

7 East-West, North-South: Between National, Regional, and International

The post-independence period in Kigoma-Ujiji could be described as a protracted liminal phase, with global transformations being imposed upon the town again and again, confronting the place and its people with uncertain outcomes. Until recently, the town seemed squeezed between two parallel forces. On the one hand, national political programmes positioning Tanzania vis-à-vis an ideologically and economically East-West-defined world had a direct bearing on Kigoma region and town, including an accelerated urbanization in the form of rural-urban migration. On the other hand, protracted warfare in neighbouring East Congo and Burundi – partly affected by violent conflict in Rwanda, as well – placed an additional burden on the region and town of Kigoma. War refugees as well as international organizations coming in their wake produced a permanent stress as well as an incessant demographic growth and increase of international presence in Kigoma for about half a century.

Schematically, one could argue that the political economies of the caravan trade complex and of colonization in combination with urbanization on the move which gave rise to the urban area towards the end of the nineteenth century look similar to what happened since 1960: global economic and ideological pressure, protracted violence, urbanization, as well as the role of “international organizations”, in the guise back then of missionary orders and geographic associations. Yet, whereas urbanization had been a coping strategy in the nineteenth century and arguably still was for many thousands of people moving to and through Kigoma-Ujiji a century later, the urbanites already living in town – the town itself, so to speak, which did not yet exist until the last quarter of the nineteenth century – now had to face the problems posed by political impositions coming from national as well as international levels and by rapid urbanization coming from the surrounding region as well as from across the national borders. While Kigoma-Ujiji remained a liminal town, where hundreds of thousands of people moved to and through in search for a way out of distress, the town as such was burdened with transformations coming from all cardinal directions.

In this chapter, I first reconstruct the impact of national politics on Kigoma-Ujiji against the backdrop of global evolutions in the half century after 1960. Thereafter, I explain how refugees and – governmental and non-governmental – international organizations that are committed to the relief of these refugees altered the town of Kigoma-Ujiji in the same period. Finally, I sketch how an interplay between international concerns and local appropriation occurred also in

other domains. Here, I focus in particular on the opportunities and drawbacks of the heritagization of Kigoma's history, linking up with the global or external perceptions of Kigoma-Ujiji introduced in Chapter 2. The subsequent chapter, then, provides a view from the inside in the form of a *longue-durée* and spatial reading of how one and a half century of history is made sense of in the present, thus offering an alternative narrative of how people in Kigoma-Ujiji deal with the challenges of the present that are presented in the current chapter.

7.1 Global Ideologies and National Politics

After Tanganyika gained independence in 1961, the TANU rank and file soon no longer reflected the profile of the TANU militants of “Manyema” origin – by then understood as stemming from the caravan trade complex and from around the lake alike – who had been active in Kigoma-Ujiji in the 1950s (see Chapter 6). The Muslim core from around Lake Tanganyika, which had controlled TANU branches in Kigoma-Ujiji and even delivered the first African mayor of Dar es Salaam, Shaykh Amri Abedi, was now overshadowed on the national level by a Western-educated, predominantly Christian apparatus that was more confined to the national territory than TANU in Kigoma-Ujiji had ever been.¹ For sure, the role of Western-educated elites and colonial servants had already been important for TANU before independence,² and, granted, TANU tried to strike a balance between Christian and Muslim functionaries.³ Yet, this was to a large extent also a mainland-coastal balance, while within the territory of Tanganyika, Kigoma-Ujiji was – spatially – as far removed from the coast as can be. When the federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was instituted as Tanzania in 1964 or when TANU merged with the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977, the weight of Muslims within the one-party state or the awareness of the connection between the coast and the mainland, which had been cru-

1 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 551–552 and 570. Also see Mohamed Said, *The Life and Times of Abdulwahid Sykes (1924–1968): The Untold Story of the Muslim Struggle Against British Colonialism in Tanganyika* (London: Minverva, 1998); Abdin N. Chande, “Muslims and modern education in Tanzania”, *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 14, nos. 1–2 (1993): 1–16. On Shaykh Amri Abedi, see McHenry, “Tanzania: The Struggle for Development”, 81–82.

2 Andreas Eckert, *Herrschen und Verwalten: Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920–1970* (München: Oldenbourg, 2014), 80–93 and 167–216.

3 Roman Loimeier, “Perceptions of Marginalization: Muslims in Contemporary Tanzania” in *Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa*, (eds.) Benjamin F. Soares and René Otayek (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 137–156.

cial for the ASP in Zanzibar could have risen.⁴ But none of this fundamentally influenced the position of the faraway town of Kigoma-Ujiji. Here, the peak of Ujiji's power in the decolonization and incipient nationalization movement was reached around 1960. The transnational urban Muslim core of TANU was soon overshadowed by an ethnic-territorial and rural force symbolized by the Jiji *mwami* George Batega Rusimbi winning the parliamentary seat for Kigoma in 1965.⁵ Meanwhile, the party, and Nyerere in particular, remained proponents of Pan-Africanism; but this was carried out instead on the international level, whereas domestic politics prioritized territorial nation-building and national development.

It was not so much the fact that many of the TANU cells were led by Muslims per se but the fact that they were strongly connected across territorial boundaries around the lake as well as to the coast that had characterized their operation in the years leading up to independence. These translocal border-crossing networks, which were strongly developed in Kigoma-Ujiji and reminiscent of the web that had been covered by the caravan trade complex in the nineteenth century, lost political clout within post-independence Tanganyika/Tanzania – although they would reappear in another form when war refugees crossed the border in the decades to come.

Although – as we have seen in the previous chapter – the township of Kigoma-Ujiji was created in 1963 and thus for the first time had a single local administration for the whole urban area, the logic of nation-building and national development implied that the town was approached as an integral part of the wider region of Kigoma, not unlike under British Native Administration. Moreover, these national policy lines did not prioritize urban development either.

7.1.1 African Socialism

When President Julius K. Nyerere pronounced his Arusha Declaration in 1967 in which he announced the implementation of a policy of African Socialism (*Ujamaa*), his primary target was rural areas.⁶ While the international context was determined by the Cold War and by largely accomplished decolonization – at least in the

4 Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Abdul Sheriff, "Race and Class in the Politics of Zanzibar", *Africa Spectrum* 36, no. 3 (2001): 301–318; Glasmann, *War of Words*.

5 McHenry, "Tanzania: the Struggle for Development", 82.

6 For a thorough analysis of TANU giving priority to rural development and being hostile to urban growth, see James R. Brennan, "Blood Enemies: Exploitation and Urban Citizenship in the Nationalist Political Thought of Tanzania, 1958–75", *The Journal of African History* 47, no. 3 (2006): 389–413.

narrow sense of flag independence – Nyerere opted for a non-aligned course, developing a leftist programme independent from the Soviet bloc. Development (*maendeleo*), self-reliance (*kujitegemea*), and brotherhood (*ujamaa*) were the core tenets of Nyerere's African Socialism, understood as a modern communalism in direct continuity with precolonial African ways of life.⁷ African Socialism, thus, was not an ideology imported or appropriated from Europe but explained as a genuine African communalism apt to modernization. Moreover, the Tanzanian brand of African Socialism – coined *Ujamaa* – was discursively promoted as genuinely Tanzanian, hence as a nation-building device.⁸ The narrative of the precolonial authenticity made it seem natural to pick rural development as the starting point for a modernizing African Socialism. Moreover, Tanzania was at the time demographically still a primarily rural country, which further underpinned the rural priority in Nyerere's African Socialism. Paradoxically, this focus on rural development would spur rapid urbanization and thus also affect Kigoma-Ujiji.

