

3 Morpho-semantic evidence of emerging subjectivity in the language of the Nahḍa

First published in *Oriente Moderno*, 101 (2021): 221–252

This chapter: A transformative process as fundamental as the emergence of subjectivity and the corresponding subject-object divide operates on numerous levels and in numerous domains of human activity and ‘being in the world’. The subject expresses itself, or better: its self, in new ways of approaching the world (which now appears in a new quality, namely as the proactive subject’s object), and the subject seeks to assert its own agency, which it gradually and increasingly becomes aware of, in numerous kinds of activity. While Chapter 1 showed that the emergence and self-affirmation of the Arabs’ subjectivity as we can observe it during the Nahḍa unfolds in two main phases, and while Chapter 2 sought to underline that the re-“organisation” or re-“ordering” (*tanẓīm*) and the “rising” or “upswing” (*nahḍa*) take place simultaneously with, and can be read as Middle Eastern specifications of, two more general, ‘global’ periods (those called “Reproductionism” and “Creativism” by the late Walter Falk), Chapter 3 now is the first of the chapters of this book to examine some of the various aspects of emerging subjectivity in more detail, namely language.

The chapter reviews some key concepts of the Arab(ic) Nahḍa with the aim of highlighting the usefulness of a more genuinely linguistic, i.e., grammar- and etymology-oriented approach for a deeper understanding of some basic features of the foundational period of Arab modernity. My contention and starting-point is that emerging subjectivity in the Arab world is reflected not only in the many phenomena we are used to associate with the Nahḍa – the emergence of the intellectual, of critical journalism, of historicism, sentimentalism, new literary genres, etc. – but also in the morpho-semantics of key Nahḍa terminology, i.e., in the language that is used to express the subject’s engaging and dealing with the world. I argue (a) that the self-referential *t*-morpheme that features in many words signifying important Nahḍa concepts, such as *taraqqī*, *taqaddum*, or *tamaddun*, can and should be seen in the same light, i.e., as an indicator of a new emphasis on the self. Moreover, I argue that both the grammatical form of larger parts of the new vocabulary (e.g., the *-iyya* suffix for abstracts, verbal nouns, the causative patterns of form II and IV) and its ‘original’, ‘basic’ (root) meanings underline (b) secularisation and the concomitant centrality of the human being, as well as (c) proactivity, energetic verve, and creativity, i.e., the subject’s being a

cause of change in time (hence history). Thus, each new conceptual term can be seen as a little ‘Nahḍa in a nutshell’, containing the very essence of Nahḍawī thought and the actual experience of feeling ‘modern’, the morpho-semantics of the terms expressing fundamental notions such as secularisation, self-referentiality, rationality (with conceptualisation, critical examination, abstraction, etc.), causality, temporalisation, etc.

* * *

3.1 Introduction

This chapter was inspired by three 2019 workshops: *The Near Eastern Saddle Period: The Formation of Modern Concepts in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian* (Berne/CH, June 12–14); *Rethinking Genre in the Islamicate Middle East* (Hamburg/DE, September 5–7); and *The Multiple Renaissances: Revolutions, Translations, and the Movement of Ideas across the Eastern Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century* (Torino/IT, October 24–25). Much of the terminology that was topical at these events¹ had also been discussed on several earlier occasions at my current home university, e.g., at the *Rethinking the Nahḍa* workshop (organised by Rana Issa, June 2017), or the workshop on *Key Concepts of Ottoman History* (convened by Einar Wigen, July 2016).²

As a follow-up to these events I prepared and circulated a rather voluminous study on the *etymology* and *semantic history* of much of the terminology that had been on the workshops’ agendas. I did so not only because, as a long-time adherent of the ‘linguistic turn’ in the Humanities, I am convinced of the deeper (existential) significance of linguistic phenomena (language as a reflection of ‘being’), but also because I believe in the usefulness of more genuinely linguistic approaches, focusing grammar and etymology (both in the European sense and in that of Arabic *ishtiḳāq*, see below), for a more thorough understanding of conceptual terminology, or even a precondition of it. Abstract grammar, ‘pure’ etymology and merely lexicographically descriptive semantic history are, of course, to

¹ The Bern programme, for instance, featured presentations on *nafir*, *ḥaqīqa*, *hawas*, *tamaddun*, *tarbiya*, *ḥaḍāna*, *inḳalāb*, *milla/millet*, *tāʾifa*, *dīn*, *ferd*, *mujtamaʿ/al-hayʿa al-ijtimāʿiyya*, *ʿilm*, *ʿerfān*, *khilāfa*, *istibdād*, *insāniyyet*, *beṣeriyet*, *ādemiyet*, and others, not the least Nahḍa itself.

² Contributions made at this latter workshop included papers on *tārīkh*, *ḳadīm* vs. *ḥadīṣ*, *ikhtilāl*, *tedennī*, *tecdīd*, *terakḳī*, *millet*, *ümmeṭ*, *nizām*, *tanẓīmāt*, *ḳānūn*, *ḥuḳūk*, *ʿadālet*, *ẓulm*, *muʿāşır-laşma*, and *zaman/zamān*.

be used with caution, as the speakers of a language often are unaware of the morphological structure and/or the origins and long-term development of the vocabulary they use.³ However, possible fallacies notwithstanding, more strictly ‘bottom-up’ linguistic approaches, informed by the ‘traditional’ categories of Arabic philology the Nahḍawī agents themselves were used to apply, are in my opinion still indispensable for an adequate understanding of the language of the Nahḍa, given that “the interest in language matters was central to the Arab renaissance” (Sawaie 2000, 395) and that the overwhelming majority of those who were active in coining new conceptual terminology belonged to the group of ‘men-of-letters’ (*udabāʾ*) who traditionally were highly language-sensitive, due to the important place that the familiarity with grammar and the ‘wide oceans’ of the Arabic lexicon, rhetorics and the literary heritage held in Arab culture/*adab* and their education.⁴ The *udabāʾ* were themselves philologists, and when they used old or created new terminology they did so not simply intuitively, but with a high degree of reflective awareness.⁵ Moreover, many of those involved in the rendering of

3 For a comprehensive discussion of the pros and cons of etymology for conceptual history, cf., e.g., Spira 2019.

4 As four prominent cases in point that testify to this type of formation and attitude we may mention Rifāʿa R. al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (1801–1873), (Aḥmad) Fāris al-Shidyāq (1804/6? –1887), Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819–1883), and Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī (1847–1906). For biographical sketches, cf., among many others, (for al-Ṭaḥṭāwī:) Dāghir, *Maṣādir*, ii, 552–6; Heyworth-Dunne 1937–39/1940; Öhrnberg 1994/2012; and Sawāʾī 1999, 122–24; (for al-Shidyāq:) Dāghir, *Maṣādir*, ii, 457–64; Karam 1964; Sawāʾī 1999, 100–5; and Junge 2019a, , 35–53; (for al-Bustānī:) Dāghir, *Maṣādir*, ii, 181–5; Abdel-Nour 2012, and Zachs 2018; (for al-Yāzījī:) Dāghir, *Maṣādir*, ii, 759–63; Gully 2001/2012. – Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī grew up in a family of prominent *imāms* and ‘*ulamāʾ*’ and was trained at al-Azhar in the classical canon of Islamic learning; al-Shidyāq started out as a copyist and later studied, among other things, Arabic language, logic, theology, and prosody; al-Bustānī received his basic formation (1830–40) at the college of ‘Ayn Warqa; Ibrāhīm al-Yāzījī was the second eldest son of Nāṣif al-Yāzījī, one of the leading philologists and poets of his time, whose commitment to language he inherited.

5 An enormous number of philological treatises and large-scale linguistic studies as well as textbooks/manuals and lexicographical enterprises, among which whole dictionaries, testify to this fact, as do also the fierce debates (not seldom with *ad hominem* attacks) about ‘correct’ Arabic and permissible/‘illicit’ innovations, etc. See, e.g., al-Ṭaḥṭāwī’s *Manāḥij al-‘alab al-miṣriyya fi mābāḥij al-‘ādāb al-‘aṣriyya* (1869) which, though essentially a book on Egyptian society, also contains many linguistic explanations and considerations; the same holds for his famous account of the Egyptian study mission to France, *Takhliṣ al-ibriz fi talkhiṣ Bārīz* (1834); on al-Shidyāq, Karam writes that, as a linguist, the author “is to be remembered for his debates with his chief followers [Y. al-Asīr, I. al-Aḥḍab, N. and I. al-Yāzījī, B. al-Bustānī, Adib Isḥāq, ... On such a debate, see Patel 2010]. In *al-Djāsūs ‘ala l-Ḳāmūs* (Istanbul 1299/1881) he points out, in the course of a long introduction [...], the shortcomings of the Arabic dictionaries, establishes the reason for this [...], and demonstrates the principal errors committed by their various authors

European conceptual terminology into Arabic, particularly Christians, not only knew the direct source languages (typically French), but were also trained in Latin and/or old Greek, a fact that made them conscious of the etymology of the French terminology itself.⁶ And even if a *adīb* did not know Latin or Greek, he nevertheless would often make inquiries among native speakers of the source language about the ‘original’ meaning of the term he was about to translate into Arabic.⁷ They did so not the least out of a professional habit, as many of them

[...]. [... Moreover, there is] *Sirr al-layāl fi ’l-ḳalb wa-’l-ibdāl* (i, Istanbul 1884 [...]), in which the author undertakes the study of the verbs and nouns in current use, which he arranges according to their pronunciation in order to demonstrate the links connecting them, their origin and the nuances distinguishing them, as well as of permutation, inversion and synonyms [...].” Al-Shidyāq’s travel accounts, *al-Wāsiṭa fi ma’rifat aḥwāl Mālṭa* (1836) and *Kashf al-mukhabbā ‘an funūn Urubbā* (1866), too, as well as many articles he authored in his journal, *al-Jawā’ib* (later collected in the 7-volume *Kanz al-raghā’ib*, contain philological ponderings and linguistic discussions. Moreover, he wrote textbooks on grammar (most famous, and controversial, probably his *Ġunyat al-ṭālib fi munyat al-rāghib*, 1871) and also composed a trilingual (Persian-Turkish-Arabic) dictionary (*Kanz al-lughāt*, 1876). – Al-Bustānī is most remembered, as a linguist, as the author of numerous lectures held at scientific gatherings and articles and pamphlets published in the press, an educational manual on Arabic grammar (*Bulūgh al-arab fi naḥw al-‘Arab*, ca. 1847) and, first and foremost, his two dictionaries, *Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ* (1869–70) and *Qutr al-Muḥīṭ* (1870). – Cf. also Nāṣif al-Yāziji’s notorious critique of the language of the press, *Lughat al-jarā’id* (1901), and J. Zaydān’s many writings about language (for some excerpts in English translation, see Philipp 2014, ch. “Language”, 177–238). – Ibrāhīm al-Yāziji “was principally a philologist, stylist and lexicographer”, wrote “a number of letters in poetic form [...] dealing with mainly linguistic themes collected together in his *Rasā’il al-Yāzidjī* (Cairo 1920)” and “played a major role in the revival of the Arab linguistic heritage”; he is best known for his *Lughat al-jarā’id* (Cairo 1901), a collection of “serialised articles attacking the standards of Arabic employed by his fellow journalists”; he, too, wrote a dictionary, *al-Farā’id al-ḥisān min qalā’id al-lisān* (left unfinished though) (Gully 2001/2012). – For debates on purification etc., cf. Gully 1997, 101 ff.

