each thing that exists naturally in the world has a certain form (*εἶδος*) by itself, but it also possesses a form with its Creator<sup>112</sup> which gives subsistence to its essence and according to which it is imprinted and comes into being in the world. Additionally, when someone sees it, then he also receives its form in his memory, and it has subsistence in his mind. Thus, the same form appears in three ways, i.e. with the Creator, in the thing, and in the memory of the person who knows it<sup>113</sup>.

73 For example, they say that a carpenter or any other kind of craftsman first imprints inside his mind the forms (*εἴδη*) and shapes (*σχήματα*) of those things that are produced by him and then carves and furnishes them. And when someone else comes thereafter and sees his works, then he will bring them into his memory and capture and preserve them inside his mind. It will thus

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.3–5; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 8.29–33.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. the reference to *Cat.* 11b15 by Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.8. Sergius discusses this point of view below, in §80.

<sup>110</sup> This excursus by Sergius has a parallel in that section of Ammonius’ commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* which refers to *Isag.* 1.9–12. In the latter passage, Porphyry addresses the question of whether genera and species exist in reality or in bare thought. In answering this question, Ammonius turns to the Platonic teaching of Ideas, or Concepts, that are contained in the Intellect of the Demiurge, which Sergius associates with one of the interpretations of the *Categories*, namely the one that states that the scope of this treatise pertains to concepts alone.

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.24–26, who specifies that the disagreement is found between Plato and Aristotle.

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–6: δῆλον, ως ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὰ εἴδη. See also 41.20–21: ὁ γὰρ δημιουργὸς πάντα ἔχει παρ’ ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντων παραδείγματα.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.5–13.

1 **بَلْ** BCDL, Epit.: **بَلْ** P 2 **بَلْ** BLP, Epit.: **بَلْ** C: **بَلْ** D 3 **بَلْ** BCDL: **بَلْ** P, Epit. 8 **بَلْ** om. C 9 **بَلْ** BCDL, Epit.: **بَلْ** P 11 **بَلْ** BCDP, cf. **بَلْ** Epit.: **بَلْ** L | **بَلْ** BCDP, Epit.: **بَلْ** L 15 **بَلْ** BCDP, Epit.: **بَلْ** BD, Epit.: **بَلْ** BCDP: **بَلْ** L 16 **بَلْ** LP: **بَلْ** BCD 17 **بَلْ** BCDP, om. BCDP **بَلْ** LP: **بَلْ** BCD 18 **بَلْ** BCDL: **بَلْ** P 19 **بَلْ** BDLP: **بَلْ** C 23 **بَلْ** BCDL: **بَلْ** P

happen that they subsist in three ways, i.e. in the mind of the craftsman, in his works, and in the memory of another person who sees them.

74 In the same way, also the Creator of the universe (first) has essentially thought about the natural constitution of things<sup>114</sup>. When these thoughts emanated from the essence, they immediately became substances, and with them he imprinted, engraved, and established all things here. It is also through these primary thoughts that he is still constantly forming and constituting everything, applying his craft of creation. And we, humans, who come into being for a particular time, observe natural things, seek the knowledge of them, and retain concepts of them in our memory.

75 Now, they suppose that these thoughts which are considered to be substantially with the Creator are the primary genera and forms (*εἴδη*) of things. And those imprints and engravings that are generated from them here in the matter of natures they designate as natural genera and species of things. And further, those concepts of things that are collected in our memory as knowledge of them they call posterior genera and species of things<sup>115</sup>.

76 In order to further explain this subject matter more clearly, I will immediately provide another example which they introduce. For instance, let there be a ring, they say, with an engraved image (*εἰκών*) of a particular person. Then someone takes a large amount of ordinary wax (*κηρός*) and make with that ring multiple imprints on all that wax. After that, also another person who has not seen the ring will come and see the imprints on the wax, put together the images of all of them, and save them in his memory. So, it is obvious that in this case the image will exist in three ways, namely first on the ring, after that on the wax, and then finally in the memory of the person who came and saw the

<sup>114</sup> Thus, the Platonic Forms are associated by Sergius with the Demiurge's thoughts, the notion which apparently belonged to Ammonius, and later on (see §75) he also identifies the thoughts of Demiurge with the primary genera and species, or forms, of the existing things. This identification allows Sergius to further explicate the system of genera and species in the ontological terms, cf. his further excurses in ontology and logic in §§129–133 and 241–242.

<sup>115</sup> Ammonius speaks in his commentary on the *Isagoge* of the forms that are in the Demiurge and that are “prior to the many” (*πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν*), forms that are “in the many” (*ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς*), and those which are imprinted in our thought and are “after the many and last-generated” (*μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ὑστερογενές*), see Ammonius, *In Isag.* 42.6–13 (cf. Elias, *In Isag.* 48.15–30). Philoponus discusses this issue in the context of primary and secondary substance, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 58.13–21.

1 **የአዲስ BCDL:** **የአዲስ P 2** **የBCDL:** **የP 3** **al L:** **የom** **ל BCDP**  
 4 **የአዲስ BCDL:** **የአዲስ P 6** **የLP:** **የP BCD** | **የBCDL:** **የom** **P**  
 8 **የአዲስ BCDL:** **የአዲስ P:** **የom BD add. in marg.** | **የBCDL:** **የom L:** **የBCDP**  
 [የP] **om. C 9** **የBCDL:** **የBCDP** **P:** **የBCDP** **B 10** **የBCLP:** **የom D** | **የBCDP**  
**BCDL:** **የom P 11** **የBCDP:** **የL 12** **የom L:** **የom P:** **የBCDP** **BCDL:** **የom P 15** **የom**  
**BCD** | **የP** + **የom P 13** **የBCDP:** **የom LP** | **የom BCCL:** **የom P** **BCDP:** **የom L:** **የom**  
**BCDP:** **የom L 16** **የLP:** **የom BCD** | **የom LP:** **የom**  
**BCDP:** **የom BCD** | **የom BCCL:** **የom P 18** **የBCDP:** **የom L 21** **የBCDP:** **የom CL:**  
**BCDP:** **የom B:** **የom D:** **የom P:** **የom BP:** **የom CD:**  
**የom L**

wax. While the image on the ring is one both in its form ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\o\zeta$ ) and in number, what derives from it on the wax are multiple images that differ from each other, not in form but in number. And further, in the mind of the person who finally saw them on the wax it will again be united and become one image that is derived from many<sup>116</sup>.