Under the ideal of *Ujamaa*, Tanzania embarked on a villagization project that was meant to modernize agriculture and to provide modern infrastructure and facilities for rural areas. Concentrating habitations in rural areas was a precondition for provisioning healthcare, education, electricity, water etc. on a sufficiently large scale. The expectation was that such large villages would help to establish collective agriculture.⁹ After an experimental phase, during which villagization was voluntary, the government decided to enforce villagization in 1973. Operation Kigoma was one of the first and largest instances of forced villagization.¹⁰ The rural region of Kigoma was relatively densely populated and economically disadvantaged since colonial times. Labour migration out of the Kigoma Region to sisal plantations on the coast had been a way to exploit this economic and demo-

7 Eric Burton, "Review Article: Sovereignty, Socialism and Development in Postcolonial Tanzania", *Stichproben: Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien* 31, no. 16 (2016): 109–126; Burton, *In Diensten des Afrikanischen Sozialismus*, 61.

8 Emma Hunter, "Revisiting Ujamaa: Political Legitimacy and the Construction of Community in Post-Colonial Tanzania", *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 3, (2008): 471–485.

9 Helge Kjekshus, "The Tanzanian Villagization Policy: Implementational Lessons and Ecological Dimensions", *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 11, no. 2 (1977): 269–282; James Scott, "Chapter 7. Compulsory Villagization in Tanzania: Aesthetics and Miniaturization" in James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 223–261.

10 Kjell J. Havnevik, *Tanzania: The Limits of Development from Above* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1993), 206; Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 73; McHenry, "Concentrations and Ujamaa Villages", 54–59.

graphic pressure on the region under British rule.¹¹ Nyerere, on the contrary, wanted to promote development in the region itself.

Unfortunately, the villagization programme failed miserably. Distances to the fields, peasants prioritizing privately owned plots of land, the unwillingness of farmers to abide by obligations in which they, borne of their experience with the environment, did not believe, a reluctance to move away from permanent crops such as banana trees, the violence used by official and paramilitary forces to enforce people to move to the *Ujamaa* villages, and perhaps also to some extent the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Burundi after the genocidal confrontations in 1971 to 1972, to which I return in the next subchapter, provide a range of reasons why Operation Kigoma failed. On top of that, infrastructure and facilities were not provided as promised.¹² I will not dig deeper into the rural villagization programme as such but instead turn to its fallout for urban Kigoma-Ujiji.

The *Ujamaa* policy affected the town in three ways. First of all, urban development was not high on the agenda and hence not promoted for decades. Secondly, the promotion of agricultural development did have a direct impact on Kigoma-Ujiji all the same, in the often-neglected domain of urban agriculture. As we have seen in previous chapters, the Luiche valley near Kigoma-Ujiji was a particularly fertile area and this was one of the fundamental reasons why a town developed there in the first place. This fertile area was a preferential focus for the villagization project, if only because economic success was relatively easy to achieve. Some fishing villages within the urban area were included in the villagization as well; both Bangwe and Kibirizi became *Ujamaa* development villages.¹³

Agricultural and fishery development in Kigoma-Ujiji had precursors in colonial times, with a Ha workforce in the Luiche delta, with “following the fish” being a prime motivation for moving to Kigoma-Ujiji since time immemorial,¹⁴ and with the establishment of fishing cooperatives towards the end of the colonial

11 Sago, “A Labour Reservoir”; Jack Wayne, “Colonialism and underdevelopment in Kigoma region, Tanzania: a social structural view”, *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie* 12, no. 3 (1975): 316–332.

12 McHenry, “Concentrations and Ujamaa Villages”, 54–59; N. Ernest Maganya, “Kigoma: From a Labour Reserve to a Cash Crop Growing Area, a Case Study of the Process of Internalization of Capitalist Relations in Peasant Societies”, BA dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam – Department of Sociology, March 1977, 40–50; Edward T.K. Kadiri, “The Co-operative Movement in Tanzania: its Economic and Social Implications for Kigoma Region”, University of Dar es Salaam – Faculty of Law, Third year university examinations, March 1974, 128.

13 Ishengoma, “The Impact of Capital Penetration”, 72.

14 Makowe, “Urban history: the case for Ujiji”, University of Dar es Salaam – Department of History (supervised by G.T. Mishambi), March 1980, 7.

period. However, Operation Kigoma attempted to interfere in the asymmetric relations between owners of agricultural plots and fishing equipment, on the one hand, and those who did the work on the land and the lake, on the other. Complaints about the exploitation of Ha labourers on land owned by people from Ujiji had already surfaced in colonial times.¹⁵ Attention to capital-labour relations in the fishing industry became the object of research at the time of the *Ujamaa* politics. Although the fishing cooperatives, whereby Africans in the fishing sector self-organized vis-à-vis European and Indian economic and commercial dominance, had been seen as an emancipating movement during colonial times, criticism arose during *Ujamaa* times.¹⁶ When it comes to *dagaa* fishing – the most important fishing sector in the area –, what was needed was a combination of two or three boats, lamps to attract the *dagaa* to the surface, a fishing net, a helmsman, and paddlers. Moreover, the *dagaa* had to be sundried and, in the end, marketed. In the actual operation, though,

[t]he owners of the boats do not actually do the fishing. The fishermen come mostly from the rural areas as casual labour. They [. . .] have no dealing in the drying and hand processing of the fish. Another group of exploiters in the *dagaa* business are the drying-ground owners who employ assistants to do the *dagaa* drying. After drying the boat owner comes in to the picture again. He is the one who sells the fish to the market. At this juncture he therefore commands importance in the whole business and actually buys membership in the co-operative society. But it is doubtful whether this man is really interested in the cooperative movement.¹⁷

The revenue primarily went to the owners of the equipment and the drying grounds. According to one scheme based on Bangwe and Kibirizi *Ujamaa* villages, the owners gained 60 percent of the revenue and the workforce 40 percent.¹⁸ Boats mostly belonged to fishermen from Ujiji, whereas the labour force either lived in Bangwe and Kibirizi and came as seasonal labour from the Ha lands or were recruited amongst the Burundian refugees, above all from the Mpanda refugee camp.¹⁹ We will learn more about these refugees in the next sub-chapter, but this depicting of labour relations in the fishing industry already makes clear how

15 TNA, District Officer's Reports: Kigoma District 1955, 27 (here mentioned in the context of Ha labourers no longer accepting this exploitation).

16 McHenry, "Tanzania: The Struggle for Development"; Kadiri, "The Co-operative Movement in Tanzania", 101–137.

17 University of Dar es Salaam – Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, "Research Report No 38 – Economic Report of Kigoma Region", October 1971, 17.

18 Ishengoma, "The Impact of Capital Penetration", 52.

19 Ishengoma, "The Impact of Capital Penetration", 72. Also see Interview KU18, Mwanga, 22 June 2012.

agricultural politics and refugees from neighbouring countries are not only outside influences on the urban area but deeply entangled with urban dynamics.

Thirdly, and for Kigoma-Ujiji perhaps most importantly, the failure of the villagization programme in the Kigoma region boosted rural-urban migration,²⁰ leading both to demographic growth and to a shift in the composition of the urban population towards a significantly larger share of Ha people, the dominant ethnic group in the Kigoma region to which also the Jiji belong.