6 Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī knew French, al-Shidyāq English, French, Persian and Turkish, and B. al-Bustānī acquired proficiency in no less than nine (European and Semitic) languages. See Guth 2003b, 470, and Zachs 2018.

7 When, for instance, R.R. al-Ṭaḥṭāwī reports about his visits to the theatres of Paris, it is clear that he has asked people about the ‘original’ meaning of the French words he was trying to find Arabic equivalents for: “I do not know of an Arabic word that renders the meaning of [French] *spectacle* (*sibiktākīl*) or *théâtre* (*tiyātīr*). The basic meaning of the word *spectacle* is ‘view’, ‘place of recreation’ or some such, whereas *théâtre* originally also meant ‘game’, ‘entertainment’, or the venue where this takes place. And so it may be compared with those actors called ‘shadow players.’ More appropriately, shadow play is a form of theatre, as both are known by the Turks as *komeḍya*. However, this denomination is too restrictive, except if it is used in a broader sense. There is no objection to translating *théâtre* or *spectacle* as *khayāl* [‘imaginary’] if you enlarge the meaning of this word, as a result of which it comes close to the idea of ‘spectacle’” – al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, *Takhlīṣ al-ibriz*, 211 / transl. Newman, 231 (on the quoted passage cf. also Sawaie 2000, 396). –

were active, and prolific, translators.⁸

Given the importance of the practice of *ishtiḡāq* (derivation from a ‘root’, as the assumed bearer of an ‘original’, basic/essential meaning)⁹ and the traditional “panchronic” (Seidensticker 2008) compilatory approach of Arabic lexicography that conceived of the lexicon as a reservoir of quasi-timeless semantic possibilities, quite frequently resulting in the “continued resonance of earlier senses” (Spira 2019, 34) of words that had acquired new conceptual meanings – given these two facts, it is promising to try to understand Nahḍa vocabulary with the help of exactly those categories that the protagonists themselves were used to apply.¹⁰ My present article will therefore have a closer look at some derivational

Cf. also, for instance, al-Ṭaḥṭāwī’s introduction of the old *kahrabā* ‘amber’ as the new word for ‘electricity’ (according to Monteil 1960, 134); the extension of meaning of *kahrabā* – an originally Persian word (< *kāh-robā*, lit. ‘robber of straw’, due to the electromagnetic features of amber; see *EtymArab*, s.v. vKHRB) – was with all likelihood inspired by the European model where *electricity* is based on Greek *ēlektron* ‘amber’; al-Ṭaḥṭāwī here obviously sought to re-produce the European way of coining neologisms by replacing the European variables with corresponding Arabic ones. Most probably, he acquired knowledge about the etymology of European terminology through learned French informants, such as S. de Sacy, A.-P. Caussin de Perceval, and E.-F. Jomard, with whom he had become friends; it is also known that he had “frequent discussions of language issues” with these (Sawaie 2000, 396).

8 Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī was trained and examined thoroughly as a translator when in Paris and later served in this profession at the School of Medicine and the Artillery School (1831–1834), then (from 1837) as head of the newly created School of Languages (*Madrasat al-lughāt*); al-Shidyāq and al-Bustānī were both involved in new translations of the Bible. In his *Takhlīṣ al-Ibriz*, al-Ṭaḥṭāwī included “translation” (*tarjama*) in a list of sciences/crafts (*ṣināʾāt*) that the Arabs should learn from the West (p. 19–20). Significantly, the author underlines that it is a very difficult “art” (*fann*) to master as it demands profound knowledge of the source and the target language as well as intimate familiarity with the subject matter and the corresponding terminology (*maʾrifat iṣṭilāḥāt uṣūl al-ʿilm al-murād tarjamatuḥā*) – see Sawaie 2000, 397–99.

9 Cf., e.g., Fleisch 1973/2012 and Chekayri 2007. – Cf. also Dichy 2011 (esp. section 3 on “Linguistic structure and the coinage of new terms”), and Larcher 2011, and id. 2012, 16 and passim. – *Ishtiḡāq* is often translated as ‘etymology’, but unlike etymology ‘proper’ (in the European linguistic tradition), the term does not imply attempts at historical reconstruction; it is a completely synchronic process, trying to ascribe any existing lexeme to an underlying abstract ‘root’.

10 Versteegh 2001, 179, briefly discusses the methods of coining new vocabulary during the Nahḍa. In at least three of them *ishtiḡāq* plays a major role: the analogical extension of an existing root (e.g., *sayyāra* ‘automobile, car’ < vSYR ‘to move around’; *ʿawlama* ‘globalization’ < LM ‘knowledge; world’), the semantic extension of an existing word (e.g., *qīṭār* ‘chain of camels in a row’ > ‘train’), and ‘loan translation’ (calquing, e.g., *ḥātīf* ‘hidden caller’ > ‘phone’, *al-muthul al-ʿulāʾ* ‘the lofty examples’ > ‘ideals’). Nahḍa writing abounds in examples that document the authors’ application of their lexicographical knowledge combined with techniques of *ishtiḡāq*, cf. Monteil 1960, 106–31, and Stetkevych 1970, 7–45. – To cite only one concrete example:

categories (the *t*-morpheme, the *-iyya* ending, verbal nouns, the causativity of verb forms II and IV, etc.), trying to highlight their semantic implications,¹¹ as well as to shed light on the semantic background of other, non-derived lexemes that acquired new meanings during the *Nahḍa*, in search of features that these other items may share with the derived ones.¹²

From the above it is clear that it cannot be the intention of this article to come with a completely new analytical-hermeneutical approach and to provide a comprehensive theoretical-methodological framework corresponding to it. Rather, it is meant as a reminder for current and future research of the usefulness of a three-fold going ‘back to the roots’, encouraging scholars (1) to give more attention to the root meanings associated with newly coined conceptual terminology as roots in Arabic, by their very nature of overarching semantic categories to which a large number of ‘related’ lexemes belong and are ‘derived’ from, tend to form associative ‘semantic fields’ of sorts in their own right;¹³ (2) to take into account the techniques applied by the *udabā*’ agents themselves, particularly all kinds of ‘derivation’ (*ishtiqaq*);¹⁴ and (3) to be less neglectful of the seminal work of earlier generations of researchers.¹⁵ With this in mind, this article should be read as a compilation of lexicographical and grammatical data (and ideas related to the semantics of grammatical forms) to which, to all my knowledge, current conceptual history has given little attention although these data are easily available – in dictionaries or implied in the language’s morphology – and although, as data inherent in the language with which ‘modernity’ was conceived and a *Nahḍa* promoted, they certainly reflect *very* deep layers and *fundamental* aspects of the experience of be(com)ing ‘modern’, like the subject-object divide, secularisation, or temporalisation and the human being’s agency in the world.

Ḥusayn al-Marṣafī, in his famous treatise on “The Eight [Key] Concepts” of his time (*Risālat al-Kalīm al-thamān*, 1880/81), starts the discussion of each of these terms with a traditional lexicographical survey of the meanings Classical dictionaries attach to the respective word and from which root they are ‘derived’, etc. See my study about his treatment of the term *waṭan* (Guth 2016 [= Chapter 5 in the present volume]) where I also called his philological approach an ‘*adab*-tation’. – For a *Nahḍa* key figure’s (Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s) understanding of the role of *adab* (and, with it, of language) for the whole project of modernisation, cf. Ryle Hodges’ highly insightful presentation (Ryle Hodges 2011).

11 For a similar approach, cf. Dichy 2003.

12 Every now and then, my investigation will draw on the findings of the seminal studies of Monteil 1960, Stetkevych 1970, Rebhan 1986, Ayalon 1987a and 1987b, and Lewis 1988/1991.

13 For a discussion of the similarity of Arabic roots and ‘semantic fields’, cf., e.g., Grande, “Ibn Sida”.

14 See notes 9 and 10 above.

15 And I should probably add: ...and in other languages than only English.

As a consequence, the headings under which the data are arranged – “The *t*-morpheme”, “Secularisation”, “The Subject’s Agency” – should not be read as markers of the logical components of an effort that would strive to systematically and comprehensively map a new terrain of research. Rather, they are intended as three lenses that may serve to view the data under some meaningful aspects that I hope will ensure connectivity between ‘traditional’, more thoroughly linguistic investigation and ‘modern’ conceptual history – and in this way contribute to an extended, more detailed and more language-sensitive mapping of the many sub-fields of Nahḍa Studies. It would be a pleasure for me to see that the data provided in this article were welcomed as useful complementary information by the colleagues who catered to the above-mentioned workshops, but also if they could generate further research (see also section “In lieu of a conclusion”, below).

3.2 The *t*-morpheme

Of all conceptual terms that gained specific prominence during the Nahḍa, three are perhaps the most ‘central’ or ‘basic’ ones: *taraqqī* ‘progress’, *taqaddum* ‘id.’, and *tamaddun* ‘civilisation’. Before turning our attention to the semantics of the *taFa* ‘*uL*’ pattern on which all three terms are coined, let us have a quick look at each of the terms individually.

Taraqqī (indef. *taraqqīm*) is a verbal noun (henceforth ‘vn.’) V, based on the form I verb, *raqiya*, *a* (*raqy*, *ruqīy*) ‘to rise, ascend, climb’.¹⁶ In addition to the primary meaning ‘ascension, ascent’ which is very similar to that of form I,¹⁷ *taraqqī* has also taken the figurative meaning of ‘advancement’, and during the Nahḍa more specifically that of ‘progress, rise, progressive development’.