77 Thus, also the genera and species ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$ ) of things exist with the Creator of beings, like the image on the ring. They are imprinted and established in the natures of things through (his) activity<sup>117</sup>, like the images on the wax. And then we come to the knowledge of natures and collect inside our intellect genera and species ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$ ) of each thing among natural beings. Just as the image on the ring is singular, so also all the forms ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$ ) of things with the Creator are simple. And also, just as the singularity of the image which is on the ring is divided into multiplicity on the wax, so also each one of the simple forms ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$ ) which are with the Creator is divided in the matter of natures into countless individual items<sup>118</sup> which differ from one another not in form — for the form of all of them is one — but in number through which they are divided from one another in their unity. And inside our intellect, from multiple individual beings which are divided from one another only in number the species ( $\varepsilon\iota\delta\eta$ ) of things are again summoned, and they appear as singulars which are acquired from the multitude.

78 So this is how all followers of Plato's ideas teach about these things. But Aristotle and all the Peripatetics, to whom also Alexander of Aphrodisias be-

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<sup>116</sup> The same example is used by Ammonius, see *In Isag.* 41.13–20.

<sup>117</sup> Ms. P: “creation”. A marginal commentary in mss. BD: “matter”.

<sup>118</sup> Syr. *qnome*, “individuals, persons”.

1 ﻚـ BCDL: ﻚـ P | ﻪـ BCDL: ﻪـ P; + ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDL: ﻮـ L, D in  
 marg.: ﻮـ BCDL: ﻮـ P 3 ﻪـ BDL: ﻪـ C 4 ﻮـ BCDL: ﻮـ C  
 5 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 6 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 7 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 8 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 9 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 10 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 11 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 12 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 13 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 14 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 15 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 16 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 17 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 18 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 19 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L  
 20 ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L | ﻮـ BCDP: ﻮـ L

longs, do not acknowledge at all those primary forms (εἶδη) which are with the Creator. However, they completely accept those ones which are in matter and in our intellect, and it is about them that their whole teaching is. They name those (forms) which are in matter natural, and those ones which are in our intellect they call noetic and posterior. Thus, in all their writings about natures they teach about natural forms (εἶδη) because they are the nature and the subsistence of things. On the other hand, in those writings which they have composed on the whole craft of logic, they introduce those genera and species (εἶδη) which, as we have said, are called noetic and posterior, because they have subsistence only in intellect and in speech.

79 Therefore, in the teaching on the whole logical craft you ought to investigate those species (εἶδη) and genera whose subsistence is only in intellect, as we have said. These are the subject of all the books on logic, and it is about their divisions that I will speak shortly afterwards.

*[The goal of the Categories: Conclusion]*

80 But now we shall return to what we began to speak about. We began to say, namely, that some people consider the goal of the treatise *Categories* to pertain only to simple concepts. And when they intend to bring forth a proof for that, they do it in the following way. They state that, if it is the ten genera which comprise everything that exists in the world and which are also called “categories” that (the author) intended to speak about in this treatise, then, since the genera that are considered in the logical craft are those concepts which are

ମେଲାଗା: ଏକ କଟକ କଟକ କଟକ କଟକ କଟକ କଟକ କଟକ 81

D66r كِلَّا : إِنَّمَا تَعْرِفُ الْمُطَهَّرَاتِ لِمَا حَطَّتْ مِنْهُنَّ وَلَا يَرَوْنَ إِلَّا مُطَهَّرَاتٍ

بـ 77r حل قـمـه قـلـه حلـسـه، قـلـه حلـسـه، مـلـه مـلـه حلـسـه، قـلـه حلـسـه،

وَمَنْ حَلَّ فِي الْأَرْضِ مِنْ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ فَمَنْ يَرَهُ فَمَنْ يَرَهُ حِلٌّ لِّرَبِّ الْأَرْضِ وَمَنْ يَرَهُ فَمَنْ يَرَهُ حِلٌّ لِّرَبِّ الْأَرْضِ

۸۲ جمیع حقوق ملکیت اسلامی را حفظ و احترام کنید

10 **فَتَبَرَّأَ هُنَّا** هُنَّا تَحْتَهُ وَ**فَتَبَرَّأَ هُنَّا** هُنَّا مُحْلِفُهُمْ

تسلم الله تعالى وعلمه. حملت الله تعالى وعلمه

P23r .**גָּבְעָם** מִתְּהִלָּה רְבִיבָה וְעַתָּה **לְפָנֶיךָ** רְבִיבָה **גָּבְעָם**

20 **جعفریان** نظریه ایجاد ارزش در کتابخانه

collected from things in the memory, it is evident that the goal of the whole treatise concerns simple concepts<sup>119</sup>.

81 However, those who correctly comprehended the goal of this treatise, among whom was also Iamblichus, stated that it was neither simple things only, nor simple words only, nor simple concepts only that the goal of this treatise concerned, but all of them together, i.e. it concerns simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts<sup>120</sup>. So much for the goal of this treatise.

82 Now, since the teaching here is about simple words which signify simple things by means of simple concepts, does this mean that the Philosopher introduced at this point an endless number of words, things, or concepts? For, behold, there is such a number of them as would be impossible to encompass! However, this is not what the knowledge of philosophers aims at, because they always establish general rules (κανόνες) in order to encompass multiple things for the sake of proper understanding of their activities. Therefore, in his teaching on these things Aristotle too fled from the unlimited number of words, and elevated his teaching to their primary genera that he took as general rules by which he would be able to skilfully and intelligently accomplish his teaching<sup>121</sup>.

83 At this point, we will conclude what just above was intended to explain briefly for the reader what the general content of this book is.

<sup>119</sup> See Philoponus, *In Cat.* 9.4–8: οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων νομίσαντες διαλέγεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, οἵος ἐγένετο ὁ Πορφύριος, φασὶν ὅτι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος: ταῦτα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς θεωροῦνται καὶ εἰσὶν ὑστερογενῆ, ἄτινά ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διανοίᾳ: περὶ νοημάτων ἄρα ἐν τούτοις τῷ Αριστοτέλει ὁ λόγος (cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.7–11). Here, Philoponus applies the same terms which Ammonius used in his commentary on the *Isagoge* when speaking of the third kind of forms according to the Platonists, see §75.

<sup>120</sup> Sergius' text corresponds nearly verbatim to Philoponus, *In Cat.* 9.12–15: οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὃν εἰς ἔστιν ὁ Ιάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὕτε περὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὕτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων οὕτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινούσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοημάτων. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 9.17–18; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 19.35–20.12.