Additionally, the widespread perception in the town was that government officials in Kigoma were predominantly imported from other parts of the country, comparable with the Christian-educated rank and file overshadowing the urbane Swahili network within TANU mentioned above. The two evolutions combined – Ha rural-urban migration and officials from other parts of the country – led to a relative loss of precedence for the original urban population of Kigoma-Ujiji, originating either from around Lake Tanganyika or from Manyema.²¹ I return to this issue in the next chapter. What matters now is the feeling of neglect and sidelining shared by urbanites, above all in Ujiji.²² This did not get better when privatization took the place of African Socialism in the neoliberal age after *baba ya taifa* (the father of the nation) Nyerere passed the presidency on to Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985.

7.1.2 The Neoliberal Age

Across the African continent, the 1980s were characterized by an international neoliberal blast forcing African states to “structurally adjust” in order to have access to the financial markets. After the failure of the villagization programme, partly because of a lack of means to deliver what was envisaged (partly also because of misconceptions in the programme itself),²³ Tanzania was forced to further reduce government spending. A lot has been said about the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes and their devastating impact on African

²⁰ For the experience of a growing agglomeration because of refugees, see Interview KU20, Ujiji, 22 June 2012.

²¹ For the dominant position of functionaries from elsewhere and the marginal position of Ha people in Ujiji in the 1960s, see Hino, “Social Stratification”, 51–74, especially 65.

²² McHenry, “Tanzania: The Struggle”, 22–23; Interview KU9, Ujiji, 15 September 2011; Interview KU19, Ujiji, 22 June 2012; Interview KU20, Ujiji, 22 June 2012; Interview KU22, Kigoma, 23 June 2012; Interview KU28, Katonga, 28 June 2012.

²³ Scott, “Compulsory Villagization in Tanzania”, 223–261.

states, societies, and economies.²⁴ In Tanzania, an already insufficient level of government spending was further decreased, and the most promising public companies were swiftly privatized or at least liberalized. With regard to the TAZARA railway connecting Dar es Salaam with the Zambian Copperbelt, which itself was the product of “Third World” socialist cooperation between China, Tanzania, and Zambia during the period of African Socialism, Jamie Monson has explained how liberalization policies drastically reduced access to the rail infrastructure for people living along – and living off – the TAZARA.²⁵ Meanwhile, the significantly older and less resource-relevant central railway connecting Dar es Salaam with Kigoma was neglected for several decades to the verge of decay. As late as 2007, the central railway was “finally” taken over by the Indian government enterprise RITES, only to be renationalized again a couple of years later because of lacking maintenance and structural dilapidation.²⁶ Investments in navigation infrastructure also date back to the African Socialism period, with, for instance, a Danish funded overhaul of the Liemba and the completion of a Finnish built ferry, both in the 1970s.²⁷ All in all, Tanzania’s second president Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in fact, reversed Nyerere’s African Socialism, although the national discourse of *Ujamaa*, *maendeleo* and *kujitegemea* was maintained. Given that more or less the same happened across the continent, perhaps Mwinyi did not really have another option. Notwithstanding, after a failed development programme followed a development concept that was destined to fail.

For urban Kigoma-Ujiji, this meant a perpetuation of the afflux of rural-urban migrants, a continuation of the absence of urban investments, and the steady decline in transportation services. This was the time when Sheryl McCurdy did her fieldwork in Kigoma-Ujiji. She captures the atmosphere of crisis in her dissertation and explains how the urban populace coped with the situation of neglect and deprivation. She was especially interested in health and medical facilities, with a special focus on female concerns relating to fertility.²⁸ Regardless of this highly interesting focus, the general context of crisis and neglect permeated all spheres of life. Mutual aid based on long-lasting experience combined with the

24 There is a wealth of critical literature about the ideological misconceptions of the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes dating back to the first half of the 1990s. The systematic analysis of neoliberalism by James Ferguson is probably one of the best analyses of the intrinsic misconceptions; James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

25 Jamie Monson, “Defending the people’s Railway in the Era of Liberalization: TAZARA in Southern Tanzania”, *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 76, no. 1 (2006): 113–130.

26 Interview, KU21, Kigoma, 23 June 2012.

27 Interview, KU36, Kigoma, 20 July 2012.

28 McCurdy, “Transforming Associations”.

mobilization of spiritual support had to compensate for the lack of sufficient medical facilities in a town the size of Kigoma-Ujiji, estimated at 100,000 inhabitants at the time.²⁹

When I was in Kigoma-Ujiji, 20 odd years after McCurdy's fieldwork, medical care was still limited and the trip to the Muhimbili National Hospital in Dar es Salaam was often needed, a trip for which the transportation infrastructure was vital. With dysfunctional railway operations after decades of disinvestment and mismanagements, bus traffic over bumpy roads became the preferential and most affordable means of transportation. Chinese and French construction firms had only just begun building new road infrastructure.

7.1.3 Multi-Party Elections in a One-Party State?

At the beginning of this chapter, I have hinted at the unfulfilled possibility that the merging of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into Tanzania in 1964 or of TANU and ASP into CCM in 1977 could have led to an awareness for the relevance of people originating from further west on the mainland, a phenomenon that was accounted for by ASP on the isles of Zanzibar and thoroughly determined Kigoma-Ujiji, as well. It did not happen in the 1960s or 1970s. But once the global thrust towards "democratization" – formalized as multi-party elections – was also implemented in Tanzania in the early 1990s, it soon became clear that Kigoma-Ujiji and Zanzibar indeed had a lot in common. In both constituencies, CCM repeatedly lost elections. Kigoma-Ujiji turned out to be perhaps electorally closer to Zanzibar than any other constituency in the country, despite being physically the furthest removed.

The 1994 by-elections after the death of the CCM Member of Parliament for urban Kigoma led to a thriller already before the first multi-party elections in Tanzania in 1995. The election results as such seemed quite straightforward: the CCM candidate Azim Suleman Premji obtained 9,453 votes against 5,325 for the opposition candidate Dr. Aman Walid Kabourou (CHADEMA). However, the latter successfully challenged Premji's victory in court based on the unfair support Premji had received from government. The serving president had used government transport to support the candidate and Radio Tanzania had reported in a biased

²⁹ McCurdy did her fieldwork in 1992 to 1993. Kigoma-Ujiji had a population of 84,704 at the time of the 1988 national census (see introduction).

way.³⁰ The 1995 general elections were imminent when the court ruling was confirmed by the Court of Appeal, which made new by-elections superfluous. During the general elections, however, the opposition candidate Kabourou won with a narrow margin of 49.7 to 48.9 percent against incumbent MP Premji.³¹ This election result, too, was brought to court and annulled because of Kabourou's use of derogatory vocabulary against people of Indian descent, Premji being an Indian car dealer in Kigoma.³² Notwithstanding, Kabourou won the general elections for the constituency of urban Kigoma in 2000 on a CHADEMA ticket. Five years later, however, he was sidelined by CHADEMA and joined CCM soon afterwards, which still caused contempt amongst interviewees in Kigoma-Ujiji several years later.³³

By the time Kabourou died in 2018, this pattern had somehow repeated itself, with Zitto Zuberi Kabwe winning the new constituency of Kigoma North – urban Kigoma-Ujiji now consisting of two constituencies after the sustained growth of the population – for CHADEMA in 2010, yet being thrown out of the party on corruption allegations five years later.³⁴ Contrary to Kabourou, however, Kabwe managed to maintain his seat in parliament in 2015 as the sole representative of the new party ACT-Wazalendo (Alliance for Change and Transparency – *Chama cha Wazalendo*). After the 2020 elections, he remained a member of parliament, seeing his party grow to five seats in total. Overall, urban Kigoma has almost uninterruptedly voted opposition candidates to parliament, since the multi-party system was introduced in 1992. Even intrigues within opposition parties and changing party allegiances have not altered the trend of opposition victories in

30 “Elections that put Kabourou on Tanzania’s political map”, *The Citizen*, 11 March 2018, <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/elections-that-put-kabourou-on-tanzania-s-political-map-2626108> (accessed 30 September 2024); Edwin Mtei, *From Goatherd to Governor: The Autobiography of Edwin Mtei* (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2008), 200.

