

BOOK ONE

[Division of philosophy]

8 The ancients divided philosophy¹² in the most consistent way, as it seems to me, O brother Theodore, into two primary parts, which are theory¹³ and practice¹⁴, and they also gave an explanation as to the reason for this division.

9 They say that God, who is the principle of everything, also possesses two general powers, from which all his actions originate. The first one is that through which He establishes everything and brings it into being; the other is that through which He takes care of the subsistence and preservation of everything created by Him. Therefore, since philosophy is likeness to God, it also has two primary parts, which are theory and practice. By means of the first one, through which it knows everything, it resembles the productive power of the Creator. And by means of the other one, that is by doing what is right, it imitates His marvellous providence¹⁵.

10 Further, they say that, since the rational soul which is the mother of knowledge is divided into two parts, so also philosophy which is knowledge of everything is divided into two parts. That all the powers of the soul are divided into two kinds is said in multiple places. Hence, they say that some of its powers are cognitive, e.g. intellect, reasoning, and calculation, and some are animal, e.g. passion, anger, and will. And because philosophy is purification of the whole soul, consequently, they say, it is also divided into two parts. Through its first,

12 The following division is to a large extent found in the *prolegomena* texts which either derive from or are dependent on Ammonius. Thus, it seems proper to quote *in extenso* the corresponding Greek passages from these texts which reflect the Greek source used by Sergius.

13 Syr. *yida'ta*, “knowledge”. Later, Sergius also renders the Greek θεωρία with the loanword *te'oriya*.

14 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.6: διαιρεῖται οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 26.7; David, *Prolegomena* 55.17.

15 Sergius reports the argument found by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.10–16: ἐπειδὴ γάρ ἐλέγομεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄμοιώσιν θεῷ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ θεός διττάς ἔχει τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν γνωστικάς πάντων τῶν ὅντων, τὰς δὲ προνοητικάς ἡμῶν τῶν καταδεεστέρων, εἰκότως ἡ φιλοσοφία διαιρεῖται εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ γινώσκομεν τὰ ὅντα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ προνοούμεθα τῶν καταδεεστέρων, καὶ οὕτως ἔξομοιοῦμεν ἐαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.9–13; David, *Prolegomena* 55.35–56.7.

لشیلیت مهاتمہ و یعنی مهاتمہ. هر خود را لکم گلر محتاط کرد
سلف مهاتمہ نگیرد. گلر لکم لعنی مهاتمہ ملسا میں مهاتمہ کے ساتھ
کیا گیم گلر کی کمی کیا کریں گے مهاتمہ کے ساتھ. لشیلیت
کیلئے: مکمل گلر کی کمی کیا کریں گے مکمل گلر محتاط کریں گے

2 **ם**נ**ה**נ**ה**נ**ה**נ**ה** BDP: **ם**נ**ה**נ**ה**נ**ה**נ**ה** C 3 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** BCD: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P 6 **ת**ת**ת** + **ת**ת**ת** BCD
 7 **ת**ת**ת** BCD: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P 8 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** BCD: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P 10 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** CDP:
תת**ת**ת**ת** B 11 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** BCD 13 **ת**ת**ת** P: **ת**ת**ת** BCD | **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** BCD: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**
תת**ת**ת**ת** P 16 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** inv. P 18, ו om. D | **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**
תת**ת**ת**ת** BCD 21 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** + **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** add. D in marg. 23 **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** BCD: **ת**ת**ת**ת**ת** P

intellectual part, it purifies the cognitive powers of the soul, keeping them from mistaking one thing for another and so grasping the truth and the exact meaning of things. Through its second, practical part, on the other hand, it refines its animal powers, instigating them not to be employed in anything useless, but to make their motions upright and profitable¹⁶.

11 But also each one of these parts is further divided into other parts that are called subparts. Thus, they subdivide theory, which is a primary part of philosophy, into the teaching on spiritual natures, which are called divine, so that the teaching on them is also called divine; the teaching on visible natures, which is also called natural; and the teaching consisting of mathematical sciences, which are called sciences in the proper sense¹⁷.

12 They also give the following reason for the three-fold division of this part which is similar to the previous one¹⁸. Some living beings are completely separate and removed from matter and from the density of bodies, dwelling in the subtle, perfect, and incorporeal spiritual realm. And some of them are placed in opposition to these, i.e. in matter and in the density of the lower world, outside of which their subsistence is impossible. And further, there are some whose nature is placed between these, and thus they are not completely removed from matter like those that are above, but neither are they mixed with it in such a way that they cannot even be separated from it intellectually like those that are below. Instead, they are separate from it in one way and mixed with it in another¹⁹. Those beings that are completely separate from matter are called divine and angelic, as well as (encompassing) all rational and intelligible

¹⁶ See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.16–22: πάλιν δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς διτταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ μὲν γνωστικαὶ οἵνιν νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἰσθησίς, αἱ δὲ ζωτικαὶ καὶ ὄρεκτικαὶ οἵνιν βούλησις θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. ὁ οὖν φιλόσοφος πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη βούλεται κοσμῆσαι καὶ εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγαγεῖν. διὰ οὖν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τελειοῦται τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν γνωστικόν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ ζωτικόν. εἰκότως οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.14–26; David, *Prolegomena* 56.7–16.

¹⁷ I.e. the theoretical part is subdivided into theology, physics, and mathematics. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.22–23: πάλιν τὸ θεωρητικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς θεολογικὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ φυσιολογικόν. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.35–36; David, *Prolegomena* 57.23. For Sergius' note on mathematical sciences, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.24–25.

¹⁸ I.e. here Sergius again gives an ontological reason for the logical division. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.23–24: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα βούλεται θεωρεῖν ὁ φιλόσοφος, τῶν δὲ ὄντων πάντων τρεῖς είσι τάξεις.

¹⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.25–31: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων παντάπασιν ἔστι χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοίᾳ, οἵλα ἔστι τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοίᾳ, οἵλα ἔστι τὰ φυσικά καὶ ἐνυλα εἶδη, ξύλον καὶ ὄστον καὶ σάρξ καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ σώματα (ταῦτα δὲ φυσικά καλούμεν ώς ὑπὸ φύσεως δημιουργούμενα προσεχῶς), τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατά τι μέν ἔστι χωριστὰ κατά τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἵλα ἔστι τὰ μαθηματικά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.36–28.2; David, *Prolegomena* 57.26–58.12.