While ‘progress’ is conceived as an ‘upward’ development here, a climbing of the civilisational ladder up into higher spheres, so to speak, the term that gradually superseded *taraqqī* as the Nahḍa equivalent of ‘progress’, *taqaddum*, reproduces the French *progrès* (< Latin *pro-gredi*) etymologically more faithfully, underlining the (horizontal) advancement rather than the (vertical) movement implied in *taraqqī*.¹⁸ (For the records, to be remembered further down: One may

¹⁶ In addition to this value, the root *VRQW/Y* also shows items expressing the idea of ‘charm, spell, incantation’ (e.g., *rāqī* ‘enchanter’). But this semantic field does not appear to be related to ‘climbing, ascension’. See root entry *VRQY* in *EtymArab*.

¹⁷ In the Qur’ān, form I usually refers to Muḥammad’s ascension to heaven – Badawi & Abdel Haleem 2008.

¹⁸ A similar shift can be observed in Ottoman Turkish into which Arabic *taraqqī* had been borrowed. In Zenker’s *Dictionnaire/Handwörterbuch* (1866), *teraqqī* still seems to denote mainly a

perhaps take this shift as one of the many indicators of a gradual temporalisation of Nahḍa thinking. While *taraqqī*, as an upwards movement, does not necessarily underline the time factor implied in progressing towards an imagined future, the ‘horizontal’ *taqaddum* fits more aptly into the concept of history advancing along a monodirectional time-line leading from the past via the present to the future.¹⁹⁾ *Taqaddum* is the vn. of *taqaddama* ‘to precede, go ahead, lead; [...] to move, proceed; to progress; to come closer, move nearer, approach; [etc]’. The latter is derived either from *qadama*, *u* (*qadm*, *quḍūm*) ‘to precede’, or *qadima*, *a* (*quḍūm*, *qidmān*, *maqdam*) ‘to arrive (at a place); to come; to get to, reach (s.o., a place); to have the audacity to do s.th. (‘alā)’. Contrary to what one might expect, these are not denominative from *qadam* ‘foot’, as this latter seems to be a development peculiar to Arabic²⁰ while the Proto-Semitic etymata can (according to Huehnergard 2011) be reconstructed as **qadm-* ‘front, east, earlier time’ and a denominative vb. meaning **‘to precede, be in front’*. Irrespective of etymological evidence, however, we may well assume that *qadam* ‘foot’ contributed to the forming of the idea of ‘progress’, as progressing also is a step-by-step sequence.

Tamaddun is the vn. of *tamaddana*, a denominative formation based on *madīna* ‘town, city’,²¹ thus literally meaning something like ‘to (make oneself) become like, or make oneself into, a city-dweller, to urbanise oneself’. Apparently

vertical movement, while the neologism *ilerleme* that was to replace *terakki* after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, is again, like Arabic *taqaddum*, a literal translation of ‘advancement, progress’, i.e., a *horizontal* movement.

19 In the light of such evidence, I tend to answer the central question asked at the Bern workshop – whether the Nahḍa could/should be regarded as a Middle Eastern *Sattelzeit* in Koselleckian terms – in the affirmative: As I tried to show also elsewhere (cf. Guth 2021a [= Chapter 17], 2022 [= Chapter 9], and 2023b [= Chapter 6]), temporalisation (as a key indicator of the European *Sattelzeit*) can, in my opinion, definitively be observed in the Middle Eastern ‘long nineteenth century’ too. – ‘*Sattelzeit*’ is a term coined by R. Koselleck to denote the period of transition between the early modern period and Modernity, spanning, in Europe, from around 1750 to 1870. The new experience of Time is a key marker of this period, changing the human subject’s attitude to life and the world in a fundamental manner that, naturally, was also reflected in the temporalisation of key conceptual terminology.

20 In Arabic, *qadam* exists alongside with the more common, and more original, *rijl* (< Central Semitic **rigl-* ‘foot’); but the main Proto-Semitic word for ‘foot’ was probably **pa‘m-* (> Ar fa‘ama ‘to have fat hips’) – Kogan, “Proto-Semitic Lexicon”, and *Genealogical Classification*.

21 *Madīna* in its turn tends to be derived by Arab lexicographers from a root *ṽMDN*, but it may in fact be a loan from Syriac and go back, etymologically, to a Semitic root **ṽDYN* ‘to judge’ (Huehnergard, “Proto-Semitic Language and Culture”). Therefore, *madīna* is probably related to *dīn* – not in the sense of ‘religion’, however, but in that of ‘judgement’ (as in the Qur’ānic *yawm al-dīn* ‘Day of Judgement’, i.e., the Day of Resurrection). Thus, like Hebrew *mēdīnā^h* and Syriac *mēdītā* (< *mēdīntā*), also Arabic *madīna* seems to have meant the ‘place (nomen loci prefix **ma-*)

during the second half of the nineteenth century, *tamaddun* came to be used as the equivalent of French *civilisation*, both as a process (to become civilised, civilise oneself) and the resulting state (to be civilised).²² As such, the term was preferred over others with similar meanings, like *ḥaḍāra* or *‘umrān*, perhaps because it sounded more sophisticated, more modern, more ‘civilised’ than the other two: *ḥaḍāra* was coined on *ḥaḍar* and thus essentially meant not much more than ‘sedentariness’, and *‘umrān*, though a key term in Khaldūnian thought expressing notions of thriving and flourishing that were very similar to the idea of ‘civilisation’, may have had an old-fashioned touch exactly due to its Khaldūnian past, or was not felt to be ‘refined’ enough, as it was derived from nothing but the ‘basic’ activity of *‘amara* ‘to build, erect (< *to populate, fill with life)’. – It would be interesting to compare these and the following assumptions to ideas, expressed by some Nahḍawi philologists themselves, on the relation between *tamaddun*, *ḥaḍāra*, and *‘umrān* and their appropriateness, or inappropriateness,

where judgements/sentences are passed, seat of jurisdiction, court’.

22 When exactly that happened is difficult to determine. In his *Dictionnaire français–arabe* of 1828, Ellious Bocthor still suggests *annasa* (vn. *ta’nis*), *addaba* (vn. *ta’dīb*), *‘allama* (vn. *ta’līm*) for the act of civilising someone, understood as ‘polir les mœurs, rendre sociable’, while the state of being civilised is translated as *‘umrān*, *unsa* or *adab*, and ‘civility’ as *adab* or *shalbana* (i.e., being a *shalabī* ‘gentilhomme, citizen’, from Turkish *çelebi*). In 1860, Kazimirski (*Dictionnaire arabe-français*) renders *tamaddun* as ‘état social, policé’ and *tamaddana* as ‘se réunir en société civile, politique (en parlant du genre humain, qui a échangé l’état sauvage contre l’état social)’ – the term ‘civilisation’ is still not mentioned yet. A few years later, however, al-Bustānī (*Quṭr al-muḥīṭ*) explains *tamaddana* as a postclassical coining (*muwallada*) meaning ‘to adopt the mores of the city-dwellers, go over from a state of wilderness, barbarity and ignorance to one of elegance, sociability, and knowledge’ (*takhallaqa bi-akhlāq ahl al-mudun wa-ntaqala min ḥālat al-khushūna wa-l-barbariyya wa-l-jahl ilā ḥālat al-ẓarf wa-l-uns wa-l-ma’rifa*), a sense that, though drawing on the use of the term by thinkers like Ibn Miskawayh (as Abu-‘Uksa, “Imagining modernity”, has shown), comes very close to the modern notion of ‘civilisation’. The latter is first mentioned, in my sources, in Zenker’s *Dictionnaire/Handwörterbuch* of 1866 where *temeddūn* is not only rendered as ‘action de se fixer ou de s’établir dans une ville; état social policé | Niederlassung in einer Stadt, Bildung einer städtischen Gemeinde, städtisches oder staatliches Gemeinwesen’ but also as ‘civilisation | Civilisation’. Catafago’s Arabic-English/English-Arabic dictionary of 1873 has no entry, in the English-Arabic part, on English *civilisation*, but for Arabic *tamaddun*, ‘civilisation’ is given as a second value, after ‘settling in a town.’ Three years earlier, Wahrmund’s Arabic-German/German-Arabic *Handwörterbuch* (1870) had already both lemmata, *tamaddun* and *Civilisation*. As in Catafago, ‘civilisation’ is given there only as a secondary value of *tamaddun* while ‘das Wohnen in der Stadt; städtisches Wesen’ are primary; in a similar vein, *tamaddun* comes last in a list of Arabic expressions that might correspond to *Civilisation*: talking about a ‘Zustand’, it corresponds, according to Wahrmund, to Arabic *adab* or *al-ādāb al-ḥaḍariyya*, or *‘umrān*, or *unsa*; referring to a process, the Arabic equivalents might be *ta’dīb al-akhlāq* or *ta’nis* (to civilise someone) or *ta’addub* (to civilise oneself) – only then *tamaddun*.

as equivalents of the European terms. Regrettably, no such statement has come to my attention so far.

However, there may have been yet another reason for preferring *tamaddun* over *ḥaḍāra* and *ʿumrān*, namely the very form of the term. As the vn. of a form V verb coined on the *taFaʿʿuL* pattern, *tamaddun* possessed three features that were neither found in *ḥaḍāra* nor in *ʿumrān*:

- it resembled *civilisation* in that it was a derived form, not a ‘simple’, basic one, with the two morphological elements (*t*-morpheme, reduplication of R₂) mirroring both the composition of the French term (*civil-is-ation*) and its air of sophistication, refinement, intellectualization, quasi-scientific abstraction;
- the *t*-morpheme expressed self-referentiality or reflexivity, i.e., an involvement of the speaker, the agent;²³
- reduplication of R₂ in the *FaʿʿaLa* pattern (form II) of which form V is an extension implied intensity, change, ‘processuality’, and causality.

Tamaddun shares these features not only with *taraqqī* and *taqaddum*, but also with many other terms that were coined or revived during the Nahḍa.²⁴ All these terms denote activities or processes that cause change (*akhhkharā* ‘to cause to be late’, *ṣarrafa* ‘to cause to change direction’, *ṭawwara* ‘to cause to unfold’, *farnaja* ‘to make European’); and each also tells us, by way of the *t*-morpheme, that in these cases, the agent performs the respective activity on *him-/herself*.

