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1 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ om. P 3 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 4 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 6 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 7 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 8 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 10 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P | ማጠቃለያ P: ማጠቃለያ BCD | ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 11 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD, corr. P in marg.: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 13 ማጠቃለያ P, add. D in marg.: ማጠቃለያ BCD 14 ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ P | ማጠቃለያ BDP: ማጠቃለያ C | ማጠቃለያ CP: ማጠቃለያ BD 15 ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ P 16 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P | ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P | ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ EP 21 ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ ማጠቃለያ P 22 ማጠቃለያ BCD: ማጠቃለያ P

BOOK ONE

[Division of philosophy]

8 The ancients divided philosophy<sup>12</sup> in the most consistent way, as it seems to me, O brother Theodore, into two primary parts, which are theory<sup>13</sup> and practice<sup>14</sup>, and they also gave an explanation as to the reason for this division.

9 They say that God, who is the principle of everything, also possesses two general powers, from which all his actions originate. The first one is that through which He establishes everything and brings it into being; the other is that through which He takes care of the subsistence and preservation of everything created by Him. Therefore, since philosophy is likeness to God, it also has two primary parts, which are theory and practice. By means of the first one, through which it knows everything, it resembles the productive power of the Creator. And by means of the other one, that is by doing what is right, it imitates His marvellous providence<sup>15</sup>.

10 Further, they say that, since the rational soul which is the mother of knowledge is divided into two parts, so also philosophy which is knowledge of everything is divided into two parts. That all the powers of the soul are divided into two kinds is said in multiple places. Hence, they say that some of its powers are cognitive, e.g. intellect, reasoning, and calculation, and some are animal, e.g. passion, anger, and will. And because philosophy is purification of the whole soul, consequently, they say, it is also divided into two parts. Through its first,

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12 The following division is to a large extent found in the *prolegomena* texts which either derive from or are dependent on Ammonius. Thus, it seems proper to quote *in extenso* the corresponding Greek passages from these texts which reflect the Greek source used by Sergius.

13 Syr. *yida'ta*, "knowledge". Later, Sergius also renders the Greek θεωρία with the loanword *te'oriya*.

14 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.6: διαίρεται οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 26.7; David, *Prolegomena* 55.17.

15 Sergius reports the argument found by Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.10–16: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐλέγομεν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὁμοίωσιν θεῷ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ θεὸς διττὰς ἔχει τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὰς μὲν γνωστικὰς πάντων τῶν ὄντων, τὰς δὲ προνοητικὰς ἡμῶν τῶν καταδεεστέρων, εἰκότως ἡ φιλοσοφία διαίρεται εἰς τὸ θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ γινώσκομεν τὰ ὄντα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ προνοοῦμεθα τῶν καταδεεστέρων, καὶ οὕτως ἐξομοιοῦμεν ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.9–13; David, *Prolegomena* 55.35–56.7.

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intellectual part, it purifies the cognitive powers of the soul, keeping them from mistaking one thing for another and so grasping the truth and the exact meaning of things. Through its second, practical part, on the other hand, it refines its animal powers, instigating them not to be employed in anything useless, but to make their motions upright and profitable<sup>16</sup>.

11 But also each one of these parts is further divided into other parts that are called subparts. Thus, they subdivide theory, which is a primary part of philosophy, into the teaching on spiritual natures, which are called divine, so that the teaching on them is also called divine; the teaching on visible natures, which is also called natural; and the teaching consisting of mathematical sciences, which are called sciences in the proper sense<sup>17</sup>.

12 They also give the following reason for the three-fold division of this part which is similar to the previous one<sup>18</sup>. Some living beings are completely separate and removed from matter and from the density of bodies, dwelling in the subtle, perfect, and incorporeal spiritual realm. And some of them are placed in opposition to these, i.e. in matter and in the density of the lower world, outside of which their subsistence is impossible. And further, there are some whose nature is placed between these, and thus they are not completely removed from matter like those that are above, but neither are they mixed with it in such a way that they cannot even be separated from it intellectually like those that are below. Instead, they are separate from it in one way and mixed with it in another<sup>19</sup>. Those beings that are completely separate from matter are called divine and angelic, as well as (encompassing) all rational and intelligible

16 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.16–22: πάλιν δὲ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς διτταὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι, αἱ μὲν γνωστικαὶ οἷον νοῦς διάνοια δόξα φαντασία καὶ αἴσθησις, αἱ δὲ ζωτικαὶ καὶ ὀρεκτικαὶ οἷον βούλησις θυμὸς ἐπιθυμία. ὁ οὖν φιλόσοφος πάντα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη βούλεται κοσμεῖν καὶ εἰς τελείωσιν ἀγαγεῖν· διὰ οὖν τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τελειοῦται τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν γνωστικόν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τὸ ζωτικόν. εἰκότως οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο διαιρεῖται, εἰς τε θεωρητικόν καὶ πρακτικόν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.14–26; David, *Prolegomena* 56.7–16.

