Chapter 6
Before Atticism: Early Hellenistic scholarship on Attic

1 Preliminaries

In the previous chapters, we saw how the cultural and, above all, linguistic construction of an Attic identity (to be Athenian *is* to speak Attic, and a particular register of it) was far from a monolithic reality. Chapter 4 (Sections 3.1–2), has demonstrated that already in the heyday of Athens' undisputed cultural supremacy, 'speaking Attic' and speaking it 'properly' were a matter of social and cultural negotiation between centripetal (exclusiveness) and centrifugal (inclusiveness) tendencies in a society that was finding itself within an ever-increasingly international world. The importance of defining what it meant to be Attic in all its nuances became particularly urgent with the spread of 'international Attic' (*Großattisch*) within a supraregional context and even more so in the changed political scenario of the mid-4th century BCE, when Athens could no longer credibly claim a position of political and economic hegemony within the Greek world (see Chapter 1, Section 3.1 and Chapter 4, Section 4). Hitherto, we have observed the evolution of this process from the inside: Attic writers (comedy, orators, and more general prose writers) on Attic and its cultural capital. In this chapter and the next, we shall move progressively away from this insider's view and investigate, however selectively, how Attic was perceived, viewed, and evaluated from the outside, and from a highly distinctive, if in some respects limited, perspective: that of Hellenistic scholarship (from the second half of the 4th to the end of the 2nd century BCE, with some occasional incursions into the first half of the 1st century BCE), which developed in new centres of political and economic power (above all Ptolemaic Alexandria, but also Pergamon).

Scholarly reflection on Attic as a distinct (spoken) dialect *and* a literary language – its orthographic, phonetic, prosodic, morphological, and lexical peculiarities (syntax will play a very minor part, mainly – but not only – for reasons of space) – will form the main subject of the final two chapters of the present volume. Exhaustiveness will be neither pursued nor attempted:[1] rather, we shall at-

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1 Recent systematic studies of Hellenistic scholarship in all its varieties of approaches and disciplines can be found in F. Montanari, Matthaios, Rengakos (2015); F. Montanari (2020), and in many of the entries of *LGGA*. Equally indispensable are the commented editions of *SGG*. For Eratosthenes, see now the website http://www.eratosthenica.it (accessed 17/07/2024) by Maria Brog-

tempt to guide the reader through what we believe to be the main significant stages of erudite reflection on (and reception of) the Attic dialect, considered mainly as a literary language but also as a contemporary educated idiom. As such, this chapter's purpose is twofold: (1) to set out the premises, methodology, and scope that will inform, across the volume's final two chapters, our approach to Hellenistic scholarly activity on Greek language in general and Attic in particular; (2) to focus on the early stages of this erudite reflection, with special attention to the framework within which it developed (the concept of γλῶσσα in the Aristotelian tradition, its declination in the first preserved collections of unusual or rare words) and to those strands of grammatical and linguistic studies (above all lexicography and dialectology) that exercised the most durable impact in orienting later Atticist theories and practices.[2] Our focus on lexicography and dialectology does not, of course, entail a denial of the importance of the τεχνικὸν μέρος of the γραμματική in the development of Atticist doctrines:[3] again, we shall see that the two elements (the lexical and grammatical proper) go hand in hand in the ancients' reflection. It remains true, however, that prescription at the level of lexical and dialectal choice is one of the most marked and visible features of Atticist theorisation.

In sketching the rise of the first Hellenistic reflection on lexicographical matters, we shall follow, for the most part, a linear diachronic dimension. However, the continuity of some thematic concerns over different periods of time will sometimes (cf. Section 3.1 below) take us backwards and forwards: this contrastive comparison will allow us to more clearly elucidate the points of convergence and divergence between Hellenistic and Atticist scholarship. Starting with Philitas of Cos and Simmias of Rhodes, via Zenodotus and Callimachus, this chapter will end with an extended overview of Eratosthenes' scholarly activity in the fields of grammar and philology, paying special attention to the lexical and linguistic observations on Attic contained in his work *On Old Comedy*, an enduring point of reference for comic studies in the Hellenistic and Imperial periods. In keeping with the volume's main themes, the final section (Section 5.3) will give particular attention to the role played by Eratosthenes' linguistic studies in the process of canon formation. Within this context, we shall also attempt to reassess the validity and interpretative usefulness, for Eratosthenes, of the claims of 'strict Atticism'

giato. The extent to which we are indebted to these essential resources will be clear at every turn of the page of Chapters 6 and 7.

2 In the Hellenistic conceptualisation of language as a system, that which we moderns call lexicography was perceived as a distinct part of the γραμματική from the very beginning: cf. Dionysius Thrax's definition of grammar in Section 3 below.

3 Cf. e.g. Probert (2011).

or 'purist tendencies' *ante litteram* that have been voiced by some strands of modern and less modern scholarship.

2 Methodology and scope

Notwithstanding its obvious limitations, there are several reasons for adopting a focus on Hellenistic scholarship on Attic rather than Attic literature as a whole. First, it has the immediate practical advantage of quantitatively limiting the field of enquiry, which even so remains quite daunting. Given the cultural capital acquired by Athenian literature in the course of the 5th and first half of the 4th century BCE, Alexandrian scholars worked for the major part on Attic texts (with some notable exceptions: Homer, Herodotus, the Hippocratic tradition, and lyric poetry to cite the most prominent cases), that is, on texts written in what was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as an Attic idiom of some sort, however composite and artificial (above all, Attic drama, historiography, oratory, and philosophical prose).[4] While an international language based on Attic was becoming the linguistic standard, Alexandrian philology on Attic literary texts strongly encouraged, even if only implicitly, the promotion of Attic to an undoubtedly prestigious rank. An explicit theorisation of Attic as the 'best', 'more correct', or even only 'more elevated' among the Greek dialects is not attested for this period; nevertheless, it is true that Attic remained the point of reference with which the other dialects were also required to confront themselves (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.4). Second, but most importantly for the purpose of our focus on ancient Greek purism, this selective approach will allow us to better highlight the differences and continuities with the later Atticist reception (and partly revision) of Attic as the 'gold standard' of pure diction among well-bred, educated speakers (and writers). By focusing on some of the criteria adopted by Alexandrian scholars (e.g. language usage in a broadly comparative way, across authors and genres but also across time and space), we shall see that not only was the range of authors studied by Alexandrian

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4 Historiography: Nicolai (2015), especially at 1094 on how in the 2nd century BCE historians 'had become a rightful component of the literary canons'. On the likely Alexandrian origin of this process, see already Nicolai (1992, 190–3; 297–311) and Matijašić (2018). Oratory: Montana (2020b, 167–9) (= Montana 2015, 95–7) and Montana (2020a) on Didymus as recipient of early Alexandrian scholarship on oratory (especially Demosthenes) rather than as starting point of a new development; Matijašić (2018, 147–60).

philology ampler than the canons promoted by the Atticists[5] but also that, as has been increasingly recognised by recent scholarship, attempts at projecting *sic et simpliciter* Atticist concerns (purity of the canon(s); heavily prescriptive and proscriptive attitudes) back to the philological and linguistic inquiries of the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE are fundamentally unproductive and misguided.[6]

This brings us directly to the heart of the two main interconnected questions informing this chapter's enquiry: (1) the usefulness or even meaningfulness of applying a strictly binary opposition descriptivism vs prescriptivism in reconstructing the various historical and cultural stages of the ancients' reflection on Attic; and (2) the extent to which a rhetorical and stylistic classicising/archaising approach can or should be separated from the minutiae of linguistic and grammatical usage.

Let us begin with the second point. A highly influential tradition going back to Schmid and Wilamowitz has identified two distinct Atticist strands in antiquity that differ considerably with respect to both chronology and goals (see Chapter 1, Section 3.2):[7] (1) a so-called 'rhetorical (or stylistic) Atticism', already promoted by literary critics and historians of the mid-1st century BCE, inviting imitation of the style of Attic Classical authors;[8] and (2) a later 'grammatical (or linguistic) Atticism', strictly prescriptive in character and orientation, mandating the use of a rigorous Attic phonology, prosody, morphology, and vocabulary. This clear-cut distinction has been challenged by Kim (2010) and, more recently, by O'Sullivan (2015). Both Kim and O'Sullivan based their arguments primarily on the classicising prose style of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (1st century BCE): Dionysius, in comparison with pre-

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5 For the existence of multiple, concurrent 'canons' within the Atticist movement, see Chapter 1, Section 4; cf. also Matthaios (2015a); Tribulato (2014); Tribulato (2021a); de Jonge (2022a) and (2022b). On the varieties of Atticist prose among the writers of the Second Sophistic, see the general survey by Kim (2017).

6 For this criticism, see, above all, Tosi (2015, esp. 632); Tosi (1994a, 162–6; 202–3); Tosi (1997); S. Valente (2015b, 31–4); with the exception of Tosi (2015), these contributions are mostly focused on Aristophanes of Byzantium's Λέξεις and its relationship with the *Antiatticist*, on which see Chapter 7, Section 2.1. For a general assessment of whether the lexicographical activity of the first Alexandrian grammarians may be considered to anticipate the trends of later Atticist reflections on language, see O'Sullivan (2015, 139); Montana (2020b, 198 with n. 318) (= Montana 2015, 135 with n. 31); Ascheri (2010, 127–8 n. 10), all with previous bibliography. Cf. also Monaco (2021, ch. 3), though conceptually rather opaque.

7 See Kim (2010, 473); Kim (2017); and O'Sullivan (2015) on the history of this bipartition in Classical scholarship.

8 For convenience's sake, we maintain the traditional terminology, even if Kim (2017, 50) has recently highlighted how 'stylistic Atticism', at least when applied to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, is a somewhat misleading term, since Dionysius did not restrict the authors for imitation to Attic literature only; to speak of 'stylistic classicism' would be more appropriate: see Wiater (2011).

vious Hellenistic prose writers (e.g. Polybius), exhibits, albeit inconsistently, more classicistic (read 'Atticist') features in terms of phonology and morphology.[9] O'Sullivan has taken the argument further by observing that already from Aristotle onwards, 'to think about "style" was necessarily to think about its "linguistic" elements as well', and that such a dichotomy style/grammar posited by modern scholarship is not an ancient one.[10] These qualifications are wholly justified: stylistic choices clearly cannot be disjoined from their linguistic counterparts, particularly when one considers the robust common basis shared by rhetoric and grammar in Classical antiquity.[11] With that said, it seems to us that a distinction, however broad-stroke, between an early, mostly (but not uniquely) stylistic phase of classicising tendencies (both at a theoretical and a practical level) and a later phase systematically oriented to police the boundaries of a pure Attic idiom in all its most minute linguistic components (phonology, morphology, lexicon, and even prosody at times), retains an important heuristic and diagnostic value, at least when the field of ancient lexicographical studies is approached in its *longue durée.* This distinction, with all its imprecisions and generalities, still allows us to appreciate a fundamental difference: namely, the recognition that even if the tools of grammatical analysis used by Atticist lexicographers have their ultimate origins in the lexicographical tradition of the early Hellenistic period, the aims and underpinning premises of early Alexandrian philology and Atticism differ substantially. While the Atticist lexicographers sought to help the would-be cultured speaker and orator to cultivate (and imitate) the purity of Attic idiom in all its finest grammatical nuances, by both promoting the positive adoption of Attic dialectal features and prohibiting any deviations from it (be they non-Attic or simply post-Classical Attic),[12] the theoretical framework of grammatical thinking for Alexandrian lexicography was philology (*Textpflege*).[13]

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9 Kim (2010, 473–4): a proportionally increased usage of the historical present, a more widespread occurrence of the optative mood; avoidance of later conjunctions, substitution of koine forms with their Attic morphological equivalent; attraction of the relative pronouns; O'Sullivan (2015, 141) adds to the list the admittedly modest revival of the dual in Dionysius' prose.

10 O'Sullivan (2015, 136).

11 On overlaps between grammar and rhetoric, in both Greece and Rome, see the detailed treatment in Nicolai (1992, 197–215) and de Jonge (2015, 981–4). One of the most apparent points of contact is their shared preoccupation for λέξις (Lat. *elocutio*), ἑλληνισμός ('correctness') included.

12 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 4 and more broadly Chapter 2.

13 Tosi (1994a); S. Valente (2015b, 602); Dubischar (2015, 583–4); Montana (2020b) (= Montana 2015) to mention only the most recent contributions. For a strongly philological orientation of Hellenistic studies on grammar, showing that the Alexandrian philologists had developed, within their philological framework, an advanced knowledge of a 'Grammatik im Kopf', see the various works by Ax (1982); Ax (1986); Ax (1990); Ax (1991).

This brings us back to our first question (1): the usefulness of adopting a mutually exclusive opposition descriptivism vs prescriptivism when approaching lexicographical studies. A clear-cut separation between prescriptivism and descriptivism as a useful hermeneutic tool when applied to works reflecting on language and usage has recently been challenged from many quarters and across different disciplines.[14] In contemporary literature, the distinction is increasingly regarded as artificial and limiting: it has instead been argued that we should see descriptive and prescriptive approaches as discrete end-points in a much broader continuum rather than as a dichotomy.[15] In particular, Wolf Peter Klein (2004) has identified four parameters to grade the slippery glides between descriptivism and prescriptivism in grammatical and lexicographical works: (i) the authorial intention (*Authordimension*), (ii) its reception (*Rezipientendimension*), (iii) its articulation as text (*Textdimension*), and (iv) its methodology (*Datendimension*: how it gathers and interprets data). On the basis of these parameters, Klein has demonstrated how any descriptive practice almost always involves some prescriptive component, even if low-grade, so to speak. This is particularly the case when one considers the third diagnostic feature, the *Rezipientendimension*. This insight may also be productively applied to ancient Greek reflection on language, particularly if one adopts a long-term rather than a short-term historical perspective: again, analysis of our sources will reveal that those linguistic observations and descriptions, originally made without an implicit or explicit value-judgement, acquire a *Nachleben* of their own. Over time, either because of genuine misunderstanding, intentional twisting, the vagaries of textual transmission (abridgement, epitomisation, excerpting), or simply because of changed cultural perceptions and expectations, originally descriptive observations morphed into prescriptive (and proscriptive) rules.[16]

Let us give just one example, and this time in the reverse direction (i.e., a later reinterpretation, with a polemical anti-purist gist, of a Hellenistic source), to complicate the matter further. Aristophanes of Byzantium's fr. 36 (on κόλλοψ, usually 'winding peg'), which in all likelihood belongs to his Λέξεις, has come down to us thanks solely to the indirect tradition – namely, Eustathius (12th century CE). In his commentary on the *Odyssey*, the archbishop of Thessalonica relates the following:

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14 On the current debate in contemporary linguistics on the meaningfulness (or lack thereof) of the opposition descriptivism vs prescriptivism, see Joseph (2020); Chapman (2020).
15 See W. P. Klein (2004); Mugglestone (2014).
16 This process is quite frequent, for instance, for many of the glosses shared between Aristophanes of Byzantium and the *Antiatticist*: see Chapter 7, Section 2.1.

Eust. *in Od.* 2.267.1–5: ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοῦ γραμματικοῦ Ἀριστοφάνους φέρεται ταῦτα· κόλλοπα τὸ παχὺ δέρμα φασὶ λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν τῶν ὀργάνων κόλλαβον, παρατιθέμενοι Ὅμηρον καὶ ἄλλους τινάς· ἕτεροι δὲ οὕτω καλοῦσι τὸν περιτρέχοντα καὶ ἑταιροῦντα, ὡς καὶ Εὔπολις (lege Εὔβουλος) ἐν τῷ· 'Καλλίστρατος †[17] ἔστι τις οὗτος οὖν | μεγάλην πυγὴν εἶχεν, ὦ Χαριάδη, | καὶ καλήν. | τοῦτον καταλεκτέον ἐς τοὺς κόλλοπας | τοὺς ἐκδρομάδας'.

In the writings of Aristophanes the grammarian, it is transmitted thus: they say that the thick skin and the κόλλαβος (i.e. the winding peg, made of tough animal skin, holding stretched the strings of the lyre) of [musical] instruments are called κόλλοψ, quoting Homer (*Od.* 21.407) and some other [authorities]. But others call κόλλοψ those who go around prostituting themselves, as also Eupolis (read Eubulus) [says] in [this passage]: 'Callistratus † . . . is then someone here who had big, beautiful buttocks, Chariades. This one should be listed among the κόλλοπες who ran away' (Eub. fr. 10)'.

The entry κόλλοψ in the *Antiatticist* (2nd century CE), clearly dependent on Aristophanes of Byzantium, is instead the following:

Antiatt. κ 36: κόλλοπας· φασὶ δεῖ<ν> κυρίως λέγειν τοὺς τῶν ὀργάνων, οὓς καλοῦσι κολλάβους, οὐ τοὺς ἀνδρογύνους. Εὔβο<υ>λος Ἀντιόπῃ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνδρογύνου.

κόλλοπας: They say that it should be used properly of the [pegs] of [musical] instruments, which [others] call κολλάβους, but not with reference to effeminate men. [But] Eubulus in his *Antiope* (Eub. fr. 10) uses it of a male prostitute'.

As observed by S. Valente, following Tosi (1997, 176), 'here, the author of this lexicon probably modified Aristophanes' descriptive observation on a peculiar word-meaning of the comic poet Eubulus to reply against those lexicographers who supported the traditional meaning of κόλλοψ'.[18] This interpretation receives further support if one considers that, in the Atticist tradition, only the first two meanings of κόλλοψ mentioned by Aristophanes of Byzantium, that is, those of 'thick (animal) skin' and, metonymically, 'winding peg', are attested.[19] Slater, in his edition of Aristophanes of Byzantium's fragments, suggested that 'the structure of the argument has been obscured by Eustathius',[20] but an unbiased reader of Eustathius is reasonably drawn to infer that Aristophanes duly recorded the three attested meanings of κόλλοψ, the sexual one included, without adopting a stance on the correctness of their usage (cf. κυρίως of the *Antiatticist*). It is widely recognised that the *Antiatticist* generally assumes a critical stance towards the ex-

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17 The passage is irremediably corrupt: see Hunter (1983, 99).

18 S. Valente (2015b, 33); cf. now also Fiori (2022, 19–20).

19 Cf. Ael.Dion. κ 34, Paus.Gr. ε 25, and Phryn. *Ecl.* 164, on which see now Benuzzi (2023a).

20 Slater (1986, 27).

cesses of a hyper-purist agenda.[21] In this entry the *Antiatticist* reformulated Aristophanes' observations as though the Alexandrian scholar had defended the propriety of the sexual meaning only. This example of how a prescriptive intention, originally absent, is created at the point of its reception along the chain of transmission, exemplarily highlights the multiple, interrelated difficulties facing students of Hellenistic lexicography, too often only fragmentarily preserved by later and non-impartial sources.[22]

Throughout this chapter, we shall therefore adopt a rather loose concept of both descriptivism and prescriptivism, highlighting gradients and nuances of approach rather than adhering to a strictly binary categorisation that cannot do justice to the richness and variety of the ancient sources. This approach is also warranted by the fact that, as we have seen above, the framework within which Hellenistic lexicography operated was essentially philological in nature and was thus strongly text-oriented. From the outset, Hellenistic lexical studies developed as ancillary to philology (the constitution and interpretation of literary texts). The philological *Textpflege* does inevitably require decision-making: one must consider the appropriateness of word-choice and expressions, *Echtheitskritik* (the inner consistency of an author's style from the perspective of his linguistic choices; avoidance of anachronism in lexicon, morphology and syntax), appropriate dialect usage, and so on; however, to call this attitude 'prescriptivism' is to miss the broader context. The same applies, more generally, to the acknowledgment that Alexandrian philologists had their own apparatus of grammatical categories (e.g. their system of word classes) and rules by which to investigate and assess the correctness of linguistic usage in literary texts – that is, what Wolfram Ax most famously defined as 'Grammatik im Kopf'.[23] As observed by Matthaios (2014, 68), 'under this designation, Ax does not mean the competence of any given speaker in speaking correctly in terms of grammar rules, but the grammarian's ability to use the grammatical categories for his philological and interpretative purposes without prior elaboration in specialized treatises'. To label this approach to language 'prescriptive', with a nod to later Atticist prescriptivism, only because Alexandrian scholars of the first Hellenistic period inevitably recognised in Greek the underly-

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21 For the ideological orientation and methodology of the *Antiatticist*, see Tribulato (2014); Tribulato (2021a).

22 For other examples, in Atticist lexica, of normative interpretations superimposed on metalinguistic observations present in Classical authors (above all comedy), see Chapter 4, Sections 3.1; 3.3; 4.1; 4.2; 5.2. It is worth remembering that the process of transmission (epitomisation) may have tampered with the original ideological orientation of the *Antiatticist*.

23 Ax (1991, 288) (= Ax 2000, 17).

ing tendency towards normativity that is proper to any given language at any given time, is equally unhelpful and conceptually confusing.[24]

One case in point, which amply illustrates how misleading this labelling habit can be, is Ar.Byz. fr. 23 AB, preserved by both the direct (the MSS P and M) and indirect traditions (Eust. *in Il.* 2.635.5–9 and *in Od.* 2.74.3–5). Codex P (= Par. gr. 1630) of Aristophanes' *On Words Suspected not to Have Been Used by the Ancients* (henceforth *OWS*) tells us that Aristophanes of Byzantium recommended the feminine form στίμμις rather than the neuter στίμμι for the substance (powdered antimony) used for eye-paint (ἡ στίμμις, οὐχὶ τὸ στίμμι). Eustathius repeats the same (Eust. *in Il.* 2.635.8–9: ἁμαρτάνειν φησὶ τοὺς λέγοντας τὸ στίμμι) adding that the word came from Egypt (Αἰγυπτίων φωνῇ)[25] and that Aristophanes cited Ion *TrGF* 19 F 25 in support of his observation. Is this evidence for a systematic prescriptive attitude on the part of Aristophanes of Byzantium,[26] or, better put, is it useful to frame the question in these terms? Hardly so. Callanan (1987, 105–6) already observed that ἁμαρτάνειν is likely to be Eustathius' own interpretation of Aristophanes' original words and that which Aristophanes must have said is that both forms are attested (στίμμι, the neuter, is the predominant form in the Hellenistic period, as confirmed by documentary texts) but that only the feminine form (στίμμις) occurs in Classical authors.[27] This, in our view, is further supported by the fact that the codex M (= Par. suppl. gr. 1164) reads στίμμις καὶ στίμμι· τὰ εἰς τὰ ὄμματα χρήσιμα. λέγεται δὲ καὶ θηλυκῶς καὶ οὐδετέρως ('στίμμις and στίμμι: Things used for the eyes. It is used in the feminine and neuter'). Slater (1986, 18) takes M as having misinterpreted Aristophanes' wording: this may be true to the extent that Aristophanes, while stating that only στίμμις was used by Classical authors, nevertheless also mentioned its koine equivalent (στίμμι). To sum up, that which Aristophanes was likely saying did not involve a generalised, absolute censure of the later form; rather, he qualified that στίμμι was not used by Classical authors (hence, the use of the prescriptive

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24 This approach is ubiquitous in Monaco (2021). For a clear exposition of the limitations of such an approach, see Callanan (1987, 103–6).

25 Latte (1915, 385 n. 1) understood Αἰγυπτίων as referring to Hellenistic Egyptian koine. στίμ(μ)ις/στίμ(μ)ι is historically an Egyptian loan-word, see *EDG* s.v.

26 Tosi (1994a, 163), usually willing to excuse Aristophanes away from normative tendencies, almost regretfully remarks that 'non si può altresì negare che per quanto riguarda στίμμι/στίμμις sia stata tramandata una chiara ed indubbia prescrizione'.

27 Cf. also more generally Callanan (1987, 39–40), with the important observation that when Aristophanes of Byzantium gives a preference in 'Genusfragen', 'in den meisten Fällen muß allerdings unter "Richtigkeit" Ursprunglichkeit im textkritischen Sinne verstanden werden' (39), especially when there is the possibility that the evidence ultimately derives from Aristophanes' Homeric recensio (this, of course, does not apply to the particular case of στίμμις/στίμμι).

ἁμαρτάνειν by Eustathius, for whom the lack of attestation among the 'golden au-
thors' rendered the word unacceptable).

The adoption of this perspective also explains the temporal range chosen for
our inquiry – that is, from the end of the 4th to the end of the 2nd century BCE,
with some selective inroads also into the first half of the 1st century BCE (above
all in Chapter 7). That is, we have decided to focus our investigation on the period
before the proliferation, beginning as early as the 1st century BCE, of the treatises
on ἑλληνισμός (also called τέχναι περὶ ἑλληνισμοῦ, 'handbooks on ἑλληνισμός'),
written by various grammarians (Philoxenus (1st century BCE), Tryphon (second
half of the 1st century BCE), Seleucus and Irenaeus (both 1st century CE)), which
already show, at least in part, a different orientation under changed cultural
circumstances.[28]

In the next sections, we shall begin by contextualising the meaning of γραμ-
ματική in the Hellenistic period and its relationship with lexical studies (glossog-
raphy and lexicography). To do so, we shall have to turn *ad fontes* (Aristotle) and
closely examine the concepts of λέξις, γλῶσσα, and ἑλληνισμός in this earlier
phase.

3 Hellenistic 'grammar' and the glossographical tradition

The ancient Greeks conceptualised γραμματική as a domain of knowledge in which
the components that we moderns commonly understand under the separate ru-
brics of grammar and philology could not be easily distinguished from one another:
from the very beginning of Greek thought on language, grammar and philology
were intimately intertwined.[29] Already by the early Hellenistic period (first quarter
of the 3rd century BCE), γραμματικός was used to designate a scholar 'expert in the
interpretation of literature and textual criticism' (Matthaios 2011, 65).[30] Throughout
the Hellenistic and early Imperial periods, the epistemological status of γραμματική
and the precise nature of its domain were the object of intense scholarly scrutiny

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28 Cf. Chapter 1, Section 3.1. See especially Schenkeveld (1994, 287–91); S. Valente (2015a, 615–9);
Pagani (2015, 814–5).

29 Among the recent contributions on the subject, see above all Pagani (2011); Pagani (2014a);
Pagani (2015); and the concise but informative survey by Matthaios (2014a).

30 On the complex issue of the Hellenistic terminology to indicate philological scholarship (κρι-
τικός, γραμματικός, φιλόλογος) and its different stages, see the detailed discussion by Matthaios
(2011, 60–7) with previous bibliography; Matthaios (2014a).

and debate.[31] Definitions (and practices) of γραμματική in the Hellenistic period came in different shades of competence and cognitive value, with a clear trend towards the increasing specialisation of the field over time. Beginning with the 3rd century BCE down to the early stages of the Roman era, we see a varied range of stances, from Eratosthenes' (3rd century BCE) claim to grammar's universal domain (schol. D.T. (*Vat.*) *GG* 1,3.160.10–1 γραμματική ἐστιν ἕξις παντελὴς ἐν γράμμασι, γράμματα καλῶν τὰ συγγράμματα, 'Grammar is the most complete mastery of letters, with letters signifying writings'),[32] emphasising both the encyclopedic nature of its competence and the importance of the written medium, to Dionysius Thrax's (2nd century BCE) definition of it as 'practical knowledge' (ἐμπειρία) limited to *literary* texts only (*GG* 1,1.5.1: γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ[33] λεγομένων), to Asclepiades of Myrlea's (second half of the 2nd century BCE) polemical rebuttal that grammar is a specific 'expertise' (τέχνη) of that which is said in poets and writers and is thus free from the arbitrary features inherent in an empirical exercise (S.E. *M.* 1.74: τέχνη τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων).[34] It is only with Demetrius Chlorus (mid-1st century BCE) that a very important addition, extraneous to the tradition of both Dionysius Thrax and Asclepiades, is made: grammar becomes not only the 'expertise of the things <said> by poets and <prose writers>' but also 'the knowledge of the words in common usage' (S.E. *M.* 1.84: τέχνη τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ <συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων καὶ> τῶν κατὰ κοινὴν συνήθειαν λέξεων εἴδησις).[35] The expansion of the scope of grammar to the knowledge of the words in 'common use', possibly influenced by the Stoic theories of the Pergamene school on the correctness of literary usage of the *spoken* language, represents a definitive step towards the emancipation of grammar to autonomous status, at the level of theoretical reflection, within the

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31 See Wouters, Swiggers (2015), particularly 533–4, for a brief sketch of the main stages of the debate; see also Matthaios (2012, 256–63), Matthaios (2020b) on the opposition ἐμπειρία and τέχνη, and Pagani (2011).

32 For the cultural and historical background (mostly Aristotelian) of Eratosthenes' definition, see the illuminating treatment by Matthaios (2011, 68–79) and Wouters, Swiggers (2015, 515–22). For the importance of the two qualifications of ἐν γράμμασι and παντελής, see esp. Matthaios (2011, 78–9): 'the subject area of this discipline is broadened by Eratosthenes so as to encompass writings in their entirety. The expression γράμματα covers all written works of any type and without further specification, everything that is written down and passed on by writing'. For greater detail on the cultural context that enabled Eratosthenes' definition, see Chapter 6, Section 5.1.

33 On the interpretative difficulty posed by ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, see below.

34 On the definition of 'grammar' by Dionysius Thrax and Asclepiades, see Pagani (2011, 18–9); see Wouters, Swiggers (2015, 522–5) on the first and (529–30) on the latter.

35 The text given here is that established by Di Benedetto (1966, 322).

framework of a discipline that was originally strongly oriented towards philology.[36] More precisely, the overture to the κοινὴ συνήθεια of the educated spoken language implies a model for the analysis and interpretation of Greek language, which is at least partly independent from its implementation in literary texts.

While acknowledging that the status and domain of 'grammar' in the 3rd and 2nd centuries BCE was still in the making, it is important for our purposes to recognise that γραμματική, up to Demetrius Chlorus, whether understood as ἐμπειρία ('empirical knowledge') or τέχνη ('systematic expertise'), subordinated grammar and philology to the interpretation of literature (starting, as always, with Homer). What is for us moderns the rather technical and sectorial aspect of *Textpflege* was for the ancients not only textual criticism in its driest and most forbidding sense but also a comprehensive effort to understand *and* explain the literary tradition in its multifarious aspects.[37] The text-oriented meaning, in its broader sense, of grammar is very clearly articulated by Dionysius Thrax, a pupil of Aristarchus, in his famous definition of the γραμματική given in his Τέχνη. While it is now generally (but not universally) recognised that the majority of the Τέχνη as we know it must date to a much later period (3rd to 5th centuries CE), the authenticity, and thus early Hellenistic origin, of the definition of the γραμματική and its subdivision into parts is not in doubt, since it was also known and quoted, with some slight differences, by Sextus Empiricus (2nd century CE) in his *M*. 1.57 (definition of grammar) and 1.250 (its subdivision into parts).[38] This is the text as printed by Uhlig:

> D.T. *GG* 1,1.5.1–6.3: γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ[39] λεγομένων. μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἕξ· πρῶτον ἀνάγνωσις ἐντριβὴς κατὰ προσῳδίαν, δεύτερον ἐξήγησις κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας ποιητικοὺς τρόπους, τρίτον γλωσσῶν τε

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36 See Matthaios (2014a).

37 Cf. Matthaios (2020a, 266) (= Matthaios 2015b, 190) with previous literature on the topic.

38 On the authenticity and Hellenistic origin of the first four chapters of the Τέχνη, see above all Pagani (2011, 18–21; 30–2). On the contemporary debate on the authenticity of the Τέχνη as a whole, see Pagani (2011, 30–7), esp. 35–6 n. 79 on the more recent scholarly contributions on the subject. Cf. also Pagani (2014a, 241–3).

39 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ is generally translated by scholars, ancient and modern, with 'usually': it would thus indicate 'a restriction of the domain of grammar, which would have as its object only the current, normal usage of Greek authors' (so Wouters, Swiggers 2015, 525). The text of S.E. *M*. 1.57 instead of ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ reads ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον, 'as far as possible', 'for the most part'. For a thorough analysis of the different twist that the two concurrent adverbial expressions give to the domain and epistemological status of the γραμματική, see Wouters, Swiggers (2015, 524–6) and Matthaios (2011, 77–8 n. 83) with further bibliography. The scholia to the Τέχνη do not seem to differentiate sharply between the two options. Whatever text and interpretation one chooses, the choice does not prejudice the overall reading of the passage proposed here.

καὶ ἱστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις, τέταρτον ἐτυμολογίας εὕρεσις, πέμπτον ἀναλογίας ἐκλο-
γισμός, ἕκτον κρίσις ποιημάτων, ὃ δὴ κάλλιστόν ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ.

Grammar is the empirical knowledge of the expressions commonly used among poets and
prose writers. Its parts are six: first, the skilful reading in conformity with the prosody; second,
the exegesis of the occurring poetic tropes; third, the readily understandable[40] rendering of
rare words and realia; fourth, the discovery of the etymology; fifth, the calculation of analogy
[that is of the analogical proportions]; and sixth, the judgement on poems, which is the finest
part of all those [contained] in the art [of grammar]. (Modified translation after Wouters, Swig-
gers 2015, 523).

It is important to observe that the different 'parts' of grammar are presented by
Dionysius Thrax in increasing order of complexity: the sixth part of the γραμμα-
τική, that is, the κρίσις ποιημάτων, is defined as 'the most beautiful' of all, and so,
in a sense, its culmination.[41] The 'judgement of poems' is a much-debated expres-
sion, whose precise meaning (aesthetic-literary evaluation and/or philological-
textual activity) remains debated.[42] However, the very fact that it is said to be the
last part of grammar and its apex suggests that it encompasses all its previous
parts – that is, linguistic explanation (at the level of morphology, syntax, and lexi-
con), exegesis of the content (realia), and stylistic features. It is more likely, there-
fore, that the 'judgement of poems' part included both a textual assessment of the
work at hand (authenticity or not) and a literary appreciation (style).

 In Dionysius Thrax's definition, we also meet another crucial element for our
inquiry: 'the readily understandable rendering of glosses and realia' (γλωσσῶν τε
καὶ ἱστοριῶν πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις) as part and parcel of the third constituent of
grammar's specific aim. In the next section, we shall see in greater detail what a
γλῶσσα was thought to be, as a linguistic category, in the Aristotelian and the
early Hellenistic tradition. For the time being, suffice it to say that the formal *and*
semantic explanation of difficult, antiquated or unusual words as isolated lexical
items was, by the middle of the 2nd century BCE, a formally recognised part of
grammar's job. The explanation of γλῶσσαι in Dionysius Thrax's definition refers

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40 For this translation of πρόχειρος, see Wouters, Swiggers (2015, 527).
41 For a concise but up-to-date analysis of Dionysius Thrax's six parts of grammar, see Schironi
(2018, 93–7).
42 Both interpretations find support in some of the ancient scholia to the Τέχνη: see Wouters,
Swiggers (2015, 528–9). Schironi (2018, 99) and Schenkeveld (1994, 264 n. 3), with reference to
S.E. *M.* 1.93 τά τε ὑγιῆ καὶ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα κρίνουσι, τά τε γνήσια ἀπὸ τῶν νόθων διορίζουσιν ('they
judge what is sound and what is not and separate the authentic from the spurious'), support the
view that the 'judgement of poems' was conceived within a strictly philological framework: it
mainly concerned issues of authenticity (*athetesis* etc.).

exclusively to *written* texts (παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν) and hence to the literary Greek tradition taught in an educational context.

