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On Wittgenstein and Socrates’ Use of Maieutic Devices

  • Jack Manzi
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Platonism
This chapter is in the book Platonism

Abstract

In this paper, I explore similarities between what I call maieutic auxiliary devices found in the dialogue Theaetetus and various methodological devices Wittgenstein uses throughout Philosophical Investigations. I begin by giving a brief description of a maieutic auxiliary device using an example drawn from the Theaetetus. I then examine Wittgenstein’s responses to his Augustinian interlocutor in the opening sections of the Investigations and argue that the way Wittgenstein employs fictional scenarios in response to the interlocutor (in particular, the builder-tribe scenario) has some similarities with the Socratic Midwife’s employment of so-called auxiliary devices. Furthermore, I argue that where Wittgenstein’s employment of such devices differs from the Socratic Midwife’s, he is still fulfilling the criteria for a maieutic practice of philosophy. This will help highlight a neglected maieutic aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and will spur further work in attempting to locate such devices in the Investigations.

Abstract

In this paper, I explore similarities between what I call maieutic auxiliary devices found in the dialogue Theaetetus and various methodological devices Wittgenstein uses throughout Philosophical Investigations. I begin by giving a brief description of a maieutic auxiliary device using an example drawn from the Theaetetus. I then examine Wittgenstein’s responses to his Augustinian interlocutor in the opening sections of the Investigations and argue that the way Wittgenstein employs fictional scenarios in response to the interlocutor (in particular, the builder-tribe scenario) has some similarities with the Socratic Midwife’s employment of so-called auxiliary devices. Furthermore, I argue that where Wittgenstein’s employment of such devices differs from the Socratic Midwife’s, he is still fulfilling the criteria for a maieutic practice of philosophy. This will help highlight a neglected maieutic aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and will spur further work in attempting to locate such devices in the Investigations.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Part I Plato
  6. Knowledge and Forms in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist 9
  7. “It Seems to Me That Our Soul Is a Bit Like a Book” 31
  8. The Tool Analogy in the Cratylus 51
  9. Structure in the Sophist 71
  10. Unity through Hierarchy 89
  11. Cataclysms and Unbalanced Souls 103
  12. Socrates’ Dream 117
  13. Part II Platonism
  14. Platonism Versus Naturalism 133
  15. Thinking and Being Are Not the Same 151
  16. How to Be an Anti-Platonist 175
  17. Remarks on Parmenides, Plato, and Constructivism 203
  18. Platonism and Postmodernism 213
  19. Welche Gründe gibt es, Universalien anzunehmen? 237
  20. Being at Home in the World 247
  21. Visions of the Ideal City 269
  22. Part III Plato and Wittgenstein
  23. Why We Cannot Call Plato a “Platonist” and How That Might Matter for Wittgenstein 289
  24. The Fly-Bottle and the Cave 305
  25. Private Language in Plato and Wittgenstein 321
  26. Logic—Grammar—Logic 333
  27. Wittgenstein and the Socratic Dialogues 349
  28. Plato and Wittgenstein on Guessing 365
  29. Über zerlumpte Begriffe und ein “Leben […], worin für Hoffnung Platz ist” (Z, §469) 385
  30. Soul, Not Mind, Out There in the World 423
  31. On Wittgenstein and Socrates’ Use of Maieutic Devices 441
  32. Now You’re Talking My Language 457
  33. The Demands of Self-Constraint 475
  34. Index 501
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111386294-026

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Part I Plato
  6. Knowledge and Forms in Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist 9
  7. “It Seems to Me That Our Soul Is a Bit Like a Book” 31
  8. The Tool Analogy in the Cratylus 51
  9. Structure in the Sophist 71
  10. Unity through Hierarchy 89
  11. Cataclysms and Unbalanced Souls 103
  12. Socrates’ Dream 117
  13. Part II Platonism
  14. Platonism Versus Naturalism 133
  15. Thinking and Being Are Not the Same 151
  16. How to Be an Anti-Platonist 175
  17. Remarks on Parmenides, Plato, and Constructivism 203
  18. Platonism and Postmodernism 213
  19. Welche Gründe gibt es, Universalien anzunehmen? 237
  20. Being at Home in the World 247
  21. Visions of the Ideal City 269
  22. Part III Plato and Wittgenstein
  23. Why We Cannot Call Plato a “Platonist” and How That Might Matter for Wittgenstein 289
  24. The Fly-Bottle and the Cave 305
  25. Private Language in Plato and Wittgenstein 321
  26. Logic—Grammar—Logic 333
  27. Wittgenstein and the Socratic Dialogues 349
  28. Plato and Wittgenstein on Guessing 365
  29. Über zerlumpte Begriffe und ein “Leben […], worin für Hoffnung Platz ist” (Z, §469) 385
  30. Soul, Not Mind, Out There in the World 423
  31. On Wittgenstein and Socrates’ Use of Maieutic Devices 441
  32. Now You’re Talking My Language 457
  33. The Demands of Self-Constraint 475
  34. Index 501
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