17 I.e. the theoretical part is subdivided into theology, physics, and mathematics. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.22–23: πάλιν τὸ θεωρητικόν διαιρεῖται εἰς θεολογικόν μαθηματικόν καὶ φυσιολογικόν. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.35–36; David, *Prolegomena* 57.23. For Sergius' note on mathematical sciences, cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.24–25.

18 I.e. here Sergius again gives an ontological reason for the logical division. Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.23–24: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα βούλεται θεωρεῖν ὁ φιλόσοφος, τῶν δὲ ὄντων πάντων τρεῖς εἰσι τάξεις.

19 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.25–31: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων παντάπασιν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοία, οἷά ἐστι τὰ θεῖα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασιν ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῇ ὑποστάσει καὶ τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπινοία, οἷά ἐστι τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἐνυλα εἶδη, ξύλον καὶ ὅσοι οὖν καὶ σὰρξ καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ σώματα (ταῦτα δὲ φυσικὰ καλοῦμεν ὡς ὑπὸ φύσεως δημιουργούμενα προσεχῶς), τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατὰ τι μὲν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.36–28.2; David, *Prolegomena* 57.26–58.12.



powers. And other beings whose subsistence is in matter are called natural and natures, for their subsistence derives from nature. They are all visible bodies, in some of which there is life and some of which are deprived of movement.

- 13 Those intermediary ones that are called mathematical sciences are truly sciences dealing with things. I am speaking about geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (ἀστρονομία), and music. Since all these crafts and suchlike are sciences which we learn and which derive either from certain books or from other bodies made of bronze, wood or stone, they are not separated from matter for they also come from matter. But since, after we have learned them, they are collected and established in our memory and subsist in our rational thought, they exist without matter. Thus, they may be separated from it intellectually, and it becomes clear that they also have another kind of subsistence which is outside of matter. That is why they are placed between those beings which are above and those which are below<sup>20</sup>.

- 14 Now, since we want to ascend from the lower natures to which we belong towards those above in order to be associated with them in knowledge, but it is impossible to ascend immediately from such a lower position to their height, an intermediary nature has been established for us, namely the mathematical sciences, which are to some extent associated with both sides and by means of which we are educated in understanding what is the knowledge of the incorporeals and gradually ascend to them<sup>21</sup>.

- 15 They say that this is similar to a man who has been confined to a very dark house and has spent a long time there. If he were to leave it all at once for a

20 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11.30–12.4: τὰ δὲ μέσα τούτων ὄντα κατὰ τι μὲν ἐστὶ χωριστὰ κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχώριστα, οἷά ἐστι τὰ μαθηματικά· κύκλος γὰρ καὶ τρίγωνον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑποστῆναι δίχα ὕλης τινὸς οὐ δύνανται καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀχώριστά ἐστι τῆς ὕλης, ἐπεὶ δὲ θεασαμένοι κύκλον ξύλινον καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ λίθινον ἀνεμαζάμεθα αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ ἔχομεν παρ' ἑαυτοῖς δίχα τῆς ὕλης. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 27.38–28.5; David, *Prolegomena* 58.9–17.

21 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.20–24: μέσον δέ ἐστι τὸ μαθηματικὸν εἰκότως· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀμέσως ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα ἀνάγεσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παντάπασιν ἀχωρίστων τῆς ὕλης ἐπὶ τὰ παντάπασιν χωριστά, ὁδεύομεν διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων, τῶν κατὰ τι μὲν χωριστῶν κατὰ τι δὲ ἀχωρίστων.

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house that is very illuminated without any intermediary, his eyes would at once become dim, being hurt by the light. But if he were to leave it for a less dark house first and later on to the one which is more illuminated, so as to become gradually accustomed to the rays of light, then he would be able to dwell even in very strong light without harm. In the same way, if we make an attempt to ascend all at once from those natural things that are in matter to those ones whose subsistence is far from material nature, our cognitive faculties will become blind and our mind obscured through the darkness of ignorance. If, instead, we are trained little by little in the mathematics which we call intermediary and ascend to the knowledge of rational natures, then we will gradually and properly proceed along the path of knowledge and reach as far as possible what we strive for<sup>22</sup>.

16 That is why some of the ancients<sup>23</sup> called mathematical sciences bridges and ladders, while others said that, since they deal with and teach about the incorporeals as well, these sciences should certainly be taken as something through which we ascend from the inferior to the superior and from natural beings towards those ones that are above nature<sup>24</sup>.

17 Thus, they say that the cause for the threefold division of the first part of philosophy is the following. Since, as we have said, things are divided into three kinds, i.e. into those which are above nature, those that are in nature, and those intermediary ones which are in mathematical sciences, it is proper that also this part of philosophy, which is knowledge of all existing things, should be subdivided into three parts, namely knowledge of the divine things which are

22 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 12.27–13.5: ἐὰν γὰρ βουληθῶμεν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τῶν φυσιολογικῶν ἐπὶ θεολογίαν ἀμέσως αὐτοὺς ἀναγαγεῖν, τυφλώττομεν, καθάπερ οἱ ἐκ σκοτεινότητος οἴκου εἰς πεφωτισμένον ἀμέσως εἰσερχόμενοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον ἐν οἴκῳ διατρίβειν σύμμετρον ἔχοντι φῶς, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν φωτεινότατον. οὕτως οὖν μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ δεῖ διατρίψαντας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀνάγεσθαι ἐπὶ θεολογίαν. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.14–21; David, *Prolegomena* 58.32–59.3.