At the same time, however, in the Hellenistic period, the known Greek world was increasingly expanding. The Ptolemies' aggressive pursuit of a policy of international cultural supremacy is at its most visible in the establishment of institutions such as the Museum and Library of Alexandria: huge financial resources were employed to monumentalise the Greek past and its cultural achievements with the support of royal patronage.[43] This promoted what can legitimately be called 'Alexandrian encyclopedism' – that is, the effort to collect and organise *all* available knowledge (and not only in the Greek language: genuine attempts were made to gather 'world literature', hence the importance of translations).[44] The combination of new synchronic and diachronic developments (and, last but not least, the levelling pressure of the incipient koine),[45] promoted, as observed, among many others, by Parsons (2011, 149), a 'systematic interest in the byways of language: a synchronic appreciation of the wide range of dialects and foreign languages more easily encountered in the new Hellenistic world, and a diachronic accumulation of literature more or less archaic now being sorted and interpreted as a common inheritance of Hellenism'. It is in this context that, alongside the time-honoured explanation of obscure literary words in schools (above all Homer) and the scholarly interpretation of the poets in general,[46] a second important strand of Hellenistic lexicography developed: the interest in *Dialektwörter* from contemporary spoken vernaculars *without* a literary tradition.[47] In particular, according to Wackernagel (1876, 56–7) and Latte (1925), the first Hellenistic treatises *On Dialects* (Περὶ διαλέκτων) were repertoires of spoken vernaculars, without the input of literary sources.[48] From Athenaeus, for instance, we know that Dionysius Iambus (3rd century BCE), one of the teachers of Aristophanes of Byzantium, in his Περὶ διαλέκτων, not only approached spoken language from a diachronic perspective but also offered diastratic observations on the idioms 'of special social groups of native

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43 Cf. Hatzimichali (2013); Thompson (2008).

44 See again Hatzimichali (2013, 66–7); Thompson (2008, 71–2).

45 See Chapter 4, Section 4 and Section 5.

46 Cf. Dubischar (2015, 582): 'Glossography for exegetical purposes, that is, to help understand and interpret a text, is the earliest Greek dictionary type. Its beginnings date back to the 6th century BC, and its roots may reach back even farther'.

47 On the importance of dialectal glossography in Hellenistic scholarship, Latte (1925) remains fundamental. See also Dettori (2000, 37 n. 105); Schironi (2009, 28–38); Pagani (2011, 37 n. 81); Ucciardello (2012, 23–4 n. 31) (= Ucciardello 2006, 44 n. 29); F. Montanari (2012, esp. 123–9); Hatzimichali (2019, 34–5).

48 Much about these early treatises remains unclear (lexicographical repertoire or more of a grammar-oriented framework? Or a combination of both?): see S. Valente (2015a, 618).

speakers like fishermen and sailors' (Hatzimichali 2019, 35).[49] This particular development of lexicography ('spoken' dialectology) can therefore be at least partly seen as a tangible manifestation of the Ptolemies' international aspirations.[50] In the present chapter, while keeping constantly in mind the importance of this strand of lexicographical enquiry, we shall delve into it only when Attic matters come to the fore. We shall now move to the kernel of Hellenistic lexical studies: ἡ γλῶσσα.

3.1 What is a gloss? Continuity and discontinuity in the *longue durée*

The explanation of γλῶσσαι (unfamiliar items of vocabulary) was one of the core elements of Greek education from the outset. Inevitably, Homer enjoyed the lion's share in this respect too: rhapsodes were the first interpreters of his idiolect,[51] and comedy's snapshots informed by schoolroom teaching (esp. Ar. fr. 233 from *Banqueters*, transmitted by Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 146.1–8 Perilli = 19.66.1–8 Kühn) reveal that by the late 5th century BCE, the explanation of γλῶσσαι (mainly but *not* uniquely Homeric) was a well-established practice in elementary education. The scene portrayed in Ar. fr. 233 is worth dwelling on: an old father requests his 'bad' son to explain some Homeric γλῶσσαι (ll. 1–2 πρὸς δὲ ταύτας δ᾽ αὖ λέξον Ὁμήρου γλώττας· τί καλοῦσι κόρυμβα; < . . . > τί καλοῦσ᾽ ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα; 'And next tell me some Homeric γλῶσσαι: what does κόρυμβα ('ship-sterns') mean? < . . . > what does ἀμενηνὰ κάρηνα ('fleeting heads') mean?'). His demand is countered by the 'bad' son's challenge to ask instead his 'good' brother the meanings of some old (Solonian) legal terms (ll. 3–4 . . . τί καλοῦσιν ἰδύους (= Solon fr. 41a–c Leão-Rhodes);[52] < . . . > τί πο-

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49 Ucciardello (2008) has suggested that the Περὶ διαλέκτων by Dionysius Iambus may also have drawn on dialectal literary sources, but see Dettori's scepticism (2019, 20–1). Dionysius Iambus' fragments have now received a detailed commentary by Dettori (2019, 21–46).

50 On the difference between Alexandrian lexicography and its encyclopedic aspirations and the more systematic Imperial 'universal' lexicography, see Matthaios (2020a, 363–4) (= Matthaios 2015b, 288).

51 Novokhatko (2020b, 44–5) (= Novokhatko 2015, 30–1); Ford (2002, 68–72); see already Latte (1925, 147–9).

52 ἰδύους is Fritzsche's virtually certain emendation of the corrupted wording of Galen's MSS (ἴδου σι A: ἰδοῦ σι CD, ἰδοῦ σοι N, εἰδοῦσι ERU). At Solon's time the original orthography must have had the diphthongised form -υι- (see Threatte 1980, 338). Yet to restore it in Galen's quotation of Aristophanes smacks of hypercorrection, the more so since in the Atticist tradition, of which Galen was certainly cognisant, the spelling with -ι- instead of -υι- was perceived as genuinely 'Attic': cf. Ael.Dion. ι 4, Hdn. *GG* 3,2.281.4–6. Whether in 427 BCE Athens (the date of the first performance of the *Banqueters*) Aristophanes actually intended to retain the archaising spelling is impossible to say.

τ'ἐστὶν ὀπύειν (= Solon fr. 52c Leão-Rhodes);[53] 'what does ἰδύοι ('witnesses') mean? < . . . > and what does ὀπύειν ('to marry') mean?'.[54] While the mention of Homeric γλῶσσαι has monopolised the attention of most ancient and modern scholarship on the fragment,[55] the 'bad' son's counter-offer of having his brother explain old legal language has, with rare exceptions,[56] gone unremarked by literary critics.[57] However, as pointedly observed by Willi (2003a, 71), in this quick exchange, 'technical terminology and poetic (Homeric) language are treated as comparable kinds of specialist discourse': they are seamlessly juxtaposed with one another without any apparent solution of continuity, implying only, if anything, a 'higher' effort for the trouble of expounding legal terms (an enhancement of the stake on the part of the 'wicked' son, so to speak). Was this juxtaposition of Homer's lofty language and Solonian terms simply a way of exerting a de-familiarising, comic effect on the audience? Would the contemporary audience have been shocked by the smooth transition, in a schoolroom setting, from the pinnacle of poetry (Homer) to legal jargon? This cannot be entirely ruled out, given the highly fragmentary nature in which Aristophanes' *Banqueters* has come down to us, but at least *prima facie* Aristophanes' passage seems to suggest that in the second half of the 5th century BCE it was parents' common expectation that the texts studied by their children, both poetic (notably Homer) *and* prosaic (Solon's legislation), were subjected to the same exegetical practice of explaining the meanings of difficult or obscure words.[58] It is important here to highlight the double attention, within a 5th century BCE Athenian school setting, to both poetic *and* prose texts: we shall see this same practice institutionalised in the schooling system of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods.

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53 Dobree's emendation for the MSS εὖ ποιεῖν. The 6th-century BCE spelling of ὀπύειν would obviously have been ὀπυίειν (see above n. 52). It is debated whether the τί ποτ' ἐστίν of the MSS tradition is Galen's own wording or genuinely part of the Aristophanic quotation: see Perilli (2017, 296–7).

54 On the possible context of the fragment, see Cassio (1977, 75–7).

55 Interesting in this respect is the wording of Poll. 2.109, who quotes only the first verse of the Aristophanic fragment: καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς φωνὰς γλώττας ἐκάλουν, ὡς Ἀριστοφάνης, entirely omitting to mention the Solonic glosses. For the importance of this fragment for the study of Homeric glossography in ancient and modern scholarship, see Novokhatko (2023, 152–3) and Matthaios (2010, 167 n. 7), both with further bibliography.

56 See e.g. Alpers (1990, 16) and Alpers (2001, 195) on Ar. fr. 233 as evidence for the early existence of 'juristische Glossare' and Dettori (2000, 26); cf. also Bonanno (1986) on the double glossematic nature (epicism and a Solonian technical term) of ὀπύειν.

57 Likewise, Solonian scholarship has focused exclusively on the legal glosses of Ar. fr. 233.

58 Cf. also at Ar. fr. 233.1 the suggestive πρὸς δὲ ταύτας ('in addition'): some other difficult expressions (non-Homeric and non-legal, presumably) had already had their turn.

Educational practices are by definition conservative, and it is no surprise that an image similar to that sketched by Ar. fr. 233 can be gained for the 4th century BCE from yet another famous comic passage, Straton's humorous depiction of a master distraught at his inability to understand the high-flown vocabulary (mostly Homeric) used by his hired cook (Strato fr. 1.40–4 from his *Phoinikides*):

> . . . ἔθυεν, ἔλεγεν ἕτερα μυρία
> τοιαῦθ᾽ ἅ, μὰ τὴν Γῆν, οὐδὲ εἷς συνῆκεν ἄν,
> μίστυλλα, μοίρας, δίπτυχ᾽, ὀβελούς, ὥστ᾽ ἔδει
> τὰ τοῦ Φιλίτα λαμβάνοντα βιβλία
> σκοπεῖν ἕκαστον τί δύναται τῶν ῥημάτων

> . . . [the cook] made the sacrifice and spoke other countless words of such a kind that, by Earth, not a single person could have understood: μίστυλλα ('dicings'), μοῖραι ('lots'), δίπτυχα ('double-folds'), ὀβελοί ('spits') so that I should have fetched Philitas' books and examined what each word means.

While most of the words mentioned by the cook are epicisms, they are far from rare:[59] the scene's humour certainly lies in exposing the exaggerated ignorance of the master, who has difficulty in understanding words that would not have taxed well-taught schoolchildren (learning basic Homeric vocabulary) and who clearly has no idea of what Philitas' Ἄτακτοι γλῶσσαι were about (certainly not a school-book, whatever it may have been).[60] As several scholars have remarked, the scanty remains of Philitas' glossographical work (cf. Section 4.1) do not suggest the image of a scholar uniquely dedicated to the study of Homeric diction: the fun of the passage consists rather in juxtaposing the name of an erudite poet who was, at the time, also the *avantgarde* of lexicographical studies (Philitas' Ἄτακτοι γλῶσσαι are usually dated to ca. 300 BCE) with the traditional Homeric glosso-graphical practice *tout court*, primary education included.[61] Thus, while we do not need infer from Straton's parody that Philitas' lexical work was an educational hit on the book stalls,[62] we may reasonably assume that the time-honoured practice of explaining Homeric vocabulary continued unchanged in 4th-century BCE schoolrooms. In fact, if we also consider the extra-textual information avail-

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59 For a detailed analysis of the lexicon of Straton's Homerising cook, see Dettori (2000, 10–1).
60 For an illuminating analysis of Straton's fragment and its import for the reception of Philitas' glossographical work, see above all Bing (2003, 343–6). On the much-discussed meaning of the title of Philitas' lexicographical work, see Section 4.2.
61 Dettori (2000, 11); Bing (2003, 346).
62 Thus, correctly, Bing (2003, 346); on the dissemination of early glossographical works outside the great libraries, see Hatzmichali (2019, esp. p. 32 n. 8 on Philitas).

able, it is almost a fitting coincidence that Straton's fr. 1 is transmitted not only by Athenaeus (9.382c–d) but, with some slight textual divergences, also by a 3rd-century BCE papyrus from the Arsinoites nomos, P.Cair. JdE 65445 (= TM 59942), most probably a schoolmaster's text with a series of exercises in increasing order of difficulty to be used in his classes (from a syllabary to lists of words, shorter and longer excerpts for copying and reading, and even mathematical tables).[63]

Likewise, the enduring practice of glossing difficult words (especially Homeric ones) in the schools of Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman Egypt is confirmed by the many lists of word, lexica (general and author specific) attested in several papyri from the Egyptian χώρα.[64] A very clear example of this practice is represented by the so-called *scholia minora* preserved on papyri: obscure vocabulary was 'translated' into the corresponding koine usage of the time.[65] Most importantly, as already seen in Section 3, in the 2nd century BCE, the explanation of γλῶσσαι (γλωσσῶν ἀπόδοσις) was codified by Dionysius Thrax as the third task of the γραμματική. Just as in Ar. fr. 233, also in Dionysius Thrax's definition of grammar, equal attention is paid to *both* poetic and prose texts (ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν [. . .] λεγομένων). Both categories are also exposed to the *same* teaching method: a readily accessible explanation of the linguistic element (γλωσσῶν [. . .] πρόχειρος ἀπόδοσις), that which we would call *Sprachphilologie*, and the underlying *realia* (ἱστοριῶν), that is, characters, myths, plots, geographical and historical information, and customs, etc. The application of the same methodology to both poetry and prose also reveals another important element of Hellenistic exegesis in general: the fluid permeability of linguistic usage between the media of poetry and prose; often in Alexandrian scholarship, prose passages are explained with reference to poetic ones (especially Homer) and *vice versa*.[66]

Hitherto, none of the evidence discussed here has clearly conveyed what a γλῶσσα is. Galen, the illustrious physician and polymath writing in the 2nd century CE, had no doubt about what qualified (and what did not qualify) as a gloss, as his dedicatory preamble to his *Interpretation of Hippocratic Glosses* (τῶν παρ᾽ Ἱπποκράτει γλωττῶν[67] ἐξήγησις) makes clear (Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 142.1–12 Perilli

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63 Cribiore (1996, 269) no. 379, on which, see Parsons (2011, 140–1).

64 For the Hellenistic period, see, above all, the survey by Parsons (2011, 146–9).

65 See Cribiore (1996, 50–1); Cribiore (2005, 207–8). For the practice of this 'intralingual translation' in the *scholia minora*, see also Schironi (2018, 218).

66 On this exegetical practice, see Montana (2020b, 169–70) (= Montana 2015, 96–7).

67 The MSS of the *classis prior* have the Ionic γλωσσῶν: on the authenticity of the Attic spelling γλωττῶν, see Perilli (2017, 92).

= 19.63.1–12 Kühn). To his young friend and fellow citizen Teuthras, eager to learn from him, in the most concise way possible, Hippocrates' γλῶσσαι (τὰς παρ᾽ Ἱπ-ποκράτει γλώττας, ὦ Τεῦθρα, βουληθέντι σοι διὰ βραχυτάτων ἡμᾶς ἐξηγήσασθαι), Galen is more than willing to oblige. First, however, he must dispense with several common misconceptions about what a gloss is and the way in which it differs from the πᾶσα λέξις (in this particular case 'the vocabulary')[68] of an author as a whole:

> Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 142. 5–12 Perilli = 19.63.5–12 Kühn: ἔσται δὲ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐκέλευσας ἡ τάξις τῷ λόγῳ κατὰ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων τάξιν, ἀφ᾽ ὧν <αἱ> γλῶτται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσι, πρότερόν γε διορισαμένοις ἡμῖν ὅπῃ διαφέρει τοῦ πᾶσαν ἐξηγήσασθαι τὴν Ἱπποκράτους λέξιν τὸ τὰς γλώττας μόνας. ὅσα τοίνυν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν μὲν τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ἦν συνήθη, νυνὶ δ᾽ οὐκ-έτι ἐστί, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα γλώττας καλοῦσι καὶ ταύτας ἐξηγησόμενος ἔρχομαι· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ζητήσεως μὲν οὐχ ἥττονος προσδεῖται, συνήθη δέ ἐστιν ἔτι καὶ εἰς τόδε, κατὰ τὰς τῶν συγγραμμάτων αὐτῶν ἐξηγήσεις ἄμεινον ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

> As you have asked, the order of my exposition will follow that of the letters [of the alphabet] with which the glosses begin, but before that, I must first define how the interpretation of the whole vocabulary of Hippocrates differs from interpreting his glosses only. For those words that in ancient times were current but nowadays are not so anymore, these [they] call glosses, and these are those which I am going to explain. All the other words that require an explanation no less than these, but that are still in use up to now, it is better to look them up in the interpretative works on those very same writings.

Galen sharply distinguishes between two sets of words: (1) words needing an explanation because they have become obsolete with time (ὅσα τοίνυν τῶν ὀνο-μάτων ἐν μὲν τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ἦν συνήθη, νυνὶ δ᾽ οὐκέτι ἐστί) and (2) words that may also require explanation but are nevertheless still currently in use in his own time (τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα ζητήσεως μὲν οὐχ ἥττονος προσδεῖται, συνήθη δέ ἐστιν ἔτι καὶ εἰς τόδε). Of these two word-groups, only the first can legitimately be called γλῶσσαι, whereas the other represents simply λέξεις ('expressions'). Galen insists on this distinction repeatedly in his proem.[69] His Hippocratic glos-sary, we are told (Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 144.21–5 Perilli = 19.65.21–5 Kühn), will con-tain not only those words that were familiar to the other ancients but have now fallen out of use (οὐ μόνον ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις παλαιοῖς ὑπάρχοντα συνήθη τῶν ὀνο-μάτων οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἐν ἔθει νῦν) but also those employed idiosyncratically by Hip-pocrates himself, either by using a familiar word in a transferred sense, or

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68 For this meaning of πᾶσα λέξις in Galen's proem, see Perilli (2017, 103; 291–2).
69 Cf. Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 144.27–9 Perilli = 19.65.27–9 Kühn: ὑπὲρ τοῦ γινώσκειν ἐναργέστερον, οἷον μέν τι ἡ γλῶττά ἐστιν, οἷον δέ τι καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον αὐτῇ τὸ γεγονὸς ὑπό τινος τῶν παλαιῶν and *Gloss.* prooem. 148.16 Perilli = 19.68.16 Kühn: διωρισμένου δὴ σαφῶς τί μέν ἐστι γλῶττα, τί δὲ λέξις.

construing a new syntagm or changing its meaning (ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα κατά τινα τρό-
πον ἴδιον αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν ὁ Ἱπποκράτης ἢ μετενεγκὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνήθους ἢ σχῆμα
περιθεὶς ἕτερον ἢ τὸ σημαινόμενον ὑπαλλάξας). Before quoting as a concrete ex-
ample what is for us Aristophanes fr. 233, Galen introduces a further refinement:

> Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 148.3–9 Perilli = 19.67.3–9 Kühn: δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων οἶμαί σοι γεγονέ-
> ναι διπλοῦν[70] εἶναι τρόπον τῶν γλωττῶν, ἢ τοῦ κοινοῦ πᾶσιν ὀνόματος ἐκπεσόντος τῆς ἐπι-
> κρατούσης συνηθείας ἢ τοῦ γενομένου πρός τινος τῶν παλαιῶν μὴ παραδεχθέντος ὅλως εἰς
> τὴν συνήθειαν. οὕτως οὖν καὶ Ἱπποκράτης τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων τότε συνήθων ὀνομάτων
> παραλαμβάνει, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς σημαινομένοις ὑπαλλάττει, καὶ δίκαιον ἕκασ-
> τον αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐξηγεῖσθαι μετὰ τῶν γλωττῶν, ὅταν γε φαίνηται τοῦ νῦν ἔθους ἐκπεπτωκός.

> I believe that, from these examples, it has thus become clear to you that there are two kinds
> of glosses: either the word that was once familiar to all but has fallen out from the prevalent
> usage or the word coined by an ancient author that has not altogether been accepted into
> the common usage. So, therefore, Hippocrates also adopts some of the words then current,
> creates some himself, and alters the meaning of others. And it is right that we explain each
> of these (i.e. the second set of words) together with the glosses, whenever such words have
> fallen out of current usage.

Here, Galen distinguishes two types of gloss: words once familiar *to all* but that
have become now obscure and words already used by a given ancient author in
an idiosyncratic way (that is, a deviant usage compared to the συνήθεια of the
time) and that are now obsolete.[71] Strictly speaking, Galen's wording (δίκαιον
ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐξηγεῖσθαι μετὰ τῶν γλωττῶν) may suggest that only the
first category is a gloss proper, whereas the second is an extension *a latere* of the
first. Both types of gloss, however, share one and the same necessary condition:
they must be or be perceived by contemporary speakers and/or readers as archa-
isms. The diriment criterion for Galen is clearly the diachronic dimension: a

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70 διπλοῦν is Ilberg's brilliant correction for the transmitted δ' εἶπον (A); Aldus Manutius
emended it into ὡς εἶπον (accepted by Kühn); διττόν was suggested by Mewaldt.

71 Partially comparable (but only partially, since the diachronic dimension is not explicitly
spelled out) is the sense of γλωσσηματικῶς in Timaeus' preface to his collection of *Platonic
Glosses* at Tim. *Lex.* praef.: ἐξέλεξα τὰ παρὰ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γλωσσηματικῶς ἢ κατὰ συνήθειαν Ἀτ-
τικὴν εἰρημένα, οὐχ ὑμῖν μόνοις τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὄντ' ἀσαφῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοῖς πλείστοις,
τάξας τε ταῦτα κατὰ στοιχεῖον καὶ μεταφράσας ἀπέστειλά σοι ('I selected in Plato those words
which are said γλωσσηματικῶς or in keeping with Attic usage, words whose meaning is unclear
not only to you Romans but also to very many Greek natives; I sent them to you after having
ordered them according to the letters of the alphabet, accompanied by a paraphrase'). S. Valente
(2009, 71) argues that γλωσσηματικῶς probably encompasses both the sense of epichoric glosses
and of rare meanings ascribed by Plato to otherwise common words. This is correct but at no
point we are told that the diatopic feature is a necessary requirement: unattested usage of com-
mon words may include dialectal words but need not to.

γλῶσσα is by definition a word that has become obsolete in current usage (at least from the reader's perspective: when used by a non-ancient author is thus a deliberate stylistic choice).[72] This, of course, does *not* imply that this was the meaning of γλῶσσα in Aristophanes' passage (Ar. fr. 233) quoted by Galen in support of his explanation: as rightly remarked already by Lebek, '[d]och steht Galen hier gewiß unter dem Eindruck der primar auf die Vergangenheit gerichteten Sprachbetrachtung seiner Zeit; seine Auslegung kann für den Sinn, den Aristophanes mit dem Substantiv verbindet, nichts lehren'.[73]

Two further points of Galen's explanation warrant attention here. First, the very same fact that Galen feels the need to clarify at great length to his friend Teuthras (an educated physician like himself, and a Greek native speaker too)[74] the way in which a γλῶσσα differs from a λέξις implies that such a distinction was not so self-evident after all. It is important to remember that in early Hellenistic scholarship, a certain degree of fluctuation between λέξις and γλῶσσα was present from the outset (after all, as we shall see later, in Aristotle the latter is a subtype of the former), even if it is especially with the Roman era that λέξις supplants γλῶσσα even as far as Homeric vocabulary is concerned.[75]

The nature of a γλῶσσα proper may have been a subject of dispute or at least discussion in early Imperial scholarship, Atticist circles included. Lebek, in fact, identified in our passage of Galen the first secure attestation of γλῶσσα strictly understood as an archaism.[76] Moreover, with his repeated insistence on the need to

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72 Cf. also Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 147.8–9 Perilli = 19.66.8–9 Kühn: ἐξ ὧν δῆλον ὡς ἡ γλῶττα παλαιόν ἐστιν ὄνομα τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεπτωκός. On Galen's concept of συνήθεια (mostly, but not uniquely, contemporary educated usage), see Manetti (2003, 223–4); Manetti (2009).

73 Lebek (1969, 63 n. 1).

74 On Teuthras' background, see Perilli (2017, 92–3). The addressee of Timaeus' Platonic glossary instead is not a Greek native speaker: whatever real name may hide beneath the corrupted Γαιατιανῷ of the MSS, the person in question was a Roman by birth, cf. S. Valente (2012, 55–6).

75 On this terminological fluctuation, see Henrichs (1971, 231–2 with nn. 7–8). A case in point is that of e.g. Apollodorus of Athens (2nd /1st century BCE), whose lexicographical work is variously mentioned as Γλῶσσαι in schol. (ex.?) Hom. *Il.* 1.244d (A) (= Apollod. *BNJ* 244 F 221) but as Λέξεις in schol. Apoll.Rh. 1.1089a ἀφλάστοιο· Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν ταῖς Λέξεσι ἀποδέδωκεν ἄφλαστον τὸ ἀκροστόλιον (= Apollod. *BNJ* 244 F 240). On Apollodorus' contribution to Hellenistic glossography, see Chapter 7, Section 5.

76 Lebek (1969, 63 n. 1). Cf. also Lebek (1969, 65 n. 4), where he correctly dismisses the passage of D.H. *Comp.* 3, p. 11.14–9 Usener–Radermacher: λυθέντος γοῦν τοῦ μέτρου φαῦλα φανήσεται τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἄζηλα· οὔτε γὰρ μεταφοραί τινες ἔνεισιν εὐγενεῖς οὔτε ὑπαλλαγαὶ οὔτε καταχρήσεις οὔτ' ἄλλη τροπικὴ διάλεκτος οὐδεμία, οὐδὲ δὴ γλῶτται πολλαί τινες οὐδὲ ξένα ἢ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα ('Indeed, if the metre is broken up, these very same lines will appear ordinary and unworthy of admiration: for there are no noble metaphors in them, nor instances of hypallage or catachresis, nor any other form of figurative language; nor again many recondite, strange

differentiate between γλῶσσα and λέξις, Galen may, at first glance, appear to simply replicate a distinction that some scholars have seen as already operating in early Hellenistic lexicographical studies (the usual term of reference quoted is Aristophanes of Byzantium's Λέξεις).[77] However, as we shall see in greater detail in Chapter 7, Section 1, we should be wary of projecting this categorisation back to early Hellenistic times: some of the words commented in the Λέξεις of Aristophanes are undoubtedly archaisms, but some are not. That is, for Aristophanes of Byzantium, archaism was a sufficient but *not* necessary condition for a gloss, differently from Galen.[78] Where, then, did Galen get his definition of γλῶσσα from? The most obvious answer is the cultural and intellectual climate of the Second Sophistic. Even if Galen was highly critical of the extremes of the Atticist trend of his own time, he nevertheless shared its uncompromising veneration of οἱ παλαιοί as educational pillars and masters of style.[79] Galen was acutely aware that language develops through time and that words may become obsolete; he himself acknowledged that even the Attic dialect, idolised by the strictest Atticists, changed over time and that the most successful authors were invariably those who followed the linguistic habits of their own period.[80] However, the classicising veneer in his definition of γλῶσσα is transparent: in this sense, Galen could not help being a child, however

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or newly-coined words', transl. Usher (1985, 29); the reference is to the excellence of a Homeric passage: its perfection is ascribable to its σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων rather than to its ἐκλογή). Usener's emended the unanimously transmitted πολλαί into παλαιαί (an emendation accepted by Latte 1925, 148 n. 26 and 158 n. 43). However, Usener's correction has been rightly rejected by modern editors (e.g. Roberts, Usher) as a comparison with Arist. *Po.* 21.2 clearly shows: see below Section 3.2.

77 So e.g. Pfeiffer (1968, 198): 'A collection of γλῶσσαι was usually limited to obsolete and obscure terms; but under the neutral title Λέξεις every word which was peculiar in form or significance and therefore in need of explanation could be listed, whether it was out of date or still in use'; cf. also F. Montanari (1993, 251).

78 It is also worth noting that what we know under the title of Zenodotus' Ἐθνικαὶ λέξεις may simply have been a subsection of his Γλῶσσαι, cf. Section 4.3. This would further weaken the retrojection of the sharp distinction between γλῶσσα and λέξις to the early Hellenistic period.

79 On the complex relationship between Galen and Atticism, see Sluiter (1995, 530 with n. 69); Swain (1996, 56–64); Manetti (2003, 172); Manetti (2009) *passim*. For Galen and the Second Sophistic, see von Staden (1997); Mattern (2017).

80 Cf. Gal. *De comp. med. per gen.* 13.408.1–6 Kühn: ἐπιδέδεικται γάρ μοι κατὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας τοῖς σολοικίζουσι καὶ αὐτοὺς Ἀττικοὺς ἄνδρας ἠκολουθηκέναι τῇ κρατούσῃ συνηθείᾳ. δέδεικται γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις πρὸ ἐμοῦ τῆς Ἀτθίδος αὐτῆς διαλέκτου μετάπτωσις γεγονέναι πολυειδής, ἕπεσθαί τε τῷ καθ᾽ ἑαυτοὺς ἔθει πάντας, ὧν δόξα μεγίστη παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησίν ἐστιν ἐπὶ λόγων δεινότητι ('In my work against those who censure those who commit solecisms I have shown that also Attic men themselves followed the prevailing usage. For others too before me have shown that the same Attic dialect has gone through many changes and all those whose reputation for eloquence is greatest among the Greeks followed the usage of their own time').

critical, of his own time.[81] Had the term γλῶσσα always been understood as an archaism by Greek educated people? A word's meaning is not a transhistorical or inalienable property: as we shall see, in the 4th and 3rd centuries BCE, the heyday of Hellenistic scholarship, the term γλῶσσα designated a considerably more capacious and 'open' linguistic category, a tool for the study of the Greek language at the level of both textual and, more broadly, stylistic analysis. Therefore, we must now turn, unsurprisingly, to Aristotle and his concept of γλῶσσα.

3.2 Aristotle's concept of γλῶσσα

Notwithstanding Pfeiffer's influential scepticism, in the last twenty years, modern scholars have increasingly recognised the important role that Aristotle's reflection on language and literature played in establishing the conceptual framework within which early Hellenistic philology developed.[82] This is also the case for the birth of grammar as an independent field of inquiry: Aristotle's treatment of linguistic issues, particularly (though not uniquely) in his *Poetics* (chapters 20–1), although short of a systematic theorisation of the 'parts of expression' (μέρη τῆς λέξεως), clearly demonstrates that Aristotle had identified and defined the 'basic units' of language mapping them out into an ascending order of complexity.[83] This is so much the case that today, Dio Chrysostom's mention, in his Περὶ Ὁμήρου (= D.Chr. 53.1.8–10), of Aristotle among the founders of literary criticism *and* grammar (καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀφ᾽ οὗ φασι τὴν κριτικήν τε καὶ γραμματικὴν ἀρχήν), with specific reference to his Homeric studies, scarcely raises an eyebrow.[84] It will come as no surprise, therefore, if our enquiry into the nature of linguistic variation as conceived of and studied in the early Hellenistic

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81 Also, Phrynichus, for example, if the ascription by de Borries of fr. 6a to the *PS* is trustworthy, while exhorting the educated to avoid using γλῶσσαι (Phryn. *PS* fr. 6a.18: φεύγειν μὲν οὖν χρὴ τὸ τῶν γλωττῶν), seems to consider them as examples of ἀρχαία φωνή (in *PS* fr. 6a Phrynichus acknowledges the Attic character of ἄγω and ἀγάλλω when used as synonyms to τὸ τιμᾶν, 'to honour'; of the two verbs the first is πολιτικόν, whereas the second is κωμῳδικὸν καὶ ἐγγὺς γλώττης. Both however are subsumed under the label ἀρχαίας φωνῆς σπουδή).

82 See Schironi (2018, 414–5 n. 5; 742–3 with n. 22) with previous bibliography; an overview is also found in Bouchard (2016).

83 On Aristotle's influence on the later linguistic studies of Alexandrian grammarians and the Stoics, see Ax (1993); Swiggers, Wouters (2002, 117 with nn. 56–8).

84 The anonymous source of φασί has been traced back to Asclepiades of Myrlea: Pfeiffer (1968, 67 n. 5; 157–8) was very sceptical about Dio's reliability; far more positive is Matthaios (2011, 67); cf. also Fornaro (2002, 87–8) on the fact that Dio's passage must depend on widespread and non-controversial notions circulating within the Greek educational system of the time.

period brings us back first to Aristotle's definition of γλῶσσα and his observations regarding its stylistic advantages and/or disadvantages according to the various literary genres in which it may be deployed.[85]

Aristotle defines what a γλῶσσα is at *Po.* 21.1457b.1–7, within a broader excursus on the building blocks of verbal expression in general (20.1456b.20: τῆς δὲ λέξεως ἀπάσης), whether in prose or verse,[86] and on word types according to their usage (ch. 21).[87] Before we turn directly to Aristotle's chapter 21, it is important to note that chapters 20 (the constitutive elements of language in terms of phonetics, phonology, and grammar) and 21 (stylistics) of the *Poetics* are intimately interconnected. Aristotle considers language and style to be *coextensive* inasmuch as style is the result of a heightened consciousness of linguistic choices made possible by the underlying 'grammatical' system: as Kotarcic (2021, 35) observed, '*lexis* as linguistic choice builds on the premises established as part of *lexis* as a language system'.[88] Therefore, chapter 20 deals with the 'parts of expression', that is, as observed by de Jonge, Ophuijsen (2010, 495), with 'all and only items that may be considered as "components of diction," whether these are words, less than words [. . .], or combinations of words'. For Aristotle, these 'components of diction' are στοιχεῖον or 'speech sound',[89] syllable (both less than words), conjunction, noun, verb, connective,[90] declination, and sen-

85 On Aristotle's concept of γλῶσσα, see recently Kotarcic (2021, 81–4); Mayhew (2019, 103–9); cf. also Schironi (2018, 218–9); Tosi (1994a, 144–5); F. Montanari (2012, 125–8).

86 Cf. *Po.* 6.1450b.13–5: λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμη-νείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ('By 'diction', I mean, as we said earlier, communication by means of language, which has the same potential in case of both verse and [prose] speeches': translation after Janko 1987, 10).

87 On the function of chapters 20–1 within the argumentative structure of the *Poetics*, see Schramm (2019) with previous bibliography.

88 See also Kotarcic (2021, 31–2) on Aristotle's multifaceted but nevertheless consistent use of λέξις across his oeuvre and at 32 n. 47 on the broader semantic spectrum covered by λέξις in Aristotle (and Plato) when compared to its post-Aristotelian development in philosophical and grammatical writings.

89 For the adoption of this translation of στοιχεῖον, see Kotarcic's detailed argumentation at Kotarcic (2021, 434).

90 On the problematic nature of ἄρθρον (here translated as 'connective') in *Po.* 20, especially with respect to its relationship with σύνδεσμος, see Kotarcic (2021, 46–7). The soundness of the transmitted text has long been suspected: for ἄρθρον as a possible interpolation generated in the later grammatical tradition, see Matthaios (1999, 494 with nn. 300–2) with further bibliography; for a recent and persuasive defence of the transmitted text, see Schramm (2005) and Schramm (2019, 183–4), followed by Hose (2022, 334–6).

tence/utterance.[91] In chapter 21, Aristotle turns to language (λέξις) in its concrete use, by analysing 'the manner in which the linguistic elements are used as a communicative means in everyday conversation. [. . .] Aristotle discusses everyday language usage by implicitly, and in some cases explicitly, positing a series of dichotomies which imply the *juxtaposition of a standard and other varieties*, or rather the identification of a standard by juxtaposing it to another' (Kotarcic 2021, 73; our italics). It is within this conceptual framework (that which is and is not standard) that Aristotle offers his definition of γλῶσσα:

> Arist. *Po.* 21.1457b.1–7: ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑφηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ· τὸ γὰρ σίγυνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα.[92]

> Each word is either standard, or γλῶσσα, or a metaphor, or an embellishment, or made up or lengthened or reduced or altered. By standard, I mean what each group of speakers uses, by γλῶσσα, what others use. It is therefore obvious that it is possible for the same word to be both γλῶσσα and standard but not for the same speakers. For σίγυνον ('spear') is standard for Cypriots, but a γλῶσσα for us.