Let us turn our attention to the latter aspect first! If we make a slight modification in our wording, replacing ‘on *him-/herself*’ with ‘on his/her *self*’, it becomes immediately evident that the *taFaʿʿuL* terms doubly emphasise the acting subject: it is not only the responsible agent but also the object of its own actions, experiencing the effects of its own deeds through its own self: *taʿakhhkharā* ‘to cause *oneself* to be late’, *taṣarrafa* ‘to cause *oneself* to change direction’,²⁵ *taṭawwara* ‘to cause *oneself* to unfold’, *tafarnuj* ‘to Europeanise *oneself*’, etc.).

²³ For the semantics of the *t*-morpheme in general, cf., e.g., Larcher, “Verb”, section 3.1.3.2 (“Forms with *t*”), and id., *Le Système verbal*, 75–77 (ch. V.1 on “Les formes augmentées en *t*”).

²⁴ Cf., e.g., *taʿakhhkhar* ‘lagging behind’ (the opposite of *taqaddum*), *taḥarruk* ‘movement, circulation’, *taḥaffuz* ‘verve, drive, vigour’, *takhalluf* ‘lagging behind, under-development’, *taṣarruf* ‘behaviour’, *taṭawwur* ‘evolution, development’, *tafarnuj* ‘Europeanisation’, *tamarrud* ‘rebellion, mutiny’, *tanaqqul* ‘removal, change of place’, etc. – Here and in the following, my examples are taken from Monteil’s seminal study (*L’Arabe moderne*).

²⁵ By the way, the concept of *taṣarruf* ‘right of disposal, discretion, flexibility’ was a key term in the linguistic debate about ‘modern’ terminology, as, e.g., the extension of older meanings of

Verbal nouns coined on the *taFa*‘*uL* pattern are not the only key terms that contain the *t*-morpheme and in this way express an involvement of the acting subject.²⁶ Very productive during the Nahḍa were also (as Monteil has shown in greater detail) forms VIII (*iFti*‘*āL*)²⁷ and X (*istiF*‘*āL*)²⁸ – to name only the two others that show the *-t-* morpheme).

As long as we do not have a dictionary of Nahḍa Arabic, and no machine-readable one in particular, that would allow us to make reliable statements about

a word demanded from the agents, the emerging subjects, the capacity of making own, independent, ‘free’ decisions about new meanings.

26 As Larcher is eager to underline (*Le Système verbal*, 75) that Arab grammarians analysed the *t*-morpheme as a marker of *muṭāwa’a*, i.e., of “le fait de subir un effet et de recevoir l’effet de l’acte”.

27 Cf., e.g., (examples taken from Monteil 1960, translated into English and ‘etymology’ added by myself, SG): *ibtikār* ‘originality, inventiveness’ < *‘to be the first (*bikr*) oneself; *ijtimā* ‘society, sociology’ < *‘to organise oneself/come together in groups (*jamā’a*), to meet’; *ihtijāj* ‘protest’ < *‘to promote (one’s own) arguments (*hujaj*, sg. *hujja*)’; *ihtikār* ‘monopoly’ < *‘to lay oneself claim to, claim as one’s own’; *ikhtibār* ‘expertise, test’ < *‘to make one’s own experience (*khibra*), test out s.th. oneself; *ikhtirā* ‘invention, inventiveness’ < *‘to devise s.th. without premeditation (*khir’a*), *irtijāl* ‘improvisation’ < *‘to stand on one’s own feet (*arjul*, sg. *rijl*), to single oneself out’; *irtiqa* ‘evolution (Darwin)’ < *‘to climb oneself, reach oneself a higher level’; *ishtirāk* ‘subscription’ < *‘to take one’s own share, become oneself a stakeholder (*sharik*)’; *i’tirāf* ‘acceptance; confession’ < *‘to acknowledge s.th. oneself; *i’tiqād* ‘opinion, conviction, (religious) belief’ < *‘to “knit” one’s own arguments’; *iqtibās* ‘borrowing, inspiration’ < *‘to let oneself be “ignited” by a “spark” (*qabas*)/an idea’; *iqtiṣād* ‘economising, saving, economy’ < *‘to behave oneself with an intention, a goal in mind (*qaṣd*)’; *iktisāb* ‘acquisition’ < *‘to work for one’s own profit (*kasb*), produce one’s own earnings’; *iktishāf* ‘discovery’ < *‘to reveal s.th. for oneself’; *iltizām* ‘engagement’ < *‘to make s.th. mandatory (*lāzim*) for oneself’; *intiḥār* ‘suicide’ < *‘to cut one’s own throat (*naḥr*)’; *intikhāb* ‘election’ < *‘to make one’s own choice’; *intiqām* ‘revenge’ < *‘to take vengeance (*naqama*) oneself’; *ihtimām* ‘interest’ < *‘to make s.th. one’s own concern (*himma*)’; *ittiḥād* ‘union, confederation’ < *‘to unite oneself, form a union (*waḥda*)’; *ittiṣāl* ‘connection’ < *‘to create a link (*ṣila*) (for) oneself’; *ittifāq* ‘agreement, treaty’ < *‘to agree oneself to a decision, etc.’

28 Cf., e.g., *isti’nāf* ‘ajournment, appeal (*jur.*)’ < *‘to request oneself a new beginning/renewal’ (cf. *anf* ‘nose’); *istibdād* ‘absolutism, despotism’ < *‘arbitrary and capricious rule, “going it alone” (i.e., for oneself)’; *istibṭān* ‘introspection’ < *‘to explore oneself the innermost (*bāṭin*) of things’; *istithmār* ‘investment’ < *‘to make s.th. bear fruits (*thamr*) for oneself’; *istikhrāj* ‘extraction’ < *‘to let s.th. come out (*kharaja*) for oneself’; *istislām* ‘resignation, capitulation’ < *‘to surrender (*aslama*) oneself’; *isti’mār* ‘colonialism, imperialism’ < *‘to cultivate (a region) for oneself’; *isti’māl* ‘use, usage’ < *‘to let s.th. work (*amila*) for oneself’; *istighlāl* ‘exploitation’ < *‘to make yield crops (*ghalla*) for oneself’; *istiftā* ‘plebiscit, public referendum’ < *‘to make people give their (legal) opinion (*fatwā*) for oneself’; *istiqbāl* ‘reception’ < *‘to treat oneself people coming in (*aqbala*)’; *istiqlāl* ‘independence’ < *‘to raise/lift (*aqalla*) oneself’; *istiqāla* ‘dismissal’ < *‘to quit a job/position (*aqāla*) oneself’; *istintāj* ‘deduction’ < *‘to extract oneself a result (*natija*)’; *istihlāk* ‘consumption’ < *‘to “destroy” (*ahlaka*) s.th. for oneself’.

word and/or pattern frequency based on large-scale text corpora, any statement about an assumed predilection of the Nahḍa for certain morphological patterns, it must be underlined, will have to remain a preliminary hypothesis, awaiting confirmation (or falsification) through lexico-statistic evidence.²⁹ However, my impression from my readings of texts from the period is that the Nahḍa was indeed fond of terminology containing the *t*-morpheme.³⁰ And I tend to regard this (assumed) proclivity as yet another indication of an emerging subjectivity, seeking to feel, experience, and assert itself, or *its* self. As discussed elsewhere,³¹ I see other indicators of the steadily growing importance of the human subject in:

- the gradual adoption of new literary genres (the novel and drama), not only as expressions of the author-subject's *creativity*, but also as sites of *emotional* experience, i.e., feeling one('s)self, of personal *musings* and 'philosophical' *contemplation*, i.e., adding *subjective comments* and *impressions*;
- the spread of the journalistic profession and the writer as a public *intellectual*,³² i.e., the subject 'showing off' and asserting him/herself as *critical observer* and *analyst* of contemporary society, and the world at large;

29 Zemánek and Milička's exploration of the "diachronic dynamics of the Arabic lexicon" (subtitle of their *Words Lost and Found*, 2017) can be considered a most valuable starting point, but for the Nahḍa, their sub-corpus certainly needs to be adjusted.

30 A test run of some text-analytical software, recently carried out by Jonathan Johnson, a student of mine, on S. al-Bustānī's novel *al-Huyām fī jinān al-Shām* (1870), a text comprising 45,528 words, was able to show (as a preliminary result) that out of 1,402 different (inflected) verbs 1,099 (i.e., 78.4 %!) showed the *t*-morpheme. They were not necessarily the most frequent ones, but among the top 20 of these clearly some very 'subjective' ones held a prominent place, such as those related to body movement (*taqaddama*: 35 occurrences), sensual perception and physical reaction (*iltafata* 20, *istayqaḥa* 13), sometimes combined with emotional involvement (*irtabaka* 11, *tabassama* 12, *irta'ada* 13), mental perception, judgment and opining (*iftakara* 12, *ta'awwada* 13, *ta'akkada* 11, *idda'ā* 11) and own capacity (*tamakkana* 12) – unpublished project report, KOS4030, spring 2021 – thank you, Jonathan! – Zemánek and Milička's lists (2017) of the 50 most frequent words of three sub-corpora that cover the Nahḍa yield 7 items for nineteenth-century book publications (rank #9 *muḥtariz*, #13 *istiḡṣā'ī*, #16 *mutabādir*, #22 *istazhara*, #25 *istashkala*, #40 *tajaddudi*, #43 *muta'ātif*; see Table 17, 120–1), 5 items for early twentieth century books (rank #2 *muḥtār*, #23 *istiḥṣāl*, #43 *ishtirā'*, #44 *istahṣala*, and #46 *mutawazzif*; see Table 18, 123–4), and 6 items for late nineteenth / early twentieth c. periodicals (rank #18 *iqtiṣādī*, #24 *ishtirākīyya*, and #25 *iktishāf*; 3 others related to colonialism: #19 *musta'mara*, #32 *isti'māriyya*, and #34 *isti'māriyya*; see Table 19, 126–7).

31 Guth 2021a (= Chapter 17), 2022 (= Chapter 9), and 2023b (= Chapter 6), with further references and a discussion of relevant previous research.

32 On the latter, cf. in particular also Dupont 2010, Hamzah, ed. 2013/2017, and Pepe 2019. On account of their self-conception, H. Sharabi called the *udabā'* "vocational intellectuals" (*Arab Intellectuals and the West*, Baltimore 1970, 4, qtd. in Gully 1997, 77).

- Nahḍa writers' emphasis on *logic* and *plausibility*, by which they underline their being *reason*-gifted subjects, capable of analyzing and explaining the world (as their object);
- the experimentation with *utopian visions* (where the subject experiences time – I briefly mentioned temporalisation above as a key feature of the Nahḍa as a *Sattelzeit* – and his/her agency as the master of history³³).