23 Ammonius refers to Plotinus in this context, see *In Isag.* 12.25–27.

24 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 13.5–7: κλῖμαξ γάρ τις καὶ γέφυρά ἐστι τὰ μαθήματα κοινωνοῦντα μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς καθὼ ἀχώριστα τοῖς δὲ θείοις καθὼ χωριστά. See also Elias, *Prolegomena* 28.13–14; David, *Prolegomena* 59.19–23.



പരമേശ്വരൻ നായർ എൻ. കോളേജ്, കോട്ടയം.

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above nature, the teaching on natural things which are in visible natures, and the tradition of mathematical sciences which are between these two.

18 But the practical part too, O our brother, they similarly subdivide into three parts, i.e. into the general rule over all people, the rule over a man's own house, and the rule over oneself only. For they say that everyone who is doing something good, does it either to all people and the city, or to his house, or to himself. Thus, if someone is doing good to all people he is called a general ruler, if it is to his house he is named a domestic ruler, and if it is to himself then he is called pious and vigilant<sup>25</sup>.

19 So, they say that in this practical (part of) philosophy a person is sometimes a law-giver and sometimes a judge<sup>26</sup>. Because for the common good, one promulgates laws that serve for instruction and education as well as for the virtuous conduct of those who are under his rule, and he passes judgement on those who infringe upon them and gives honor and respect to those who observe them. But beyond this, also in his own house the domestic ruler lays down certain laws, and he punishes those who transgress them and shows favor to those who follow them. And also for himself he lays down certain laws and judgements, if he wishes to set his habits in order and to purify the animal part of his soul<sup>27</sup>.

20 For this is what one of the ancient philosophers said to himself: "Accustom yourself, first of all, to restrain your stomach and to master your sleep and lust."<sup>28</sup> Furthermore he said: "If you are doing good things be glad. But when you are doing bad things reprove yourself."<sup>29</sup> So, the first of these (sayings) is

25 Cf. Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.2–6: διαιρείται τοίνυν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἰς τε τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν. ὁ γὰρ πράττων τι ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἰς ἑαυτὸν πράττει κοσμῶν αὐτοῦ τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ λέγεται ἠθικός, ἢ εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οἶκον καὶ λέγεται οἰκονομικός, ἢ τὴν ὅλην κοσμεῖ πόλιν καὶ λέγεται πολιτικός.

26 Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 32.26–30; David, *Prolegomena* 75.33–76.16. Both Elias and David ascribe this division to the Platonists. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 464b.

27 See Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.11–17: τούτων δὲ ἕκαστον διαιρεῖται εἰς τε τὸ νομοθετικὸν καὶ δικαστικόν· ὁ γὰρ πολιτικός φιλόσοφος ἢ νόμους τίθησι, καθ' οὓς δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ δικάζει καὶ τοὺς μὲν γεράν ἀξιοῖ τοὺς δὲ παρατρέψαντάς τι τῶν κειμένων νόμων κολάζει. εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ θεωρεῖται τὸ νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ νόμους τίθεμεν καὶ δικάζομεν τῶν οἰκετῶν ἢ υἱῶν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας. οὐ μόνον δὲ ἐν τῷ οἰκονομικῷ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἠθικῷ. Cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.8–25.

28 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 94, lines 9–11). Ammonius quotes this passage also without reference to Pythagoras: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ ἠθικός νόμους τίθησιν ἑαυτῷ, ὅταν λέγη κρατεῖν δ' εἰθίξω τῶνδε γαστρός μὲν πρῶτιστα καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος (Ammonius, *In Isag.* 15.17–20; cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.18–21).

29 (Ps.-)Pythagoras, *Golden Verses* (Thom 1994: 96, line 43; Sergius inverts the order of the sentences) as quoted in Ammonius, *In Isag.* 16.3 (cf. Elias, *Prolegomena* 34.10–12).



like establishing laws, while the other one is like a judgement, which is either praise that follows the one who observes the law or reproach of the one who breaks it.