<sup>121</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 12.1–4. Ammonius discusses this subject at length in the *prolegomena* part of his commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, see *In Isag.* 17.1–20.15.

תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה לְתְּהִלָּה וְתְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה 84

תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה לְתְּהִלָּה לְתְּהִלָּה לְתְּהִלָּה לְתְּהִלָּה

B77v תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה

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C116r תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה

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P23v | D66v תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה

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תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה

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20 תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה תְּהִלָּה

1 תְּהִלָּה BDL: תְּהִלָּה P: om. C | תְּהִלָּה...2 תְּהִלָּה CDLP, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה B 2 תְּהִלָּה BCDP,

Epit.: תְּהִלָּה L 5 תְּהִלָּה BCDL, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה P 6 תְּהִלָּה LP, Epit., corr. in marg. in BD: תְּהִלָּה

BCDE | תְּהִלָּה LP: תְּהִלָּה BCD | תְּהִלָּה BP, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה CDL | תְּהִלָּה BCLP, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה D

תְּהִלָּה BCDE, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה P 8 תְּהִלָּה + תְּהִלָּה L 9 תְּהִלָּה BCDE, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה P

תְּהִלָּה BCDE, Epit.: תְּהִלָּה LP: תְּהִלָּה C: תְּהִלָּה B: תְּהִלָּה D 12 תְּהִלָּה L:

10 תְּהִלָּה BCDE: תְּהִלָּה P: תְּהִלָּה BCDL: תְּהִלָּה P | תְּהִלָּה LP: תְּהִלָּה P 13 om. תְּהִלָּה L: om. תְּהִלָּה P: om. om. BCD 15 תְּהִלָּה LP: תְּהִלָּה BCD

תְּהִלָּה BCDE: om. hom. B 16 תְּהִלָּה om. P | תְּהִלָּה + תְּהִלָּה P 17 תְּהִלָּה + תְּהִלָּה P | om. BCD

18 om. BCDE: om. hom. B 19 om. P | om. BCDE 20 om. BCDE: om. hom. BCDL: om. BCDE

*[Kinds of speech]<sup>122</sup>*

84 There are four kinds (εἴδη) of speech<sup>123</sup>: the imperative, e.g. when a man says authoritatively to someone who is subordinate to him: “Go, perform such-and-such action!”; the optative, when a man comes with a supplication and begs for something in a prayer; the interrogative, e.g. when someone asks another person: “Where do you come from and where are you going to?”; and the fourth and last type is the declaratory, e.g. when someone says: “Every human being that is alive has breath,” or “Every rational soul is immortal.”<sup>124</sup>

85 Now, philosophers do not inquire into the first three types of speech, because they never express truth or falsehood. A discussion of them belongs to grammar. But it is the fourth and last one where truth and falsehood are involved with which they take all the pains. That truth and falsehood are distinguished only in it, this matter of fact proves to be obvious<sup>125</sup>.

86 Indeed, neither the person who utters an imperative, nor the person who is praying, nor, further, the person who is asking, no one among them will be right or wrong. But the one who declares will necessarily say either truth or falsehood. For when he says, “Socrates is walking”, then it is clear that, if he declares this while (Socrates) is walking, he is true, but if (while Socrates) is not walking then he is false. Also, if, when one declares about him that he is not walking, (Socrates) is walking, he would speak falsely, and if (Socrates) is not walking, he will speak truly<sup>126</sup>.

87 Now, this type of speech which expresses truth and falsehood is constructed in its primary composition from two utterances<sup>127</sup>, namely from the subject

122 MSS. BCD have the subtitle, “On the kinds of speech, i.e. how many and what they are”.

123 Ammonius writes about “parts of speech” (μέρη τοῦ λόγου) in his commentary on the *Isagoge* right after his account of the Platonic Forms, and this was probably the reason for Sergius to deal with this topic in the same context. Ammonius mentions five “parts” which correspond to the list found by Sergius but adding also the vocative: τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλά εἰσι μέρη, ἀποφαντικὸν εὐκτικὸν κλητικὸν προστακτικὸν πυσματικόν (*In Isag.* 43.4–5). Ammonius discusses this topic also in the introductory part of his commentary on Aristotle’s *On Interpretation* (*In De Int.* 2.9–25), where he calls them, similarly to Sergius, “kinds of speech” (εἴδη τοῦ λόγου) and gives concrete examples of each one of them.

124 Cf. the examples (deriving mostly from Homer) by Ammonius in *In De Int.* 2.10–20. The last example by Ammonius corresponds to that of Sergius.

125 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.6–12.

126 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.12–17.

127 Syr. *bat qale*, “utterances, words”, corresponding to Gr. φωναί.

## 5 حلماً خارج قلبه حلماً علم وهميًّا تفاصيله: حلماً

גָּזָבָה לְתַתְּ חַלְמָה כְּמַה כְּתַבְתָּה אֶלְךָ לְתַתְּ מַעֲזָמָה

des.L7v .**ମହାକାଳଙ୍କିମାତ୍ରା**

ମୁଲ୍ଲା ଜୀବନରେ କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା କିମ୍ବା

לְהַבְשָׁלָה גָּלָה בְּגָמָר מַעַל וְלִבְנָה גָּמָר לְקָרֵב

କଣ୍ଠରେ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ

אֵל גַּם גַּם אַתְּ מִלְּמַד אֶת־עַמּוֹתֶיךָ. חֲלֹת וְלֹא גַּדְלָה מִבְּזָמָה. **בָּזָה**

גַּדְעָן. גַּתְּהָ גַּם מִתְּבָרְגָּן חַלְבָּן. גַּתְּהָ גַּם גַּם גַּם

ହାରୁ କାହିଁ କାହିଁ

ମେଲାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର

سندم: بمن و همچنین مم لحد: ملکه هم ملکه ملکه ملکه

س. حلقہ دفتر حلقہ حلقہ

that should be signified and from what signifies it<sup>128</sup>. What I mean is this. When someone says, “Socrates is walking”, he makes a statement which is composed of two utterances, the name “Socrates” and the (phrase) “is walking”. While “Socrates” is the subject that is characterized, the words “is walking” are pronounced in order to signify what he is doing. Thus, the utterances which are subjects of these compositions are always signified by something, while other ones which are predicated of them in these compositions signify a particular time and some activity<sup>129</sup>.

88 In the composition which I am here speaking about, “Socrates is walking”, the name “Socrates” signifies a certain person, while the (phrase) “is walking” informs us about his activity, i.e. what he is doing, and also about the time it takes place. For if you say, “Socrates is walking”, you signify the present time. But if you say, “Socrates walked”, you express the past time. And further, if you say, “Socrates will walk”, you point to the future time.