Several elements stand out in this definition. Perhaps the most striking, at least from the perspective of modern linguistics, is that Aristotle, in distinguishing between different sets of speakers or language-users, clearly acknowledges that 'applied' λέξις is 'a distinctly social phenomenon, as it allows for the grouping of speakers into a single speech community due to the similarities their use of language displays' (Kotarcic 2021, 79). Equally noteworthy is that in explaining what γλῶσσαι are, Aristotle cites as an example an instance of an ethnic/dialectal word that is not Attic and that, in so doing, he does not hint at a hierarchical or pre-established order among Greek dialects: Attic dialect is not said to be 'better' or 'more correct' than the Cypriot, even if in terms of literary tradition and historical

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91 For this sense of λόγος, see Hose (2022, 332). From the perspective adopted in the *Poetics* (a stylistic rather than a rhetorical one), the 'utterance' (λόγος) belongs to the μέρη τῆς λέξεως: cf. the definition of λόγος at *Po.* 20.1457a.23–4. On how 'parts of expression' (μέρη τῆς λέξεως: *Poetics*) and 'parts of speech' (μέρη τοῦ λόγου: *Rhetoric*) represent two very different approaches to language, see de Jonge, van Ophuijsen (2010, 495–6).

92 The Arabic translation of the *Poetics* goes on quoting the reverse example: 'while δόρυ ('spear') is standard for us but foreign [sc. for the Cypriots]': this sentence is probably a 'learned marginal gloss which was later added to the text of Σ [i.e. the Greek uncial manuscript from which the Syriac translation was made] or of its ultimate source', cf. Tarán in Tarán, Gutas (2012, 286–7) and Gutas (ibid. 431), followed by Hose (2022, 344–5).

contingency, the former was already unquestionably more prestigious than the latter. At least in this passage,[93] Aristotle's observation is formulated in a matter-of-fact manner, deprived of any value judgement: Attic is one dialect among many, and it just happens to be that used by the speech community to which Aristotle and his immediate potential readers belong, and for this reason, it is used as the point of reference for what is 'standard' (κύριον).[94]

A third element worth noting is that the very basic distinction between 'standard' linguistic usage (κύριον) and that which is not 'standard' (not only γλῶσσα, but also metaphor, embellishments, etc.) is not framed within a prescriptive grid: 'standard' usage is not 'more correct' *per se* than non-standard usage. Different contexts (read 'genres' when it comes to literary tradition) allow for different usages, each with its own peculiarities. So, for instance, poetry, and especially epic (*Po.* 22.1459a.9–10: τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων [. . .] αἱ δὲ γλῶτται (i.e. μάλιστα ἁρμόττει) τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς),[95] needs γλῶσσαι because they confer a certain grandiosity on diction by differentiating it from ordinary conversation (*Po.* 22.1458a.21–2: σεμνὴ δὲ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικὸν ἡ τοῖς ξενικοῖς κεχρημένη· ξενικὸν δὲ λέγω γλῶτ-ταν καὶ μεταφορὰν καὶ ἐπέκτασιν καὶ πᾶν τὸ παρὰ τὸ κύριον, 'A diction using exotic language is grand and remote from the ordinary. By exotic I mean γλῶσσαι, metaphor, lengthening and everything which deviates from the standards'). At the same time, one must avoid excessive use of them on the grounds that such a hypertrophic use of γλῶσσαι will lead to βαρβαρισμός ('gibberish'), that is, the opposite of 'speaking good Greek' (ἑλληνίζειν), just as an excessive use of metaphors will result in a riddling style (*Po.* 22.1.1458a.22–3: ἀλλ᾽ ἄν τις ἅπαντα τοιαῦτα ποι-ήσῃ, ἢ αἴνιγμα ἔσται ἢ βαρβαρισμός· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ μεταφορῶν, αἴνιγμα, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός, 'But if one composes only in this way, the result will be either a riddle or a barbarism; a riddle if made if metaphors, a barbarism if made of γλῶσσαι').

Let us now attempt to pin down more precisely the exact nature of Aristotle's γλῶσσα: does the term designate a diatopic variant only ('what the Cypriots say')?

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93 Things will be different when Aristotle discusses ἑλληνίζειν vs βαρβαρίζειν: see below Section 3.3.

94 In this direction see already Kotarcic (2021, 85). Gasser's recent treatment of Aristotle's concept of λέξις in the *Poetics* does not expound at all on γλῶσσα (Gasser 2024, above all 143–5).

95 Cf. also *Po.* 24.1459b.32–5: τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ γλώττας καὶ μεταφορὰς δέχεται μάλιστα and *Rhet.* 3.3.1406b.1–3: διὸ χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς (οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις), αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς (σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὔθαδες).

Some scholars have limited Aristotle's γλῶσσα to just that: a *Fremdwort* or a *Dialektform*.[96] Aristotle's recognition of diatopic variations in speech is indeed obvious in our passage, as the ensuing Cypriot example of σίγυνον ('spear') makes clear. This, by the way, is also not the only place where Aristotle explicitly acknowledges regional variations in speech: at Arist. *HA* 536b.8–9, within a broader physiological excursus on the phonatory apparatus of men and animals, Aristotle states that in the case of human beings and animals possessed of tongue and lips (alongside lungs and pharynx: e.g. birds but not dolphins), their 'voices' (φωναί) and 'modes of speech' (διάλεκτοι)[97] 'differ according to locality' (διαφέρουσι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ αἱ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ διάλεκτοι). Wolfram Ax pointed out that in this passage of the *History of Animals*, we can already see *in nuce* the seeds of the later semantic development of διάλεκτος, meaning 'regional dialect',[98] whose first attestation is usually identified in fr. 20 *SVF* III (= D.L. 7.59) of the Stoic philosopher Diogenes of Babylon (3rd/2nd century BCE).[99] But does this 'spatial' sense exhaust the possibilities of what Aristotle calls a γλῶσσα? Closer examination of the wording of *Po.* 21.2.1457b.1–7 reveals instead that Aristotle's concept of γλῶσσα is considerably more capacious. As formulated by Aristotle in the *Poetics*, a γλῶσσα is everything that differs from the speech habit of a given speech community: from a theoretical perspective, such a definition encompasses *every* possible deviation from what is considered the standard usage, be it diatopic, diachronic, diastratic, or diaphasic. The open nature of Aristotle's definition of γλῶσσα remains valid even if all but two of the specific examples given at *Po.* 21.2 (the Cypriot word σίγυνον) and later on at *Po.* 25.1461a.10–5 (the two exceptions are Homeric

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96 Thus, for instance, Lebek (1969, 65), who rules out any possible reference to the temporal dimension ('archaism'). Lebek is now followed by Hose (2022, 344).

97 In *HA* 353a.31–2 διάλεκτος is the voice articulated by means of the tongue (διάλεκτος δ' ἡ τῆς φωνῆς ἐστι τῇ γλώττῃ διάρθρωσις).

98 Ax (1986, 128 and n. 45): 'In dieser Passage kündigt sich bereits die spätere Bedeutungsentwicklung διάλεκτος = Dialekt an'; cf. also Ax (1978, 258) (= Ax 2000, 23).

99 Diog.Bab.Stoic. fr. 20 *SVF* III: διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς, ἢ λέξις ποταπή, τουτέστι ποιὰ κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα θάλαττα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα ἡμέρη ('A dialect is a form of speech characterised as ethnic and Greek, or a form of speech from a certain place, that is, having a certain quality according to a dialect, as for instance θάλαττα according to the Attic [dialect] and ἡμέρη according to the Ionic [dialect]'). On this passage see van Rooy (2016, 250–1) with previous bibliography. We are inclined to agree with Consani (1991, 19–21) vs Ax (1986, 201–2) in taking Ἑλληνικῶς as complementary – and not contrastive – to ἐθνικῶς: that is to say, there is no opposition between Greek speakers and non-Greek speakers: the focus is entirely Hellenocentric, or better, intra-Hellenic, from the very beginning. Cf. also Section 3.3.

passages: the use of ὀρεύς for φύλαξ and of ζωρότερον in the sense of 'faster')[100] are cases of ethnic/regional variations. Discrete instantiations limited to the illustration of diatopic variants do not nullify the capaciousness of the general principle. This comprehensiveness of the category of γλῶσσα, which, for Aristotle, also includes that which will be called λέξις in later terminology – that is, 'any expression in need of a clarification'[101] – is made explicitly clear by the examples given not in the *Poetics* but in the *Rhetoric* (*Rhet*. 3.3.1406a.6–10), within a discussion of the virtues (ἀρεταί) of prose style (in opposition to poetry). This *Rhetoric* passage from Book 3 is explicitly cross-referenced by Aristotle himself to his *Poetics*' chapter 21:[102] it is legitimate, therefore, to complement the examples of γλῶσσα given in the *Poetics* with those produced in the *Rhetoric*, even if the context is obviously different. In the passage of the *Rhetoric*, γλῶσσαι are identified as one of the four sources of 'frigidity' (τὰ ψυχρά) in prose (the other three being an excessive use of compounds, epithets, and metaphors). The text is as follows:

> Arist. *Rhet*. 3.3.1406a.6–10: μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην 'πέλωρον ἄνδρα', καὶ Σκίρων 'σίνις ἀνήρ', καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας 'ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει', καὶ 'τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν', καὶ 'ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον'.

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100 *Po*. 25.6.1461a.10–5: τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, οἷον γλώττῃ τὸ 'οὐρῆας μὲν πρῶτον' (*Il*. 1.50). ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἡμιόνους λέγει ἀλλὰ τοὺς φύλακας· καὶ τὸν Δόλωνα, 'ὅς ῥ' ἦ τοι εἶδος μὲν ἔην κακός' (*Il*. 10.316), οὐ τὸ σῶμα ἀσύμμετρον ἀλλὰ τὸ πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν, τὸ γὰρ εὐειδὲς οἱ Κρῆτες τὸ εὐπρόσωπον καλοῦσι· καὶ τὸ 'ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε' (*Il*. 9.203) οὐ τὸ ἄκρατον ὡς οἰνόφλυξιν ἀλλὰ τὸ θᾶττον ('Some [sc. problems] must be solved by looking at the diction, for example the expression 'mules first' (*Il*. 1.50) [must be explained] via a γλῶσσα: for perhaps [Homer] means not mules but 'guards'. And [when he says] about Dolon 'who was indeed ugly in his appearance (εἶδος)' (*Il*. 10.316) he may mean not that his body was misshapen but that his face was ugly, for the Cretans call fair of face 'shapely formed' (εὐειδές). And the expression 'mix purer wine' (*Il*. 9.203) refers not to unmixed wine as if for drunkards but to [mix it] faster'). On this passage and the use of glosses to resolve (λύσις) Homeric problems, see Mayhew (2019, 107–8).
101 See above Section 3.1. Lack of clarity is the major discrimen already in Aristotle: *Rh*. 3.10.1410b.10–3: τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν ('For to learn easily is naturally pleasant to everyone: words signify something, so whatever words make us learn (and understand) are most pleasant. Now, *glossai* are unintelligible, whereas we do know and understand standard words'); cf. also *Top*. 140a.5: πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός ('everything which is not usual is obscure').
102 Cf. *Rhet*. 3.2.1404b.7: ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, 1404b.28: τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τοσαῦτ' ἐχόντων εἴδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως; 1405a.5: καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς). On these cross-references, see Kotarcic (2021, 102).

> Another source [of frigidity in style] is the use of γλῶσσαι, such as Lycophron's calling Xerxes 'a giant man' and Sciron 'a bane of a man' (Lyc.Soph. Diels–Kranz 83 A 5 = 38 D6 Laks–Most); Alcidamas too speaks of 'toys for poetry' (Alcid. fr. 11 Muir), 'the wickedness of nature' (Alcid. fr. 12 Muir), and of one 'whetted by the unmixed anger of his thought' (Alcid. fr. 13 Muir).

Five examples of γλῶσσαι are given, two by the sophist Lycophron, and three by Alcidamas: none of them entails the use of a *Dialektwort* or 'ethnic' expression. Scholars have variously attempted to identify the 'glossographic' nature of these examples in archaisms, epicisms, syntactic alterations (nouns used adjectivally), or use of abstract nouns.[103] However, the occurrences of πέλωρον, σίνις, ἄθυρμα, ἀτασθαλία, and τεθηγμένον do not all fit easily into any of these categories.[104] All these idiosyncrasies (archaism, alleged syntactic innovations, excessive use of abstract nouns) identified by modern scholars in the five examples of γλῶσσαι given by Aristotle in *Rhet.* 3.3 may have contributed to the defamiliarising effect of the ξενικόν of which the γλῶσσαι clearly partake; however, given the definition of γλῶσσα at *Po.* 21.2, their least common denominator is the broad category of 'poeticisms': all of these are predominantly (Alcid. frr. 11 ἄθυρμα, 12 ἀτασθαλία, and 13 Muir θήγω) if not uniquely (Lycophron's πέλωρος, σίνις in Diels–Kranz 83 A 5) poetic words, mostly epicisms. In *Rhet.* 3.3, Aristotle is concerned with the shortcomings, in prose, of an excessive use of γλῶσσαι (a generic difference: prose vs poetry): given the specific context, the linguistic habit of the speech community referred to at *Po.* 21.2 (λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι) becomes here, *mutatis mutandis*, the speech habit *within a given genre* (prose vs poetry, specifically epic poetry). This is, in our opinion, the most eco-

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103 Archaisms: Kennedy (2007, 203 n. 39) surmises that πέλωρον 'could be called a gloss because it was archaic'; epicisms: Rapp (2002, 847); Muir (2001, 88); nouns used adjectivally: Freese, Stricker (2020, 365 n. 21); Laks, Most (2016 vol. 9, 131 n. 1) and Nelson, Molesworth (2021, 214 n. 65) identify Lycophron's glossographical features in the adjectival use of nous (cf. respectively Freese, Stricker and Laks, Most on σίνις and Nelson, Molesworth on πέλωρον); abstract nouns: O' Sullivan (1992, 33) suggests that one element that might have contributed to Aristotle's criticism of Alcidamas was the orator's predilection for abstract expression (cf. fr. 12 Muir τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν).

104 As for the adjectival use of nouns, on closer inspection, nothing hinders the possibility that in Lycophron πέλωρον may well be used as an apposition *more Homerico*: the lack of definite article is not an impediment; see the detailed analysis of the alleged adjectival occurrence of πέλωρον in Homer by Troxler (1964, 174–82) – ignored by V. Langholf, *LfgrE* s.v. πέλωρ, πέλωρον –, who identifies the adjectival use of πέλωρος as a distinctively Hesiodic innovation; similarly also Risch (1974, 113, §40b) 'πέλωρον neben πελώριος ist bei Horn, wahrscheinlich noch Substantiv', and *EDG* s.v. πέλωρ; (*DELG* s.v. πέλωρ quotes as possible Homeric examples only *Il.* 12.202 = 220, *Od.* 9.527, and *Od.*15.161). Likewise, σίνις too may be used appositionally by Lycophron.

nomical way of explaining this apparent shift in focus (that is, the absence of dialectal/regional or ethnic features) in Aristotle's conceptualisation of γλῶσσα if compared with *Po*. 21.2.

The definition of γλῶσσα given in the *Poetics* is, anthropologically speaking, all-encompassing: time, space, situation, and social stratum are all variables included in the general juxtaposition of κύριον and γλῶττα. Hence, Lebek's criticism of Vahlen's interpretation of the Aristotelian definition of γλῶσσα as archaism ('das aus dem lebendigen Gebrauch der herrschenden Sprache verschollene Wort') is at least partly unjustified.[105] With that said, it remains true that Aristotle never explicitly mentions variation through time as a criterion for a γλῶσσα, and Lebek is therefore correct in saying that archaism is not expressly thematised as one of the criteria for a gloss. We have already seen in Section 3.1 that the reduction of γλῶσσα to an antiquated word outside current usage is a historically determined interpretation deeply indebted to Atticist trends; this, however, does not mean that the temporal dimension was not included among the criteria envisaged by Aristotle's definition: simply, it was not the only criterion, nor the overruling one.[106]

To sum up, Aristotle's definition of γλῶσσα, both as exegetical method and parameter of stylistic analysis, did not come from a vacuum: behind Aristotle's definition lies is a lengthy tradition, both in school classes but also in different cultural environments (e.g. rhapsodic performances, scholarly reflections, and philosophical inquiries).[107] As we shall see in Section 4.1, Aristotle's treatment of γλῶσσα will continue to exercise a dominant influence in early Hellenistic lexicographical inquiries at Alexandria. Let us now turn to a second linguistic category that, in Aristotle, is in some respects related to that of gloss: ἑλληνισμός in as much as it involves κυριόλεξις ('employment of a word in its proper sense').[108]

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105 The exact reference is Vahlen (1865, 248); Lebek (1969, 65 with n. 2, 66): 'Die Möglichkeit, daß die Menschengruppe, für die ein Wort eine γλῶττα ist, von der, für die es ein κύριον ὄνομα ist, zeitlich getrennt ist, wird in der aristotelischen Erklärung nicht in Betracht gezogen. [. . .] Der Archaismus als solcher wäre dabei nicht in den Blick gefaßt'.

106 Aristotle was obviously aware that languages change through time, cf. e.g. *Rhet*. 1.2.27.1357b.9–10: τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν γλῶτταν '*tekmar* and *peras* means the same in the old language', and *Pol*. 1272a.2–3 (Spartan φιδίτια were once (τό γε ἀρχαῖον) called ἀνδρεῖα). It remains undisputed that some words can be archaism and dialectalism at the same time: see e.g. the use of αἶσα among the Argives to designate the individual contribution towards the cost of a symposium, as explained by Hegesander of Delphi (2nd century CE) at Ath. 8.365d (= Heges. fr. 31 Müller, *FHG* vol. 4, 419).

107 See F. Montanari (2012, 129); cf. also Novokhatko (2023, 153 n. 13).

108 Cf. Siebenborn (1976, 48–50).

3.3 Ἑλληνισμός between grammar and style

We have already seen that at *Po.*22.1458a.22–3 Aristotle firmly places glosses within the domain of τὸ ξενικόν ('the exotic'), perceived positively as an element that, if moderately used, lends charm to the diction.[109] At *Rhet.* 3.2.1404b.8–12, in discussing the virtues of an appropriately elevated diction that deviates only slightly from the standard, Aristotle offers an anthropological explanation of why that which is ξενικόν naturally appeals to humans:

> Arist. *Rhet.* 3.2.1404b.8–12: τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν· διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν.

> For its deviating from the standard makes it more dignified. For human beings feel the same in relation to diction as they do in relation to fellow-citizens and strangers: that is why one should make his diction exotic: they marvel at what is far away, and that which causes one to wonder is pleasant.

De-familiarisation, if employed sensibly and to a moderate extent, is a positive feature. At *Rh.* 3.2.1404b.35–7, with reference to the prose diction (λέξις τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων), Aristotle repeats the lesson: if one composes his speech well, there will be something effortlessly exotic about it and yet its meaning will be clear (ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέξεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ), because such is the virtue of good rhetorical diction (αὕτη δ᾽ ἦν ἡ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή). All this, however, must be done in moderation, without the speaker actually seeming to be doing it (λανθάνειν): key to Aristotle's theory of verbal communication is effortless clarity and intelligibility (σαφήνεια).[110] Clarity and intelligibility, in turn, strike at the core of Aristotle's notion of ἑλληνίζειν ('to speak correct Greek'):[111] unlike his disciple Theophrastus of Eresus (371–287 BCE), who would make clarity a separate virtue of style in his quadripartite theory (Theophr. fr. 684 Fortenbaugh = Cic. *Orat.* 79), in

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[109] For τὸ ξενικόν in Aristotle, see Kotarcic (2021, 82–4).

[110] This also has an anthropological reason: cf. *Rh.* 3.10.1410b.10–3: τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥᾳδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσίν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλῶτται ἀγνῶτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν (see also *Top.* 140a.5 πᾶν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς τὸ μὴ εἰωθός).

[111] It is with Aristotle that, for the first time, ἑλληνίζειν acquires a prescriptive nuance: not simply 'to speak Greek' (like e.g. in Thucydides) but 'to speak correct Greek'. On the semantic evolution of ἑλληνίζειν, see Casevitz (1991). Cf. also Chapter 4, Section 4.3.

Aristotle, ἑλληνισμός is not yet distinct from σαφήνεια.[112] At *Po.* 22.1458a.22–3, we were told that an excessive use of γλῶσσαι leads to βαρβαρισμός, which for Aristotle, together with σολοικίζειν, is the polar opposite of ἑλληνίζειν.[113] This is clearly spelled out in Arist. *S.E.* 165b.20–1, where the fourth aim of a contentious argument (the first three being refutation, fallacy, and paradox) is σολοικίζειν ποιεῖν – that is, to make the opponent commit a solecism, where solecism is defined as 'to induce the answerer to βαρβαρίζειν (i.e. to speak ungrammatically) as a result of the argument' (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον).[114]

Aristotle gives a positive definition of ἑλληνίζειν not in the *Poetics* but in the *Rhetoric*:

> *Rh.* 3.5.1407a.19–b10: ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις [. . .] δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. τρίτον μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις [. . .] τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διῄρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη· [. . .] πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ [καὶ ὀλίγα: del. Kassel] καὶ ἓν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν.

> The foundation of diction is to speak correct Greek: this consists of five parts: first, the use of connecting particles; [. . .] second, to employ specific, and not generic terms. Third, to avoid ambiguous terms [. . .]. Fourth, as Protagoras did, to distinguish among the genders – masculine, feminine, and neuter. [. . .] Fifth, [by observing the number], to correctly use the plural and the singular.

It is important to observe that of the five criteria that Aristotle mentions, only the first (correct use of connectives), together with the fourth and fifth (correct agreement of gender and number), are strictly grammatical, whereas the second and third criteria (use of appropriate vocabulary and avoidance of ambiguity) are related to style in general and to the (for Aristotle) overriding principle of clarity in particular.[115] This alerts us to an important caveat: we should be cautious before identifying ἑλληνισμός with that which in contemporary linguistics is typically called 'standard language'. As observed by Clackson (2015a, 309), the Greek term ἑλληνισμός covered 'a wider range of linguistic varieties' than those included by

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112 See Siebenborn (1976, 24); Pagani (2015, 804).

113 For σολοικισμός as the negation of speaking correct Greek, see *S.E.* 182a.14: οὐκ ἂν δοκοίη ἑλληνίζειν.

114 In this passage, Aristotle seems somehow not yet to fully differentiate, as the later grammatical tradition will do, starting with Diogenes of Babylon (D.L. 7.59 = Diog.Bab.Stoic. fr. 24 *SVF* III), between barbarism (a phonetic, prosodic, or morphological error limited to the single word) and solecism (syntactical error): see Sandri (2020, 19–27). It should, however, be noted that at Arist. *S. E.* 173b.17–174a.16, all examples of solecism given by Aristotle are instances of syntactical inaccuracy (that is, 'solecism' proper in the later grammatical tradition).

115 Cf. Schenkeveld (1994, 281); Pagani (2015, 803–4).

the modern standards of linguistic normativity (our concept of 'correct use of a given language'). Just as for the other 'virtues' of style (clarity, appropriateness, etc.), the criteria employed to define ἑλληνισμός were, for the ancients, as much stylistic (read rhetorical) as they were grammatical.

As for the γραμματική, the Hellenistic period saw an intense debate about the true nature of ἑλληνισμός, involving philologists, grammarians, and philosophers alike.[116] Treatment of the full range of opinions proposed by ancient scholars on ἑλληνισμός lies beyond the scope of the present chapter.[117] Just as we have seen for the γραμματική, the theoretical reflection on ἑλληνισμός offered a wide palette of interpretative possibilities: from the radical view of Heraclides Criticus (probably dating to the third quarter of the 3rd century BCE), who denied any specifically linguistic reality underlying the concept of 'speaking good Greek', limiting it to mere ethnic descent,[118] to a certain Pausimachus (ca. 200 BCE),[119] an advocate of a euphonic theory of diction according to which the peak of ἑλληνισμός is found not in word-choice (ὀνομασία) or composition (σύνθεσις) but in sound (ἦχος).[120] Both Heraclides and Pausimachus represented minority positions, which will leave no

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116 On ἑλληνισμός in Alexandrian scholarship (before the advent of a systematic theorisation of the concept within grammatical and rhetorical studies), see Sandri (2020, 6–8); Pagani (2015, esp. 806–14).

117 The most detailed and up-to-date treatment is that by Pagani (2015).

118 Cf. Heracl.Crit. *BNJ*² 369A F 3.2: Ἕλληνες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν τῷ γένει καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἑλληνίζουσιν ἀφ' Ἕλληνος ('So Hellenes are those who are descended from Hellen and speak the Hellenic language inherited from Hellen') and F 3.5: ἡ δὲ καλουμένη νῦν Ἑλλὰς λέγεται μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐστί. τὸ γὰρ ἑλληνίζειν ἐγὼ εἶναί φημι οὐκ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ γένει τῆς φωνῆς. αὕτη <δ'> ἐστὶν ἀφ' Ἕλληνος ἡ δὲ Ἑλλὰς ἐν Θετταλίαι κεῖται. ἐκείνους οὖν ἐροῦμεν τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατοικεῖν καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἑλληνίζειν ('What is presently called Greece is a word, but not a reality, for I maintain that 'to hellenize' or 'speak Greek' is not a matter of correct pronunciation but concerns the language's descent'; all translations are after McInerney 2019). On Heraclides' particular take on ἑλληνισμός, see Ucciardello (2012, 28) with previous literature.

119 Pausimachus is the author of a treatise whose content is summarised and criticised by Philodemus in *Po.* 1–2; the possible title of this treatise may have been *On the Elements of Diction* (Περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῆς λέξεως): see Janko (2020, 143–4).

120 Pausimachus fr. 46 Janko (= Philod. *Po.* 2.180.20–181.1 Janko): τὰ μὲν [γὰ]ρ (ὀνόματα) ἀνομ-[οί]ως θεωρεῖ[ται] ἕ[νεκα τῶν ὑπ]οκειμένων, [τὰ] δὲ κα[τ]ὰ τὸν ἦχον, ἀνέσει καὶ [ἐ]πιτάσει καὶ προσπνε[ύ]σει καὶ ψιλότητι καὶ ἐ[κτ]άσει καὶ συσ[το]λ[ῆι καὶ] προθέσει καὶ πτώσει· [ὧ]ν πάντων ὀρθῶς πλ[ε]κομένων ἑλλην[ισ]μὸς ἀποτελεῖται, καὶ ἁρμογή τις ἐστὶ τούτων κτλ. ('For some [words] are regarded anomalous because of their sense, others according to their sound, with lax and tense accents, aspiration and lack thereof, lengthening and shortening [of vowels], prefixation and change of ending. When all these things [that is, both sense and sound] are correctly interwoven, pure Greek is produced and there is a kind of attunement of them, etc.'; transl. after Janko 2020, 569); cf. also fr. 56 (= Philod. *Po.*1.100.7–15) and fr. 58 (= *Po.* 2.185.13–26) Janko (the latter with a comparison between βαρβαρίζειν and ἑλληνίζειν).

enduring legacy behind them. Nonetheless, they help us to understand that the cultural and linguistic 'reality' underlying 'speaking correct Greek' was a hotly contested domain. We shall therefore limit ourselves here to the conclusions reached by the detailed survey offered by Laura Pagani, which are worth quoting in full:

> ἑλληνισμός became a field of contention between different but interconnected constituencies, each with its own agenda to pursue but ultimately all sharing some common ground, historically and culturally, with each other: philologists aiming at reconstructing *and* interpreting literary texts (with Homer at the fore-front), rhetoricians looking for the most authoritative and effective way of speaking, philosophers investigating the ontological relationship between language and reality, 'grammarians' interested in specific linguistic phaenomena. Reflections on ἑλληνισμός in the early Hellenistic period embraced both poetry and prose, written and oral, and required a constant process of negotiation between different and at times mutually incompatible needs. (Pagani 2015, 848–9).

It is within this historical and cultural scenario that one crucial aspect (for our present inquiry) of the ancient reflection on ἑλληνισμός must be contextualised: ἑλληνισμός implied, for the Alexandrian scholars, a somewhat 'abstract' concept of Greek as language, a concept that included within it all its various dialectal forms without an *a priori* hierarchical order between them.[121] Thus, in the London scholia to Dionysios Thrax, we read the following:

> Schol. D.T. (Lond.) *GG* 1,3.446.12–4: ἔστι δὲ ἑλληνισμὸς λέξις ὑγιὴς καὶ ἀδιάστροφος λόγου μερῶν πλοκὴ κατάλληλος κατὰ τὴν παρ' ἑκάστοις ὑγιῆ καὶ γνησίαν διάλεκτον.

> ἑλληνισμός is appropriate speech and correct in the congruent construction of the parts of speech, according to the appropriate and native dialect respectively. (Translation by Clackson 2015a, 316).

Conformity to local dialectal usage (κατάλληλος κατὰ τὴν παρ' ἑκάστοις ὑγιῆ καὶ γνησίαν διάλεκτον) was not only tolerated but expected: this openness to local variations (and generic too: for Aristarchus' view that Homeric language represented the peak of ἑλληνισμός, see Chapter 7 Section 3.3) clearly reveals that the notion of 'correctness', at least in the Hellenistic period, was relatively loose. It admitted, to say the least, a certain relativisation: what is correct in one context might not be so in a different locality. This absence of an internal hierarchy between the Greek dialects is also apparent in Diogenes of Babylon's definition of διάλεκτος:[122]

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121 Important observations à propos are in Clackson (2015a, 314–7).
122 Cf. also above Section 3.2 n. 99.

> Diog.Bab.Stoic. fr. 20 *SVF* III (= D.L. 7.56): διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἐθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς, ἢ λέξις ποταπή, τουτέστι ποιὰ κατὰ διάλεκτον, οἷον κατὰ μὲν τὴν Ἀτθίδα θάλαττα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἰάδα ἡμέρη.

> A dialect is a form of speech characterised as *ethnic* and *Greek*, or a form of speech *from a certain place*, that has a certain quality according to a dialect, as, for instance, θάλαττα according to the Attic [dialect] and ἡμέρη according to the Ionic [dialect].

This passage is often taken by modern scholarship to be the first 'modern' attestation of the equivalence διάλεκτος = regional/ethnic dialect. It is worth noting that the Attic dialect is not considered superior to Ionic: all are forms of acceptable Greek.

According to Clackson (2015a, 316), it is within this understanding of dialectal variation that Diogenes' definition of ἑλληνισμός, (by now, one of the five virtues of speech together with clarity, concision, propriety, and elevation) must be understood (D.L. 7.59 = Diog.Bab.Stoic. fr. 24 *SVF* III): ἑλληνισμὸς μὲν οὖν ἐστι φράσις ἀδιάπτωτος ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ ('ἑλληνισμός is thus faultless speech according to expert and non-ordinary usage'). In Diogenes, 'correctness' does indeed require a lack of grammatical mistakes (morphological or syntactical) and must have as its benchmark not the ordinary linguistic usage of low-bred people but the 'competent' usage of well-educated Greeks (ἐν τῇ τεχνικῇ καὶ μὴ εἰκαίᾳ συνηθείᾳ). However, *pace* Clackson, correctness of expression is not explicitly linked here to the notion that each dialect has its own ἑλληνισμός, and the two strands (dialectology and 'correctness') tend to be two separate constituencies.[123]

We return to Diogenes' definition of διάλεκτος, abstract and anachronistic as this view may seem to us: be this as it may, for the Stoic philosopher the Attic dialect was then no better or more prestigious than Aeolic or Doric. In the sections that follow, we shall have to keep this constantly in mind: 'correctness' in the Hellenistic reflection on language was strikingly different from the later notion of correctness in Imperial times, often linked as it was to a specific dialectal variety (Attic) thought to embody the most prestigious and cultivated realisation of the Greek language.[124] Both Alexandrian scholars and Atticists used several different methods as criteria to identify language correctness: both resorted to etymology, analogy, observation of the usage (συνήθεια), and range of linguistic and

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123 This does not mean, of course, that in the treatises on correctness one cannot find a tolerant attitude to dialectal variation. This is attested also in the first treatises περὶ ἑλληνισμοῦ of the Roman era: see Hintzen (2011) and Pagani (2014a, 248–50) on Philoxenus, Tryphon, and Seleucus.
124 Cf. Chapter 3, Section 6. Embryonic traces of this attitude can be seen in Minucius Pacatus Irenaeus (1st century CE): see Pagani (2014a, 252–3); Matthaios (2020a, 367–8) (= Matthaios 2015b, 291–2).

stylistic variations within a single author or a literary genre. Philologists and grammarians thus used similar sets of criteria but in different ways: the former had the edition and interpretation of texts as their primary goal, whereas the latter were concerned with the minute details of phonological, morphological, and lexical 'correctness' to help would-be orators to enhance their social capital. For the philologist, συνήθεια meant, above all, the linguistic usage of a given author, and hence παράδοσις referred primarily to its textual transmission; for the grammarian, συνήθεια instead meant mostly contemporary educated linguistic usage, while παράδοσις designated the literary tradition broadly conceived.[125] These two traditions, for the most part, followed separate trajectories, but some intersections were unavoidable, and the tension between these two approaches to συνήθεια and παράδοσις permeates both Hellenistic and Imperial scholarship.[126] With these premises, we shall now turn to the early phase of Alexandrian scholarship on language, in its oscillation between spoken vernaculars and literature.

4 The roots of scholarship at Alexandria: Lexicography between literature and vernaculars

In the following sections, the focus will be on the earliest stages of lexicographical studies, spanning from the second half of the 4th to the first half of the 3rd century BCE. Dialectal interest in the contemporary spoken varieties of Greek and attention to the literary heritage play an equally important role in this early phase of erudite scholarship on Greek language; and the former is frequently brought to bear upon the latter, as we shall presently see. Attention to dialects in early Alexandrian scholarship was not strictly normative (there was no explicit prestige hierarchy among dialectal variants): Philitas, Simmias, Zenodotus, and Callimachus describe and collect evidence rather than prescribe the 'correct form'.[127] In this sense, the Aristotelian tradition, with its encompassing approach to λέξις, remains a significant point of reference, both in theory and in practice. The geopolitical centre had however shifted from Athens to Alexandria and its sphere of influence: Cos (Philitas), Rhodes (Simmias), and

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125 A clear survey of the analogies and differences of these two traditions can be found in Sluiter (1990, 60).

126 See Pagani (2015, 841–4); Schenkeveld (1994, 287); Siebenborn (1976, 27–31; 85–9).

127 See Consani (1991, 31–2). Consani appears to limit the possible source of dialectal information to written texts of the literary canon, particularly given the Alexandrians' interest in orthography. However, attention to orthography need not be considered mutually exclusive of a concomitant interest in contemporary diatopic variants: the written medium of communication partly explains *per se* the attention to orthography.

Cyrene (Callimachus, Eratosthenes) were important cultural hubs gravitating around Alexandria, with Cos and Rhodes at the centre of the Ptolemies' international ambitions.[128] This new international dimension is, to some extent, mirrored in the wide range of linguistic interests present in these early lexicographical writings.