31 Reeves, Pamela, and Keith Klein, *Republic in transition: 1995 elections in Tanzania and Zanzibar – IFES Observation Report* (Washington: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1995), <https://www.eisa.org/storage/2023/05/eom-report-1995-observation-report-zanzibar-ifes-eisa.pdf>, 236 (accessed 30 September 2024).

32 See “Elections that put Kabourou on Tanzania’s political map”. Premji’s father had been a representative of the Ismaili community in the Kigoma Township Authority in the 1950s. TNA, Tang. Sec. 19408: Kigoma Township Authority, vol. II: 1941–1953. For a broader analysis of tensions between African and Indian populations in Tanzania, primarily focusing on Dar es Salaam, see James R. Brennan, *Taifa: Making nation and race in urban Tanzania* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012).

33 Interview, KU28, Katonga, 28 June 2012.

34 For more information on the sacking of Zitto Kabwe from CHADEMA, <https://mtega.wordpress.com/2013/11/24/collected-articles-on-sacking-of-zitto-kabwe-from-chadema-positions/> (accessed 30 September 2024).

parliamentary elections – in a town that was a TANU stronghold during the decolonization period.

This may seem trivial but given the long history of Kigoma-Ujiji sketched so far, it is not. A global transformation or more precisely a national transformation of the political system in response to global changes and international pressure after the end of the Cold War was yet again shaped idiosyncratically and translocally in the case of Kigoma-Ujiji. The questions to be answered are what distinguishes Kigoma-Ujiji from those 50 odd other constituencies that went to opposition parties in 1995, on the one hand, and what makes this distinction translocal rather than merely local, on the other. Therefore, I go beyond the election results as such and have a closer look at the 1995 presidential elections by juxtaposing this with the dynamics apparent in Kigoma-Ujiji simultaneously.

In 1995, during the first multi-party elections since Tanzania was instituted in 1964, 46 direct and nine additional mandates for the Tanzanian parliament went to opposition candidates against 186 plus 28 for CCM. More than half of these opposition seats, however, went to candidates from the isles of Zanzibar, where the Civic United Front (CUF) gained 24 direct and four additional seats. Meanwhile, a quarter of a century later, CUF has lost clout in Zanzibar while on the mainland CHADEMA gradually established itself as the main opposition party. In 1995, however, we witness a combined success of both parties in the urban constituency of Kigoma-Ujiji: the CHADEMA candidate Kabourou won the seat in parliament and the CUF candidate for the presidency obtained a higher share of the votes than in any other constituency on the mainland, even more than any constituency on the primary Zanzibari isle of Unguja. Only on the secondary Zanzibari isle of Pemba did the CUF candidate register better results than in urban Kigoma. In the end, president Mkapa (CCM) obtained the highest number of votes in Kigoma-Ujiji (15,352). But the 16,038 combined votes of three opposition candidates surpassed Mkapa's, 10,188 of which went to Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba, the CUF candidate.³⁵ Why did this CUF candidate appeal to the citizens of urban Kigoma?

That Professor Lipumba, an economist trained at the universities of Dar es Salaam and Stanford, could be seen as a challenge to the aforementioned Christian-educated take-over of TANU is perhaps meaningful, but there is no reason to believe that this explains his electoral success in Kigoma-Ujiji.³⁶ However, as a Muslim born in the region of Tabora and leading the Zanzibari CUF party, he embodied the thread running across Tanzania from Indian Ocean islands into the interior – or the other way around – that reflects connectedness rather than terri-

³⁵ Reeves and Klein, *Republic in transition*, 180.

³⁶ Dr. Aman Walid Kabourou and Zitto Zuberi Kabwe also studied abroad.

toriality, the networks from the caravan trade complex rather than colonial and national state building.³⁷

The widespread but concealed dissent against CCM politics and policy lines, which are blamed for having neglected the interests of Kigoma-Ujiji since independence, also shows outside of election periods.³⁸ Not only the words but also the setting of some interviews underscore how the hold of the CCM on town and country was appreciated. One interview took place in a relatively empty living room decorated with CCM posters and campaign materials. Nevertheless, after I had gone through the checklist of my semi-structured interview and asked my usual open closing question if there is anything important to add that had not been addressed so far, the informant – not devoid of a sarcastic tone – started to rant against politicians, the government, and CCM in particular. This put the CCM pictures on the wall in a different perspective. Trying to understand this apparent contradiction, I was told, off the record, that the posters indicated the acknowledgement of CCM's almightiness: people refrain from criticizing CCM in public, but CCM colours are not necessarily a sign of support.

This disconnect between public and hidden transcripts,³⁹ which hint at dissent and distrust within the urban populace, also surfaced in the religious domain. The early 1990s were a period of religious tension, just as the late 1970s had been after the failure of the villagization programme. Juxtaposing these two periods is useful to grasp the dynamics in the urban area.

In the late 1970s, the crisis had coincided with rural-urban migration, which incidentally raised the share of Christian population in the town as well as with factionalism within the Muslim community of Ujiji. Ujiji had been a hotbed of Qadiriyya Sufism since the 1920s at the latest,⁴⁰ and double roles had existed for government officials who were Qadiriyya leaders at the same time – e.g. Shaykh Muhamedi Nassoro who was also vice-governor in the late 1960s.⁴¹ However, in the late 1970s, the Muslim community of Ujiji fell apart along lines of religious interpretation. While BAKWATA – the National Muslim Council of Tanzania – had

37 I have tried in vain to get in touch with him since 2021. I have not been able to reconstruct his family background.

38 Interviews in Kigoma-Ujiji, September 2011 and June to July 2012. Several interviewees gave their assessments of CCM off the record, but I prefer not to disclose the identity of those who spoke on the record either. Although Tanzania is a democracy and a multi-party state by now, the hold of the CCM is still so omnipresent that I do not want to take the risk of causing trouble for the people who were so kind to respond to my questions.

39 See James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

40 Abel, *Les Musulmans noirs*; Nimtz, *Islam and Politics*, 58–60 and 88. Also see Chapter 6.

41 Interview KU2, Ujiji, 10 September 2011.

been founded on the national level in order to bring the interests of different Islamic denomination together, adherence to BAKWATA in Ujiji became a dividing line between those who stuck to the Central-African tradition within Qadiriyya to perform *zikri*, to play drums, and to include women, and those who followed the coastal influences more in tune with modern developments in the Islamic world at large.