*[The ten primary genera]<sup>130</sup>*

89 We ought to know that in these compositions species (ειδη) are always subjects that are defined and genera are predicated of them<sup>131</sup>. What I mean is this. Universal human being, i.e. humanity, and also universal horse, universal dog, and other things like that are species of animal, and animal is their genus. For, as we have said above, we observe each one of them and combine them in our mind into one genus that is imprinted in all of them<sup>132</sup>.

128 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 43.17–20: περιέχει δὲ οὗτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ δύο τινά, τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἵνα δὲ σαφῆς γένηται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἰπωμεν οὕτως: δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι ὑποκείμενον λέγεται περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, κατηγορούμενον δὲ τὸ περὶ ἐκείνου λεγόμενον. Instead of using a Syriac equivalent for “predicate” (τό κατηγορούμενον), Sergius prefers to speak here of what signifies and what is signified, probably having the Gr. terms τι σημαίνει and τὸ σημαινόμενον in mind. In accord with this, Sergius speaks in §§88 of grammatical tenses of the verbs. However, he switches again to the logical terminology in §89.

129 The same examples appear in Ammonius, *In De Int.* 2.7–11.

130 MSS. BCD have the subtitle, “On the difference between genera and species”. The following section has a parallel in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 13.12–19, where another introductory point is discussed, namely the reason for the title of Aristotle’s treatise (cf. further Philoponus, *In Cat.* 12.17–27 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 15.26–18.6). Sergius’ account, however, derives primarily from Ammonius’ description of the “ascent to the universal” (ἡ εἰς τὰ καθόλου ἀναδρομή) and the ten primary genera in *In Isag.* 17.1–20.14. The accounts of both Sergius and Ammonius are based on the so-called “Tree of Porphyry” as described in the *Isagoge* 4.1–8.6. Sergius turns again to this subject matter in §§165–172, speaking of universal and particular.

131 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 13.12–15: λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πρόκειται αὐτῷ διδάξαι περὶ γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν καὶ ὅτι τὰ μὲν εἰδη τοῖς αὐτῶν γένεσιν ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ γένη κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν ἑαυτῶν.

132 On the three types of the universals, see §§78 and 80, above. Here Sergius speaks of only the third type, i.e. universals abstracted in human mind “after the many” (μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς).

1 حمل BCD: حمل P 4 حمل BCP: حمل D 5 ,تمام بـ، BCP: ,تمام D 7 حمل BCD:  
 9 حمل P 11 حمل lac. in P | حمل BCD: حمل P 16 tam BCP: tam D  
 18 BCP: حمل D 20 حمل BCP, Epit.: حمل D 21 حمل<sup>1</sup> CP, Epit.: حمل BD

90      Further, regarding each one of these species, we observe particulars belonging to certain species and combine them in our memory into their species. What I mean is the following. When we observe this man, and that one, and the rest of them who are numerically distinguished from one another, we combine them in our memory into universal man, which is the nature of humanity, and we establish it as a species of all men. Similarly, also, when we observe all horses, dogs, and bulls, which are numerically distinguished from one another, we in the same way combine them in our intellect into universal horse and universal dog and subsume them under their species. And since such species are numerous and even countless, we further combine them into what someone might call one nature that contains them all, and this is what we call their genus.

91      Thus, animal is the genus for all these species. And this genus is in turn a species of animate body. For there is another genus of plants which comprises many species and which is also a species of animate body. And further, this animate body is a species of substance (*οὐσία*). For there is inanimate body which is a genus of all bodies that are inanimate and a species of substance.

92      So, substance is a genus which has no other (genus) that is prior to it. Below it, there are other genera, i.e. animate and inanimate body. And also, below the animate one there is a genus of animal. Below animal, then, there are species that are not further divided into genera, but into individual beings which differ from one another only numerically.

1 መስቀል P, Epit.: መስቀል BCD 13 ዝግጁ መስቀል om. B | መስቀል BCD, Epit.: መስቀል P 14 ዘመን መስቀል P: መስቀል BCD, Epit.: መስቀል BCD 15 ዘመን መስቀል BCD: ዘመን መስቀል BCD, CP: መስቀል መስቀል D: መስቀል መስቀል BCD 16 ዘመን መስቀል om. hom. B 17 ዘመን መስቀል + tit. መስቀል BCD 18 ዘመን መስቀል BCD 19 ዘመን መስቀል BCD, Epit.: መስቀል P 21 ዘመን መስቀል BCD 22 ዘመን መስቀል BCD, corr. in marg. D: መስቀል መስቀል D: መስቀል መስቀል add. in marg. BD

93 A species that has nothing below itself is therefore also called the most specific species<sup>133</sup>, e.g. universal horse and universal dog. Their genus is animal, and animal is also the genus of horse, dog, and everything else like these, as we have said. It is a species of animate body, while animate body is in turn a genus of animal and a species of substance.

94 So, substance is always a genus, because there is no other genus above it, and hence it is called the most generic genus<sup>134</sup>. Universal horse, on the other hand, is always a species, because there is no other species beyond it. And those between them, i.e. animal and animate body, are species and genera at the same time. But while they are species of those that are before them, they are genera for those that are after them<sup>135</sup>.

95 Now, the Philosopher considered the genus of substance to be prior and superior, comprising multiple species and genera, and thus he put it in the first place in the treatise *Categories*. It is a simple word<sup>136</sup> that signifies countless simple things through mediating simple concepts of each one of them. When (people) define this word, they say the following: Substance is every thing that has subsistence in itself and has no need for something else through which it would come to be, for example, a man, a stone, a piece of wood, and all other things that have subsistence by themselves<sup>137</sup>.

96 This may be better understood from the contraries: there are things in the world which cannot come into being by themselves but require something else through which their nature would subsist. These are, e.g., whiteness and black-

<sup>133</sup> Lit. “species of species”. Sergius thus renders the Gr. ειδικώτατος.

<sup>134</sup> Lit. “genus of genera”, cf. Gr. γενικώτατος.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. Porphyry, *Isag.* 4.14–20.

<sup>136</sup> Syr. *bat qala* “utterance, speech”, corresponds to Gr. φωνή.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.9–10: ὅσα οὖν ἔστιν αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δυνάμενα καὶ μὴ δεόμενα πρὸς τὸ ὑποστῆναι ἄλλου τινός, οὐσίαι λέγονται.