We will encounter some more indicators of an emerging subjectivity further below in this article (section III). Before we proceed to these, however, let us remember that, in Europe, the focus on the human subject and its perspective formed part and parcel of an overall process of secularisation that started with the Renaissance. The Humanist movement of the Renaissance gave increased attention to the human being because man was part of the *world*, and it was this world and the worldly that had begun to matter more than the orientation of life towards the Hereafter, as it had been the case in the Middle Ages. In the nineteenth century Middle East, similar processes of secularisation can be observed (in many sectors of society and public life, at least), processes that seek to limit the dominant influence of religion and religious institutions on the life of the human being, increasingly conceived of as an autonomous human subject (cf. Guth 2023a). As a matter of course, these processes are reflected also in the language of the Nahḍa.

3.3 Secularisation

One of the most evident indicators of the new interest in the human being is probably the emergence of newly coined terms for 'humanity' and 'humanism', such as *insāniyya*, *bashariyya*, and *ādamiyya*. All of these terms underline specifically *human* characteristics instead of referring to man and mankind by religiously connotated expressions that would underline man's dependence on God, such as *khalq* '(God's) creation/creatures' or *'ibād Allāh* 'God's servants'. And all are abstract formations in -iyya, a fact that in its turn may be interpreted as an indicator of the increasing importance of the human subject, as these terms are the result of abstraction, i.e., an operation carried out by the human subject's analytical mind. According to Monteil, in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), c. 90% of all abstract nouns are such *nisba* adjectives with a feminine ending, coined sometime

³³ For the change in the perception of historical time, see, e.g., Di-Capua 2009.

during the Nahḍa.³⁴ (As we will see below, the spread of verbal nouns, *maṣādir*, can be regarded as another indicator of this process of rationalisation, i.e., subjecting human action and processuality – as expressed in inflected verbs – to intellectual conceptualisation through nominalisation.)

Insāniyya (which was borrowed into Ottoman as *insāniyet*) is such an abstract in *-iyya*, formed from *insān* ‘man, human being’. *Insān* and its plural, *(u)nās*, belong to the root *v*’NS ‘to be companionable, sociable’. Thus, the term *insāniyya* characterises man’s being the ‘sociable animal’ per se, underlining *interhuman* rather than *God-human* relations.

The etymology of *bashariyya* (> Ottoman *beşeriyet*) is not as clear as that of *insāniyya*. The underlying word to which *-iyya* is suffixed here, *bashar* ‘man, human being; men, mankind’, seems to be akin to *bashara* ‘skin’ which ultimately goes back to a Proto-Westsemitic **bašar*- ‘skin, flesh, meat’ (Kogan 2011). The original sense of *bashar* would thus have been *‘being(s) with skin/flesh’ or *‘being(s) that have skin-to-skin/flesh-to-flesh contact’³⁵ – the latter being a more physical, and perhaps even more secular, variant of the idea of ‘sociability’ expressed in *insāniyya*. There are however at least two other major values attached to the root *vBŠR*, namely ‘good tidings’ (as in *bushrā*; cf. also *bishr* ‘joy’) and ‘to pursue, practise, carry out’ (as in vb. III, *bāshara*; cf. also *mubāshir* ‘direct; imme-

34 Cf. Monteil 1960, 122. Coining abstracts in *-iyya* was not ‘invented’ during the Nahḍa (cf. pre-modern terms like *shu’ūbiyya*, *māhiyya*, *kayfiyya*, *ubūdiyya*, *rūhāniyya*, etc.). Nevertheless, it seems that the Nahḍa witnessed an unprecedented increase in such formations, to the degree that, as Monteil has it, “une grande partie” of French abstracts in *-té* or *-isme* (often > English *-ty* or *-ism*) came to be rendered by Arabic nouns in *-iyya* (ibid., 121–122); to quote only some very few, randomly picked from the long lists provided ibid., 123–126: *thunā’iyya* ‘duality, dualism’, *jādhibiyya* ‘gravity, gravitation’, *tajribiyya* ‘empirism, pragmatism’, *ḥassāsiyya* ‘sensitivity’, *ḥay-awīyya* ‘vitality’, *dhātīyya* ‘personality, subjectivity, identity’, *ramziyya* ‘symbolism’, *mas’ūliyya* ‘responsibility’, *mashrū’iyya* ‘legitimacy’, *sha’biyya* ‘popularity’, *shakliyya* ‘formalism’, *ṭabī’iyya* ‘naturalism’, *‘adamiyya* ‘nihilism’, *‘aṣabiyya* ‘nervosity’, *‘āṭifiyya* ‘sentimentalism’, *‘aqliyya* ‘mentality’, *‘aqlāniyya* ‘rationalism’, *fardiyya* ‘individualism’, *infi’āliyya* ‘irritability, affectivity, impulsiveness’, *qābiliyya* ‘capacity, susceptibility’, *mithāliyya* ‘idealism’, *māddiyya* ‘materialism’, ‘centrality’, *imkāniyya* ‘possibility’, *nisbiyya* ‘relativity’, *ijābiyya* ‘positivism’, *waq’iyya* ‘positivism’, *mawḍū’iyya* ‘objectivity’, *wāqi’iyya* ‘realism’. – Monteil’s impression is corroborated by the evidence from Zemánek and Milička’s nineteenth-century sub-corpus where the authors found “a strong set of abstracts formed by the suffix *-iyya*§ [§ = *tā’ marbūṭa*]” ranging among the 50 most frequent nouns of 19th century Arabic vocabulary, a fact they interpret as indicators of “the beginning of a new form of writing”, comparable only to the changes that happened a thousand years earlier, in the 9th century, as a result of the “so-called ‘translation movement’, when the Arabization of Greek thought took place”; see Zemánek and Milička 2017, 122.

35 For further details, cf. entries “*bašar*” and “*bašara*” as well as root entry *vBŠR*, in my *Etym-Arab*.

diately; live'). We cannot know to which extent, if ever, the various notions resonated in the meaning of *bashariyya* when it was coined; but it is clear that none of these possible associations are religious and/or referring to the Hereafter.

Like the other two renderings of the idea of 'mankind' and 'humanity', *ādamiyya* (> Ottoman *ādemīyet*) too is an abstract in *-iyya*, in this case from *Ādam* 'Adam', significantly the name of the first human being (in the Abrahamic tradition).³⁶

As already mentioned above, the new centrality of the human being has to be seen in connection with a general process of secularisation of which it represents an integral aspect. Secularisation can however be observed in many other fields, e.g., the emergence of non-religious schools and institutions of higher education, in the increased esteem enjoyed by the natural (i.e., 'worldly') sciences as opposed to the traditional religion-based scholarship and learning and the concomitant up-valuation of the *udabā'* against the '*ulamā'*', etc.³⁷ Linguistically, it is interesting to follow not only the emergence of new vocabulary related to these fields, but also the secularisation of previously religiously connoted words. (The opening, observable for instance in al-Ṭaḥṭāwī, for the more 'worldly' '*āmīyya*' as a source for new terminology to be coined,³⁸ may be another indicator of the secularisation of the language as a whole.³⁹ Of course, this is in line with the general tendency to free Arabic from the dated 'ballast' it had inherited from the past and was still carrying along in dictionaries and grammar books due to its status as a 'holy', 'untouchable' language; instead, the language should be turned into a tool that was of more practical – 'wordly' – use now, by focusing on the essentials and getting rid of obsolete vocabulary and rules.⁴⁰)

An interesting case in point is, e.g., the old term *umma*. Although originally with all likelihood a loanword,⁴¹ *umma* has had good time to come to be felt as

³⁶ Etymologically, the name (borrowed into the Qur'ān from the Hebrew Bible) goes back to the Central Semitic noun **ʾādam*- 'human being' and is perhaps akin to Common Semitic **dam*- (> Arabic *dam*) 'blood' and the root *v*'DM 'red, ground', cf. Classical Arabic *adima* 'to be red-brown', *adīm* '(red) skin; terrestrial surface' – Huehnergard 2011.

³⁷ According to H. Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals* (see note 32, above), especially the "formative years, 1875–1914" (as the subtitle has it) were a period of "reformism and secularism" (qtd in Gully 1997, 76). – For a brief overview of secularism in the Arab world, c.f., e.g., entry "Säkularismus" in Flores 2003, 225–8.

³⁸ For some examples of new coinings where al-Ṭaḥṭāwī borrowed from the Egyptian vernacular, cf. Stowasser, in tr. Ṭaḥṭāwī [1834] 1989, 30–31, or Sawaie 2000, 404–05.

³⁹ On the debate "Classical Arabic or Colloquial" cf. the sub-section of this title in Gully 1997, 83–87.

⁴⁰ This is the main idea behind, e.g., al-Bustānī's *Muḥīṭ* (conceived as a 'modern' dictionary) or al-Shidyāq's *Jāsūs* and his textbook on grammar, *Ghunyāt al-ṭālib*; on Shidyāq, cf., e.g., Sawā'i 1999, 106–13; see also ch. 5 on "Attempts at a Simplification of the Grammar" in Stetkevych 1970, 79–94.

⁴¹ (Sumerian? >) Akkadian *ummatu*- 'people, clan, army' > Hebrew *ummāh*^h, Biblical Aramaic

genuine Arabic: According to the *Doha Historical Dictionary of Arabic* (DHDA), the first attestation of the word is from a verse by a pre-Islamic poet from the first half of the third century CE, i.e., even long before the Qur'ān. In this verse, *umma* seems to have the general meaning of 'any group held together by some uniting bond'. With this rather unspecific meaning, *umma* is of frequent occurrence also in the Qur'ān: according to B. Lewis, it can refer to ethnic, religious, moral, or ideological groups there. In the famous 'Constitution' of Medina, the first Islamic community is referred to as a *umma* in the ancient Arabian sense of a 'tribal confederacy', and *umma* was used with this or a similar meaning also during the lifetime of the Prophet (Lewis 1988/1991, 32). The word could have both religious and ethnic connotations also for centuries after Mohammed's death. Towards the end of the Middle Ages, however, a semantic shift can be observed:

Increasingly, [...] Muslim writers came to speak of a single *umma* of the Muslims, without ethnic or regional subdivisions, and when they speak of other *ummas* (the Arabic plural is *umam*), these are usually religious groups such as, for example, the Christians or the Zoroastrians. They may also be ethnic nations, such as the Franks or the Slavs, though from late medieval times *umma* is rarely used of ethnic groups within Islam.