5 **ይ** ፳፻፲፭ ዓ.ም የኢትዮጵያ ሲልደን ሲልደን በ፲፻፲፭ ዓ.ም የኢትዮጵያ ሲልደን ሲልደን

جبل طورقان و مکانیکی. این کوه را نیز حداکثر ۲۰۰۰ متر ارتفاع دارد.

15 . **خليه** **عنوان** **كميّة** **عنوان**

جلا حملہ اور قلعہ حملہ کو مستحب سمجھتا ہے: مصلحت 14

15 **מִתְּמִימָה** לְתַתְּמִימָה לְתַתְּמִימָה לְתַתְּמִימָה לְתַתְּמִימָה לְתַתְּמִימָה לְתַתְּמִימָה

1 رکام BCD: رکام P | رکام P + رکام add. D in marg. | رکام BCD: رکام P 2 رکام
 CDP: رکام B 6 رکام BCD: رکام P: رکام add. P in marg.

የአዲስ በርሃን + የዚህንን P | የዚህንን BCD: የአዲስ በርሃን P 14 የአዲስ በርሃን P: የአዲስ በርሃን BCD

16 لىك] om. B | سەمەتى BCD: سەمەتى خەلەن 18, 19] om. P 19 سەمەتى بەلەن inv. P

۲۰ CDP: ۲۰۳ B | ۲۱ om. P | ۲۱ om. B ۲۰ CDP: ۲۱ B ۲۱ تکمیلی BCD: ۲۱۹

କୁଟୀର୍ପିତା P 22 ମୁଣ୍ଡରାଜାନ୍ତିମା P

ANSWER TO THE QUESTION

powers. And other beings whose subsistence is in matter are called natural and natures, for their subsistence derives from nature. They are all visible bodies, in some of which there is life and some of which are deprived of movement.

13 Those intermediary ones that are called mathematical sciences are truly sciences dealing with things. I am speaking about geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (ἀστρονομία), and music. Since all these crafts and suchlike are sciences which we learn and which derive either from certain books or from other bodies made of bronze, wood or stone, they are not separated from matter for they also come from matter. But since, after we have learned them, they are collected and established in our memory and subsist in our rational thought, they exist without matter. Thus, they may be separated from it intellectually, and it becomes clear that they also have another kind of subsistence which is outside of matter. That is why they are placed between those beings which are above and those which are below²⁰.

14 Now, since we want to ascend from the lower natures to which we belong towards those above in order to be associated with them in knowledge, but it is impossible to ascend immediately from such a lower position to their height, an intermediary nature has been established for us, namely the mathematical sciences, which are to some extent associated with both sides and by means of which we are educated in understanding what is the knowledge of the incorporeals and gradually ascend to them²¹.

15 They say that this is similar to a man who has been confined to a very dark house and has spent a long time there. If he were to leave it all at once for a

²⁰ See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.30–12.4: τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατά τι μὲν ἔστι χωριστὰ κατά τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἔστι τὰ μαθηματικά· κύκλος γὰρ καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δίχα ὅλης τινὸς οὐ δύνανται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀχώριστά ἔστι τῆς ὅλης, ἐπειδὴ δὲ θεασαμένοι κύκλον ξύλινον καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ λίθινον ἀνεμαξάμεθα αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ἔχομεν παρ' ἑαυτοῖς δίχα τῆς ὅλης. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.38–28.5; David, *Prolegomena* 58.9–17.

²¹ See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.20–24: μέσον δέ ἔστι τὸ μαθηματικὸν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀμέσως ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παντάπασιν ἀχωρίστων τῆς ὅλης ἐπὶ τὰ παντάπασι χωριστά, ὁδεύομεν διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων, τῶν κατά τι μὲν χωριστῶν κατά τι δὲ ἀχωρίστων.

house that is very illuminated without any intermediary, his eyes would at once become dim, being hurt by the light. But if he were to leave it for a less dark house first and later on to the one which is more illuminated, so as to become gradually accustomed to the rays of light, then he would be able to dwell even in very strong light without harm. In the same way, if we make an attempt to ascend all at once from those natural things that are in matter to those ones whose subsistence is far from material nature, our cognitive faculties will become blind and our mind obscured through the darkness of ignorance. If, instead, we are trained little by little in the mathematics which we call intermediary and ascend to the knowledge of rational natures, then we will gradually and properly proceed along the path of knowledge and reach as far as possible what we strive for²².

16 That is why some of the ancients²³ called mathematical sciences bridges and ladders, while others said that, since they deal with and teach about the incorporeals as well, these sciences should certainly be taken as something through which we ascend from the inferior to the superior and from natural beings towards those ones that are above nature²⁴.

17 Thus, they say that the cause for the threefold division of the first part of philosophy is the following. Since, as we have said, things are divided into three kinds, i.e. into those which are above nature, those that are in nature, and those intermediary ones which are in mathematical sciences, it is proper that also this part of philosophy, which is knowledge of all existing things, should be subdivided into three parts, namely knowledge of the divine things which are

²² See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.27–13.5: ἔτιν γὰρ βουληθῶμεν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν φυσιολογικῶν ἐπὶ θεολογίαν ἀμέσως αὐτοὺς ἀναγαγεῖν, τυφλώττομεν, καθάπερ οἱ ἐκ σκοτεινοτάτου οἴκου εἰς πεφωτισμένον ἀμέσως εἰσερχόμενοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν οἴκῳ διατρίβειν σύμμετρον ἔχοντι φῶς, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν φωτεινότατον. οὕτως οὖν μετά τὰ φυσικὰ δεῖ διατρίψαντας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐπὶ θεολογίαν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.14–21; David, *Prolegomena* 58.32–59.3.

²³ Ammonius refers to Plotinus in this context, see *In Isag.* 12.25–27.