[Division of Aristotle's writings]<sup>30</sup>

- 21 So, after this, we ought to turn also to the general division of all Aristotle's writings. This will make comprehensible our account when we write about the goal of each one of them separately. Indeed, it is necessary to know that those things which have been discussed until now and which we are also discussing now are useful for understanding the goals of Aristotle's writings which we are going to discuss. For it is about these goals in particular and about the division of all his writings that we are going to speak in the following sections<sup>31</sup>.
- 22 So, the general division of his works is the following. Some of them are particular, being written about each and every kind of matter; others are written universally about nature in general, and still others are in between, since they are neither written about something as a whole like the universal ones nor do they speak about some concrete things only like the particular ones<sup>32</sup>. Those which are written as particular are his letters which he addressed to his friends or his listeners concerning concrete inquiries (ζητήματα)<sup>33</sup>. Those which are placed between the particular ones and the universal ones are his writings about the government of the nations and the investigations<sup>34</sup> into the natures of animals<sup>35</sup>.
- 23 We ought to know, however, that the books which Aristotle composed on the government of the nations are not on how they should be governed, exist

30 This subtitle appears in mss. BCD.

31 Sergius refers here to the same two *prolegomena* issues (Gr. σκοπός and τάξις), to which he has already pointed in the form of the alleged inquiry by Theodore in §4 above.

32 See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.21–23: φέρε δεύτερον καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν συγγραμμάτων ποιησώμεθα. τούτων οὖν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ μερικὰ τὰ δὲ καθόλου τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ τῶν καθόλου καὶ τῶν μερικῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.8–11; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.10–12; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.9–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.17–20.

33 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.23–24: καὶ ἐστὶ μερικὰ μὲν ὅσα πρὸς τινὰς ἰδίᾳ γέγραπεν, ἢ ἐπιστολὰς ἢ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.22–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.11–13; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.21–24.

34 Syr. *taš'ita*, “story”, here apparently renders the Gr. ἱστορία, “inquiry, investigation”.

35 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.26–28: μεταξὺ δὲ ὅποσα περὶ ἱστορίας γέγραπεν, ὥς αἱ γεγραμμένα αὐτῷ Πολιτεῖαι ἀμφὶ τὰς πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίας οὔσαι. See also Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.26–29; Elias, *In Cat.* 113.29–34.



and dwell in the cities, but on what the governments and customs of each particular nation are and the laws that are established in each land. Also, what he wrote about animals was not on the subsistence and the constitution of each one of them, but on their nature during birth and growth and the habits of the whole genus. Thus, the nature of this kind of writings is not particular (in the same way) as in the letters, since he spoke about one whole nation or country and about one whole genus of animals. But neither is it universal in the same way as the other writings, in which he considered generally the nature of things about which he wrote<sup>36</sup>.

24 Now, of those writings of his that are universal, some are like notebooks, others are written as questions-and-answers between two persons (πρόσωπα), and still others are as if (they are spoken) by one person but combining multiple arguments<sup>37</sup>. We ought to know that every time this philosopher found some opinion or idea suitable for teaching, he wrote it down like a reminder in summary fashion which he could make use of in one of his teachings. Thus, those books where he recorded one by one all the ideas that he had found are called notebooks, for they were written in the form of reminders<sup>38</sup>. Also, some of these notebooks were written about particular things, namely those which deal only with one concrete subject, and some are universal, namely those which encompass multiple concepts<sup>39</sup>.

25 Now, in those books of his that are composed in the form of questions and answers, either there is one person (πρόσωπον) or there are several persons

<sup>36</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.6–11; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.29–4.6.

<sup>37</sup> Ammonius and other commentators divided Aristotle's universal writings first into systematic treatises and into those which were written in the form of notes written for memory: τῶν δὲ καθόλου τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συνταγματικά τὰ δὲ ὑπομνηματικά (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.4–5; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.11–12; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.1). The systematic treatises, in turn, were divided into those written in the dialogue form and those written by Aristotle in the first person: καὶ πάλιν τῶν συνταγματικῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ διαλογικά, ὡς ὅσα δραματικῶς διεσκεύασται κατὰ πεῦσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσιν πλείονων προσώπων, τὰ δὲ αὐτοπρόσωπα ὡς ὅσα γέγραφεν ὡς ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.14–17; cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.10–11; Elias, *In Cat.* 114.15–16).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 3.28–4.3; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.12–13; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 6.25–35.

<sup>39</sup> See Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.13–14: τῶν δὲ ὑπομνηματικῶν τὰ μὲν μονοειδῆ, ὡς ὅταν περὶ ἑνός τινος ποιῆται τὴν ζήτησιν, τὰ δὲ ποικίλα, ὅταν περὶ πολλῶν. Cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 3.12–14; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 7.1–3.



who pose questions or answer them, and there are one or more interlocutors who argue against those who are questioned<sup>40</sup>.

26 Also, those writings which are spoken as if by one person<sup>41</sup> are further divided as follows. Some of them are about *te'oriya* (θεωρία), which means “knowledge” and is the first part of philosophy, and some of them are written about practice, which is the second part of philosophy, as we have said above. And further, some of them are written about instruments (ὄργανα) of philosophy which are called in Greek *dialektika* (διαλεκτικά) and *logika* (λογικά) and which we designate as “logic” and “logical craft”<sup>42</sup>. For this is not a part of philosophy, neither is it a subpart, but it is only its instrument (ὄργανον), as we will demonstrate at length later on<sup>43</sup>.