In the first place, a divide sharpened within Qadiriyya between people who defended the ritual tradition for which Ujiji had become the point of reference for Muslims all over East Central Africa, and a more orthodox understanding and practice of Islam that was promulgated in the wider Islamic world and reached Ujiji from the coast. Felicitas Becker, focusing on Islamic funerary practices in Tanzania, framed the divide as one between the propitiation of the ancestors and of God, which can be connected to long-term interactions between Muslim and indigenous religious notions.⁴² Shaykh Nassoro stood for the coastal Qadiriyya orientation and instituted *ijazah* to several followers while he was vice-governor of Kigoma.⁴³ He insisted on separating men and women and to stopping the playing of the drums. Shaykh Abdul Muhsin Kitumba, who had represented the Uwaysiyya branch of the Qadiriyya *tariqa* since around 1930 (see Chapter 6), joined this Qadiriyya reorientation.⁴⁴ Long-standing dynasties of Qadiriyya scholarship in Ujiji, above all three generations of leadership by the Kiumbe family, opposed the reforms, leading to a split in 1978. Those who stuck to the long-standing traditions called themselves *Istiqama* – the straight or proper route, steadfastness or uprightness – thereby continuing female participation and the practice of *zikri*. They refused to join BAKWATA. Each faction argued that they were practicing the “right” Islam, but beneath the surface, the authority of Islamic leaders within Ujiji and the positionality of Ujiji for Muslims in the whole of East Central Africa were at stake. One of my informants stated that it was all about money,⁴⁵ but it has not been possible to trace the financial interests involved. There is no doubt, though, that power and influence at the very least played an important role.

Parallel to this inner-Qadiriyya split, Ansar al-Sunna, an even more orthodox, Saudi and Salafist influenced form of Islam, was introduced from Zanzibar around 1980. They propagate a “pure” Islam and refute both Qadiriyya and Istiqama. Their leader in Kigoma, Shaykh Kazema, is a local from the town and was

⁴² Felicitas Becker, “Islamic Reform and Historical Change in the Care of the Dead: Conflicts over Funerary Practice Among Tanzanian Muslims”, *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute* 79, no. 3 (2009): 416–434.

⁴³ Interview KU2, Ujiji, 10 September 2011.

⁴⁴ Interview KU3, Ujiji, 12 September 2011.

⁴⁵ Interview KU1, Ujiji, 8 September 2011.

educated by Shaykh Kiumbe.⁴⁶ Taken together, these Islamic divides and reorientations reflect both divisions within the community and questions of priority: does the East-Central-African or the Islamic connection prevail, or put differently, the cohesion of the community, including women and ancestors, or the overarching connection to the worldwide Islamic community or Ummah and to Allah?

In the early 1990s, we again notice a coincidence between political dissension and religious division, this time both within and between Muslim and Christian communities. Contrary to the realignment in the late 1970s, in the early 1990s the divisions amongst Muslims became hostile, putting a stop to intermarriages – as had been the case around 1930, another time of crisis.⁴⁷ In an increasingly mixed town, where the Christian share of the population was growing, confrontations between Christians and Muslims also increased, including fierce prejudices against Muslims, accusing them of sorcery for instance.⁴⁸ One way to channel these confrontations were publicly organized theological debates or *Muhadharahs* between Christian and Muslim leaders, that took place in Kigoma-Ujiji from the mid-1990s.⁴⁹ Parallel to that, the mainline churches within the Christian community lost ground to pentecostalist churches, as can be observed across Africa, leading to tensions and prejudices amongst Christians as well.⁵⁰

However, in dozens of interviews and conversations, nobody confirmed a link between religious and electoral dissent in Kigoma-Ujiji. Therefore, I will also not jump to conclusions in this regard as I am not able to substantiate a causation. I can only state the coincidence in a still ongoing process. There are, however, translocal or global parallels in each of these instances. The Muslim dynamics reflect phenomena that can be observed across East Africa and the Islamic World.⁵¹ The Christian

46 Interview KU3, Ujiji, 12 September 2011; Interview KU12, Ujiji, 19 September 2011. Also see Roman Loimeier, “Zanzibar’s geography of evil: the moral discourse of the Anṣār al-sunna in contemporary Zanzibar”, *Journal for Islamic Studies* 31, no. 1 (2011): 4–28.

47 Interview KU3, Ujiji, 12 September 2011.

48 Informal conversation KU23, Kigoma, 23 June 2012; Informal conversation KU30, Ujiji & Mwanga, 4 July 2012.

49 Interview KU18, Mwanga, 22 June 2012; Interview KU19, Ujiji, 22 June 2012.

50 Informal conversation KU23, Kigoma, 23 June 2012. For an analysis of the appeal of pentecostalist churches, see Hansjörg Dilger, “Healing the Wounds of Modernity: Salvation, Community and Care in a Neo-Pentecostal Church in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania”, *Journal of Religion in Africa* 37, no. 1 (2007): 59–83.

51 See Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform in Twentieth-Century Africa* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016) and Felicitas Becker, “Introduction: ‘Performing citizenship and enacting exclusion on Africa’s Indian Ocean littoral’”, *The Journal of African History* 55, no. 2 (2014): 161–171.

developments also reflect dynamics that occur across Africa.⁵² These parallels cannot be reduced to some kind of global determinism. But we can discern translocal dynamics, where the local and the global are connected and local problems are tackled drawing on dynamics on other scales.

Overall, we observe that Kigoma-Ujiji underwent global transformations and resultant local problems from the time of African Socialism to the neoliberal age and the multi-party system, but transformations were also idiosyncratically and translocally appropriated, displaying an electoral profile that is unique to the Tanzanian mainland and, paradoxically, combines a remote position on the map with connectedness across and beyond the national territory. Likewise, we observe convoluted entanglements between local or regional concerns and global influences in the religious sphere.

7.2 Regional Refugees and International Interference

Parallel to the narrative from African Socialism over neoliberal obsessions to a multiparty system, Kigoma-Ujiji was also confronted with several critical periods in which hundreds of thousands of refugees arrived from neighbouring Congo/Zaire and Burundi.⁵³ At the same time, Kigoma was used as a strategic site from where warfare was coordinated and launched by foreign actors and as a location for international organizations to arrange refugee relief operations. All of these forces came from outside Kigoma and even outside Tanzania, but seriously affected the town – and the region – of Kigoma, which was simultaneously trying to cope with the globally incited national policies discussed before.

In this subchapter, I first briefly introduce the different phases of refugees arriving in Kigoma and then highlight a few relevant international impacts on Kigoma relating to the successive refugee crises.

⁵² See, for instance, Birgit Meyer, “‘Pentecost’ in the World” in *Going to Pentecost: An Experimental Approach to Studies of Pentecostalism*, (eds.) Annelin Eriksen, Ruy Llera Blanes and Michelle MacCarthy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 209–215.

⁵³ From the 1970s until the 2010s, close to one million Burundian refugees fled to Tanzania, mainly to the Kigoma Region. This number includes double or triple counting, as some people fled after each outbreak of violence (1972, 1993 and 2015). However, urban refugees are not reliably accounted for as they – usually – avoided registration. Stephanie Schwartz, “Home, Again: Refugee Return and Post-Conflict Violence in Burundi”, *International Security* 44, no. 2 (2019): 123.

7.2.1 Refugees from Congo and Burundi

The first “wave” of refugees arrived almost instantly after Tanganyika had gained independence in 1961. In neighbouring Congo, which was declared independent a year and a half ahead of Tanganyika, decolonization turned violent within days of the formal declaration of independence.⁵⁴ The first stages primarily concerned confrontations between the legitimate government and neo-colonial forces in resource-rich areas. But after the elected head of the government, Patrice Lumumba, had been butchered by a conglomerate of Katanga, Belgian, and US-American agents backed by a UN that would soon lose its secretary-general in a suspicious plane crash near the Congolese-Northern Rhodesian border, the battle over national legitimacy versus international recognition shifted to the east of the country.⁵⁵ The so-called Simba rebellion, which was only a rebellion if one recognizes the preceding coup d’état as legitimate, led to a massive movement of refugees, on the one hand, and to the shipping in of warring agents, on the other.