1 بـ BD: بـ C 2 بـ CDP: بـ B 3 بـ BCD: بـ P  
 5 بـ om. D | بـ BCP: بـ D 6 بـ + بـ in marg. D  
 بـ + بـ B: بـ in marg. D | بـ + بـ BCD  
 7 بـ BDP: بـ C 9 بـ om. om. P 10 بـ BEP: بـ CD  
 11 بـ<sup>2</sup> BCD: بـ EP 12 بـ CDP: بـ E 15 بـ BCD:  
 BCD: بـ P | بـ BCDE: بـ P 16 بـ + tit. بـ BCD  
 بـ + بـ BCDE | بـ 19 بـ P, Epit.: بـ BCDE | بـ 20 بـ CD: +  
 بـ + بـ BCDE | بـ 21 بـ P, CDEP, Epit.: بـ B

ness, sweetness and bitterness, and all other figures (σχήματα), qualities, and colours. They cannot come to be just by themselves, but their subsistence is in something else. For whiteness exists in snow, or in milk, or in white lead, or in anything else like that<sup>138</sup>. Likewise, also blackness exists in wool or in leather<sup>139</sup>, sweetness exists in a fig or in honey, and bitterness exists in aloe or in wormwood (ἀψίνθιον). And in the same way, all colours, shapes, and other qualities have subsistence in other things, and their nature cannot subsist only by itself.

97 Thus, such things that have subsistence by themselves and do not require something else through which to subsist — whether they are corporeal or incorporeal — pertain to substance and are called substances. On the other hand, those things that cannot subsist by themselves apart from being in something else, as we have said, differ from substance, and the Philosopher discovered also their genera and species, placed them in the teaching and wrote generally about them too.

98 For he observed and saw that there is something in the world whose subsistence is in substance and which is spoken of by means of measures and numbers. For instance we are accustomed to speak of two cubits or three cubits, and also of one or two palms, of a period of ten months, or ten years, or of any other length. Such words he subsumed under one genus which comprises all of them in common and which he called quantity. For all

<sup>138</sup> Sergius' text is very close to what we find in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.3–9: μάθοιμεν δ' ἀν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἔστι τινὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἃ μὴ δύναται αὐτὰ καθ' ἔαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἄλλοις τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ἃ καὶ συμβεβηκότα καλεῖται, λευκότης μελανία γλυκύτης καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα γάρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ' ἔαυτὰ οὐ δύνανται ὑποστῆναι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἡ λευκότης ἡ ἐν ψιμμυθίῳ ἡ ἐν γάλακτι σώμασιν οὖσιν ὑφέστηκεν, ὄμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα.

<sup>139</sup> MSS. B and D add in the margins: "In a raven or in a Cushite (i.e. an Ethiopian)".

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C120r **କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ** କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ କାନ୍ତିକାରୀ

P26v      قل لئا شئي. ا. جل مهار تئي جم علم ذاته لئي. سه بئي

وَكَذَلِكَ مِنْ كُلِّ مَا يَعْلَمُ لَهُ مُلْكٌ كُلُّهُ حَلْقَةٌ

କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର

۱۰۰۰ میلیون دلار را در سال ۱۹۷۷ میلادی در ایران پرداخت کردند.

10 **କନ୍ଦାରୀ ଏକ ରାଜ୍ୟ ପାଇଁ ଲେଖିଲୁମାଙ୍କ ଏକ ମହିଳା**

D68v **አ**ለም አስተያየት የመንግሥት በመስቀል የተመለከተ የሚከተሉ የ

15 **וְשָׂרֵג** מִלְּחָמָה שָׂרֵג מִלְּחָמָה חֲלֹב מִלְּחָמָה. תְּלִם יְם

جیسا کوئی ملکہ کو اپنے بھائی کے لئے کوئی ایسا کام نہیں کر سکتا۔

وَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِثْقَالَ ذَرْنَةٍ يَرَهُهُ فَلَهُ كُلُّهُ وَمَنْ لَا يَعْمَلْ مِثْقَالَ ذَرْنَةٍ لَّهُ مَا لَمْ يَحْكُمْ لَهُ وَمَنْ يَعْمَلْ مِثْقَالَ ذَرْنَةٍ لَّهُ مَا لَمْ يَحْكُمْ لَهُ

20 ගෙවා ඇත්තා මෙයි මෙයි

22r මෙයි මෙයි

גָּדוֹלָה מְאֹד מִזֶּה כִּי כָּל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הַמְּבָרֵךְ לְבָרֵךְ כָּל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ

4 ଏକାନ୍ତରୀଣ + tit. ଏକାନ୍ତରୀଣ ଲାଗୁ ଏକାନ୍ତରୀଣ କମଳା, ମ ଏକ ଏକାନ୍ତରୀଣ କମଳା କୁ ଲାଗୁ BCD

5 କା] om. BCD 8 ଯତ] om. B 10 କଥ] om. BCD 11 ତଥ୍ୟତଥ] + କା, in marg. D | ତଥ୍ୟତଥ

BCDL: ۲۰ P 20 BCDL: ۲۱ P 21 LP: ۲۱ BCD

രാജ് സ്കൂൾ. രാജ് സ്കൂൾ

measures, numbers, and calculations of times and years designate a certain quantity<sup>140</sup>.

99 Thus he discovered two universal genera which encompass multiple things, i.e. substance and quantity. But beyond them, he also saw other words that do not pertain to these two genera. For instance, we have just now spoken about sweetness and bitterness, and about all colours and shapes. They neither pertain to substance nor signify any quantity, because they subsist not by themselves but only in other natures, and they also do not possess any dimension of quantity. All such (words) he (i.e. Aristotle) subsumed under one universal genus<sup>141</sup> which he called *pw̄tws* (ποιότης, “quality”)<sup>142</sup>. As for us, we call it sometimes *hayla* (“capacity”) and sometimes *muzzaga* (“mixture”), since up to this time we haven’t found among Syriac names one which would suit it perfectly<sup>143</sup>.

100 There are also other words which do not fall under one of those three genera that have been discussed. They have a certain relation to one another<sup>144</sup>, so that one of them may not be considered without the other. It is in the way of their existence that we call them, e.g. father and son, servant and master, double and half. For neither may a son be considered without a father, nor a servant without a master, nor a half without a double. But also, one may not say that a father, or a master, or a double exists without a son, a servant, or a half. It is all such things that the Philosopher further subsumed under one of the universal genera that he called *prost̄i* (πρός τι) which means “to something”<sup>145</sup>. Because, as we have said, when any of these things is spoken of, it receives its

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.13–18.