27 So, of his theoretical writings some are about rational and incorporeal beings, and they are also called “After natures”<sup>44</sup>, others are about visible natures, their accidents and affections, and their generation and corruption — we will speak about each one of them according to our ability in the appropriate places<sup>45</sup>, — and still others are written about mathematical sciences which, as we have demonstrated, are between nature and those beings that are above nature<sup>46</sup>.

28 Of those (writings) which he composed as instruments of philosophy, some concern those things that contribute to the logical craft, some of them he composed about logic (itself), and some of them he wrote about such things that are attached to the logical craft<sup>47</sup>. We will further explain these subjects in detail in those sections that suit each one of them, quoting from the words of this man (i.e. Aristotle).

40 Ammonius and other commentators thus divide the systematic treatises (τὰ συνταγματικά), cf. the commentary to §24 above.

41 What Ammonius and other commentators refer to with the term τὰ αὐτοπρόσωπα are treatises written by Aristotle in the first person.

42 Cf. Ammonius, *In Cat.* 4.18–5.4; Philoponus, *In Cat.* 4.23–35. Sergius modifies Ammonius’ division in some aspects.

43 See §§30–48.

44 Gr. μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, “(what comes) after natural things”, i.e. the treatise *Metaphysics*.

45 Sergius speaks several times of his intention to compose commentaries on Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy, particularly on *Physics*, cf. §256. Additionally, the present commentary contains several sections which are based on the *Physics* and not on the *Categories* (see §§263–284) and it is possible that here he refers to these sections rather than to his future commentaries.

46 Sergius’ division is very close to the account of Philoponus in *In Cat.* 4.35–5.6.

47 Ammonius speaks of the writings which either concern principles of the logical method or the method itself or serve as complements to it: τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεθόδου τὰ δὲ εἰς τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλως εἰς τὴν μέθοδον συντελούντων (Ammonius, *In Cat.* 5.6–8, cf. Philoponus, *In Cat.* 5.8–14; Simplicius, *In Cat.* 4.28–31).



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- 29 For now, we intend to speak only briefly about the general division of his writings in order to train the hearing of those who learn, but later on we will speak clearly and specifically about each one of them according to our ability. For a general explanation might be very obscure for those who learn. A particular teaching, instead, would be for them more instructive. While something general is similar to an idea, that which is called particular, instead, is like a perfect depiction of this idea. That is why we shall first think about the former and then turn to the latter.

*[Logic, an instrument of philosophy]*

- 30 After this, it is necessary for us to examine whether the logical craft is a part or a subpart of philosophy, or whether it is only its instrument (ὄργανον). This issue has been disputed by some not insignificant people, indeed by those who occupy nothing less than the foremost position, at the peak (κεφάλαιον) of the whole philosophy<sup>48</sup>.
- 31 Thus, e.g., the Stoics — people who became renowned in logic and in teaching worldly kind of argumentation — stated that logic is a part of philosophy. Consequently, according to their idea, philosophy is divided not into two parts, as we have stated above, i.e. into theory and practice, but into three parts, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic. However, the Peripatetics, one of whom was Aristotle, established only two primary parts of philosophy which have been discussed above, and they considered logic to be not its part, but its instrument<sup>49</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> Ammonius does not mention this question in the introductory part of his commentary on the *Categories*, although Olympiodorus discusses it at length (*Prolegomena* 14.13–18.12). Elias remarks (*Prolegomena* 26.35–27.1) that it belongs to the study of the *Analytics*, and we indeed find extensive discussions of this topic in the commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Elias himself.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.20–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.21–24; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.18–20.

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ማጽናት BCD 19 ማጽናት<sup>2</sup> om. P | ማጽናት CDP: ማጽናት B

- 32 Plato, on the other hand, and all the Academics were not sure in which direction they should move, so that they said various things which contradict one another. For sometimes they assumed logic to be part of philosophy, but sometimes clearly proclaimed it to be its instrument. E.g., in the treatise called *Phaedo* and also in the one called *Phaedrus*, Plato stated that logic was part of philosophy, while in another treatise with the title *Parmenides*, as if he had forgot about the earlier ones, he clearly called logic an instrument<sup>50</sup>.
- 33 Those who defend (Plato's views) answer to this that what we consider to be erroneous is not in fact what they mean. We will speak about it after we have first considered those arguments which the Stoics elaborate in order to establish by means of them that, as they believe, logic is a part of philosophy and not its instrument<sup>51</sup>. As soon as we have refuted and disclosed their haughtiness in this issue and demonstrated that they speak vainly, then we will also show that logic is not both a part and an instrument of philosophy but only an instrument in accord with the view of the Peripatetics.
- 34 Now, those from the Stoa state that, if there is something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart, then it is either a part or a subpart of the craft that uses it. Therefore, if philosophy uses

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50 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.20–24; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.20–27.

51 See §§46–47, below.

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logic and if logic is neither a part nor a subpart of any other craft, it is clear that it is either a part or a subpart of philosophy<sup>52</sup>. So, they believe to have demonstrated by means of this argument that logic is either a part or a subpart of philosophy.