Finally, given that in the following sections of this chapter (and in Chapter 7) we shall be dealing with a body of evidence that is extremely fragmentary, several preliminary caveats concerning the dynamics of transmission of our texts are in order:

(1) Unlike Aristophanes' Λέξεις, an unparalleled case of a Hellenistic lexicographical collection preserved through both direct and indirect tradition (see more in detail Chapter 7, Section 2.1), no unabridged treatise or lexicographical writing of the Hellenistic period (on the Attic dialect or any other dialect) has been directly transmitted to us. We must thus rely on more or less substantial quotations or paraphrases found in later works of various character: miscellaneous literary collections (such as that of Athenaeus, himself compiling from a large array of previous sources), lexicographical, etymological, or other erudite works of the Roman, Late Antique, and Byzantine periods, handed down through papyri and Medieval MSS (many of whom are still in need of a reliable modern edition). Despite their relationships to one another, these compilations may be seen as stand-alone works produced by scholars and erudite scribes in specific cultural milieux.

Let us clarify this point with one specific example, representative of the various chains of abridgement with which one must reckon while consulting these later sources: the relationship between Athenaeus and Hesychius, two of the most frequently quoted sources in Chapters 6 and 7. We know that both ultimately rely on Pamphilus' encyclopedic *Lexicon* (Περὶ γλωσσῶν ἤτοι λέξεων, first half of the 1st century CE) in 95 books, alphabetically arranged and partially compiled by an otherwise unknown Zopyrion (cf. *Su.* π 142).[129] This monumental work soon underwent several epitomisations: Iulius Vestinus (first half of the 2nd century CE) is credited with the 64-book collection entitled Ἑλληνικὰ ὀνόματα (*Greek Nouns*) derived from Pamphilus.[130] At approximately the same time, Diogenianus compiled the Λέξις παντοδαπή (*Expressions of Any Kind*) in five books and its later revision entitled Περιεργοπένητες (*Handbook for Those Without Means*?). It re-

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128 From the last decade of the 4th century BCE, Cos was the Ptolemies' major naval centre in the Mediterranean and their main bulwark in the ongoing rivalry with the Antigonids (Huss 2001, 171–2; 302–3); on the cultural life of Cos under the Ptolemies, see the handy and concise survey by Spanoudakis (2002, 28). On Rhodes as an intellectual powerhouse in Hellenistic times, see now Matijašić (2020, 21–31).

129 See Hatzimichali (2006, 22–51); Hatzimichali (2019).

130 Cf. Matthaios (2020a, 364–5) (= Matthaios 2015b, 289–90).

mains a topic for debate as to (i) whether Diogenianus relied on Pamphilus directly or through Vestinus' epitome and (ii) whether Περιεργοπένητες is a later augmented or shorter version of the first collection.[131] Hesychius' *Lexicon* (around 500 CE), known to us in an epitomised redaction, is mainly based on Diogenianus' Περιεργοπένητες. In turn, Athenaeus also used Pamphilus' dictionary (sometimes he simply refers to it with ὥς φησι Πάμφιλος, in other instances he inconsistently quoted his work as ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ὀνομάτων, Περὶ γλωσσῶν καὶ ὀνομάτων, which may also be titles of selected chapters of his work). Furthermore, to complicate the matter even further, we cannot rule out the possibility that, in some passages, Athenaeus also made use of Didymus through Pamphilus. We shall thus have to bear in mind the possibility of alternative scenarios, depending on the different stages of transmission one tries to reconstruct.

(2) The broader loss of these collections on dialectal varieties (among which the Attic) makes our picture quite partial and often prevents us from properly assessing how the methodological premises underlying these Hellenistic collections were perceived and conceivably partly reshaped by later users according to their different evaluative and ideological parameters.

(3) As we have just seen, many of our extant repertoires have been preserved only in the form of epitomes and manipulated excerpta – that is, a material that is textually highly unstable from one copy to the next. Consequently, any attempt to identify the boundaries of the quotations of previous authors, their original context, the inner arrangement of the material (organised by alphabetical order or by semantic groups?), and the way in which it was reshaped by later sources is difficult, and certainty is rarely within reach. Likewise, commented editions of the fragmentary evidence of several grammarians are still a desideratum. Space constraints prevent us from providing fully fledged editions of the fragments under scrutiny, for which we shall mainly limit ourselves to the standard texts of reference.

(4) Scholia and learned works usually quoted earlier sources by assembling what scholarly jargon calls *Zitatennest* ('a nest of quotations'): it is thus likely that when Roman or Late antique authors quoted a long list of authorities, they relied directly only on the latest quoted work, in which they probably found the previous references. Hence the overall picture may become somehow misleading, because the material provided by earlier sources is mediated through a *Mittelquelle* in which the original fragment might have undergone additional rearrangements. The apparent carelessness of these sometimes crowded clusters of quotations is

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131 See further Hatzimichali (2006, 45–51).

thus partially attributable to their tortuous transmission and to the mixture of direct and indirect usage of material.[132]

(5) In several instances, the survival of a lexicographical doctrine, although deprived of the relevant scholar's name, is guaranteed by its overlap with items that are usually identical in content and form, preserved in later strands of the lexicographical tradition, sometimes of different nature and scope.

(6) Other thorny questions involve the reliability of the titles and the self-consistency of these collections of glosses: in some instances, the bio-bibliographical tradition (mainly represented by entries in the *Suda*), preserves multiple titles attributed to the same work or subheadings of a larger collection.[133] In some cases, we are not entitled to assume that titles such as Ἀττικαὶ φωναί or Ἀττικαὶ λέξεις represented stand-alone works contained in book-rolls with independent circulation. Rather, they may represent sub-sections of larger works, such as the treatises on dialects or more general onomastic repertoires, which were copied in a single bookroll as part of a set of multiple *volumina* and eventually recorded as independent headings in the pinacographical tradition.[134]

With the above in mind, let us now address our extant evidence, beginning with the Peripatetic tradition.

4.1 The Peripatetic tradition

That the discussion of γλῶσσαι as a category of stylistic discourse was still very much a hot topic, liable to refinements and modifications, in the literary circles of Ptolemaic Egypt at the end of the 3rd century BCE, has been confirmed by the publication of P.Hamb. II.128 (= TM 62832), an anonymous *Ars poetica* dated to the end of the 3rd century BCE, with interesting similarities to and differences from Aristotle's *Poetics*. In particular, Schenkeveld has plausibly argued that fr. (a) col. i.33–7 is a section on γλῶσσα (as opposed to ὄνομα κύριον), that incorporates, unlike Aristotle, several observations on synonyms.[135] This indicates that the debate surrounding the elements that were distinctive of a γλῶσσα was ongoing.

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132 For the *Zitatennest* technique a classic example is that of Harpocration's lexicon. Harpocration is likely to have consulted directly only Didymus, while other earlier sources were probably quoted through the intermediation of Didymus, who therefore is a *Mittelquelle*.

133 Cf. e.g. the case of Aristophanes' Λέξεις in Chapter 7, Sections 2.1 and 2.2.

134 On the book titles and the pinacographical tradition, see D. Caroli (2007, 61–79).

135 Schenkeveld (1993, 69).

A specific lexicographical and glossographical interest after Aristotle within the Peripatetic school is only sporadically attested but nonetheless confirms the master's enduring influence.[136] Two names stand out in our sources: Clearchus of Soli (born before 340 BCE), with his Γλῶτται (Clearch. frr. 111–2 Wehrli = frr. 124–5 Dorandi–White)[137] and Heraclides Ponticus (ca. 390–320 BCE) with his Περὶ ὀνο-μάτων (Heraclid.Pont. fr. 22 Wehrli). Evidence for the latter is not unambiguous: the title of the work Περὶ ὀνομάτων (and nothing more) is preserved in Diogenes Laer-tius' lists of works by Heraclides (D.L. 5.87); the title is sandwiched between ἠθικά and διάλογοι, a collocation that may suggest not a lexicographical work proper but rather one on ὀρθοέπεια ('correctness of diction').[138] The case of Clearchus rests on more solid ground. In Clearch. fr. 111 Wehrli (= fr. 124 Dorandi–White)[139] we are told that Rhianus (born around the first third of the 3rd century BCE) and Aristophanes of Byzantium read εὐηφενέων ('wealthy') vs the vulgate εὐηγενέων ('noble') and that Clearchus also knew this variant and etymologised it in his Γλῶτται with εὖ τῷ ἀφένει χρωμένων ('using nobly their wealth'). In this sense, Clearchus' interest in Homeric exegesis is perfectly in line with Aristotle's own interest in Homer. Clearchus' second gloss (without specific attribution to the Γλῶτται) – that is, Clearch. fr. 112 Wehrli (= fr. 125 Dorandi–White) – deals with a sacrificial vessel, λοιβάσιον.[140]

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136 Fragments with lexicographical and glossographical features (interest in unidiomatic use of words and *Dialektwörter*) in Aristotle's Πολιτεῖαι are collected by Dettori (2000, 41 n. 121). Evidence for the explanation of words within the Peripatetic school can be found in Dettori (2000, 40 n. 120).

137 Both fragments are dubious according to Wehrli, but see the detailed, persuasive defence by Matthaios (2005).

138 See Dettori (2000, 40 with n. 116); Ippolito (2009) is sceptic. Matthaios (2005, 74) is more optimistic.

139 Clearch. fr. 111 Wehrli = fr. 124 Dorandi–White (= schol. [Did.] Hom. *Il.* 23.81a [A]): {τείχει ὑπὸ Τρώων} <εὐηγενέων·> ἐν τῇ Ῥιανοῦ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνους εὐηφενέων διὰ τοῦ <φ>, εὖ τῷ ἀφένει χρωμένων, ὡς Κλέαρχος (codd.: Κλείταρχος Schweighäuser) ἐν ταῖς Γλώτταις ("'Under the wall of the noble (εὐηγενέων) Trojans': in the [edition] of Rhianus (fr. 11 Leurini) also Aristophanes [of Byzantium: Slater (1986, 111)] reads εὐηφενέων ('wealthy') with the φ, that is, using their wealth nobly, just as Clearchus in his Γλῶτται'; the context is Patroclus' prophecy of Achilles' death). Matthaios (2005, 61–8; see also 51 nn. 21–2) has forcefully shown that Schweighäuser's emenda-tion Κλείταρχος must be rejected: the glossographer Cleitarchus of Aegina (3rd/2nd or 2nd century BCE) was interested only in *Dialektwörter*, most often preserved through spoken vernaculars with-out a literary tradition behind them; there is no evidence that Cleitarchus dealt with literary texts and their exegesis; cf. also Dettori (2020b).

140 Clearch. fr. 112 Wehrli = fr. 125 Dorandi–White (= Ath. 11.486a): λοιβάσιον· κύλιξ, ὥς φησι Κλείταρχος καὶ Νίκανδρος ὁ Θυατειρηνός, ᾧ τὸ ἔλαιον ἐπισπένδουσι τοῖς ἱεροῖς, σπονδεῖον δὲ ᾧ τὸν οἶνον, καλεῖσθαι λέγων καὶ λοιβίδας τὰ σπονδεῖα ὑπὸ Ἀντιμάχου τοῦ Κολοφωνίου ('λοιβά-σιον: A κύλιξ, as Cleitarchus (Clitarch. *BNJ*[2] 343 F 16) and Nicander of Thyateira (Nicand.Hist. *BNJ*[2] 343 F 16) say, in which they pour oil for sacrifices, while a σπονδεῖον is the type in which they pour wine, although he says that σπονδεῖα are called λοιβίδες by Antimachus of Colophon

The term λοιβάσιον is rare: its only literary attestation is in Epich. fr. 69.2 (= Ath. 8.362b–c), from the comedy Θεαροί. The origin of the suffix -άσιον remains obscure, as does its function (a diminutive value is attested with certainty only for κοράσιον); it appears to have enjoyed a certain spread in northwest Doric, yet besides its occurrence in Epicharmus, one cannot detect anything specifically Doric about this term.[141] As Matthaios has shown, both of Clearchus' fragments (frr. 111 and 112 Wehrli) attest to a linguistic practice that was perfectly aligned with Aristotle's definition of and interest in glosses.[142]

4.2 Philitas of Cos and Simmias of Rhodes

Moving beyond the Peripatetic school, it is the poet and scholar Philitas of Cos (born ca. 340 BCE), teacher of Zenodotus (Philit. test. 10 Dettori = test. 15 Spanoudakis), who is traditionally considered to be the founder of Hellenistic lexicographical studies, putting them on a more rigorous footing compared to the lexical exegesis practised by the contemporary γλωσσογράφοι.[143] A native of the Doric island of Cos, Philitas arrived at Alexandria ca. 305–300 BCE to serve as tutor (διδάσκαλος) to the future king Ptolemy II Philadelphus. His involvement in the project of the Alexandrian Library and Museum is possible and even likely, but there is no direct evidence of any official role.[144] The nature and aim of Philitas' major lexicographical work, the Ἄτακτοι γλῶσσαι, remains largely unclear (a combination of both exegetical help and a repertoire of recondite words for his own literary production? or a collection more oriented to merely documenting local linguistic varieties without exegetical aims?), as does the

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(Antim. fr. 26 Matthews: on Nicander of Thyateira, see Chapter 7, Section 4.3); translation after Sickinger 2018). Kaibel posited a lacuna after Θυατειρηνός: for the unnecessary nature of this intervention, see now Matthaios (2005, 48–9 n. 8).

141 See Chantraine (1933, 75). Plutarch (*Aem.* 33.3, *Marcell.* 2.8) mentions a λοιβεῖον, used like the λοιβάσιον for pouring libations of olive oil (cf. Poll. 10.65). It may be observed that the term κοράσιον, stigmatised by Atticists as ξενικόν (see e.g. Phot. π 26 = Ael.Dion. π 2; cf. also Poll. 2.17: τὸ γὰρ κοράσιον εἴρηται μέν, ἀλλὰ εὐτελές and Phryn. *Ecl.* 50: τὸ δὲ κοράσιον παράλογον), is deemed to be of Macedonian origin in schol. (ex.) Hom. *Il.* 20.404c (T).

142 Matthaios (2005, 69–70).

143 Recent critical surveys of Philitas' lexicographical interests can be found in Tosi (1994a, 142–6); Montana (2020b, 142–3) (= Montana 2015, 71–2); Matthaios (2014b, 505–6, 517–8); Dettori (2021). The best and most detailed treatment of Philitas' grammatical and lexical activity remains Dettori (2000) (with some updates in Dettori 2021); cf. also Spanoudakis (2002, 347–403). On the elementary methodology of the γλωσσογράφοι (mostly an autoschediastic interpretation of lexical items on the basis of their immediate context, the so-called ἐν καθ᾽ ἑνός principle, a limited use of etymology and dialects), see Dettori (2019, 16–21).

144 See Spanoudakis (2002, 28).

meaning of its title.[145] Suffice it here to say that Philitas' collection of unusual words was probably not ordered alphabetically, and its ἄτακτος character may simply imply that the glosses did not refer to a single given text (or to a homogeneous group of texts) from which they were taken.[146] What is certain is that Philitas' work showed the three main different strands of early Hellenistic lexicography already unified:[147] explanation of Homeric glosses;[148] a marked interest in dialectal words (and their underlying realia); and technical expressions. For our purposes, it is important to emphasise that Philitas drew his glosses from *both* literary sources and spoken vernaculars (other than Attic), with an apparent predilection for the latter.[149] His interests were not only literature-oriented but also embraced a historic-antiquarian dimension, with particular attentiveness for the rural, agrarian world (unless this impression is not irremediably skewed by the fact that the majority of his glosses come, for us, from Athenaeus). In this sense, it may well be that productions by contemporary local historians, now mostly lost, were an important source of Philitas' grammatical work.[150]

Philitas' dialectal glosses include words from Aeolic (Philit. fr. 7 Dettori = fr. 35 Spanoudakis σκάλλιον, a small libation cup), Argive (fr. 9 Dettori = fr. 37 Spanoudakis κρήϊον,[151] a type of nuptial bread cake), Boeotian (fr. 5 Dettori = fr. 33 Spanoudakis πέλλα, a type of κύλιξ), Cypriot (fr. 2 Dettori = fr. 30 Spanoudakis ἄωτον, some sort of drinking ware), Cyrenean (fr. 4 Dettori = fr. 21 Spanoudakis δῖνος, a foot-

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145 For an updated overview of the different interpretations advanced by modern scholarship, see Dettori (2021) with previous bibliography; cf. also Montana (2020b, 142–3 n. 33) (= Montana 2015, 72–3 and n. 33).

146 Tosi (1994a, 148–9) has argued that the Ἄτακτοι γλῶσσαι may have had some sort of sub-grouping based on formal features as in P.Hibeh II.172 (= TM 65730), a mid-3rd century BCE poetic onomasticon or 'genre lexicon' (a list of epithets mainly from epic, choral, and tragic poetry, organised in families linked not by semantic but formal features; each family is alphabetically ordered). This may be the case, but the typology of P.Hibeh (probably a school text: cf. Esposito 2009, 260) significantly weakens the cogency of the comparison.

147 See Alpers (2001, 195).

148 Dettori (2000, 30–1) somewhat over-minimises Philitas' contribution to Homeric studies: see Kerkhecker (2004, 302).

149 Dettori (2000, 21 n. 52 and 36–7) with previous bibliography; of particular significance is the fact that Philitas often offers an altogether different meaning for the words that are also attested in the literary tradition. For a different but less persuasive view, see Spanoudakis (2002, 388–90), who emphasises instead the role of written, literary sources (mostly comedy).

150 The importance of *Lokalhistoriker* for early Hellenistic glossography was already highlighted by Latte (1925, 148–53).

151 This is the (not unproblematic) reading of Athenaeus' MS A at 14.645d. Kaibel's emendation κηρίον (on the basis of Hsch. κ 2546: κηρίον· τὸ τῶν μελισσῶν. καὶ εἶδος πλακοῦντος) remains equally unsatisfactory: see Dettori (2000, 88–9); Spanoudakis (2002, 363).

washing basin), Lesbian (fr. 14 Dettori = fr. 42 Spanoudakis ὑποθυμίς, a twig of myr-tle with violets and other flowers intertwined around it), Megarean (fr. 3 Dettori = fr. 31 Spanoudakis γυάλα, a drinking vessel), Sicyonian (fr. 12 Dettori = fr. 40 Spa-noudakis ἴακχα, a well-perfumed garland), and Syracusan (fr. 10 Dettori = fr. 38 Spa-noudakis κύπελλον, remnants of barley cakes and bread left on the table).

Only three glosses can be traced back to a specific Attic context via their De-metriac cultic link: fr. 16 Dettori = fr. 44 Spanoudakis (= schol. Apoll.Rh. 4.982–92i) στάχυν ὄμπνιον,[152] rendered by Philitas with the hendiadys εὔχυλον καὶ τρόφιμον ('a juicy and nourishing ear-corn'). The adjective ὄμπνιος, mainly used as an epi-thet of Demeter or, by extension, applied to agricultural produce, is well docu-mented in Attic literature (Soph. fr. 246 ὀμπνίου νέφους, significantly from the *Theseus*; Moschion *TrGF* 97 F 6.9 καρποῦ [. . .] ὀμπνίου) and has a handful of epi-graphic attestations in Attica.[153] Fr. 17 Dettori = fr. 45 Spanoudakis (= *Et.Gud.* 248.13) ἀχαιά: within a discussion of the term as Attic epiclesis of Demeter (Ἀχαιά· ἡ Δημήτηρ παρὰ Ἀττικοῖς) we are informed that Philitas said that also female field labourers are called ἀχαιαί ([. . .] ἢ ὡς Φιλητᾶς, τὰς ἐρίθους ἀχαιάς ἐκάλουν). Fr. 18 Dettori = fr. 46 Spanoudakis (= Hsch. δ 3417) ἄμαλλα 'sheaf, bundle of ears of corns (δράγματα)': the mention, in Hesychius' entry, of Sophocles' *Triptolemos* (Soph. fr. 607) and of the 3rd-century BCE antiquarian Ister (*BNJ* 334 F 62) guaran-tees the word's Attic pedigree (on Ister, see Chapter 7, section 4.1). Dettori (2000) has provided a thorough commentary on these three Attic glosses, and his conclu-sions need not be repeated here in any detail. For us, it is sufficient to note that even if ὄμπνιος and its derivates occupy a specific place in later Atticist lexicogra-phy (Paus.Gr. ο 16 = Phot. ο 318 with reference to Athenian sacrificial cakes of meal and honey: Ἀθηναῖοι ὅτ᾽ ἂν τὸν νεών ἰδρύωνται πυροὺς μέλιτι δεύσαντες, ἐμβαλόντες εἰς καδίσκον, εἶθ᾽ οὕτως ἐπιθέντες τὸ ἱερεῖον, συντελοῦσι τὰ ἐξῆ κτλ.), as apparently also ἄμαλλα (cf. Philem. (Vindob.) 393.11: ἀμάλας <λέγουσιν Ἀττι-κῶς>, οὐ δράγματα, and Ael.Dion. α 91), nothing in Philitas frr. 16–8 Dettori leads us to suppose that Attic enjoyed a privileged status within Philitas' glossographi-cal work. The Attic dialect and antiquarian customs were, for him, as worthy of investigation as those of any other Greek dialect.

A collection of glosses in three books (*Su.* σ 431: ἔγραψε Γλώσσας βιβλία γʹ) is also attested for the poet and scholar Simmias[154] of Rhodes (4th–3rd century BCE), a

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152 Dettori (2000, 121–3) rightly argues for the status of gloss of the whole syntagm στάχυν ὄμπν-ιον, not only of the adjective ὄμπνιον.

153 For the inscriptional evidence, see Dettori (2000, 122 with n. 370). It is not likely that Phili-tas may have used this word in his own *Demeter*, as observed by both Dettori (2000, 123) and Spanoudakis (2002, 370).

154 For the spelling of the name with two μ instead of one, see Dettori (2019, 344).

contemporary of Philitas. This is, in itself, unsurprising: Simmias' poetic oeuvre, even if only scantily preserved, reveals an abundant use of obscure and rare words.[155] Only four glosses of his scholarly work survive, all transmitted by Athenaeus, possibly through Pamphilus.[156] Of these, only one deals with dialectal features, Simm. fr. 1 Dettori (= Ath. 7.327f) ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ γένος λίθου φάγρος· ἡ γὰρ ἀκόνη κατὰ Κρῆτας φάγρος, ὥς φησι Σιμμίας: according to Simmias φάγρος is the Cretan *terminus technicus* for the whetstone, ἀκόνη (in the other Greek dialects φάγρος denotes some kind of fish).[157] The source of this piece of dialectal lore is debated: Wilamowitz (1924, 112 n. 2) tentatively opted for a poetic source, yet spoken vernacular cannot be ruled out (cf. Latte 1925, 162–3). In fr. 2 Dettori (= Ath. 11.472e): κάδος. Σιμμίας ποτήριον, παρατιθέμενος Ἀνακρέοντος (Anacr. fr. 373.1–2 *PMG*)· ‘ἠρίστησα μὲν ἰτρίου λεπτοῦ <μικρὸν> ἀποκλάς, | οἴνου δ᾽ ἐξέπιον κάδον’,[158] Simmias evidently missed the point of Anacreon's hyperbolic expression (κάδος usually means ‘jug’, not ‘cup’)[159] and over-interpreted the poet's expression as evidence for an otherwise unattested semantic equivalence κάδος = ‘cup’. Even if Simmias' interpretation of κάδος is not defensible, fr. 2 is important in that it assures us that literary sources were also used in his glossographical work. Fr. 3 Dettori (= Ath. 11.479c): Σιμμίας δὲ ἀποδίδωσι τὴν κοτύλην ἄλεισον, tells us that Simmias glossed κοτύλη (‘cup’) with ἄλεισον. The synonymic couple δέπας/ἄλεισον on the basis of *Od.* 3.40–63 is well attested in Homeric exegesis (see Dettori 2019, 257), and it is likely that, here, as well, Simmias drew on a literary source that is now lost to us. In fr. 4 Dettori (= Ath. 15.677c), Τιμαχίδας (Timach.Rh. fr. 16 Matijašić) δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας οἱ Ῥόδιοι ἀποδιδόασιν ἓν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνός· Ἴσθμιον· στέφανον, the term Ἴσθμιον is glossed with the simple ‘garland’ (στέφανος). This fragment appears to reveal some common ground between Simmias' (and Timachidas') methodology and that of the Hellenistic γλωσσογράφοι much blamed by Aristarchus: Simmias also used the ‘one-for-one’ principle (ἓν ἀνθ᾽

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155 See Di Gregorio (2008, 54–9).

156 So Matthaios (2008, 580). The grammatical fragments of Simmias have been edited and commented on in detail by Dettori (2019, 394–423), to whom this section is heavily indebted. Kwapisz (2019, 18–26) provides a concise (but not entirely reliable: on Kwapisz' idiosyncratic interpretation of the principle ἓν ἀνθ᾽ἑνός at 21–3 see Dettori 2019, 346 n. 15) overview of Simmias' grammatical work.

157 Cf. also Eust. *in Od.* 2.103.5–7: πάντως δὲ καὶ ὁ κατὰ διάλεκτον Κρητῶν φάγρος ἡ ἀκόνη, ὡς ἱστορεῖ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ Σιμμίας. ἔργον γὰρ καὶ πάθος δὲ ἀκόνης τὸ φαγεῖν, ἐσθιούσης τε δηλαδὴ τὰ τριβόμενα καὶ ἐσθιομένης ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν.

158 ‘κάδος: Simmias [says that it is] a cup and quotes Anacreon (fr. 373.1–2 *PMG*): ‘I broke off a little piece of thin sesame-cake and had a meal, and I drank a κάδος of wine”.

159 As observed by Bernsdorff (2020 vol. 2, 520), the *pointe* of οἴνου δ᾽ ἐξέπιον κάδον is the ‘grotesquely disproportionate amount of wine-drinking’ (a whole jar) if compared with the meagre eating. For Simmias' misunderstanding of Anacreon's verse, see also Dettori (2019, 358–9).

ἑνός: i.e. the rather mechanical substitution of one word for another) in his interpretation of glosses, if we are to believe Athenaeus.[160] In this case, again, it is difficult to identify the precise source of Simmias: some scholars have suggested a possible *interpretatio Homerica* (*Od.* 18.300), but there are grounds for doubting this, since, in general, the gloss in Athenaeus is not centred on Homer.[161] All in all, Simmias' lexical interests are partially comparable to those of Philitas[162] (three of the four glosses deal with *realia*: but here again, the fact that the only source is Athenaeus may skew our perspective), but unlike the Coan scholar, Simmias' collection of glosses mentions specific literary sources (fr. 2), and the dialectal interest does not appear to be predominant (only fr. 1), unless this assessment has been dramatically distorted by the random process of survival of the available evidence.[163] The underlying aim of Simmias' collection of glosses remains equally unclear: perhaps partly an aid for poetic composition, partly an attempt at poetic exegesis, and possibly also a record of spoken vernaculars.[164]

4.3 Zenodotus of Ephesus and Agathocles of Cyzicus

Another important stepping stone in the development of Hellenistic lexicography, and again one about which we are unfortunately very poorly informed, must have been Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι. Zenodotus of Ephesus (ca. 330–260 BCE), the first director of the newly founded Alexandrian library and first 'editor' of Homer, was also the author of a collection of Γλῶσσαι that were alphabetically ordered (unlike that of his teacher Philitas). Only one fragment that is securely ascribable to his Γλῶσσαι survives, Zenod. fr. 1 Pusch (= schol. (Ariston.) Hom. *Od.* 3.444b.1): ἀμνίον· ἀγγεῖον εἰς ὃ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ ἱερείου ἐδέχοντο. (BHMᵃ) Ζηνόδοτος δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Δ Γλώσσαις τίθησι τὴν λέξιν. ἅπαξ δὲ ἐνταῦθα παρ᾽ Ὁμήρῳ ἡ λέξις ΗΜᵃ ('ἀμνίον: A vase in which [they] gathered the victim's blood. But Zenodotus lists the word in his Γλῶσσαι under the entries beginning with delta. This word is found only here in Homer'). In *Od.* 3.444, Nestor and Telemachus are about to offer a sacrifice to Athena, and 'Perseus was holding the bowl' (Περσεὺς δ᾽ ἀμνίον εἶχε in the vulgate), presumably to collect

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160 On the 'one for one' principle in ancient lexicography, see Dettori (2004); Matijašić (2020, 124).

161 See Dettori (2019, 247–50).

162 Thus, for instance, already Latte (1925, 162–3); Pfeiffer (1968, 89–90).

163 Dettori (2019, 345–6). On the other hand, it is hardly coincidental that both Philitas and Simmias were natives of islands (Cos and Rhodes) where the local Doric dialect of the Aegean area persistently opposed the spread of the koine well into Hellenistic times: Bubeník (1989, 94–8).

164 For the first hypothesis, see Latte (1925, 163); for the second, Matthaios (2014b, 518).

the blood of the sacrifice. The scholium quoted above informs us that Zenodotus in his Γλῶσσαι read, with a different word division, δάμνιον instead of the vulgate δ᾽ ἀμνίον; since he placed the word under the entries beginning with the letter δ, his Γλῶσσαι must have been alphabetically organised. The word δάμνιον is said by schol. (Hrd?) Hom. *Od.* 3.444f (HM[a]) to have also been known to Nicander (second half of the 2nd century BCE) and Theodoridas (second half of the 3rd century BCE; a Syracusan poet), both of whom derive it from δάμνασθαι.[165] We are not told explicitly in which sense they understood δάμνιον; however, since this piece of information comes immediately after the definition of ἀμνίον as τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ὑποσφάγματος, it is likely that they understood it in the 'traditional way', as a sacrificial bowl for collecting the blood of the animal. Otherwise, in extant Greek, the word δάμνιον is attested (in the plural) only in Hsch. δ 205: δάμνια· θύματα, σφάγια. The scholium to *Od.* 3.444b.1 does not specify which meaning Zenodotus ascribed to δάμνιον, but it is likely that Hesychius' *interpretamentum* ('sacrificial offerings') was intended to explain Zenodotus' reading.[166] How Zenodotus himself understood δάμνια, whether as 'vessel for the blood' or 'sacrificial offering', remains ultimately unclear.

All remaining ten fragments ascribed by Pusch to Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι are conjectural, since the title of Zenodotus' work is nowhere mentioned except, as we have seen, in fr. 1 Pusch: the rationale for such an ascription is that, since Zenodotus with all probability did not write commentaries (ὑπομνήματα), he must have dealt with longer textual and exegetical issues not in the marginal annotations of his ἔκδοσις but in his Γλῶσσαι.[167] The fragments collected by Pusch are as follows:

– fr. 2 Pusch = Porph. *Quaest. Hom.* 115.22–5 Sodano:[168] a semantic observation. Zenodotus apparently invented a non-existent bird named βότρυς to explain the adverb βοτρυδόν at *Il.* 2.89 βοτρυδὸν δὲ πέτονται (indicating, in reality, the bees' whirling flight in clusters: Pusch 1890, 193–4);

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165 Schol. (Hrd?) Hom. *Od.* 3.444f (~ Eust. *in Od.* 1.138.12–9): ἀμνίον· τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ὑποσφάγματος. Νίκανδρος [fr. 133 Schneider] δὲ καὶ Θεοδωρίδας [*SH* 747] ἀπὸ τοῦ 'δάμνασθαι' προφέρονται ἀσυνδέτως 'δάμνιον' κτλ. (HM[a]); on this scholium see below.

166 Pusch (1890, 192–3); Nickau (1977, 44 n. 7).

167 See already Pfeiffer (1968, 115); Nickau (1972, 39–40); Tosi (1994a, 151) and most recently Le Feuvre (2022, 29). This, however, is one possibility among others: lectures' notes taken by his pupils (cf. e.g. the case of Ptolemy Epithetes, 2nd century BCE, who in a monograph defended Zenodotus' Homeric textual choices against Aristarchus' criticism: see F. Montanari 1988, 83–5), oral transmission, or other *syntagmata* that have not come down to us. On the oral character of the ecdotic and exegetical work of the first Alexandrian philologists, cf. also Nickau (1977, 15–7).

168 Zenod. fr. 2 Pusch: θαυμάσαι δὲ ἔστι Ζηνόδοτον τὸ 'βοτρυδὸν' ἐκλαβόντα ἐοικότως βότρυϊ τῷ ὀρνέῳ, ὃ ἑαυτὸ συστρέφει ἐν τῇ πτήσει ('One wonders that Zenodotus understood βοτρυδόν as if it were similar to the bird βότρυς, which gathers itself together while flying').

- fr. 3 Pusch = schol. (Hrd.) Hom. *Il.* 1.567b1 (A):[169] a textual and interpretative issue (orthography and meaning). Zenodotus, like Aristarchus, read at *Il.* 1.567 ἀάπτους with smooth breathing but interpreted the adjective in the sense of 'strong' rather than 'undaunted' (Aristarchus' own explanation);
- fr. 4 Pusch = schol. (Hrd.) Hom. *Il* 13.450a[1] (A):[170] a textual and interpretative issue (word division and meaning). Zenodotus read at *Il.* 13.450 Κρήτη ἐπίουρον (and not Κρήτη ἔπι οὖρον, 'watcher over Krete') and interpreted the term (referring to Minos) in the sense of 'lord and protector' (βασιλέα καὶ φύλακα);
- fr. 5 Pusch = schol. (Hrd.) Hom. *Il.* 11.754 (A):[171] again, both a textual and interpretative issue (word division and meaning). Herodian quotes various authorities (Aristarchus, Crates, and Zenodotus) on the possible readings suggested for the sequence ΔΙΑΣΠΙΔΕΟΣΠΕΔΙΟΙΟ at *Il.* 11.754.[172] *Scriptio continua* enables two different segmentations: (i) δι' ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο (variously interpreted as 'through the shield-like (i.e. rounded) plain', or 'covered by shields'); (ii) διὰ σπιδέος πεδίοιο. Zenodotus, along with Crates, sided with (ii) and interpreted the adjective σπιδής (unattested) as synonymous with ἄπορος καὶ τραχύς ('impassable and harsh');
- fr. 6 Pusch = schol. (ex.) Hom. *Il.* 18.564 (T):[173] a semantic explanation. As argued by Pusch (1890, 196–7), Zenodotus must have commented not on the

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169 Zenod. fr. 3 Pusch: <ἀάπτους χεῖρας>· οὕτως ψιλῶς προενεκτέον· οὕτως δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος· ἤκουε δὲ τὰς δεινὰς καὶ ἀπτοήτους. ὁ δὲ Ζηνόδοτος καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμοίως τῷ πνεύματι, εἰς τὰς ἰσχυρὰς δὲ μετελάμβανεν ('<ἀάπτους χεῖρας>: One must pronounce so, with smooth breathing. So also Aristarchus; he understood '[hands] terrible and undaunted'. Zenodotus himself, like Aristarchus, had the same breathing as well but took the adjective to mean 'strong' (sc. hands)'). On Aristarchus' etymological interpretation of the adjective ἄαπτος as deriving from privative α + πτοεῖν, see Schironi (2018, 117).