²⁴ Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 13.5–7: κλῖμαξ γάρ τις καὶ γέφυρά ἐστι τὰ μαθήματα κοινωνοῦντα μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καθὸ ἀχώριστα τοῖς δὲ θείοις καθὸ χωριστά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.13–14; David, *Prolegomena* 59.19–23.

above nature, the teaching on natural things which are in visible natures, and the tradition of mathematical sciences which are between these two.

18 But the practical part too, O our brother, they similarly subdivide into three parts, i.e. into the general rule over all people, the rule over a man's own house, and the rule over oneself only. For they say that everyone who is doing something good, does it either to all people and the city, or to his house, or to himself. Thus, if someone is doing good to all people he is called a general ruler, if it is to his house he is named a domestic ruler, and if it is to himself then he is called pious and vigilant²⁵.

19 So, they say that in this practical (part of) philosophy a person is sometimes a law-giver and sometimes a judge²⁶. Because for the common good, one promulgates laws that serve for instruction and education as well as for the virtuous conduct of those who are under his rule, and he passes judgement on those who infringe upon them and gives honor and respect to those who observe them. But beyond this, also in his own house the domestic ruler lays down certain laws, and he punishes those who transgress them and shows favor to those who follow them. And also for himself he lays down certain laws and judgements, if he wishes to set his habits in order and to purify the animal part of his soul²⁷.

20 For this is what one of the ancient philosophers said to himself: "Accustom yourself, first of all, to restrain your stomach and to master your sleep and lust."²⁸ Furthermore he said: "If you are doing good things be glad. But when you are doing bad things reprove yourself."²⁹ So, the first of these (sayings) is

25 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.2–6: διαιρεῖται τοίνυν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἰς τε τὸ ἡθικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν. ὁ γὰρ πράττων τι ἀγαθὸν ή εἰς ἑαυτὸν πράττει κοσμῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἡθικά καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ λέγεται ἡθικός, ή εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καὶ λέγεται οἰκονομικός, ή τὴν δλην κοσμεῖ πόλιν καὶ λέγεται πολιτικός.

26 Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 32.26–30; David, *Prolegomena* 75.33–76.16. Both Elias and David ascribe this division to the Platonists. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b.

27 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.11–17: τούτων δὲ ἔκαστον διαιρεῖται εἰς τὸ νομοθετικὸν καὶ δικαστικόν ὁ γὰρ πολιτικὸς φιλόσοφος ή νόμους τίθησι, καθ' οὓς δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ή δικάζει καὶ τοὺς μὲν γερῶν ἀξιοῖ τοὺς δὲ παρατρέψαντάς τι τῶν κειμένων νόμων κολάζει. εἰδέναι δὲ χρή ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ θεωρεῖται τὸ νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ οἰκῷ νόμους τίθεμεν καὶ δικάζομεν τῶν οἰκετῶν ή υἱῶν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας, οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἡθικῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.8–25.

28 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 94, lines 9–11). Ammonius quotes this passage also without reference to Pythagoras: καὶ γάρ καὶ ὁ ἡθικός νόμους τίθησιν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν λέγῃ κρατεῖν δέ εἰθίζει τῶνδε γαστρὸς μὲν πρώτιστα καὶ ὑπου καὶ φιλότητος (Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.17–20; cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.18–21).

29 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 96, line 43; Sergius inverts the order of the sentences) as quoted in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 16.3 (cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.10–12).

like establishing laws, while the other one is like a judgement, which is either praise that follows the one who observes the law or reproach of the one who breaks it.

[Division of Aristotle's writings]³⁰

21 So, after this, we ought to turn also to the general division of all Aristotle's writings. This will make comprehensible our account when we write about the goal of each one of them separately. Indeed, it is necessary to know that those things which have been discussed until now and which we are also discussing now are useful for understanding the goals of Aristotle's writings which we are going to discuss. For it is about these goals in particular and about the division of all his writings that we are going to speak in the following sections³¹.

22 So, the general division of his works is the following. Some of them are particular, being written about each and every kind of matter, others are written universally about nature in general, and still others are in between, since they are neither written about something as a whole like the universal ones nor do they speak about some concrete things only like the particular ones³². Those which are written as particular are his letters which he addressed to his friends or his listeners concerning concrete inquiries (*ζητήματα*)³³. Those which are placed between the particular ones and the universal ones are his writings about the government of the nations and the investigations³⁴ into the natures of animals³⁵.

23 We ought to know, however, that the books which Aristotle composed on the government of the nations are not on how they should be governed, exist

³⁰ This subtitle appears in mss. BCD.

³¹ Sergius refers here to the same two *prolegomena* issues (Gr. σκοπός and τάξις), to which he has already pointed in the form of the alleged inquiry by Theodore in §4 above.

³² See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.21–23: φέρε δεύτερον καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ποιησώμεθα. τούτων οὖν τὰ μέν ἔστι μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν μερικῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.8–11; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.10–12; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.9–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.17–20.

³³ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.23–24: καὶ ἔστι μερικὰ μὲν ὅσα πρός τινας ιδίᾳ γέγραφεν, ἥ ἐπιστολάς ἢ ἔτερα τοιαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.22–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.11–13; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.21–24.

³⁴ Syr. *taš'ita*, “story”, here apparently renders the Gr. *ἱστορία*, “inquiry, investigation”.

³⁵ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.26–28: μεταξὺ δὲ ὄπόσα περὶ *ἱστορίας* γέγραφεν, ὡς αἱ γεγραμμέναι αὐτῷ Πολιτεῖαι ἀμφὶ τὰς πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίας οὖσαι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.26–29; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.29–34.

and dwell in the cities, but on what the governments and customs of each particular nation are and the laws that are established in each land. Also, what he wrote about animals was not on the subsistence and the constitution of each one of them, but on their nature during birth and growth and the habits of the whole genus. Thus, the nature of this kind of writings is not particular (in the same way) as in the letters, since he spoke about one whole nation or country and about one whole genus of animals. But neither is it universal in the same way as the other writings, in which he considered generally the nature of things about which he wrote³⁶.