From the beginning, the refugee phenomenon was an international affair involving not only the border-crossing movements between Congo and Tanganyika/Tanzania but also the international community represented by the United Nations and its subsidiaries. Moreover, the global hero of anti-imperialist resistance Ernesto Che Guevara joined – and was disillusioned by – the Simba rebellion, in which Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who would succeed Mobutu Sese Seko as head of state more than 30 years later, was one of the leaders. Quite a few threads in global, regional, and international history are condensed in this war in East Congo. Just like a century before, access to that zone came from the east – though increasingly also from the air – more precisely via Kigoma. At the same time, refugees moved in the opposite direction, also heading for Kigoma. It is not so easy to gather information about these Congolese refugees of the 1960s, because in oral history the distinction between different “waves” of refugees is hard to grasp and the archival documents in the first years after independence are rather shallow, paying attention primarily to provisioning, repatriation from Congo to countries of origin, and repatriation to Congo, hence not to the ones staying on.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it is clear that there was a serious impact on the region and town of Kigoma. Some of the refugees were absorbed by local communities, especially

54 Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2002); Verhaegen, *Rébellions au Congo*; Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo, Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

55 Verhaegen, *Rébellions au Congo*. I am also eagerly awaiting the ongoing research by Gillian Mathys on the topic.

56 TNA, 523.A.30/1: Aliens – Refugees, 1966–1971.

when they came from the same areas west of the lake where the urban population also originated from.⁵⁷

At the beginning of the 1970s, at the time when Nyerere implemented his *Ujamaa* policy, a new phase of massive arrivals of refugees took place in the wake of genocidal violence in Burundi. Since the abhorrent Rwandan genocide in 1994, it is often overshadowed that genocidal violence was probably more extreme in Burundi than in Rwanda before 1994.⁵⁸ In 1971 to 1972, educated Hutu were targeted by the Burundian UPRONA government, which had turned into an ethnic Tutsi party soon after the independence of Burundi in 1962 and, probably at least as important, the assassination of Prince Louis Rwagasore in 1961.⁵⁹ We know more about these refugees than about the Congolese ones a decade before, thanks to research by Liisa Malkki on Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania in the mid-1980s.⁶⁰ She was interested in the perspective of the refugees – not my perspective on Kigoma-Ujiji –, yet her analysis distinguished between refugees in camps and in town and this, at least indirectly, tells us something about the town as well. Whereas most refugees were transferred to the camps, where Malkki analysed their Hutu radicalization, a significant number settled in Kigoma-Ujiji, where they tried to integrate in the urban population as unnoticed as possible. The relative anonymity of town life, the closeness of Rundi to Ha culture, and the longstanding character of Kigoma-Ujiji as a liminal town, where the transformation of new arrivals into urbanites was a common practice since time immemorial, facilitated the absorption of numerous Burundian refugees.

One of my informants – I do not know whether his residence status has been regularized and I wish to respect his anonymity – told me that he stayed in the refugee camp of Mpanda for a while, until he moved to Kigoma-Ujiji as a fisher and took control of his life again. He also lamented that later refugees had been actively obstructed from doing the same, although he would have wanted to help his fellow-Burundians in starting a new life in the town.⁶¹

The spontaneous and low-profile integration of Burundians into Kigoma-Ujiji, which had been relatively successful in the 1970s, was obstructed two decades

57 Hino, “Neighborhood Group”, 18; McHenry, “Tanzania: the Struggle for Development”, 71.

58 René Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jean-Pierre Chrétien and Jean-François Dupaquier, *Burundi 1972, au bord des génocides* (Paris: Karthala, 2007).

59 Ludo De Witte, *Moord in Burundi: België en de liquidatie van premier Louis Rwagasore* (Antwerpen: EPO, 2021).

60 Malkki, *Purity and exile*, 153–196. For a complementary analysis of Burundian refugees in Dar es Salaam, see Marc Sommers, *Fear in Bongoland: Burundi Refugees in Urban Tanzania* (New York: Berghahn, 2001).

61 Interview KU18, Mwanga, 22 June 2012.

later when a new refugee crisis followed the eruption of the Burundian Civil War in 1993. Like the Congo wars in the 1960s, the Burundian Civil War was also partly coordinated and supplied via Kigoma, from where the late(r) president Nkurunziza and his *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (FDD) operated.⁶² The Tanzanian government in cooperation with the UNHCR attempted to channel all incoming refugees to camps in the Kigoma region. They thus wanted to prevent the free wandering of refugees, for instance, to Kigoma-Ujiji.⁶³ The underlying idea was that it would make it easier to repatriate later. UNHCR officials even deny – or ignore – that people who were not in the camps and hence not registered are refugees to begin with.⁶⁴ It is a formalistic approach that enables their operations in direct cooperation with Tanzanian ministries, but it also means that refugees who “did it their way” are neither accounted for nor looked after by the UNHCR or the Tanzanian government. Nevertheless, the attempt to channel all refugees to camps has, obviously, never been foolproof and some Burundian refugees did rove around in the region or moved to Kigoma-Ujiji. However, they were fewer in number than had been the case in the 1970s.

The few Burundian refugees of the 1990s whom I could interview accentuate that their deliberate decision to move to Kigoma-Ujiji straight away without registering along the way was their ticket to town, sometimes with the aid of relatives who were already there. It does imply, however, that their residence status remains precarious.⁶⁵

The same policy would be applied to refugees from Congo after war broke out there as well in 1996. Because of the restrictive refugee politics, refugees actually settling in town were fewer than during earlier crises. Yet, the massive arrival in the region led to scarcity and rising prices as well as to – perceived – insecurity in the Kigoma region, which, in turn, triggered more rural-urban migration again. In the next chapter, this cocktail of refugees, rural-urban migration, and the pressure on town are addressed from the perspective of the town's core population and its history.

⁶² Interview KU39, Kigoma, 24 July 2012.

⁶³ Malkki, *Purity and Exile*; Sommers, *Fear in Bongoland*. Also see: Ragna Frans, “Burundian Refugees Becoming Tanzanian Citizens: Conceptualisations and Constructions of Identity and Home”, MA dissertation, Universiteit Gent, 2012.

⁶⁴ Interview KU41, Kigoma, 26 July 2012.

⁶⁵ Interview KU18, Mwanga, 22 June 2012; Interview KU24, Kigoma, 25 June 2012; Interview KU39, Kigoma, 24 July 2012.

7.2.2 International Organizations in the Wake of Refugees

The successive refugee crises and the stronger hold that the Tanzanian government tried to have on these refugees also led to an increased presence of both governmental and non-governmental international organizations in Kigoma-Ujiji. In 1992, the UNHCR opened a sub-office, the next hierarchical level after the main office in the national capital, on the shores of Lake Tanganyika, in the part of town where colonial officials had lived before, tellingly called Stanley Road.⁶⁶ In the wake of the refugee relief needs, numerous humanitarian NGOs flocked together in and around refugee camps in the Kigoma region. Although the locus of operation was outside of the town, Kigoma-Ujiji was the access to the region, the logistic hub, the place where NGO and IO workers, their Toyotas, and the provisions for refugees in the camps moved through.

A couple of upmarket hotels opened in Kigoma, which initially made their living from IO officials much more than from tourism. Air traffic also expanded in the wake of the refugee crisis and its international dimension. The airport facilities expanded and improved for the sake of international officials and humanitarian workers who were drawn to the refugee relief complex around Kigoma, where hundreds of thousands of Burundian and Congolese refugees fled from wars that lasted well over a decade. It was the first significant investment in transportation infrastructure since the central railway and the ferry Götzen/Liamba in 1914. Rather than marginality, a centrality in crises seems to have characterized this town from the mid-nineteenth until the early-twenty-first centuries.