(ibid.)

Thus, in premodern times the concept was de-territorialised and de-ethnicised in meaning, and religionised instead, to signify, in general, an exclusively *Muslim* community, with also the consequence that "Muslims would be part of the *umma* regardless of whether they lived within Muslim-ruled territory" (Ali and Leaman 2008, 147).

In the context of our investigation, however, it is still more important that yet another semantic shift happened with the advent of modernity. After *umma* had come to be understood widely as an essentially *religious* group, signifying the universal community of all Muslims, the word now also began to serve as a rendering of the modern concept of French *nation*, increasingly conceived in a *secular, non-religious* sense, though the latter often still overlapped with the religious aspect. Ḥusayn al-Marṣafī, for instance, in his famous treatise on "The Eight Key Concepts" of his time (*R. al-Kalim al-thamān*, 1880/81), described *umma* as a group of people united by linguistic and territorial *as well as* religious bonds (*lisān, makān, dīn*), with language being the most important element because it creates the strongest social cohesion between human beings (cf. Delanoue 1963, 10).

Thus, the semantic development of the term *umma* can serve as an example

ummā 'nation, race, people', Judeo-Palestinian *ummatā* – cf. DRS s.v. "MM-2"; Jeffery 1938, 69; Pennacchio 2014, 158; Huehnergard 2011.

of an at least partly (re-) secularisation having taken place during the Nahḍa, a process that is quite common in the context of modernisation.⁴² It can, for instance, be observed also with another originally mainly religiously-connotated term with which *umma* competed for some time to express the secular idea of ‘nation’ – *milla* (Rebhan 1986, 121). In the Qur’ān (where *milla*, like *umma*, is a loanword⁴³), it still means ‘religion, creed, form of belief’.⁴⁴ But this term too underwent considerable semantic change during the Nahḍa. Initially, since the 1830s, it was preferred over *umma* to render the French *nation*, probably on account of the fact that *umma* at the time still had mostly *Islamic* connotations while *milla* could refer also to non-Muslim religious communities.⁴⁵ It was only after some decades that *umma* superseded and eventually replaced *milla* as an equivalent of ‘nation’ – perhaps, as Rebhan thinks, due to the fact that, traditionally, *milla* referred to smaller units while *umma* was more comprehensive. Moreover, as we have seen above, *umma* had undergone, since the 1870s, a process of generalisation, expanding from the religious sphere to include groups sharing a language, culture and/or territory.⁴⁶ When *umma* overtook as equivalent of ‘nation’, *milla* receded in this function and was reduced again to its earlier, narrower meaning – in Arabic, at least; in Persian and Turkish, *mellat/millet* has retained the secular meaning the word had acquired earlier and has remained the standard term for ‘nation’ to the present day, while an Arabic expression like *ḥuqūq al-milal*, still given in Wahrmund’s dictionary of 1887 as the translation of ‘Völkerrecht’ (inter-national law), has become obsolete today.

Secularisation is evident also in the change the term *tarbiya* ‘education, upbringing; teaching, instruction; pedagogy’ underwent during the Nahḍa. Before its contact with modern concepts of education, learning, and science, traditional

⁴² Cf. Lewis’s remark that “Arabs, Persians, and Turks alike preferred to take old terms, with a religious [!] meaning, and refurbish them to meet the new [secular] need[s]” – Lewis 1988, 41.

⁴³ According to Jeffery 1938, 268–69, it is from Syriac *mellā*, *mellatā* ‘word, ῥῆμα’, but also ‘λόγος’. – *DHDA* gives Qur’ān 16: 123 as the first attestation: “And afterward We inspired thee (Muhammad, saying): ‘Follow the religion of Abraham (*millata Ibrāhīma*), as one by nature upright [...]’.”

⁴⁴ Jeffery explains the semantic shift from ‘word, ῥῆμα, λόγος’ to ‘religion, creed’ as due to the fact that the Syriac *mellā*, *mellatā* was also “used technically for ‘religion’” – Jeffery 1938, 268–69, following Nöldeke and others.

⁴⁵ In the Ottoman Empire, *millet* was a “technical term, [...] used for the organised, recognised, religio-political communities enjoying certain rights of autonomy under their own chiefs. / [...] the primary basis was religious rather than ethnic. [...] It was not until a very late date, and under the influence of European nationalist ideas, that separate ethnic millets began to appear” – Lewis 1988/1991, 38–39.

⁴⁶ Lewis 1988/1991, 34.

Islamic *tarbiya* had a mainly “otherworldly orientation”, used “curricula largely unchanged since medieval times” and treated knowledge

as something to be revealed because of a divine command. The questioning of what [was] taught [was] then unwelcome, teaching styles [were often] authoritarian, education [was] mainly undifferentiated, and memorisation [was] important. By contrast, modern education [had] an *orientation towards this world* [my emphasis], and claim[ed] to be directed towards the development of the individual pupil [see above, passim, about the new focus on the subject]. Curricula change[d] as the subject matter change[d], and knowledge [was] acquired through empirical [= *worldly*, fact-oriented!] or deductive methods [see above, on the *reasoning* subject] [...]. [...] The different subjects [were] clearly distinct from each other, by contrast with the fairly unified notion of religious education.

(Ali and Leaman, eds. 2008, 29–31)

3.4 The subject’s agency

As already mentioned above, processes of abstraction as expressed in the many new ‘-isms’ in *-iyya* should, in my opinion, be read as an indicator of the emerging subject’s desire to demonstrate its capability of conceptionalising and, hence, also mastering the world as its object. Another way of subjecting the world to human reason is conceptualisation by way of deriving verbal nouns, *maṣādir* (sg. *maṣdar*), from all kinds of verbs. We have already seen examples of such terms above, coined on the self-referential patterns *taFa’uL*, *iFti’āL* and *istiF’āL* (forms V, VIII, X). But there are many others, among which also those that emphasise the subject’s agency rather than self-referentiality, in particular verbal nouns of forms II (*taF’iL*, *taF’iLa*) and IV (*iF’āL*). Most of these have a causative meaning, in this way underlining the subject’s agency, its own ‘causality’.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Cf., e.g., for form II: *ta’tθir* ‘influence’ (and electrical ‘induction’), *ta’dīb* ‘disciplining’, *ta’mīn* ‘assurance’, *tajdid* ‘renewal, renovation’, *tajrīb* ‘trial, testing out’, *tajriba* ‘experience’, *tajrīd* ‘abstraction’, *taḥqīq* ‘realisation, implementation’, *taḥlīl* ‘analysis’, *takḥfīf* ‘planning’, *tadbīr* ‘management, measure’, *tadrīj* ‘gradual advancement/progress’ (< *‘to cause to climb the steps, *da-raja*’), *tarkīb* ‘synthesis, composition, structure’, *tasrī* ‘acceleration’, *tashjī* ‘encouragement’, *tashkīl* ‘formation’, *taṣmīm* ‘planning, design’, *taṭbīq* ‘application’, *ta’qīm* ‘sterilisation’, *taqfīr* ‘distillation’ (< *‘to make fall in drops, *qaṭr*’), *taqlīd* ‘imitation, emulation’ (< *‘to follow s.o. like one pearl the other in a necklace, *qilāda*’), *takḥfīf* ‘condensation’, *tamrīn* ‘training, practise, exercise’ (< *‘to make flexible, *marīn*’), *tansīq* ‘coordination’ (< *‘to arrange in proper order, *nasaq*’), *tanwīm* ‘hypnosis’, *tawqīt* ‘timing, schedule’; and for form IV: *iḥṣā* ‘statistics’ (< *‘to operate a calculator’, based on *ḥaṣan* ‘pebbles, little stones’), *ikhrāj* ‘production’, *intāj* ‘production’ (< *‘to make bring forth, *nataja*’), *inshā* ‘construction, building, erection’, *irād* ‘revenue’ (< *‘to cause to come in, *warada*’). – For the semantics of forms II and IV in general, cf., e.g., Larcher 2011, section 3.1.3.1 (“Forms without *l*”).

Again, as long as we are lacking machine-readable and searchable large-scale corpora of representative Nahḍa texts, any statement about the valiance of linguistic data cannot be other than impressionistic and preliminary, awaiting confirmation or falsification through reliable lexicostatistic data. Yet, one should not underestimate the results that have already been obtained on the basis of still relatively small sub-corpora like Zemánek and Milička's, nor the impressions formed earlier by experienced scholars, based on many years of close reading of huge amounts of a large variety of source texts. It is therefore probably not completely misleading to have a look at Vincent Monteil's findings in his seminal study of the genesis of *L'arabe moderne*. It seems to be quite significant in the context of our investigation that Monteil states that modern Arabic "fait un usage massif [!]" (Monteil 1960, 111) of all kinds of verbal nouns of derived verb stems. And it is equally significant that he calls these nouns "noms d'action" (ibid.), combining the abstraction implied in the derivation of nouns and the "action" expressed by the underlying verbs. In an attempt to form a rough idea about the frequency of *maṣḍar* items in Nahḍa texts, Monteil undertook a small-scale statistical analysis. In Hans Wehr's *Dictionary* (first ed. 1956), he skimmed the c. 1,300 entries with 'ayn as first root consonant (c. 160 verbal roots) for all *maṣḍars* II–X. The table below summarises his results:⁴⁸

form	vn.s out of 1,300 entries	‰ of 1,300	% of all vn.s. of derived stems
II	35	26.92 ‰	23.6 %
III	21	16.15 ‰	14.2 %
IV	19	14.62 ‰	12.8 %
V	24	18.46 ‰	16.2 %
VI	9	6.92 ‰	6.1 %
VII	5	3.85 ‰	3.4 %
VIII	19	14.62 ‰	12.8 %
X	16	12.31 ‰	10.8 %
total	148	113.85 ‰	100.0 %

⁴⁸ The figures in the second column are Monteil's (1960, 111), those in the other columns my own calculations based on Monteil's findings.