24 Now, of those writings of his that are universal, some are like notebooks, others are written as questions-and-answers between two persons (πρόσωπα), and still others are as if (they are spoken) by one person but combining multiple arguments³⁷. We ought to know that every time this philosopher found some opinion or idea suitable for teaching, he wrote it down like a reminder in summary fashion which he could make use of in one of his teachings. Thus, those books where he recorded one by one all the ideas that he had found are called notebooks, for they were written in the form of reminders³⁸. Also, some of these notebooks were written about particular things, namely those which deal only with one concrete subject, and some are universal, namely those which encompass multiple concepts³⁹.

25 Now, in those books of his that are composed in the form of questions and answers, either there is one person (πρόσωπον) or there are several persons

³⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.6–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.29–4.6.

³⁷ Ammonius and other commentators divided Aristotle's universal writings first into systematic treatises and into those which were written in the form of notes written for memory: τῶν δὲ καθόλου τὰ μέν ἔστι συνταγματικὰ τὰ δὲ ὑπομνηματικά (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.4–5; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.11–12; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.1). The systematic treatises, in turn, were divided into those written in the dialogue form and those written by Aristotle in the first person: καὶ πάλιν τῶν συνταγματικῶν τὰ μέν ἔστι διαλογικά, ὡς ὅσα δραματικῶς διεσκεύασται κατὰ πευσιν καὶ ἀπόκρισιν πλειόνων προσώπων, τὰ δὲ αὐτοπρόσωπα ὡς ὅσα γέγραφεν ὡς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.14–17; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.10–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.15–16).

³⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.28–4.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.12–13; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.25–35.

³⁹ See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.13–14: τῶν δὲ ὑπομνηματικῶν τὰ μὲν μονοειδῆ, ὡς ὅταν περὶ ἐνός τινος ποιῆται τὴν ζήτησιν, τὰ δὲ ποικίλα, ὅταν περὶ πολλῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.12–14; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 7.1–3.

،**କାନ୍ଦିରାରେ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ ପାଇଁ** କାନ୍ଦିରାରେ ପାଇଁ

B64r **የአዲስአበባ** ከተማ ተ በፊት የተመዘገበ የአዲስአበባ

C95v **אָמֵן וְאָמֵן וְאָמֵן וְאָמֵן וְאָמֵן וְאָמֵן וְאָמֵן** .

وَلَمْ يَرْجِعْ إِلَيْهِمْ مِمَّ أَنْهَى اللَّهُ أَنْهَى إِلَيْهِمْ وَمَا يَحْكُمُونَ

مختلک و نجات پذیری از مبتلایان خودرو

15 حمله: جلیلیتی کتابخانه و سمتی لعلی و نویسنده

اکنہم سبھی وھیں۔ ملکہم ایم ۹۰۰ تھا ملکہ سمجھتے۔ ہر ملک

1. *Alma-Ata Declaration on Primary Health Care* (1978) 29

الله رب العالمين

الآن، يُمكنكم تجربة تطبيقاتنا على الأجهزة المحمولة.

ccc + ps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1. *Leptothrix* *moniliformis* (L.)

من مکالمہ، جلد بیہجہ

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ରକଳାନ୍ତିକ୍² BD: ରକଳାନ୍ତିକ୍ P 8 ରକଳାନ୍ତିକ୍ + ରକଳାନ୍ତି ବ୍ୟାକ୍ BD add. in marg.
ରକଳାନ୍ତି ବ୍ୟାକ୍ + ରକଳାନ୍ତି ବ୍ୟାକ୍ BD add. in marg. | ୧୮ CDP: ରକଳାନ୍ତି B 9 ରକଳାନ୍ତି ବ୍ୟାକ୍ CDP: ରକଳାନ୍ତି B

10 **بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ** BCD: **بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ** P 12 **لَهُمْ** om. P 15 **بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ** BCD: **بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ** P

17. **குடும்பம்** BCD. **குடும்பம்** 18. **காலைக்காலை**, BCD. **காலைக்காலை** 19. **காலை** + **காலை**
add. (corr.?) in marg.

who pose questions or answer them, and there are one or more interlocutors who argue against those who are questioned⁴⁰.

26 Also, those writings which are spoken as if by one person⁴¹ are further divided as follows. Some of them are about *te'oriya* (θεωρία), which means “knowledge” and is the first part of philosophy, and some of them are written about practice, which is the second part of philosophy, as we have said above. And further, some of them are written about instruments (ὅργανα) of philosophy which are called in Greek *dialektika* (διαλεκτικά) and *logika* (λογικά) and which we designate as “logic” and “logical craft”⁴². For this is not a part of philosophy, neither is it a subpart, but it is only its instrument (ὅργανον), as we will demonstrate at length later on⁴³.

27 So, of his theoretical writings some are about rational and incorporeal beings, and they are also called “After natures”⁴⁴, others are about visible natures, their accidents and affections, and their generation and corruption — we will speak about each one of them according to our ability in the appropriate places⁴⁵, — and still others are written about mathematical sciences which, as we have demonstrated, are between nature and those beings that are above nature⁴⁶.

28 Of those (writings) which he composed as instruments of philosophy, some concern those things that contribute to the logical craft, some of them he composed about logic (itself), and some of them he wrote about such things that are attached to the logical craft⁴⁷. We will further explain these subjects in detail in those sections that suit each one of them, quoting from the words of this man (i.e. Aristotle).

40 Ammonius and other commentators thus divide the systematic treatises (τὰ συνταγματικά), cf. the commentary to §24 above.

41 What Ammonius and other commentators refer to with the term τὰ αὐτοπρόσωπα are treatises written by Aristotle in the first person.

42 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.18–5.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.23–35. Sergius modifies Ammonius’ division in some aspects.

43 See §§30–48.

44 Gr. μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, “(what comes) after natural things”, i.e. the treatise *Metaphysics*.

45 Sergius speaks several times of his intention to compose commentaries on Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy, particularly on *Physics*, cf. §256. Additionally, the present commentary contains several sections which are based on the *Physics* and not on the *Categories* (see §§263–284) and it is possible that here he refers to these sections rather than to his future commentaries.

46 Sergius’ division is very close to the account of Philoponus in *In Cat.* 4.35–5.6.

47 Ammonius speaks of the writings which either concern principles of the logical method or the method itself or serve as complements to it: τῶν ὄργανικῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλως εἰς τὴν μέθοδον συντελούντων (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–8, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 5.8–14; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.28–31).