Crisis situations are not limited to spectacular events that draw international attention but also apply to individual people facing acute problems in their daily lives. The small crises that become significant because there are so many of them were Sheryl McCurdy's focus, when she explained how ordinary women in Ujiji and Mwanga coped with fertility problems and health issues more generally in the late 1980s.

Likewise, the story of the Brothers of Charity in Kigoma is worth telling in this regard. A Catholic religious institute founded in 1807 in one of my hometowns, Ghent, they are specialized in the fields of education and mental health – and, besides, under harsh criticism for scores of sexual abuse cases and a highly problematic way of responding to this scandal. The Brothers of Charity have a particularly active branch in Kigoma, with a training school and a lodging house,

⁶⁶ Interview KU41, Kigoma, 26 July 2012; UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service, "Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation Operation to Mozambique EVAL/02/96", 1 February 1996, <https://www.unhcr.org/ie/publications/evaluation-unhcrs-repatriation-operation-mozambique> (accessed 30 September 2024), section 198.

focusing on services for mentally impaired people. But what is striking and makes their story relevant for the global urban history of Kigoma-Ujiji is how they ended up there. The Belgian religious institute has a long tradition of activity in the former Belgian colonial territories of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi but not in Tanzania. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, however, Brothers of Charity became refugees themselves, fleeing to Zaire, where they were compelled to flee again when the country was invaded from Rwanda in 1996. In the end, all roads led to Kigoma, where a group of Brothers of Charity arrived as refugees like so many others and stayed on. But they continued their former activities and established a Kigoma branch, which is now led by a Tanzanian brother. This, as well, is an illustration of global entanglement and international presence, including the fact that the Tanzanian brothers travel to Ghent and Rome for education.⁶⁷

7.3 International Impositions and Local Appropriation

So far, I have framed this chapter in an ideological East-West narrative during the Cold War, regional incursions from Tanzania's western neighbours, and relentless state interventions and impositions coming to Kigoma from the nation-state east of them. Furthermore, the political reforms since the 1990s as well as the international response to successive refugee crises also have a global North-South dimension to it. Taken together, the people in Kigoma-Ujiji and the surrounding region had to endure a succession of transformations induced from all cardinal directions and from larger spatial scales, be they regional, national, international or global. It almost seemed as if Kigoma-Ujiji was stuck in never-ending waves of transformations. Yet, there are signs that half a century after independence, Kigoma-Ujiji once again became a site where transformations are appropriated and where globalization is shaped.

Throughout this period, Kigoma-Ujiji had remained a liminal town, where hundreds of thousands of people had gone through the uncertainty of so many individual transformations as refugees, as rural-urban migrants, or – not yet-mentioned – as people using Kigoma-Ujiji as a springboard to somewhere else. Indeed, not only did people move to Kigoma-Ujiji but also away from the town hoping for better chances in Dar es Salaam or abroad. Amongst my informants who have the longest pedigree in town, reaching back to the urbanization on the move explained in Chapter 3, a remarkably high share of their children moved out of Kigoma-Ujiji in the post-independence years. Based on my interviews, I can

⁶⁷ Interview KU16, Kigoma, 21 June 2012.

give an indicative impression of the movement out of town, not least by the core urban population dating back to the late nineteenth century:

A *dagaa* fisher and trader born in Ujiji in 1941, whose great-grandfather came from Congo to Ujiji before the birth of his grandfather (hence probably in the 1880s as a rough estimate), has thirteen children “half” of whom lives in Dar es Salaam while the other “half” is in Kigoma-Ujiji.⁶⁸

A crane operator in the port of Kigoma born in Ujiji in 1924, whose father came to Ujiji from Congo as a child and was around 50 years of age when my informant was born (hence probably arrived around 1880 as a rough estimate), has six children who are still alive, two of them living in Kigoma-Ujiji, one in Morogoro, one in Mwanza, one in Dar es Salaam, and one in South Africa.⁶⁹

A musician and administrator born in Ujiji in 1934, whose grandfather moved from Congo to Bangwe before the First World War, has six children, who all live in Tanzania but none in Kigoma-Ujiji.⁷⁰

A port worker born in Ujiji in 1930, whose father was born in Ujiji and had his first child in 1913 (hence must probably have been born there around 1890), has 11 children living across the country, but none of them in Kigoma-Ujiji.⁷¹

A fisher born in Ujiji in 1931, whose father was also a fisher born in Ujiji under the German rule, has three children who all live in Dar es Salaam.⁷²

This pattern also applies to more recent arrivals:

A tailor born in the Jiji lands between Kigoma-Ujiji and the Burundian border, who moved to the town in 1969, has seven children. Only one of them lives in Kigoma-Ujiji, five in other parts of Tanzania, and one in Canada.⁷³

I can also refer back to the opening of this book. When the *bongo flava* hit “Leka Dutigite” (“Let’s be proud of ourselves” in Kiha) was aired across East Africa back in 2012, this was a symbolic return of people having left the town (and region) or descending from such people, who were now promoting Kigoma on a larger scale – and stage. The fact that opposition politician Zitto Kabwe had taken the initiative for Leka Dutigite, which was not only a song with videoclip but also a music festival in Ujiji in July 2012, draws the link with the idiosyncratic electoral

68 Interview KU2, Ujiji, 10 September 2011.

69 Interview KU7, Ujiji, 14 September 2011.

70 Interview KU7, Ujiji, 14 September 2011.

71 Interview KU9, Ujiji, 15 September 2011.

72 Interview KU11, Ujiji, 19 September 2011.

73 Interview KU13, Mwanga, 23 September 2011.

trajectory of urban Kigoma. Besides, it was not only Kabwe but also the CCM members of parliament from the Kigoma region who were on stage together with the *bongo flava* artists from the coast – or from Kigoma, depending on how one decides to define them.

This local employment of forces that had left Kigoma-Ujiji, for the promotion of Kigoma on national and regional scales may be the last step so far in the town's long global history as a space of transformation where challenges coming from elsewhere are taken up as opportunities, thus claiming ownership of how globalization is shaped translocally – i.e. locally in relation to and making use of connections on different scales. These forces stemming from Kigoma-Ujiji can, as is the case in this example, be people, but also imaginations and representations of Kigoma-Ujiji are forces that work back on the place.

In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on heritagized local history or localized universal heritage, in which tensions and hopes coincide. Given that Kigoma-Ujiji has caught attention in other parts of the world repeatedly since the mid-nineteenth century (see Chapter 2), there is enough “imperial debris” available that can be turned into heritage.⁷⁴ The caravan trade complex – in a context of heritage usually presented as slave trade⁷⁵ –, the infrastructure built under the German colonial rule, and the origin of mankind in the African Rift Valley are three huge heritage themes condensed in Kigoma-Ujiji. The interest in these themes, however, primarily comes from outside. I have to qualify this: obviously, people living in and around Kigoma-Ujiji are sincerely interested in the infrastructure connecting the town across the lake and to the Indian Ocean, to give but one example, but their interest is primarily in transportation infrastructure and not necessarily in infrastructure as heritage. However, fascination with the slave route, the Liemba ferry, the central railway, and the chimpanzees – human's closest relative – in Gombe National Park are part of world heritage, which turns all of this into an economic asset for Kigoma-Ujiji as well.⁷⁶ The impetus for conserving heritage and promoting tourism comes from outside but is seen as an economic opportunity by people in Kigoma-Ujiji.