- 35        However, they suppose it to be not a subpart but rather a part of philosophy, and they demonstrate this as follows<sup>53</sup>. Everything that is a part and a portion of something else has the same subject matter (ὑλη) and also the same goal as that thing whose part it is<sup>54</sup>. Thus, they say, we shall first examine what the subject matter of the parts of philosophy is and what their goal is. If we then discover that logic has such a subject matter and such a goal that correspond to either of them (i.e. the parts of philosophy), then we could say that logic is a subpart of that part to which they correspond. But if one finds out that it corresponds neither in material nor in goal to either of them, then it would become apparent that it may not be their subpart.

- 36        Now, the subject matter of that primary part of philosophy which is called theory are all divine and human things, while its goal is the true knowledge of them. As for the other part which is called practice, its subject matter is government in the world and moderation of the passions, i.e. not allowing them to act in excess of what is appropriate, while its goal is to choose those things which are profitable and to avoid those which are harmful. So, they say that logic is not associated with any of them either in subject matter or in goal, since the subject matter of logic is skilful organisation of speech, while its goal is applica-

52 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.6–12: ἐάν τις τέχνη κέχρηται τινι ὁ μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον, τοῦτο πάντως ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἢ μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ μόριον. <...> ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία, φασὶν, κέχρηται τῇ λογικῇ, ἥτις οὐδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τέχνης \*\*\* τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ’ ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 14.29–15.2.

53 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–6: συλλογίζονται γὰρ οὕτως.

54 Cf. Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–32: τὸ γὰρ μόριόν τινος καὶ τῆς ὕλης κοινωνεῖ καὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἐκείνῳ οὗ ἐστι μόριον.



tion of correct arguments that are arranged properly by means of ordered speech. Therefore, since both the subject matter and the goal of logic are different from those of the parts of philosophy, i.e. of theory and practice, it is clear that it is not a part of any of them and it thus may not be considered to be a subpart of philosophy<sup>55</sup>.

37 Hence, they say, since we have first shown that (logic) should be either a part or a subpart of philosophy, but now it has been clearly demonstrated that it is not a subpart, what remains as the only possible conclusion is that it is a part of philosophy, which is thus divided not into two parts but into three parts, as we have said, i.e. into theory, practice, and logic.

38 This is what the Stoics say, being sure that their arguments are straightforward and they have not missed anything. Against it the followers of Aristotle spoke, refuting them as follows: The first premise from which they believe to straightforwardly develop their argument is not correctly formulated and understood<sup>56</sup>. For instead of saying, “something that is used by a certain craft and is not found in any other craft as its part or subpart”, they should have expanded it and said, “if it is not a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of another craft, it is either a part, or a subpart, or an instrument of the craft that uses it”. This way, they would have shown consequently that logic is not a part or a subpart of philosophy but its instrument. However, they omit “an instrument”

55 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.22–34; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 6.31–7.8; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 1.13–2.1.

56 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2: ἐροῦμεν ὅτι παρελογίσαντο. Cf. also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–11: δυνατόν μὲν γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτὸν ἀντιστῆναί τε καὶ ἐλέγξαι τὴν πρότασιν ὡς κακῶς προβεβλημένην.





and put only “a part or a subpart” in their statement and thus believe to have shown that logic is not a subpart of philosophy but its part<sup>57</sup>.

39 After this, we shall listen further to some of the Peripatetics. Whenever some craft makes use of a part of another craft, it is much greater than the one whose part serves as its instrument, as we may say about bridle-making and navigation. One of them, i.e. bridle-making, produces bridles and provides those who use them in horsemanship with them, while navigation gives course to ships and allows one to steer them. Hence in both cases the latter (crafts) are superior to the former ones which they utilize for their service. Provided that this is true, if we consider that rhetors, doctors, and any other craftsmen use logic, then if logic were a part of philosophy it would turn out that rhetoric and medicine are much greater than philosophy for they use its part as their instrument. But since it would be absurd to place philosophy which is the source of rhetoric and medicine after them: logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument<sup>58</sup>.

40 Further, merely from the fact that logic originates from philosophy they cannot demonstrate at all that it is a part of philosophy, because not everything that is generated by some craft is necessarily part of it. For, behold, there are plenty of crafts which produce their own instruments, as in the case of carpenters and blacksmiths. For a carpenter produces a hammer, a rule, and a corner,

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57 See this argument in Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.2–7 and a more detailed account in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.10–23.

58 Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–26; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.1–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.31–16.10; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In An. Pr.* 2.22–33. Sergius’ account finds its closest parallel in Philoponus.