170 Zenod. fr. 4 Pusch: <Κρήτη ἐπίουρον>· τοῦτο τριχῶς ἀνεγνώσθη. Ζηνόδοτος γὰρ ὡς ἐπίκουρον, ἐκδεχόμενος βασιλέα καὶ φύλακα. καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ οὕτως, ἐκδεχόμενος τὸν φύλακα κτλ. ('<Κρήτη ἐπίουρον>: This has been read in three ways (i.e. ἐπίουρος, ἐπιοῦρος, ἔπι οὖρος). In fact, Zenodotus takes it as ἐπίκουρος ('guard') interpreting it as 'lord and protector'; and so also Aristarchus, taking it as 'the protector''). On ἐπίουρος, see Lehrs (1882, 107–11 and 309). ἐπιοῦρος was preferred by Ptolemy of Ascalon, a grammarian of the 1st century CE, as the rest of the scholium above quoted shows: ὁ δὲ Ἀσκαλωνίτης (p. 53 Baege) παρέλκειν ἡγεῖται τὴν ἐπί· διὸ καὶ τὸν τόνον φυλάσσει τῆς προ<σ>θέσεως: see Pusch (1890, 195 n. 1).

171 Zenod. fr. 5 Pusch: <δι' ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο>· [. . .] Ζηνόδοτος δὲ συναινεῖ τῇ δίχα τοῦ <α> γραφῇ καί φησι 'σπιδέος' τοῦ ἀπόρου καὶ τραχέος {καὶ μεγάλου} (del. Lehrs: see Pusch (1890, 195)) ('<δι' ἀσπιδέος πεδίοιο>: [. . .] Zenodotus agrees with the reading without α and says that σπιδέος means 'impassable and harsh'').

172 The scholium is analysed in detail by Schironi (2018, 368–70).

173 Zenod. fr. 6 Pusch: <κυανέην> κάπετον· τὴν ληνόν· Ζηνόδοτος δέ φησιν ἀπὸ χαλκοῦ κεκαυμένου κτλ. ('<κυανέην> κάπετον: The watering tub: Zenodotus says that it was made of smelted bronze etc.').

noun κάπετον ('field-ditch') but on its adjective κυανέην, specifying that it indicated not the colour (or not only the colour) but the material ('made of molten bronze': ἀπὸ χαλκοῦ κεκαυμένου);[174]

– fr. 7 Pusch = Ath. 1.13d:[175] another semantic remark. Thanks to internal parallels (*Od.* 8.98 and *Il.* 9.225), Zenodotus interpreted the adjective ἔϊσος ('equal') in the *iunctura* δαῖτα ἐΐσην as meaning 'good', probably etymologising it from ἐΰς ('good, noble');

– fr. 8 Pusch = Ath. 11.478e:[176] a lexical explanation. Zenodotus, together with the glossographers Silenus (cf. Chapter 7, Section 5) and Cleitarchus (both datable to the 3rd or 3rd/2nd century BCE), defended the equivalence κοτύλη = κύλιξ on the basis of *Il.* 23.34 (the blood of the sacrificial victims flowing by the cupful (κοτυλήρυτον) – that is, abundantly, at the funeral banquet for Patroclus) – and of a proverbial saying (Zenob. 5.71). The synonymic equivalence κοτύλη = κύλιξ is otherwise attested only in Ath. 11.480f as a Cypriot gloss quoted by Glaucon (of uncertain date) in his Γλῶσσαι and in Hsch. κ 4502. An indirect support for this semantic equivalence may be provided by Call. *inc. auct.* fr. 773 Pfeiffer κυλικήρυτον αἷμα, where κυλικήρυτον clearly alludes to the Homeric κοτυλήρυτον;

– fr. 9 Pusch = *Epim. Hom.* ι 13:[177] a semantic observation of Zenodotus on the adjective ἴφθιμος, which he took to mean 'noble', on the basis of *Il.* 5.415, where the epithet is referred to Diomedes' wife. As van Thiel argued (2014 vol. 1, 44), it

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174 Cf. *LfgrE* s.v. κύανος.

175 Zenod. fr. 7 Pusch: ἐκ τούτων δ᾽ ἐπείσθη Ζηνόδοτος δαῖτα ἐΐσην τὴν ἀγαθὴν λέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡ τροφὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν, ἐπεκτείνας, φησίν, εἴρηκεν ἐΐσην ('Through these passages [i.e. *Od.* 8.98 and *Il.* 9.225] Zenodotus was persuaded that a good meal is said to be 'equal' (ἐΐσην): for since food is a necessary good for men, [Homer], he says, by extension said 'equal' (ἐΐσην)').

176 Zenod. fr. 8 Pusch: Σιληνὸς καὶ Κλείταρχος ἔτι τε Ζηνόδοτος τὴν κύλικα· 'πάντη δ᾽ ἀμφὶ νέκυν κοτυλήρυτον ἔρρεεν αἷμα' (*Il.* 23.34) καὶ· 'πολλὰ μεταξὺ πέλει κοτύλης καὶ χείλεος ἄκρου' (Zenob. 5.71). ('Silenus (fr. 7 Dettori), Cleitarchus, and also Zenodotus, [say that the κοτύλη] is a κύλιξ: 'and blood was flowing everywhere around the corpse by the cupful' [*Il.* 23.24] and also 'there is much between the κοτύλη and the lip' [Zenob. 5.71]'). See Dettori (2019, 275), who rightly defends the transmitted ἔτι τε against Dindorf's emendation ἔτι δέ: the emphasis conferred by ἔτι τε may suggest that in the original source used by Athenaeus, Zenodotus' stance differed from that of Silenus and Cleitarchus, even if he too identified the κοτύλη with the κύλιξ.

177 Zenod. fr. 9 Pusch: ἴφθιμος (*Il.* 1.3 *alibi*): ὄνομα ἐπιθετικόν. ἰφθίμους Τρύφων ἀπεδήλωσε τοὺς ἰσχυρούς, Ζηνόδοτος τοὺς ἀγαθούς· τί γάρ, φησίν, ἐροῦμεν 'ἰφθίμη ἄλοχος Διομήδεος' (*Il.* 5.415); κτλ. ('ἴφθιμος: Adjective. Tryphon (fr. 125 Velsen) took ἰφθίμους to mean 'strong', Zenodotus 'noble'. Why, he says, should we say 'the noble wife of Diomedes' (*Il.* 5.415)?'). The entry goes on quoting Crates' interpretation of ἴφθιμος as *vox media* (Crates Gr. fr. 51 Broggiato): on whether (or not) Crates knew of Zenodotus' interpretation, see Broggiato (2001, 219 with n. 283).

seems likely that Tryphon (1st century BCE) fr. 125 Velsen is the source of Zeno-dotus' quotation;

– fr. 10 Pusch = schol. Theocr. 5.2d:[178] another semantic note on the meaning of Homeric νάκη ('sheepskin, fleece') based on *Od.* 14.530 ἂν δὲ νάκην ἕλετ' αἰγὸς ἐϋτρεφέος μεγάλοιο. The transmission of the scholium is far from clear and may have been tampered with by a copyist eager to flesh out Zenodotus' notes (Pusch 1890, 199). If the text is trustworthy, Zenodotus apparently gave two different meanings for νάκη: τὸ κώδιον, that is, 'fleece' (the only other-wise attested in post-Homeric literature) and the more puzzling one, judged by Pusch to be incorrect, of τὸ μαρσύπιον: 'leather pouch';

– fr. 11 Pusch = schol. Hes. *Theog.* 116c1:[179] an interpretative point. Zenodotus did edit Hesiod's *Theogony* (cf. the mention of τὰ Ζηνοδότεια, i.e. ἀντίγραφα, at schol. Hes. *Theog.* 5b2), but it is far from certain that the Zenodotus' mentioned in this Hesiodic scholium is our scholar from Ephesus.[180] Be that as it may, Zen-odotus explained the Hesiodic χάος as τὸν κεχυμένον ἀέρα ('the mist shed around').

As this brief survey has indicated, the fragments collected by Pusch and ascribed to Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι deal mainly, if not almost uniquely, with *Homererklärung* (word division, orthography but also semantics) and poetic diction in general (Hes-iod, if fr. 11 is to be ascribed to our Zenodotus).[181] Previous scholarship has made

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178 Zenod. fr. 10 Push: <νάκος χθές·> Ζηνόδοτος τὸ κώδιον, τὸ μαρσύπιον. καὶ νάκος αἰγὸς δορὰν καὶ Ὅμηρος (*Od.* 14.530)· 'νάκος ἕλετ' αἰγὸς ὀρειτρόφου'. καὶ Θεόκριτος ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς (v. 12) αἰγός φησιν. ('<νάκος χθές>: Zenodotus [says that νάκος means] 'fleece, leather pouch'. Also Homer [says that] νάκος is the goats' skin (*Od.* 14.530): '[Eumaeus] picked up the fleece of a moun-tain-bred goat'. And Theocritus says the same in the following verses (*Id.* 5.12)'). The maladroit quotation from *Od.* 14.530 (νάκος instead of νάκην and ὀρειτρόφου instead of ἐϋτρεφέος) is as-cribed by Pusch not to Zenodotus but to a zealous copyist: see Pusch (1890, 199–200).
179 Zenod. fr. 11 Pusch: χάος γένετ'· [. . .] χάος λέγει τὸν κεχυμένον ἀέρα· καὶ γὰρ Ζηνόδοτος <οὕτως> φησίν. Βακχυλίδης (5. 26–7 Snell–Maehler) δὲ χάος τὸν ἀέρα ὠνόμαζε κτλ. ('χάος γένετ': [. . .] [the poet] calls chaos the ἀήρ ('mist' in the translation of Pfeiffer 1968, 117) shed around; and in fact, also Zenodotus says <so>. Bacchylides (5.26–7 Snell–Maehler) called chaos the expan-sion of the air etc.'). The textual tradition of this scholium is disrupted: the information about Zenodotus is found in a part of the scholium transmitted by some MSS but judged by di Gregorio to be extraneous to the archetype.
180 See F. Montanari (2009, 333–5) with previous bibliography for the other possible candidates: Zenodotus of Alexandria (2nd–1st century BCE), author of a work entitled Εἰς τὴν Ἡσιόδου Θεογονίαν; Zenodotus of Mallus (2nd–1st century BCE), also known in the Homeric scholia as Zenodotus ὁ Κρατήτειος; and Zenodotus the Stoic philosopher (2nd century BCE?), a disciple of Diogenes of Babylon.
181 Cf. Pusch (1890, 201); Nickau (1972, 40); Latte (1925, 154); Tosi (1994a, 151).

much of the fact that Zenodotus' collection, unlike that of Philitas, was alphabetically ordered, claiming that this new ordering was an important step ('a model for the future', in Pfeiffer's words) for the development of lexicographical studies.[182] Esposito (2009, 259–60), though without specific reference to Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι, also detects in the shift from a broadly onomasiological to a progressively perfected alphabetical ordering a developmental progress of the genre.[183] However, this assumption is debatable: more than forty years ago, Alpers (1975, 116–7) observed that a thematic arrangement should not to be conceptualised as a less sophisticated approach to ordering knowledge than the rather more mechanical process of alphabetisation.[184] The two systems simply served different purposes and should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. On the basis of the fragments collected by Pusch, it would appear that in Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι, unlike those of his teacher Philitas, no marked dialectal interest emerges, nor is any sustained attention to realia evident. However, the evidence at our disposal does admit other interpretations. Zenodotus also authored a work entitled Ἐθνικαὶ λέξεις (*Ethnic Expressions*):[185] the title is preserved by Gal. *Gloss.* π 12 πέζαι and π 13 πέλλα Perilli. In π 12 we are told that in his *Ethnic Expressions* Zenodotus said that Arcadians and Dorians call the foot πέζα ([. . .] Ζηνόδοτος μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς Ἐθνικαῖς λέξεσι πέζαν φησὶ τὸν πόδα καλεῖν Ἀρκάδας καὶ Δωριεῖς):[186] the mention of the Arcadians appears to imply a non-literary source. Analogous is also the case of π 13 πέλλα: here, too, Zenodotus' authority is said to vouch for the Sicyonian use of πέλλος (an adjective usually

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182 Cf. e.g. Pfeiffer (1968, 115).

183 Esposito wrote before the publication by Vecchiato (2022) of P.Köln inv. 22323 (= TM 977097), a 3rd/2nd century BCE lexicon already fully alphabetically ordered (that is, throughout all the letters); on P.Köln inv. 22323 see Chapter 7, Section 7.6. Previous to the publication of the Cologne lexicon the *communis opinio* among scholars was that the alphabetical ordering beyond the third letter was an innovation introduced by Diogenianus and fundamentally linked to the prescriptive character of Atticist trends: see Vecchiato (2022, 5 with nn. 19–20).

184 See more recently also Hatzimichali (2013, 36 n. 17), who quotes as a telling example of critique of alphabetical arrangement as inferior to the onomasiological arrangement the evidence offered by Dioscorides (1st century CE), Dsc. *Materia medica* I Prol. 3.7–9: ἥμαρτον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τάξιν, οἱ μὲν ἀσυμφύλους δυνάμεις συγκρούσαντες, οἱ δὲ κατὰ στοιχεῖον καταγράψαντες, διέζευξάν <τε> τῆς ὁμογενείας τά τε γένη καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο ἀσυμμνημόνευτα γίνεσθαι (within a critique of Niger and other physicians): '[Niger and the rest of them] have also blundered regarding organization: some have brought into collision disconnected properties, while others an alphabetical arrangement, separating materials and their properties from those closely connected to them. The outcome of this arrangement is that it is difficult to commit to memory', transl. after Beck (2017).

185 Pusch (1890, 174–80); Latte (1925, 167–9).

186 According to Pusch (1890, 176–7) the peculiar usage of Arcadians and Dorians consisted in the fact that, whereas in *gemeingriechisch* πέζα meant a specific sub-part of the foot (either the malleolus or the foot's sole), they used πέζα to designate the whole foot.

meaning 'dark-coloured', cf. *EDG* s.v. πελιδνός) to designate what is tawny-orange in colour ([. . .] Ζηνόδοτος δὲ ἐν ταῖς Ἐθνικαῖς λέξεσι Σικυωνίους φησὶ τὸ κιρρὸν πέλλον ὀνομάζειν). Finally, Pusch ascribed a third diatopic gloss to Zenodotus' Ἐθνικαὶ λέξεις, even if the title of the work is not mentioned: at Ath. 7.327b, we are told that, according to Zenodotus, the Cyreneans call the sea-fish usually known as ἐρυθρῖνος 'ὕκης' (Ζηνόδοτος δέ φησι Κυρηναίους τὸν ὕκην ἐρυθρῖνον καλεῖν). In these three passages, Zenodotus' dialectal interest comes to the fore in a way that does not differ substantially from that of Philitas (spoken *Mundarten* as sources, attention to realia). Even more interesting is the case of schol. Apoll.Rh. 2.1005–6a: <στυφελήν>· τραχεῖαν καὶ σκληράν· οὕτως Κλειτόριοι λέγουσιν, ὥς φησι Ζηνόδοτος ἐν Γλώσσαις, Κυρηναῖοι δὲ τὴν χέρσον ('<στυφελήν>: Harsh and hard; so the inhabitants of Cleitoria [in Achaia], as Zenodotus says in his Γλῶσσαι. The Cyreneans call so the mainland'). Here, the dialectal gloss is ascribed to Zenodotus' Γλῶσσαι *tout court*: unless one assumes a mistake (facilitated by a certain degree of fluctuation between λέξις and γλῶσσα already in the early Hellenistic period) as Pusch does,[187] it is not implausible to suspect that the Ἐθνικαὶ λέξεις were an inner section of the Γλῶσσαι themselves.[188]

On both explanations (two different works or only one with internal thematic subdivisions), Zenodotus' methodological approach in his lexical studies does not appear, all in all, substantially different from that of his predecessors, with the obvious exception of the lion's share accounted for by the *Homererklärung* in his Γλῶσσαι: his lexicographical interests extend from literary text to spoken vernaculars, and there is no sign that the Attic dialect played any special part in his studies. This is even more the case if one considers the later history of ἀμνίον (a sacrificial vessel used to collect the blood of the victim). In Zenod. fr. 1 Pusch (= schol. (Ariston.) Hom. *Od.* 3.444b.1 (HMᵃ)), we have seen that Zenodotus at *Od.* 3.444b1 read δάμνιον instead of δ' ἀμνίον of the vulgate. In the Homeric scholium, we were not told which sense Zenodotus ascribed to δάμνιον, whether 'vessel for collecting blood' or, on the basis of Hsch. δ 205 (δάμνια· θύματα, σφάγια), 'sacrificial offerings'. Interestingly, other Homeric scholia (schol. Hom. *Od.* 3.444c, e1 and f1) report that Attic speakers (οἱ Ἀττικοί) did not use ἀμνίον for the sacrificial bowl but rather the term σφάγιον (possibly an itacistic spelling for σφάγειον), an observation that smacks of Atticistic flavour.[189] The text of these scholia is as follows:

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187 Pusch (1890, 175–6).

188 See Nickau (1972, 40–3), followed by Tosi (1994a, 152) and Montana (2021a).

189 Nickau's statement that 'Die Bedeutungsgleichung ἀμνίον = σφάγιον wird in den Odyssees-scholien den Ἀττικοί zugeschrieben (im Gegensatz zu der akzeptierten Bedeutung "Gefäß zum Auffangen des Blutes des Opfertieres"' (Nickau 1977, 44 n. 7) is misleading inasmuch as it suggests an alleged shift of meaning of the term in Attic. That is, however, not what the scholium says: the

(1) Schol. (V) Hom. *Od.* 3.444c: ἀμνίον· ἔστι μὲν τῶν ἅπαξ εἰρημένων ἡ λέξις. σημαίνει δὲ τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ὅπου τὸ αἷμα τοῦ ἱερείου δέχονται. (MaTV) καὶ ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἔτυμον 'ἀμένιον', ὅ ἐστι στερητικὸν τοῦ μένους τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς. οἱ Ἀττικοὶ δὲ 'σφάγιον' αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν (HMaTVY). ('ἀμνίον: A hapax. The term designates the vessel where the blood of the sacrificial victim is collected; its etymology is from ἀμένιον, that is, that which deprives the soul of its strength). Attic speakers call it σφάγιον');

(2) Schol. (ex.) Hom. *Od.* 3.444e1 (E) [. . .]: ἔστι δὲ τῶν ἅπαξ εἰρημένων ἡ λέξις. ἄλλοι δὲ μικρὸν μαχαιρίδιον, ὃ καὶ 'σφάγιον' καλοῦσιν οἱ Ἀττικοί. ('[. . .] a hapax. Other say that it means a small knife, which Attic speakers call also σφάγιον');[190]

(3) Schol. (Hrd.) Hom. *Od.* 3.444f (HM^a) (~ Eust. *in Od.* 1.138.12–9): ἀμνίον· τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ὑποσφάγματος. Νίκανδρος δὲ καὶ Θεοδωρίδας ἀπὸ τοῦ 'δάμνασθαι' προφέρονται ἀσυνδέτως 'δάμνιον'. Πορσίλος[191] δὲ ὁ Ἱεραπύτνιος παρὰ Ἱεραπυτνίοις ἔτι σώζεσθαι τὴν φωνὴν 'αἵμνιον', δασέως μετὰ τοῦ ι κατ' ἀρχὴν προφερομένην, παρὰ τὸ 'αἷμα'. καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν ὡς εἰκὸς ἦν παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ οὕτως αὐτὸ <προ>φέρεσθαι, ὑπὸ δέ τινων περιηρῆσθαι τὸ ι. Ἀττικοὶ δὲ 'σφάγιον' αὐτὸ καλοῦσιν. εἰς τοῦτο δὲ πρῶτον αἷμα δεχόμενοι τοῖς βωμοῖς ἐπιχέουσιν. ('ἀμνίον: The vessel for the blood of the sacrificial victim. Nicander [fr. 133 Schneider] and Theodoridas [*SH* 747] say δάμνιον without word division, deriving it from δάμνασθαι ('to overpower'). Porsilus of Hierapytna [says] that among the Hierapytnioi the word αἵμνιον is still kept, with rough breathing and with the iota at the beginning of the word, from αἷμα ('blood'). And Apollodorus (Apollod. *BNJ* 244 F 288) says that it is reasonable that it is cited thus by the poet, but the iota is taken away by some. The Attic writers call it σφάγιον, and they catch the first blood into it when they pour it on the altars').

The correct Attic diction for the bowl used in sacrifices to collect the first blood of the sacrificial victim was σφάγιον/σφάγειον. It is worth observing that, according to the scholia quoted above, no concern about the proper Attic word for ἀμνίον can be traced back to Zenodotus. Like other contemporary glossographers, it appears that Attic terminology was not a privileged field of inquiry for him.

Zenodotus' interest in both literary exegesis (Homer) and dialectal glosses was further pursued by his pupil Agathocles of Cyzicus (*Su.* π 3035), best known in antiq-

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scholium specifies that Attic speakers called the ἀμνίον 'σφάγιον': different name but same underlying realia. This is also confirmed by Eust. *in Od.* 1.138.18: Ἀττικοὶ δὲ σφάγιον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀγγεῖον ἐκάλουν. On σφάγειον as a blood vessel in sacrificial practice, see Ekroth (2002, 244–7).

190 In the apparatus *ad loc.*, Pontani (2007, vol. 2) notes that the equivalence σφάγιον = μαχαιρίδιον is nowhere else attested. The origin of this equivalence remains obscure, aside from the obvious fact that σφάζω denotes the sacrificial killing of the victim with a knife.

191 Πορσίλος is Jacoby's emendation for the mss. Πορσίλλος (Σ^HM) and Πορσίαλος (Σ^Q). Eustathius has Πόσιλος. Latte (1925, 151 n. 33) proposed to emend Πόρσιλλος (not an attested Greek proper name) into Πορθέσιλλος, the *Kurzform* of Πορθεσίλας, on the basis of inscriptional evidence from Crete (of Hellenistic date).

uity for his work on local historiography.[192] From the scanty remains, it appears that Agathocles' interest in Homer centred primarily on passages of mythographic and cosmological relevance: the application of cosmological and allegorical interpretations on the Homeric text suggests a Stoic influence (not present in Zenodotus) and an affinity with the method of Crates of Mallos.[193] However, we also have fragments that suggest a closer relationship with the two strands characteristic of early Hellenistic lexicography: literary exegesis and dialectal glosses. Particularly interesting for us in this respect, in that it synthesises Homeric textual criticism and dialectal features,[194] is Agatochl. *BNJ* 472 F 10 = fr. 10 Montanari (= Eust. *in Il.* 3.668.1–6).[195] The text of our fragment is as follows:

> Agatochl. *BNJ* 472 F 10: τὸ δὲ ʽδρυσὶν ὑψικόμοισιν' Ἀγαθοκλῆς, ὡς οἱ παλαιοί φασι, ʽδρυσὶν ἰξοφόροισι' γράφει· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκαρποι, φησί, καὶ πλατύφυλλοι ἐρίφλοιοι καλοῦνται παρὰ Περγαμηνοῖς, αἱ δὲ λεπτόφλοιοι καὶ καρποφόροι ἡμερίδες, ὡς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ʽἡμερὶς ἡβώωσα'· καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτων εὐανθοῦντας βότρυς σταφυλὰς καλοῦσιν, ἐξ ὧν καὶ ὁ ἰξὸς γίνεται. ἡ γὰρ ἄκαρπος δρῦς, φησί, κηκιδοφόρος ἐστίν, ὅτι δὲ δρύες τινὲς ἡμερίδες εἰσ-έτι καὶ νῦν λέγονται, οἱ περὶ Θράκην οἴδασιν.

> Instead of 'oaks with lofty foliage' Agathokles, as the ancient authorities report, writes 'oaks with mistletoe growing on them'. For, he says, trees which do not bear fruit and are broad-leaved are called ἐρίφλοιοι by the Pergamenians, but those which have thin leaves and do bear fruit are called ἡμερίδες, as also the poet does in the *Odyssey*: 'a luxuriant ἡμερίς' (*Od.* 5.69). And the blooming bunches of grapes on these trees they call σταφυλαί, from which also birdlime (ἰξός) is made. For the oak which does not bear fruit, he says, bears gall-nuts (κηκιδο-φόρος). People who live in Thrace know that certain kinds of oaks are still called ἡμερίδες. (Transl. after Engels 2008).

Commenting on *Il.* 14.398 δρυσὶν ὑψικόμοισιν, Eustathius tells us that Agathocles read instead δρυσὶν ἰξοφόροισι, a reading that is not otherwise preserved by the manuscript tradition and may represent a conjecture on the part of Agathocles himself on the basis of his profound botanical knowledge.[196] Agathocles supports ἰξοφόροισι by referring to different varieties of oaks, among which he includes those that do not bear fruit and have broad leaves and are called ἐρίφλοιοι [. . .]

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192 For an overview of Agathocles' historical and philological works, see F. Montanari (1988, 20–4).

193 F. Montanari (1988, 23).

194 This connection was already highlighted by Latte (1925, 156).

195 Cf. also Eust. *in Od.* 1.200.39–44 on *Od.* 5.69, basically a repetition of *in Il.* 3.668.1–6.

196 Cf. Agathocl. *BNJ* 472 F 4 (= fr. 4 Montanari = Ath. 14.649e) where, in a discussion on rare Mediterranean plants called at Alexandria κόνναρος and παλίουρος, the name of Agathocles is quoted as an authority on such flora as shown by his remarks on it in the third book of his Περὶ Κυζίκου (μνημονεύει δ' αὐτῶν Ἀγαθοκλῆς ὁ Κυζικηνὸς ἐν γʹ τῶν Περὶ τῆς πατρίδος).

παρὰ Περγαμηνοῖς.[197] In Agathocles, we see thus synthesised *Textpflege* and an interest in local vernaculars, perhaps mediated by his expertise in natural sciences: Latte (1925, 156 and 161) was also one of the first to recognise the importance of the 'naturwissenschaftliche Forschung', with its taxonomical and descriptive drive (above all 'Synonymenlisten'), in the development of Hellenistic lexicography.

4.4 Callimachus between poetry and scholarship: Glosses for a multicultural Greek world

Callimachus of Cyrene (ca. 303–240 BCE), poet and scholar, was active in Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (284–246 BCE) and Ptolemy III Euergetes (262–222 BCE). His literary and scholarly output was vast, amounting to more than 800 books, according to the *Suda* (κ 227). Although not formally in charge of the Library of Alexandria, Callimachus certainly wrote his bibliographical masterpiece, the Πίνακες, and his other antiquarian-scholarly works by taking full advantage of the collection of all extant Greek literature in the Library, an enterprise sponsored by the Ptolemies' policy of cultural supremacy.[198] Alexandria was not only the capital of scholarship, with its Museum and Library, but was also a melting pot of people coming from the most far-flung regions of the Greek world and beyond: it was the ideal place for Callimachus' linguistic experimentalism – for *his* 'multiple *koinaï*', to use Parsons' expression.[199] Callimachus' linguistic πολυειδεία, and his strong interest in aetiology and historical-antiquarian research, a recurrent *Leitmotif* in his literary works, represents an important trait d'union between his creative production and his antiquarian and philological studies.

Callimachus' extraordinary range of writings, in terms of both quality and quantity, makes it impossible to survey in any meaningful detail his engagement, as a poet and a scholar, with what we have highlighted hitherto as the two main strands of early Hellenistic lexicography: literary exegesis and dialectology. His same creative oeuvre constantly intertwines, in a highly sophisticated and allusive way, learned exegesis of obscure poetical words and attention to spoken vernacu-

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197 Engels (2008) translates παρὰ Περγαμηνοῖς with 'by scholars from Pergamon', following apparently Helck's erroneous interpretation: see F. Montanari (1988, 39 n. 27). The mention of a local botanical gloss suggests direct knowledge of the Pergamon dialect according to Montanari (*ibid.*). The reference to Thracian linguistic contemporary usage is likely Eustathius' own addition.

198 On the importance of the Alexandrian library and its royal sponsorship for the development of Hellenistic lexicography, see above Section 3.

199 Parsons (2011).

lars. This is particularly true, for example, of his *Hecale*, an aetiological epyllion on the Attic cult of Zeus Hecaleios (Call. frr. 230–377 Pfeiffer): with its Attic setting, the *Hecale* is replete with references and allusions to Attic customs, lore, mythology, and topography, for which Callimachus drew heavily on the Atthidographers.[200] This also has clear repercussions for the language used in the epyllion, which betrays a heavy indebtedness to Attic vocabulary in general and Attic comedy in particular.[201] Does this mean that Callimachus considered Attic to be superior to other Greek dialects? Not necessarily. As Hollis (2009, 13) demonstrated, in the *Hecale*, Callimachus 'is receptive to influences from all over the Greek world': ἄλλιξ (fr. 42.5 Hollis), a kind of cloak, is according to ancient sources a Thessalian word (*Et.Gen.* α 515); γέντα (fr. 127 Hollis), 'entrails', comes from Thrace (Ael.Dion. γ 6*); σῦφαρ (fr. 74.11 Hollis), a piece of 'wrinkled skin', is possibly a Sicilian idiom (schol. Nic. *Alex.* 91g; first attested in Sophron fr. 55) and so on.[202] Athens and Attica were clearly an important political *and* cultural asset for the Ptolemies during the greatest part of the 3rd century BCE:[203] Attic literature constituted the largest share of the Library's collection, and Attic 'themes' were increasingly popular among Hellenistic poets.[204] However, we do not perceive in Callimachus any privileged treatment of Attic dialect as such or any prescriptive attitude.

As hinted above, we shall therefore limit our brief survey to Callimachus' Ἐθνικαὶ ὀνομασίαι (*Local Nomenclatures*, fr. 406 Pfeiffer), the only work in the *Suda*'s entry that is explicitly marked as lexicographical. Prior to tackling this work, however, it is important for our purposes to recall that Callimachus has often been considered the 'father' of 'modern' bibliography.[205] He wrote three major bibliographical works: (1) Πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν (*Tables of Persons Eminent in Every Branch of Learning, Together with a List of their Books*), in 120 book-rolls (frr. 429–53 Pfeiffer): judging from the extant fragments, the *Pinakes* were intended not only to provide (and systematically classify) information on the biographical data and literary outputs of the selected authors but also to discuss problems of attribution and authorship. In other words, it was a reasoned bibliographical guide to the most eminent authors

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200 Benedetto (2011); aetiology and etymology were fundamental methods of investigation for the Atthidographers.

201 Hollis (2009, 9); A. Cameron (1995, 443).

202 The examples are taken from Hollis (2009, 13).

203 For the Ptolemies' intense interests in making Athens the stronghold of their offensive against the Antigonids, see Asper (2011, 157–8) with previous bibliography. The Ptolemies' cultural policy was also central to preserving the Atthidographers' writing: see Benedetto (2011, 366); Costa (2007, 5–7).

204 See Hollis (1992).

205 See Blum (1991, 244–7).

(*both* in prose *and* poetry): its main internal division was apparently by genre (εἶδος) and within each genre by alphabetical order (first letter only) of the relevant authors;[206] (2) Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκάλων (*Table and Register of Dramatic Poets in Chronological Order from the Beginning*, frr. 454–6 Pfeiffer): a record and catalogue of dramatic authors and their victories, organised chronologically, probably an updated version of Aristotle's dramatic διδασκαλίαι;[207] (3) Πίναξ τῶν Δημοκρίτου[208] γλωσσῶν καὶ συνταγμάτων (*Table of Democritus' Glosses and his Syntagmata,* fr. 350 Pfeiffer): apparently some kind of glossary of Democritus' diction, even if the meaning of the second part of the title, συντάγματα, remains hotly debated.[209] Callimachus' encyclopedic classificatory effort in his multiple *Tables* represents a momentous event in the history of Classical scholarship: it was the much needed and necessary premise for the subsequent development, on a more systematic basis, of literary, lexical and dialectal studies.[210] His 'bibliographical' tools enabled for the first time comprehensive cross-references and comparisons between sources and provided 'a background and an ideal of the totality of knowledge' (Hatzimichali 2013, 70): the practice of ordering knowledge systematically and in more or less new formats (and contexts) profoundly shaped the future of the discipline.[211]

As for the Ἐθνικαὶ ὀνομασίαι, only one fragment of this work has come to us via Athenaeus (fr. 406 Pfeiffer). It has long been suspected that the other nomenclature-oriented titles mentioned in the *Suda* may well have been subheadings of the *Local Nomenclatures*. Bentley suggested that this may have been the case for the treatise entitled Περὶ μετονομασίας ἰχθύων (*On Fishes and Their Name Changes*); Fabricius included Μηνῶν προσηγορίαι κατὰ ἔθνος καὶ πόλεις (*Appellations of the*

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206 The most detailed treatment remains Blum (1991, 150–60). Attested are the following generic labels, as detailed by Meliadò (2018): ῥητορικά (frr. 430–2 Pfeiffer), νόμοι (fr. 433 Pfeiffer), παντοδαπὰ συγγράμματα (frr. 434–5 Pfeiffer), epic (frr. 452–3 Pfeiffer), lyric (frr. 441 and 450), tragedy (frr. 449?, 451 Pfeiffer), comedy (frr. 439–40 Pfeiffer), philosophy (frr. 438?, 442 Pfeiffer), history (fr. 437 Pfeiffer), and medicine (fr. 429? Pfeiffer).
207 See Blum (1991, 138–42).
208 The MSS of the *Suda* read Δεμοκράτης: the emendation Δημοκρίτου is universally accepted by modern scholarship.
209 See Blum (1991, 143–4). The interpretations offered for συντάγματα range from 'writings' (Pfeiffer 1968, 132), to 'index of works' (Diels–Kranz), and more recently 'syntactic units' (Navaud 2006); West (1969) suggested emending γλωσσῶν into γνωμῶν (that is, Callimachus would have written a collection not of Democritus' rare words but of his sentences, his famous *dicta*). Dettori (2000, 43 n. 128) has proposed to emend the transmitted text into Πίναξ τῶν Δημοκρίτου γλωσσῶν κατὰ συντάγματα: we should then have a list of glosses whose order follows Democritus' series of writings).
210 See Krevans (2011, 121–4).
211 Cf. also Jacob (2013, 76–8).

Months according to Peoples and Cities, fr. 412 Pfeiffer), Schneider Περὶ ἀνέμων (*On Winds*, fr. 404 Pfeiffer); Daub added to the list Περὶ ὀρνέων (*On Birds*, frr. 414–28 Pfeiffer), and, more recently, Navaud (2006, 224) suggested the same for Κτίσεις νήσων καὶ πόλεων καὶ μετονομασίαι (*Foundations of Islands and Cities and their Name Changes,* fr. 412 Pfeiffer).[212] That is, Callimachus' *Local Nomenclatures* may have had a structure that did not differ significantly from that of an onomasticon, a collection of words and idioms organised according to semantic categories.[213] This, at least, is what is suggested by its only extant fragment, fr. 406 Pfeiffer (= Ath. 7.329a),[214] which deals with local (Chalcedonian and Athenian) names for fish:

> Call. fr. 406 Pfeiffer (= Ath. 7.329a): Καλλίμαχος δ' ἐν ἐθνικαῖς ὀνομασίαις γράφει οὕτως· 'ἐγκρασίχολος, ἐρίτιμος Χαλκηδόνιοι. τριχίδια, χαλκίς, ἴκταρ, ἀθερίνη' (post ἀθερίνη <Ἀθηναῖοι> add. Meineke). ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ μέρει καταλέγων ἰχθύων ὀνομασίας φησίν· 'ὄζαινα, ὀσμύλιον Θούριοι. ἴωπες, ἐρίτιμοι Ἀθηναῖοι.'

> Callimachus in his *Local Nomenclatures* writes thus: 'ἐγκρασίχολος (anchovy): the Chalcedonians [call it] ἐρίτιμος; τριχίδια ('pilchardlets'), χαλκίς ('sardine'), ἴκταρ ('brisling'), ἀθερίνη ('sand-smelt')'. In another section while listing the terms for fish he says: 'ὄζαινα (a kind of octopus): the inhabitants of Thurii [call it] ὀσμύλιον; ἴωπες: the Athenians [call them] ἐρίτιμοι.' (Translation by Olson 2008 slightly modified).