If Monteil's findings reflect actual language usage – a big caveat is in place here, as he counted only dictionary entries, not frequency in 'real' texts⁴⁹ – the verbal nouns II–X amount to c. 11.4 % of all vocabulary items of MSA. Out of these, c. two fifths are provided by the self-referential forms V, VIII, and X (16.2 % + 12.8 % + 10.8 % = 39.9 %), while a little bit less (36.5 %) are the causative verbal nouns II and IV (23.6 % + 12.8 %).⁵⁰

In section I, we mentioned briefly that *taraqqī*, *taqaddum*, *tamaddun* and similar verbal nouns V not only are self-referential, but also retain the causativity of the corresponding form II verbs (*raqqā*, *qaddama*, *maddana*, etc.) from which they are extensions in *t*-. Causativity implies causality, and causality emphasises, as we said, the subject's pro-activity, its capability to make things happen. However, it also implies change – fitting very well into the picture of an age of modernisation and reform –, and change can only be effected in time – a strong indicator of temporalisation that is typical of a Koselleckian *Sattelzeit*.⁵¹ Limitation of space does not allow me to treat this aspect in more detail; but cf., e.g., *tarbiya*, treated above in the context of secularisation: as a vn. II, *tarbiya* clearly carries with it the spirit of the Nahḍa, its belief in the changeability of the world through the subject's agency.⁵² The same holds for the form IV vn. *īslāḥ* and the form II vn. (Ottoman Turkish) *tanẓīmāt*, both key terms of the period and both causative formations implying human effort to restore a previous ideal order (*ṣalāḥ*, *niẓām*) which in itself may be of divine origin and still have a 'heavenly' connotation,⁵³ but restoration will, of course, be secular, happening on earth. In the context of *īslāḥ* and *tanẓīmāt*, also language reform was discussed, significantly often under titles implying temporalisation, like "The future [!] of the Arabic language" (*Mustaqbal al-lugha al-‘arabiyya*)⁵⁴ or

⁴⁹ On the other hand, an advantage of this approach is that it does not count those instances in which the *maṣḍar* is used verbally, as 'infinitive' of the corresponding verb; rather, it registers usage as an abstract term that has obtained the status of a distinct lexeme.

⁵⁰ Verbal nouns IX (for colours, etc.) are left out of consideration here as they are of insignificant frequency. Form III and its correspondent in *t*-, form VI, are not included in our discussion either as their semantics (III: associative, applicative; VI: reciprocal, etc.) are not as strongly subject-related as those of the other forms. I would not go so far as to interpret associativeness and reciprocity as inter-subjectivity. – It is significant that also the 'passive' vn.s VII play an almost negligible role.

⁵¹ See above, note 19.

⁵² No wonder then that the discussion of *tarbiya* takes almost 50 % of al-Marṣafī's book on *The Eight Key Concepts* of his time and also comes at the end, as its culmination; see Delanoue 1963.

⁵³ *ṣalāḥ* is a Qur'ānic term and also appears in the Muslim prayer call, *adhān*. For *niẓām*, cf. already the "New Order" (*niẓām-ı cedid*) proclaimed by Sultan Selim III in 1793.

⁵⁴ Gully 1997, 76 and passim. Of course, also *ta'rib* (another vn. III!) 'Arabisation' (see *ibid.*, 87

“Arabic as a living being, subject to evolution [!]”.⁵⁵

However, concepts need not be of the *taF‘iL* and *iF‘āL* type in order to express pro-activity and agency. In the remaining part of this paper, I will briefly discuss some terms that do not have specific morphological features, yet display similar semantics. Here, a deepened understanding may be reached via heightened attention paid to relevant lexicographical data and basic root meanings.

There is, first of all, the word *nahḍa* itself. It is used today to refer to both the process and the period of the cultural ‘revival’ of the late nineteenth, early twentieth century, the *Nahḍa*, with capital ‘N’. The word is not attested with this specific conceptual meaning in Arabic dictionaries until quite lately – my earliest reference so far is, in fact, Wehr’s dictionary. However, the value ‘(esp. national) awakening, upswing, advancement, progress’ appears already around 1860 (e.g., in the introduction to the Lebanese writer Khalil al-Khūrī’s novel *Way, idhan lastu bi-Ifranji!*).⁵⁶ Particularly interesting is the fact that the underlying verb, *nahaḍa*, does not only mean ‘to rise, get up, stand up’ (and *nahḍa* thus an ‘act of rising’), but also ‘to start’, so that *nahḍa* also is a ‘departure’,⁵⁷ combined with *ilā* also a ‘rush(ing) towards x’, a sudden and energetic ‘movement’ (*ḥaraka*), as Bustānī characterizes it. Perhaps, the suddenness and energy inherent in such an act⁵⁸ can explain that *nahḍa* also can mean ‘power, ability, strength’⁵⁹ and, occasionally, an ‘act of violence’ or wrong-doing (Steingass 1884). The active participle *nāhiḍ* means ‘energetic, sharp, vigorous, effective in one’s agency or work’ (Lane).⁶⁰ This energy, vigour, strength – or, as Tomiche calls it, the “active [!] perspective”⁶¹ – implied in the ‘rising’ and ‘rushing towards/against (a goal)’ is obviously at the heart of the ‘movement’, *nahḍa*, that in the second half of the nineteenth century comes to be opposed to ‘petrification, stagnation’ (*jumūd*) and ‘decay’ (*inḥitāṭ*); “[o]n chérit tout ce qui évoque ‘l’évolution’ (*taṭawwur*), le ‘progrès’ (*taqaddum*, *taraqqī*), ‘l’avenir’

ff.) is part of this ‘causative’ project.

55 J. Zaydān, *al-Lughā al-‘arabiyya kā’in ḥayy khādī’ li-nāmūs al-irtiqā’*, 1904, new ed. by M. Kāmil, Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, 1960. Partial translation in Philipp 2014, 226–38.

56 For a detailed survey of the term *n/Nahḍa* from the nineteenth century until our days, cf. Deuchar 2017.

57 Steingass 1884; cf. also Zenker 1866/76 [*nahḥ*], and Wahrmund 1887: ‘Aufstehen; Aufbrechen, Aufbruch, Abreise’.

58 Cf. also Kazimirski 1860/1875: ‘avec promptitude’.

59 Lane 1863ff; Hava 1898; cf. also Bustānī, *Quṭr al-muḥīṭ*: ‘ṭāqa wa-quwwa’.

60 Lane, *op.cit.*

61 Tomiche 1992/2012.

(*mustaqbal*) ou le ‘devenir’ (*maṣīr, ṣayūra*). On méprise le *taqlīd* – ‘conformisme, imitation servile’, le ‘fatalisme’”.⁶² The most adequate rendering of *Nahḍa* as the term for the nineteenth century intellectual movement is therefore probably ‘(the Age/Period of) Upswing’.⁶³

The experience of the subject’s agency, its capability to actively manage its own affairs and reform its present, with progress towards a brighter future in mind, is probably also the reason behind the change of the terminology used in Arabic to express the idea of ‘revolution’, today generally rendered by *thawra*. To quote again Lewis:

Fitna was the term used by the first Muslim writers who discussed the French Revolution of 1789, and did not like it. When Muslim writers, in the course of the nineteenth century, began to speak more favorably of revolutions, they coined new words or reconditioned old words to denote them. Ottoman Turkish, followed by Persian, used *inqilāb*, an Arabic verbal noun with the literal meaning of ‘turning around.’ In Arabic *inqilāb* acquired a rather negative meaning, with a connotation of coup d’état or putsch, and the positive term for revolution was *thawra*, which in classical usage variously meant ‘rising,’ ‘excitement,’ ‘rebellion,’ or ‘secession.’ It is now the universal Arabic term for good or approved revolutions.

(Lewis 1988, 96)⁶⁴

The process described by Lewis can be explained with the categories introduced above. The first shift, from *fitna* to *inqilāb*, reflects a process of secularisation: the highly religiously-loaden *fitna*⁶⁵ is replaced by the more neutral and ‘worldly’ *inqilāb* (‘cataclysm, turnover, turn’, used already in the 9th century CE by al-Kindī in his astrological writings⁶⁶). The second shift, from *inqilāb* to *thawra*, marks the period when people became more and more curious to know *who* was responsible for (i.e., the cause behind) the ‘cataclysm, turnover’. While other modernist terminology is eager to highlight the agency of the emerging subject, the passive *inqalaba* does not. To me, exactly this is the reason why *inqilāb*, though originally an Arabic coining, never became rooted in Arabic as an equivalent of ‘revolution’. When Arab intellectuals began to feel

⁶² Monteil 1860, 321.

⁶³ Cf. Tomiche’s critical remark on rendering *Nahḍa* as ‘Renaissance’ as “Euro-centrist” – Tomiche 1992/2012.

⁶⁴ Lewis 1988/1991, 96. – Cf. also Ayalon’s detailed article “From Fitna to Thawra” (Ayalon 1987b).

⁶⁵ Cf., e.g., Ali & Leaman, *Islam*, 39–40.

⁶⁶ Rebhan 1986, n. 51.

that they had an agency, *inqilāb* started to become obsolete and the more 'energetic' *thawra* came into use – significantly, this was, according to Rebhan, during the last third of the nineteenth century.⁶⁷

While *nahḍa* and *thawra* mainly point to activities of the emerging subject, other terms characterize the *qualities* that gained specific relevance in the process of a 'subjectivation' of the Arab human being's world-view. One of these terms, *hawas* 'madness, ecstasy, fancy, passion',⁶⁸ is promoted for the first time by Khalīl al-Khūrī in his *Way, idhan lastu bi-Ifranji!* (1859, mentioned above as one of the first to speak of a 'national *nahḍa*').⁶⁹ In the programmatic preface to the novel, the author introduces a new aesthetics⁷⁰ when he calls for a literature that not only should contain the "truth" (*ḥaqīqa*), but also be driven by "passion" (*hawas*); while observing logic and plausibility – al-Khūrī here appeals to the reader as the intellectual, the *reasoning* subject – , the writer should at the same time speak "like a drunken person" (*ka-sakrān*) in order to talk to the heart (lit., "make an impression on the soul", *yu'aththir bi-l-nafs*). Interestingly enough, the author believes that the best way for a writer to achieve this goal is to "make people feel what *he himself* feels" (al-Khūrī 1860, 20; my emphasis), on the condition, however, that the writer never give up his "individual independence and freedom" (*istiqlāl dhātī, ḥurriyya*) nor "sell the truth" (ibid., 21). – Al-Khūrī develops his aesthetics via a comparison between a poem by al-Mutanabbī and another by Lamartine. While he criticizes Lamartine's lack of realism, he also discards al-Mutanabbī's dry artificiality and his lack of authentic feeling. In conclusion, al-Khūrī underlines the necessity of both, realism *and*

67 Rebhan 1986, 111. – In Persian and Turkish, into which Arabic *inqilāb* had been loaned at an early stage, the terms *enqelāb* and *inkilāp* were retained, probably because it was a foreign word; unlike native Arabs, the speakers of Persian and Turkish were neither aware of the semantic history nor sensitive to the 'passivity' of the term's morphology.