- C100r  
 B67r  
 5  
 P12r  
 10  
 C100v  
 D59r  
 B67v

1 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 3 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 4 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P  
5 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 6 ሞሐጽ BCP: ሞሐጽ D 7 ሞሐጽ BCD:  
ሞሐጽ P 9 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 11 ሞሐጽ P: ሞሐጽ BCD  
14 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 20 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P | ሞሐጽ BCD:  
ሞሐጽ P 21 ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P 23 ሞሐጽ P: ሞሐጽ C: om. BD  
ሞሐጽ inv. P | ሞሐጽ BCD: ሞሐጽ P

which are instruments for his craft and not a part of it. And also a blacksmith forges an anvil and a hammer, which are tools that he uses and not a part of his craftsmanship. That is why logic too, even though it is produced and established by philosophy for the sake of demonstrating things, is not a part of philosophy but an instrument, by means of which it shows and makes visible things that are hidden. Without it, in fact, it would be impossible for philosophy to enter the world of men<sup>59</sup>.

41 Also, from the defining account of the part it becomes evident that logic is clearly an instrument of philosophy. For a part is something that completes the thing whose part it is when it is present in it and makes it deficient when taken away from it<sup>60</sup>. E.g., we say that, when a leg which is a part of a body is in it, it makes the whole (body) complete, but when it is separated from (the body), it makes it deficient. But logic neither makes the nature of philosophy complete when it is present nor does it make the latter in any way deficient if it is not present. In fact, its essence is in things, for it is knowledge of all existing things in which it exists, regardless of whether we comprehend them or not. For logic reveals to us those things which we do not comprehend<sup>61</sup> and it is knowledge whose essence is in things, regardless of whether we know them or not. Thus, we need logic by means of which we come to our knowledge. And consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but an instrument by means of which philosophy becomes known to us<sup>62</sup>.

42 Further, they say the following. If all the parts are removed from something whose parts they are this thing will perish too. But as we have just said, philo-

59 Cf. a brief note by Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 9.36–10.1 and a lengthy account of this argument by Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 7.23–8.6. See also Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–30.

60 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.6–7: τὸ μέρος συμπληρωτικόν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πράγματος· ἀμέλει τοι παρὸν μὲν σώζει τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸν δὲ φθείρει.

61 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.10–11: ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῆς λογικῆς ἐδείθημεν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως εἰς κατάληψιν τῶν κεκρυμμένων. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.24–25.

62 For this argument, see Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 8.26–33; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.21–27; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.4–17.

הַפֶּה כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי

- P12v 43 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 L1r 44 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 C101r 45 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 10 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 15 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 20 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 B68r 21 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי

- 15 46 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 20 47 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 C101v 48 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 20 49 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי  
 B68r 50 יִחַד לִי מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אֵם לִי כִּי הָיִיתָ לִּי

3 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ om. P 4 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ B: כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ CD 5 BCDL: כְּחֹלֶלֶת P  
 כְּחֹלֶלֶת BCD: כְּחֹלֶלֶת P | כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ BCD: כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ P 6 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ BCD:  
 כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ L: כְּחֹלֶלֶת מִלְּפָנֶיךָ P | BCDL: אֵם P 9 יִחַד om. P 11 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד  
 P 12 אֵם<sup>2</sup> BCDL: אֵם P 14 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P | יִחַד אֵם יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד  
 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P 15 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P 16 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P 17 יִחַד om. CP | יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P 19 יִחַד BCDL:  
 יִחַד P 20 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P | יִחַד L: יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P 21 יִחַד BCDL: יִחַד P

sophy will not perish if logic is removed from it, since this is what its nature is. Consequently, logic is not a part of philosophy but its instrument<sup>63</sup>.

43 After this, it is time to speak about those from the Academy who state that logic is both a part and an instrument of philosophy. For I suppose that by means of what was said a sufficient refutation has been provided of those who state that it is only a part of philosophy. Now, we shall also understand that a part differs very much from an instrument. For a part exists in virtue of itself and not in virtue of something else, while an instrument is used for the benefit of something else and not in virtue of itself. For instance, a hand, a leg, or any other part of the body exists in virtue of itself, while an axe, a saw, or a drill exists in order to be used by something else and not in virtue of itself. Therefore, it is clear that a part and an instrument are not same thing<sup>64</sup>.

44 And further, the following (argument). If one part is attached to another part, together they will bring about the whole whose parts they are. However, if you attach one instrument to another a thousand times, they will never bring about the whole thing whose instruments they are. Hence the instrument and the part differ from one another. That is why logic may not be at the same time both an instrument and a part of philosophy, as Plato and all the Academics state, but it is either only a part, which is not possible as we have shown above

63 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 17.14–15: ἡ λογικὴ ἀναιρουμένη οὐκ ἀναιρεῖ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν· ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα ὄργανον τῆς φιλοσοφίας. See also Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.9–11; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.27–29.

64 Cf. Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 16.30–34: ἴδιον μέρους ἐστὶ, φασί, τὸ δι' αὐτὸ παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ὄργανον δὲ τὸ δι' ἕτερον παραλαμβάνεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἡ λογικὴ οὐ δι' ἑαυτὴν παραλαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον, διὰ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, τὸ δὲ δι' ἄλλο παραλαμβανόμενον τοῦ δι' ὃ παραλαμβάνεται ὄργανόν ἐστιν, ἡ λογικὴ ἄρα οὐκ ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀλλ' ὄργανον. See also Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.25–27.



in our refutation of the Stoics, or only an instrument, as the truth requires. So the statement of those who consider it both part and instrument is false<sup>65</sup>.