As observed by Tosi (1994a, 149–50), in this fragment we have recorded ten names of fishes, three of which (four if we accept Meineke's addendum <Ἀθηναῖοι>) are accompanied by a specific local tag. The fact that no *auctoritas* is quoted to support the tags may simply be ascribable to the process of transmission to which this kind of works are most liable, or Athenaeus may simply have had access to an already epitomised version of Callimachus' work. This appears to be supported by the fact that both Hsch. o 1410 (ὀσμύλια· τῶν πολυπόδων αἱ ὄζαινα λεγόμεναι. καὶ ἰχθύδια ποῖ' ἄττα εὐτελῆ) and Poll. 2.76 (ὀσμυλία ἰχθύων τι γένος, ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὄζαινα καλουμένη) identify the ὄζαινα with the ὀσμύλιον, as Callimachus does. Furthermore, Pollux quotes as evidence for this semantic equivalence Ar. fr. 258.2 (ὀσμύλια καὶ μαινίδια καὶ σηπίδια), a quotation that resurfaces also in Phot. o 558 (ὀσμύλια· ἰχθύδια εὐτελῆ· 'ὀσμύλια καὶ μαινίδια καὶ σηπίδια' φησὶν Ἀριστοφάνης). Tosi rightly noted that there is a good chance, even if unprovable, that Aristophanes' quotation may be traced directly to Callimachus' *Local Nomenclatures*.[215] What is certain is that in this single preserved entry of Callimachus' otherwise lost lexicographical work, no sense of hierarchy is discernible in the discussion of the dialects spoken by

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212 For bibliographical details, see Meliadò (2018); cf. also Krevans (2011, 120–1; 129).

213 See Montana (2020b, 181) (= Montana 2015, 108).

214 Cf. also Eust. *in Od.* 2.290.30–5.

215 Tosi (1994a, 150).

the inhabitants of Calchedon, Thurii, or Attica. This is even more remarkable when one considers that two of them – that is, the dialects of Calchedon and Thurii – did not have their own literary traditions, unlike Attic. One fragment is clearly very little to go by, yet if we must make sense of what we have, however meagre and partial, it is worth noting that, at least in this single extant case, Callimachus' attitude towards Greek dialects in his lexicographical work *Local Nomenclatures* appears to be as oecumenic and all-inclusive as that observed in his creative poetic work.

5 Eratosthenes of Cyrene

The truly encyclopedic breadth of Eratosthenes of Cyrene's (ca. 275–194 BCE) knowledge was widely renowned in antiquity. A pupil of Callimachus and the successor to Apollonius of Rhodes as head of the Alexandrian Library, Eratosthenes was first a scholar and a scientist in his own right and only secondarily a poet.[216] His scholarly output was prodigious: he wrote on an impressive range of subjects, making foundational contributions to topics as different as geography, chronology, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy, and literary criticism.[217] In this section, our attention will be directed exclusively towards Eratosthenes' scholarly activity in the fields of grammar and philology.[218] The selectivity of our focus must not, however, allow us to forget the constant interaction, both in terms of methodology and content, between Eratosthenes' philology and his more strictly scientific work (mathematics, astronomy, chronology). What we would nowadays call humanities and sciences were not, for Eratosthenes and his contemporaries, rigidly compartmentalised fields of inquiry: mutual exchange between the two disciplines was possible. Benuzzi (2022a) has recently demonstrated that, on a methodological level, Eratosthenes' 'intertextual' comparison between authors (also *across* literary genres), a fundamental heuristic tool in his linguistic and literary studies, has its roots in our scholar's engagement with sciences. Put otherwise, his philological 'intertextuality' (the use of a web of parallel passages to establish the semantics, morphol-

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[216] See Matthaios (2011, 81–2) on the 'shift of context' in which Callimachus and Eratosthenes articulated their respective pleas for knowledge: while Callimachus claimed an epistemic status for poetry, Eratosthenes claimed it, first, for scholarship/philology. See, in this direction, already Pfeiffer (1968, 152; 170).

[217] For a general overview of Eratosthenes' scholarly activity, see Montana (2020b, 185–91) (= Montana 2015, 111–8). A modern comprehensive study of Eratosthenes' polymathy in its historical context is provided by Geus (2002).

[218] An excellent survey of Eratosthenes' grammatical and linguistic output is now offered by Dettori (2023).

ogy and even orthography of a given expression)[219] must be understood as an extension of the application of a *universal* scientific criterion based on ἀναλογία as an instrument for solving complex problems in the exact sciences. In this sense, Eratosthenes' lexicographical explanations go well beyond the autoschediastic interpretation of words on the basis of their immediate context (the ἓν καθ᾽ ἑνός principle of the γλωσσογράφοι: see Section 4.2) and mark a new phase in the development of Hellenistic lexicography.

In the sections that follow, we shall thus first briefly outline Eratosthenes' definition of γραμματική, providing the theoretical basis for the implicit but all-important link between philology and science within Eratosthenes' scholarly activity. We shall then proceed to examine Eratosthenes' engagement in the fields of grammar and philology, paying special attention to the lexical and linguistic observations contained in his monograph *On Old Comedy*, a work destined to exercise a highly influential impact on subsequent Hellenistic and Imperial studies of Attic comedy (Didymus of Alexandria *in primis*).[220] As in the previous sections, priority will be given to that body of linguistic evidence that better helps us to highlight possible continuities and divergences with the later Atticist tradition.

5.1 Eratosthenes' definition of γραμματική and his philological activity

For the modern scholar, the first attested definition of γραμματική, which also coincides with the 'philological' origin of grammar as a science, is Eratosthenes' own formulation as reported by the scholia Vaticana to Dionysius Thrax's Τέχνη (cf. Section 3):

> Schol. D.T. (Vat.) *GG* 1,3.160.10–2: [. . .] Ἐρατοσθένης ἔφη, 'γραμματική ἐστιν ἕξις παντελὴς ἐν γράμμασι᾽, γράμματα καλῶν τὰ συγγράμματα.

> Eratosthenes said that 'grammar is the complete mastery [of the necessary skills to examine] γράμματα', with γράμματα signifying writings.

In his seminal 2011 article, Matthaios has thoroughly unravelled the historical, cultural, and possibly theoretical (especially Aristotelian) premises within which Eratosthenes' definition of γραμματική ('scholarship' or 'philology' broadly understood) should be contextualised.[221] What is unprecedented in Eratosthenes' conceptualisa-

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219 This 'scientific' aspect of Eratosthenes' philology has also been repeatedly emphasised also by Tosi (1998a, 338); Tosi (1998b, 135–6). Cf. also Broggiato (2023, 126).
220 See Benuzzi (2018) and now esp. Benuzzi (2023c, 277–8).
221 Matthaios (2011). See also Wouters, Swiggers (2015, 515–22).

tion of γραμματική as an epistemic acquired condition (ἕξις)[222] is the double qualification conveyed by the prepositional phrase ἐν γράμμασι and by the adjective παντελής: 'through both characteristics of the term ἕξις, Eratosthenes connected the potential of the philological discipline with a demand for *universal* knowledge' (Matthaios 2011, 79; emphasis ours). The bare ἐν γράμμασι, without definite article, is not poor style: it purposely covers not just literary oeuvres (as, for instance, the definition of Asclepiades of Myrlea does)[223] but all manner of writings. For Eratosthenes, everything that is written down and conveyed through the written medium is the proper object of γραμματική: he thus extends the domain of philology to a potentially universal knowledge, without further specifications or disciplinary boundaries. As Matthaios remarked (2011, 79), 'there is no mention of 'canonic authors' in Eratosthenes' definition of grammar: the Cyrenean speaks of γράμματα as universally as possible'. It is precisely this universal and all-embracing claim to knowledge advocated by Eratosthenes for 'grammar' that explains and facilitates the transferral of methodological skills across disciplines (humanities and exact sciences). This is also why Eratosthenes, from a self-identification perspective, refused the title of γραμματικός ('man of letters'), a 'title' that was already well established at the time, as too reductive, choosing instead to style himself as φιλόλογος – that is, a person open to learning and knowledge in all its breadth (Suet. *Gram. et rhet.* 10 = Eratosth. *BNJ*[2] 241 T 9).[224]

Turning to Eratosthenes' scholarly activity in the fields of grammar and philology, his output is for us almost entirely represented by the indirect tradition (quotations or paraphrases in scholia and lexicographical repertoires). In the various chains of transmission that determined the survival of Eratosthenes' philological work, Didymus of Alexandria (1st BCE/1st century CE) emerges as a key figure. This is especially true for one of his monographs, Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας (*On Old Comedy*). As acknowledged by modern scholarship, Didymus is likely

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222 Matthaios (2011, 73) rightly observed that Eratosthenes, by deliberately choosing the term ἕξις, a word already current in the contemporary philosophy of science, 'granted scholarship the status of a τέχνη and managed to integrate this discipline into the ancient system of sciences'.

223 S.E. *M.* 1.74: γραμματική ἐστι τέχνη τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι λεγομένων ('grammar is a τέχνη of things said by poets and prose authors').

224 Suet. *Gram. et rhet.* 10: *philologi appellationem assumpsisse videtur quia – sic ut Eratosthenes, qui primus hoc cognomen sibi vindicavit – multiplici variaque doctrina censebatur*: cf. Pfeiffer (1968, 158–9); Geus (2002, 39–41). The evidence of Suetonius is only superficially contradictory with the title of γραμματικός attributed to Eratosthenes according to Clem.Al. *Strom.* 1.16.79.3, where the context is, typically, that of identifying who is the first to have been called γραμματικός, 'scholar', rather than κριτικός (on the evidence provided by Clemens Alexandrinus, see below). As argued by Matthaios (2011, 64–5), a φιλόλογος is *a priori* also a γραμματικός, since the former 'title' encompasses the latter (a hyponym). Cf. now also Dettori (2023) *ad loc.*

to be the original source of the majority of the Eratosthenic quotations from *On Old Comedy* that we find in Athenaeus, Harpocration, Hesychius, and the Medieval scholia to Aristophanes.[225]

The direct tradition (papyri) is unfortunately quite limited and postdates both the (only) complete edition of Eratosthenes' fragments by Bernhardy (1822) and Strecker's (1884) collection of the fragments believed to belong to *On Old Comedy*.[226] The evidence is as follows: (i) P.Oxy. 35.2737 (= TM 59248; 2nd century CE), an Aristophanic commentary, possibly of Didymean origin, that preserves an extensive quotation from Eratosthenes at fr. 1 col. ii.10–7 (= Ar. fr. 590. 44–51 = *CLGP* 1.1.4 Aristophanes no. 27 = Eratosth. fr. 18 Bagordo): Eratosthenes is here discussing the dramatic career of Plato Comicus (= Pl.Com. test. 7);[227] (ii) PSI 2.144 (= TM 63455; 2nd/3rd century CE) (= Eratosth. fr. 19 Bagordo = fr. 4 Broggiato), containing excerpts from a biographical oeuvre of uncertain origin: Eratosthenes appears to report some anecdotal evidence, possible drawn from comedy (Antiphanes and Timocles) and from Demetrius of Phalerum, on the orator Demosthenes; he also deals with some aspect of Crates Comicus' oeuvre;[228] and, finally, (iii) P.Turner 39 (= TM 64217; 3rd century CE), a list of book titles, including an otherwise unknown Eratosthenian work on the *Iliad*.[229]

The *Suda*, together with the general remark that Eratosthenes wrote γραμματικὰ συχνά ('many grammatical works'), also gives us the titles of five philological works (*Su.* ε 2898):

(1) the monograph Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας (*On Old Comedy*), in at least 12 books;[230] Strecker's (1884) edition includes 55 fragments judged to be certain by

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225 For the indirect transmission of Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy*, see Benuzzi (2018); Benuzzi (2019); Benuzzi (2023c, 277–8), with previous literature.

226 Bagordo (1998) contains a small selection of Eratosthenes' fragments pertaining to Attic drama, together with some of the new papyrological evidence. Broggiato (2023) has recently re-edited 24 fragments (from Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy*, Ἀρχιτεκτονικός, and Σκευογραφικός). To facilitate the reader's navigation through the various partial re-editions of Eratosthenes' fragments, we shall first give Strecker's numeration, followed, when available, by Bagordo's and Broggiato's.

227 See Bagordo (1998, 133–4); Montana (2012) *ad loc.*

228 See Bagordo (1998, 134–5); Perrone (2020, 332–4; 341–4); Broggiato (2023, 25–32).

229 See Geus (2002, 291; 302–3) and more below. The evidence of P.Oxy. 13.1611 (= TM 64211; 3rd century CE), a collection of exegetical excerpts apparently gathered from various sources, is of uncertain attribution: Grenfell and Hunt suggested Eratosthenes' Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας or Didymus' Σύμμικτα as possible titles: cf. Montana (2012, 238–9).

230 The full title is preserved by D.L. 7.5, Gal. 19.65 Kühn (= *Gloss.* 144 Perilli), Harp. δ 13 and μ 25; the titles Περὶ κωμῳδίας (Poll. 10.60 = Eratosth. fr. 11 Strecker; Ath.11.510d = Eratosth. fr. 25 Strecker; Phot. ε 2227 = Eratosth. fr. 47 Strecker = fr. 11 Bagordo; Harp. μ 16 = Eratosth. fr. 91 Strecker = fr. 4 Bagordo) or Περὶ κωμῳδιῶν (Eratosth. fr. 109 Strecker = fr. 6 Bagordo) are clearly

the editor (but only eight preserve the mention of the title) and further 28 of uncertain attribution (marked by Strecker with an asterisk);[231]

(2) Ἀρχιτεκτονικός (i.e. λόγος: something like *Description of Construction Tools*): an onomastic work collecting technical terms used by craftsmen. Sometimes thought to be not an independent work but a subheading or subchapter of the monograph *On Old Comedy*, the Ἀρχιτεκτονικός is now considered by modern scholarship to be a self-standing glossographical work arranged by subject matter, probably a by-product of Eratosthenes' studies on Old Comedy.[232] Two fragments of certain ascription survive: schol. Apoll.Rh. 1.564–7c (= Eratosth. fr. 60 Strecker = fr. 22 Bagordo = fr. 2 Broggiato), on the different constituents of a ship's mast,[233] and schol. Apoll.Rh. 3.232 (= Eratosth. fr. 17 Strecker = fr. 21 Bagordo = fr. 9 Broggiato) detailing the parts of the plough;[234] it is also likely that Pollux's description of the ἔμβολος (Poll. 1.145 = Eratosth. fr. 39 Strecker = fr. 3 Broggiato) – that is, the linchpin at the end of a wagon's axle preventing the wheel from falling off – can be traced back to the Ἀρχιτεκτονικός;[235]

(3) Σκευογραφικός (i.e. λόγος: *Description of Household Tools*): also likely to be an onomasticon, this time of household implements,[236] and most probably one of the main sources of Pollux's Book 10 (cf. Poll. 10.1 = Eratosth. fr. 23 Bagordo = Strecker 1884, 13);[237]

(4) A commentary on some aspect(s) of the *Iliad* (= P.Turner 39 [= TM 64217; 3rd century CE] fr. A.2 Ἐρατοσθ(ένους) Εἰς τὸν ἐν τῇ Ἰλ[ιάδι);[238]

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abbreviated forms of the original. Critical overviews of the work can be found in Nesselrath (1990, 172–80); Geus (2002, 291–301); Mureddu (2017); Benuzzi (2018); Broggiato (2023, 125–6).

231 From the outset, Strecker's *recensio* was deemed over-confident: see Tosi (1994a, 168–9 n. 46).

232 Sub-chapter of *On Old Comedy*: Bernhardy (1822, 205–6); autonomous onomasticon: Strecker (1884, 13–4), followed by Latte (1925, 163 n. 56); Geus (2002, 290 nn. 7–8; 301); Mureddu (2017, 161–2); Broggiato (2023, 123).

233 See Broggiato (2023, 19–22).

234 See Broggiato (2023, 51–6).

235 Cf. Geus (2002, 302 n. 102); Broggiato (2023, 23–4).

236 The Σκευογραφικός was also suspected by Bernhardy (1822, 204–5) of being part of *On Old Comedy*; in this direction, still Nesselrath (1990, 88), but see Geus (2002, 300–1 n. 8) and more recently Tribulato (2019c, 247); Broggiato (2023, 126).

237 On Eratosthenes' Σκευογραφικός as an important source for Pollux's Book 10, see Nesselrath (1990, 87–8; 94–5); Tosi (2007, 4–5); Tosi (2015, 624).

238 See Matthaios (2011, 57 n. 12) on the possible nature of this work (Homeric geography, according to Poethke 1981, 165; explanation of obsolete words and word-formations, according to Geus 2002, 302–3, or, as a further alternative, a monograph on the dual (Geus 2002, 310 n. 105)).

(5) A grammatical work entitled Γραμματικά, in two books, according to Clem.Al. *Strom.* 1.16.79.3: Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ ὁ Κυμαῖος πρῶτος <τοῦ γραμματικοῦ ἀντὶ> τοῦ κριτικοῦ εἰσηγήσατο τοὔνομα καὶ γραμματικὸς προσηγορεύθη. ἔνιοι δὲ Ἐρατοσθένη τὸν Κυρηναῖόν φασιν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξέδωκεν οὗτος βιβλία δύο 'γραμματικὰ' ἐπιγράψας ('Apollodorus of Cyma was the first to introduce the name of γραμματικός in substitution for κριτικός and was the first to be called γραμματικός. But according to some, Eratosthenes was [the first to be called γραμματικός] because he published two books entitled Γραμματικά').[239] It is highly likely that Eratosthenes' definition of γραμματική in the *scholia Vaticana* to Dionysius Thrax's Τέχνη discussed in the previous pages originally belonged to this work. Another likely candidate for the Γραμματικά is Eratosthenes' observation that the circumflex accent 'inclined from an acute first part to a grave second part' (*Eratosthenes ex parte priore acuta in grauem posteriorem* [sc. *flecti putavit*]) according to the *Explanationes in artem Donati* by Pseudo-Sergius, quoting Varro who, in his turn, must have drawn on Tyrannion ([Sergius], *Ex. in Don. GL* 4.530.17–531.1 = Varro fr. 84.15–29 Goetz–Schoell = Tyrannion fr. 59 Haas).[240]

Within Eratosthenes' extant philological production, items (1), (2), and (3) all exhibit a dominant interest in Attic comedy in general,[241] with (3) more specifically focused on Old Comedy, which, as we have already seen (cf. Chapter 1, Section 4.1; Chapter 4, Section 5.2), will be of paramount importance for the later Atticist theorisation, especially in terms of canon formation. We shall now examine more closely Eratosthenes' treatise Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας in its scholarly context, trying in particular to see to which extent the claim of 'strict Atticism' or 'purist tendencies' advocated by some modern scholarship for this work is justified, and whether it is at all a useful hermeneutical tag to apply to Eratosthenes' scholarly agenda.[242]

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239 Cf. above n. 224. On the trustworthiness of Clemens' evidence (doubted by Geus 2002, 305) see Matthaios (2011, 53 n. 13; 57–8).

240 An illuminating analysis of Eratosthenes' own concept of the circumflex accent (defined uniquely through the acute and grave accents, with the exclusion of the existence of a μέση προσῳδία, differently from Varro) is now offered by Matthaios (2022). On Varro's fragment and its context within the Latin grammarians' reflection of the circumflex accent, see Probert (2019, 195–200; our translation of the Latin text follows hers). It is unclear whether Eratosthenes' comment must be related to the spoken or written accent: see Tosi (2006, section C), who favours the spoken thesis. For the ascription of this piece of evidence to the Γραμματικά of Eratosthenes, see already Knaack (1907, 385); Geus (2002, 304 n. 110); Matthaios (2011, 62–3).

241 This holds true, irrespective of the view that one is inclined to take for the Ἀρχιτεκτονικός and Σκευογραφικός (standalone works or subchapters or annexes to *On Old Comedy*).

242 Strict Atticism: Slater (1976, 237; 241), in the wake of Strecker (1884, 19); Geus (2002, 295 with n. 50). Purist tendencies: Tosi (1994a, 168; 171); Tosi (1998a, 335), followed by Montana (2020b,

5.2 Eratosthenes on comic language

Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy*, despite clearly representing a new stage in Hellenistic scholarship on drama given the adoption of a more 'scientific' approach to its subject,[243] did not emerge from thin air, but could rely on a long tradition of studies on Attic comedy, especially, though not exclusively, within the Aristotelian and Peripatetic schools.[244] An important predecessor against whom Eratosthenes, in his studies on Attic comedy, measured himself, often mercilessly pointing out his forerunner's inaccuracies, was the poet and scholar Lycophron of Chalcis (4th/3rd century BCE).[245] Lycophron was entrusted by Ptolemy Philadelphus with the διόρθωσις of the comic poets[246] and was himself author of a treatise entitled Περὶ κωμῳδίας in at least 9 books (cf. Lyc. fr. 13 Strecker = fr. 1 Pellettieri). From the twenty or so extant fragments that are ascribable with a reasonable degree of certainty to Lycophron, we know that the Chalcidian scholar covered both Old and Middle Comedy (cf. Ath. 13.555a = Lyc. fr. 2 Pellettieri on Antiphanes). However, the structure and inner articulation of his *On Comedy* remains largely uncertain: Strecker thought it was a collection of comic glosses, perhaps even in alphabetical order,[247] and without any systematic method behind it, but in the last decade, this rather negative judgement on Lycophron's scholarship has been questioned. Recent studies have, in fact, shown that Lycophron's *On Comedy* must have been a work covering a broader range of topics than that expected by a

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186–7) (= Montana 2015, 113–4). Schenkeveld in Tosi (1994a, 202–3) had already expressed his scepticism towards both attitudes; cf. now also Dettori (2023).

243 See Section 5.1 on Eratosthenes' scientific analogical method.

244 See the overview by Lowe (2013, 343–7). Theophrastus of Eresus was author of a treatise entitled *On Comedy* (Theophr. frr. 1–2 Bagordo; see Nesselrath 1990, 149–61), as also Chamaeleon (Chamael. frr. 10–11 Bagordo; see Nesselrath 1990, 163–4; Bagordo 1998, 26–8), while the Peripatetic philosopher Eumelus wrote specifically on Old Comedy (Eumelus phil. fr. 1 Bagordo; see Nesselrath 1990, 165; Bagordo 1998, 32).

245 Two recent contributions on Lycophron's philological activity (Lowe 2013, 351–3 and Pellettieri 2020, esp. 237–4) have offered a more charitable interpretation of the Chalcidian's accomplishments: the indirect tradition, mostly via Didymus' Λέξις κωμική, offers a very partial (if not, at times, deforming) perspective, since it almost uniquely records Lycophron's mistakes.

246 See Tzetzes *Proll. Com.* 11a.1.22–3.1–7 (= Lyc. test. 6a Pellettieri), 11a.2.31–32.1–4, 33.22–5 (= Lyc. test. 6b Pellettieri), the *scholium Plautinum* 48.1–6 Koster (= Lyc. test. 6c Pelletteri), and the *Anonymus Cramerii* II, *Proll. Com.* 11c.43.1–4, 17–8 (= Lyc. test. 6d Pellettieri). The precise nature of Lycophron's editorial work has been much disputed: cf. Lowe (2013, 350 with n. 29), and now, in greater detail, Pellettieri (2020, 261; 264–5, with previous bibliography), inclined to ascribe to Lycophron an activity of revision and emendation of the copies of the comic texts, comparable to that of Zenodotus for Homer.

247 Strecker (1884, 4); cf. also Pfeiffer (1968, 119–20), and more recently Dubischar (2015, 566).

mere glossary: in the extant fragments, we find not only lexical explanations but also issues of stagecraft, relative chronology, and literary criticism.[248]

Returning to Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy*, its structure also remains unclear, and this notwithstanding the fact that a higher number of fragments has been preserved by the indirect tradition. The only reasonably safe conclusion that we may draw is that Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy* does not appear to have been ordered either alphabetically or chronologically.[249] What is also certain, as is already clear from the title, is that Eratosthenes recognised at least two stages in the development of Attic comedy: an older and a newer phase, with the first broadly coterminous with our notion of Old Comedy.[250] In particular, in Cic*. Att.* 6.1.18 (= Eratosth. fr. 48 Strecker = fr. 12 Bagordo = fr. 19 Broggiato) we are informed that Eratosthenes employed chronological arguments to debunk the trustworthiness of the tradition that held that Eupolis had been murdered in 415 BCE by Alcibiades (as revenge for having been attacked in Eupolis' comedies): Eratosthenes pointed out that some of Eupolis' productions postdated that date (*adfert enim quas ille post id tempus fabulas docuerit*).[251] In late antique and Byzantine treatises on Attic comedy, this anecdote about Eupolis' death at the hands of Alcibiades (= Eup. test. 3) is frequently considered as the dividing line between Old Comedy and Middle Comedy, when the ὀνομαστὶ κωμῳδεῖν was not allowed.[252] However, this later use of the anecdote does not necessarily imply that Eratosthenes himself used this evidence in a discussion of the periodisation of Attic comedy in general: just as in other surviving fragments, we might simply be dealing with an isolated observation on the relative chronology of Cratinus' comic performances, as recently restated by Broggiato (2023, 96).

Regarding the content of *On Old Comedy*, the variety of topics treated by Eratosthenes testifies to the breadth and diversity of his scholarly interests. The same may be said for the range of authors quoted: alongside Aristophanes, we find

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248 See Lowe (2013, 352–4); Broggiato (2019b, 279–80); Pellettieri (2020, 237–8).

249 Nesselrath (1990, 177 with n. 78) speaks of a loose collection of miscellaneous items, comparable to modern *Adversaria*; Geus (2002, 292) suggests a thematic principle as a possible ordering criterion but offers no further details. For an overview of the various hypotheses advanced by previous scholarship on the subject, see Benuzzi (2018, 336 n. 4).

250 See Montana (2013). Nesselrath (1990, 180) is willing to ascribe to Eratosthenes the tripartition of Attic comedy into Old, Middle and New, but see the objections by Geus (2002, 292), and in more detail by Broggiato (2019b, 280–2). Cf. also Montana (2020b, 186 n. 252) (= Montana 2015, 113 n. 240). On the likely Hellenistic origin of the tripartition of Attic comedy, first explicitly attested in 2nd century CE sources, see Montana (2020b, 175 n. 178) (= Montana 2015, 102 n. 168) with relative bibliography.

251 This anecdote was reported, among others, also by Duris of Samos (Duris *BNJ* 76 F 73).

252 See e.g. Platon. *Diff. com.* 21–5 Perusino.

Crates Comicus, Cratinus, Eupolis, Lysippus (perhaps), Pherecrates, Phrynichus, Plato Comicus, Strattis, but also quotations from tragedians (Aeschylus, Euripides), epic poetry (Hesiod), lyric (Archilochus, Simonides, Lamprocles the dithyrambographer),[253] and prose authors such as Plato, and perhaps Lysias and Demosthenes.[254] If we keep to the fragments whose attribution to Eratosthenes' treatise is more solidly grounded,[255] we find a wide array of observations on various subjects:[256]

Dramatic chronology: alongside general chronological remarks,[257] many of Eratosthenes' observations within this category are intertwined with issues of (re-)performance, revision, and stagecraft. Cf. e.g. Ar. *Pax* Arg. II a2 (= Eratosth. fr. 38 Strecker = fr. 10 Bagordo): Eratosthenes claimed that it was unclear (ἄδηλον) whether Aristophanes' second *Peace* was simply a revival of the first *Peace* (the extant version) or a completely new play not preserved at Alexandria (ἥτις οὐ σώζεται); schol. Ar. *Nu.* 553 (= Eratosth. fr. 97 Strecker = fr. 14 Bagordo): Eratosthenes rectifies Callimachus' mistaken judgement on the relative chronology of Aristophanes' *Clouds* and Eupolis' *Maricas*. Callimachus apparently found fault with the Aristotelian production lists (διδασκαλίαι) but, in so doing, Eratosthenes tells us, he did not take into consideration Aristophanes' revised version of the *Clouds*; schol. Ar. *Ra.* 1028f (= Eratosth. fr. 109 Strecker = fr. 6 Bagordo = fr. 18 Broggiato): an allegedly revised version of Aeschylus' *Persians* at Syracuse on Hieron's instigation. As Benuzzi (2023c, 277–8) has argued, Eratosthenes possibly also discussed the wording of *Ra.* 1028 in this context: this evidence is important because it demonstrates how a remark on reperformance probably originated from a narrow textual observation; schol. Ar. *Pl.* 1194 (= Eratosth. fr. 7 Strecker = fr. 10 Broggiato = Lyc. fr. 13 Pellettieri): Lycophron thought that Aristophanes' *Wealth* (staged in 388 BCE) was the first play in which torches had been brought on stage (see Pellettieri 2020, 319–24); Eratosthenes corrected Lycophron, quoting as evidence Aristophanes' *Assemblywomen* (staged between 393 and 389 BCE), Stratt. fr. 38, and Philyll. fr. 29 (both active at the turn of the century, ca. 410–400 BCE).

Attic realia (especially legal and religious customs): cf. e.g. Hsch. π 513 (= Eratosth. fr. 3 Strecker = fr. 7 Broggiato) on **παρ᾽αἴγειρον θέα**, 'a viewing place be-

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253 For these last two poets, see the detailed treatment by Benuzzi (2019).

254 Full list in Geus (2002, 292–4).

255 That is, those not marked by an asterisk in Strecker's edition.

256 The following division of topics is merely *exempli gratia*; some categories, needless to say, overlap.

257 Cf. e.g. schol. Ar. *Pax* 48e–f (= Eratosth. fr. 70 Strecker) on Cleon's death, important to contextualise *Peace*, and P.Oxy. 35.2737, in which Eratosthenes treated some aspect of literary-historic interest connected with the dramatic career of Plato Comicus (= Ar. fr. 590.44–51 = Pl.Com. test. 7).

side a poplar' (a quotation from Cratin. fr. 372), explained by Eratosthenes as the viewing place for theatregoers close to the end of the wooden scaffolding, the ἴκρια (see Broggiato 2023, 43–7; the reference is obviously to the old 5th-century BCE wooden auditorium and not to the stone one built in the 4th century BCE); schol. Apoll.Rh. 4.279–81c and *Et.Gen.* (A) 213v–214r, (B) 168r, s.v. κύρβεις (~ *EM* 547.45–58) (= Eratosth. fr. 80 Strecker = fr. 1 Broggiato) on the form and nature of the Solonian ἄξωνες and **κύρβεις** (cf. also Ar.Byz. fr. 410), on which see the detailed treatment by Broggiato (2023, 9–17); Harp. α 166 (= also part of Eratosth. fr. 80 Strecker just quoted above) on the link between the γένος of the Eupatridae and the cult of the Eumenides in Athens (cf. schol. Soph. *OC* 489 = Polemon fr. 49 Preller); Harp. δ 13 (= Eratosth. fr. 89 Strecker = fr. 3 Bagordo) on **δεκάζω** 'to corrupt (judges)' and the proverbial expression **Λύκου δεκάς**: for the transmission of these two expressions in the lexicographical tradition, see Benuzzi (2018, 338–42); Harp. μ 16 (= Eratosth. fr. 91 Strecker = fr. 4 Bagordo) on **μεῖον** and **μεια-γωγός**: the reference is to the Athenian practice of introducing the sons of male citizens into their respective phratries by bringing a sacrificial victim of the required weight (that is, not inferior (μεῖον) to a given measure): at the presentation of the offering, the members of the phratry would ritually shout 'too small' (μεῖον): cf. Benuzzi (2018, 335–8) for the Didymean origin of this entry.

Miscellaneous matters of antiquarian interest: cf. e.g. schol. Ar. *Av.* 806a (= Eratosth. fr. 6 Strecker) on **κῆπος**, a particular kind of 'hair-do' (cf. Benuzzi 2018, 342–6 on the textual dislocation of this gloss within the scholiastic tradition); cf. also the chronology of historical events in schol. Ar. *Av.* 556b (= Eratosth. fr. 59* Strecker = fr. 13 Bagordo) on the sacred war between the Athenians and Phoceans for the sanctuary of Delphi (448 BCE).

Dialectal glosses (other than Attic): Arcadian: cf. below Eust. *in Il.* 1.302.27–30 (= Eratosth. fr. 16 Strecker) under the rubric 'proverb'. **Cyrenean**: cf. schol. Ar. *Pax* 70a (= Eratosth. fr. 18 Strecker = fr. 15 Broggiato) on **ἀναρριχᾶσθαι** 'to climb up with hands and feet' (the ultimate source of the scholium is Didymus: see Benuzzi 2022c); for the Atticist doctrine on this lexical item, see below Section 5.3; schol. Ar. *Av.* 122a (= Eratosth. fr. 125 Strecker) on a goat-hide garment called **σίσυρνα** (τὴν δὲ σισύρναν οἱ κατὰ Λιβύην λέγουσι τὸ ἐκ τῶν κωδίων ῥαπτόμενον ἀμπεχόνιον) on which see Pellettieri (2020, 357). Strecker also ascribed to Eratosthenes other glosses of allegedly Cyrenean origin, but the evidence is doubtful: Hsch. β 1152 (= Eratosth. fr. 29* Strecker = Lyc. fr. dub. 36 Pellettieri) on **βρίκελος**, of uncertain meaning (Strecker followed M. S. Schmidt 1854, 30 in considering this gloss Cyrenean on the basis of Hsch. β 1156: βρικόν· ὄνον, Κυρεναῖοι. βάρβαρον), and Hsch. μ 351 (= Eratosth. fr. 90* Strecker = Lyc. fr. dub. 21 Pellettieri) on **μασταρίζω** 'to gnash with teeth', 'to mumble' (cf. Phot. μ 129). **Sicilian**: *Et.Gen.* (A) 113r–v, (B) 83r s.v. δραξών

(~ *EM* 286. 33–7 = Eratosth. fr. 37 Strecker = fr. 17 Broggiato) on the terms **δραξών** 'snatcher' and **καψιπήδαλος** (of obscure meaning): both terms refer to a ritual game practised in Sicily during the festival in honour of the goddess Cotyto (see Broggiato 2023, 83–8). Broggiato (2023, 87–8) suggests that the original context of Eratosthenes' comment on these Sicilian words must have been a passage of Eupolis' *Dyers*, whereas Tosi (1994a, 170 n. 48) and Geus (2002, 294 n. 31) hypothesise some comment on Doric comedy (Kaibel 1899b, 180 thought that Eratosthenes was discussing the vexed question of the origin of comedy).

Literary criticism: cf. e.g. schol. Pi. *O*. 9.1k (= Eratosth. fr. 136 Strecker = fr. 16 Bagordo) on the literary genre to which the onomatopeic refrain **τήνελλα καλλίνικε** (= Archil. fr. 324 West) belonged (see in this connection also schol. Ar. *Av*. 1764, where, however, Eratosthenes' name is not mentioned); issues of disputed authorship also arise: cf. e.g. Harp. μ 25 (= Eratosth. fr. 93 Strecker) on the authorship of Pherecrates' *Miners*, with the closely related entry of Phot. ε 2203 (= Eratosth. fr. 46 Strecker); Eratosth. fr. 149 Strecker (= 17 Bagordo) on the presence in Aristophanes' MSS of spurious Attic idioms. For a detailed treatment of these last two fragments and what they can or cannot tell us about the supposed 'purist tendencies' of Eratosthenes', see Section 5.3 below.