68 Kazimirski, *op.cit.*, translates *hawas* as 'désir ardent, passion, manie de...'; Wahrmond, *op.cit.*, has 'leidenschaftliche Begierde, Passion; Manie; Ehrsucht; Lust, Vergnügen, Unterhaltung; Thorheit, Tollheit; (mod.) Leichtsinn'; and Hava, *Arabic-English Dictionary*, gives 'light-headedness, giddiness, insanity; violent desire, passion; hope'. – In MSA, the meaning as given by Wehr/Cowan 1979/1994 is 'foolishness, folly, craze, madness; dreaminess, visionariness, rapture, ecstasy; wild fancy, fantasy; raving madness, frenzy; infatuation, blindness, delusion; mania (psych.)'.

69 For a detailed study of this text, cf. Wielandt, *Das Bild der Europäer*; Guth 2003b, 10–47 (and passim, esp. §82e); id. 2019/20 [= Chapter 7], passim, as well as the introductions to the two extant print editions (see Bibliography s.v. al-Khūrī).

70 For more about this aesthetics, cf. Guth 2022 [= Chapter 9].

feeling.⁷¹ Can one think of a nicer proof of emerging subjectivity: writer and reader imagined as subjects endowed with reason *and* emotion?

The term al-Khūrī uses to express ‘truth’, *ḥaqīqa*, is itself worth briefly dwelling upon. It belongs to the semantic complex of *ḥaqq* ‘truth; correctness; rightful possession; right, legal claim; (adj.) true, real; right’.⁷² Both *ḥaqq* and *ḥaqīqa* can express the concept of ‘truth’. But when *ḥaqq* does so, it is religiously connotated: in Islamic tradition, ‘the’ (absolute) truth is generally equated with God, *al-Ḥaqq*. In contrast, *ḥaqīqa* describes a more subjective ‘truth’, the truth as it appears to the human intellect that tries to grasp it. Morphologically, *ḥaqīqa* can be analysed as a quasi-passive participle (*Faʿīl*),⁷³ literally meaning something like ‘discerned, confirmed (sc. by the human intellect)’, thus the *object* of the *subject’s* activity. I would argue that al-Khūrī prefers *al-ḥaqīqa* over *al-ḥaqq* for exactly these two reasons: its ‘worldliness’ and its subjectivity,⁷⁴ as *adab* now also increasingly comes to mean the *adīb’s* capability to make choices and serve as a guide who helps to master the challenges of modernity (Guth 2019/20 = Chapter 4). – At the same time, in al-Khūrī’s aesthetic programme of “truth mingled with passion”, *al-ḥaqīqa* represents, of course, the intellectual counterpart of emotion and affect as well as the empirical, facts-oriented mind of the secular thinker – important other components of emerging subjectivity, as we saw above.

Last but not least, a re-conceptualisation with emphasis on the subject’s

71 For the self-asserting function of emotionalism as a widespread phenomenon of late nineteenth, early twentieth century, cf. my essay “*Fa-ghrawraqat ‘uyūnuhum bi-d-dumū’ ...*”.

72 Etymologically, Arabic ḤQQ seems to go back to a West-Semitic *ḤQQ ‘to cut into; to level, make correct; to decree’ (Huehnergard, “Proto-Semitic Language and Culture”). To see the link between ‘cutting’ and ‘right, truth’ we have to imagine a right or the truth as something ‘written down/cut in stone’, and a duty or an obligation as something ‘prescribed < inscribed, engraved’. The value ‘to cut in, inscribe’ is attested in Hebrew, Phoenician, Judeo-Palestinian Aramaic and Syriac. All of these also show the additional meaning ‘to prescribe, order, decree’ (which is found alone also in Epigraphic and Modern South Arabian as well as in Ethiopian Semitic), cf. DRS #ḤQQ-2. DRS is reluctant to make the latter value dependent on the former, but others (like Huehnergard) take it as a given.

73 In some Semitic languages, e.g., Aramaic, the *Faʿīl* pattern is the default pattern of the passive participle of the form I verb. In Arabic, the pattern is not productive any longer, but the language has preserved many ‘adjectives’ with recognisably passive meaning, such as *qatīl* ‘dead, fallen (< *killed)’, *fariq* ‘separated’, *ṣadiq* ‘trusted in, reliable’, etc.

74 Cf. Avicenna’s use of *ḥaqīqa* in the sense of Latin *certitudo*, i.e., the reality/truth of a thing in the intellect; it is this certitude which assures a thing’s *esse proprium*, its actual being what it is. In contrast, *ḥaqq* is used for anything that is determined and fixed – Courtine & Rijksbaron, “Tò tí ên eīnai”, 1298.

agency can be observed also through the term *fann*.⁷⁵ In MSA, the two most frequent senses of the word are 'art' or (esp. in the plural, *funūn*) 'discipline'. In a few formulaic expressions it is also still used in the meaning it generally had in earlier times, namely 'sort, kind, species, variety', cf., e.g., the popular saying *al-junūn funūn* 'insanity has many varieties, manifests itself in many ways', or the plural *afānīn min...* 'all kinds of, sundry, various'. In the corresponding *nisba* adjective, *fannī*, modern usage has still preserved also the value 'technique' (cf., e.g., *tadrib fannī* 'vocational training') that *fann* used to have for a long time in the nineteenth/twentieth century before 'technique' came to be expressed preferably by the neologism *tak(a)niyya* or *taq(a)niyya* (cf. Monteil 1960, 171–72).

The value 'art', or better 'Art', with a capital 'A', i.e., 'Fine Art', is not attested before the nineteenth century. When nineteenth century dictionaries mention 'art' as one of the possible English renderings of *fann*, they usually mean 'skilled craftsmanship, knowledge', not 'Art' in the modern sense of a creative activity expressing a person's imaginative, conceptual ideas, a conception that, in European modernity, is

associated with the emergence of the artist as a distinct social or professional role, the cult of artistic genius and inspiration, the elevation of the work of art to quasi-sacred status as a fetish object, and the rise of aesthetics and aesthetic judgment as distinct faculties for the perception of works of art.

(Mitchell 2005, 6)

The expansion of the classical range of meanings of *fann* to include the modern notion of '(creative, fine) Art' was possible, it seems, via the idea, itself attested as early as the mid-eighth century CE,⁷⁶ of 'skillfully entertaining variegation, branching out in many different directions, diversification, esp. in the use of rhetoric devices in one's speech'. The latter aspect was particularly present in the derived *t*-stems, e.g., form VIII: *iftanna fī ḥadīthih/khuṭbatih* 'he produced, or gave utterance to, various sorts and ways of speech, [i.e., he diversified,] in his narration, or discourse, and in his oration, or harangue', or form V: *tafannana fī l-'ulūm* 'he was, or became, possessed of various acquirements in the sciences', *tafannana fī l-kalām* 'he practised, or took to, various modes, or manners, in speech; he diversified therein'.⁷⁷ When the European Romanticists' understanding of 'Art' began to take hold in the Middle East, artistic creativity

⁷⁵ For a detailed description of the term's semantic history, cf. Mestyan 2011.

⁷⁶ *DHDA* mentions a *ḥadīth* from a collection tentatively dated 767 CE.

⁷⁷ Lane, *op.cit.*, vol. vi, s.r. *f-n-n*.

thus appears to have been associated, in the first place, with the inventiveness needed for diversification and variation in a skill or profession or in speaking and writing, an inventiveness that, via the reflexive *t*-morpheme of forms V and VIII, could easily be related to the agency of the emerging subject.

3.5 In lieu of a conclusion

In the above chapter I have, hopefully, succeeded in proposing the potential usefulness of a closer look into the etymology, semantics and morphology of Nahḍa terminology as reflections of several key traits of the period, or the Nahḍa “project” (as Junge 2019a, 24–5, has it), particularly secularisation and a focus on the human subject and its manifold types of agency (implying temporalisation). Given the all-encompassing relevance of language for the study of the ‘long nineteenth century’ as well as the key traits just mentioned and, on the other hand, the impossibility of treating more than a few within the confines of a book chapter, I have to leave it to the interested reader to test the ultimate tenability of my suggestions and explore their possible consequences. I would be happy if colleagues working on the conceptual history of the Nahḍa would consider including ‘my’ perspective in their current work, asking whether it may make sense in the light of their own findings and perhaps add some useful complementary aspects. The subfields of conceptual history and Nahḍa Studies where this may be done are as diverse as emerging subjectivity itself: as mentioned above, the new world view is an increasingly secularised and, due to temporalisation, also an increasingly historicizing one, and the ‘typical’ Nahḍawi is eager to assert him/herself as a rational, critically observing, analyzing and evaluating being, creative, visionary, independent (more and more also in a wider, ethnical, political and/or cultural sense), actively contributing to ‘progress’, but also ‘feeling’ him/herself and capable of passing judgments of good taste.⁷⁸ All this is expressed through language, and language use therefore is a key source of gaining knowledge about the period/movement.

It is clear, however, that the above suggestions still also need further corroboration, especially by modern computer-supported lexicostatistics and a thorough scrutinisation of statements made by the protagonists themselves about the criteria and considerations that informed their decisions in the process of coining

⁷⁸ On taste, *dhawq*, as a key concept related to the subject’s faculty of aesthetic and moral judgment, see Abou-Hodeib 2017, esp. ch.s 2 and 5 (with discussion of the concept’s entanglement with mid- to late-nineteenth century Beirut “middle-class domesticity”).

new vocabulary,⁷⁹ as well as the interplay between several factors, including secularization motivated by political conditions and ideas, like (proto-) nationalism. I would be more than happy to see that my ideas inspired further research in these directions, but also on other grammatical patterns than the ones mentioned in this article (e.g., *miF'aL*, *miF'āL*, *Fā'il(a)*, *Fā'ūL* for instruments, tools, etc., i.e., new devices of actively dealing with the world).

79 In addition, discussions like the one by R.R. al-Ṭaḥṭāwī (qtd. above, fn. 7) on the adequate Arabic rendering of French *théâtre* or *spectacles*, highly giving sources in this respect could be newspaper/journal articles, encyclopedia entries, linguistic treatises, proceedings of the meetings of the language academies, etc.