<sup>141</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.18–25. Ammonius speaks here of τὸ ποιόν, “the qualified”. Sergius does not seem to make a clear distinction in his commentary between quality and things qualified (see particularly Book VI), although in some passages he speaks rather of the latter than of the former.

<sup>142</sup> Ms. B adds in the margins the Syriac equivalent *zna*, “quality”.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. §§354–355 and 365, below. In §355, Sergius writes that he considers the Syriac term *zna* as the most fitting equivalent to the Greek ποιότης, although the two other terms, *hayla* and *muzzaga*, also appear in his work (see, e.g., §108), thus corroborating Sergius’ statement that all three of them were used synonymously at his time. It is also worthy to note that in ms. E, which contains a selection of passages from Sergius’ *Commentary* dating from the 8th century, the term *muzzaga* appears as the only variant in the passage which corresponds to §99.

<sup>144</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29: σχέσις ἐτέρου πρὸς ἑτέρον.

<sup>145</sup> Sergius consistently applies the expression *lwat meddem*, “(in relation) to something”, which renders the Greek πρός τι. Though it seems possible sometimes (e.g., here) to translate it literally, in what follows, I will use the terms “relation” and “relatives”.

என் கூடுரை கூடுமேற்கொண்டு வருகிறேன். கூடுமேற்கொண்டு வருகிறேன்.

101 جمیں میں تھے جو عہد گلہرے تھے میں میں تھے جمیں

102 **የኢትዮጵያ ማኅበር ማኅበር ማኅበር**

כטבם גראם תחוליה. און גם אונט. מיטוונט. לאו. ליטו. מיטוונט. אונט. גראם.

۱۰۳ **دکتر محمد قاسم قلی** دلیل آنچه در علم سمعی

አስተዳደር: የሚገኘ ተከራካሪ ስምምነት

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104 جمیں کے قلمروں کی تحریک کے لئے جو ایجاد کیا گیا تھا

בנין ומחדרים לערך זה: גללים נרחבים: ורמלה חסרת דמות. למלון

## ਗੁਰੂ ਨਾਨਕ ਦੇਵ ਦੀ ਸਾਡੀ ਅਤੇ ਸਾਡਾ ਜੀਵਨ

ମହାକାବ୍ୟାକ୍ଷମ୍ବନ୍ଧୁ

name from its relation to something, which (in turn) has its name<sup>146</sup> through its relation to it<sup>147</sup>.

101 And further, there are other words that are not found under any of these genera, which signify place. For instance, when someone says, “Socrates is in the theatre (θέατρον)”, or “Plato is in the market”, and everything else like that. He also subsumed them under one universal genus which he called “where”, for each one of them appears as an answer to (the question) “where?”<sup>148</sup>.

102 Now, these are five universal genera that encompass many of those things that exist in the world, i.e. substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, and where.

103 Further, there are other words that do not pertain to the afore-mentioned five genera, which signify certain time. For instance, we are accustomed to say, “yesterday”, “today”, “ten years ago”, or “after so-and-so many years”. All of them he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called “when”<sup>149</sup>. Because if someone is asked this (question), he gives one of the suitable answers which all pertain to the genus of “when”.

104 There are other words which signify something that a person possesses. E.g., we are accustomed to say, “he is dressed up”, “he has his shoes on”, or “he wears a ring”. All these too he subsumed under one universal genus which he called “having”<sup>150</sup>.

105 And further, all other (words) that signify certain position — e.g., when we say, “standing”, “sitting”, or “lying” — he subsumed under one universal genus which he called “being-in-a-position”<sup>151</sup>.

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<sup>146</sup> In ms. P and in the marginal notes of mss. B and D: “its nature”. This variant, however, is most likely a scribal mistake.

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.28–29.

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 19.29–20.2: πάλιν δὲ ἔστι τι τὸ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ εἶναι ή ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἀπέρ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποῦ, ὅπερ ἔστι τόπου σημαντικόν. Ammonius, however, does not mention that the name of this category should be understood as an answer to a question.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.2–4: πάλιν ἔστι τι χθὲς πέρυσιν αὔριον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἀπέρ ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποτέ, ὅπερ ἔστι χρόνου σημαντικόν. As in the previous case, Ammonius does not mention that Aristotle's title for this category derives from an answer to a certain question.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.6–7. Ammonius interprets this category as “placing of one substance around another” (ἔχειν γάρ ἔστιν οὐσίας περὶ οὐσίαν περίθεσις). Sergius omits this interpretation, just as he does in his account of having in §404.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.4–6. Ammonius discusses it before having.



106 And further, all those words that signify some activity — e.g., when we say, “writing”, or “striking”, or “cooling”, or “heating” — he also subsumed under one universal genus which he called “acting”. For, as we said, it is some activity that each one of them signifies<sup>152</sup>.

107 And further, all the words which are opposite to them — e.g., when we say, “written”, or “struck”, or “cooled”, or “heated” — he also collected into one universal genus which he called “being-affected”<sup>153</sup>.

108 So, these are the ten primary and principal genera that are also called the most generic genera. They comprise all things that came to be, are existing, and will appear, and it is not possible to find anything that will not fall under one of them. They are: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, and the last one of them is being-affected<sup>154</sup>.

109 However, before we speak concisely about the division of each one of them according to Aristotle's view, we shall discuss something that is very necessary, namely whether there is anything which turns out to pertain to two genera<sup>155</sup>. Let speculation (θεωρία) concerning it not lead us astray into thinking that Aristotle subsumes one genus within another. For none of the words which remain one and the same may fall under two of the afore-mentioned genera, neither, obviously, under three or four, or anything like that.

110 So, even if it may seem to us that the size of one cubit, or two, or anything else which we determine in a piece of wood or in a stone which pertain to

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.7–9: πάλιν ἔστι τι τύπτειν θερμαίνειν ψύχειν· τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνήγαγον ὑπὸ τὸ ποιεῖν· ποιεῖν δέ ἔστι τὸ δρᾶν περὶ τι.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.9–10.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 20.11–12: ἔσχον οὖν δέκα τοιαῦτας κοινότητας· οὐσίαν ποσὸν ποιὸν πρός τι ποῦ ποτὲ κεῖσθαι ἔχειν ποιεῖν πάσχειν.

<sup>155</sup> Sergius discusses this question in the context of the genus of relatives, see §§391–393, where his account is based on Aristotle's text.