29 For now, we intend to speak only briefly about the general division of his writings in order to train the hearing of those who learn, but later on we will speak clearly and specifically about each one of them according to our ability. For a general explanation might be very obscure for those who learn. A particular teaching, instead, would be for them more instructive. While something general is similar to an idea, that which is called particular, instead, is like a perfect depiction of this idea. That is why we shall first think about the former and then turn to the latter.

[Logic, an instrument of philosophy]

30 After this, it is necessary for us to examine whether the logical craft is a part or a subpart of philosophy, or whether it is only its instrument (ὅργανον). This issue has been disputed by some not insignificant people, indeed by those who occupy nothing less than the foremost position, at the peak (κεφάλαιον) of the whole philosophy⁴⁸.

31 Thus, e.g., the Stoics — people who became renowned in logic and in teaching worldly kind of argumentation — stated that logic is a part of philosophy. Consequently, according to their idea, philosophy is divided not into two parts, as we have stated above, i.e. into theory and practice, but into three parts, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic. However, the Peripatetics, one of whom was Aristotle, established only two primary parts of philosophy which have been discussed above, and they considered logic to be not its part, but its instrument⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ Ammonius does not mention this question in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories*, although Olympiodorus discusses it at length (*Prolegomena* 14.13–18.12). Elias remarks (*Prolegomena* 26.35–27.1) that it belongs to the study of the *Analytics*, and we indeed find extensive discussions of this topic in the commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Elias himself.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.20–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.21–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.18–20.

فَلَمَّا جَاءَهُمْ حَلَوْنَ أَرْقَاصُهُمْ لَكَ مَنْهُمْ مِّنْ بَعْدِهِمْ

تَمَّ لَمَّا جَاءَهُمْ مِنْ حُكْمٍ مِنْ أَنْهُمْ لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُمْ بِهِمْ حُكْمٌ

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جے ملیں جم حکومت پریس ایجنسی ملکے ایک دوستی حاصل کرے گا۔

وَسَبَقَ لِمَنْ يُطْهَى لِمَ كَلْمَحَ بَلْمَدَ لِمَ كَلْمَدَ مَلْمَدَ

የዚህ የሰነድ የሚከተሉ የሚመለከት የሚከተሉ የሚመለከት የሚከተሉ የሚመለከት

ମୁନ୍ଦରିଯା କାଳିଦାନ ରାଜ୍ୟରେ ଉପରେ ଉପରେ ଉପରେ ଉପରେ ଉପରେ

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ରାଜାର ପ୍ରକାଶ କାନ୍ତିର ପାତାର ପାତାର ପାତାର

34 **אלה נטולות הילך ימי נסיך קיסר**

କମିଟ୍ୟୁନିକ୍ସନ୍, କମିଟ୍ୟୁନିକ୍ସନ୍ ଏବଂ କମିଟ୍ୟୁନିକ୍ସନ୍ ଏବଂ କମିଟ୍ୟୁନିକ୍ସନ୍

የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ነው፡፡ የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ነው፡፡ የአዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር ነው፡፡

1 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD | **مَكَرَ** om. B | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 2 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD 3 **مَكَرَ** BDP: **مَكَرَ** C | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 4 **مَكَرَ** om. P 5 **مَكَرَ** SCR: **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 7 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** corr. D in marg. | **مَكَرَ** CDP: **مَكَرَ** B | **مَكَرَ** BP: **مَكَرَ** CD 9 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 11 **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 12 **مَكَرَ** inv. BD | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 13 **مَكَرَ** CDP: **مَكَرَ** B | **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 14 **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P | **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P 15 **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** P | **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD: **مَكَرَ** om. P 16 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** CD: **مَكَرَ** B 17 **مَكَرَ** P: **مَكَرَ** BCD 19 **مَكَرَ**^[2] om. P | **مَكَرَ** CDP: **مَكَرَ** B

32 Plato, on the other hand, and all the Academics were not sure in which direction they should move, so that they said various things which contradict one another. For sometimes they assumed logic to be part of philosophy, but sometimes clearly proclaimed it to be its instrument. E.g., in the treatise called *Phaedo* and also in the one called *Phaedrus*, Plato stated that logic was part of philosophy, while in another treatise with the title *Parmenides*, as if he had forgot about the earlier ones, he clearly called logic an instrument⁵⁰.

33 Those who defend (Plato's views) answer to this that what we consider to be erroneous is not in fact what they mean. We will speak about it after we have first considered those arguments which the Stoics elaborate in order to establish by means of them that, as they believe, logic is a part of philosophy and not its instrument⁵¹. As soon as we have refuted and disclosed their haughtiness in this issue and demonstrated that they speak vainly, then we will also show that logic is not both a part and an instrument of philosophy but only an instrument in accord with the view of the Peripatetics.

34 Now, those from the Stoa state that, if there is something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart, then it is either a part or a subpart of the craft that uses it. Therefore, if philosophy uses

⁵⁰ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.20–24; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.20–27.

⁵¹ See §§46–47, below.

וְנִזְמָן אֶל-בְּנֵי-יִשְׂרָאֵל. וְיַעֲשֵׂה לְעֵדָה
לְעֵדָה וְיַעֲשֵׂה שָׁפֵט לְעֵדָה וְיַעֲשֵׂה מִשְׁפָט לְעֵדָה.

לְבָבָךְ יְפָנֵן כְּלָמָדְךָ וְלִבְנָתָךְ תְּהִלָּתָךְ

10 ,**କାମକାର ରୂପରେ :** ଏହିବେଳେକାଜ କହିଲୁଗ କିମନ କାମକାର ରୂପରେ
ଦେଖିବାକୁ ପରିବର୍ତ୍ତନ କରିବାକୁ ପରିବର୍ତ୍ତନ କରିବାକୁ ପରିବର୍ତ୍ତନ କରିବାକୁ

മലന്മ: നാനു തുടക്ക ചെയ്യുന്ന മലന്മ എന്നും മലന്മ: നാനു തുടക്ക ചെയ്യുന്ന മലന്മ എന്നും

15 ഏകാധികാരി, നാം ഏകാധികാരി, ഏകാധികാരി, ഏകാധികാരി, ഏകാധികാരി, ഏകാധികാരി, 36

የአዲስአበባ የትንተኞች ማስኅድር ለመስጠት የአዲስአበባ ተመክላል የተመክላል የትንተኞች ማስኅድር ለመስጠት የአዲስአበባ ተመክላል

ج. فصلی. نیز چند نام نسبتی، مخصوصاً نام علم جستجو و نام علم ملخص و جزئی هستند.