Explanation of unusual or difficult words/expressions: this category, unsurprisingly, represents the overwhelming majority of the extant fragments: cf. e.g. Gal. *Gloss.* prooem. 144, 25–6 Perilli (= p. 17 Strecker) on neologisms in comedy; schol. Ar. *Eq*. 963a and schol. Hes. *Op*. 590b (= Eratosth. fr. 9 Strecker = fr. 12 Broggiato) on **(ἀ)μολγός** 'embezzler' and **ἀμολγαίη**, 'a loaf fit for shepherds': on the long exegetical history of these terms in ancient and modern scholarship, see Tosi (1998b), and Broggiato (2023, 65–9); Poll. 10.60 (= Eratosth. fr. 11 Strecker = fr. 1 Bagordo = fr. 13 Broggiato) on **ἀναλογεῖον**, 'lectern' (on the importance of this fragment for the range of authors consulted by Eratosthenes, see Section 5.3 below); Ath. 4.140a (= Eratosth. fr. 26 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 15 Pellettieri) on **βάραξ/βήρηξ**, apparently a kind of μᾶζα eaten at the Spartan festival of the Kopides, but erroneously understood by Lycophron as τολύπη 'ball' and by Eratosthenes as προφυράματα, 'doughs kneaded in advance'; schol. Ar. *V*. 704b (= Eratosth. fr. 43 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 8 Pellettieri) on **ἐπισίζω**: both Lycophron and Eratosthenes (οἱ περὶ Ἐρατοσθένην) glossed ἐπισίζω with 'to hiss at a dog to set it on someone', possibly betraying an interest in onomatopoeic word formation and euphonic theories (cf. Pellettieri 2020, 308–9). On its Atticist survival, see Section 5.3 below; Ath. 11.501d (= Eratosth. fr. 25 Strecker = fr. 21 Broggiato = Lyc. fr. 4 Pellettieri) on the compound adjective **βαλανειόμφαλος**, 'with bath-like bosses', with reference to bowls ('φιάλαι'): the navel-like protuberances inside the bowls are explained by Eratosthenes as being like the domes of the bathing rooms (βαλανεῖον), hence the iunctura φιάλας τάσδε βαλανειομφάλους in

Cratin. fr. 54 (*Fugitive Women*): see Broggiato (2023, 102–7); Phot. η 8 and Eust. *In Od.* 1.97.30–1 (= Eratosth. fr. 55 Strecker) on **ἤϊα** 'provisions for the journey' or 'chaff' in Homer, interpreted by Eratosthenes as indicating 'properly' (κυρίως) the stalks of pulses (ὀσπρίων καλάμαι). Eustathius, after mentioning Eratosthenes' understanding of the term, adds καὶ δισυλλάβως ἐν συναιρέσει, ἦα ὡς καὶ Φερεκράτης ('and by contraction there is disyllabic ἦα, as Pherecrates [says] (fr. 172)). The bisyllabic scansion ἦα instead of ἤϊα is said to be proper of the 'newer Attic' in schol. (Did. *vel* Hdn.) Hom. *Od.* 2.410a (HMᵃ): δεῦτε φίλοι· Καλλίστρατος [p. 208 Barth] 'δεῦτε φίλοι, ὄφρ' ἦα φερώμεθα'. καὶ ἔστι τῆς νεωτέρας Ἀτθίδος τὸ οὕτως συναιρεῖν. Barth (1984, 211 n. 4) ascribes the observation on the bisyllabic scansion in Eustathius *in Od.* 1.97.30–1 directly to Callistratus (a 2nd-century BCE grammarian, pupil of Aristophanes of Byzantium), but Eratosthenes himself may indeed have already remarked on this feature. Whether the remark on the linguistically 'younger' character of ἦα vs Homeric ἤϊα (trisyllabic) goes back to Eratosthenes is impossible to say (cf. Barth 1984, 212). To us, it rather smacks of Aristarchean doctrine, perhaps filtered through Herodian (see Chapter 7, Section 3.2); Hsch. ε 1590 (= Eratosth. fr. 63 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 11 Pellettieri) on **κατειλυσπωμένην**, interpreted by Eratosthenes as derived from κατὰ + εἰλεῖν 'to coil' + σπᾶσθαι 'to be drawn', vs Lycophron's καταρτωμένην, 'hung': cf. Pellettieri (2020, 315–6), and Tosi (1998a, 345); for the Didymean origin of Hesychius' entry, see now Benuzzi (2023c, 162–3 n. 489); Hdn. Περὶ παθῶν *GG* 3,2.295.13–9 (= Eratosth. fr. 68 Strecker) on the colloquialism **ποῖ κῆχος**, understood by Eratosthenes as ποῦ ἐγγύς; ('where nearby?') and εἰς τίνα τόπον; ('to which place?'); schol. Ar. *V.* 239a (= Eratosth. fr. 74 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 7 Pellettieri) on **κόρκορος**: not a fish, as Lycophron argued, but a wild and cheap vegetable from the Peloponnese; it was also part of a proverbial expression (κόρκορος ἐν λαχάνοις), on which see below; schol. Ar. *Pax* 199b (= Eratosth. fr. 81 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 9 Pellettieri) on **κύτταρος**, indicating, according to Eratosthenes, the 'holes' of wasps' and bees' nests vs Lycophron's botanical explanation (cf. Pellettieri 2020, 310–2); Phot. σ 498 (= Eratosth. fr. 121 Strecker) on **σάμαξ**, understood by Eratosthenes as 'rush-mat'; schol. Ar. *Pax* 702a (= Eratosth. fr. 152 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 10 Pellettieri) on **ὡρακιάω** 'to have the sight darkened while fainting', vs Lycophron's ὠχριάω, 'to become pallid' (cf. Benuzzi 2018, 346–8; Pellettieri 2020, 313–4).

Disambiguation of semi-synonyms: cf. e.g. schol. Ar. *Av.* 122a, schol. Pl. *Erx.* 400e, and Ph.Bybl. *Diff. sign.* 169 Palmieri (= Eratosth. fr. 125 Strecker) on **σισύρα** = βαίτη, that is, a 'goat-fleece cloak' (cf. Chapter 7, Section 4.4 n. 269), vs **σίσυρνα**, 'goat-hide coat' (see also σισύρα in Lyc. fr. dub. 28 Pellettieri); *Et.Gud.* 171.17–9 (= Eratosth. fr. 20 Broggiato) on **ἀποκήρυκτος** (someone disowned by his own kin because of an offending act) and **ἐκποίητος** (someone given up to adoption), both technical terms in Attic law: see Broggiato (2023, 97–101). Interestingly, ἀποκήρυκτος is not attested

in extant Greek poetry but only in oratory; Poll. 4.93–4 says that the term ἀποκήρ-υκτος was not used by ancient authors since its first attestation was in the 4th-century BCE historian Theopompus (Theop.Hist. *BNJ* 115 F 339), who, always according to Pollux, 'is nothing to judge by' in linguistic matters (τὸ μέντοι ὄνομα 'ὁ πο-κήρυκτος' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρήσει τῇ παλαιᾷ, Θεόπομπος δ' αὐτῷ κέχρηται ὁ συγγραφεύς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν Θεοπόμπῳ σταθμητὸν εἰς ἑρμηνείας κρίσιν). However, Broggiato (2023, 99–100) has rightly observed that the verbs ἀποκηρύττω and ἐκ-ποιέω are well attested in comedy, hence the suggestion that this fragment belongs to *On Old Comedy*: Eratosthenes might thus have commented on a lesser known or later author whose text has not survived.

Proverbs:[258] cf. e.g. schol. Ar. *V*. 239a = (Eratosth. fr. 74 Strecker) on which see above: cf. Zen. 4.57 καὶ **κόρκορος** ἐν λαχάνοις, Diogenian. 5.36, *Su*. κ 1404; Eust. *in Il*. 1.302.27–30 (= Eratosth. fr. 16 Strecker) includes the quotation of the Atticist Pausanias for a type of oak called by the Arcadians **φελλός**, 'cork-oak' (Paus.Gr. α 153: a word attested in Hermesian. fr. 10 Lightfoot = Paus. 8.12.1), a kind of hat worn in Arcadia (**Ἀρκᾶς κυνῆ**:[259] Paus.Gr. α 152; cf. Hsch. α 7273), and the proverb **Ἀρκάδας μιμούμενος** (= Paus.Gr. α 151): see Tosi (1998a, 344–5) and now Broggiato (2023, 73–6). See also *Proverbia* in the Florentine MS Pl. 58. 24 (= Eratosth. fr. 20 Bagordo) for the expression **μὴ ὑπὲρ τὸν καλόποδα**.

Attic orthography and accentuation. **Orthography**: Phot. ε 100 (= Eratosth. *fr. novum* Broggiato): **ἔγχουσαν** οἱ Ἀττικοὶ λέγουσι τὴν ῥίζαν, οὐ δὴ ἄγχουσαν, ἣν ἀπείρως Ἐρατοσθένης φυκίον. Ἀμειψίας Ἀποκοτταβίζουσι· 'δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν ἔγχουσα καὶ ψιμύθιον' ('Attic speakers call the root (alkanet) ἔγχουσα, not ἄγχουσα, which Eratosthenes out of ignorance [thinks is] a seaweed. Ameipsias in the *Cottabus-Players* (Amips. fr. 3): 'alkanet and white lead at the price of two obols'').[260] Alka-

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258 On the important role that paroemiography played in the development of Hellenistic lexi-cography, see Tosi (1994a, 179–93); it is worth remembering that Aristotle and the Peripatus also had a particular interest in proverbial expressions: cf. Benuzzi (2018, 340 n.18). On the role played by proverbs in Eratosthenes' philology, see Tosi (1998a, 344–5).

259 For the ascription to Eratosthenes of the explanation of the expression Ἀρκᾶς κυνῆ, see Lan-gella (2014); the original Classical reference must have been Ar. *Av*. 1203 πλοῖον ἢ κυνῆ (cf. schol. Ar. *Av*. 1203a.α).

260 The lemma is preserved only in the codex Zavordensis (z) of Photius, a manuscript discov-ered by Linos Politis in the monastery of Zavorda in 1959. For the ascription of this fragment to *On Old Comedy*, see the detailed argumentation by Broggiato (2019a): in the extant literature of the 5th and 4th century BCE ἔγχουσα (and perhaps the denominative ἐγχουσίζομαι: cf. *com. adesp*. fr. *170) are attested only in comedy (Ar. *Lys*. 48, *Ec*. 929, Ar. fr. 322.3, and Ameipsias fr. 3) and in Xenophon (2x in the *Oeconomicus*). According to Broggiato (2019a) the accusation of ἀπει-ρία against Eratosthenes may have originated in Polemon of Ilium, an antiquarian of the first

net is a vegetable root used as red pigment by Greek women: the entry in Photius compares and contrasts the Attic form and the common Greek spelling of the word (cf. also Hdn. Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας *GG* 3,2.495.29–30: ἔγχουσα· εἶδος βοτάνης, ἢ καὶ διὰ τοῦ α λέγεται ἄγχουσα, Ἀττικοὶ δὲ διὰ τοῦ ε and Moeris ε 30 ἔγχουσα διὰ τοῦ ε <Ἀττικοί>· ἄγχουσα διὰ τοῦ α <Ἕλληνες>) and explains that ἔγχουσα was the root of a herb, hence finding fault with Eratosthenes, who thought it was a type of seaweed. As observed by Broggiato (2019a, 452), Eratosthenes may have been misled by the fact that φῦκος (*Roccella tinctoria*), a water plant, was also used for cosmetic purposes, and that φῦκος is mentioned together with ἔγχουσα in Ar. fr. 322.3, a list of toiletry items (cf. also Poll. 5.101: ἴσως δ' ἂν τοῖς κόσμοις προσήκοι καὶ τὸ ἔντριμμα, ψιμύθιον, ἔγχουσα, φῦκος, κτλ.). **Accentuation**: Phot. ε 2227 = Ael.Dion. ε 71 (= Eratosth. fr. 47 Strecker = fr. 24 Broggiato): **εὐκλεία καὶ τὰ ὅμοια**· μακρὰ ἡ τελευταία καὶ παροξύνεται, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν ιβ' Περὶ <κωμῳδίας> (suppl. Porson). Eratosthenes commented on the long quantity of the final vowel (and the consequent paroxytone accentuation) of abstract nouns in -εία in Attic; Ael.Dion. α 21 (= Eust. *in Od.* 1.579.28–31) mentions also other abstract nouns in -είᾱ and -οίᾱ (ἀγνοία, ἱερεία, ἀναιδεία, προνοία), together with a quotation from Ar. fr. 238 (*Banqueters*). Strecker (1884, 38) ascribed the discussion of all these terms to Eratosthenes together with the remarks on the pronunciation on ἀγνοία in Σᵇ α 74 (= Eratosth. fr. 1* Strecker) and ἀδολεσχία (schol. Ar. *Nu.* 1480d = Eratosth. fr. 2* Strecker), but see the caution recommended by Tosi (1994a, 168) and now Broggiato (2023, 120). Eustathius, quoting Ael.Dion. α 21, specifies that the paroxytone accentuation was a characteristic of the παλαιοὶ Ἀττικοί.[261] In Attic dialect abstract nouns in -εια deriving from adjectives in -ής and -ους may have either a long α (with the Ionic equivalent ending in -η) or a short one. Modern scholarship has usually considered the form in -είᾱ as the original (older)

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261 Eust. *in Od.* 1.579.28–31 (commenting on *Od.* 7.297): οἱ γὰρ παλαιοὶ Ἀττικοὶ κατὰ Αἴλιον Διονύσιον ἐξέτεινον τὰς τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων ληγούσας· διὸ καὶ παρόξυναν αὐτά· ἡ ἀγνοία γάρ, φησίν, ἔλεγον καὶ ἡ εὐκλεία καὶ ἡ ἱερεία καὶ ἡ διανοία, καὶ ἡ ἀναιδεία δέ, φησί, καὶ ἡ προνοία· ὧν πάντων ἐκτείνεται μὲν ἡ τελευταῖα, ἡ δὲ πρὸ αὐτῆς ὀξύνεται. Ἀριστοφάνης Δαιταλεῦσιν· 'ὦ προνοία καὶ ἀναιδεία' ('For the ancient speakers of Attic, according to Aelius Dionysius, lengthened the final syllables of nouns of this sort, and as a consequence they put an acute accent on the penultimate; because they used to say ἀγνοία ('ignorance'), he says, and εὐκλεία ('glory') and ἱερεία ('sacrifice') and διανοία ('thought'), as well as ἀναιδεία ('shamelessness'), he says, and προνοία ('forethought'). The final syllable of all of these is lengthened, and the syllable before that gets an acute accent. Aristophanes in the *Banqueters* (Ar. fr. 238): 'Oh προνοία ('forethought') and ἀναιδεία ('shamelessness')!'").

one, with -ειᾰ being the later form (cf. K–B vol. 1, 126; Schwyzer 1939, 469; Chantraine 1933, 87–8), thus apparently backing up Eustathius' testimony. This interpretation has, however, been disputed.[262] Be this as it may, Aristophanes used both the form in -είᾱ and the one in -ειᾰ (cf. e.g. Ar. *Eq.* 323 ἀναίδειᾰν, metrically guaranteed) according to metrical convenience (see Cassio 1977, 82). It is difficult to assess whether the diachronic argument (older -είᾱ vs younger -ειᾰ) was already present in Eratosthenes and was simply omitted in Phot. ε 2227 = Ael.Dion. ε 71 through a process of epitomisation and excerption. As observed by Vessella (2018, 124), Herodian records both spellings and corresponding accentuations (-ίᾱ; -ιᾰ), commenting on the first as 'poetic' (Hdn. Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας *GG* 3,2.453.10: λέγεται δὲ καὶ ποιητικώτερον ἀναιδία, εὐγενία, ἀπαθία, εὐμαθία and Hdn. Περὶ ὀρθογραφίας *GG* 3,2.453.20: καὶ τὸ <ι> ποιητικόν). Vessella tentatively identifies the reason for such a diastratic evaluation in 'its attestations in Attic theatre'. Again, it is impossible to say whether this observation on the 'poetic' feature of the nouns in in -είᾱ vs -ειᾰ also went back to Eratosthenes.

Idioms peculiar to the Attic dialect: cf. e.g. Phot. η 51 and *Et.Gen.* (A) 165v, (B) 125v (~ *EM* 416.31-8) s.v. **ἦ δ᾿ ὅς** (= Eratosth. fr. 52 Strecker = fr. 22 Broggiato): ἦ δ᾿ὅς (or ἦν δ᾿ἐγώ) was understood by Eratosthenes as 'he said' (or 'I said'); on the ancient exegesis of this expression, already Homeric, and well attested in Attic comedy and above all in Plato, see Schironi (2004, 545–53); Broggiato (2023, 111–3). The idiom is explicitly recognised as Attic in schol. Ar. *Eq.* 634b: <ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ·> ἔφην ἐγώ. Ἀττικὴ δὲ ἡ λέξις καὶ ἡ σύνταξις. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῇ συνεχῶς κέχρηται καὶ κατακόρως ὁ Πλάτων. In Phot. η 51 we find a quotation from the comic poet Hermippus (fr. 2), shared also by the *Et.Gen.*, and from Plato (Pl. *R.* 327c.10): both quotations probably go back to Eratosthenes. Our scholar attended the Academy while in Athens and wrote a treatise entitled Πλατωνικός (cf. Geus 2002, 20–1), mostly of philosophical nature. It seems more likely, therefore, that Eratosthenes' strictly grammatical remark on ἦ δ᾿ ὅς (ἦ explained as a form of the verb ἠμί = φημί followed by the qualification that the pronoun ὅς has a rough breathing because it is used as a (demonstrative) pronoun, cf. Phot. η 51: ἦ δ᾿ ὅς· οἱ μὲν περὶ Ἐρατοσθένην ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔφη δὲ ὅς· διὸ καὶ δασύνουσι τὴν ἐσχάτην· ἐντετάχθαι γὰρ ἄρθρον τὸ ὅς. καὶ ἦ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔφη) was to be found not in his *Platonikos* but in his *On Old Comedy*: see Broggiato (2023, 112–3).

A second Attic form commented on by Eratosthenes is the indefinite pronoun (neuter plural) **ἄττα**, that according to schol. Pl. *Sph.* 220a (= Eratosth. fr. 22 Strecker) Eratosthenes interpreted 'temporally' (χρονικῶς), presumably quoting

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262 See Dettori (1996, 304–7).

Ar. frr. 617 πυθοῦ χελιδὼν πηνίκ’ ἄττα φαίνεται, and 618 ὁπηνίκ’ ἄτθ’ ὑμεῖς κοπ-
ιᾶτ’ ὀρχούμενοι. The later lexicographical tradition, Atticists included (cf. e.g. Ael.
Dion. α 193; Phryn. *PS* fr. 274; Σᵇ α 2372), usually records four possible meanings
for ἄττα: (i) τινά (‘something’), when it has smooth breathing; (ii) ἅτινα (‘anything
which’) or ἅπερ ἄν (‘the very thing which’), when it has rough breathing; (iii) a
‘superfluous’ use, often after numerals (cf. Ael.Dion. α 193: [. . .] ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ὡς
παρέλκον ἐστί), often exemplified by the quotation of Pherecr. fr. 161.2; (iv) a tem-
poral value, similar to that of πότε, πηνίκα, and the like (that is, the use remarked
upon by Eratosthenes).[263] We do not know whether Eratosthenes too discussed
the three other meanings of ἄττα/ἅττα.

Finally, in Ath. 2.41d (= Eratosth. fr. 92 Strecker), we are informed that Eratosthenes
said that the Athenians (Ἀθηναῖοι) called **μετάκερας** (‘intermixed’, often of water,
that is, ‘lukewarm’) that which the other Greeks called τὸ χλιαρόν (καλοῦσι τὸ
χλιαρόν, ὡς Ἐρατοσθένης φησίν. ὑδαρῆ φησὶ καὶ μετάκερας), and the Platonic glos-
sary by [Did.] *De dubiis apud Platonem lectionibus* 20 Valente (= Eratosth. fr. 75
Strecker) attests that the idiom **ἐπὶ κόρρης** (τύπτειν) was glossed by Eratosthenes as
(to be beaten) ‘on the head’. On Eratosthenes’ interpretation of ἐπὶ κόρρης in the
context of the relevant Atticist doctrine, see Section 5.3 below.

As the above examples attest, Eratosthenes’ treatise covered almost every imagin-
able aspect pertaining to Old Comedy, from minute textual issues to performance
and stagecraft; in his comments and observations, the point of departure is fre-
quently a detail of the text, from which he then proceeds to expound on broader
topics. In the overwhelming majority of cases, Eratosthenes’ ‘scientific’ method
includes an extensive and appropriate use of parallels both within and beyond
the comic corpus, a comparative method that jars strongly with the impromptu
explanation offered by the so-called γλωσσογράφοι.

5.3 Eratosthenes and linguistic purism

We noted that previous scholars have detected in Eratosthenes’ philological activ-
ity signs of either a strict Atticism *ante litteram* (the strong claim: Strecker, Slater,
Geus) or traces of ‘purist’ tendencies (the weak claim: Tosi, Montana), albeit in a
descriptive rather than prescriptive manner (see Section 5.1 above). In this sec-

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263 Dunbar (1995, 699), with reference to at Ar. *Av.* 1514, comments that ‘the neut. plur. ἄττα
may have been illogically added to adv. πηνίκα on the analogy of ποῖ’ ἄττα (*Ra.* 936), πόσ’ ἄττα
(*Pax* 704, *Ra.* 173)’.

tion, we shall once more examine the evidence adduced in support of either the strong or weak version of these claims.

The fragments most frequently invoked by scholars in this respect are Eratosth. frr. 46 (= Phot. ε 2203) and 93 (= Harp. μ 25) Strecker, both dealing with Pherecrates' *Miners*.[264]

> Eratosth. fr. 46 (= Phot. ε 2203): εὐθὺ Λυκείου· τὸ εἰς Λύκειον· ὅθεν Ἐρατοσθένης καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑποπτεύει τοὺς Μεταλλεῖς. καὶ Εὐριπίδης οὐκ ὀρθῶς· 'τὴν εὐθὺς Ἄργους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίας ὁδόν'.

> Straight to (εὐθύ) the Lykeion' (Pl. *Ly*. 203a): [It means] towards the Lykeion. Hence, for this reason as well, Eratosthenes suspects [the authenticity of] the *Miners* (Pherecr. fr. 116 and *PCG*, vol. 7, 155 test. ii). And Euripides, not correctly, [says]: 'the road straight to (εὐθύς) Argos and Epidaurus' (Eur. *Hipp*. 1197).

> Eratosth. fr. 93 (= Harp. μ 25): Μεταλλεῖς· [. . .] ἔστι δὲ καὶ δρᾶμα Φερεκράτους Μεταλλεῖς, ὅπερ Νικόμαχον φησι πεποιηκέναι Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν ζ´ Περὶ τῆς ἀρχαίας κωμῳδίας.

> *Miners*: There is also a play by Pherecrates entitled *Miners*, which Eratosthenes in the 7th book of his *On Old Comedy* says was composed by Nicomachus.

The use of the adverbs εὐθύ, usually meaning 'straight to', and εὐθύς, usually meaning 'immediately', has a long exegetical presence in the erudite tradition. As Benuzzi (2022b) has recently demonstrated, in the Classical period, both adverbs εὐθύ and εὐθύς could, on occasion, overlap semantically, with either used in the temporal or spatial sense alongside their standard use.[265] In the Hellenistic period (3rd to 1st century BCE), the situation remains apparently unchanged as far as literary texts are concerned, with the exception of a wider use of εὐθύ with temporal value and no instances of εὐθύς + genitive in the spatial sense (the temporal εὐθέως increasingly becomes dominant in documentary texts).[266] Whereas the evidence from literature, as just seen, appears to allow for a certain degree of flexibility between usages across a substantial span of time (Classical and Hellenistic Greek), the later Atticist tradition drew a much more rigid distinction between the 'correct' and 'incorrect' uses of both adverbs. For instance, for Phrynichus (*Ecl*. 113) only the ignorant 'many' (οἱ πολλοί) would ever use εὐθύ temporally; the correct usage was only one: εὐθύ + genitive in the spatial sense of 'straight to-

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264 Both fragments have a long interpretative history: see Slater (1976, 235–7 and 241); Tosi (1994a, 169); Tosi (1998a); Tosi (2022), and most recently Benuzzi (2022b). They are also briefly discussed by Montana (2020b 186–7) (= Montana 2015, 112–4).

265 The use of εὐθύς + genitive in the spatial sense ('straight to') is attested twice in Euripides: Eur. *Hipp*. 1197 and Eur. fr. 727c.29–30. The cases of temporal εὐθύ (Soph. *OT* 1242; Eur. *IT* 1409; Eup. fr. 392.2; Men. *Pc*. 155) are, however, not entirely unambiguous: see Benuzzi (2022b).

266 These data rely on the thorough survey by Benuzzi (2022b).

ward', while εὐθύς had only temporal value ('immediately'), with no room for overlap between the two idioms.[267] The same 'correct' use of the two adverbs was upheld by Photius;[268] the only Imperial lexicographical source to admit an exception and record the extended use of εὐθύ meaning 'immediately', is, unsurprisingly, the *Antiatt.* ε 96 (εὐθύ· ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐθέως), probably drawing on Aristophanes of Byzantium (fr. 369) to defend its more flexible stance.[269]

It is against this background that we must evaluate Eratosth. frr. 46 and 93 Strecker. Both fragments tell us that Eratosthenes doubted the authenticity of the *Miners* by Pherecrates. Fr. 93 adds that according to Eratosthenes, the author of the *Miners* was not Pherecrates but Nicomachus, correctly identified by modern scholars with a 3rd-century BCE dramatist (a New Comedy poet).[270] Only fr. 46 (that is, Photius' entry) articulates, albeit in an obscurely abridged form, one of the reasons (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο) for Eratosthenes' doubt. Photius is unfortunately rather elliptic: the abrupt transition from the lemma, a quotation from the beginning of Plato's *Lysis* 203a (εὐθὺ Λυκείου), to the inference drawn by Eratosthenes about the spuriousness of Pherecrates' *Miners* (ὅθεν Ἐρατοσθένης καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὑποπτεύει τοὺς Μεταλλεῖς) reveals a blatant logical gap.[271] As cogently argued by Tosi (1998a, 329), the only way of restoring some logical consequentiality in Photius' entry is to suppose that the *interpretamentum* in its originally unabridged form is likely to have included a more extended remark, on the part of Eratosthenes, on the different usages of εὐθύς and εὐθύ: this would then explain the following censure of the Euripidean passage (*Hipp.* 1197) for the 'improper' use of εὐθύς + genitive indicating motion towards.[272]

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267 Phryn. *Ecl.* 113: εὐθύ· πολλοὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ εὐθύς, διαφέρει δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τόπου ἐστίν, εὐθὺ Ἀθηνῶν, τὸ δὲ χρόνου καὶ λέγεται σὺν τῷ σ.

268 Phot. ε 2185: εὐθὺς λέγουσι καὶ εὐθέως· τὸ δὲ εὐθὺ χωρὶς τοῦ σ ἐπὶ τόπου τιθέασιν ('They say εὐθύς and εὐθέως, but they use εὐθύ without sigma to indicate a place'): cf. also *Su.* ε 3523. A full list of the occurrences of the two idioms in the lexicographical and grammatical tradition can be found in Benuzzi (2022b).

269 For the evidence provided by Ar.Byz. fr. 369 = Herenn.Phil. 81 ([Ammon.] 202) and its relation to Eratosthenes' evaluation, see Benuzzi (2022b) and Chapter 7, Section 2.1.

270 Two comic poets (New Comedy) with this name are attested in the 3rd century BCE: see Kassel, Austin, *PCG* vol. 7, 56 and 62. The identification by Nesselrath (1990, 179 n. 88) of our Nicomachus with an alleged 5th-century BCE comic poet thus named, and seemingly attested at Ath. 8.364a (a passage concerning the authenticity of Pherecrates' *Chiron*: [. . .] τὰ εἰρημένα ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν Χείρωνα πεποιηκότος, εἴτε Φερεκράτης ἐστὶν εἴτε Νικόμαχος ὁ ῥυθμικὸς ἢ ὅστις δή ποτε Νικόμαχος ὁ ῥυθμικός), has been rightly refuted by Tosi (1998a, 330–1): Νικόμαχος ὁ ῥυθμικός is to be identified with Nicomachus of Gerasa, the 2nd-century CE Neoplatonic philosopher.

271 See Tosi (1998a, 328–30) for the textual clues indicating the bad epitomisation suffered by the *interpretamentum* of our lemma.

272 The quotation of Eur. *Hipp.* 1197 (with εὐθύς) would have made less sense if Eratosthenes had limited himself to expound on the usage of sole adverb εὐθύ.

It thus follows that Eratosthenes faulted the *Miners* with an improper use of either εὐθύ or εὐθύς. Various scholars have advanced different proposals. According to Slater (1986, 136), initially followed by Tosi (1994a, 169; 1998a, 329), what Eratosthenes would have censured in the *Miners* is the use of εὐθύς with genitive in the spatial sense, just as in the Euripidean passage quoted immediately after in Photius (that is, the Euripidean usage would not have been valid proof for Eratosthenes for its acceptability in Pherecrates). More recently, Tosi (2022, 43) has changed his mind, and on the basis of evidence provided by Ar.Byz. fr. 369 = Herenn.Phil. 81 ([Ammon.] 202) has argued that it was the temporal use of εὐθύς that Eratosthenes faulted (Herennius/Ammonius recommends εὐθέως for 'immediately'). This solution, however, is highly counterintuitive: as argued in detail by Benuzzi (2022b), not only is the temporal use of εὐθύς ubiquitous in 5th-century BCE literature (and in comedy of *any* period), but such a use occurs in many other plays by Pherecrates (frr. 40, 71, 75, 113, 153, 162). Benuzzi's alternative explanation (Eratosthenes objected to the temporal use of εὐθύ, whose attestation in the Classical period is open to contrasting interpretations) is, in our opinion, much more likely to be the correct one: Eratosthenes' censure of temporal εὐθύ in a 5th-century BCE comic poet (Pherecrates) and its admissibility in a 3rd-century BCE New Comedy poet (Nicomachus) would be in keeping with the linguistic data outlined above for the Hellenistic period, when a markedly increased use of temporal εὐθύ is recorded (Benuzzi 2022b).

To take stock of what we have argued so far, we saw that Strecker (1884, 19) considered frr. 46 and 93 to constitute evidence of an Atticist tendency *ante litteram* in Eratosthenes, and that almost a century later, Slater strongly assented to this judgement, followed by Geus.[273] Various scholars have since criticised this claim; Tosi especially has repeatedly argued that we cannot speak of a fully-blown Atticism (the strong claim) for Eratosthenes but only of a 'purist tendency' (the weak claim), partly determined by the subject matter (Old Comedy), and that Eratosthenes' allegedly 'purist' tendency grows anyway out of philological concerns (*Textpflege*).[274] However, even more importantly for our purposes, and this independently from whatever solution one may be inclined to adopt for fr. 46

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[273] See Slater (1976, 237): '[. . .] we are justified in thinking of him as one of the first Atticists'; and Slater (1976, 241): 'We can also see that arguments concerning atticistic rules grew up around the attribution of works in the library, and the movement can therefore be said to begin at least 230 B.C. Eratosthenes appears as a strict atticist, Aristophanes as a milder follower of the συνή-θεια'. Cf. also Geus (2002, 295 with n. 50): 'Eratosthenes scheint hier einem strikten Attizismus verpflichtet gewesen zu sein'.

[274] See Tosi (1994a, 168; 171); Tosi (1998a, 335), followed by Montana (2020b, 186–7) (= Montana 2015, 113–4). It is worth quoting Tosi (1994a, 171) in full: 'Appare, infatti, probabile che per lui si debba parlare di una tendenza purista, dovuta innanzi tutto all'argomento trattato; si tratta però solo di una tendenza, e non lo si può ovviamente accostare a coloro che nell'ambito del movi-

(Eratosthenes suspected the use of εὐθύς + genitive indicating motion towards or that of εὐθύ in a temporal sense), it is important to highlight what has so far gone practically unnoticed by modern scholarship (perhaps because of its obviousness): that is, a notable difference of attitude between Eratosthenes and the later Atticist tradition (with the exception of the *Antiatticist*) vis-à-vis the usage of the two idioms discussed so far. What our evidence (frr. 46 and 93 Strecker) tells us is not that Eratosthenes denied in absolute terms the linguistic possibility of using εὐθύ in a temporal sense (or εὐθύς in a spatial one): rather, he simply deemed it unsuitable for a given play by a given author – namely, Pherecrates (an Old Comedy poet) – but possible, and hence admissible, in a play by Nicomachus, most probably a later New Comedy poet. This stance is a far cry from that embraced by Phrynichus or Photius. We are, in fact, not dealing with an absolute veto: Eratosthenes simply recognised that different authors (possibly of different chronological periods) also have different linguistic usages. What is inadmissible in Pherecrates may be accepted in Nicomachus.[275] That is, in exercising his judgement on the κρίσις ποιημάτων, Eratosthenes employed linguistic criteria, distinguishing between different authors' various styles and usages. This, rather than the later Atticist prescription regarding the 'correct' use (in absolute and not relative terms) of εὐθύ and εὐθύς, is the context within which Eratosthenes' evaluation of the authenticity of the *Miners* must be located. Moreover, to recognise the original conceptual framework of Eratosthenes' linguistic observation on the usage of the two adverbial idioms further contributes to undermine also the 'weak' claim of 'purist tendencies'. To speak of linguistic purism (see Chapter 1, Section 3) with reference to Eratosthenes' distinction between the admissible uses of εὐθύ(ς) in Pherecrates and Nicomachus is, in itself, unwarranted: purism presupposes an *a priori* selection of approved authors and a prescriptive attitude, while Eratosthenes is not saying that Pherecrates is 'more Attic' or 'better' than Nicomachus (even if to judge by the quantitative ratio of their textual survivals it was probably so).[276] He is drawing a distinction between different linguistic usages that are peculiar to two given comic poets: he is not drawing up a 'canon' of approved and non-approved authors.[277]

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mento atticista svolgeranno una vera e propria funzione purista, su un piano decisamente e programmaticamente prescrittivo'.

275 This holds true, by the way, irrespective of the date that is assigned to Nicomachus himself.

276 In the 2nd century CE Pherecrates had already acquired the status of ὁ Ἀττικώτατος ('the most Attic'): cf. Ath. 6.268e (quoting from the *Miners*: Pherecr. fr. 113) and Phryn. *PS* fr. 8 (~ Phot. α 466).

277 This dovetails neatly with the fact that also in Eratosthenes' definition of grammar 'there is no mention of 'canonic authors', as already observed by Matthaios (2011, 79): see above Section 5.1.

Another piece of evidence often quoted to substantiate claims of Atticism or linguistic purism in Eratosthenes is fr. 149 Strecker (= 17 Bagordo):

> Eratosth. fr. 149 Strecker (= schol. Ar. *Ra*. 1263c VEΘBarb(Ald.)): τῶν ψήφων λαβών· Ἐρατοσθένης τῶν ψευδαττικῶν τινας γράφειν φησὶ † 'τῷ ψήφῳ λαβών' (τῷ ψήφῳ Barb: τῇ ψήφῳ Θ, τῶ ὃ ψήφω V, τῶν ψήφων E(Ald), τὼ ψήφω Dindorf), ἵνα καὶ τὰ πεπλασμένα δράματα ἐν οἷς τὸ παράπαν τοῦτο ἠγνόηται δοκῇ μὴ σεσολοικίσθαι.†

> τῶν ψήφων λαβών ('having taken some pebbles'): Eratosthenes says that some of the ψευδαττικοί read † 'τῷ ψήφῳ λαβών' in order that (or with the consequence that: see below with n. 279) also spurious comedies, in which this [construction] is entirely unknown, might seem not to contain solecisms†.