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substance therefore also pertains to substance, this is not how we shall think, for the nature of a piece of wood, or a stone, or anything else like that pertains to substance; because they are wood and stone. That they are of two or three cubit, on the other hand, because of this they pertain to quantity.

111 Also, concerning sweetness or whiteness we may not conclude from the fact that they exist in honey or milk, since honey and milk pertain to substance, that they too pertain to substance. For honey or milk pertain to substance not because they are sweet or white but because they are certain bodies, while because they are sweet or white, they are considered to pertain to quality.

112 Therefore, if some entities appear to be subsumed under two genera, we should know that it is not in one and the same manner that they do this, but, as we have said, they appear in two genera in different ways. For if it were not comprehended like that, then also nine other genera would become idle, and only one genus would remain, namely substance, while all the others would come to be through it, since it alone has subsistence by itself and does not require anything else through what it would be generated, as we have said above.

*[Homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, and polonyms]<sup>156</sup>*

113 Since Aristotle himself before teaching about the ten genera defined certain terms that appeared to him useful for the knowledge of these genera<sup>157</sup>, it is also proper for us, if we are eager to follow the order of his teaching, to discuss them according to our capacity, before the division of the genera. Hence here we also begin with it. 1a1-15

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156 The previous paragraph concludes the *prolegomena* part of Sergius' treatise. In what follows, Sergius provides a commentary on Aristotle's text, stating that he is "eager to follow the order of his teaching". Hence the passages from the *Categories* which Sergius apparently comments on are indicated in the outer margins of the text. However, in some cases these references have a conjectural character.

157 Sergius thus refers to the *antepraedicamenta* section of the *Categories*. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 14.4-5: τὰ δὲ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν συμβαλλόμενα ἡμῖν ἔσται εἰς τὴν τῶν κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν.



114 All things that fall under our knowledge become known sometimes through one simple name and sometimes through a certain account that defines them<sup>158</sup>. And such a definitory account is sometimes derived from what a thing naturally is and sometimes from what is accidentally concomitant to it. What I mean is this. Naturally man is a certain being which we signify by means of a simple name when we call it “man”. But when we compose a statement in order to signify it and call it “rational, mortal animal”, we define it by means of a statement which derives from what it naturally is. If, instead, we compose a statement in order to signify it from what is accidentally concomitant to it, e.g. when we say that he is capable of speaking and is skilled in crafts, we determine it from what is accidentally concomitant to it. For we call accidental everything what a man acquires but may exist without it<sup>159</sup>.

115 So, we say of a simple word which signifies a certain subject matter that it is its name. A statement which signifies a thing and is derived from its nature is called a definition. Also, another kind of statement which is composed from what is accidentally present in things we call a characterization from accidents, or a description<sup>160</sup>.

116 Thus, since, as we have said, things are comprehended sometimes through simple names and sometimes through a definitory account, we ought to know that some things share with one another only name but differ in their definitory accounts; sometimes they have in common their definitory account but differ in name; and further, sometimes they have in common both, i.e. name

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<sup>158</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.4: δηλοῦνται δὲ πάντα καὶ δύνομάτων καὶ διὰ λόγων (see in general 15.4–16, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.5–6). See also David, *Prolegomena* 11.15–12.18, discussing as one of the introductory questions what a definition (όρισμός) is. Like Ammonius, David makes a distinction between a name (όνομα) and an account (λόγος) both of which may provide a definition of a subject matter.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. the same example in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.10–16; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.7–8.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. the next main point of David's *Prolegomena* (12.19–13.6) dealing with the distinction between a definition (όρισμός), a description (ύπογραφή), and a descriptive definition (ύπογραφικός ορισμός).



and definition; and sometimes they differ in both, having in common nothing at all, i.e. neither name nor definition<sup>161</sup>.

117 One may also express it as follows. Since, as we have said, things have a name and a descriptive definition, what follows from this is that either they share with one another both name and definition; or they differ from one another both in name and in definition; or they have one of them in common but differ in another, while this in turn may happen in two ways, i.e. either they have name in common but differ in definition, or they share definition but differ in name<sup>162</sup>.

118 Thus, when things have only a name in common but differ in their descriptive definition, they are called “of similar name” (i.e. homonyms)<sup>163</sup>, for it is only in the name that the similarity between them shows up. For instance, we use the name “dog” to designate dissimilar natures. For there is a water-dog<sup>164</sup> and a land-dog, there is a star called like that, the one which ascends after the Orion<sup>165</sup>, there is also a philosophical writer who is called like that<sup>166</sup>, and finally a painted or carved image may be called like that too<sup>167</sup>. So, it is only the name that makes these things similar to one another while the definitions of each one of them are different.

119 When things have definition in common but differ in name, then they are called “of similar kind”<sup>168</sup>, for they belong to one and the same kind. E.g., we have the custom to call a stone also “rock” and “flint”. While the definition of their nature is one, they differ from one another only in names and they are of the same kind.

**161** The taxonomy which Sergius presents here is close to what we find in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 14.11–16 and Simplicius, *In Cat.* 22.15–31, who both attribute each case to homonyms, polyonyms, synonyms, and heteronyms.

**162** Here, Sergius’ account concurs nearly verbatim with what we find in Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.16–22: τούτων τοίνυν οὕτως είρημένων εί λάβοιμεν δύο πράγματα, ταῦτα ἡ κατὰ ἀμφότερα κοινωνούσι, λέγω δὴ κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ἡ κατ’ ἄμφω διαφέρουσιν, ἡ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἐν κοινωνούσι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔτερον διαφέρουσι· καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς· ἡ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνούσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ἡ ἀνάπαλιν κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνούσι κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέρουσιν.

**163** Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.29–16.1: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ ὄνομα κοινωνούειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον διαφέροιεν, ὄμώνυμα λέγεται.

**164** Probably, a kind of shark, cf. Chase 2003: 115.

**165** I.e. Sirius, Gr. Σείριος, also called the “dog-star”.

**166** I.e. a Cynic philosopher whose name derives from the term κύων, “dog”.

**167** Cf. the same example by Simplicius, *In Cat.* 24.9–13.

**168** Greek commentators (including Ammonius and Philoponus) designate these cases as polyonyms (πολυώνυμοι). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 16.4–5: εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον κοινωνούσι κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα διαφέρουσιν, ὄνομάζεται πολυώνυμα. The term suggested by Sergius would correspond to Gr. ὄμοειδής.