1 **BCD** + 2 **BCD** = 3 **BCD** 2 **BDP**: 3 **BDP**: 4 **CD**

3 **ر&ش&د و &ن&م&ل&ه**, BCD: **ر&ش&د و &ن&م&ل&ه**, P 5 **ر&ش&د و &ن&م&ل&ه**, BCD: **ر&ش&د و &ن&م&ل&ه**, P

6 एकांकिका, BCD: एकांकिका, P 7 مکسی CP, corr. D in marg.: مکسی BD | مکسی P:

P 11 لج] om. P 12 نسیان C: نسیان BDP | نسیان BCD: نسیان P 15 نسیان BCD: نسیان

P | **የአዲስአበባ**: BCD: **የአዲስአበባ**: P 19 ማቅ BCD: **ማቅ P** | **መስቀል** BCD: **መስቀል**

logic and if logic is neither a part nor a subpart of any other craft, it is clear that it is either a part or a subpart of philosophy⁵². So, they believe to have demonstrated by means of this argument that logic is either a part or a subpart of philosophy.

35 However, they suppose it to be not a subpart but rather a part of philosophy, and they demonstrate this as follows⁵³. Everything that is a part and a portion of something else has the same subject matter (ὑλη) and also the same goal as that thing whose part it is⁵⁴. Thus, they say, we shall first examine what the subject matter of the parts of philosophy is and what their goal is. If we then discover that logic has such a subject matter and such a goal that correspond to either of them (i.e. the parts of philosophy), then we could say that logic is a subpart of that part to which they correspond. But if one finds out that it corresponds neither in material nor in goal to either of them, then it would become apparent that it may not be their subpart.

36 Now, the subject matter of that primary part of philosophy which is called theory are all divine and human things, while its goal is the true knowledge of them. As for the other part which is called practice, its subject matter is government in the world and moderation of the passions, i.e. not allowing them to act in excess of what is appropriate, while its goal is to choose those things which are profitable and to avoid those which are harmful. So, they say that logic is not associated with any of them either in subject matter or in goal, since the subject matter of logic is skilful organisation of speech, while its goal is applica-

⁵² Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.6–12: έάν τις τέχνη κέχρηται τινι δι μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης μέρος ἔστιν ἡ μόριον, τούτο πάντως ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἡ μέρος ἔστιν ἡ μόριον. <...> ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία, φασίν, κέχρηται τῇ λογικῇ, ἡ τις οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης *** τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ’ ἡ μέρος ἡ μόριον. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.29–15.2.

⁵³ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–6: συλλογίζονται γάρ οὕτως.

⁵⁴ Cf. Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–32: τὸ γάρ μόριόν τινος καὶ τῆς ὅλης κοινωνεῖ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἐκείνῳ οὖν ἔστι μόριον.

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جَمِيعَ الْمُجْمَعِينَ لِيَعْلَمَ أَنَّهُمْ لَا يَنْهَا
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B66r **אַתָּה חֶלְקָה גָּדוֹלָה** מִכְּלָמָדָה, וְאַתָּה מִלְּמָדָה.

37

ମହା କମଳ, ମହାକାଳ ମାତ୍ରର ମୁଣ୍ଡର ମୁଣ୍ଡର : ରଥାପାତା, ରଥା
କମଳର ପାତାର ରଥାପାତା, ଅନ୍ତର ମହା କମଳ : ରଥା
ରଥା. ସୁଧା କମଳ ମହା କମଳ : ରଥାପାତା, ରଥା
ରଥା. ରଥାପାତା, ରଥାପାତା ମହା କମଳ : ରଥାପାତା, ରଥା

وَعَلَيْهِمْ حَمْلَةٌ لِمَنْ يَرِيدُ. كَمْ لَمْ يَرِدْ لِمَنْ يَرِدُ.

10 **ללה מ-חלה** מ-בְּחִילָה. **ר-חִילָה** מ-חִילָה ו-לְחִילָה. **ל-חִילָה** מ-חִילָה ו-לְחִילָה.

38

للمحتوى المنشورة على موقعنا الإلكتروني، فإننا نحترم خصوصية زوارنا ونpledge عدم نشر أي معلومات شخصية ملحوظة في المحتوى المنشورة على موقعنا.

15 **କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି କାଳି**

P11r | C99r የ የዕስኬ, መስዕል የ የዕስኬ የዕስኬ መ መዕስኬ

ଏହି ପିଲାରୁ ଦେଇ ଉପରେ ରଥିଲାର ରଥିଲାରଙ୍କ ରଥିଲାରଙ୍କ
ରଥିଲାରଙ୍କ ଦେଇ କର ରଥିଲାର କର ରଥିଲାର, କାଳିଲାର
ରଥିଲାର କର, କାଳିଲାର କାଳିଲାରଙ୍କ କାଳିଲାର, ରଥିଲାର
କାଳିଲାର ଦେଇ ଉପରେ ରଥିଲାରଙ୍କ ରଥିଲାରଙ୍କ ରଥିଲାର

tion of correct arguments that are arranged properly by means of ordered speech. Therefore, since both the subject matter and the goal of logic are different from those of the parts of philosophy, i.e. of theory and practice, it is clear that it is not a part of any of them and it thus may not be considered to be a subpart of philosophy⁵⁵.

37 Hence, they say, since we have first shown that (logic) should be either a part or a subpart of philosophy, but now it has been clearly demonstrated that it is not a subpart, what remains as the only possible conclusion is that it is a part of philosophy, which is thus divided not into two parts but into three parts, as we have said, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic.

38 This is what the Stoics say, being sure that their arguments are straightforward and they have not missed anything. Against it the followers of Aristotle spoke, refuting them as follows: The first premise from which they believe to straightforwardly develop their argument is not correctly formulated and understood⁵⁶. For instead of saying, “something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart”, they should have expanded it and said, “if it is not a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of another craft, it is either a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of the craft that uses it”. This way, they would have shown consequently that logic is not a part or a subpart of philosophy but its instrument. However, they omit “an instrument”

⁵⁵ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.22–34; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–7.8; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 1.13–2.1.