74 For the concept of “imperial debris”, referring to processes of “ruination” perpetuating or reviving the colonial stranglehold on the material environment – as well as on bodies and minds – into the present, see Ann L. Stoler (ed.), *Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013).

75 For a critical analysis of the reduction of the caravan trade history to slave trade in the context of heritage politics, see Jan Lindström, *Muted Memories: Heritage-Making, Bagamoyo, and the East African Caravan Trade* (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019).

76 See, for instance, informal conversation KU31, Ujiji, 4 July 2012; Interview KU36, Kigoma, 20 July 2012.

I highlight three examples already touched upon before (chimpanzees, the Liemba, and slave trade), each involving international as well as local actors. Exactly that – the internationalization of Kigoma-Ujiji and the way in which some local actors play into these international opportunities – is what the three examples have in common.

In the beginning, there was Jane Goodall. First archival traces of her anthropological – motivated by an interest in the origins of mankind and evolution – research in Gombe near Kigoma in 1965, on the occasion of an article in *National Geographic*, already hint at the “potential opening of this Game Reserve for tourism”.⁷⁷ By now, Gombe Stream National Park has indeed developed into a tourist attraction, accessible via Kigoma. But parallel to that, the Jane Goodall Institute and her Roots & Shoots organization have become promoters of environmental protection, education, and development.⁷⁸ Both organizations are decidedly international with activities in more than 100 countries around the world, but Kigoma is where it all started and the link with Gombe remains paramount. The global concern for biodiversity and the protection of endangered species is complemented with the local care for compensating people living close to the National Park for the prohibition of foraging in the park and with education towards environmental awareness.⁷⁹ Tellingly, the first mention of Gombe in the colonial archives already addressed the tension between establishing the “Gombe Stream Reserve” and the pressure this put on local fishers who depended on wood from the forest for *dagaa* fishing.⁸⁰

The Jane Goodall Institute and Roots & Shoots are not only active in the rural area surrounding Gombe National Park, but in Kigoma town as well, in the same street where the UNHCR sub-office was located. These institutes are local and global at the same time: global concerns having come to the area, experience emanating from the area, a global organization shooting from, returning to, and remaining rooted in the area. It would be interesting to research the reception and the workings of both organizations in relation to the *Ujamaa* villagization project in the area in the 1970s but given that this clearly is outside the urban area, it is

77 TNA, 523.A.3/11: Members of National Executive Seat – Kigoma, 1964–1965: Note M.A. Hassan, Administrative Secretary Kigoma Region, to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Information and Tourism, 17 March 1965.

78 Interview KU40, Kigoma, 25 July 2012. Also see: <https://janegoodall.org/> and <https://rootsandshoots.global/> (accessed 30 September 2024).

79 Interview KU40, Kigoma, 25 July 2012.

80 TNA, Kigoma District Book, Vol. III, August 1942–October 1944. The fishers needed the wood for the fires with which they attract the *dagaa* fishes to the surface.

beyond the scope of this book. The tourism connection and the coordination, however, run through Kigoma.

Another example of international fascination hitting local needs and interests is the Liemba. The German-built steamer from 1914, then called Götzen, is still indispensable for navigation on Lake Tanganyika, for people living around the lake, as well as for the UNHCR repatriating Burundian and Congolese refugees. For them, the Liemba is not heritage but vital infrastructure. I refer back to Chapter 2 for an explanation of how conflicting as well as complementary interests are at play when international – above all German – associations approach the vessel as heritage to be conserved and visited. Local actors make use of this international interest, trying to broker a compromise between reliable navigation on the lake (possibly provided by a new ship), conserving the Liemba, and making a business out of its utilization.⁸¹

A third example of how international and local interests collide or coalesce can be found in UNESCO's slave trail as world heritage. The nineteenth-century slave-trade discourses were at least partly used to legitimize colonization and now the traces of the trade and the abolitionist campaigns are reified as heritage. As a result, they have become a resource for tourism.⁸² The mango-lined avenue in Ujiji – and in Bagamoyo, for that matter – is explained as the road for enslaved people to be shipped to the coast, whereby an uninterrupted line of mango trees over more than 1,000 kilometres allegedly casted shadow over the caravans of enslaved people. I do not want to downplay the widespread practice of enslavement and of trafficking enslaved people (see Chapter 2 and 3), but it is not historically correct to reduce the caravan trade complex to the slave trade alone,⁸³ and even less to make the ecologically impossible statement that mango trees stretched from Lake Tanganyika to the Indian Ocean. An open space called the old slave market, and the Livingstone Museum complete the scenery for a story of shock and indignation for international tourists in Ujiji, not unlike what is told in Zanzibar, Bagamoyo or Tabora.

Ujiji is an iconic place in this regard, reproducing the nineteenth-century narratives presented in Chapter 2. I visited the Livingstone Museum twice with less than a year between the two visits. In September 2011, a new building was under construction, but the museum still was an awkward room filled with impressions surrounding Stanley's finding of Livingstone in 1871 (Figure 9). A graft of the mango tree under which they met was standing in front of the museum, accom-

⁸¹ Interview KU36, Kigoma, 20 July 2012. Also see section 2.2.

⁸² Informal conversation KU31, Ujiji, 4 July 2012.

⁸³ Lindström, *Muted Memories*.



Figure 9: Impression of the Livingstone Museum, Ujiji, September 2011.⁸⁴

panied by a stone monument. Both the monument and the grafted tree could be considered “imperial debris”, preserved and perpetuated since the colonial period into the present.⁸⁵ In front of the monument and the mango tree, an aged guide rambled a touching story by heart and from the heart.

Less than a year later, the museum had moved to the new building. Displays presented the history of the area, showcasing tools, information about the soil, political structure, and a master narrative reducing the caravan trade complex to a slave trade operated by villains intruding into the area. And lest one forget, there was also (still) a display of Stanley finding Livingstone. It is a UNESCO sponsored museum, giving additional clout to a one-sided reading of the caravan trade complex, which can be directly traced back to colonialist propaganda since the 1870s. Yet, at the same time, it also is a UNESCO sponsored initiative targeting tourists from the Global North craving to be shocked by displays of cruelty, from which they can vehemently distance themselves in indignation. Local people were hoping to see flocks of tourist arrive walking the only asphalted street in Ujiji – apart from the main road connecting to Kigoma and the airport.

These three examples have three aspects in common: they all start from a heritage concern coming from outside, they all provide economic opportunities

⁸⁴ Photo taken by Geert Castryck, Ujiji, September 2011.

⁸⁵ Stoler, *Imperial Debris*. For the colonial origin of both tree and monument, see NA-UK, CO.691/200/4: Arrangements for the rebuilding of the David Livingstone War [sic] Memorial at Ujiji, 1945–1948; Coke, “The Livingstone Memorial”.

(or compensation) which mobilize local entrepreneurs, and they also plug into the internationalization and the logistics that came in the wake of the refugee crises. Hotels, airport, international presence and perhaps exposure triggered by successive crises were more decisive in enabling those international heritage projects than the local elements that were turned into heritage over the past decade or two. To some extent, the staff of international refugee relief organizations, devoid of leisure for quite some time, were probably the first target group to visit Gombe Stream National Park or the Livingstone Museum, or to take a leisure trip on the Liemba. I admit having done all three of these activities myself. Through the heritagization projects, one could say that international forces are fossilizing Kigoma-Ujiji or contributing to “ruination”.⁸⁶ But at the same time, local actors try to make a living out of these opportunities yet again appropriating a transformation initially coming from elsewhere.

⁸⁶ Stoler, *Imperial Debris*.