120 As for those that differ from one another in both, i.e. in name and in definition, they are designated in various and diverse ways<sup>169</sup>. For those things that have nothing in common at all, e.g. when someone says, “man”, “stone”, and “wood”, they differ from one another both in name and in definition<sup>170</sup>. While other things have both in common, i.e. name and definition, and are also of the same kind, e.g. when someone says “Alexander the Macedonian” and “Alexander Paris”<sup>171</sup>. For these have in common both the name and also the definition which is a natural characteristic of man.

121 So, these are things about which the Philosopher spoke abundantly before the teaching on the ten genera which have been outlined above. We, instead, have suggested a brief account of it in the form of a helpful division. For we promised at the beginning of this treatise that we will discuss the ideas of this man as concisely as possible. Therefore we (have provided) an account of these things which here we bring to end.

End of Book Two.

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<sup>169</sup> Here, Sergius combines two types, heteronyms and synonyms. The first sentence of this paragraph finds a close parallel in Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.22–23, where Philoponus explicates the meaning of the term “homonym” that may be applied in multiple ways (ἐν διαφόροις τόποις).

<sup>170</sup> I.e. they are heteronyms. Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.26: εἰ δὲ κατ’ ἄμφω διαφέροιεν, ὄνομά-ζεται ἔτερώνυμα.

<sup>171</sup> I.e. they are synonyms (thus Sergius seems to believe that both designations refer to the same person). Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 15.22–23: εἰ μὲν οὖν κατ’ ἄμφω κοινωνοῦσιν, ὄνομάζεται συνώνυμα. Philoponus, Elias, and Simplicius suggest the same example with the name of Alexander, when speaking of homonyms, which would be more appropriate in this case, see Philoponus, *In Cat.* 16.23–24; Elias, *In Cat.* 139.33; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 31.24–25.

P31r

## فَلَمَّا جَاءَهُمْ بِالْحُكْمِ

فَلَمَّا

B84r | C125v

D71r

5

C126r | P31v

مِنْهُمْ لَهُ

حلاقہ علم و فقیہ صاحب

સુસૂખનાર માનનાર - લે હનુમાનાર તા તા તા તા

መ.፩፻፲፭ - የ፩፻፲፭ ዓ.ም. የ፩፻፲፭

*Divisions of Book Two*

*First division*

Writings about the craft of logic:

- some of them are before the craft of demonstrations:
  - some are about simple words: the treatise *Categories* which is about the ten genera;
  - some are about their first composition: the book *On Interpretation*;
  - and some are about syllogisms which derive from this composition: the book *Prior and Posterior Analytics*;
- some are composed about demonstrations: the book of demonstrations which is called *Apodeictics* and the one about topics (of an argument)<sup>172</sup> which is called *Places*, i.e. *Topica*;
- and some are written about those things that are useful for this craft: the book *Refutation of Sophists* and also the one about the craft of rhetoric.

*Second division*

Of what is simple in the world:

- there are simple words; they do not exist naturally;
- concepts which are signified; they exist naturally;
- things that are known; they exist as natures.

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<sup>172</sup> Syr. *reše*, corresponding most likely to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, the main points discussed in an argument.

B84v |  
C126v | D71v  
| L11r

ମୁଖ୍ୟ ପାତାର ପାତାର ପାତାର  
ପାତାର ପାତାର ପାତାର ପାତାର  
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፲፻፲፭

فَلَمَّا جَاءَهُمْ

10

مکالمہ میں کہاں

፲፻፲፭ የግብር የመንግሥት

בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְנָשָׁתְּךָ

## የዚህ ደንብ የወጪ

3 **مَكَلَل** BCDP: **مَكَلَلَ** L 6 **مَكَلَل** LP: **مَكَلَلَ** BCD 7 **مَكَلَلَ** BCDP: **مَكَلَلَ** L  
**مَكَلَلَ** + **مَكَلَلَ** B | **مَكَلَلَ** L: **مَكَلَلَ** P: **مَكَلَلَ** BCD 8 **مَكَلَلَ** + **مَكَلَلَ** B  
**مَكَلَلَ** BCDP: **مَكَلَلَ** L 10 **مَكَلَلَ** + **مَكَلَلَ** BCD 12 **مَكَلَلَ** BCDL: **مَكَلَلَ** P 14 **مَكَلَلَ**  
 om. L

*Third division*

There are four kinds of speech:

- imperative,
- optative,
- interrogative,
- and making a statement.

*Fourth division*

Species/forms and genera:

- some of them are with the Creator; they are called simple and primary;
- some are in matter; they are designated as material and natural;
- and some are in our mind; they are called posterior and noetic.

*Fifth division*

Substance is a most generic genus.

Body is a species and a genus.

Animate body is a species and a genus.

Animal is a species and a genus.

Universal man is only a species and thus a most specific species.

B85r | C127r

| D72r

ગુજરાતી લાલ

ଶାନ୍ତିକାନ୍ତି

## تاریخ علمی و تاریخ فلسفی - تاریخ علمی و تاریخ فلسفی - تاریخ علمی و تاریخ فلسفی

جسے محلہ جسے محلہ، جسے محلہ فلسفہ

5 አዋጅ - የመጀመሪያ ደንብ ተስፋ ተስፋ ተስፋ - የመጀመሪያ ደንብ ተስፋ ተስፋ ተስፋ

- ተመስና ተመስና ተመስና - ተመስና ተመስና ተመስና

କିମ୍ବା ଅନ୍ୟାନ୍ୟକିମ୍ବା କୁଳାକୁ ଅନ୍ୟାନ୍ୟକି

لے تھے ملے کے کام کا حق - گھر گھر کا

הט בעמ - מסמך מודולרי כתוב עי

P32r حَسَنَتْ كَوَافِرْ حَلَّتْ مَلَكَتْ حَلَّتْ كَوَافِرْ حَسَنَتْ  
كَوَافِرْ - كَوَافِرْ - كَوَافِرْ - كَوَافِرْ حَلَّتْ مَلَكَتْ حَلَّتْ كَوَافِرْ

*Sixth division*

Of things:

- some have only a name in common, they are called “of similar name”, e.g. land-dog and water-dog, dog of Orion, and philosopher-dog;
- some have only a definition in common, they are called “of similar kind”, e.g. stone, rock, flint;
- some have both a name and a definition in common, they are of one kind, e.g. Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris;
- and some have in common neither a name nor a definition, they are different in every respect, e.g. wood, stone, man.

\* \* \*

The ten genera of the *Categories* with which Aristotle's entire account is concerned are the following: substance, quantity, quality, (in relation) to something, where, when, having, being-in-a-position, acting, being-affected.