45 And if they say, as they are accustomed to do, “Behold, a hand may at the same time be a part and an instrument!”, one should answer them that, even if the same hand might be both a part and an instrument, however it cannot be both of them for one and the same thing. For it is a part of the body, while it is an instrument not of the body but of the soul which uses it in order to make necessary movements. But this is what those who set logic as a part and an instrument of philosophy do not comprehend<sup>66</sup>.

46 The followers of Plato, however, say in his defence that logic may be considered in two ways. On the one hand it exists by itself apart from things, and on the other it is in things that its subsistence may be observed. Also, of other objects, e.g. of a measure of one or two cubits, we say that they exist in the same two ways. On the one hand it exists in measure, and on the other its subsistence is in some other body that is measured. Thus, some amount of water or wine or other things that can be measured exists by itself as the measure but also in those things that are measured by it. Also a pint is said both of the measure and of wine or water or oil whose amount is measured. Similarly, a peck is said of the measure and also of grain of a certain amount<sup>67</sup>.

<sup>65</sup> A short version of this argument is found in Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 8.29–31: καὶ πάλιν συν-τιθέμενα τὰ μέρη ποιεῖ τὸ ὅλον, τὰ δὲ ὄργανα οὐδαμῶς· τὰ ἄρα μέρη οὐκ ὄργανα.

<sup>66</sup> Philoponus suggests the same fictitious dialogue, see *In An. Pr.* 8.31–36: εἰ δέ τις εἴποι ‘καὶ μὴν ἡ χεὶρ μέρος οὐσά ἐστι καὶ ὄργανον, ὥστε οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ὄργανον οὔσαν εἶναι καὶ μέρος’, φαμέν ὅτι ἄλλ’ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γάρ οὐ ἐστι μέρος ἡ χεὶρ, τούτου ἐστὶ καὶ ὄργανον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο· μέρος μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ὡς σώματος, ὄργανον δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς. Olympiodorus also presents this imagined speech which he puts in the mouth not of some anonymous Platonist but of Plato himself: *Prolegomena* 17.18–23.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 10.36–38 and 11.15–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.3–5 and 9.13–15; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.23–29.



B68v      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 P13v      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 C102v      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 5      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 es.L1v      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට  
 D60r      මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට අනුමතව පවතින අතරතුර මනුෂ්‍යයෙකුට

[illegible][illegible]

- 47 In the same way, they say, also logic exists for its own sake and for the sake of something else that uses it. It exists for its own sake when one observes it in his intellect without applying it in speech and in demonstrations. But it exists for the sake of what uses it when it is skilfully applied in speech, in combination of words, and in demonstrations. That is why Plato regarded it both as instrument and part. He took it for an instrument when considered in its application through the combination of words and demonstrations. But he regarded it as a part of philosophy when one contemplates it in pure knowledge in his intellect apart from its application by something else<sup>68</sup>. Now, whether they are speaking well or they are far from understanding, that is what you will distinguish and comprehend yourself while reading this.
- 48 Here ends the first book, wherein three points<sup>69</sup> have been discussed, namely the division of philosophy, the general division of all the writings of Aristotle, and the question of whether logic is a part of philosophy or its instrument. In the second book, we will speak about the goal of logic.

End of Book One.

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<sup>68</sup> Cf. Ammonius, *In An. Pr.* 11.3–20; Philoponus, *In An. Pr.* 9.5–20; Olympiodorus, *Prolegomena* 15.29–37.

<sup>69</sup> Syr. *reše*, corresponding to Gr. τὰ κεφάλαια, “headings”, the main points discussed in the introductory part of a treatise.

[illegible]

*The divisions of Book One are the following:*<sup>70</sup>

*First division*

Philosophy is divided into two kinds, theory and practice.

Theory is divided into the knowledge of divine things, the mathematical sciences, and the knowledge of natural things.

The mathematical sciences are divided into geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music.

Practice is divided into rule over all people, rule over one's own house, and rule over oneself; into the law-givers and the upright judges.

*Second division*

Aristotle's writings:

- some of them are written particularly; these are the letters;
- some of them are intermediary; these concern the constitutions of the nations and about the natures of animals;
- and some are universal: some are written as reminders, some are in the form of questions and answers, and some are as if spoken by one person<sup>71</sup>.

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<sup>70</sup> All extant manuscripts containing Sergius' *Commentary* include after each one of the seven books tables which depict the division of the key-terms discussed in these books. Due to the technical limitations of a critical edition, it is impossible to represent these division in the same form. Instead, they are indicated as plain text. See the Appendix, where the divisions are presented in the diagram form.

<sup>71</sup> Mss. BCD add: "Some of them are dedicated to divine things, some are written about natural things, and some are instrumental, namely logic. Some of the (latter) are before this craft, some are about this craft of demonstrations, and some are attached to this craft."