At Ar. *Ra*. 1262, Euripides has just stated that he will offer a parodied version of Aeschylus' choral lyrics to illustrate how repetitive and poor they are. Xanthias promptly replies (1263) καὶ μὴν λογιοῦμαι ταῦτα τῶν ψήφων λαβών ('and I shall indeed take some pebbles and count them off'). The partitive genitive τῶν ψήφων (after λαβών)[278] is unanimously attested in all the MSS; our scholium instead substitutes the correct τῶν ψήφων with some unidentified 'wrong' form criticised by Eratosthenes. Unfortunately, much in the transmitted *Wortlaut* of this scholium is problematic and is still awaiting a satisfactory solution, as the cruces of Chantry make clear. The main points of contention among modern scholars are (i) the precise wording of the variant (or conjecture?) ascribed by Eratosthenes to some of the ψευδαττικοί; (ii) the identity of these ψευδαττικοί (professional forgers/interpolators, or scholars ignorant of the proper Attic idiom?); and (iii) the syntactical referent of τοῦτο in the relative clause introduced by ἐν οἷς.

Let us start from ψευδαττικοί. The two different interpretations put forward (intentional forgers or erudites not well versed in Attic dialect) are strictly linked to the meaning one attributes to ἵνα. If ἵνα is taken as introducing a final clause, the intentionality of the linguistic falsification is blatant and the ψευδαττικοί must be Ptolemaic forgers active in the librarian market: their interest was therefore to pass as 'Aristophanic' plays that were not genuinely by Aristophanes. If one instead takes ἵνα + subjunctive in the well-attested post-Classical meaning of ὥστε, the 'falsification' is not an intended consequence, but rather the clumsy result of ignorance: the ψευδαττικοί would then be scholars not properly acquainted with correct Attic usage. Owing to their incompetence, they inadvertently allowed solecisms to creep

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278 See Dover (1993, 345). The use of the genitive with both the active and middle forms of λαμβάνω is well attested in the later grammatical tradition: Cf. e.g. [Hdn.] *Philet.* 257: καὶ τὸ <λαβέσθαι> μᾶλλον γενικῇ συντάττουσιν (for which *Antiatt*. λ 11 with the quotation from Alexis fr. 23 might be relevant); Eust. *in Il*. 1.229.7: ὅτι κεῖται καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ λαβεῖν ἐπὶ γενικῆς and 2.610.10: πολλαχοῦ δὲ τὸ λαβεῖν γενικῇ συντάσσεται ταὐτὸν ὂν τῷ ἅψασθαι (cf. also *Su*. λ 82).

into Aristophanes' text.[279] Both interpretations are possible: forgers of literary texts certainly existed in Eratosthenes' own time, and so did sloppy scholars.

As for (iii), it is likely that the text of our scholium has undergone some form of abridgement, thus obliterating an important logical intermediate step: Tosi reasonably suggested that, to restore some logical sense to the text of the scholium, one must assume that some essential information specifying the meaning of τοῦτο (presumably referring to some linguistic norm) has at a certain point been omitted (Tosi 1998a, 334).[280] Issue (i) proves more challenging: the precise reading discussed by the scholium and criticised by Eratosthenes on the grounds of solecism remains unclear. Tosi (1998a, 332–3) argues for a gender metaplasm, adopting Dobree's τὸν ψῆφον (ψῆφος being notoriously feminine),[281] whereas Broggiato (2017, 281–2) supports Dindorf's accusative dual τὼ ψήφω: Eratosthenes, who admitted the use of the dual for the plural in Homer, would not have accepted it in Attic and condemned it as a solecism.[282]

Notwithstanding all these uncertainties, the general sense conveyed by the scholium is clear enough: Eratosthenes faulted some persons for accepting in Aristophanes' text an incorrect linguistic usage (σεσολοικίσθαι: be it gender, number, or case), a usage that, to more competent eyes, was immediately perceived as incorrect and, as such, could be used to tell apart genuine and spurious plays (cf. τὰ πεπλασμένα δράματα). Just as in the case of Pherecrates' *Miners*, we find Eratosthenes involved in a question of *Echtheitskritik* and, once more, his criterion for determining the authenticity of a given expression is strictly linguistic in nature. That is, whatever was the proper Attic 'norm' (congruence of gender or number) to which Eratos-

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279 The supporters of the 'forgery' hypothesis are, among others, Fritzsche (1845, 337), Strecker (1884, 16), and Wilamowitz (1900, 42). Tosi (1998a, 331–5, with previous bibliography), followed by Broggiato (2017), interprets instead ψευδαττικοί as a reference to ignorant scholars on the basis of the only two other extant occurrences of ψευδαττικός, that is, Phryn. *Ecl.* 45 (υἱέως· οἱ ψευδαττικοί φασιν οἰόμενοι ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ Θησέως καὶ τῷ Πηλέως) and Luc. *Sol.* 7 (καὶ χρᾶσθαι δε τινος εἰπόντος, ψευδαττικόν, ἔφη, τὸ ῥῆμα). For the post-Classical use of ἵνα = ὥστε, see Di Bartolo (2021, 5 n. 19 and 123; 127); for just an example of this use of ἵνα in the Aristophanic scholia, cf. e.g. schol. Ar. *Ach.* 200 REΓ: χαίρειν κελεύων: κατ' εὐφημισμὸν τὸ χαίρειν: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ χαίρειν κελεύων τὸν Ἀμφίθεον <λέγειν> οἴονταί τινες, ἵνα γραφῇ τὸ κελεύω χωρὶς τοῦ ν. τὸ δὲ ἑξῆς <"ἐγὼ δὲ πολέμου"> τὸν Δικαιόπολιν.

280 See also the textual discussion on ἐν οἷς τὸ παράπαν τοῦτο ἠγνόηται in Nesselrath (1990, 180 n. 90).

281 For Eratosthenes' interest in change of gender, see Eratosth. fr. 82 Strecker (ἡ πέτασος, ἡ στάμνος according to 'some').

282 For Eratosthenes' defence of the use of the Homeric dual *pro* plural, see schol. (Ariston.) Hom. *Il.* 24.282 (A) and schol. (Ariston.) Hom. *Il.* 10.364b (A) (= Eratosth. fr. 35 Strecker). Fritzsche proposed instead the dative τῷ ψήφῳ, for which see Tosi (1998a, 330 n. 20) with the parallel of Aeschin. 1.161: ἵνα [. . .] δίκην λάβῃ τῇ ψήφῳ παρὰ τοῦ παραβάντος.

thenes referred in passing his judgement on the ψευδαττικοί, our scholar was not formulating a systematic rule but commenting on a specific passage of a specific author (Aristophanes), with his own linguistic συνήθεια. Strecker (1884, 16–7; 19) considered this fragment, together with fr. 93, to constitute evidence that Eratosthenes was 'Atticismi tam accuratus observator'. If this was intended to convey the idea that Eratosthenes' knowledge of the Attic dialect was extremely proficient and that he used it, as any editor would do, to judge questions of authenticity on a sound linguistic basis (the usage of a given author: in this specific case Attic authors), this is correct. If, instead, we want to see in this definition, as Slater (1976, 236–7 and 241) does, a declaration of affiliation *ante litteram* to the Atticist tenets, this is misleading. For one, it is important to emphasise that there is no guarantee that the dismissive label of ψευδαττικοί in our scholium can be traced directly back to Eratosthenes' *ipsissima verba*. Rather, it is highly likely that he did not use this formulation and that what we have here is a rendition, in Atticist terminology, of Eratosthenes' original wording. The fact that the only two other occurrences of the term ψευδαττικός in extant Greek literature are Phryn. *Ecl.* 45 and Luc. *Sol.* 7 (see n. 279 above) strongly suggest that the use of ψευδαττικοί to denigrate those who pretend to know Attic but really do not, makes much more sense in the cultural climate of the Second Sophistic in the second century CE rather than in 3rd-century BCE Alexandria.

A more complex case, as remarked by Tosi,[283] is that of Eratosth. fr. 35 Strecker (= schol. (Aristonic.) Hom. *Il.* 10.364b (A)), whose ascription to *On Old Comedy* remains doubtful (and with good reasons).[284] However, regardless of whether Eratosthenes' observation in the scholium should be traced back to *On Old Comedy* or to some other work of his, this witness is compelling in that it offers a grammatical observation by Eratosthenes that was apparently re-interpreted in an Atticist sense later on in the chain of transmission (Byzantine etymologica). The text of our fragment is as follows:

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283 Tosi (1994a, 171).

284 Pfeiffer (1968, 161) suggested that it could belong to a lost Homeric σύγγραμμα by Eratosthenes; see in this direction also Tosi (1994a, 171), and Geus (2002, 310 n. 105), both on the basis of schol. (Ariston.) Hom. *Il.* 24.282 (A), where Eratosthenes, together with Crates (Crates Gr. fr. 36 Broggiato), is mentioned among those who want the dual to be used 'confusedly' (that is, *pro plurali*) in Homer (οἱ θέλοντες συγχεῖσθαι τὰ δυϊκὰ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ: on this scholium see Schironi 2018, 589). Geus, in particular, has suggested that P.Turner 39 (see above Section 2.1) may be Eratosthenes' monograph on the dual.

Eratosth. fr. 35 Strecker (= schol. (Aristonic.) Hom. *Il.* 10.364b (A)): <διώκετον>· ὅτι τὸ <διώκε-τον> σημαίνει διώκουσιν ἢ διώκετε, οὐ τὸ <ἐ>διωκέτην,[285] ὡς Ἐρατοσθένης. ἔστιν οὖν τὸ Δόλωνα διώκουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐδίωκον, ὃν τρόπον 'αἱ μὲν ἀλετρεύουσι μύλης ἔπι' ἀντὶ τοῦ ἠλέτρευον.

<διώκετον>: [Note] that <διώκετον> ('the two of them pursue') means διώκουσιν ('they pursue') or διώκετε ('you pursue'), and not <ἐ>διωκέτην ('the two of them pursued') as Eratosthenes [says]. [The expression] Δόλωνα διώκουσιν ('they pursue Dolon') is used for ἐδίωκον ('they pursued'), just as we have 'some of the female servants grind (ἀλετρεύουσι) at the mill' (*Od.* 7.104) instead of 'they ground' (ἠλέτρευον).

Diomedes and Odysseus have just caught sight of the Trojan spy Dolon and decided to pursue him relentlessly. Here, Aristonicus probably preserves Aristarchean doctrine, according to which Homer intentionally used the present third-person dual διώκετον ('the two of them pursue') rather than the (unmetrical) imperfect (διωκέτην) as an example of the historic present.[286] Eratosthenes instead argued that Homer, while writing διώκετον, really meant the imperfect διωκέτην (-την being the secondary ending for the dual of the third person).[287] This poetic licence, usually attributed to metrical convenience by modern scholars, is found in two further instances in the *Iliad*, at 13.346 (ἐτεύχετον), and 18.583 (λαφύσσετον).[288] Ancient grammarians explained this Homeric licence in various ways.[289] For διώκετον at *Il.* 10.364, Apollonius Dyscolus speaks not of 'enallage of tense', as does Aristarchus, but of 'enallage of persons' (ἐναλλαγὴ προσώπων), although with evident scepticism (this explanation advanced by some is οὐ πιθανὴ ἀπολογία: Apoll.Dysc. *Pron. GG* 2,1.1.110.3–5).[290] Similarly, the explanation given in *Epim.Hom.* τ 55 observes that the poet 'does not keep to the analogy of persons' (μὴ φυλάξαντα τὴν τῶν προσώπων ἀναλογίαν). In the Byzantine etymologica, we find two motivations, both different from the Aristarchean one:

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285 Erbse ascribes the emendation (<ἐ>διωκέτην) to Friedlaender but this is incorrect: Friedlaender (1851, 370–1) prints throughout διωκέτην, that is, the unaugmented form of the imperfect, and rightly so in our opinion.

286 Translated into Aristarchean terminology, Homer would here be resorting to an 'enallage of tense' (the use of the present for the past): see Schironi (2018, 195–6); Matthaios (1999, 334).

287 Cf. West (2001, 77 and n. 98): 'He (i.e. Aristarchus) scolds Eratosthenes at K 364b for another inaccuracy concerning a dual, namely his construing διώκετον as an imperfect instead of as a historic present. Eratosthenes was right in this case and Aristarchus wrong'. Both explanations are reported in Hsch. δ 2043: διώκετον· ἐδίωκον. δυϊκῶς. ἢ διώκουσι.

288 See e.g. Chantraine (2013, 96 and 457); K–B (vol. 2, 69).

289 Cf. Friedlaender (1851, 671); Matthaios (1999, 334 n. 280).

290 Apoll.Dysc. *Pron. GG* 2,1.1.110.3–5: οὐ πιθανὴν ἀπολογίαν τινές φασιν, ὡς ἐν ῥήμασι παραλλαγὴ προσώπων· 'διώκετον' (K 364) γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ διωκέτην. Cf. Brandenburg (2005, 549).

EM 280.30–5 (~ *Et.Gen.* (AB) s.v. διώκετον: cf. Erbse's apparatus to schol. Hom. *Il.* 10.364b): διώκετον· ὅτι οἱ Ἀττικοὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τρίτοις προσώποις τῶν δυϊκῶν τοῖς δευτέροις χρῶνται, ὡς Ἀριστοφάνης· 'καταντιβολεῖτον αὐτὸν ὑποπεπτωκότες. | ἐκμαίνετον τὸν πατέρα τοῖς ὀρχήμασι'. τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ 'διώκετον ἐμμενὲς αἰεί'. ἅπερ ἔνιοί φασι διὰ τὸν κρητικὸν πόδα, ἤγουν τὸν ἀμφίμακρον, μὴ δυνάμενον παραλαμβάνεσθαι (Stephanus: παραλαμβάνειν MSS), † εἰς σύμφωνον λήγειν†· οὐκ ἠδύνατο γὰρ εἶναι διωκέτην· ἀκάθαρτον γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἀμφίμακρος.

διώκετον: [This is] because Attic writers use the second person of the dual also for the third person, as in Aristophanes (Ar. fr. 603): 'Falling down before him, you do entreat him! With your dances you two are making your father mad'. Such things [are found] also in Homer: 'the two of them pursued (διώκετον) relentlessly' (*Il.* 10.364). These forms, some say, because of the cretic foot, that is, the one with a long syllable at both ends (i.e. – ∪ –), not being acceptable, † end in a consonant†.[291] For it could not be διωκέτην: the cretic foot would be troublesome (?).[292]

This entry, in poor textual shape, appears to carelessly merge heterogeneous pieces of information.[293] Notwithstanding its many inconsistencies,[294] we are given two explanations for διώκετον: (i) Attic writers use the ending for the second person of the dual also for the third person, and this is already the case in Homer (with reference to our passage in *Il.* 10. 364) and (ii) διώκετον is a metrical licence. The first explanation, which seems to imply that Homer also wrote in some form of Attic, is not supported by either literary or documentary evidence. As observed by Kühner and Blass, with the exception of the three Homeric examples, Attic writers (poetry and prose) provide no certain cases of the past ending -τον of the second-person dual used for the third-person dual (whose proper ending is -την),[295] whereas

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291 σύμφωνον has been suspected (cf. Gaisford *ad loc.*: 'videtur mendosum'); the *Wortlaut* may be corrupt but the sense that διωκέτην is totally unacceptable because it ends in a consonant, that is, without possibility of abbreviation in hiatus of η, makes sense. Friedlaender read συστολήν, but even so the syntax still remains perplexing. We have put between cruces also λήγειν because of the syntactic oddity.

292 The translation of the last sentence is merely *exempli gratia*, since the overall syntax of the last period is convoluted and almost certainly corrupt: see Gaisford *ad loc.* The transmitted ἀκάθαρτον literally means 'unpure': Erbse suggested correcting it into ἄκαιρον, Friedlaender (1851, 371 n. 6) into ἀπαράδεκτον.

293 Cf. Friedlaender (1851, 371 n. 6).

294 The most blatant of which is the quotation of Ar. fr. 603 where καταντιβολεῖτον is a second-person dual present imperative and ἐκμαίνετον second-person dual present indicative: see K–B (vol. 2, 69), and Kassel, Austin *PCG* vol. 7, 321 in their apparatus *ad loc.* ('καταντιβολεῖτον et ἐκμαίνετον quomodo pro formis tertiae personae (imperfecti, cf. exemplum Homericum) haberi potuerint non liquet [. . .]. ἐκμαίνετον secundae personae indicativus praesentis esse videtur, καταντιβολεῖτον imperativus est, cf. Pac. 113, Vesp. 978').

295 Only three extant instances are known, all corrected by modern editors into -την (ἔφατον in Pl. *Euthd.* 274a, Isae. 4.7 ἤλθετον, and Thuc. 2.86 διέχετον/διείκετον): see Keck (1882, 52–4).

many examples of the reverse are known: the use of the third-person dual (-την) for the second person, in both poetry and prose.[296] Similarly, no instances of the use of the past ending -τον of the second-person dual for the third-person are attested in Attic inscriptions, with the exception of two metrical texts, the first (of the Roman period) being a direct quotation of Hes. *Op.* 199 ἴτον, and the second (post 350 BCE) most likely a Homeric imitation.[297]

What justification did Eratosthenes adduce in defence of his interpretation (διώκετον for διωκέτην)? Metrical licence or παραλλαγὴ προσώπων? Once again, we cannot tell for sure. We saw that Eratosthenes believed that Homer did use the dual with a certain liberty, extending it to a plurality of agents (that is, more than two). Did he also believe that Homer was equally loose in the use of the personal endings, swapping the second and third persons of the dual? Again, we cannot tell. However, even in the case that he did and was not simply explaining this licence on metrical grounds, we must remember that Eratosthenes was commenting on a specific Homeric passage and not on an Attic writer (οἱ Ἀττικοί of the *EM*). Aristarchus did believe that Homer wrote in an old form of Attic, and Aristophanes of Byzantium may have shared (or not) his opinion (see Chapter 7, Section 2.2). Nothing of the kind is however attested for Eratosthenes. If we keep this in mind along with the fact that the claim about the παραλλαγὴ προσώπων by Attic writers in *EM* 280.30–5 runs against the extant evidence (poetry *and* prose), it seems more economical to suppose, with Tosi (1994a, 171),[298] that what we have in the *EM* is an Atticist reinterpretation of whatever the original material may have been, possibly filtered through an ill-digested Aristarchean lens (Homer as an Attic author).

Other, scattered pieces of evidence contribute to the impression that to label Eratosthenes as either a fully-fledged 'Atticist' *ante litteram*, or a budding 'purist', is equally misleading. Let us take, for instance, the case of schol. Ar. *Pax* 70a–e (= Eratosth. fr. 18 Strecker = fr. 15 Broggiato) on ἀναρριχᾶσθαι 'to climb up with hands and feet':[299]

> Schol. Ar. *Pax* 70a–e: πρὸς τὸ ὕψος ἀνέβαινε. πρὸς δένδρα καὶ τοίχους ἢ σχοινίον ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς ποσὶν ἀνα<βαίνειν ἀνα>ρριχᾶσθαι λέγεται. φησὶ δὲ Ἐρατοσθένης Κυρηναίους οὕτω λέγειν. (V) εἴρηται δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρρίχων, ὅ ἐστι κοφίνων, οὓς εἰώθασι διὰ σχοινίων ἀνιμᾶν. ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀραχνῶν, καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἀραχνᾶσθαι. αἱ δὲ ἀράχναι πολλάκις νήθουσι κατακτὰς ἐναερίους ὁδούς. (RV) ἄλλως. καὶ τὸ ἀναρριχᾶσθαι δὲ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀράχνιόν ἐστι

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296 See the discussion in K–B (vol. 2, 69–70); cf. also Monro (1891, 6 n. 3).

297 Cf. Threatte (1996, 454) with details.

298 Tosi is most succinct in his treatment, but he does observe that 'gli etimologici bizantini (*Etym. Gen.* - *EM* 280, 28) lo (i.e. Eratosthenes' remark) riprendevano attribuendogli una connotazione atticista'.

299 Text and translation are by Benuzzi (2022c).

γενόμενον, ἀραχνιῶ, καὶ ἐν ὑπερθέσει τῶν στοιχείων ἀναρριχῶ τοῦ μὲν ν εἰς τὴν χώραν τοῦ ρ τεθέντος, τοῦ δὲ ⟦ι⟧ ἀμοιβαίως ⟦καὶ τοῦ ρ⟧ εἰς τὴν χώραν τοῦ ν, τοῦ δὲ χ πλησίον τοῦ ω. ταῦτα Ἡρωδιανὸς ἐν τῷ <ιϛ΄> τῆς καθόλου. ἄλλως. (V) κτλ.

He climbed upwards. The act of climbing along trees and walls or a small rope with the hands and the feet is called ἀναρριχᾶσθαι. Eratosthenes states that the Cyrenaeans say so. It comes from the ἄρριχοι, that is the baskets, which they used to draw up with small ropes. Or from the spiders (ἀράχναι), as if it were ἀραχνᾶσθαι. The spiders often spin fragile paths in the air. Alternatively, the ἀναρριχᾶσθαι [found] in Attic authors comes from ἀράχνιον ('spider's web'), ἀραχνιῶ and, with transposition of the letters, ἀναρριχῶ, with ν taking the place of ρ, ι and ρ in turn taking the place of ν, and χ close to ω. So [says] Herodian in the sixteenth book of the *General* [*Prosody*] etc.[300]

Immediately after the *interpretamentum* (ἀναρριχᾶσθαι = ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς ποσὶν ἀναβαίνειν), we are told that according to Eratosthenes, this expression was a Cyrenean gloss. Afterwards, we are given a first etymology: ἀναρριχᾶσθαι derives from ἄρριχος, a wicker basket apparently lifted upwards using ropes (the term is attested, within the comic corpus, only in Ar. *Av.* 1309).[301] A second etymology follows, clumsily repeated twice: ἀναρριχᾶσθαι derives from ἀράχνη ('spider'). The second time, this alternative etymology from 'spider' is explicitly framed within a specifically Attic context (καὶ τὸ ἀναρριχᾶσθαι δὲ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς κτλ.) and traced back to Herodian, who, according to the grammatical doctrine of pathology, had ἀναριχάω derive from ἀράχνη via *ἀραχνιάω (through multiple transpositions of letters).[302]

It appears that, in antiquity, there were thus two competing etymologies for the verb: one from ἄρριχος (and hence ἀναρριχᾶσθαι with gemination of ρ), going back at least to Pausanias the Atticist but perhaps even to Didymus (Benuzzi) or Eratosthenes himself (Strecker), and a second from ἀράχνη 'spider' (and hence ἀναριχᾶσθαι, with only one ρ). This appears to be supported by the witness of Phrynichus in his *PS* 32.2–4:

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300 Cf. *Et.Gen.* α 805 (= *EM* 99.14–25) quoting instead Hdn. Περὶ παθῶν (*GG* 3,2.387.5) for the etymology.

301 Strecker also attributed to Eratosthenes the etymology from ἄρριχος. On the basis of Eust. *in Od.* 1.213.31–2, who ascribes the etymology to Paus.Gr. α 158, Benuzzi (2022c) is more cautious: the etymology from ἄρριχος 'goes back at least to Pausanias, but possibly even to Didymus (as it occurs right after the reference to Eratosthenes in the scholium to *Pax* 70)'.

302 Benuzzi (2022c), following Vessella (2018, 150), rightly observes that 'Herodian's proposed etymology should result in *ἀναριχῶ, without geminate ρ'. Benuzzi inclines for the second of the two possible explanations for the lack of the geminate in the Herodian's transposition of letters ('either a duplication of ρ went missing in the transmission of the scholium, or the spelling with ρρ was applied by analogy to the text of the entire annotation at some point in its transmission, obscuring Herodian's original ἀναριχάομαι'), also on the basis of Phryn. *PS* 32.2–4 attesting a spelling with only one ρ.

> Phryn. *PS* 32.2–4: ἀναριχᾶσθαι· πάνυ Ἀττικὴ ἡ φωνή. σημαίνει δὲ τὸ τοῖς ποσὶ καὶ ταῖς χερσὶν ἀντεχόμενον ἀναβαίνειν, οἷον ἀνέρποντα. οἱ δὲ δύο ρρ γράφοντες ἁμαρτάνουσιν.

> ἀναριχᾶσθαι: The word is very Attic. It means to climb up holding on by the feet and the hands, as if creeping upwards. Those who write it with two ρ are wrong.

Phrynichus explicitly specifies that the verb in question is 'very Attic' (πάνυ Ἀττικὴ ἡ φωνή)[303] and that the correct spelling is with only one ρ, whereby those who write it with two are in error. The evidence presented hitherto reveals that at least in Imperial times (Herodian, Phrynichus), the word's correct spelling was disputed (with the orthography with a single ρ approved as 'correct' by the strict Atticist Phrynichus). Not only is there no trace of this debate in Eratosthenes, who, incidentally, from Phrynichus' perspective would have sided with those he criticised for ἁμαρτία (since they spelled the term with two ρ), but he explicitly considered the term a feature of the Cyrenean dialect.

Likewise, there are other cases in which Eratosthenes would have ended up, if not on the 'blacklist' of later Atticists, at least among those who did not propose a wholly sound doctrine. Take the case of Eratosth. fr. 75 Strecker on the Attic expression ἐπὶ κόρρης, which is probably a colloquialism:[304]

> Eratosth. fr. 75 Strecker (= [Did.] *De dubiis apud Platonem lectionibus* 20 Valente): ἐπὶ κόρρης· οἱ μὲν τὸ κατὰ κεφαλὴν τύπτεσθαι· τῶν γὰρ Ἰώνων, ὥς φησιν Ἐρατοσθένης, τὴν κεφαλὴν καλούντων κόρσην, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καθάπερ μυρρίνην τὴν μυρσίνην καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, κόρρην τὴν κεφαλὴν ὠνόμασαν, ὡς Πλάτων ἐν Γοργίᾳ καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου· οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ κόρρης ἐξηγοῦνται τὸ εἰς τὰς γνάθους τύπτεσθαι, ὡς Ὑπερ(ε)ίδης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Δωροθέου· 'ῥαπίζειν αὐτὸν Ἱππόνικον κατὰ κόρρης, ἔπειτα καὶ Ἱππόνικος ὑπ' Αὐτοκλέους ἐρραπίσθη τὴν γνάθον'. καὶ Φερεκράτης· 'τὸ δ' Ἀχιλεὺς εὖ πως ἐπὶ κόρρης αὐτὸν ἐπέταξεν, ὥστε πῦρ ἀπέλαμψεν ἐκ τῶν γνάθων'.

> ἐπὶ κόρρης: Some [say that it means] to be beaten on the head, for, as Eratosthenes says, while the Ionians call the head κόρση, the Athenians called it κόρρη, just like (they call) μυρσίνη ('myrtle') μυρρίνη and the likes, as Plato in *Gorgias* (Pl. *Grg.* 646c.3) and Demosthenes in *Against Meidias* (D. 21.71, 147). Others instead say that ἐπὶ κόρρης means to be beaten on the jaw, as Hyperides in *Against Dorotheus* (Hyp. fr. 97 Jensen): 'Hipponicus beats him on the jaw, and then Hipponicus is beaten on the jaw by Autocles'. And Pherecrates (Pherecr. fr. 165): '† Achilles gave him a good stroke on the jaw, so that fire sparkled from his jaws'.

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303 Moer. α 115 also explicitly speaks of an Attic word, but the spelling of the MSS is with the double ρρ (ἀναρριχᾶσθαι Ἀττικοί· προβαίνειν ἀνέρπων Ἕλληνες). Single ρ is attested in Hsch. α 4549: *ἀναριχᾶσθαι· ἀναβαίνειν, but the gemination reappears in at α 7444: ἀρριχᾶσθαι: see Benuzzi (2022c).

304 In *Grg.* 486.c3 Plato explicitly says that the expression is 'rather rustic': τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, εἴ τι καὶ ἀγροικότερον εἰρῆσθαι, ἔξεστιν ἐπὶ κόρρης τύπτοντα μὴ διδόναι δίκην.

Eratosthenes correctly characterises the development /rs/> /rr/ as typically Attic and apparently adduces passages from Plato and Demosthenes to support his interpretation of ἐπὶ κόρρης (τύπτειν) meaning '(to be beaten) on the head'. The expression's meaning was disputed among ancient grammarians, who offered a variety of interpretations for κόρρη, including 'head' (like Eratosthenes), 'jaw', and 'temples'.[305] The stricter Atticists, however, accepted as 'correct' only the interpretation ἐπὶ κόρρης = ἐπὶ γνάθους ('on the jaw'), as testified by Phryn. *Ecl.* 146,[306] Harp. ε 100,[307] and Phot. ε 483.[308] That is, once again, *not* Eratosthenes' explanation.[309]

Particularly interesting from a non-purist perspective is Poll. 10.60 (= Eratosth. fr. 11 Strecker = fr. 1 Bagordo = fr. 13 Broggiato) on ἀναλογεῖον ('lectern', 'bookstand'):[310]

> Eratosth. fr. 11 Strecker (= Poll. 10.60): εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀναλογεῖον ἐθέλοις προσονομάζειν, οὕτω μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ τοῖς βιβλίοις ὑποκειμένου παρ' οὐδενὶ τῶν κεκριμένων εὗρον, Ἀθήνησι δὲ ἦν ὑπὲρ ὑδρείου τινός, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐπεξεχεῖτο, ποίημα καὶ ἀνάθημα Διογένους, ὃ καὶ Διογένειον ἀναλογεῖον ἐκαλεῖτο. παρὰ μέντοι Ἐρατοσθένει ἐν τοῖς περὶ κωμῳδίας, ὡς ἔχοιμέν τινα τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦδε ἀποστροφήν, εὕροις ἂν τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τοῦ σκεύους τοῦ τοῖς βιβλίοις χρησίμου.

> If you wish to mention also the ἀναλογεῖον, I did not find the word with reference to the stand that supports books in any of the selected authors. But in Athens there was a sculpture and votive inscription by Diogenes on a fountain from which water poured out, and it was called the ἀναλογεῖον of Diogenes. Nevertheless, in Eratosthenes' *On Comedy*, to have

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305 Cf. Ael.Dion. ε 55 (from Σ ε 691~ *Su.* ε 2400): ἐπὶ κόρρης· ἐπὶ κεφαλῆς ἢ γνάθου ἢ κροτάφου. κόρρην γὰρ καὶ κόρσην τὴν ὅλην κεφαλὴν σὺν τῷ αὐχένι λέγουσι. τινὲς δὲ καὶ ῥάπισμα λέγουσι τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς γνάθου †λαμβάνειν† ἀπτόμενον καὶ τοῦ κροτάφου; Poll. 2.40: τοὺς δὲ κροτάφους ἔνιοι καὶ κόρρας καλοῦσιν· καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἐπὶ κόρρης παίειν.

306 Phryn. *Ecl.* 146: τὸ ῥάπισμα οὐκ ἐν χρήσει· χρῶ οὖν τῷ καθαρῷ· τὸ γὰρ τὴν γνάθον πλατείᾳ τῇ χειρὶ πλῆξαι ἐπὶ κόρρης πατάξαι Ἀθηναῖοι φασιν ('The word ῥάπισμα ('slap on the face') is not in usage (i.e. literary fashionable usage). Do use thus the pure idiom: for the Athenians call to strike the jaw with the flat of your hand ἐπὶ κόρρης πατάξαι').

307 Harp. ε 100: ἐπὶ κόρρης· Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου. ἄλλοι μὲν ἄλλως ἀπέδοσαν, βέλτιον δὲ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπὶ κόρρης λέγεσθαι τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς γνάθου, ὃ λέγομεν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ῥάπισμα ('ἐπὶ κόρρης: Demosthenes in *Against Meidias*. Different scholars have given different interpretations, but it is better to take ἐπὶ κόρρης as referring to the jaw, which, in real life, we call ῥάπισμα').

308 Phot. ε 483: ῥαπίσαι· πατάξαι τὴν γνάθον ἀπλῇ τῇ χειρί, ὃ λέγουσι καὶ ἐπὶ κόρρης ('ῥαπίσαι: To strike the jaw with the bare hand, which they also call ἐπὶ κόρρης').

309 Also ἐπισίζω (schol. Ar. *V.* 704b = Eratosth. fr. 43 Strecker = Lyc. fr. 8 Pellettieri), glossed by Eratosthenes with 'to hiss to a dog to set it on someone': cf. above Section 5.1) has an Atticist *Nachleben*: ἐπισίζω and not ἐπιστίζω is the correct Attic spelling (cf. Moer. ε 53: ἐπισίξας Ἀττικοί· ἐπιστίξας Ἕλληνες; Phot. ε 194: ἐπισίττειν καὶ ἐπισίζειν, οὐκ ἐπιστίζειν). In Eratosthenes' fragment there is no trace of this prescription.

310 For this translation of ἀναλογεῖον, rather than 'reading-desk' (Broggiato 2023, 71), see Dickey (2015b, 208), following Dionisotti (1982, 111). For bookstands in antiquity, see Turner, Parsons (1987, 6 with notes 16–7) and Sukenik (1933).

some kind of loophole for this term, you might find the word with reference to the object that is useful for holding books. (Translation by Broggiato 2023, 71 with some modifications).

While listing a series of implements relating to learning γράμματα, Pollux observes that he could not find the word ἀναλογεῖον to denote a bookstand/lectern in any of the 'chosen' authors – that is, the authorised 'classics'. Having mentioned a sculpture atop a fountain (by an otherwise unknown Diogenes) resembling an ἀναλογεῖον,[311] Pollux adds that you could however find the word attested in Eratosthenes' *On Old Comedy*, if you needed some support (ἀποστροφή) for this expression.[312] Scholars have astutely inferred that Eratosthenes, in *On Old Comedy*, thus extended his range of philological activity to include authors beyond the 'enlisted' ones (οἱ κεκριμένοι). In particular, Nesselrath (1990, 180 n. 91), followed by Broggiato (2023, 72), has suggested that Eratosthenes may have dealt with what we would now call 'post-Classical' authors. The authority to whom Eratosthenes refers may also simply have been a minor 5th-century BCE author. Be this as it may, what is certain is that according to Pollux, Eratosthenes' work also contained references to non-canonical authors (that is, 'non-canonical' from the point of view of the 2nd century CE).

Overall, if our argument hitherto is sound, the general impression is that Eratosthenes did introduce new rigour and 'scientific-like' precision to the field of philological studies (extensive use of linguistic *comparanda*; distinction between stylistic usages by different authors). This more exact and exacting attitude, however, does not appear to justify labelling Eratosthenes as a proto-Atticist or proto-purist.

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311 Theodoridis (2003, 76–8) provides a specimen (found at Philippi) of what the fountain mentioned by Pollux may have looked like.

312 This passage of Pollux is insightfully commented on by S. Valente (2013b, 158). The term ἀναλογεῖον is for us attested only in the grammatical and lexicographical tradition (e.g. Hsch. α 4240: ἀναγνωστήριον· ἀναλογεῖον, where the term is used as *interpretamentum*, not as lemma; *Su.* α 1942: ἀναλογεῖον· ἐν ᾧ τίθενται τὰ βιβλία); for a full list of its occurrences, see Broggiato (2023, 70 and 71–2 with nn. 147–8). Burzacchini (1995–1996) remarks that the concurrent spelling ἀναλόγιον is attested from the 2nd century CE.