⁵⁶ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2: ἐροῦμεν ὅτι παρελογίσαντο. Cf. also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–11: δυνατὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἀντιστῆναι τε καὶ ἐλέγχαι τὴν πρότασιν ὡς κακῶς προβεβλημένην.

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ମୁଖ୍ୟମନ୍ତ୍ରୀଙ୍କ ପାଇଁ ପରିବାରର ପାଇଁ ପରିବାରର ପାଇଁ ପରିବାରର ପାଇଁ

40

and put only “a part or a subpart” in their statement and thus believe to have shown that logic is not a subpart of philosophy but its part⁵⁷.

39 After this, we shall listen further to some of the Peripatetics. Whenever some craft makes use of a part of another craft, it is much greater than the one whose part serves as its instrument, as we may say about bridle-making and navigation. One of them, i.e. bridle-making, produces bridles and provides those who use them in horsemanship with them, while navigation gives course to ships and allows one to steer them. Hence in both cases the latter (crafts) are superior to the former ones which they utilize for their service. Provided that this is true, if we consider that rhetors, doctors, and any other craftsmen use logic, then if logic were a part of philosophy it would turn out that rhetoric and medicine are much greater than philosophy for they use its part as their instrument. But since it would be absurd to place philosophy which is the source of rhetoric and medicine after them: logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument⁵⁸.

40 Further, merely from the fact that logic originates from philosophy they cannot demonstrate at all that it is a part of philosophy, because not everything that is generated by some craft is necessarily part of it. For, behold, there are plenty of crafts which produce their own instruments, as in the case of carpenters and blacksmiths. For a carpenter produces a hammer, a rule, and a corner,

⁵⁷ See this argument in Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2–7 and a more detailed account in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–23.

⁵⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.1–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.31–16.10; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 2.22–33. Sergius’ account finds its closest parallel in Philoponus.

1 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 3 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: अर P 4 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P
 5 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 6 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 7 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P
 9 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 11 **मूल्यांकन** P: **मूल्यांकन** BCD
 14 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 20 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P | **मूल्यांकन** BCD:
 21 **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P 23 अर P: अर C: om. BD
 मूल्यांकन P | **मूल्यांकन** BCD: **मूल्यांकन** P

which are instruments for his craft and not a part of it. And also a blacksmith forges an anvil and a hammer, which are tools that he uses and not a part of his craftsmanship. That is why logic too, even though it is produced and established by philosophy for the sake of demonstrating things, is not a part of philosophy but an instrument, by means of which it shows and makes visible things that are hidden. Without it, in fact, it would be impossible for philosophy to enter the world of men⁵⁹.

41 Also, from the defining account of the part it becomes evident that logic is clearly an instrument of philosophy. For a part is something that completes the thing whose part it is when it is present in it and makes it deficient when taken away from it⁶⁰. E.g., we say that, when a leg which is a part of a body is in it, it makes the whole (body) complete, but when it is separated from (the body), it makes it deficient. But logic neither makes the nature of philosophy complete when it is present nor does it make the latter in any way deficient if it is not present. In fact, its essence is in things, for it is knowledge of all existing things in which it exists, regardless of whether we comprehend them or not. For logic reveals to us those things which we do not comprehend⁶¹ and it is knowledge whose essence is in things, regardless of whether we know them or not. Thus, we need logic by means of which we come to our knowledge. And consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but an instrument by means of which philosophy becomes known to us⁶².

42 Further, they say the following. If all the parts are removed from something whose parts they are this thing will perish too. But as we have just said, philo-

⁵⁹ Cf. a brief note by Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.36–10.1 and a lengthy account of this argument by Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.23–8.6. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–30.

⁶⁰ Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.6–7: τὸ μέρος συμπληρωτικόν ἔστι τῆς ούσίας τοῦ πράγματος· ἀμέλει τοι παρὸν μὲν σώζει τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸν δὲ φθείρει.

⁶¹ Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.10–11: ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀνθρωποι τῆς λογικῆς ἐδεήθημεν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως εἰς κατάληψιν τῶν κεκρυμμένων. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.24–25.

⁶² For this argument, see Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.26–33; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.21–27; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.4–17.

L1r **לְעִזָּהָר וְתִבְלָשׁוּן** **לְמִזְרָחָה** **וְתִבְלָשׁוּן** **לְעִזָּהָר**.

מִלְּמָדָה מְלָאכָה גָּמְנָתָה חֲסִינָה חֲסִינָה חֲסִינָה

20 የኩርኩር የሚጠች የሚከተሉ የሚያስተካክል የሚያስተካክል የሚያስተካክል የሚያስተካክል

sophy will not perish if logic is removed from it, since this is what its nature is. Consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument⁶³.

43 After this, it is time to speak about those from the Academy who state that logic is both a part and an instrument of philosophy. For I suppose that by means of what was said a sufficient refutation has been provided of those who state that it is only a part of philosophy. Now, we shall also understand that a part differs very much from an instrument. For a part exists in virtue of itself and not in virtue of something else, while an instrument is used for the benefit of something else and not in virtue of itself. For instance, a hand, a leg, or any other part of the body exists in virtue of itself, while an axe, a saw, or a drill exists in order to be used by something else and not in virtue of itself. Therefore, it is clear that a part and an instrument are not same thing⁶⁴.

44 And further, the following (argument). If one part is attached to another part, together they will bring about the whole whose parts they are. However, if you attach one instrument to another a thousand times, they will never bring about the whole thing whose instruments they are. Hence the instrument and the part differ from one another. That is why logic may not be at the same time both an instrument and a part of philosophy, as Plato and all the Academics state, but it is either only a part, which is not possible as we have shown above

⁶³ Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.14–15: ή λογική ἀναιρουμένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· ή λογική ἄρα ὅργανον τῆς φιλοσοφίας. See also Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–11; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.27–29.

⁶⁴ Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 16.30–34: ἵδιον μέρους ἔστι, φασί, τὸ δι' αὐτὸ παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ὅργάνον δὲ τὸ δι' ἔτερον παραλαμβάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ή λογική οὐ δι' ἔαυτὴν παραλαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ δι' ἔτερον, διὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄλλο παραλαμβανόμενον τοῦ δι' ὁ παραλαμβάνεται ὅργανόν ἔστιν, ή λογική ἄρα οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ὅργανον. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.25–27.

45 D59v | P13r

in our refutation of the Stoics, or only an instrument, as the truth requires. So the statement of those who consider it both part and instrument is false⁶⁵.

45 And if they say, as they are accustomed to do, “Behold, a hand may at the same time be a part and an instrument!”, one should answer them that, even if the same hand might be both a part and an instrument, however it cannot be both of them for one and the same thing. For it is a part of the body, while it is an instrument not of the body but of the soul which uses it in order to make necessary movements. But this is what those who set logic as a part and an instrument of philosophy do not comprehend⁶⁶.

46 The followers of Plato, however, say in his defence that logic may be considered in two ways. On the one hand it exists by itself apart from things, and on the other it is in things that its subsistence may be observed. Also, of other objects, e.g. of a measure of one or two cubits, we say that they exist in the same two ways. On the one hand it exists in measure, and on the other its subsistence is in some other body that is measured. Thus, some amount of water or wine or other things that can be measured exists by itself as the measure but also in those things that are measured by it. Also a pint is said both of the measure and of wine or water or oil whose amount is measured. Similarly, a peck is said of the measure and also of grain of a certain amount⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ A short version of this argument is found in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.29–31: καὶ πάλιν συντιθέμενα τὰ μέρη ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὅργανα οὐδαμῶς τὰ ἄρα μέρη οὐκ ὅργανα.

⁶⁶ Philoponus suggests the same fictitious dialogue, see *In An. Pr.* 8.31–36: εἰ δέ τις εἴποι ‘καὶ μήν ἡ χειρ μέρος οὗσά ἔστι καὶ ὅργανον, ὥστε οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ὅργανον οὗσαν εἶναι καὶ μέρος’, φαμέν ὅτι ἄλλ’ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ οὗ ἔστι μέρος ἡ χειρ, τούτου ἔστι καὶ ὅργανον, ἀλλὰ πρός ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ὡς σώματος, ὅργανον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς. Olympiodorus also presents this imagined speech which he puts in the mouth not of some anonymous Platonist but of Plato himself: *Prolegomena* 17.18–23.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.36–38 and 11.15–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–5 and 9.13–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–29.

بـ ۱۳ پـ ۱۳

5 **କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର କାହାର** ।

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۱۱- جملہ کا مکالمہ اور اپنے فکر کا انتہا

علم المذاق

1 LP: BCD 4 BCDL: P | BCDL: P: BCD: LP

5 മുന്താൻ BCDP: ഏകാദശാൻ L 6 പ്രക്രമം BCLP: പ്രക്രമം D | പ്രക്രമം om. BCD 8 ഏകാദശാൻ

BCD: ഏകാംഗം, L: ഏകാംഗാലിഗ, P 9 പര] + കൂ P | നീക്കാംഗം CDP: നീക്കാംഗം B

12 රුග] om. B 13 ගැහැකිවා, CDP: ගැහැකිවා B | රැකිවාවා, BCD: රැකිවාවා, P

14 ~~ալլավար~~ C: ~~ալլավար~~; B: ~~ալլավար~~; D: ~~առավար~~; P

15. BCD: $P = 17 \text{ נס} + \text{מס} \text{ נס}$ + $B \text{ נס}$

وَهُوَ يَعْلَمُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَمَنْ يَعْلَمُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ فَإِنَّمَا يَعْلَمُ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ مَّا يَعْلَمُ

47 In the same way, they say, also logic exists for its own sake and for the sake of something else that uses it. It exists for its own sake when one observes it in his intellect without applying it in speech and in demonstrations. But it exists for the sake of what uses it when it is skilfully applied in speech, in combination of words, and in demonstrations. That is why Plato regarded it both as instrument and part. He took it for an instrument when considered in its application through the combination of words and demonstrations. But he regarded it as a part of philosophy when one contemplates it in pure knowledge in his intellect apart from its application by something else⁶⁸. Now, whether they are speaking well or they are far from understanding, that is what you will distinguish and comprehend yourself while reading this.

48 Here ends the first book, wherein three points⁶⁹ have been discussed, namely the division of philosophy, the general division of all the writings of Aristotle, and the question of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument. In the second book, we will speak about the goal of logic.

End of Book One.

⁶⁸ Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 11.3–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.29–37.

⁶⁹ Syr. *reše*, corresponding to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, “headings”, the main points discussed in the introductory part of a treatise.

P14r

فَهَلَّا يَرَى مَنْ يَرَى مِنْ حَسَنَةٍ مِّثْلَهُ مَنْ يَرَى

B69r | C103r

فَوْلَاد

5

لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ
لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ
لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ لِكُوْنِيْهِ حَمْلَهُ

10

مکالمہ

ପାତ୍ରକାରୀ ଅଧ୍ୟାତ୍ମିକ

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.....

The divisions of Book One are the following:⁷⁰

First division

Philosophy is divided into two kinds, theory and practice.

Theory is divided into the knowledge of divine things, the mathematical sciences, and the knowledge of natural things.

The mathematical sciences are divided into geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.

Practice is divided into rule over all people, rule over one's own house, and rule over oneself; into the law-givers and the upright judges.

Second division

Aristotle's writings:

- some of them are written particularly; these are the letters;
- some of them are intermediary; these concern the constitutions of the nations and about the natures of animals;
- and some are universal: some are written as reminders, some are in the form of questions and answers, and some are as if spoken by one person⁷¹.

70 All extant manuscripts containing Sergius' *Commentary* include after each one of the seven books tables which depict the division of the key-terms discussed in these books. Due to the technical limitations of a critical edition, it is impossible to represent these division in the same form. Instead, they are indicated as plain text. See the Appendix, where the divisions are presented in the diagram form.

71 MSS. BCD add: "Some of them are dedicated to divine things, some are written about natural things, and some are instrumental, namely logic. Some of the (latter) are before this craft, some are about this craft of demonstrations, and some are attached to this craft."